Wellington. After a short siege, during which it sustained a heavy
bombardment, and by which the whole town was nearly laid in ruins,
it was stormed by General Graham, and taken, August 31st, 1803.
The loss was almost all on the British side in the storming--the
Spaniards losing few.
ST. VINCENT, BATTLE OF CAPE.--Between the Spanish and British
fleets off this Cape. The latter was commanded by Admiral Sir
John Jarvis, who took four line of battle ships, and damaged
considerably the rest of the Spanish fleet, February 14th, 1797.
His own fleet consisted of 15 sail of the line only--whilst the
enemy’s fleet was 27 sail, 7 of which carried from 112 to 130 guns
each.
ST. VINCENT, CAPE.--Admiral Rooke, with 20 men of war, and the
Turkish fleet, under his convoy, was attacked by Admiral Tourville
with a force vastly superior to his own, when 12 English and Dutch
men of war, and 80 merchant men were taken or destroyed by the
French, June 16th, 1693. Here, also, Admiral Rodney destroyed
several Spanish ships, January 16th, 1780.
SALAMANCA, BATTLE OF.--Fought July 22nd, 1812.--“Lord Wellington
had fought the battle of Talavera in less than three months after
he had marched out of Lisbon, and in only three months and six days
after his landing in Portugal. He had seen some kind of action and
enterprise to be absolutely necessary. It was demanded by England;
it was expected by Spain and Portugal. Hence he first drove the
French out of Oporto and out of the Portuguese dominions, and then,
in conjunction with a Spanish army, marched upon Madrid, and fought
a battle with the French.
But these three months sufficed to show him, how utterly valueless
was the aid proffered him by the Spaniards. They left him without
provisions; they furnished him with no means of transport; and when
they placed an army by his side, that army could do nothing but run
away, and spread alarm and consternation on every side. Hence, so
soon as he fully understood the real condition of affairs, he wrote
home to the British government in these plain terms:
“Spain has proved untrue to her alliance because she is untrue to
herself;” “and until some great change shall be effected in the
conduct of the military resources of Spain, and in the state of
her armies, no British army can attempt safely to co-operate with
Spanish troops in the territories of Spain.”
Having arrived at this conclusion, Lord Wellington soon withdrew
his army from Spain, retired into Portugal, and began to concert
measures for the effectual defence of that kingdom. At home,
party spirit, as usual, led to injustice. The opposition in the
British parliament questioned the whole of his conduct of the past
campaign. Sir W. Napier tells us, that “his merits, they said, were
nought; his actions silly, presumptuous, and rash; his campaign one
deserving not reward but punishment. Yet he had delivered Portugal,
cleared Galicia and Estramadura, and forced 100,000 French veterans
to abandon the offensive and concentrate about Madrid!”
He now calmly submitted to the British government his views of
the defence of Portugal. He assigned to Marshal Beresford the
organization of the Portuguese army; he required only 13,000
British troops to be permanently maintained; and with this force
he expected to be able to defend Portugal, at least until Spain
should be thoroughly subdued by the French; so as to allow of the
concentration of their whole force on the work of subjugating
Portugal.
The wisdom and expediency of this employment of English troops
and English revenues in foreign war, was abundantly evident. For,
when the Continent should have been wholly conquered by Napoleon,
he would then, as he plainly declared, attempt the invasion of
England. Hence, to keep his armies employed in the Peninsula, was
the way plainly pointed out by common sense, as likely to postpone
or wholly avert a French invasion of the British islands. To defend
Portugal, therefore, was Wellington’s first object; for Portugal
had become a sort of outwork of England.
The Spanish government, meanwhile, with equal imbecility and
self-sufficiency, chose to rush into inevitable defeat. They
had starved the English army; which, in a whole month, got only
ten days’ bread; and which lost 1000 horses from mere want of
provender; and had thus forced Lord Wellington to retire into
Portugal. They now choose, with an army of 50,000 men, to give
battle to the French at Ocana; where, on the 12th of November,
they sustained such a total defeat, that ten days after the battle
not a single battalion kept the field. No fewer than 20,000 of the
Spaniards laid down their arms, and the rest were utterly scattered
and dispersed.
