This subject of political work, apart from espionage proper on the part
of German agents, is a delicate one, for proof is not only hard to come
by, but direct proof is practically non-existent, owing to the nature of
the work. The most that can be done is to take cases of political work
which, on the face of them, are such that no honest citizen would
attempt: by a process of mental elimination one may arrive at the source
of such work, though the result of the process is little more than
conjecture. Still, half a dozen or so of results, all pointing the same
conclusion, are of value, and, in spite of the absence of definite
proof, police-court and criminal-court trials and the like, there can be
no reasonable doubt that the work of the _agent provocateur_ goes on,
and that the central office at Berlin pays in order to keep it going.
Harking back once more to Stieber, it will be remembered that, at the
outset of his career, he took service in a mercantile firm, and
identified himself with German Socialism of the revolutionary kind. He
learned at first hand the power which Socialism has among the working
classes; he learned that, with very little reality behind the promises,
it is easy to make a workman do nearly anything, if only the promises as
regards the future of the working class are large enough. He came to
his own as a master in espionage and treachery--by betraying the men to
whom he posed as a leader--at almost the first beginnings of the German
Socialistic movement, and he watched that movement grow as the years
went on. He saw that working men had a passion for organising in
defence of their rights, and that they could be led by nearly any appeal
which proclaimed their rights, no matter how extravagant the
proclamation might be.
Further, he saw that in Germany, under the Empire, workmen's rights
would never win them anything--repression was too efficiently conducted,
and there was no good in the workmen's movement for him; so he joined in
with the forces that unto to-day (1914) govern Germany and suppress all
that makes for real democratic government. Stieber was an opportunist,
and knew well which side would best reward him.
Later on in his career he gained opportunities of studying the social
conditions involved in the political constitutions of other countries;
after 1870 the constitution of France interested him, and, studying it
as he studied all things, with a view to the furtherance of his plans,
he saw that much nominal power was placed in the hands of the people--
illiteracy and ignorance were no bars to the free expression of
opinions, and, further, a man might agitate and stir up discontent among
the working people to his heart's content, compared with what might be
done in Germany, and there was no aristocracy nor any bureaucracy to say
him nay. Now, said Stieber, if these workmen could be stirred up in a
way that would make them distrustful of the governing classes: if class
could be set against class, unions formed, and the men led to strike and
paralyse industry at a given time--say, at a time when Germany wanted to
make war--the benefits accruing would be immense; but not to France.
We have no definite proof that modern Syndicalism and its evils arose
out of Stieber's efforts. We have certain evidence, and certain
coincidences, that are nearly as good as definite proof. For instance,
there is no actual proof of this contention in the fact that the
incident of the _Panther_ and Agadir, which so nearly precipitated the
whole of Europe into war, was practically coincident with one of the
worst strikes that the history of British industry can show; but there
is proof that, for years past, German agitators have been teaching both
British and French workmen the way to organise "in defence of their
rights," and have been advocating Syndicalism and the weapon of the
general strike as a panacea for all evils to which the classes subject
the masses.
With the economic aspect of the question we are not concerned for the
purpose of this book, and lest we be misunderstood let us pay tribute to
the fine loyalty of the leaders of labour in this country; to such men
as Will Crooks, who have helped to bring the nation into line in the
hour of national peril, and are men worthy of all honour and all praise.
We are concerned more with certain coincidental happenings, like that
of Agadir and our own great strike, and certain other happenings which
point to the same conclusion--that Germany has tried, by means of
industrial unrest, disaffection, and other means, to weaken the hands of
potential enemies in the hours when strength was most needed.
First of all, it must be noted that the two chief essentials to the
mobilisation of troops for war, and the placing of a navy on a war
footing, are an efficient railway and transport system, and the
assurance of an adequate coal supply. We may call it a coincidence, and
no more, that the two industries which have made most progress towards
Syndicalism and the use of the general strike, both in England and
France, are those of transport and coal-mining. The first piece of
evidence may be regarded as coincidence pure and simple, and it is only
when the coincidences mount up that they may be accepted as evidence of
weight.
