ALBERTUS MAGNUS
Albert the Great was prodigious in the mass of his accomplishment. Therein
lay his importance for the age he lived in; therein lies his interest for
us. For him, substantial philosophy, as distinguished from the
instrumental rôle of logic, had three parts, set by nature, rather than
devised by man; they are physics, mathematics, and metaphysics. “It is our
intention,” says Albert at the beginning of his exposition of Aristotle’s
_Physics_, “to make all the said parts intelligible to the Latins.” _And
he did._ Perhaps the world has had no greater purveyor of a knowledge not
his own. He is comparable with Boëthius, who gave the Latin world the
Aristotelian _Organon_, a gift but half availed of for many centuries.
Albert gave his Latin world the rest of Aristotle, the _philosophia
realis_. His world was as ready to receive this great donation, as the
time of Boëthius was unready to profit by any intellectual gift demanding
mental energies for its assimilation. Boëthius stood alone in his
undertaking; if his hand failed there was none to take up his task. Fate
stayed his hand; and the purpose that was his, to render the whole of
Plato and Aristotle intelligible to the Latin world, perished with him,
the Latin world being by no means eager for the whole of Aristotle and
Plato, and unfit to receive it had it been proffered. But Albert’s time
was eager; it was importunate for the very enlargement of knowledge which
Albert, more than any other man, was bringing it. An age obtains what it
demands. Albert had fellow-labourers, some preceding, some assisting, and
others following him, to perfect the knowledge in which he worked, and
build it into the scholastic Christian scheme. But in this labour of
purveyorship he overtopped the rest, the giant of them all.
He was born Count of Bollstadt, in Suabia, probably in the year 1193.
Whether his youth was passed in the profession of arms, or in study, is
not quite clear. But while still young he began his years of studious
travel, and at Padua in 1223 he joined the Dominican Order. He became a
miracle of learning, reputed also as one who could explain the phenomena
of nature. From 1228 to 1245 he taught in German cities, chiefly at
Cologne. Then the scene changed to Paris, where he lectured and won fame
from 1245 to 1248. With this period begins the publication of his
philosophical encyclopaedia. Perhaps it was first completed in 1256. But
Albert kept supplementing and revising it until his death. In 1248 he was
remanded to Cologne to establish a school there. His life continued
devoted to study and teaching, yet with interruptions. For he filled the
office of Provincial of his Order for Germany from 1254 to 1257, and was
compelled to be Bishop of Regensburg from 1260 to 1262. Then he insisted
on resigning, and retired to a cloister at Cologne. Naturally he was
engaged in a number of learned controversies, and was burdened with
numerous ecclesiastical affairs. In 1277 for the last time he set his face
toward Paris, to defend the doctrines and memory of his great pupil, who
had died three years before. His own illustrious life closed at Cologne on
the fifteenth of November, 1280. Albert was a man of piety, conforming
strictly to the rules of his Order. It is said that he refused to own even
the manuscripts which he indited; and as Dominican Provincial of Germany
he walked barefoot on his journeys through the vast territory set under
his supervision. Tradition has him exceeding small of stature.
Albert’s labours finally put within reach of his contemporaries the sum of
philosophy and science contained in the works of Aristotle, and his
ancient, as well as Arabian, commentators. The undertaking was grandly
conceived; it was carried out with tireless energy and massive learning.
Let us observe the principles which informed the mind of this mighty
Teuton scholar. He transcribed approvingly the opinion expressed by
Aristotle at the opening of the _Metaphysics_, that the love of knowledge
is natural to man; and he recognized the pleasure arising from knowledge
of the sensible world, apart from considerations of utility.[560] He took
this thought from Aristotle; but the proof that he made it his own with
power lay in those fifty years of intellectual toil which produced the
greatest of all mediaeval storehouses of knowledge.
