Transcriber's Note
For this version of the text, italics are denoted with _underscore_
characters, and bold text with =equal= signs. The ligature for 'oe' is
separated into its two letters, e.g., 'manoeuvre'.
There are three types of notes in the text. The lettered notes
(originally asterisks) were printed as standard footnotes on each page.
References to these notes now appear in brackets as [A], [B] and so on.
The notes themselves have been moved to directly follow the paragraph
within which they are referenced. Occasionally, an asterisk is used for
some other purpose, usually preceding rather than following a word or
phrase, and remain asterisks.
Numeric references referring to the extensive Notes section of the text
appear as bracketed numbers. Unlike standard footnotes, the references
to those notes in the text are themselves not necessarily consecutive,
nor are they unique. To assist in consulting those notes using search
features, the chapter number has been prefixed to each, using Arabic
numerals, as [21.1], [25.2], [30.3], etc. Any internal references
directing attention to another note have also been changed.
Within the Notes, there are =bold= numbers prefixed to key words (e.g.,
'=123=keyword') which serve as references to sources. These numbered
sources are found in the final section of the text. There may be
multiple references to the same source.
The logic behind this system is explained by the author in his Preface,
and in more detail in the fifth note [P.5] of the Notes to that Preface.
The notes themselves have several footnotes, using numbers and
asterisks. These footnotes have been re-numbered sequentially as [1],
[2], [3], etc.
Right-side page headers contained descriptions of the current topic
covered by the two open pages. These were retained and are placed on
separate lines prior to the paragraph where the topic is introduced,
and enclosed in brackets, as [Topic headers]. The choice of that
position is not always obvious and should be regarded as approximate.
Should the topic persist over multiple pages, any redundant headers
have been removed.
Illustrations are denoted with square brackets as [Illustration:
<caption>] at approximately the point where they were printed. The
captions are usually printed on the maps themselves. Where there is
no title to the map, the caption has been provided from the table of
illustrations, in mixed case.
References to chapters I through XX, as well as their respective notes,
refer to the Volume I of this work.
See https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/44437
Project Gutenberg also has an HTML version of this file which includes
the original illustrations.
See 44438-h.htm or 44438-h.zip:
(https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/44438/pg44438-images.html)
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THE WAR WITH MEXICO
+----------------------------------------+
| BY THE SAME AUTHOR |
| |
| The |
| Annexation of Texas |
| |
| _Octavo ix + 496 pages_ |
| |
| _By mail, postpaid, $3.00_ |
| |
| ------------------------ |
| This is the only work attempting to |
| deal thoroughly with an affair that |
| was intrinsically far more important |
| than had previously been supposed, |
| and was also of no little significance |
| on account of its relation to the war |
| with Mexico. |
| ------------------------ |
| |
| THE MACMILLAN COMPANY |
| _PUBLISHERS_ |
+----------------------------------------+
THE
WAR WITH MEXICO
BY
JUSTIN H. SMITH
FORMERLY PROFESSOR OF MODERN HISTORY
AT DARTMOUTH COLLEGE
AUTHOR OF "THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS," "OUR
STRUGGLE FOR THE FOURTEENTH COLONY,"
"ARNOLD'S MARCH FROM
CAMBRIDGE TO QUEBEC,"
ETC.
VOLUME II
New York
THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
1919
_All rights reserved_
COPYRIGHT, 1919,
BY THE MACMILLAN COMPANY.
Set up and printed. Published December, 1919.
Norwood Press
J. S. Cushing Co.--Berwick & Smith Co.
Norwood, Mass., U.S.A.
