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[Illustration: DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,: March 3, 1849]
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
Douglas McKay, _Secretary_
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE
Conrad L. Wirth, _Director_
_HISTORICAL HANDBOOK NUMBER TEN_
This publication is one of a series of handbooks describing the
historical and archeological areas in the National Park System
administered by the National Park Service of the United States
Department of the Interior. It is printed by the Government Printing
Office and may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents,
Washington 25, D. C. Price 25 cents.
SHILOH
_National Military Park, Tennessee_
_by Albert Dillahunty_
[Illustration: Cannons]
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE HISTORICAL HANDBOOK SERIES NO. 10
WASHINGTON 25, D. C. 1955
[Illustration: NATIONAL PARK SERVICE: DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR]
_The National Park System, of which Shiloh National Military Park is a
unit, is dedicated to conserving the scenic, scientific, and historic
heritage of the United States for the benefit and enjoyment of its
people._
_Contents_
_Page_
PRELIMINARY CAMPAIGN 2
THE FIRST DAY 9
THE SECOND DAY 16
RESULTS OF THE BATTLE 19
GUIDE TO THE AREA 24
Iowa State Monument 24
Michigan State Monument 27
Confederate Monument 27
Ruggles’ Batteries 28
Confederate Burial Trench 28
Illinois State Monument 29
Shiloh Church Site 29
Fraley Field 30
Putnam Stump 30
Hornets’ Nest and Sunken Road 31
Johnston’s Monument 31
Peach Orchard 32
War Cabin 32
Bloody Pond 33
Indian Mounds 33
Overlook 33
Pittsburg Landing 34
NATIONAL CEMETERY 35
HOW TO REACH THE PARK 35
ADMINISTRATION 36
RELATED AREAS 36
VISITOR FACILITIES 37
SHILOH INSPIRES WRITERS 37
[Illustration: _Shiloh Church, painted by Capt. A. M. Connett, 24th
Indiana Volunteer Infantry, a participant in the battle._]
[Illustration: Paddlewheel steamers]
SHILOH NATIONAL MILITARY PARK preserves the scene of the first great
battle in the West of the War Between the States. In this 2-day battle,
April 6 and 7, 1862, both the Union and Confederate Armies suffered
heavy casualties, bringing home the horrors of war to the North and
South alike. Nearly 24,000 were killed, wounded, or reported missing—a
number equal to more than one-fifth of the combined Union and
Confederate Armies engaged in the battle. By their failure to destroy
the Federal Armies at Shiloh the Confederates were forced to return to
Corinth, Miss., relinquishing all hold upon West Tennessee, except a few
forts on the Mississippi which were soon to be wrested from them. Their
failure at Shiloh foreshadowed the loss of the Memphis and Charleston
Railroad, the South’s vital line of communication between Chattanooga
and the Mississippi. After the fall of Memphis, early in June, the
Federals were in position to strike at Vicksburg, the conquest of which
would give them control of the Mississippi and split the Confederacy in
two.
The psychological effect on the South of the Union campaigns was
probably of greater importance than the material gains or losses of the
contending armies. The Confederates learned by bitter experience the
error of their former opinion of the Union soldier. No longer could they
boast that the fighting ability of one Confederate was equal to that of
10 Federals, now that Southern dash and chivalry had been grievously
tried against Northern valor and endurance.
The near-defeat at Shiloh removed the illusion of easy victory, created
by the fall of Forts Henry and Donelson, from the minds of Northerners.
They now realized that the struggle was to be a long and bloody one. A
few days after Donelson, one Union soldier wrote: “My opinion is that
this war will be closed in less than six months from this time.” Shortly
after Shiloh the same soldier wrote: “... if my life is spared I will
continue in my country’s service until this rebellion is put down,
should it be ten years.”
Shiloh is not distinguished by outstanding generalship on either side,
but it is interesting as a battle fought by raw volunteers—young men
without previous experience in a major engagement and with little or no
military training.