In order to render effective the railways of the country, which as far
as France is concerned are on strategic plans toward the western
frontier, Germany has increased its establishment of railway engineers
to fifty-four military companies. That is to say, no matter what
sympathetic action might have been taken by German railwaymen in case of
an international strike, the German railways could still have run with
full staffs, and every man was trained to his place on the lines that
would be concerned in the mobilisation and placing of troops on the
western frontier of the country, to act against France. No Syndicalist
movement could shake German power--the defensive action was too strong
for that. Further, the railways of the state system, organised with a
view to mobilisation of troops rather than peace requirements, are
controlled not by capitalists, nor by political figures, but each by a
colonel of the German Army, at the head of his military division of
railway engineers, and the officers, non-commissioned officers, and men
of these railway engineers are qualified railwaymen; their military
duties consist in the efficient performance of railway work. For it is
no use forging a weapon that will, in time of need, prove as dangerous
to the holder as to the one it is aimed against.
As a final guard against trouble of this kind, Stieber laid down as a
definite rule in 1884:
"That no native of Alsace-Lorraine, even though performing his military
service in Germany, should be either recruited or admitted in any
capacity whatever for employment on the said railways."
As to general offensive action, the first sign thereof lies in the vote,
in February of 1893, of a credit of 80,000 thalers "to defray the
expense of foreign publications useful to the policy of the Empire,"
combined with the appearance, in France, of the famous "Mesnard
pamphlet" five months later. The pamphlet in question was a deliberate
incitement to the men employed on French railways to take matters into
their own hands and carry Republicanism on to sheer anarchy. "If you
want your employees to be attentive and polite to the public," says the
author, "try to give those employees a somewhat better idea of whom it
is they toil and sweat to benefit. At present all that we know is that
our work is not done precisely for the love of the thing, nor does it
result in any improvement for ourselves. This being so, our sole object
is to keep our situations and get through with our tasks. As far as the
public are concerned, we take no notice of them, while they for their
part behave in the most abusive manner toward us...
"The employees should elect their chiefs themselves in accordance with
the principle of universal suffrage... It would be merely logical if
the employees had the right to choose who should give them orders, and
to turn out those who proved unjust or incapable...
"The last resource of railway workers in search of justice is a strike.
A strike is a legitimate weapon, and the fact cannot be contested. If
it is suppressed, its suppression constitutes an abuse of the rights of
the stronger party. With the organisation which the syndicate cannot
fail to have in a short time, we shall have arrived at a position at
which we can contemplate the possibility of a general strike of all the
railways and of similar institutions if necessary. It is highly
important that everybody should think over this problem. No partial
strikes, but patience and then a general strike..."
Then, fearing lest mobilisation of the Army of France should defeat the
ends to which this pamphlet was designed, its authors went on to say
that railwaymen would not be forced to mobilise to prevent a strike.
"We know our duty as patriots, and we know when we must be soldiers; but
if you gentlemen, you officers, do not know it, then leave us alone to
manage our own affairs, or we shall call in the Prussians."
These extracts from the pamphlet itself show its general tenor, but
though one may search through all its pages there will be found no
definite and legitimate ground for the proclamation of the general
strike which "Mesnard" advocates so stirringly. The whole publication,
which must certainly rank among the "foreign publications useful to the
policy of the [German] Empire," is an attempt to stir up class hatred,
to get the men to mobilise against military service at a given word of
command, and to paralyse the railway services of France when German
aggression should consider such a step necessary. For the evidence has
become too strong for us to take this as mere coincidence, nor did the
French Government regard it as such. Even the railwaymen's unions of
France repudiated the document, and one of the heads of a trade union in
France stated openly as his opinion that it was the work of Germany and
an attempt at the establishment of German influence. The pamphlet
itself, which was widely circulated among railwaymen until government
action stopped its distribution, came from Geneva, one of the
headquarter stations of the German secret service, and the residence of
one of the most highly placed officials in the espionage system.
The direct effect of the Mesnard pamphlet was small, but evidently the
policy that it outlined was found worth following. The first great
demand of the Syndicalists on behalf of the railwaymen of France was
made at the time that the Dreyfus trial was causing definite friction
between France and Germany in official circles. On this occasion a
general strike was actually declared, but it was a fiasco. Yet again,
railway troubles in France grew ever greater as relations grew strained
between the two countries toward the dawn of the second decade of this
century. The Agadir incident was coincident not only with labour
troubles in England, for if the railways of France could have been
paralysed at the time of a declaration of war by Germany, the result
would have been equivalent to a decisive German victory over French
troops in the field.
