breadstuffs, meats, rice, beans, coffee, sugar and forage existed near
the proposed line of march, and arrange for obtaining them despite the
hatred of the people, which quite equalled their fear.[24.3] A third
care was to divine what Santa Anna intended and was able to do, for
news came that he was now on our flank and rear, preparing to conduct
guerilla war against the American detachments and convoys. Contrary to
his expectation Scott found subsistence and forage scarce at Jalapa,
and as Quitman's brigade came up without the extra rations it had been
ordered to bring, the situation proved embarrassing. A scarcity of
funds aggravated it alarmingly. An immediate advance upon the capital
was therefore out of the question; but on April 30 Scott issued
preliminary instructions, enjoining kind treatment of the people in the
strongest possible terms, as absolutely necessary if the troops did
not wish to starve; and the volunteers were ordered to set out on the
fourth and fifth of May.[24.6]
But now a difficulty that had been feared by Scott rose directly in
his path. Seven regiments and two companies of volunteers were to be
free at various near dates, averaging about the middle of June. Polk,
believing that many would reënlist, had recommended that a bounty
should be offered as an inducement, and Congress had acted upon the
suggestion. April 26 General Scott received the law and promptly
circulated it; but he soon found that Polk's expectations were to be
disappointed.[24.6]
It would have been quite agreeable to linger at Jalapa, strolling
about this paradise of birds, gazing at the many-hued blossoms of a
perpetual springtime, feasting on the delicacies of semi-tropical
gardens, winning occasional glimpses of exotic luxury through doors
ajar, listening to ever-graceful señoritas--a few dazzling blondes as
well as many sparkling brunettes--who played the guitar hour after
hour in their grated windows, and catching glances now and then from
eyes of fire; but the soldiers had learned what campaigning really
meant. They had been allowed to go unpaid and unprovided for. They
had met with hardships and privations not counted upon at the time of
enlistment. Disease, battle, death, fearful toil and frightful marches
had been found realities. Besides, they had now "seen the elephant," as
they said; they felt they had won glory enough; and, as even Colonel
Campbell admitted, they "sighed heavily" for home, family and friends.
In spite of their strong desire to see the Halls of the Montezumas, out
of about 3700 men only enough to make one company would reëngage, and
special inducements, offered by the General, to remain as teamsters
proved wholly ineffective.[24.6]
One course now open to Scott was to march on, trusting that new forces
would arrive seasonably to replace the soldiers discharged; but of
this he had no assurance. Another was to assume that even when legally
free the volunteers would not abandon him in the enemy's capital;
but the evidence was all to the contrary. More than once American
troops had insisted upon their rights without considering the needs
of the country; and now five colonels declared in writing that "only
a very small proportion" of their men would "under any supposable
circumstances" remain in the service "for any time whatever" beyond
their term. Such was the sentiment of all these volunteers.[24.6]
Moreover, to advance, capture Mexico and so force the men to sail
from Vera Cruz in the midst of the pestilential season would have
been insubordinate as well as inhumane, for the government had
ordered most emphatically, with particular reference to the yellow
fever, that regard for their health must outweigh all military
considerations.[24.4] The returning volunteers would also have been
exposed, under inexperienced commanders and without a proper complement
of artillery, to Santa Anna and the guerillas, and those remaining
behind at the capital would have been regarded by the Mexicans as
destined prey. On the other hand, should the entire army retreat after
capturing Mexico, the exultant people would have risen almost _en
masse_ to starve, harass and slaughter them; while even Worth doubted
whether Scott's whole force, could it by any possibility be persuaded
to remain intact, would be strong enough to hold the capital. Finally,
as the sequel was to show and as any well-informed person could have
foreseen, merely capturing and retaining Mexico City was not sure by