In his reliance on his sources, Albert is mediaeval; his tendency is to
accept the opinion which he is reproducing, especially when it is the
opinion of Aristotle. Yet he protested against regarding even him as
infallible. “He who believes that Aristotle was God, ought to believe that
he never erred. If one regards him as a man, then surely he may err as
well as we.”[561] Albert was no Averroist to adhere to all the views of
the Philosopher; he pointedly differed from him where orthodoxy demanded
it, maintaining, for instance, the creation of the world in time, contrary
to the opinion of the Peripatetics. Albert, and with him Aquinas, had not
accepted merely the task of expounding Aristotle, but also that of
correcting him where Truth (with a large Christian capital) required it.
Albert held that Aristotle might err, and that he did not know everything.
The development of science was not closed by his death: “Dicendum quod
scientiae demonstrativae non omnes factae sunt, sed plures restant adhuc
inveniendae.”[562] This is not Roger Bacon speaking, but Albertus; and
still more might one think to hear the voice of the recalcitrant
Franciscan in the words: “Oportet experimentum non in uno modo, sed
secundum omnes circumstantias probare.”[563] Yet these words too are
Albert’s, and he is speaking of the observation of nature’s phenomena;
regarding which one shall not simply transcribe the ancient statement; but
observe with his own eyes and mind.
This was in the spirit of Aristotle; Albert recognizes and approves. But
did he make the experimental principle his own with power, as he did the
thought that the desire to know is inborn? This is a fundamental question
as to Albert. No one denies his learning, his enormous book-diligence. But
was he also an observer of natural phenomena? One who sought to test from
his own observation the statements of the books he read? It is best here
to avoid either a categorical affirmation or denial. The standard by which
one shapes one’s answer is important. Are we to compare Albert with a St.
Bernard, whose meditations shut his eyes to mountains, lakes, and woods?
Or are we to apply the standards of a natural science which looks always
to the tested results of observation? There is sufficient evidence in
Albert’s writings to show that he kept his eyes open, and took notice of
interesting phenomena, seen, for instance, on his journeys. But, on the
other hand, it is absurd to imagine that he dreamed of testing the written
matter which he paraphrased, or of materially adding to it, by systematic
observation of nature. Accounts of his observations do not always raise
our opinion of his science. He transcribes the description of certain
worms, and says that they may come from horse-hairs, for he has seen
horse-hairs, in still water, turning into worms.[564] The trouble was that
Albert had no general understanding of the processes of nature.
Consequently, in his _De animalibus_ for instance, he gives the fabulous
as readily as the more reasonable. Nevertheless let no one think that
natural knowledge did not really interest and delight him. His study of
plants has led the chief historian of botany to assert that Albert was the
first real botanist, after the ancient Theophrastus, inasmuch as he
studied for the sake of learning the nature of plants, irrespective of
their medical or agricultural uses.[565]
The writings of Albertus Magnus represent, perhaps more fully than those
of any other man, the round of knowledge and intellectual interest
attracting the attention of western Europe in the thirteenth century. At
first glance they seem to separate into those which in form and substance
are paraphrases of Aristotelian treatises, or borrowed expositions of
Aristotelian topics; and those which are more independent compositions.
Yet the latter, like the _Summa de creaturis_, for example, will be found
to consist largely of borrowed material; the matter is rearranged, and
presented in some new connection, or with a purpose other than that of its
source.
In his Aristotelian paraphrases, which were thickly sown with digressive
expositions, Albert’s method, as he states at the beginning of the
_Physica_, is “to follow the order and opinions of Aristotle, and to give
in addition whatever is needed in the way of explanation and support; yet
without reproducing Aristotle’s text (_tamen quod textus eius nulla fiat
mentio_). And we shall also compose _digressiones_ to expound whatever is
obscure.” The titles of the chapters will indicate whether their substance
is from Aristotle. Thus instead of giving the Aristotelian text, with an
attached commentary, Albert combines paraphrase and supplementary
exposition. Evidently the former method would have presented Aristotle’s
meaning more surely, and would have thus subserved a closer scholarship.
