Measures to defend the route had been set on foot by Mexico in good

season.[23.6] From the lofty plateau of the interior the national

highway--which it was evident that an American army would have to

follow on account of its artillery--wound through mountains to

sea level, presenting, according to the minister of war, "almost

insuperable obstacles against any audacious invader." Not far above

Jalapa the village of Las Vigas marked a spot of military value, and

the narrow, rugged pass at La Hoya, though it could be turned without

much difficulty, afforded an excellent opportunity to stop a weak force

or delay a strong one, while below that city Corral Falso, Cerro

Gordo, Plan del Río and the national bridge (_puente nacional_) were

fine points. As early as October 11, 1846, an order to fortify several

of these positions was issued. Some gangs of laborers assembled, a

little preparatory clearing of the ground was done, a few cannon were

moved about; but energy, money, supplies, appliances and engineering

skill fell indefinitely short of the requirements, and up to the

twentieth of March, 1847, nothing substantial was accomplished.[23.9]

[Illustration: CONTOUR LINES NEAR CERRO GORDO. The difference

of elevation between two lines is fifty metres.]

That day Santa Anna arrived near the capital on his return from the

north, and, although he expected Vera Cruz to delay the Americans much

longer than it did, he seems to have taken the southern danger into

consideration at once. Disputes between the generals had sprung up. As

a result La Vega was given the district from Vera Cruz to Corral Falso,

General Gregorio Gómez that extending from Corral Falso to Las Vigas,

and General Gaona a jurisdiction above this; and each was ordered to

fortify his best points and raise as many troops as he could. Over all

of these officers was then placed General Canalizo, a little man with a

big tongue, as commander-in-chief of the eastern division. The forces

under Senobio and other chiefs were to be gathered, "regularized" and

trained. The troops--a cavalry brigade, two brigades of infantry and a

force of artillery--that had followed the President from La Angostura

were ordered to march toward Vera Cruz by the shortest route, a brigade

under Rangel to proceed from the capital in the same direction, and

2000 National Guards, from Puebla to join those corps; and General

Mora, who now commanded the Army of the North, was instructed to send

his bronze 16-pounders to Jalapa with all possible speed.[23.7] Every

effective engineer then at the capital received similar marching

orders, and attention was given to the need of ammunition, wagons,

mules and other necessaries. At the same time instructions were issued

to block the route _via_ Orizaba at Chiquihuite, a naturally strong

position below that city.[23.9]

Late on March 30 news that Vera Cruz had fallen reached the capital.

At once the government expelled Black, the American consul residing

at Mexico, and issued a circular calling upon all citizens to forget

rancor and dissension, offer their lives and fortunes, and stand

unitedly behind the President. "Mexicans," exclaimed Santa Anna, "do

not hesitate between death and slavery.... Awake! A sepulchre opens at

your feet; let it at least be covered with laurels!" and he adjured

Canalizo in the name of the country to fortify Corral Falso and Cerro

Gordo, and above all to defend the national bridge "in all possible

ways and at all costs" in order to give time for troops to concentrate

above it. With Senobio's forces and the militia--amounting, said

this letter, to more than 2000 men--and aided by the topography of

the ground, itself "equal in value to an army," the enemy could be

detained, the President assured him; and he was authorized to shoot

every deserter and every coward. At the same time Governor Soto was

directed to proclaim martial law, call out all the fit men between the

ages of fifteen and fifty years, and aid Canalizo in every possible

way. Then, after transferring the executive power to General Anaya, the

substitute President, Santa Anna left the capital on April 2. As he

went down the steps of the palace to his waiting carriage, he and the

onlookers felt sad presentiments they could not hide. Even his enemies

had tears in their eyes, and it seemed to every one like a final

good-by.[23.9]

[SANTA ANNA AT THE FRONT]

On the way gloomy reports met him. Soto wrote that while all in his

power had been done, the fate of Vera Cruz had smitten the people

with terror, and the resources of the state were far from adequate.