CONTENTS OF VOLUME II
PAGE
MAPS AND PLANS IN VOLUME II vi
CONSPECTUS OF EVENTS xi
PRONUNCIATION OF SPANISH xiii
CHAPTER
XXI. BEHIND THE SCENES AT MEXICO 1
XXII. VERA CRUZ 17
XXIII. CERRO GORDO 37
XXIV. PUEBLA 60
XXV. ON TO THE CAPITAL 79
XXVI. CONTRERAS AND CHURUBUSCO 99
XXVII. NEGOTIATIONS 120
XXVIII. MOLINO DEL REY, CHAPULTEPEC AND MEXICO 140
XXIX. FINAL MILITARY OPERATIONS 165
XXX. THE NAVAL OPERATIONS 189
XXXI. THE AMERICANS AS CONQUERORS 210
XXXII. PEACE 233
XXXIII. THE FINANCES OF THE WAR 253
XXXIV. THE WAR IN AMERICAN POLITICS 268
XXXV. THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE WAR 294
XXXVI. CONCLUSION 310
NOTES ON VOLUME II 327
APPENDIX (LISTS OF SOURCES) 517
INDEX 563
MAPS AND PLANS IN VOLUME TWO
As equally good sources disagree sometimes, a few inconsistencies are
unavoidable. Numerous errors have been corrected. An asterisk indicates
an unpublished source. Statements, cited in the notes, have also been
used.
PAGE
1. The Fortress of San Juan de Ulúa in 1854 21
From a *plan in the War Dept., Washington.
2. Siege of Vera Cruz: General Plan 24
From a map drawn by McClellan from surveys done by six
American officers (N. Y. City Public Library); *a map
drawn by order of Lieut. Col. Henry Wilson (War Dept.,
Washington).
3. Siege of Vera Cruz: The American Works 28
From a map drawn by Lieut. Foster, based on surveys of
four American officers (War Dept., Washington).
4. From Vera Cruz to Perote 39
Based on a map issued by Manouvrier and Snell, New Orleans,
1847 (Papers of N. P. Trist).
5. Contour Lines near Cerro Gordo 40
From a *drawing in the War College, Washington.
6. Battle of Cerro Gordo: General Map 43
Based on a map drawn by Lieut. Coppée from the surveys of
Maj. Turnbull and Capt. McClellan (Sen. Ex. Doc. 1; 30
Cong., 1 sess.); a map drawn by McClellan (Mass. Hist.
Society); a *sketch of a reconnaissance by Lieut. Tower
(War Dept., Washington); *Croquis de la Posición del campo
de Cerro Gordo, 1847 (War Dept., Washington); a plan by
I. A. de Soiecki (Vera Cruz City archives); and a *sketch
by Lieut. Thos. Williams (among his letters).
7. Battle of Cerro Gordo: Central Portion 51
Based on the same sources as No. 6 _supra_.
8. From Jalapa to Puebla 61
Based on a Fomento Dept. map.
9. Profile of the Route from Vera Cruz to Mexico 62
From a map published by Manouvrier and Snell, New Orleans,
1847 (Papers of N. P. Trist).
10. A Part of the Valley of Mexico 80
From a map surveyed and drawn by Lieut. M. L. Smith and
Bvt. Capt. Hardcastle (Sen. Ex. Doc. 11; 31 Cong., 1
sess.); and a map by Balbontín (Invasión Americana).
11. Battles of August 19 and 20, 1847: General Map 100
Based on a map drawn by Hardcastle from the surveys of
Maj. Turnbull, Capt. McClellan and Lieut. Hardcastle
(Sen. Ex. Doc. 1; 30 Cong., 1 sess.); the Smith and
Hardcastle map (No. 10 _supra_); a *map drawn by
Capt. Barnard from the surveys of Capt. Mason and Lieuts.
Beauregard, McClellan, and Foster (War Dept., Washington);
a map drawn by Hardcastle from the surveys of Mason
and Hardcastle (Sen. Ex. Doc. 1; 30 Cong., 1 sess.); a map
in Apuntes; and a map drawn by McClellan (Mass. Hist.
Society).
12. Battle of Contreras 108
Based on the Turnbull map (No. 11 _supra_); a *plan
of Capt. Gardner (Pierce Papers); *notes by Capt. Henshaw
on a map by Hardcastle (Mass. Hist. Society); a *sketch
by Lieut. Collins, 4th Artillery (Collins Papers); New
Orleans _Picayune_, Sept. 12, 1847; a plan by
Balbontín (Invasión Americana); and a map in Apuntes.
