English writers--utterly denied as its truth has been by the
party so accused. But, strangely enough, although there was every
probability that Napoleon’s account of his own strength, and of
that of his opponent, would be wholly untrustworthy--several of our
best English writers have given entire credence of his statement
of the real amount of his army; even while those statements are
clearly refuted by abundant testimonies of many Frenchmen. And this
point is not an immaterial one. For if we could admit the truth of
Napoleon’s final conclusion, that “On that day 69,000 French beat
120,000 men, and the victory was only torn from them between eight
and nine o’clock at night by the increase of the allies to 150,000
men”[17]--what merit could we assign to the British soldiers, or to
their great commander, for such a victory? But, in sober verity, of
all the falsehoods deliberately put forth by Napoleon in the course
of his life, this, probably, is nearly the greatest.
Let us, however, now endeavour to arrange our narrative in its
proper order. The army which was assembling in Belgium under
the Duke’s command, had reached, in the beginning of June, the
respectable amount of almost 100,000 men. It contained, however,
far more Belgians, Hanoverians, Brunswickers, and Dutchmen, than
British troops, and far more new levies, landwehr, and militia,
than of experienced soldiers. The English regiments which had
followed the Duke through all the fields of Spain had been sent to
America, and were now on the Atlantic, on their return home. He had
some of the Guards, and a few other regiments of some standing; but
the largest portion of the British troops which had yet reached
Belgium were second battalions--new recruits drafted from the
militia--and the same observation would apply to the Hanoverians
and other auxiliaries.
It was a knowledge of this intrinsic weakness of the Duke’s army,
and of the fact that 10,000 or 15,000 of his old Peninsular
troops would soon join him, that decided Napoleon, as is frankly
confessed,[18] to make a sudden attack on the British and Prussian
forces before they were fully prepared to meet him. Silently,
therefore, but with his usual skill and rapidity, Napoleon brought
together a powerful army, and on the morning of the 15th of June he
moved forward and entered Belgium.
And here we are met by the most current of all the fictions
which are connected with this history. A variety of writers have
repeated, one after another--Napoleon himself setting them the
example--the story that the Duke never heard of the approach of the
French until eleven o’clock in the evening of that day, while at a
ball at Brussels. The facts, however, which are beyond dispute, are
these--that the French did not enter Charleroi, the first Belgian
town, until eleven or twelve o’clock on June the 15th--that tidings
of their movement reached the Duke at Brussels by three o’clock,
and that between four and five o’clock that same afternoon orders
went out to every corps of the British army to move to the front,
many of them beginning their march that same evening. There was no
surprise, then, nor was there the loss of a single day. The French
had not marched thirty miles--had not entered any place of the
least importance, when, on the third day, they found the British
army drawn up across their path, and had to fight the battle of
Waterloo.
They had, indeed, found their progress arrested still earlier.
Entering Belgium on the 15th, they were stopped the very next day
at Ligny by the Prussians, at Quatre Bras by a part of the English
army. Marshal Blucher being defeated, and retiring a few miles,
the Duke fell back also, and thus was enabled to draw up his army
at Waterloo--a position which he had before observed to be an
advantageous one, and which was in all respects well suited to the
defence of Brussels.
It was on the afternoon of the 17th June that the Duke’s army found
itself assembled on this spot. The French army, led by Napoleon
himself, soon approached, but the day was too far advanced to
afford time for a general engagement. The two armies, therefore,
took position, the English on a rising ground called Mont St. Jean,
about half a mile in advance of the village of Waterloo, and nine
miles on the French side of Brussels; the French on a series of
heights facing Mont St. Jean, having the village of Planchenoit on
the right, and looking down upon a small valley which separated the
two hosts.
And now we are naturally brought to a consideration of the
question, what was the respective strength of these two armies?
This is a point upon which Napoleon has bestowed great pains in
his “Historical Memoir, Book ix,” and on which he has succeeded in
deluding many English writers.
As to the strength of the British army, there can be no kind of
doubt upon that point, for the actual numbers present in each
battalion and squadron was carefully recorded; and these records
were needed to establish the respective rights of all present to
honours and rewards. We have spoken of a gross amount of nearly
100,000 men. But of these, several thousands were required to
garrison Antwerp, Ostend, Nieuport, Ypres, Tournai, and Mons,--the
loss at Quatre Bras had been 3000 or 4000, and a post of
observation at Hal, consisted of nearly 6000. When these deductions
were made, not quite 70,000 men remained, to meet Napoleon’s attack
at Waterloo.