_Preliminary Campaign_
War activity west of the Appalachian Mountains in 1861 was confined
chiefly to the States of Kentucky and Missouri. Toward the end of the
year when loyalty, or at least the neutrality, of the governments of
these border States seemed assured, the Federals began making plans for
the invasion of the South by way of the western rivers and railroads.
Each side began to maneuver for strategic positions. The Confederate
General, Leonidas Polk, believing that the Southern States were about to
be invaded through Kentucky, moved up quickly from his position at Union
City, Tenn., and seized Columbus, Ky., the northern terminus of the
Mobile and Ohio Railroad. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant, recently appointed
commander of the Federal troops in and around Cairo, Ill., had made
preparations to occupy that important river port and railway center on
the following day. Thwarted at Columbus, Grant retaliated by taking
Paducah, Ky., located at the junction of the Tennessee and Ohio Rivers.
It now became apparent to the Confederate high command in Richmond that
a strong line would have to be established along the northwestern border
of the Confederacy before the Union armies had time to occupy more of
the strategic points. They believed that the task could be performed
more effectively if all troops in that theater of operation were placed
under one commander. Accordingly, Confederate President Jefferson Davis
sent Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston to the West with the imposing title of
“General Commanding the Western Department of the Army of the
Confederate States of America.”
Arriving in Nashville on September 14, 1861, General Johnston studied
his difficult assignment. The line he was supposed to occupy extended
from the mountains of eastern Tennessee westward across the Mississippi
to the Kansas boundary. Only two points on the proposed line were then
in Confederate hands: Columbus, which he considered the natural key to
the Confederate defense of the Mississippi, and Cumberland Gap, Ky.,
which he had previously ordered Gen. Felix K. Zollicoffer to occupy.
One of Johnston’s first official acts upon arriving at Nashville was to
order Gen. Simon B. Buckner to secure Bowling Green, Ky., one of the
most important railroad centers south of the Ohio. He also ordered
garrisons to the incomplete works at Fort Henry, on the Tennessee, and
Fort Donelson, on the Cumberland, hoping to prevent a Union advance up
either of these natural highways. A Federal offensive up the Tennessee
or the Cumberland would endanger the important railroad and industrial
center of Nashville, Tenn.
Since the outbreak of the war, Nashville had been converted into a huge
arsenal and depot of supplies. Large quantities of food, clothing, and
munitions had been collected and stored in its warehouses. Its factories
were turning out percussion caps, sabers, muskets, saddles, harness,
knapsacks, cannon, and rifled pieces. Its looms were turning out
thousands of yards of gray cloth which were being made into uniforms for
the soldiers. The loss of this city would be an irreparable blow to the
Confederacy.
[Illustration: _The_ WAR IN THE WEST _before Shiloh_]
While General Johnston was establishing his positions, the Federals were
rapidly organizing their forces preparatory to an attack upon the
Confederate line. Gen. Henry W. Halleck, from headquarters in St. Louis,
was strengthening his positions at Cairo, Ill., and Paducah, Ky. At the
same time, he was making ready a large number of river steamers so that
his troops could be moved by water to almost any point along his front.
From headquarters in Louisville, Gen. Don Carlos Buell, commander of the
Department of the Ohio, reinforced his line so that Johnston had to keep
his main force at Bowling Green, Ky., to guard the important railroads
which penetrated Middle and West Tennessee.
[Illustration: _Commodore Foote’s gunboats ascending the Tennessee
to attack Fort Henry._]
Various plans for an attack upon the Confederate line were considered by
the Federals. General Halleck, commander of the Department of the
Missouri, believed that it would take an army of not less than 60,000
men, under one commander, to break the well-established line. He,
therefore, asked that General Buell’s army be transferred to him, or at
least placed under his command.
Before a union of the two departments could be effected, General Grant
asked for, and received, permission to attack the line at Fort Henry. A
combined land and naval attack by Grant’s troops and the gunboat fleet
of Commodore Andrew H. Foote resulted in the surrender of Fort Henry on
February 6, 1862, and the capture of Fort Donelson, with about 12,000
prisoners, on the 16th. The loss of these forts broke Johnston’s line at
its center and compelled him to evacuate Bowling Green and Columbus,
permitting western Kentucky to fall into Union hands. To prevent
encirclement, he was also forced to withdraw from Nashville, abandon
Middle and West Tennessee, and seek a new line on the Memphis and
Charleston Railroad.