But for this the Aristotelian commentaries of Aquinas must be awaited.
The compass of Albert’s achievement as a purveyor of ancient knowledge may
be seen from a cursory survey of his writings; which will likewise afford
an idea of the quality of his work, and how much there was of Albert in
it.[566] To begin with, he sets forth with voluminous exposition the
entire Aristotelian _Organon_. The preliminary questions as to the nature
of logic were treated in the _De praedicabilibus_,[567] which expanded the
substance of Porphyry’s _Isagoge_. In this treatise Albert expounds his
conclusions as to universals, the universal being that which is in one yet
is fit (_aptum_) to be in many, and is predicable of many. “Et hoc modo
prout ratio est praedicabilitatis, ad logicam pertinet de universali
tractare; quamvis secundum quod est natura quaedam et differentia entis,
tractare de ipso pertineat ad metaphysicam.” That is to say, It pertains
to logic to treat of the universal in respect to its predicability; but in
so far as the question relates to the nature and differences of essential
being, it pertains to metaphysics. This sentence is an example of Albert’s
awkward Latin; but it shows how firmly he distinguishes between the
logical and the metaphysical material. His treatment of logic is
exhaustive, rather than acutely discriminating. He works constantly with
the material of others, and the result is more inclusive than
organic.[568] In his ponderous treatment of logical themes, no possible
consideration is omitted.
The _De praedicabilibus_ is followed by the _De praedicamentis_, Albert’s
treatise on the _Categories_. Next comes his _Liber de sex principiis_,
which is a paraphrasing exposition of the work of Gilbert de la Porrée.
Then comes his _Perihermenias_, which keeps the Greek title of the _De
interpretatione_. These writings are succeeded by elaborate expositions of
the more advanced logical treatises of Aristotle, all of them, of course,
_Analytics_ (_Prior_ and _Posterior_), _Topics_, and _Elenchi_. The total
production is detailed, exhaustive, awful; it is _ingens_ truly, only not
quite _informis_; and Teutonically painstaking and conscientious.
Thus logic makes Tome I. of the twenty-one tomes of Albert’s _Opera_. Tome
II. contains his expository paraphrases of Aristotle’s _Physics_ and
lesser treatises upon physical topics, celestial and terrestrial. From the
opening chapter we have already taken the programme of his large intention
to make known all Aristotle to the Latins. In this chapter likewise he
proceeds to lay out the divisions of _philosophia realis_ into
Aristotelian conceptions of _metaphysica_, _mathematica_, and _physica_.
With chapter two he falls into the first of his interminable digressions,
taking up what were called “the objections of Heracleitus” to any science
of physics. Another digressive chapter considers the proper subject of
physical science, to wit, _corpus mobile_, and another considers its
divisions. After a while he takes up the opinions of the ancients upon the
beginnings (_principia_) of things, and then reasons out the true opinion
in the matter. Liber II. of his _Physica_ is devoted to _Natura_,
considered in many ways, but chiefly as the _principium intrinsecum omnium
eorum quae naturalia sunt_. It is the principle of motion in the mobile
substance. Next he passes to a discussion of causes; and in the succeeding
books he considers movement, place, time, and eternity. Albert’s
paraphrase is replete with logical forms of thinking; it seems like formal
logic applied in physical science. The world about us still furnishes, or
_is_, data for our thoughts; and we try to conceive it consistently, so as
to satisfy our thinking; so did Aristotle and Albertus. But they avowedly
worked out their conceptions of the external world according to the laws
determining the consistency of their own mental processes; and deemed this
a proper way of approach to natural science. Yet the work of Aristotle
represents a real consideration of the universe, and a tremendous mass of
natural knowledge. The achievement of Albertus in rendering it available
to the scholar-world of the thirteenth century was an extension of
knowledge which seems the more prodigious as we note its enormous range.