Canalizo wrote no more hopefully. Efforts had been made to rouse the

spirit of the public.[23.8] Under penalty of death all intercourse

with the Americans had been prohibited, and under the same threat all

citizens had been ordered to place beyond the invader's reach whatever

could be of service to him. But the outlook was dark. Although a good

engineer had been at the national bridge for a week, work on the

fortifications had scarcely begun; eight hundred out of a thousand men

had fled panic-stricken on learning of Scott's triumph at Vera Cruz,

there was little ammunition or money, and the bridge could not be held.

In view of Santa Anna's adjuration Canalizo promised to make another

effort, but he soon ordered La Vega to abandon the position. The light

fortifications recently built were demolished, and as wagons to carry

the guns away could not be obtained, they were spiked and pitched into

a ravine.[23.9]

Observing at La Hoya that virtually nothing had been done, Santa

Anna ordered Engineer Cano to fortify the pass, and then went on to

his great hacienda of El Encero, eight miles below Jalapa, where he

arrived on the fifth. Two days later, in company with Lieutenant

Colonel Robles, he passed Corral Falso, five miles farther down the

highway, and the hamlet of Cerro Gordo, nearly five miles beyond that,

and finally, making a steep and circuitous descent, he came to Plan

del Río, about five miles from the hamlet. Near the first of these

three positions the highway passed through a narrow, craggy defile,

that could not be turned; but Santa Anna decided to make a stand at

the second, because according to the country people and the traditions

of both the Spanish régime and the revolutionary war, it was equally

unassailable on the flanks, and holding it would force the Americans to

remain within reach of the yellow fever, which ceased to be terrible

just above Plan del Río.[23.14]

[CERRO GORDO]

Very little work had been done at Cerro Gordo, but the position seemed

admirable. About half a mile below the hamlet the descending highway

entered a ravine, which rapidly deepened. On the left of this rose a

hill named El Telégrafo, which, though low and easily ascended from

the direction of the hamlet, was five or six hundred feet high on the

opposite side and extremely steep. To the right of the ravine the

grade of the hamlet continued for more than a mile, ending finally in

three tongues, just south of which the plateau was cut, approximately

east and west, by a precipitous canyon of rock more than five hundred

feet deep, the channel of a small stream called the Río del Plan. The

tongues, which may be designated from south to north as _A_, _B_ and

_C_, were parallel to the highway and more or less fully commanded

it.[23.10] Near the head of the ravine, at a spot that may be called

_D_, a road branched off from the highway toward the tongues, and there

was a low eminence, _E_, in this vicinity.[23.14]

[Illustration: BATTLE OF CERRO GORDO GENERAL PLAN]

Believing that Scott could advance with artillery only by the highway,

Santa Anna gave his chief attention to this part of the terrain, and

recalling Cano and his men from La Hoya, he sent them to assist Robles

here. At the ends of the tongues parapets were laid out, which, though

not completed, served to indicate the correct positions; and in front

of each the bushes and trees were cut down and left on the ground, so

that an assailant should be impeded and should have no screen. On _A_

General Pinzón, a mulatto of considerable ability, was placed with

about six guns and some five hundred men. At _B_, where the highway had

formerly run, there were not less than eight guns and about a thousand

troops under General Jarero. _C_ was held by Colonel Badillo with about

five pieces and nearly three hundred men.[23.11] _E_ was entrusted to

General La Vega with a reserve of some five hundred grenadiers; and

that officer had charge also of a six or seven gun battery at _D_ and

of a neighboring breastwork, parallel to the highway--which was cut at

that point--and completely dominating it, where the Sixth Regiment,

counting nine hundred bayonets, was placed. In all some 3500 men,

including the artillery, occupied this wing.[23.14]

April 17 Santa Anna transferred Robles, Cano and their laborers to

the other side of the highway. On the summit of El Telégrafo, which

commanded the entire position, there was a level space of about an

acre, and in it stood a square stone tower. Here a breastwork, some

distance back from the crest and partly enclosing the tower, was

imperfectly constructed; four 4-pounders were planted; all the bushes,

cactus and small trees within musket range on the slope were cut down

and left on the ground; and the Third Infantry, consisting of about

one hundred men, took possession of the summit. To the left and rear

of this point ran a spur, which rose to a minor crest--a broken ledge

eighteen or twenty feet high--some thirty feet lower than the summit

and about a hundred yards from it. In the rear of all these points,

close to the hamlet, lay the main camp and strong reserves of troops

and guns. To Santa Anna the position seemed impregnable. He reported

to the government that it was completely fortified, well armed with

artillery and garrisoned with 12,000 men.[23.12] News from the capital

that revolutionary movements were on foot and that something must be

accomplished to prevent the idea of peace from gaining currency, no

longer troubled him. Confiding in his army and his position he gave

free rein to his vanity, his lordliness and his exultation. Here should

the proud invaders be rolled back or here under the saffron wing of the

plague should they rot. And then let domestic foes tremble![23.14]