The British infantry in the field were 15,181, and the German
Legion infantry were 3301. The British and German cavalry were
7840, and their artillery was 3493. Thus the whole reliable force
of the Duke--the force to which he must look to stand the French
attack--was not quite 30,000 men. All this was well known to
Napoleon, who, in his “Book ix,” says, “Victory appeared to be
_certain_,” for the French army consisted of “good troops, while,
in the enemy’s army, the English only, amounting to 40,000 _at
most_, could be reckoned upon as such.”[19]
The “Allied troops,” who made up the Duke’s array, consisted of
10,755 Hanoverians, many of whom were mere landwehr or militia, and
nearly 25,000 Belgians, Dutch, and men of Brunswick and Nassau.
Some of these fought gallantly, but others retreated whenever
the French approached,--some actually flying from the field.
Hence Napoleon justly says, “one Englishman might be counted
for one Frenchman:--two Dutchmen, Prussians, or soldiers of the
Confederation, for one Frenchman.”
Adopting, therefore, Napoleon’s own method of calculation, we may
say, that the Duke had an army nominally amounting to about 68,000
men, really equal to something less than 50,000.
And now we turn to the other side of the account. Here we must,
to be safe, accept only French testimony. If we draw together all
the credible statements of this class that we can find, we shall
probably be able to arrive at a just conclusion.
There was published at Paris, in 1815, a volume by an officer
attached to the staff, which may be considered to be “the French
account,” at the time and in detail, of this battle. In this
volume, the whole army which entered Belgium is stated to have been
“150,000 effective men of whom about 30,000 were cavalry.” It seems
improbable that a staff-officer should have greatly erred, or that
a Frenchman should have exaggerated the strength of the beaten
army. Reckoning, therefore, the gross number to have been 150,000;
and deducting 15,000 for losses at Ligny, and at Quatre Bras, we
may estimate the force detached under Grouchy on the 17th, at about
38 or 40,000 men, and the strength of the French army at Waterloo
at something more than 90,000.
And this estimate precisely agrees with Napoleon’s own statement,
written at Paris three days after the battle. In this bulletin he
says, “We estimated the force of the English army at 80,000 men. We
_supposed_ that a Prussian corps which _might be_ in line toward
the right might be 15,000 men. The enemy’s force, then, was upwards
of 90,000 men; ours less numerous.”
He is here speaking of the morning. But there was not a Prussian
soldier in the field until five o’clock in the afternoon; and this
Napoleon well knew. Why, then, does he here introduce a “supposed”
Prussian corps? Clearly, in order to bring up the allied force
to 95,000 men, so that he might be able to add, “Ours, _less
numerous_.” He had every possible motive, as a beaten General,
striving to make the best of his case,--for saying, _if he had
dared_,--“The enemy was more than 90,000 strong, but we had not
quite 70,000.” But he could not venture, in the face of abundant
evidence then existing, to say that his army was less than 80,000,
the force he assigns to the English. He therefore, by an “ingenious
device,” augments the allied force to 95,000; and then he can
venture to assert that his own army was inferior in numbers. There
is clearly implied in this statement an admission that his own
force was not greatly below 95,000.
Yet when Ney and others were dead, and the records, in all
probability, scattered or destroyed, the same man who wrote this
bulletin, concocted at St. Helena, four or five years after, a
widely-different account. In his “Book ix,” p. 128, he puts forth
an elaborate table, purporting to show, that the whole force of the
French army at Waterloo was only 68,650 men! And such has been the
imposing effect of this table, that many English writers, while
they could detect the falsehood of other statements in that same
volume, still accepted, as an undeniable fact, the conclusion, that
Napoleon’s army at Waterloo consisted of only 68,650 men! Yet only
common prudence, and the use of a little careful scrutiny, was
needed, to prove that these same elaborate tables in “Book ix” were
nothing more than what is usually called, in railway language, “a
cooked account.”
The proof of this shall be given from French writers alone. And,
first, let “Book ix” refute itself, by its own self contradictions.