any means to end the war. The seat of government could easily move, and
Scott was correctly informed that it proposed to do so. Santa Anna was
in the field with a growing army; his moral and physical resources had
not been exhausted; and more fighting needed to be done.[24.6]
Scott was called slow by some of his critics, but when the case
permitted he could make a quick decision; and on the sixth and seventh
of May the volunteers referred to--"with a joyous and pleasant
countenance upon every man," as one of them wrote--set out for home
under Patterson.[24.5] Their departure left the General with an army of
7113. As for early reinforcements, he had recommended on November 29
the addition of twelve regiments to the regular establishment, and had
said that about the first of May they would be indispensable; but at
present he only knew that 960 recruits were on the way. None the less
he sent Quitman forward with three regiments of November volunteers,
and on the sixth of May instructed Worth to advance with his division
and two of those regiments, led by Quitman, against Puebla, leaving the
third regiment with a sufficient number of artillerists at Perote.[24.6]
[MEXICAN ASSISTANCE]
For the confidence with which less than 4000 men were thus advanced
beyond the reach of prompt assistance, to cope with a strong city
and the Mexican troops, there was a special reason. The heads of the
Roman Catholic Church in Mexico, who did not feel all the religious
intolerance which they deemed it proper to exhibit in public, cherished
no love toward Santa Anna. For many years his rapacity had given them
offence; and one of his first acts on landing at Vera Cruz in August,
1846, had been to strike at their power. They had therefore felt
disposed to favor the continuance of hostilities, hoping that he and
his myrmidons would be destroyed. But when Moses Y. Beach made it plain
to them on the one hand that resistance to the United States would be
dangerous, and on the other guaranteed the freedom and the property
of Church and citizens, they decided to support our efforts in behalf
of peace, work against Santa Anna as the chief obstacle, and arrange
secretly to have Jalapa, Perote, Puebla and Mexico City refrain from
opposing Scott.[24.8]
At "unconquered Puebla," which was more fully under the domination
of the Church than any other Mexican town, circumstances favored the
clerical design. Terrible stories had been circulated there about the
Americans. They were barbarians, vandals, tigers; they had branded and
sent across the Gulf into slavery shiploads of Tampico people, and
stuck little children on their bayonets at Vera Cruz. But these tales
had now lost all credibility. Santa Anna had been found out. Buena
Vista no longer seemed a Mexican victory. The military caste was not
only hated but despised. News had come that wherever the Americans took
possession, odious taxes were abolished and trade became brisk. Scott's
treatment of the people shone in comparison with Santa Anna's, and
his soldiers looked angelic beside the guerillas. The defeat at Cerro
Gordo caused not only deep discouragement but even deeper disgust, for
the men and money of the state had been sacrificed to the incompetence
of the commanders. Besides, marvels were told of the Americans. They
could hew a man asunder at one stroke; their horses were gigantic and
incredibly swift; their artillery was unspeakably terrible; and every
one of their bullets might split into fifty pieces, each of the pieces
fatal. Worth's division included 5000 of these warriors, an American
deserter stated.[24.8]
With such popular support the clericals had Isunza, who was closely
connected with them, put in place of the vigorous Ibarra as governor,
and he not only took a stand for non-resistance, but answered the
appeals of the national government with sharp complaints. Instead of
preaching against the Americans, the churchmen led pious processions
about the streets, to show that prayer and not the arm of flesh
was to be relied upon. The arms and ammunition were sent away--for
safe-keeping. The governor would supply no funds for military purposes.
"Reason prohibits vain sacrifices," he remarked. The comandante general
decided that the city could not be defended. The prefect ordered that
after the arrival of the Americans, not more than three citizens
were to meet in public, and that none should carry arms; while the
ayuntamiento announced that no unsigned placards would be tolerated.
