OTHER RECENT CASES. BIBLIOGRAPHY.

The work of the supply ship captured recently in a port on the east

coast of Scotland hardly comes within the limits of this book, but it is

significant as showing the daring of German methods, which apparently

include the obtaining of supplies from an enemy's country by means which

endanger neutral shipping--so long as the neutral ships can be found to

take the risks. It was noted by the naval authorities that German

submarines had been displaying activity at such a distance from their

legitimate ports of supply as to render probable and almost certain the

existence of other sources of supply. A watch was consequently kept for

suspicious neutral shipping, and in the end a capture was made.

A vessel came into port and proceeded to load for departure, and the

customs officers could find nothing wrong with her. Her papers were in

order, her cargo contained nothing in the nature of contraband of war,

and there was no cause for detaining her, as far as could be seen. But

there were noted on the deck of the vessel, neatly coiled, cables and

cables, enough to furnish a whaler on a three-years' sailing voyage and

leave over sufficient to start a ropemaker in business. All over the

decks bulky coils of hawser lay, and though, at any other time, the

hawsers might have passed without notice, it was felt by the customs men

that the superabundance of rope justified further investigation than had

already been bestowed on the boat.

So one of the coils was unfastened, its wrappings removed, and the cable

itself was uncoiled. Then was it found that there was merely a shell of

rope, which served as covering for a steel drum containing oil fuel

suited for the use of submarine engines. And there the story ends.

The other case which I propose to quote shows equal audacity. At the

Guildhall Court there appeared, on October 5, George Newton Spencer, who

described himself as a clerk, and gave his address as Lubeckerstrasse,

33, Hamburg, Germany. He was charged with "unlawfully inciting Mr

Frank Henry Houlder (Houlder Brothers, Limited, Leadenhall Street and

Liverpool) to trade with the enemy."

Mr Humphreys stated in opening the case for the prosecution that the

charges against the accused were based on the Trading with the Enemy Act

of 1914. The accused was a British subject (as they all seem to be) who

had been long resident in Germany, and had been clerk to a shipping

company with a rather long name, but which might be translated as the

Transport Shipping Company of Hamburg. The accused appeared to have

been sent over to this country by his employers towards the end of

September for the purpose of negotiating what, from their point of view,

was a most important transaction. Although an Englishman, and of the

age of thirty-two years, no difficulty was made by the German military

authorities over the accused obtaining a pass to travel in Germany and

leave the country. There was little doubt that the object of his visit

was known to the authorities, who gave him that permission, although,

from the German Emperor's point of view, he was an alien enemy.

The prisoner arrive in London on September 22, and on the next day he

called on Mr Houlder. He introduced himself by producing a document in

English, signed by his employers, which contained the proposal which had

been made the subject of the charge. The proposal was as follows: There

were six ships owned by the company at Hamburg, on which Messrs. Houlder

had mortgages amounting to about 30,000 pounds. These ships, on the

outbreak of the war, and certainly in September--were either in neutral

ports, and therefore temporarily lost to their owners, or were prizes of

war, and as such temporarily--and probably finally--lost to their

owners. The proposal to Messrs. Houlder--to whom was payable 20,000

pounds on November 11, and 13,000 pounds on November 15, was to the

effect that they should pay over 15,000 pounds to the Hamburg firm, and

take over three of the steamers. The result would be that the mortgages

on all six of the vessels would be wiped off, and Messrs. Houlder would

become the owners of them, while the steamship company at Hamburg would

have 15,000 pounds in cash to enable them to carry on their business.

The fact that one of the steamers was a prize of war in Gibraltar, and

would probably be sold as such, made the proposal still more remarkable.

Since, under these circumstances, Messrs. Houlder could have no title,

the Hamburg firm were virtually, asking for cash for nothing.

Mr Houlder did not seriously consider the proposition, but, having made

up his mind what to do, told the defendant he would have to consult his

solicitors, and mentioned the existence of the proclamation which he

assumed would prevent them from carrying out the transaction. Defendant

replied to the effect that his employers had communicated with the

German Foreign Office--as they had no proclamation--and had received

permission to carry out the transaction. He handed Mr Houlder a bundle

of documents in German, which showed that the defendant's employers in

Hamburg, before ever they attempted to put this transaction in form,

obtained leave from their own authorities, to whom they stated their own

frank view-point with regard to the matter. It was set out that

monetary benefit to a certain amount would accrue to the Hamburg company

as a result of the transaction, and that the vessels were all old

freight steamers, of no possible use to the German Navy--neither were

they fit for transport purposes. The Berlin Secretary of State for Home

Affairs replied that no objection would be taken to the transaction.