At page 71, it gives the second corps, 19,800 infantry; while at
p. 95-97, it states the same infantry, at the same moment, at
21,000. At page 128 it gives the first corps 16,500 infantry, and
at table F it calls the same infantry, 17,600. At page 128 the
cavalry of the Guard and the third and fourth corps of cavalry are
stated at 10,000; while at pp. 158 and 173 they are twice called
12,000. At p. 35 we are told that “the regiments generally had but
two battalions; each battalion consisting of 600 men, _present and
under arms_.” Yet in the principal table, F, the regiments are
always estimated at either 1000 or 1100 men, the battalions at 500
or 550. Thus it is abundantly clear, even from the pages of “Book
ix” itself, that its writer is one who “plays at fast and loose
with figures.”
But other refutations, from purely French sources, are abundant.
We have seen that Napoleon states, in “Book ix,” p. 35, that his
battalions had 600 men; but that he quietly puts them down in table
F, as being only 500 or 550.
Now in his portfolio, captured at Charleroi, and published at
Brussels, there was one report, made by an officer named De
Launoy, and dated “Montalimert, June 4th,” which said, “The first
battalion, 720 strong, marched on the 1st of June.” And, in the
_Moniteur_ of May 28th, published at Paris under Napoleon’s own
authority, there was given a letter dated “Lille, May 26th,” which
says, “Our garrison is entirely composed of battalions of select
troops, which successively arrive: the 20th arrived yesterday;
almost all consist of 720 men; we are expecting two battalions of
veterans.” Now these troops formed part of the first corps, as
stated in “Book ix,” p. 31; and in table F they are all set down as
having in each battalion, 550 men!
It was of this first corps that Marshal Ney spoke in his letter
of June 26th, 1815, in which he complained of having it taken
away from him on the 16th. He describes it as having consisted
of “between 25,000 and 30,000 men.” He must have had the actual
returns in his pocket when he wrote this. Now if the battalions
generally consisted of 720 men, as the _Moniteur_ of May 28th
had told us, then its thirty-two battalions would have contained
23,040; which added to 1400 cavalry, and 1564 artillery men, would
be accurately described as “between 25,000 and 30,000 men.” But
Napoleon, in his statement of the force at Waterloo, sets down
the infantry of this corps as only 16,500; thus contradicting at
once the statement of the _Moniteur_, the report found in his own
portfolio, and the declaration of the Marshal who commanded that
corps!
In the same spirit, in the table of the troops at Waterloo, (Book
ix, p. 128,) we find the infantry of the Guard set down as being
11,500. Yet Gourgaud, Napoleon’s Aide-de-Camp, and Fleury de
Chaboulon, his secretary, both concur in stating this infantry to
have been 14,000.[20]
Of the heavy cavalry we have already seen, that while Napoleon,
in his table, at p. 128, sets it down at 4000, 3000, and 3000, or
10,000 in all, he afterwards twice describes it, at p. 158 and at
p. 173, as “these 12,000 select horse.”
Once more, in “Book ix,” p. 129, he states the force detached under
Grouchy to have been 34,300. His own companion at St. Helena,
General Montholon, in his history, (vol. i, p. 14,) calls this
force 42,000.
All this evidence, then, drawn from several quarters, but wholly
French, points to one conclusion,--namely, that Napoleon, in
forming his tables for “Book ix,” deliberately reduced his real
strength at Waterloo by about one-fourth or one-fifth; and that his
first statement, in his bulletin issued at the time, was the true
one; namely, that his army was only somewhat “less numerous than
95,000.”
And to this conclusion a remarkable support is found, in
the behaviour of the two Generals on the day preceding the
action. Wellington had beaten nearly every one of Napoleon’s
Marshals;[21]--and could not but feel a degree of exultation at the
thought of meeting the master of them all. Napoleon, on his part,
had to encounter a General who had never been conquered. Supposing,
then, the armies to have been nearly equal in strength, what might
have been anticipated, but a degree of eager anticipation on
Wellington’s side, and of seriousness on Napoleon’s? Instead of
which, what do we hear? The Duke writes to Marshal Blucher, that he
will accept battle, _if_ the Marshal will assist him with one corps
of his army. Meanwhile, Napoleon’s only anxiety is lest the English
should escape him. “He was surprised,” writes his secretary,
Fleury, “when daylight discovered to him that the English army had
not quitted its positions, but appeared disposed to accept battle.”