At the opening of 1810, Napoleon resolved to complete the conquest
of the Peninsula. He augmented his armies in Spain to 360,000 men.
One army, consisting of 65,000 men, under the command of Soult, was
charged with the subjugation of Andalusia; and another, of 80,000
men, under Massena, was to move to the west, and reduce Portugal.
Now, therefore, must Wellington’s plans for the defence of Portugal
be brought to the test.
The actual force of Massena’s army in May, 1810, is shown by French
returns given by Sir W. Napier, to have been 86,847 men.
On the 1st of June the French commander invested Ciudad Rodrigo,
which capitulated on the 11th of July. Almeida surrendered on the
26th of August, and thus the road to Lisbon was opened to the
French army. Wellington would gladly have fought a battle to save
these fortresses; but if he engaged 80,000 French, with 32,000
English and Portuguese, and did not signally defeat them; what
would then have become of Portugal? Still, when on Portuguese
ground, and engaged in the defence of Portugal, he thought it
right, on September 27th, to make one stand at Busaco; where he
inflicted on the French a loss of 4500 men, at a cost, to his own
army, of only 1300. Massena then began even to think of retreating
into Spain; when a peasant informed him of a mountain-pass by
which he might carry his army into a position from which he could
threaten Wellington’s left. This compelled the English General
again to make a retrograde movement; and on the 15th of October the
whole British and Portuguese army was collected within the lines of
Torres Vedras.
These now famous lines, which Wellington had long been silently
constructing, were so little thought of either in England or in
France, that military instructions were actually given in England
commencing thus: “As it is probable the army will embark in
September.” And the French commander on his part, found his way
suddenly stopped by an insurmountable obstacle, of the existence of
which he had never before heard.
Lord Wellington had observed that on the land side (and the French
had no force upon the water) Lisbon could be completely defended
by a series of entrenchments properly manned. Silently, therefore,
during many months past, he had been at work on these lines. They
were now complete, mounting 600 guns and when manned by 50,000 men
they might have defied Napoleon himself at the head of one of his
largest armies.
Massena, astonished, employed several days in examining these
lines on every side, but at no point could he find an attack to
be feasible. One or two attempts were made, in which his troops
were roughly handled, and one of his Generals killed. At last,
altogether perplexed, he sent off General Foy to Paris to ask of
Napoleon what was to be done. But Napoleon himself had no remedy
to prescribe, and hence, after remaining before the lines for one
whole month, until utter starvation menaced his army, the French
Marshal commenced a retreat. He first retired to Santaren, where
he remained until the following March. He then finally retreated
out of Portugal, having lost, in the short space of seven months,
not fewer than 45,000 men, chiefly by exposure, disease, and
starvation. Lord Wellington followed him, and at once invested
Almeida. Massena ventured on an engagement at Fuentes d’Onore, but
failed, and Almeida capitulated to the English on the 12th of May,
1811.
This campaign had greatly raised the hopes and the confidence
of England, and had placed the character of her General on an
unassailable elevation. Portugal had been defeated, and a French
Marshal with a noble army had been driven back in defeat. Lord
Wellington now, therefore, resolved to begin offensive operations
in Spain, and he sat down before Badajoz. But Napoleon had at
last awakened to the real character of this great struggle. He
resolved that Badajoz should not be lost. He therefore earnestly
and strenuously increased his forces in Spain, until, in September,
1811, they again amounted to 368,000 men. Soult and Marmont
received their orders, and approached Badajoz with 60,000 men. Lord
Wellington retired, but in July he threatened Ciudad Rodrigo, when
again the two French Marshals marched to its relief with a greatly
superior army. And now, as the winter approached, both armies went
into cantonments, and the campaign of 1811 ended.
But with January, 1812, commenced that career of triumph which
only ended at Waterloo. In 1810, Wellington had saved Portugal; in
1811, he had threatened and disquieted the French armies in their
possession of Spain; but the opening year was not to close until
that possession was very seriously endangered.