Following the fall of Forts Henry and Donelson, Grant incurred the
displeasure of General Halleck by sending a division of troops into
Buell’s department at Clarksville. Halleck’s indignation increased when
he learned that Grant had gone to Nashville for consultation with Buell.
Halleck directed the withdrawal of the division from Clarksville,
suspended Grant from command, and ordered him to Fort Henry to await
orders.
[Illustration: _Dover Tavern, General Buckner’s headquarters and
scene of the surrender of Fort Donelson._]
[Illustration: _Map of the battlefield of Shiloh, made by Gen. W. T.
Sherman soon after the battle._]
The army under Grant’s successor, Gen. Charles F. Smith, moved up the
Tennessee toward the heart of the Confederacy, with the intention of
rendezvousing at Savannah, Tenn., on the east side of the river. Gen.
William T. Sherman was sent forward on the so-called Yellow Creek
Expedition for the purpose of destroying railroad communications to the
west of Corinth, Miss., the objective of the campaign. High water made
Sherman’s mission a failure, and he was compelled to return. He reported
to General Smith that a more convenient place for the assembling of his
army was at Pittsburg Landing, Tenn., 9 miles above Savannah, and on the
west side of the river, from which direct roads led to Corinth. General
Smith, therefore, instructed him to disembark his division and that of
Gen. Stephen A. Hurlbut at Pittsburg Landing, in positions far enough
back to afford room for the other divisions of the army to encamp near
the river.
[Illustration: _Conference of Confederate commanders the night
before the battle. From left to right, Gen. P. G. T. Beauregard,
Gen. Leonidas Polk (seated), Gen. John C. Breckinridge, Gen. A. S.
Johnston, Gen. Braxton Bragg, and Maj. J. F. Gilmer. Gen. W. J.
Hardee was not present._]
[Illustration: _Cherry Mansion, Savannah, Tenn., used as
headquarters for the Union Army, March 13 to April 29, 1862. While
eating breakfast in this house, General Grant heard the sounds of
heavy firing which told him the battle had begun. Generals W. H. L.
Wallace and C. F. Smith died here in April 1862._]
In obedience to this order, Sherman encamped his division along a ridge
on either side of Shiloh Church, almost 3 miles from Pittsburg Landing,
with General Hurlbut’s division about a mile to his rear. Within a few
days, Gen. Benjamin M. Prentiss’ division took position on Sherman’s
left, while Gen. John A. McClernand and Gen. W. H. L. Wallace formed
their divisions between Sherman and the river. The 3d Division,
commanded by Gen. Lew Wallace, was stationed at Crump’s Landing, about 4
miles downstream from the main encampment. Thus, by April 5, 1862, there
were in the five divisions of the Army of the Tennessee at Pittsburg
Landing 39,830 officers and men present for duty and 7,564 at nearby
Crump’s Landing.
While this concentration of troops was in progress, General Smith
received a leg injury which became so serious that he had to give up his
command. General Grant was restored to duty and sent to Savannah with
orders to concentrate troops and supplies, but to bring on no general
engagement until a union could be made with Buell’s army, and Halleck
had arrived to assume personal command of the combined forces.
General Johnston, in the meantime, was concentrating all available
forces at Corinth, Miss., on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad. After
this had been accomplished, he resolved to take the offensive and attack
Grant’s army at Pittsburg Landing, hoping to defeat that army before it
could be reinforced by General Buell. Hearing that Buell was nearing
Savannah, Johnston determined to attack at once and accordingly on the
3d of April issued the order for the forward movement. He expected to
give battle at daylight on April 5th, but heavy rains and bad roads made
progress so slow that the last of his columns did not reach the field
until late afternoon. It was then decided that the attack should be
postponed until daylight the next morning. Johnston’s army, 43,968
strong, went into bivouac in order of battle within less than 2 miles of
the Federal camps. The Confederate forces were formed in three lines.