"Men are not all called to play the rôle of heroes," observed the
_Monitor del Pueblo_. We can only "await with resignation the terrible
blow with which Providence chooses to afflict us," decided the city
authorities. All the arrangements are complete, Worth was notified
by headquarters on the tenth of May. The people are waiting for you,
reported foreigners from Puebla.[24.8]
Scott, for his part, agreed to protect the citizens and especially the
Church, and he put forth on the eleventh of May a proclamation called
by him "the crowning act of conciliation," which was drawn up under his
direction by a representative of the bishop of Puebla, and embodied the
ideas and sentiments deemed by the leaders of the clerical party most
likely to be effective.[24.7] The oppression under which the people
of Mexico lay crushed received in this proclamation brief but vivid
treatment, distrust regarding Santa Anna's abilities, honor and aims
was excited, and the Americans were represented as true brethren of
the Mexicans. Paredes, an unpatriotic usurper, had forced us to take
up arms in behalf of republican institutions and the welfare of the
whole continent, as well as for the maintenance of our proper dignity;
but we were anxious now as ever, to live in peace and friendship with
Mexico, even though determined, if the war must continue, to do the
work of the sword thoroughly.[24.8]
[SANTA ANNA'S MEASURES]
On the other hand Santa Anna was not idle. His first thought on
quitting the terrible field of Cerro Gordo was that Canalizo's horse
would stop at El Encero, and that he might rally the flying infantry
upon it; but on moving in that direction by the southern bank of Río
del Plan he found himself cut off by the American pursuit, and turned
abruptly to the left. Always profoundly depressed after a reverse, he
rode along grim and speechless, as if stunned; but the next day an
enthusiastic reception at a small town, aided perhaps by the marvellous
beauty of the district, lifted his head. In the early evening of
April 21 he reached Orizaba, and here the applause of the readily
excited townsfolk made him feel himself once more a general and a
President.[24.12]
His low intellectual plane did not permit him to understand his mental
inferiority or to perceive the real strength of the unpretentious and
apparently careless Americans.[24.9] It was impossible for him, looking
abroad upon a vast and potentially rich country with all the vanity
of his people, to believe that a handful of poorly dressed Yankees,
imperfectly trained and seemingly not very martial, could overpower its
millions. He felt that sooner or later his groping finger would touch
the right spring, as it had done so many times before, and the nation
would rise up about him. Pride, self-will and blind passion, raging
in his heart, inflamed his courage; and his sense of a proprietary
claim to the country inspired him with a sort of patriotism. What
has been lost after all, he said, except a position and some cannon?
The nation is still mighty. Let it but join me, and I shall yet be
victorious.[24.12]
Within his reach lay the brigade of Antonio de León--a little more
than 1000 poorly armed men with two 6-pounders--just from Oaxaca, the
presence of which in this quarter had brought him to Orizaba, and also
the National Guards ordered before the battle to Chiquihuite. Larger
and smaller bodies of fugitives and irregulars, learning where he was,
came in. All the armed men of the vicinity, whatever their proper
function, he caught in his unsparing net, and he summoned to the
colors every citizen from sixteen to forty years of age. Beyond the
sweep of his arm far less animation reigned. One disappointment more,
one hope less now, was the mildest frame of mind among the public.
Canalizo, a faithful dog that for the present had been kicked one time
too many, sharply resented Santa Anna's complaints. The scattering
soldiers and officers, denouncing him bitterly as well as exaggerating
the power of the Americans, discouraged the people. A popular newspaper
demanded savagely that he should be court-martialled. The charge of
collusion with the invaders came back to life. Many of the Indians,
feeling that an American triumph would help them, became restive.[24.12]
But the government stood resolutely behind him, and he was invested
with plenary powers. Soto tried again to rouse the people of the state.
From a wider and wider circle fugitives and laboring men were gathered.
