The routine of naval espionage is very similar in character to that
followed by military spies. The naval spy, however, must be a rather
more intelligent and highly trained man than his military confrere, and
cases that have come to light prove that his position is one of more
responsibility, and that he is entrusted with more funds for the
carrying out of his work. It is an interesting fact that, for many
years past, officers and men of the German naval service have been
employed along the East coast of England in compiling extremely detailed
plans of places and fortifications. The accuracy of these plans is
ascertained by persistent redrawing done by new members of the naval
espionage staff, and all changes in building, roadmaking,
bridge-construction, and as far as possible the interior work of
fortifications, are duly recorded on the Berlin maps. Not that this
information is of definite working value at the present time, but the
principle of secret-service headquarters is that no item is too trivial
for record, and information is acquired without regard to its direct
uses, but in view of the fact that it may possibly be of some use at a
future date. The adoption of such a principle involves an immense
amount of work in checking and sorting the masses of information
obtained, but beyond doubt the principle itself has gone far to assure
such successes as German arms have obtained, either on land or at sea.
In addition to the work of fixed naval posts, stationed at dockyards and
harbours, the work of spies at sea must not be overlooked, either in
time of peace or in war. In the former case an innocent-looking trawler
or private yacht is useful for taking soundings, ascertaining channels,
and even locating naval mines used for purposes of harbour defence and
fired by land contact. In time of war the services which may be
performed by such vessels are even more valuable; the reports of the
sinking of three British cruisers by German submarine attack are fairly
unanimous with regard to the presence of a trawler in the vicinity of
the spot at which the engagement took place. All that can be definitely
learned with regard to this trawler is that she was not a British boat,
and it is reasonable to assume that her business consisted in signalling
to the submarines particulars which they may have been unable to obtain
themselves, or in shielding them from sight during their approach
towards the cruisers. Although there are no substantial proofs of this
assumption, it is hardly likely that the vessel was a trawler engaged in
usual and legitimate business.
The work of the naval spy in time of peace is best illustrated by the
record of cases which have actually come to light through actions taken
in the courts. One noteworthy case is that of Sub-Lieutenant Ullmo, a
gifted naval officer of the French service, serving in the Republican
warship _Carabine_. Ullmo was an officer of undoubted ability, but he
came under the influence of a female spy, known to him and his fellows
as Lison, who persuaded him to set up an establishment for her and
managed to secure his assent to a plan by which this establishment,
maintained at his expense, was to be converted into an opium-den. So
great an ascendancy did Lison gain over her victim that in a period of
two years he had spent 3,000 pounds, which was all that was his in the
way of capital and income apart from his pay. His position in the
service rendered money a necessity, and, once his private fortune was
gone, Lison pointed out to him that more money could be obtained. As
soon as she spoke of the means by which he could obtain money he
repudiated the suggestion, but, by working on his jealousy with regard
to her acquaintance with a brother officer, she secured his consent to a
bargain by which he was to give up the secret documents kept in a safe
on board his ship, in return for a price which was fixed at more than
ten times his previous competence. The bargain was to be arranged by
the medium of advertisements, and it was through the wording of these
advertisements that the plot was detected by the French secret service.
Ullmo's reward for his treachery was degradation from his rank and
imprisonment for life, and Lison put in an appearance at his trial in
order to watch the proceedings as an uninterested spectator.
The system of counter-espionage thus evidenced on the part of a foreign
Government has its counterpart in the British service. Since Britain is
the most powerful enemy Germany has to fear in a naval sense, it follows
that German naval espionage is principally directed against Britain, and
that the establishment of naval spies is greater in this country than in
any other. It is safe to say, however, that the majority of the fixed
posts of the German naval service in Britain are known to the police,
and that, as soon as information which, in the opinion of the British
naval authorities, is of value, is in danger of being communicated to
Germany, action is taken to prevent the transmission of the spies'
reports to headquarters. A case in point is that of Doctor Max Schulz,
who, charged with espionage at Devon Assizes, was sentenced to a year
and nine months' imprisonment for acts attempted rather than acts
committed.
According to his own account, Schulz became implicated in the work of
the military branch of the German secret service in 1910, when he was
engaged to obtain reports about British military and naval affairs for
statistical purposes. Although no more was said, there can be no doubt
that Schulz realised quite well the nature of the work he was
undertaking, especially as, on the evidence of Sir Rufus Isaacs, who
prosecuted at the trial, he was able to offer 500 pounds a year to a
British subject for continuous information of a confidential character.
He began his career as a spy by ineffectual work in Ireland, following
up this by a visit to Toulon, still in search of information. After
various adventures, he returned in 1911 to Plymouth, and thence went for
a trip up the River Yealm on a yacht called the _Egret_; here, according
to the evidence of Crown witnesses for the prosecution, he was visited
by a Mr Duff and a Mr Tarrant, to whom he made overtures with regard
to the obtaining of information concerning naval matters.
The charges against Schulz, as outlined by the Attorney-General in
opening the case, were four in number. The first charge was that, in
the summer of 1911: "He, at the borough of Plymouth, having possession
or control over knowledge which had been obtained by means of an act
which constituted an offence against the Official Secrets Act,
communicated or attempted to communicate the same to a person to whom
the same ought not in the interest of the State to be communicated at
the time." The second charge amplified the first in that Schulz was
accused of having intended to communicate his illegally gained knowledge
to the Government of a foreign State. The third and fourth counts
against him were that he had "endeavoured to procure Samuel Hugh Duff
and Edward Charles Tarrant respectively to communicate to him
information relating to the naval affairs of His Majesty which ought not
in the interests of the State to be communicated to any person."
Sir Rufus Isaacs stated, in his outline of the case for the prosecution,
that Schulz had offered Duff a salary of 500 pounds a year, with a
possibility of this sum being doubled, for confidential information.
Schulz alleged that the confidential information in question would be
published in a German newspaper, but, at the time of Schulz's arrest,
there had been found in his possession a letter which proved the purpose
for which the information was required. One passage of the letter which
was read in court is enlightening as regards the detailed information
required of German naval spies. The passage is as follows:
"How do matters stand with the commander and lieutenant respectively?
Can nothing at all be expected from them? Reserve officers are no use.
They do not procure any valuable secrets because they do not have access
to them. Confidential books and reports are what is wanted, and what
you must procure at all costs if our relations are to continue."
Sir Rufus Isaacs stated, and the evidence proved, that a man named
Tobler, who did not visit England, kept Schulz supplied with money. A
number of telegrams were produced, written in code, of which the
prosecution had found the key. The deciphered telegrams read: "In
greatest danger. Wire immediately 50 pounds."
"In greater trouble and danger. All prepared for departure. Wire
immediately 50 pounds and date of meeting." Instructions from Tobler to
Schulz included a list of questions which Schulz was to put to Mr Duff,
and the list included the following:
I. Are officers or men granted leave, or have those on leave possibly
been recalled?
II. Is there any sign of coals, stores, ammunition, etc, being
accumulated?