Gen. W. J. Hardee’s corps and one of Gen. Braxton Bragg’s brigades were
in the first line, the remainder of Bragg’s corps in the second line,
and Generals Leonidas Polk’s and J. C. Breckinridge’s corps in the third
line.
During the night of April 5th the two hostile armies were encamped
within a short distance of each other: the Confederates poised, ready to
attack, while the unsuspecting Union army went about its normal camp
routine, making no preparations for the defense of its position. On
Saturday, a few hours before the battle, Sherman wrote Grant: “I have no
doubt that nothing will occur to-day more than some picket firing,” and
that he did not “apprehend anything like an attack” on his position. The
same day, after Sherman’s report from the front, Grant, who was at
Savannah, telegraphed Halleck: “I have scarcely the faintest idea of an
attack (general one) being made upon us, but will be prepared should
such a thing take place.”
_The First Day_
The battle began about 4:55 a. m., Sunday, April 6, when a
reconnoitering party of Prentiss’ Union division encountered Hardee’s
skirmish line, under Maj. Aaron B. Hardcastle, a short distance in front
of Sherman’s camps. The reconnoitering party—three companies of the 25th
Missouri under Maj. James E. Powell—fighting and retreating slowly
toward its camps was reinforced by four companies of the 16th Wisconsin
and five companies of the 21st Missouri. These troops were, in turn,
reinforced at the northeast corner of Rhea Field by all of Col. Everett
Peabody’s brigade. Here they succeeded in holding the Confederates in
check until about 8 a. m., when they fell back to Prentiss’ line of
camps, closely followed by the enemy.
General Sherman, hearing the picket firing in his front, immediately got
his division under arms and posted a battery at Shiloh Church and
another on the ridge to the south. The left of this hastily formed line
received the full impact of the Confederate onslaught at about the same
time that Prentiss’ camps were attacked. One of the regiments in the
left brigade—the 53d Ohio—consisted of raw troops who had never been
under fire. Unable to withstand the fierce Confederate attack, this
regiment soon broke and fled to the rear. A short time later the other
two regiments of the brigade did likewise. The commander of the brigade,
Col. Jesse Hildebrand, refused to leave the field with his men. Since he
had no troops of his own, he acted as aide for General McClernand the
rest of the day.
[Illustration: _The Confederate charge upon Prentiss’ camps._ From
“Battles and Leaders of the Civil War.”]
General Prentiss, in the meantime, was making a gallant, but futile,
stand along his line of camps. Assailed by the eager Confederates in
front and on the flanks, his whole division soon broke and fell back in
confusion. He succeeded in rallying about 1,000 of his men on the center
of a line that W. H. L. Wallace and Hurlbut were forming with parts of
their divisions in a strong position in the rear. This new line, running
through a densely wooded area along an old sunken road, proved to be
such a strong position that the Confederates named the place “Hornets’
Nest” because of the stinging shot and shell they had to face there.
Meanwhile, General Grant at breakfast in Savannah heard the guns in the
battle of Shiloh. He at once sent word to the advance of Buell’s army,
which had already arrived at Savannah, to march immediately to the point
on the river opposite the battlefield. He then hurried up the river
aboard the steamer _Tigress_, moving in close enough to the shore at
Crump’s Landing to instruct Gen. Lew Wallace to be prepared to execute
any order he might receive. Upon arriving at the field, he dispatched
reinforcements to Prentiss and formed two regiments in line near
Pittsburg Landing, to arrest the tide of stragglers from the battle and
organize them to return. He then rode to the front.
While the Confederate right was engaged with Prentiss, the left,
supported by continuous artillery fire, was hurled against the combined
forces of Sherman and McClernand who were making a stubborn stand along
the ridge at Shiloh Church. This small log building, which gave its name
to the battle, was considered the key position of the field, as it
commanded the best road from Corinth to Pittsburg Landing. When General
Grant reached the church, about 10 a. m., his troops were heavily
engaged all along the line. They had resisted the relentless pounding
from the Confederate artillery and the repeated infantry charges for
over 2 hours. Seeing that the line could not hold much longer, Grant
dispatched orders to Lew Wallace to move to the field, expecting him to
reinforce the Union right. Leaving Sherman, he moved down the line to
the left to confer with his other division commanders. He visited
Prentiss in the Hornets’ Nest and directed him to hold his position
there at all hazards.