Silently, all November and December, Wellington’s preparations were
going on. Soult imagined that he was about to renew the siege of
Badajoz, but suddenly, in the earliest days of January, a bridge
was thrown over the Agueda, and the English army crossed the river
and invested Ciudad Rodrigo. The siege commenced on the 8th, and
on the 19th the place was stormed and carried. It had cost the
French a siege of six weeks to take it from the Spaniards two years
before. On hearing of its capture in twelve days, Marmont wrote to
Napoleon, saying, “On the 16th, the English batteries opened their
fire: on the 19th the place was taken by storm, and fell into the
power of the enemy. There is something so incomprehensible in all
this, that until I know more I refrain from any observation.”
Badajoz, a far stronger place, was next invested, on the 17th of
March, and on the 6th of April it was taken by storm. And here,
too, General Lery, a French engineer, expressed his astonishment,
writing thus: “I think the capture of Badajoz a very extraordinary
event, and I should be at a loss to account for it in any manner
consistent with probability.” These two great strongholds, the
border-fortresses, had now been taken, and the way was thus opened
into the heart of Spain. All Europe saw with astonishment that a
little English army, seldom amounting--even with the aid of the
Portuguese,--to more than 40,000 men, could counteract the efforts
of the best armies of France, led by Napoleon’s most trusted
Generals.
After these exploits, Wellington gave his army some rest until the
harvest should grow up, and provisions be more easily obtained. But
in May he sent General Hill to storm the forts at Almarez on the
Tagus, when the French works, with all their artillery and stores,
fell into the hands of the English, who lost only 180 men. By this
able manœuvre the two armies of Marmont and Soult were separated.
On the 13th of June, the rains having ceased, and the field
magazines being completed, Wellington passed the Agueda, and on
the 17th be entered Salamanca, the people shouting, singing, and
weeping for joy. The forts, however, were still held by French
garrisons, and were not taken until the 27th.
On the 8th of July, Marmont, the French General now opposed to
Wellington, received a reinforcement of 6000 men, and both he and
Wellington began to prepare for a battle. On the 15th and 16th,
Marmont, who had previously made several deceptive movements,
concentrated his beautiful and gallant army between Toro and the
Hornija rivers. Then began a series of manœuvres, continued for
several successive days, until, on the 20th, the two armies were
in sight, marching on parallel heights within musket-shot of
each other in the most perfect array. The strength of each army
amounted to from 45,000 to 48,000 men; but of Wellington’s force a
considerable portion consisted of Portuguese troops.
In two or three days more, Marmont would have been joined by two
other French corps, augmenting his force by nearly 20,000 men.
But then he apprehended the arrival of either King Joseph, or
Jourdan, the senior Marshal then in Spain, either of whom would
have superseded him in the command. His object, therefore, was
either to force the English to retreat from Salamanca, or else to
fight a battle, and if possible gain a victory, before either of
his superiors in command could arrive.
On the 22nd of July, some change of position on the part of the
English army gave Marmont the impression that Wellington was about
to retire towards Ciudad Rodrigo. Eager not to let the English
thus escape him, the French General ordered Maucune’s division,
which formed his left, to march forward so as to fall upon the
flank of the British in their expected retreat. They did so; but in
so advancing a chasm intervened between them and the division of
Bonnet, which formed part of the French centre. Word was brought
to Wellington of this movement. “Starting up, he repaired to the
high ground, and observed their movements for some time with stern
contentment. Their left wing was entirely separated from the
centre. The fault was flagrant, and he fixed it with the stroke of
a thunderbolt.” Turning to the Spanish General Alava who stood by
his side, he exclaimed, “Mon cher Alava, Marmont est perdu!”
A few orders issued suddenly from his lips like the incantations of
a wizard, and suddenly the dark mass of troops seemed animated by
some mighty spirit. Rushing down the slope of the mountain, they
entered the great basin. And now, after long coiling and winding
like angry serpents, the armies suddenly fastened together in
deadly strife.
