war of 1860 in China:--“On the 25th of June, 1860, the arrival of
Sir Hope Grant at Tahlien Bay completed the muster of the British
force in Northern China. General de Montauban reached Cheefoo
at the same time, but his tale of men was not full; and as the
Ambassadors were not due for a fortnight, it was determined that
our troops should be landed. This was done, and horses and men
benefited exceedingly by their sojourn on the breezy slopes which
look upon the northern and southern sides of the grand harbor of
Tahlien-wan, chosen for our rendezvous; notwithstanding that the
hottest month of the summer was passed by the men in bell-tents,
and by horses in the open.
On the 1st August, a landing was effected at Pehtang without
opposition, much to our surprise and delight, for the only spot at
which disembarkation was practicable is distant only 2000 yards
from the snug-looking forts which appeared to protect the town; and
even at this place there was a mile of water at high tide, or of
more difficult mud at low water, to be traversed, before the troops
could reach anything which might, by courtesy or comparison, be
termed dry ground.
The 2nd brigade of 1st Division of British troops, and a French
brigade, formed the first landing party. A vigorous resistance
had been expected at this place; and had a fair proportion of the
means lavished on the defence of the Peiho been expended on the
Pehtang river, we should have had great trouble, for by nature that
position is certainly the stronger. The forts on either side, and
the town which adjoins that on the right bank, are built on two
molecules of solid ground, which have turned up, one does not know
how, at a distance of five miles inland from the bar, which closes
the entrance of the river, to even the smallest gunboats, save at
high water. The town is surrounded by a sea of mud, impassable
to horse or man, inundated at high tide; it is connected with
the comparatively higher country bordering the Peiho by a narrow
causeway, which a determined and skilful enemy could hold against
any force whatever, until driven successively from positions which
might be established on the causeway at every hundred yards.
We found, on the night of the 1st August, that the forts were
deserted, and that the guns with which they bristled were but
wooden “Quakers.” Next day we occupied town and forts.
Large bodies of cavalry having shown themselves in our front, a
reconnaissance was made on the 3rd August, covered, in the absence
of cavalry, not yet landed, by infantry and by two French 8-pounder
guns, the only artillery disembarked. We discovered that our polite
enemy had left the causeway unoccupied, and that his force held no
position nearer than 8 miles from the town we were in. The Chinese
pickets opened fire upon our troops, but were speedily driven
back. The reconnaissance effected, our force returned to Pehtang
unmolested.
Meanwhile the Admirals had set to work, landing troops, horses,
guns, materiel, and stores. The navy worked famously; and as
everything had to be brought into the river either in, or in tow
of, the gunboats, whose movements depended upon the tides, the
work, under the active superintendence of Captain Borlase, C.B.,
continued without regard to any arbitrary distinction between
day and night. During four or five of the ten days spent in this
tedious operation, the rain fell in torrents; and as the interior
of Pehtang is below high water-mark, the streets were knee-deep
in mud, composed, in addition to the usual impurities pertaining
to that substance, of flour, wardrobes, Tartar-hats, field rakes,
coal, shutters, oil-cake, chaff, china-cups, matting, beer-bottles,
tin cans, and kittens, being chiefly the contents of the dwellings
of the townspeople, which were successively turned out of windows
to make room for our troops. The cavalry and artillery horses
were picketed in the streets, where alone space was available;
and how they and we and everybody escaped death from typhus fever
or plague, Heaven only knows. The sanitary officer was outraged
by the result. During this time, water for the use of the troops
was obtained in boats filled by the navy in the river above the
influence of the tide, and towed to Pehtang, where the contents
were landed in barrels for distribution.
On the 12th August, after a delay of a day on account of the
French, who at first were unwilling to advance till the season
changed, we moved out to attack the enemy’s position; General
Michel with the 1st Division and the French, along the causeway
against the enemy’s front, General Napier, with the 2nd Division
and cavalry, by a track which diverged from the causeway to the
right at a short distance from Pehtang, with the view of turning
the enemy’s left.