[Illustration: _Union defenders of the Hornets’ Nest (right)
repulsed 11 Confederate charges against the Sunken Road._]
[Illustration: _The Sunken Road near Bloody Pond._]
Soon after Grant’s departure, Sherman withdrew from Shiloh Ridge,
abandoning his camps and much of his equipment. He took a new position
behind the Hamburg-Purdy Road alongside McClernand who had been pushed
back on line with Prentiss’ Hornets’ Nest position.
Grant’s army was now posted on either side of Prentiss, making a line
approximately 3½ miles long. The opposing army was charging this line
with a series of frontal attacks, just as hard on the left as on the
right. This was contrary to Johnston’s plan of battle. He had intended
to push hardest on the Union left and seize their base of supplies at
the Landing. Without supplies or an avenue of escape, he hoped to drive
the disorganized Federals into the swamps of Snake and Owl Creeks and
destroy them.
Seeing that the enemy was being driven into its base of supplies rather
than away from it, Johnston, about noon, moved to the extreme right to
direct in person the activities of that wing of his army. There, he
found his troops exposed to a galling fire and unable to advance.
Determined to move his line forward, Johnston ordered and led a
successful charge. The Union lines recoiled, and the Confederates surged
forward about three-fourths of a mile. As Johnston sat on his horse,
watching the lines re-form, a ball from the gun of an unknown Union
soldier struck the Southern commander, severing the large artery in his
right leg. No surgeon being near, he died from loss of blood at 2:30 p.
m.
The death of Johnston caused a lull in the battle on the right flank for
about an hour. The situation was relieved somewhat by the fact that a
second in command was on the field. Gen. Pierre G. T. Beauregard was in
charge of headquarters which had been established near Shiloh Church.
When informed of Johnston’s death, he immediately assumed command. He
sent General Bragg to the right of the field and put Gen. Daniel Ruggles
in command at the center.
[Illustration: _Johnston mortally wounded._]
General Ruggles, having witnessed 11 unsuccessful charges against the
Hornets’ Nest, decided to concentrate artillery fire upon the position.
Therefore, he collected all the artillery he could find—62 pieces—and
opened fire upon the Union line. Under cover of continuous fire from
these guns, the Confederates attacked with renewed courage and redoubled
energy. Unable to withstand the assault, the troops on both the Federal
right and left withdrew toward the Landing, leaving Prentiss and W. H.
L. Wallace isolated in the Hornets’ Nest. As the Union forces withdrew,
the left of the Confederate line swung around and joined flanks with the
troops moving around from the right, thus forming a circle of fire
around Wallace and Prentiss.
Wallace, seeing that the other divisions were withdrawing and that his
command was being surrounded, gave the order for his troops to fall
back. To execute the order, his division had to pass through a ravine
which was already under the crossfire of the encircling Confederates.
Wallace was mortally wounded in the attempt, but two of his regiments
succeeded in passing through the valley, between the Confederate lines,
which they appropriately named “Hell’s Hollow.” Prentiss continued the
resistance until 5:30 p. m., when he was compelled to surrender with
over 2,200 troops—all that remained of the two divisions.
During the afternoon, Col. Joseph D. Webster, Grant’s Chief of
Artillery, placed a battery of siege guns around the crest of a hill
about a quarter of a mile in from the Landing. The smaller field
artillery pieces were put in position on either side of them as they
were moved back from the front. The two wooden gunboats, _Tyler_ and
_Lexington_, anchored opposite the mouth of Dill Branch, further
strengthened the line. As the remnants of the shattered Union Army
drifted back toward the Landing, they were rallied along this line of
cannon.
[Illustration: _Gen. Ulysses S. Grant._
Courtesy National Archives.]
After the capture of Prentiss, an attempt was made to reorganize the
Confederates for an attack upon the Union position near the Landing.