Small cannon and some artillerists came within his reach. The stocks of
horses and mules that Scott had tried in vain to get from the region
of the upper Alvarado River were turned to account. Considerable
money and supplies arrived from the government, and other funds and
necessaries were taken without formalities wherever they could be
discovered.[24.10] By the first of May he pretended there were 4000 men
under his flag, and no doubt he did have 2500.[24.12]
By good fortune more than by design, too, he found himself in an
excellent position, within striking distance of Scott's communications,
rear and base; and even though not richly imbued with the spirit of
Napoleonic warfare, he laid his plans accordingly. But--fortunately
for Scott, who might have been seriously embarrassed[24.11]--Santa
Anna was more politician than general. On May 15 the election of a
President was to occur, and the votes had to be counted at the seat
of government. His enemies and rivals were incessantly busy there. A
revolution had begun to brew, he understood. A suspicion had got abroad
that he intended to give up the fight and move into Guatemala; and news
reached him that Mexico City was to be surrendered. For these reasons
and to obtain additional supplies, all his forces were directed upon
Puebla; and at the head of a motley and miserable army numbering--he
boasted--4500 men he arrived there on May 11.[24.12]
His reception was not flattering. Aside from the fact that everybody of
much account felt ready to see Scott, the town had suffered previously
through Santa Anna's visiting it, accounts of his exactions had come
from Orizaba, his presence was thought likely to result in hostilities,
and the people feared that he would compel them to take up arms. Many
fled at his approach, and many more wished they were elsewhere. Not
without excuse under the circumstances, his conduct was arbitrary,
insulting and extortionate. He cashiered all the officers of the Vera
Cruz garrison, raved at the indifference of the authorities and people
at Puebla, seized the horses, made liberal demands for cash, and--it
was asserted--even took ornaments of gold from the churches. Some
funds, a quantity of ammunition and some cannon were finally obtained
here; but Isunza furnished him less than two hundred men, and perhaps
the indignation of the people quite offset his gains.[24.13]
[THE AMERICANS MARCH ON]
Close behind him, too, came the Americans. Already a day's march apart,
Worth's two brigades maintained that interval for some time, followed
by Quitman with the New York and South Carolina regiments at an equal
distance. For six or eight miles from Perote the country was highly
cultivated and already brown with ripening wheat and barley; but then
came a sandy, arid region where steep, conical hills of bare limestone,
calcined like those of the Rhone valley, shot up from a wide, smooth
plain in extravagant confusion, and appeared to bar the way. Hacienda
buildings that were crenellated fortresses could be seen here and
there; but the only cheering sights were glimpses of silvery Orizaba, a
number of smaller mountains with Italian profiles, forked lightnings at
play sometimes in the black clouds, and mirages of gardens, lakes and
sylvan shores that deceived even the most experienced.[24.14]
At Ojo de Agua, about thirty-five miles from Perote, a spring of water
almost as large as the fountain of Vaucluse gave rise to a creek,
which watered palmettoes and extensive meadows. Eight or nine miles
farther on, the troops came to dark Nopalucan, which lay reclining on a
comfortable eminence and viewing complacently its fertile valley. Then
some twenty-five miles of romantic scenery brought them to Amozoc, a
manufacturing town of 2000 souls ten or eleven miles from Puebla, and
here Worth, who had made easy marches for two days in order to lessen
the interval between him and Quitman, halted his now united brigades at
noon on the fourteenth to await that officer, and to give his own dusty
division time to "brush up."[24.14]
Santa Anna, after sending his infantry and artillery toward Mexico
early that morning, had moved off with some 2000 cavalry to surprise
Quitman, supposing that he would be at his usual distance behind Worth,
and that Worth had continued his march. The consequence was that his
troops, finding themselves at about eight o'clock within half a mile or
so of Duncan's battery and under fire, scattered promptly up the hills
and into the woods. Divining correctly that he would reassemble them
to strike at Quitman, Worth despatched forces at once to the rear; but
Quitman, who had set out in the night, was now only two miles distant,
and, warned by the artillery fire, had prepared to meet the enemy.