It will not be easy for those who were not present to realise
the difficulties of this march, or to do justice to the troops
who performed it. The gun-waggons sank literally axle-deep, and
their hinder parts had to be left behind; the heavy cavalry were
greatly distressed in struggling through the mud, and it occupied
the troops six hours to traverse four miles, during which time the
enemy remained in his position.
Napier’s division having reached moderately firm ground,
advanced upon the open Tartar flank and rear; whilst the Allied
left cannonaded his front, which was covered by a formidable
intrenchment. The Tartar cavalry came out in great numbers to
meet Napier, who opened on them with Armstrong guns. At first
the Tartars seemed puzzled, but not disturbed; presently, seeing
they were losing men, they rapidly extended, and in a few minutes
the 2nd Division stood enveloped in a grand circle of horsemen,
advancing from all points towards the centre. Napier’s infantry
were speedily deployed, his cavalry let loose, and artillery kept
going; and though the heavy ground was rendered more difficult for
our cavalry by ditches broad and deep, whose passages were known to
the enemy alone, yet, within a quarter of an hour of their advance,
the Tartar force was everywhere in retreat. Not, however, till a
body of their horsemen, which had charged Sterling’s battery, had
been gallantly met and beaten by a party of Fane’s Horse, inferior
in number, under Lieutenant Macgregor, who was severely wounded.
The Allied left then advanced along the causeway, and occupied the
lines of the intrenchments about Senho, which the enemy deserted on
the success of our right.
Amongst some papers found after the action, was a copy of a report
from the Tartar General San-ko-lin-tzin to the Emperor, setting
forth that the physical difficulties in the way of our landing at
Pehtang, and of advancing thence across a country which never is
dry, rendered it unnecessary to dispute our disembarkation on that
river; and even if a landing should be effected, and our troops
could be got under weigh, the general considered that nothing would
be easier than to destroy us with his hordes of cavalry, so soon as
we got entangled in the marshes.
At Senho the Allied forces rested their right on the Peiho river.
The Taku Forts are about six miles lower down. Mid-way between
Senho and the northernmost or nearest fort on the left bank, stands
the town of Tungkoo, surrounded by a very long intrenchment,
consisting of a formidable rampart and a parapet, covered in all
its length by a double wet ditch.
General de Montauban proposed to attack this town the afternoon we
reached Senho, but Sir Hope Grant would not consent to do so until
he had acquired some knowledge of the position.
The French Commander-in-Chief thereon determined to take the place
at once without the aid of our troops. The French troops were led
along the causeway communicating between Senho and Tungkoo, which
appeared to be the only means of approach; but so considerable
a fire was developed from the ramparts as to deter our Allies
from attempting a _coup-de-main_, and they returned to camp after
cannonading the place for half an hour.
Means having been afterwards found of approaching Tungkoo with
a large front on firm ground, the 1st British Division and the
French captured the place on the 14th August. It was exclusively an
affair of artillery; the enemy’s guns in position on the ramparts
were silenced by our Armstrong and 9-pounder guns, and the rifled
24-pounder of the French, gradually advanced, covered by infantry,
to successive positions, as the enemy’s fire became weaker. The
Allies had forty-two guns in the field. We found about fifty guns
of all sorts in the ramparts, which the enemy, abandoned as our
infantry advanced under cover of the guns. The British headed by
the 60th Rifles, turned the right of the ditch, and entered the
works a quarter of an hour before the French, who made their entry
at the gate.
After taking Tungkoo, the 1st Division (British) returned to its
camp in front of Senho, and the 2nd Division, which had been in
reserve, occupied the town.
The view from General Napier’s house-top was not encouraging. As
far as the eye could reach, we were surrounded by salt marshes,
intersected by very numerous and wide canals, which carry sea-water
into the salt-pans.