Before a coordinated attack could be made, Beauregard, who had received
word that Buell would not arrive in time to save Grant’s army, sent out
the order from his headquarters at Shiloh Church to suspend the attack.
Unknown to Beauregard, the advance of Buell’s army had already arrived
opposite Pittsburg Landing and was being rapidly ferried across the
river.
During Sunday night and Monday morning, Buell moved approximately 17,000
troops into line on the Union left. Lew Wallace put almost 6,000 fresh
troops—Fort Donelson veterans—in position on the right. The
Confederates, receiving no reinforcements, spent a sleepless night in
the captured Union camps annoyed by shells from the gunboats, which were
thrown among them at 15-minute intervals throughout the night.
[Illustration: _Gen. Don Carlos Buell._
Courtesy National Archives.]
The battle had already raged for 13 hours. Charge after charge had been
made by the Confederates, followed by Federal countercharges. Ground had
been gained and lost, but the general direction of movement had always
been toward the Landing. By the time the day was over and the weary
soldiers had lain down to rest, the Confederates were in possession of
all the field, except the Landing and a bit of adjoining territory. Many
Southern soldiers, in view of the gains made during the day, believed
that the victory was already theirs. An equally large number of
Northerners were willing to concede defeat. When night at last closed in
around the hostile armies, feelings of uncertainty prevailed among the
leaders on both sides. Many of them were well aware that the battle was
yet to be won or lost.
_The Second Day_
Monday morning, April 7, at daylight, the vanquished of the previous day
renewed the struggle with increased strength and restored confidence.
Anxious to take the initiative, the Union armies were put in motion
almost simultaneously, with Buell on the left, Lew Wallace on the
extreme right, and Grant’s weary troops occupying the space between. The
movement began unopposed, except by small unsupported parties which were
quickly forced to retreat.
The Confederates had been unable to reorganize their widely scattered
forces during the night. Therefore, when the Union advance began on
Monday the opposing line of battle was yet unformed. The Confederates
were still back in the vicinity of the captured Union camps vainly
trying to reorganize their broken commands. They did not succeed in
forming a line until after the enemy had advanced beyond the Peach
Orchard and the Hornets’ Nest, regaining much of the territory they had
lost the day before.
[Illustration: _Young Confederate enlisted men from the Washington
Artillery of New Orleans._ From a photograph made prior to the
Battle of Shiloh.]
The Confederates, one brigade strong, were first encountered by Lew
Wallace a short distance in front of his Sunday night bivouac. In a
brief but spirited engagement, the Confederates were attacked in front
and on the left flank by the Union division. To keep from being
surrounded, they fell back almost a mile in the direction of Shiloh
Church to take their place in the forming line of battle.
In the meantime, Buell moved his troops rapidly forward until they
developed the Confederate line of battle west of the Peach Orchard. The
Southerners boldly charged the advancing Union infantry which had moved
forward so rapidly that its artillery was still far to the rear. Without
artillery support, the Federals were unable to withstand the violent
assault of the Confederates and were forced to make a hasty retreat. The
timely arrival and effective use of two batteries of artillery permitted
the Union line again to advance, only to be driven back once more by the
stubborn Confederates.
The battle now raged the entire length of the field. Charge followed by
countercharge moved the fitfully swaying line first toward the river and
then toward the church. The advantage would seem to rest momentarily
with the weary Southerners, but would soon be lost to their greatly
strengthened opponent. Commands became so intermingled and confused that
it was often impossible to distinguish between friend and foe. The
Confederates, clad in a variety of colored uniforms, with no
well-defined line and on an ever-changing front, suffered the heavier
losses from the fire of their own troops.
Meanwhile, General Beauregard, at Shiloh Church, anxiously awaited the
return of couriers he had dispatched to Corinth to hurry forward Gen.