“He returned to his head-quarters (Book ix, p. 125) full of
satisfaction at the great fault committed by the enemy’s General.”
“He held this,” says Brialmont, “to be rashness, and a fault,
exclaiming, ‘At last, then, I have them,--these English!’” Do not
these views and anticipations, on the part of both of the Generals,
make it quite evident that each of them was fully aware of the
great superiority of the French army; and of the temerity of which
the Duke would be guilty if, without any assurance of support, he
ventured on an engagement in the face of such odds?
It is worth remark, too, that while several of the best English
writers have accepted with the most good-natured simplicity,
Napoleon’s own account of the force with which he fought this
battle--French historians, even when admirers of Napoleon, show
much less faith in his assertions. Thus, Lamartine, having
Napoleon’s ixth Book before him, in which the number, “sixty-eight
thousand, six hundred and fifty men,” is strenuously insisted
on--quietly disregards the fiction, and repeatedly speaks of the
French force as being “eighty thousand men.”[22]
But Napoleon’s “_certainty_ of success,” of which he speaks at p.
127 of his Book ix, rested more upon the superior _quality_ of
his troops than on their superior _numbers_. He was thoroughly
well aware, both of the slight value of the Belgian and Hanoverian
auxiliaries, and of the excellence of his own troops. And the Duke,
also, knew full well both of these facts. On the 8th of May he had
written to Lord Stewart, “I have got an infamous army; very weak
and ill-equipped; and a very inexperienced staff.” And seven days
after the battle, he repeated to Lord Bathurst, that he had got
“not only the worst troops, but the worst-equipped army, with the
worst staff, that ever was brought together.”[23]
On the other hand, Napoleon’s army was, for its amount, the finest
that he had ever led into the field. Thus his secretary, Fleury,
says, “The whole army was superb, and full of ardour.” Lamartine
speaks of it as “his grand army of chosen men; every battalion of
which had a soul equal to the utmost extremity.” Napoleon himself,
in “Book ix,” says: “The spectacle was really magnificent: the
earth seemed proud of being trod by such intrepid combatants.” And
at St. Helena he told O’Meara: “My troops were so good, that I
esteemed them sufficient to beat a hundred and twenty thousand.”[24]
Thus, as Brialmont remarks, whatever might be the numerical
proportion of the two armies, “when we come to look at the
respective qualities of the troops, the inferiority of the
Anglo-Belgian army _was enormous_. Not only was it composed of
heterogeneous elements, but it consisted almost entirely of young
soldiers, a large proportion of whom had never been under fire. The
Hanoverian contingent was made up of militia; and many regiments
were fit only for garrison duty.”[25]
The evening which preceded the memorable 18th of June was dark
and cloudy; the rain fell in torrents, and the men were often
ankle-deep in water. But, however deplorable might be their
outward condition, the interest of this eventful moment rendered
the combatants on either side, almost insensible to physical
sufferings. Every man in both armies knew that a great and
decisive battle was to be fought on the following day. With the
opening morning, then, would begin what might prove the final
contest,--ending a strife of nations which had lasted more than
twenty years. The two greatest Generals of the age were for the
first time to be brought into collision: the conqueror of Europe
was to measure swords with the deliverer of Spain. No two such
leaders, it has been well observed, had confronted each other,
since Hannibal and Scipio met at Zama.
Doubtless, and very naturally, the greatest degree of confidence
was felt in the camp of the invaders. The French soldiers relied
with reason on the extraordinary talents of their great leader,
victorious in fifty contests, foiled in scarcely any. The men
who stood by his side, too, were the veterans who had marched
triumphantly over many victorious fields, and who now felt defeat,
under such a Captain, to be scarcely possible. They were confident,
too, in their numbers. All of them had heard that the Emperor had
carried over the frontier a picked army of 150,000 men. They saw
on the heights around them the first and second corps, amounting
together to nearly 50,000 men, with the sixth, less numerous,
in reserve. The Imperial Guard was there, from 18,000 to 20,000
strong,--the finest troops that France had ever possessed, and the
cuirassiers, nearly 6,000 in number. What could a mixed force of a
few English, joined with Belgians, Hanoverians, and Dutchmen, do
against such a power?