But a number of circumstances undermined him. The narrow camp, too

much crowded with cottages, tents, huts and market booths, became

confused even while there were no hostilities. Insects kept the troops

restive. The supply of water, brought in barrels from the Río del Plan,

was insufficient,[23.13] and many drank the crude sap of the maguey,

which made them ill. A sort of cholera set in, and exposure produced

lung troubles. Far worse, however, were the moral distempers. Some of

the troops had turned their backs to the Americans at Palo Alto, the

Resaca, Monterey and Buena Vista, while others had recently, to their

utter amazement, seen heroic Vera Cruz and mighty Ulúa, the pride of

Mexico, haul down their flags; and men of both classes represented

the enemy as invincible. Every deserter was ordered shot, and this

interference with a popular diversion gave offence.[23.14]

Looking at the shaggy hills and ravines on his left, Santa Anna

declared that a rabbit could not get through there. Perhaps not,

thought many a soldier, but the Americans are not rabbits. About seven

hundred yards in front of El Telégrafo stood a similar though somewhat

lower hill called La Atalaya, which commanded a wide expanse of the

rough country, and the engineers felt it should be fortified and

strongly held; but the President would merely station twenty-five men

there. Robles himself believed that Scott could turn the main position,

and wanted fortifications erected at the extreme left; but Santa Anna

would listen to no advice, and his cocksureness itself excited alarm.

In private, officers talked of a disaster, and even Canalizo foreboded

it. The tinder of a panic was ready.[23.14]

[TWIGGS'S ADVANCE]

Meanwhile Twiggs with two field batteries,[23.15] six 24-pounders, two

8-inch howitzers, four 10-inch mortars, and a squadron of dragoons--in

all some 2600 men--set out in the footsteps of Cortez.[23.16] Most

fortunately the troops had a stock of enthusiasm, for the beginning

of the march was terrible. After going three miles along the beach

they struck off at a right angle for six or eight on a deep, sandy

road, sometimes three or four feet below the level of the ground,

with a blazing sun overhead, not a breath of moving air, and Twiggs's

horse for a pace-maker. Many threw away everything detachable, and the

greater part of the division--at least four fifths, it was said--fell

by the way. Some died, and many others did not rejoin the command for

days. Unbroken mules and drivers ignorant of their business added to

the difficulties. The meagre facilities for transportation did not

permit even officers to have tents, and some of the scanty supplies

were lost through the breaking down of wagons.[23.19]

The next day, happily, a change took place. The column set out before

sunrise, marched more slowly, and halted occasionally; and the national

highway, no longer buried in sand, proved to be a spacious, comfortably

graded cement avenue, carried over the streams by handsome bridges

of cut stone, and flanked on both sides by the estates of Santa

Anna.[23.17] Now it penetrated a dark forest of palms, cactus, limes

and countless other trees festooned with vines, and now it crossed

rolling prairies. Here it was cut through solid rock; here it skirted

a beautiful hill, with a charming vista of leafy glades; and presently

it was clinging as if in terror to the face of a cliff. Bowers carpeted

with many soft hues and perfumed with heliotrope recalled ideas of

Eden, while marshes full of strange bloated growths, bluish-green pools

rimmed with flowers of a suspicious brilliancy, and thick clumps of

dagger plants tipped with crimson offered suggestions of a different

sort.[23.19]