Earl Van Dorn’s army of about 20,000 men, daily expected there from Van
Buren, Ark. He had promised to make a junction with General Beauregard
as soon as possible, but was delayed because he had no means of
transporting his troops across the Mississippi. Unaware that Van Dorn
was still in Arkansas, General Beauregard maintained his largest troop
concentration in the vicinity of the church to defend the
Corinth-Pittsburg Road so that reinforcements could be quickly moved
onto the field. As soon as it became known that additional troops were
not on the way, Beauregard realized that the road would have to be kept
open as a possible line of retreat. The Union commanders were equally
determined to drive the Confederates from the position. Consequently,
furious fighting raged before the church long after the tempo of the
battle had slackened on each flank.
Despite all efforts of the Confederates, the Union line continued slowly
to advance. In desperation the Confederates made a gallant charge, first
expending their ammunition and then relying on the bayonet. The charge
carried the surging line through waist-deep Water Oaks Pond, beyond
which the fire from the adversary became so strong that the line was
brought to an abrupt halt. Taking cover at the edge of a woods, they
repulsed every attempt by the Federals to advance.
[Illustration: _Arrival of Federal reinforcements._]
[Illustration: _The first tent field hospital ever used for the
treatment of the wounded on the battlefield was established at
Shiloh, April 7, 1862._]
By 2 p. m. General Beauregard decided it was useless to prolong the
unequal struggle. Since early morning, his lines had been forced back,
step by step, with heavy losses. From all parts of the field his
subordinates were sending urgent requests for reinforcements, which he
was unable to supply. Even his position at the church was in danger of
being taken. A continuation of the battle could bring only additional
disasters upon his already greatly depleted ranks. To forestall a
complete rout, he ordered a rear guard with artillery support to be put
in position on the ridge west of the church and instructed his corps
commanders to begin withdrawing their troops. By 4 o’clock, the last of
the Confederate Army, or what was left of it, had retired from the field
and was leisurely making its way back to Corinth without a single
Federal soldier in pursuit.
The Union armies did not attempt to harass the retreating Southern
columns or attack them when they went into bivouac for the night.
Instead, Grant’s troops, from the privates to the highest commanders,
appear to have been content to return to their recaptured camps, while
the Confederates returned to their former positions in and around
Corinth to recruit and reorganize.
In explanation of his inactivity Grant said: “My force was too much
fatigued from two days’ hard fighting and exposure in the open air to a
drenching rain during the intervening night, to pursue immediately.
Night closed in cloudy and with heavy rain, making roads impracticable
for artillery by the next morning.”
The next morning, April 8, however, Gen. Thomas J. Wood, with his
division, and Sherman, with two brigades and the 4th Illinois Cavalry,
went in pursuit. Toward evening they came upon the Confederate rear
guard at Fallen Timbers, about 6 miles from the battlefield. The
Southern cavalry, commanded by Col. Nathan Bedford Forrest, charged the
Federals, putting the skirmishers to flight and throwing the Union
cavalry into confusion. The Confederates, pursuing too vigorously, came
suddenly upon the main body of Federal infantry and were repulsed, after
Colonel Forrest had been seriously wounded in the side. Before returning
to camp, the Northerners tarried long enough to bury their 15 dead,
gather up their 25 wounded, and find out that they had lost 75 as
prisoners. The spirited action of the Confederate rear guard at Fallen
Timbers put an end to all ideas of further pursuit by the Federals.
_Results of the Battle_
The losses on each side at Shiloh were unusually heavy. Grant’s army of
39,830 had been reinforced by 25,255 during the night between the 2
days’ battle, swelling the total number of Union troops engaged to
65,085, excluding a guard detachment of 1,727 men left at Crump’s
Landing. Of that total number 1,754 were reported killed, 8,408 wounded,
and 2,885 missing; presenting an aggregate of 13,047 casualties.
The army under Generals Johnston and Beauregard had gone into battle
with 43,968 men of all arms and condition. They received no
reinforcements, except 731 men of Col. Munson R. Hill’s Tennessee
Regiment who had reached the front unarmed and were furnished with arms
and equipment picked up from the field. The Southerners lost 1,728
killed, 8,012 wounded, and 959 captured or missing, or a total of 10,699
casualties.