Marmont saw the country beneath him suddenly covered with enemies
when he was in the act of making a complicated evolution; and when
by the rash advance of his left, his troops were separated into
three parts, each at too great a distance to assist the other. In
this crisis, despatching officer after officer, some to hasten up
his troops from the forest, some to stop the march of his left
wing, he still looked for victory, till he saw Pakenham with his
division penetrate between his left and his centre; then hope died
within him, and he was hurrying in person to the fatal spot, when
an exploding shell stretched him on the field, with two deep wounds
in his side.”
This naturally augmented the confusion of the French; but they
still fought manfully. It was just five o’clock when Pakenham fell
on Maucune, who, little thinking of such an onset, expected to see,
from the summit of a hill he had just gained, the Allies in full
retreat. Still, his gunners stood to their guns, and his cavalry
charged; but both were killed or repulsed; the infantry endeavoured
to form a front, but in the midst of its evolution it was charged
and broken. The British cavalry fell upon the rear, while Leith,
with the fifth division, bore down on the right flank. For awhile,
the French veterans maintained some kind of order, but at last the
cavalry broke them; Thomiere, one of their Generals, was killed,
2000 of the French threw down their arms, and the whole division
was utterly routed.
The next portion of the French line, Clausel’s division, while
warmly engaged with the English under Cole and Leith, had to
sustain a charge from 1200 British dragoons. The whole French
division was broken in an instant. Five guns and 2000 prisoners
were taken in a few minutes. The entire of the left wing of the
French army was now only a helpless mob of fugitives. In the centre
the struggle was a more arduous one. The French still held a strong
position on a hill--the Arapiles. Two attacks by the Portuguese
and English were repelled. Beresford, Cole and Leith, were all
wounded, and the English centre for a moment was shaken and in
danger. But Wellington, whose eye was always where the peril was
greatest, immediately ordered up Clinton’s division from the rear,
and restored the battle. The ridge of the Arapiles was regained,
“And now the current once more set in for the British. Pakenham
continued to outflank the French left; Foy retired from the ridge
of Calveriza, and the Allied host, righting itself like a gallant
ship after a sudden gust, again bore right onwards, holding its
course through blood and gloom.”
There remained only the division of Foy, which formed the extreme
right of the French line, and still maintained a gallant fight.
It seemed difficult for this General to extricate his division,
but he did it with great dexterity. Just as the darkness fell, he
increased his skirmishers, and brought forward some cavalry, as if
for a charge. But when the English had prepared themselves for a
real encounter, the skirmishers fell back, and the English pursued;
but when they reached the top of the hill, the main body of the
French had escaped into a forest hard by, where darkness gave them
safety.
Another failure on the part of a Spaniard, here, again, favoured
the French. The castle of Alba, on the Tormes, was garrisoned by a
Spanish force, under Carlos d’Espana. This, if maintained, would
have stopped the French in their flight by the main road, and have
forced them to take the fords. But d’Espana, without informing
Wellington, had withdrawn the garrison, and left the road open!
“Had the castle of Alba been held,” says Napier, “the French could
never have carried off a third of their army.” But by this piece of
Spanish folly or cowardice, they were permitted to escape.
As it was, their loss was enormous. They went into action with
43,800 infantry and 4000 cavalry. Three weeks after, their
General, Clausel, who succeeded Marmont in the command, wrote
to the Minister of War at Paris, “The army consists of 20,000
infantry, and 1800 horse.” So that, by death or wounds or capture,
it had lost more than half of its numbers. On the part of the
Allies, the loss was 3176 British, 2018 Portuguese, and eight
Spanish. One General was killed, and five were among the wounded.
Wellington himself was struck in the thigh by a spent ball, which
passed through his holster. This was one of the last incidents of
this great battle; in which the English leader, to use a French
officer’s expression, “defeated 40,000 men in forty minutes.” “Late
in the evening of that great day,” says Sir William Napier, “I saw
him behind my regiment, then marching towards the ford. He was
alone; the flush of victory was on his brow, his eyes were eager
and watchful, but his voice was calm and even gentle. More than the
rival of Marlborough,--for he had defeated greater Generals than
Marlborough ever encountered, he seemed with prescient pride to
accept this victory only as an earnest of future glory.”