13. Battle of Churubusco 111
Based on the Turnbull map (No. 11 _supra_); a map
drawn by Hardcastle from the surveys of Mason and
Hardcastle (Sen. Ex. Doc. 1; 30 Cong., 1 sess.); and a
sketch by Balbontín ("Invasión Americana").
14. The Tête de Pont, Churubusco 112
*Drawn by Lieuts. Beauregard and Tower from Beauregard's
survey (War Dept., Washington).
15. Profile of East Curtain, Tête de Pont, Churubusco 113
*Drawn by Beauregard from the surveys of Lieuts. McClellan,
Beauregard, and Foster (War Dept., Washington).
16. The Fortifications of Churubusco Convent 114
*Drawn by Beauregard and Tower from Beauregard's survey
(War Dept., Washington).
17. Battles of Mexico: General Map 141
Based on a map drawn by Hardcastle from the surveys of
Turnbull, McClellan, and Hardcastle (Sen. Ex. Doc. 1;
30 Cong., 1 sess.); and a map drawn by McClellan and
Hardcastle (published by the government).
18. Battle of Molino del Rey 143
Based on the maps specified under No. 17 _supra_; a
sketch by Hardcastle (Sen. Ex. Doc. 1; 30 Cong., 1 sess.);
and a sketch in New Orleans _Picayune_, Oct. 17, 1847.
19. Battle of Chapultepec 150
Based upon the maps specified under No. 17 supra; a
*sketch drawn by Tower from surveys of Beauregard and
Tower (War Dept., Washington); a plan accompanying Gen.
Quitman report (Sen. Ex. Doc. 1; 30 Cong., 1 sess.);
*recollections of Señor D. Ignacio Molina, Chief
Cartographer of the Fomento Dept., Mexico.
20. Blindage at Chapultepec 151
21. The Citadel, Mexico, in 1840 (War Dept. *plan, Washington) 159
22. Alvarado, Mexico 198
A *plan by J. L. Mason (War Dept., Washington).
23. A Part of Tabasco River 205
Based on a map in Ho. Ex. Doc. 1; 30 Cong., 2 sess.
24. Guaymas, Mexico 206
From a plan in Ho. Ex. Doc. 1; 30 Cong., 2 sess.
25. Mazatlan, Mexico 207
From a *drawing by Commander Wouldridge of Brigantine
_Spy_ (Admiralty Papers, Public Record Office,
London).
26. The Tip of Lower California 207
Based on a map in Sen. Ex. Doc. 18; 31 Cong., 1 sess.
27. Territory acquired from Mexico 241
CONSPECTUS OF EVENTS
1845
March. The United States determines to annex Texas; W. S. Parrott
sent to conciliate Mexico.
July. Texas consents; Taylor proceeds to Corpus Christi.
Oct. 17. Larkin appointed a confidential agent in California.
Nov. 10. Slidell ordered to Mexico.
Dec. 20. Slidell rejected by Herrera.
1846
Jan. 13. Taylor ordered to the Rio Grande.
Mar. 8. Taylor marches from Corpus Christi.
21. Slidell finally rejected by Paredes.
28. Taylor reaches the Rio Grande.
Apr. 25. Thornton attacked.
May 8. Battle of Palo Alto.
9. Battle of Resaca de la Palma.
13. The war bill becomes a law.
June 5. Kearny's march to Santa Fe begins.
July 7. Monterey, California, occupied.
14. Camargo occupied.
Aug. 4. Paredes overthrown.
7. First attack on Alvarado.
13. Los Angeles, California, occupied.
16. Santa Anna lands at Vera Cruz.
18. Kearny takes Santa Fe.
19. Taylor advances from Camargo.
Sept. 14. Santa Anna enters Mexico City.
20-24. Operations at Monterey, Mex.
22-23. Insurrection in California precipitated.
23. Wool's advance from San Antonio begins.
25. Kearny leaves Santa Fe for California.
Oct. 8. Santa Anna arrives at San Luis Potosí.