_“Present” and “Casualties” at Shiloh_
Present for duty Casualties
Killed Wounded Missing Total
UNION
Army of the Tennessee (April 39,830 1,433 6,202 2,818 10,453
6)
_Reinforcements (April 7)_
Army of the Tennessee 7,337 80 399 12 491
Army of the Ohio 17,918 241 1,807 55 2,103
Total Federals engaged[1] 65,085 1,754 8,408 2,885 13,047
CONFEDERATE
Army of the Mississippi 43,968 1,728 8,012 959 10,699
(April 6)
_Reinforcements (April 7)_
Hill’s 47th Tennessee 731
Total Confederates engaged 44,699 1,728 8,012 959 10,699
Grand Total 109,784 3,482 16,420 3,844 23,746
[1]Does not include 1,727 troops left at Crump’s Landing as rear guard.
During the first few weeks following the battle, both sides claimed a
victory. The Confederates based their claim upon the facts that they had
inflicted an almost complete rout on the Federals on Sunday, April 6,
and that they had been able to hold a part of the field until they
withdrew in good order on Monday. Furthermore, they said, the Union
armies were so battered that they were unable to pursue.
[Illustration: _Shiloh National Cemetery._]
[Illustration: _Bloody Pond._]
[Illustration: CONFEDERATE PLAN OF BATTLE]
Johnston expected to push rapidly with his right wing around Grant’s
left as shown by the long black arrow. Such a move would drive the
Federal Army downstream away from its base of supplies at Pittsburg
Landing. The Confederates would then envelop and defeat the
Federals.
[Illustration: HOW THE BATTLE WAS FOUGHT]
The Battle of Shiloh developed into a series of frontal attacks with
the left of the Confederate Army moving faster than the right. By
the end of the first day the Federals had been pushed back into
their base of supplies at Pittsburg Landing where they were strongly
protected by gunboats and artillery. On the second day, Federal
reinforcements turned the tide of battle and swept the Confederates
from the field.
The Federals claimed the victory upon the grounds that on Monday evening
they had recovered their encampments and had possession of the field
from which the Confederates had retired, leaving behind a large number
of their dead and wounded.
After the Battle of Shiloh the Confederates were compelled to withdraw
southward. Corinth was abandoned to the North on May 30th, severing the
railroad from Memphis to Chattanooga. By the end of June 1862, only
those forts on the Mississippi River near Vicksburg remained in Southern
hands. After a long siege, Vicksburg fell to the North on July 4, 1863,
cutting the Confederacy in two.
_Guide to the Area_
For the benefit of visitors who are unable to take the guided tour,
numbered markers have been placed at points of interest in the park to
correspond with the following numbered sections and those shown on the
guide map. For the complete tour, Nos. 1 to 17 should be followed in
consecutive order.
[Illustration: _Grant’s last line._]
1. IOWA STATE MONUMENT.
This 75-foot monument, designed by E. F. Triebel, was erected by the
State of Iowa in 1906. Surmounting the main shaft are a bronze capital,
globe, and an eagle with a wingspread of 15 feet. Ascending the steps at
the base of the monument is a bronze statue, symbolic of “Fame,”
inscribing a tribute to the Iowa soldiers who fought in the battle. In
addition to this monument, Iowa has 11 regimental monuments on the
field.
[Illustration: SHILOH NATIONAL MILITARY PARK
TENNESSEE]
The pyramid of cannon balls north of the monument marks the headquarters
site of Gen. W. H. L. Wallace. When the battle opened, there were five
Union divisions on the field. All of the divisional camps, except this
one, were captured by the Confederates on the first day of the battle.
The siege guns southwest of the monument are the heaviest pieces used in
this battle. They had an accurate range of about 2,000 yards whereas,
the ordinary cannon were effective at only about 1,100 yards. These
cannon represent the last Union line, formed late Sunday afternoon,
extending from the river to Snake Creek Bridge, a distance of about 2
miles.
The small earthwork beyond the siege guns is the only one thrown up on
this battlefield. The emplacement was not used, however, because the
Federals took the offensive early the next morning.
[Illustration: _Confederate Monument, erected by the United
Daughters of the Confederacy._]