Very naturally, therefore, we learn from Gourgaud, that “the French
troops were full of enthusiasm. Such were the acclamations of joy,
that they prevented the orders from being heard.”[26] From Napoleon
to his Generals, from the Generals to the troops, the feeling
had spread and become universal. “Ah! we have them, then,--these
English!”
The British troops had not the same ground of confidence. They knew
well that their own numbers did not amount to one-third of the
strength of Napoleon’s army, and that the Hanoverian and Belgian
landwehr, by whom their line was to be filled up, were of very
uncertain value. Many of the battalions, both English and foreign,
had never been in action before. Still, they had a great and
well-founded trust in their Commander; and with a spirit like his
own, they meant to _do their duty_, and while they lived, to stand
their ground.
The field of Waterloo, or the heights of Mont St. Jean, as the
English and the French respectively call this spot, is a piece of
slightly-elevated ground lying, as we have already said, about 1000
yards in advance of the village of Waterloo. Brussels, in which
Napoleon intended to sleep that night, was about nine miles in the
rear of the English army. The main road from Charleroi to Brussels
passed through the French position, descended into the valley, and
then ascended Mont St. Jean, cutting the English position at right
angles near a farm-house called La Haye Sainte. The English line
lay about 200 yards behind this farm-house. Here was the centre
and left centre. In advance of the right wing of the English army,
and between it and the left wing of the French, stood a larger
house, surrounded by walled gardens and orchards, and called
Hougoumont. As this place would have afforded great advantages to
the French in preparing attacking columns, the Duke placed in it
some companies of the Foot-Guards, with some Nassau and Hanoverian
troops, and enjoined its resolute defence. Well were his orders
obeyed, for the utmost efforts of a whole army corps of the French
were ineffectual to carry this position. The French lost 6 or 8000
men in the attempt, but up to the very close of the day the English
Foot-Guards maintained their possession.
The position of Waterloo was deliberately chosen by the Duke,
and the choice is commended by all unprejudiced critics. Yet
Napoleon, ungenerous throughout, strives to depreciate his
antagonist’s judgment in this particular. He says, in “Book
ix:”--“The English General had in his rear the defiles of the
forest of Soignes, so that if beaten, retreat was impossible”
(p. 125). Upon which M. Lamartine observes: “In fighting on the
borders of a forest fortified in all its approaches, as well as
by its own impenetrability, the Duke had every pledge of victory,
if victory was possible; and of a secure retreat if defeat were
unavoidable. Waterloo was an admirable field of battle, and it is
to be regretted that Napoleon has not acknowledged this, but has
obstinately striven to prove that his conqueror was unworthy of
him. These are the littlenesses of glory. The choice of Waterloo
on Wellington’s part was a further mark of that genius, at once
resolute, powerful, and prudent, which has characterized all the
campaigns of this General.”
It should be added, that the Duke, during five years of constant
warfare with the French armies, had never once been beaten by them
in a pitched battle. Nor had he any thought of retreating upon the
present occasion, or any desire to make a special provision for
such an emergency. In after years he dropped the remark: “I knew
that they could never so beat us, but that we could have made good
the forest against them.”
And now the several divisions of the two armies were placed in the
positions which to the two commanders seemed suitable. On the left
of Napoleon’s line he placed his second corps, which he himself
states to have consisted of 17,000 men, and which undoubtedly
was nearer 20,000. This corps, to which his brother Jerome was
attached, was ordered to seize upon Hougoumont, and then to attack
the right of the British army. Napoleon’s right wing was formed
of his first corps, under Ney’s command. This corps had not yet
been in action, and was complete. Napoleon sets down its strength
us 17,900 men; but Ney, who commanded it, describes it as “from
twenty-five to thirty thousand.” In the second line stood the
sixth corps, consisting of 7 or 8000 men; the heavy cavalry, of
about 7000; and in a third line stood the Imperial Guard, which, of
cavalry and infantry, had at least 18,000. The artillery numbered
more than 6000 men, with 240 cannon. The entire force was probably
described with truth in Napoleon’s bulletin of the battle, in which
he calls it “less than 95,000.”