This continues to impress us as we turn over Albert’s next treatises,
paraphrasing those of Aristotle, as their names indicate: _De coelo et
mundo_; _De generatione et corruptione_; _Libri IV. meteorum_; _De
mineralibus_, which ends Tome II. and the physical treatises proper.
Tome III. introduces us to another region, opening with Albert’s
exhaustive paraphrase, _De anima_. It is placed here because the _scientia
de anima_ is a part of _naturalis scientia_, and comes after minerals and
other topics of physics, but precedes the science of animate
bodies--_corporum animatorum_; for the last cannot be known except through
knowing their _animae_. In this, as well as in other works of Albert,
psychological material is gathered from many sources. One may hardly speak
of the psychology of Albertus Magnus, since his matter has no organic
unity. It is largely Aristotelian, with the thoughts of Arab commentators
taken into it, as in Albert’s Aristotelian paraphrases generally. But it
is also Augustinian, and Platonic and Neo-Platonic. Albert is capable of
defending opposite views in the same treatise; and in spite of best
intentions, he does not succeed in harmonizing what he draws from
Aristotle, with what he takes from Augustine. Hence his works nowhere
present a system of psychology which might be called Albert’s, either
through creation or consistent selection. But at least he has gathered,
and bestowed somewhere, all the accessible material.[569]
Tome III. of Albert’s _Opera_ contains also his Aristotelian paraphrase,
_Metaphysicorum libri XIII._ In this _vera sapientia philosophiae_, he
follows Aristotle closely, save where orthodoxy compels deviation.[570]
Tome IV. contains his paraphrasing expositions, _Ethica_ and _In octo
libros politicorum Aristotelis commentarii_. Tome V. contains paraphrases
of Aristotle’s minor natural treatises,--_parva naturalia_; to wit, the
_Liber de sensu et sensato_, treating problems of sense-perception; next
the _Liber de memoria et reminiscentia_, in which the two are thus
distinguished: “Memoria motus continuus est in rem, et uniformis.
Reminiscibilitas autem est motus quasi interceptus et abscissus per
oblivionem.” Treatises follow: _De somno et vigilia_; _De motibus
animalium_; _De aetate, sive de juventute et senectute_; _De spiritu et
respiratione_; _De morte et vita_; _De nutrimento et nutribile_; _De
natura et origine animae_; _De unitate intellectus contra Averroem_ (a
controversial tract); _De intellectu et intelligibile_ (an important
psychological writing); _De natura locorum_; _De causis proprietatum
elementorum_; _De passionibus aeris, sive de vaporum impressionibus_; and
next and last, saving some minor tracts, Albert’s chief botanical work,
_De vegetabilibus_.
Aristotle’s _Botany_ was lost, and Albert’s work was based on the _De
plantis_ of Nicolas of Damascus, a short compend vulgarly ascribed to
Aristotle, but really made in the first century, and passing through
numerous translations from one language to another, before Albert accepted
it as the composition of the Stagirite. It consisted of two short books;
Albert’s work contained seven long ones, and made the most important work
on botany since the times of Aristotle and his pupil Theophrastus. In
opening, Albert says that generalities applicable to all animate things
have been already presented, and now it is time to consider more
especially and in turn, _vegetabilia_, _sensibilia_, _rationabilia_. In
the first eight chapters of his first book, Albert follows his supposed
Aristotelian source, and then remarks that the translation of the
Philosopher’s treatise is so ignorantly made that he will himself take up
in order the six problems thus far incompetently discussed. So he
considers whether plants have souls; whether plant-souls feel and desire;
whether plants sleep; as to sex in plants; whether without sex they can
propagate their species; and as to their hidden life.
In the second book, having again bewailed the insufficiency of his source,
Albert takes up the classification of plants, and proceeds with a
description of their various parts, then passes on to the shape of leaves,
the generation and nature of flowers, their colour, odour, and shape.