Mr Houlder communicated with the Admiralty instead of with his

solicitors, and in the meantime the defendant went to a firm of marine

insurance agents and made a similar proposal--this time to the extent of

about 13,400 pounds cash benefit to the Hamburg firm. In neither case

was any application made to the authorities in England for a licence to

break the law regarding trading with the enemy. The total effect of the

proposals, had they been carried through, would have been to place the

Hamburg company in possession of about 28,000 pounds, with no

compensating advantage whatever to the British firms--and the defendant

was committed for trial. He received sentence of imprisonment for his

treachery on October 14, 1914, after due and proper trial.

The only point worthy of comment in connection with this case is the

doubtful morality, in a business sense, of German firms. We may set

aside the fact that a contravention of an enemy's law was attempted, for

no country would consider or regard the laws of a country with which it

was at war, unless they involved principles of definite conduct and were

the laws of civilisation rather than the laws framed for the protection

of the said enemy in time of war. The point at issue is that a shipping

company of Hamburg, by its offer of valueless titles in exchange for

hard British cash, was attempting such a form of sharp practice as would

land any British trader in the criminal courts for fraud. One is forced

to the conclusion that among many Germans, and even among German firms

whose standing ought to guarantee the cleanliness of their hands in

business, there is no such thing as honesty, at least where dealing with

a foreign firm is concerned. These people asked two London firms to

break British law, and to be swindled. By German ethics, evidently,

this is fair play and just dealing. It is an effect of the spy system

on the moral fibre of the nation, rather than an instance of the working

of the spy system itself--though the British subject who passed out from

Germany at an acute point of the war between the two countries, without

being questioned by German authorities, looks perilously like a spy at

work, and the nature of his other missions in England, had he been left

at liberty, calls for some speculation.

Much may be learned with regard to the present working of German spies

by intelligent perusal of the war reports, especially those coming from

France, for the Russian theatre of war is so tremendous and so far off

that the small details seldom come through--the details small in

themselves, but of far-reaching import. As an instance may be again

mentioned the way in which German troops, occupying a town, chalk on

certain doors "Spare this house"--there is a world of enlightenment in

the three words. Similarly, in advance and retreat the Germans have

their agents with them or near them, and often the report makes tacit

admission of the fact, in such a way that it is clear to one who reads

with the espionage system in mind. The work of these agents is as

endless as it is dishonourable and deadly--a poison that works just as

efficiently as the legitimate weapons of war--and often more

efficiently, since one can guard against an open weapon, but against the

treachery that uses naturalisation and all things to further the ends of

the monster trampling across the earth, there is no guard that soldiers

can use as they use their weapons against troops opposed to them.

The bibliography of espionage--German espionage--is a brief one, so far

as books of value are concerned. First and foremost stand Stieber's

Memoirs, which tell all that Stieber chose to tell--and that is a good

deal. The work has been translated into French, but not into English.

There is the "Indiscretions" of Wollheim, a book which gives some idea

of the system, but is mainly concerned with incident. The Memoirs of

Busch, Bismarck's friend, afford further light on the system, but only

in a fragmentary way. "Military Espionage in Peace and War," by W.N.

Klembovski, a Russian Staff Officer, is more a manual of what ought to

be done by purely military spies than a book descriptive of the German

system. "Espionage Militaire," by Lieutenant Froment of the French

Army, is open to the same class of criticism, as is to a certain extent

"Espionage," by N. de Chilly, though the last named is a more

informative book. "The German Spy System in France," an English

translation of Paul Lanoir's book on the subject, is a brief but

well-compiled review of what Germany has accomplished in the way of

espionage since 1870 in France, and although rather pessimistic in tone

as regards French counter-measures, ranks as a work of value.

As a rule "confessions" of spies may be disregarded, though they make

good melodramatic reading. The nature of the subject is such that those

who would tell the whole cannot, and those who can will not. Bearing in

mind the effect of thorough espionage on the German nation as a whole,

it is to be hoped that in the near future the whole system will be swept

away, together with the form of government that gave it birth and room

to grow.

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