It was in contemplation to attack the north and south forts
simultaneously, with a force operating on each side of the Peiho,
and a bridge of boats was in course of construction across the
river at Senho. But as all the materials of the bridge, save boats,
had to be conveyed overland from Pehtang, its progress could not be
rapid. Meanwhile, by dint of most laborious reconnaissance, General
Napier had discovered that open ground near the north fort could
be reached by artillery, on the completion of a line of causeway
which he had commenced over the inundated ground within the town of
Tungkoo, and by establishing crossing-places at certain points on
five or six canals. He urged an immediate attack on the north forts
only; and, having obtained permission to throw out a picket towards
them, on the 19th, made so good a use of it, that in one night the
passages of the canals were completed, and the Commander-in-chief
was conducted next morning within five hundred yards of the nearest
fort. Seeing all obstacles to the approach of the forts overcome,
Sir Hope Grant frankly consented to General Napier’s scheme, and
intrusted its execution to his division. The French commander was
very averse to the plan proposed. He formally protested against it,
but General Grant maintained his determination; and, devoting the
night of the 20th to the construction of batteries, the attack was
made upon the upper north fort at daylight of the 21st August. The
fire of thirty-one pieces of British and six of French ordnance
gradually subdued the enemy’s artillery; their magazine was
exploded by one of our shells; shortly before, that of the further
north fort, which supported it, was blown up by a shell from one
of the gunboats, which were rendering such assistance as they
could give at a range of two thousand yards, the distance imposed
by the stakes and booms which were laid across the river. On the
advance of the infantry, the French crossed the ditches, upon
scaling-ladders laid flat. Our engineers, who trusted to pontoons,
were less successful, and the French had reared their ladders
against the ramparts for a quarter of an hour, before our infantry,
some by swimming and scrambling, others by following the French,
had struggled across the ditches and reached the berme. But so
active was the defence that no French soldier got into the place by
the ladders, though several bravo men mounted them; an entrance was
eventually made by both forces at the same time through embrasures,
which were reached by steps hewn out of the earthen rampart with
axes, bayonets, and swords.
When the attack was delivered General de Montauban was absent from
the field, the French army being represented by General Collineau
and his brigade.
It had been intended to breach the rampart near the gate, and so
secure an entrance to the fort actually taken by assault; but our
gallant Commander-in-Chief became impatient of the process, and
the more speedy means of escalade was resorted to. It is highly
probable that the rapidity of our success, and the tremendous
loss inflicted on the garrison of the first fort, who had no time
for escape in any large numbers, conduced to the surrender of the
second fort and to the prompt abandonment of the position. Our loss
amounted to two hundred and three British killed and wounded; the
French loss was somewhat less. That of the Tartars was estimated
at two thousand men, large numbers of whom became inmates of our
hospitals.
The attack was gallant, so was the defence, and the success was
perfect. The enemy immediately surrendered the further northern
fort into our hands, with two thousand prisoners; and before the
evening the entire position on the Peiho, covering an area of six
square miles, and containing upwards of six hundred guns, was
abandoned by its defenders.
The attack on the forts had only been deferred until provisions and
munitions of war could be drawn from Pehtang, which we had quitted
on the 12th August, in as light marching order as possible. Since
our arrival at Senho, our tents, packs, kits, ammunition, and
baggage, had gradually been brought through the mud to the front
as speedily as the limited means of transport would permit, but
in the process many of the beasts of burden perished. The state
of the country would alone account for this; but further, as none
of the commissariat waggons were at this time disembarked, it was
necessary that everything should be carried upon the backs of
transport animals, many of which having just landed from Manilla,
Japan, and Bombay in sorry condition, were quite unfit for this
service. At this juncture the Chinese Coolie Corps, composed of men
recruited at Canton, became the only reliable means of transport.
They were very hard worked, but they performed their duty very
cheerfully and well.
From the first landing at Pehtang until after the capture of the
forts, the army was entirely dependent on sea-borne provisions,
brought from the fleet in gunboats and carried across from Pehtang;
fresh meat rations were therefore rare. No sooner were the forts
surrendered than the Chinese peasantry hastened to establish
markets; and fruit, poultry, eggs and sheep were offered for sale
in profusion, at such moderate prices, that on the march from
Tungkoo to Tientsin, spatchcock fowls, savoury omeletes, and
stewed peaches became the staple food of the British soldier. On
the 22nd of August, the day after the forts were captured, Admiral
Hope, with a squadron of gunboats, had pushed up the Peiho river
to Tientsin. He met with no opposition, and the townspeople threw
themselves at his feet. The Ambassador, Commander-in-Chief, and a
portion of our troops, speedily followed in gunboats; the remainder
of the force by land, so soon as transport could be organized. The
last of our regiments reached Tientsin, distant thirty-five miles
from Taku, on the 5th of September.