Liber III., still as an independent _digressio_, discusses seeds and
fruit. In Liber IV. Albert returns to his unhappy source, and his matter
declines in interest; but again, in Liber V., he frees himself in a
_digressio_ on the properties and effects of plants, gathered from many
sources, some of which are foolish enough. His sixth book is a description
of trees and other plants in alphabetical order. The last and seventh is
devoted to agriculture.[571]
In the _De vegetabilibus_, Albert, as an expounder of natural knowledge,
is at his best. A less independent and intelligent production is his
enormous treatise _De animalibus libri XXVI._, which fills the whole of
Tome IV. of Albert’s _Opera_. A certain Thomas of Cantimpré, an admiring
pupil of Albert, may have anticipated the above-named work of his teacher
by his own compilation, _De naturis rerum_, which appears to have been
composed shortly before the middle of the thirteenth century. Its
descriptions of animals, although borrowed and uncritical, were at least
intended to describe them actually, and were not merely fashioned for the
moral’s sake, after the manner of the _Physiologus_,[572] and many a
compilation of the early Middle Ages. Yet the work contains moralities
enough, and plenty of the fabulous. But Thomas diligently gathered
information as he might, and from Aristotle more than any other. Thus, in
his lesser way, he, as well as Albert, represents the tendency of the
period to interest itself in the realities, as well as in the symbolisms,
of the natural world.
Albert’s work is not such an inorganic compilation as Thomas’s. He has
paraphrased the ten books of Aristotle’s natural histories, his four books
on the parts of animals, and his five books on their generation. To these
nineteen, he has added seven books on the nature of animal bodies and on
their grades of perfection; and then on quadrupeds, birds, aquatic
animals, snakes, and small bloodless creatures. Besides Aristotle, he
draws on Avicenna, Galen, Ambrose (!), and others, including Thomas of
Cantimpré. Thus, his work is made up mainly of the ancient written
material. Moreover, Albert is kept from a natural view of his subject
through the need he feels to measure animals by the standards of human
capacity, and learn to know them through knowing man. His _digressiones_
usually discuss abstract problems, as, for instance, whether beyond the
four elements, any fifth principle enters the composition of animal
bodies. As for his anatomy, he describes the muscles, and calls the veins
nerves, having no real knowledge of the latter. He corrects few ancient
errors, either anatomical or physiological; and his own observations,
occasionally referred to in his work, scarcely win our respect. Nor does
he exclude fabulous stories, or the current superstitions as to the
medicinal or magical effect of parts of certain animals. On the whole,
Albert’s merit in the province of Zoology lies in his introduction of the
Aristotelian data and conceptions to the mediaeval Latin West.[573]
After Tome IV. of Albert’s _Opera_, follow many portly tomes, the contents
of which need not detain us. There are enormous commentaries on the Psalms
and Prophets, and the Gospels (Tomes VII.-XI.); then a tome of sermons,
then a tome of commentaries on the Hierarchies of Pseudo-Dionysius; and
three tomes of commentaries on the Lombard’s _Sentences_,--commentaries,
that is to say, upon works which stood close to Scripture in authority.
With these we reach the end of Albert’s labours in paraphrase and
commentary, and pass to his more constructive work. Of course, the first
and chief is his _Summa theologiae_, contained in Tomes XVII. and XVIII.
of the _Opera_. With Albert, theology is a science, a branch of systematic
knowledge, the highest indeed, and yet one among others. This science,
says he in the Prologue to his _Summa_,
“... is of all sciences the most entitled to credence--_certissimae
credulitatis et fidei_. Other sciences, concerning creatures, possess
_rationes immobiles_, yet those _rationes_ are _mobiles_ because they
are in created things. But this science founded in _rationibus
aeternis_ is immutable both _secundum esse_ and _secundum rationem_.