Santa Anna therefore accomplished nothing more than to fatigue his men,
and give them a superfluous lesson in running away; and after returning
with them to Puebla for the night, he evacuated that city before
daybreak the next morning with one more failure to his account.[24.14]
While at Nopalucan, May 12, Worth had addressed the governor and the
municipality at Puebla, saying that in three days he should take
possession of the city, and that he desired to confer with the civil
authorities before doing so, in order to arrange for the maintenance of
order and worship. Owing to what was regarded as a lack of formality in
this proceeding and to Santa Anna's insistence that Worth should have
addressed him, no reply was made. But when a second letter arrived in
the evening of the fourteenth, the ayuntamiento appointed a commission
to meet the American general, and the next morning a conference took
place at Chachapa, where our troops arrived at an early hour. Generous
pledges of civil and religious protection were then offered and
accepted; and the Pueblans, who adopted the usual jockeying tactics,
drew from Worth an agreement that Mexican law, to be administered by
Mexican authorities, should remain in force, although Scott's General
Orders 20 had thrown the protection of military law round the American
troops.[24.15] In short, said Hitchcock, the inspector general of the
army, Worth--not Puebla--surrendered; and Scott found it necessary to
rectify the error.[24.17]
[WORTH TAKES POSSESSION OF PUEBLA]
At a little before ten o'clock that day the American troops--who
had suffered badly from dust on the arid, stony hills, consoled
only by views of the great snow-clad volcanoes glittering behind
Puebla--approached the city. It was a proud moment for them when, as
their brilliant commander said, "with all the flush and glow of victory
in their hearts" they entered the second city of Mexico in importance
and the first in military fame. Almost the entire population of the
town looked on. Streets, sidewalks, windows and balconies were thronged
with holiday-makers. As usual, the appearance of the victorious
Americans fell sadly below expectation--perhaps only demigods in
luminous mail could have reached it; but the people showed an intense
curiosity to scrutinize them. Sometimes the troops had to work their
way through the crowd; but no ill temper was displayed on either side,
and finally, reaching the main plaza, our men stacked their arms and
lay down to sleep as if at home.[24.17]
Puebla, a fine city laid out in the rectangular style and inhabited
by some 80,000 persons, was chiefly noted for piety, cotton mills,
dolls and sweetmeats. The principal feature was the cathedral with its
two dark towers--each of them capped with a yellowish, incrusted dome
bearing aloft a globe and cross, and each filled with numberless bells
of all sizes, which singly performed special offices, and three times a
day rang together in a celestial chorus. Eight or ten altars, refulgent
with sacred vessels of gold, silver and precious stones in amazing
profusion, lighted up the interior; and there was also a candelabra so
big--or was it so grimy?--that $4000 had been paid a few months earlier
for cleaning it. Near by, in the arcades of the plaza, could be found
the dolls and sweetmeats; and of course Poblana market girls, too,
were there: black eyes, black hair combed over the ears, huge silver
ear-rings, snowy chemisette partly hidden with a gray _rebosa_ (scarf),
short red petticoat fastened round the waist with a silk band and
fringed with yellow, small shoes and large silver buckles.[24.17]
For almost a fortnight Worth now had an opportunity to show the real
breadth of his admired talents. With the ecclesiastical authorities,
for obvious reasons, no difficulties occurred. He and the bishop
exchanged calls promptly. Bells rang, churches opened, and in some
of them public rejoicings were celebrated. But between him and
the civil functionaries, mainly in consequence of his excessive
complaisance, there sprang up not a little friction. His troops felt
very much dissatisfied, for his nervous and restless temperament was
in continual excitement about Mexican attacks, and once he kept them
standing under arms needlessly all day. Such alarms came to be known
as "Worth's scarecrows"; and as the natural consequence, had a real
danger presented itself, the men would have responded tardily and
half-heartedly.[24.17]
Worse yet, on evidence for which he himself could not say much, he
warned his division a little later (June 16) by means of a circular,
that attempts to poison them were to be feared, adding gratuitously,
"Doubtless there are among those with whom we are situated many who
will not hesitate, as is the habit of cowards, to poison those from
whom they habitually fly in battle--a resource familiar in Spanish
history, legitimately inherited and willingly practised by Mexicans."
Of course the circular was not likely to elude publicity, and its
indiscretion blazed. It gave the Pueblans a dangerous hint, insulted
all Mexicans, and reflected grossly upon Spain, whose continued
neutrality was highly desirable.[24.16] Evidently, though quite able
to criticise, Worth did not possess all the qualifications of a
commander-in-chief.[24.17]
[THE AMERICAN SITUATION AT PUEBLA]