The French fled with such celerity, that their headquarters, on the
following night, were at Flores d’Avila, no less than forty miles
from the field of battle! The English army, on the other hand,
entered Madrid on the 12th of August, amidst a scene of the wildest
ecstasy. “No words can express the enthusiasm which prevailed
when the English standards were seen in the distance, and the
scarlet uniforms began to be discerned through the crowd. Amidst a
countless multitude, wrought up to the highest pitch of rapturous
feeling; amidst tears of gratitude and shouts of triumph, the
British army entered the Spanish capital, not as conquerors, but
as friends; not as oppressors, but deliverers.” As for Wellington,
“with tears and every sign of deep emotion, the multitudes crowded
round his horse, hung by his stirrups, touched his clothes, and
throwing themselves on their knees, blessed him aloud.” The
intrusive King, with about 12,000 men, had fled out of the city a
few days previous.
The Retiro, the largest arsenal which the French possessed in
Spain, still had a garrison of 1700 men. But it surrendered on the
13th, and the British found in it, 180 pieces of cannon, 20,000
stand of arms, and immense stores of all kinds. Meanwhile, “the
French affairs in every part of the Peninsula now exhibited that
general crash and ruin which so usually follows a great military
disaster, and presages the breaking up of a political power.”
Nor were the mighty results of this great battle limited to
Southern Europe. At the very moment when it took place, Napoleon,
at the head of 450,000, was entering the heart of the Russian
empire. The news of the defeat of his forces in Spain, reached
him on the evening preceding the great battle of Borodino. It
doubtless reached the Emperor Alexander also; and the news must
have greatly aided the Russian Monarch in forming that remarkable
resolve, “I am _immovable_; and no terms whatever shall induce me
to terminate the war, or to fail in the sacred duty of avenging our
country.” And, in a general order, issued shortly after, General
Kutusoff, Alexander’s chief commander, said, “The hand of God is
falling heavily on Napoleon: _Madrid is taken_.” Still, when, in
October, Wellington, from the want of battering-artillery, failed
in carrying the castle of Burgos, faction again raised its head
in England, and even dared to question his skill and talent as
a General! It was with reference to some of these attacks that
Wellington took the following review of the results of the year.
“I fear that the public will be disappointed at the results of
the last campaign: and yet it is, in fact, the most important and
successful campaign in which a British army has been engaged for
the last century. We have taken by siege Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajoz,
and Salamanca, and the Retiro has surrendered. Since January, this
army has sent to England little short of 20,000 prisoners; and it
has taken and destroyed, or we now possess, little short of 3000
pieces of cannon.”
More wonderful achievements, occupying a series of years, never
were wrought out by a British army. Sir William Napier justly
traces the triumph of Salamanca and other victories to the
forethought of Wellington, in having laid such a foundation as
he had provided in Torres Vedras. “This strong post was of his
own planning,--he had chosen it, fortified it, defended it, and
now, knowing its full value, he was availing himself of its
advantages. The tree was planted to bear such fruit as was gathered
at Salamanca, and the value of his combinations must be estimated
from the general result. He had only 60,000 disposable troops, and
100,000 were especially appointed to watch and control him; yet he
passed the frontier, defeated 45,000 men in a pitched battle, and
drove 20,000 others from Madrid in confusion, without difficulty
and without risk. No General was ever more entitled to the honour
of victory.”
SALAMIS, BATTLE OF.--The Persians defeated by the Greeks in this
great battle, October 20th, 480 B.C. Themistocles, the Greek
commander, with only 310 sail defeated the whole fleet of Xerxes,
consisting of 2000 sail. One of the greatest naval engagements in
ancient times.
SALDANHA BAY.--_Near the Cape of Good Hope._--Here a Dutch squadron
was captured by Admiral St. George Keith Elphinstone, without
resistance. Five men of war and nine frigates surrendered, and St.
George was in consequence of this bloodless victory, which was
executed with wonderful judgment, created Lord Keith, August 17th,
1796.