Matted tangles of leafage spattered with gold, big tulipans gleaming in

the shadows like a red rose in the hair of a Spanish dancer, blossoms

like scarlet hornets that almost flew at one's eyes, and blooms like

red-hot hair-brushes, the sight of which made the scalp tingle, were

balanced with big, close masses of white throats and purple mouths, and

with banks of the greenish-white cuatismilla, discharging invisible

clouds of a fragrance that seemed to be locust blended with lily of the

valley. Trees with tops like balloons, like corkscrews and like tables,

trees drained almost dry by starry parasites that swung from their

branches, trees covered with strawberry blossoms--or what appeared to

be strawberry blossoms--that were to graduate into coffee beans, trees

bare of everything except great yellow suns, the Flower of God, that

fascinated one's gaze--these and countless other surprises followed one

another; and then would come a whole grove netted over with morning

glories in full bloom. Amid scenes like these our exhausted troops

quickly regained their spirits.[23.19]

Toward the end of the march on the eleventh, when about thirty-seven

miles from Vera Cruz, the troops crossed a branch of the Antigua, and

soon came to the river itself. In the triangular space thus bounded

rose a hill crowned with an old fort.[23.18] Here stood the national

bridge, a magnificent structure more than fifty feet high and nearly

a quarter of a mile in length, commanding romantic views of the rapid

stream winding through towering vistas of luxuriant vegetation. On

leaving the bridge the road made a sharp turn to the left at the foot

of a high and very steep bluff; and it seemed as if a battery planted

at the top of the bluff, as La Vega's had been, might stop an army

until overpowered with siege guns. But Canalizo had been wiser than

his chief, for there were fords above and below and cross-roads in the

rear, that made it possible to turn the position. So amidst a wondrous

illumination from glow-worms and fireflies, the troops made their third

camp here in peace.[23.19]

Beyond this point the influence of Canalizo could be seen. The bamboo

huts thatched with palm-leaves were all vacant and empty. Scarcely one

living creature could be seen except flitting birds. These, however,

still abounded: parrots, macaws, hawks, eagles, orioles, humming-birds,

mocking-birds, cardinals brighter than cardinals, cranes larger than

cranes, talkative chachalacas, toucans as vociferous as their bills

were huge--every color from indigo to scarlet, and every note from the

scream to the warble; and the same ocean of green still rolled its vast

billows, warmed and brightened by the same golden sun.[23.19]

At the end of this march, about thirteen miles from the national

bridge, the highway narrowed and pitched down a long, steep, winding

descent, with overhanging trees and rocks on one side and a precipice

on the other, as if making for the centre of the globe. Then it crossed

Río del Plan, and came to a small, irregular opening, where a few

scattered huts could be seen. This was Plan del Río. Views of superb

heights delighted the eye, but the hot breath of the coast could be

felt in the valley. Even the hollows between the sand-hills of Vera

Cruz were thought less pestilential. But the men lay down, and, as a

soldier wrote, covered themselves with the sky.[23.19]

In the midst of scenery like this, "Old Davy" Twiggs appeared like a

perfectly natural feature. His robust and capacious body, powerful

shoulders, bull-neck, heavy, cherry-red face, and nearly six feet

of erect stature represented physical energy at its maximum. With

bristling white hair and, when the regulations did not interfere, a

thick white beard, he seemed like a kind of snow-clad volcano, a human

Ætna, pouring forth a red-hot flood of orders and objurgations from

his crater of a mouth; and he was vastly enjoyed by the rough soldiers

even when, as they said, he "cursed them right out of their boots." In

a more strictly human aspect he made an excellent disciplinarian, and

he could get more work out of the men than anybody else in the army;

but as a warrior, while he always looked thirsty for a fight, he was

thought over-anxious to fight another day--to be, in short, a hero of

the future instead of the past; and as a general, Scott had already

said that he was not qualified "to command an army--either in the

presence, or in the absence of an enemy." His brains were, in fact,

merely what happened to be left over from the making of his spinal

cord, and the soldiers' names for him--the "Horse" and the "Bengal

Tiger"--classed him fairly as regarded intellect.[23.20]

Twiggs had been warned by Scott that a substantial army, commanded by

Santa Anna, lay in his front; lancers were encountered on April 11;

and a reconnaissance of that afternoon, made because the enemy were

said to be in force just ahead, proved that guns commanded the pass of

Cerro Gordo; yet the next morning he advanced in the usual marching

order. Nothing saved his division but the eagerness of the Mexicans.

They opened fire before he was entirely within the jaws of death, and

he managed to retreat--extricating his train with difficulty, however.