Inquiry into Syndicalist work in France and England alike will show that
the funds of the Syndicalists have benefited, if they have not been
mainly supported, by German contributions. Then, again, if one examines
the career of the average fiery, anarchistic orator, who declaims
against law and order, and does his best to stir up men irrespective of
national rights, it will be found in many cases that the orator in
question is in some way connected with Germany. He may not be a German,
but he is in such a position that German influence is at least
possible--and Stieber himself was apparently heart and soul with
revolutionary German workmen, while in reality he was busy betraying his
associates to the secret police whom he subsequently governed. The
working man himself is disinterested, and believes that he is acting for
the best in his own behalf, and in that of all oppressed humanity. But
his leaders cannot always be regarded in an equally charitable light.
German efforts do not stop here. Almost simultaneously with the
outbreak of hostilities a placard was distributed broadcast in Ireland,
with a view to ensuring the desired action on the part of the "revolting
province." The placard in question has been attributed to the few
Fenians still remaining in Ireland; but such an aspersion on the
character of these men is the rankest injustice, for even the most rabid
of the anti-English in Ireland have realised that a world-war transcends
domestic affairs, and Irishmen of all shades of opinion have shown
themselves ready to fight the battles of freedom against Prussian
militarism. The placard in question is decidedly a "foreign publication
useful to the policy of the [German] Empire," and it reads as follows:
Irishmen--FOOLS!
Have you forgotten that England is your only enemy?
Have you forgotten Kathleen-ni-Houlihan, that you are willing to shed
your blood to win England's battles?
Have you lost your wits, that you believe all the ridiculous lies
published against the Germans in the Jingo papers?
Have you forgotten how the English treated the Boers?
Have you forgotten 'ninety-eight?
Have you forgotten the Manchester Martyrs?
Have you forgotten the K.O.S.B. murders?
Have you forgotten that the Future lies in your hands?
Have you forgotten that England's difficulty is Ireland's opportunity?
God save Ireland!
Thus the _agent provocateur_ at his very worst. Germany has confessedly
set out to make war by "all the violent means at her command," but not
by violent means alone. Such work as this placard makes evident,
though, shows plainly how Germany has mistaken the temper of a people,
for the Munsters and the Irish Guards have given their answer to the
questions put. The flagrant error and waste of effort is like that of
Von Holeben, who, when German Ambassador to America, strove to stir up
strife between America and England until his efforts became common talk
in Washington, and Berlin was forced to recall the blunderer. Yet more
efforts of the same kind have been made in America since the outbreak of
war, and at least one highly placed German official has received
definite notice from Washington that he must either stop his work of
sowing discord or leave the country.
These are but instances. The whole history of Syndicalism, the whole
history of setting class against class in the case of industrial unrest,
and of Irish disturbances in recent years, point to some influence
working independently of the rights and betterment of the classes
concerned in the agitations. In the case of Ireland, we may assume that
the majority of Irish patriots have the best interests of their
countrymen at heart; but the placard of which the contents are quoted
above never emanated from any Irish patriot; it was a definite and
ineffectual attempt to stir up the worst passions of which humanity is
capable in the hour of England's greatest need, at a time when all Irish
patriots were voicing unity and support to their Government, whether
they were Home Rulers or Orangemen--the action of Ireland has proved
that. In the case of working men's unions, the action of the men
themselves has always been to a definite end, both in England and in
France; to the end that they might obtain better conditions of life,
just laws to govern their work, and the elemental rights of man. But,
in addition to these things, there have been of late years agitators who
would claim for the working men of the two countries that Germany had
most cause to fear, not only the rights of their class, but a right to
disregard the rights of all other classes, and take absolute power into
their hands at a signal from some leader. Efforts have been made to
induce men to strike for little, for nothing; to cause them to render a
whole country powerless by their action, and to do indirect injury to
themselves. Such action as this points to the working of a force not
necessarily beneficial to the workmen themselves, but certainly inimical
to the country to which the workers happen to belong. And, always
keeping in mind Stieber and the debasement of aim he has brought on his
own country, together with the fact that industrial unrest is in the
first place a German product, we may say that coincidence does not
account for all the Syndicalist efforts that have been contemporary with
rumours of war.