A convention for the cessation of hostilities was to be signed
on the 7th, and ground was actually taken for a review of all
the troops, which was to be held for the edification of the
Commissioners, after they should have signed the treaty.
Suddenly the sky darkened: it was ascertained that “Kweiliang”
and his brother Commissioners were not armed with the powers
they asserted, and ultimately, instead of parading on the 8th
in holiday pageant, a portion of our forces began that day the
march towards Pekin. The Ambassadors left next day, in company
with the Commanders-in-Chief; the forces were advanced as far as
carriage could be procured; but the means of the commissariat
were insufficient to move the whole army to such a distance, and
to carry the necessary supplies. The draught cattle furnished by
the mandarins at Tientsin were spirited away at the first halting
place, and the 2nd division of the British army, which was to have
brought up the rear, had to devote its carriage to the assistance
of the 1st division, and remain behind.
In this emergency the commissariat would have had the greatest
difficulty in feeding the troops in the front, but for the measures
taken by Sir Robert Napier, who remained in command at Tientsin. By
inducing persistent efforts to push boats up the river Peiho, which
runs parallel to the road nearly up to Pekin, but which had been
pronounced unnavigable by even the smallest craft, and by laying
embargo on the traffic of Tientsin, General Napier procured, and
with the aid of the navy organised, large means of water transport,
which afforded invaluable assistance.
As the Ambassadors advanced they were met by letters announcing
the appointment of “Tsai Prince of Ee” as Chief Commissioner to
conclude negotiations in lieu of Kweiliang, who was pronounced
to have proved himself incompetent; and on the 14th September,
Messrs. Parkes and Wade held a conference with the Commissioners at
Tung-chow, whereat, all preliminaries being settled, a letter was
written to Lord Elgin acceding in terms to all his demands.
It was arranged that Lord Elgin was to meet the Commissioners in
the walled city of Tung-chow, eight miles short of Pekin, where he
would sign the convention, under escort of 1000 men; and that he
should immediately afterwards proceed to Pekin, there to exchange
ratifications of the Treaty of Tientsin (1858), under similar
protection. Our armies meanwhile were to encamp four miles below
Tung-chow.
Nothing remained but to settle details, and take up suitable
quarters for Lord Elgin at Tung-chow. For this purpose Mr.
Parkes, accompanied by Messrs. Loch (private secretary), De
Norman (attached to Shanghai mission), and Bowlby (_Times’_
correspondent), with an escort of Fane’s Horse, under Lieut.
Anderson, went out on the 17th. Lieut.-Colonel Beauchamp Walker
accompanied the party, for the purpose of inspecting the ground
designated by the Chinese for our encampment, and Mr. Thompson
(Commissariat) was sent to guage the capabilities of supply of the
city of Tung-chow.
On arrival they were well received; but in discussing affairs they
were surprised to find objections raised on several points to which
the Chinese Commissioners had before consented. However, after a
discussion of five or six hours, the Chinese negociators gave way;
and having arranged details, our party slept that night in the
city, the guests of the Commissioners.
Next morning Colonel Walker, accompanied by Messrs. Parkes
and Loch, and attended by a Chinese officer deputed by the
Commissioners, proceeded to examine the ground on which the British
army was to be encamped, leaving the larger part of the escort
at Tung-chow, where Messrs. Bowlby and De Norman also remained,
pending the return of Parkes and Loch, who had yet to find a
suitable residence for Lord Elgin within the walls of Tung-chow. On
the way out, the party found the Tartar army in hurried movement
in the direction of our forces, and on reaching the ground
proposed for encampment, discovered it to be entirely commanded
by the position which the Tartar forces, supported by a numerous
artillery, were then taking up.