The enemy have given up and withdrawn, boasted Santa Anna, while the

Americans felt ashamed. Further reconnoitring on that day gave a still

more impressive idea of the problem ahead; but the General, as if

intoxicated by holding an independent command, ordered an assault made

at daybreak the next morning. The Volunteer Division, consisting at

present of two brigades, a field battery and a squadron of cavalry,

then arrived. Patterson, who led it, seemed, however, by no means

eager to accept the responsibility of command, and, as no confidence

whatever was felt in Pillow, the second in rank, he placed the entire

force under Twiggs on the ground of illness. Pillow and Shields, who

were thought no less willing than Twiggs to make a bid for glory at the

expense of their men, then demanded a day for rest and preparation; and

accordingly, about sunset on the thirteenth, orders for the attack were

issued.[23.20]

[DISCOURAGEMENT]

But the officers and soldiers, distrusting alike the information and

the ability of their commander, now felt extremely depressed. The

situation appeared hopeless, thought even Lieutenant U. S. Grant; and

Captain Robert E. Lee described the Mexican position as an "unscalable"

precipice on one side and "impassable" ravines on the other. It seemed,

wrote a third man, like a Gibraltar; and the idea of assailing it with

Twiggs for leader inspired the deepest alarm. Everybody not selfishly

ambitious desired to wait for the commander-in-chief; and yet Polk,

in order to justify his depreciation of Scott, said with reference to

this very situation, that our forces would be victorious "if there

was not an officer among them." Suddenly, however, the faces of the

men brooding round their bivouac fires lighted up, for news came that

Patterson, in order to veto the project of Twiggs, had assumed the

command, and ordered offensive operations to be suspended.[23.20]

Scott, whose ideas of an army differed radically from those prevalent

in Mexico, hardly believed that Santa Anna could place himself below

Jalapa at this time with as many as 4000 men, even though reports of

a larger number reached him; but he arranged to drop his work at Vera

Cruz on the first news of serious opposition, and letters from Twiggs

and Pillow, received late on April 11 led him to set out the next

day. Early on Wednesday afternoon, the 14th, he was at Plan del Río,

doffing his old straw hat as the soldiers, who doubtless realized that

in taking Vera Cruz by siege instead of assault he had spared their

lives, cheered tumultuously. Instantly chaos became order, confidence

reigned, and the jealous clashes of the commanders ended. Now something

will be done, thought the officers; the soldiers began to laugh and

whistle; and what an officer called a "hum of satisfaction" pervaded

the camp. Already the battle was half gained.[23.23]

Engineers Beauregard and Tower had by this time done some

reconnoitring, and, as indeed would have been fairly obvious to any

intelligent person, had concluded that a turning movement against the

Mexican left--toward which a trail had been found to lead--offered

the best hope. But an idea was not a plan. The reconnaissances were

far from complete, and reports upon the Mexican position and numbers

differed materially. Hence the commander-in-chief, who accepted

everything valuable done by his subordinates but never surrendered his

own judgment, decided to begin anew, and, in the hope of gaining the

highway in Santa Anna's rear and cutting off his entire army, sent

Captain Lee at once to the ravines.[23.21] Friday that indefatigable

engineer found himself in contact with the Mexican lines far to the

rear of El Telégrafo. Reconnoitring could go no farther, and the

highway toward Jalapa was not actually seen; but there were good

reasons for believing it near, and the construction of a "road" for

troops and artillery on the route discovered by Lee was pressed with

great energy. At about 9 o'clock on Friday evening all the facts and

conclusions were brought together in a plan by Major John L. Smith,

senior engineer on the ground, and in substance his plan was adopted.

Its essential point was, in accordance with Scott's announced aim, to

gain the highway in the Mexican rear first of all, and then--not until

then--attack in the rear and perhaps also on the front.[23.22] After

the adjournment of this conference the army was further cheered by

the arrival of Worth, 1600 picked men and a number of heavy guns. The

Mexican forces were estimated as 12-18,000, and Scott had only 8500;

but the bright stars of that night looked down on an army sleeping

soundly in full courage and confidence.[23.23]

[PRELIMINARY OPERATIONS]

The War with Mexico, Volume 2 (of 2) · 第 4 / 72 段