And since it is not constituted of the sensible and imaginable, which
are not quite cleared of the hangings of matter, plainly it, alone or
supremely, is science: for the divine intellect is altogether
intellectual, being the light and cause of everything intelligible;
and from it to us is the divine science.”
Albert’s dialectic is turgid enough, and lacks the lucidity of his pupil.
Yet his reasoning may be weighty and even convincing. Intellect, Reason
and its realm of that which is known through Reason, is higher than sense
perceptions and imaginations springing from them: it affords the surest
knowledge; the science that treats of pure reason, which is in God, is the
surest and noblest of sciences. Albert clearly defines the province and
nature of theology.
“It is _scientia secundum pietatem_; it is not concerned with the
knowable (_scibile_) simply as such, nor with the knowable
universally; but only as it inclines us to Piety. Piety, as Augustine
says, is the worship of God, perfected by faith, hope, charity,
prayer, and sacrifices. Thus theology is the science of what pertains
to salvation; for piety conduces to salvation.”[574]
The _Summa theologiae_ treats of the encyclopaedic matter of the sacred
science, in the order and arrangement with which we are familiar.[575] It
is followed (Tome XIX.) by Albert’s _Summa de creaturis_, a presentation
of God’s creation, omitting the special topics set forth in the _De
vegetabilibus_ and _De animalibus_. It treats of creation, of matter, of
time and eternity, of the heavens and celestial bodies, of angels, their
qualities and functions, and the hierarchies of them; of the state of the
wicked angels, of the works of the six days, briefly; and then of man,
soul and body, very fully; of man’s habitation and the order and
perfection of the universe. Thus the _Summa de creaturis_ treats of the
world and man as God’s creation; but it is not directly concerned with
man’s salvation, which is the distinguishing purpose of a _Summa
theologiae_, however encyclopaedic such a work may be.
Two tomes remain of Albert’s opera, containing much that is very different
from anything already considered. Tome XX. is devoted to the Virgin Mary,
and is chiefly made up of two prodigious tracts: _De laudibus beatae
Mariae Virginis libri XII._, and the _Mariale, sive quaestiones super
evangelium, Missus est angelus Gabriel_. These works--it is disputed
whether Albert was their author--are a glorification, indeed a
deification, of Mary. They are prodigious; they are astounding. The
worship of Mary is gathered up in them, of Mary the chief and best beloved
religious creation of the Middle Ages; only not a creation, strictly
speaking, for the Divine Virgin, equipped with attribute and quality,
sprang from the fecund matrix of the early Church. The works before us
represent a simpler piety than Albert’s _Summa theologiae_. They contain
satisfying, consoling statements, not woven of dialectic. And the end is
all that the Mary-loving soul could wish. “Christ protects the servants of
His genetrix:--and so does Mary, as may be read in her miracles, protect
us from our bodily enemies, and from the seducers of souls.”[576] The
praises of Mary will seem marvellous indeed to anyone turning over the
_tituli_ of books and chapters. There is here a whole mythology, and a
universal symbolism. Symbolically, Mary is everything imaginable; she has
every virtue and a mass of power and privileges. She is the adorable and
chief efficient Goddess mediating between the Trinity and the creature
man.
Tome XXI., last tome of all, has a variety of writings, some of which may
not be Albert’s. Among them is a work of sweet and simple piety, a work
of turning to God as a little child; and one would be loath to take it
away from this man of learning. _De adhaerendo Deo_ is its title, which
tells the story. Albert wished at last to write something presenting man’s
ultimate perfection, so far as that might be realized in this life. So he
writes this little tract of chamber-piety, as to how one should cling to
Christ alone. Yet he cannot disencumber himself of his lifelong methods of
composition. He might conceive and desire; but it was not for him to write
a tract to move the heart. The best he can say is that the end of all our
study and discipline is _intendere et quiescere in Domino Deo intra te per
purissimum intellectum, et devotissimum affectum sine phantasmatibus et
implicationibus_. The great scholar would come home at last, like a little
child, if he only could.