Seeing this, Parkes turned round and rode back to Tung-chow to
demand a cessation of these hostile movements. Loch went on into
the British camp with a couple of men to report progress, whilst
Col. Walker, Thompson, and half-a-dozen dragoons, remained in the
Tartar position, at Parkes’s request, until he should return.
Having reported progress to the Commander-in-Chief, whom he met
advancing, about a mile from the Tartar position, Loch returned
towards the Tartars, accompanied by Captain Brabazon, R. A., with
orders to Parkes to come back at once.
Mr. Parkes, on reaching Tung-chow, was rudely received by the
Prince of Ee, and was told that until the questions to which
objections had been made the day previous had been satisfactorily
determined, peace could not exist. Thereupon Parkes, with Bowlby,
De Norman, and all our people, left Tung-chow for the British camp.
Mid-way they met Loch and Brabazon, who turned homewards with them,
and all went on together, preceded by a flag of truce.
Before they came in sight of Colonel Walker and his few men, Tartar
cavalry, blowing their matches, and making other hostile gestures,
came galloping along the high bank on either side of our people,
who were in a hollow way. Presently the party was summoned to
halt; being surrounded, and ignorant of the ground, it was deemed
advisable to comply, both to insist on the sanctity of the flag
of truce, and to gain an opportunity of discovering the best way
out of their uncomfortable position. The Tartar officer in command
civilly told them, that as firing had commenced, he was unable to
let them pass, without orders from his General, to whose presence
he would conduct Mr. Parkes. Parkes, Loch, and one Sikh rode away
with the officer. Suddenly turning the angle of a field of maize,
they found themselves in the midst of a mob of infantry, whose
uplifted weapons their guide with difficulty put aside. Further
on stood San-ko-lin-tzin, the Tartar General, of whom Parkes
demanded a free passage. He was answered with derision; and, after
a brief parley, in which San-ko-lin-tzin upbraided Parkes as the
cause of all the disasters which had befallen the empire, at a sign
from the General our men were tossed off from their horses, their
faces rubbed in the dust, and their hands tied behind them, and
so, painfully bound, were placed upon carts, and taken to Pekin.
Orders, were, at the same time, sent to capture the escort, which
had been already surrounded by ever increasing numbers. Some of the
troopers suggested the propriety of cutting their way through, but
Anderson replied it would compromise the others, and refused to do
what his gallant heart desired.
Soon, however, the whole party was disarmed, and taken to Pekin on
their horses without dishonor. Next day they were removed to the
Summer Palace of Yuen-Ming-Yuen, where they were severally bound.
Their hands and feet tied together behind their backs, they were
thrown on their chests, and kept in the open air exposed to the
cold at night, and the still considerable heat by day, without
food or water, for three days and nights. From the first their
bonds were wetted to tighten them, and if they attempted to turn
or move to rest themselves, they were cruelly kicked and beaten.
On the third day poor Anderson’s fingers and nails burst from the
pressure of the cords, which were not even then relaxed. The wrist
bones became visible, and mortification ensued; the victim became
delirious, and thus mercifully made unconscious of the horror of
his position, this gallant soldier died. During his sufferings his
men made efforts to approach him and to gnaw his cords, but they
were savagely kicked away by his inhuman jailers. The condition of
the survivors was only ameliorated, after the lapse of three days,
by the bonds on their hands and feet being exchanged for heavy
chains and irons. But, from this time, they were regularly, though
most scantily and miserably, fed.
Poor Bowlby died the fifth day, in the same way as Anderson, then
De Norman and several of the men. All appear to have kept noble
hearts, and to have cheered and encouraged each other, but no less
than thirteen sank under the horrors of this captivity. Brabazon
and a French Abbé, who were taken with the escort, were, still
unbound, seen to leave the party, on the way to Pekin, saying they
were going to the Chinese Commander-in-Chief to procure the release
of their companions. Their mournful fate was, we rejoice to know,
less horrible. They were beheaded, by order of a Chinese General,
on the 21st September, in revenge for a wound he had received
during the action of the day; but their bodies being then thrown
into the canal, were unhappily never recovered.