Oct. 15. Second attack on Alvarado.
24. San Juan Bautista captured by Perry.
28. Tampico evacuated by Parrodi.
29. Wool occupies Monclova.
Nov. 15. Tampico captured by Conner.
16. Saltillo occupied by Taylor.
18. Scott appointed to command the Vera Cruz expedition.
Dec. 5. Wool occupies Parras.
6. Kearny's fight at San Pascual.
25. Doniphan's skirmish at El Brazito.
27. Scott reaches Brazos Id.
29. Victoria occupied.
1847
Jan. 3. Scott orders troops from Taylor.
8. Fight at the San Gabriel, Calif.
9. Fight near Los Angeles, Calif.
11. Mexican law regarding Church property.
28. Santa Anna's march against Taylor begins.
Feb. 5. Taylor places himself at Agua Nueva.
19. Scott reaches Tampico.
22-23. Battle of Buena Vista.
27. Insurrection at Mexico begins.
28. Battle of Sacramento.
Mar. 9. Scott lands near Vera Cruz.
29. Vera Cruz occupied.
30. Operations in Lower California opened.
Apr. 8. Scott's advance from Vera Cruz begins.
18. Battle of Cerro Gordo; Tuxpán captured by Perry.
19. Jalapa occupied.
May 15. Worth enters Puebla.
June 6. Trist opens negotiations through the British legation.
16. San Juan Bautista again taken.
Aug. 7. The advance from Puebla begins.
20. Battles of Contreras and Churubusco.
Aug. 24-Sept. 7. Armistice.
Sept. 8. Battle of Molino del Rey.
13. Battle of Chapultepec; the "siege" of Puebla begins.
14. Mexico City occupied.
22. Peña y Peña assumes the Presidency.
Oct. 9. Fight at Huamantla.
20. Trist reopens negotiations.
Nov. 11. Mazatlán occupied by Shubrick.
1848
Feb. 2. Treaty of peace signed.
Mar. 4-5. Armistice ratified.
10. Treaty accepted by U. S. Senate.
May 19, 24. Treaty accepted by Mexican Congress.
30. Ratifications of the treaty exchanged.
June 12. Mexico City evacuated.
July 4. Treaty proclaimed by President Polk.
THE PRONUNCIATION OF SPANISH
The niceties of the matter would be out of place here, but a few
general rules may prove helpful.
_A_ as in English "ah"; _e_, at the end of a syllable, like _a_ in
"fame," otherwise like _e_ in "let"; _i_ like _i_ in "machine"; _o_, at
the end of a syllable, like _o_ in "go," otherwise somewhat like _o_ in
"lot"; _u_ like _u_ in "rude" (but, unless marked with two dots, silent
between _g_ or _q_ and _e_ or _i_); _y_ like _ee_ in "feet."
_C_ like _k_ (but, before _e_ and _i_, like [A]_th_ in "thin"); _ch_ as
in "child"; _g_ as in "go" (but, before _e_ and _i_, like a harsh _h_);
_h_ silent; _j_ like a harsh _h_; _ll_ like [B]_lli_ in "million"; _ñ_
like _ni_ in "onion"; _qu_ like _k_; _r_ is sounded with a vibration
(trill) of the tip of the tongue (_rr_ a longer and more forcible sound
of the same kind); _s_ as in "sun"; _x_ like _x_ in "box" (but, in
"México" and a few other names, like Spanish _j_); _z_ like [A]_th_ in
"thin."
Words bearing no mark of accentuation are stressed on the last syllable
if they end in any consonant except _n_ or _s_, but on the syllable
next to the last if they end in _n_, _s_ or a vowel.
[A] In Mexico, however, usually like _s_ in "sun."
[B] In Mexico usually like _y_.
[Illustration: MEXICO IN 1919]
THE WAR WITH MEXICO
XXI
BEHIND THE SCENES AT MEXICO
September, 1846-March, 1847
The revolution of August 4, as already has been suggested, was a
complex and inconsistent affair, combining most heterogeneous elements:
the popular institutions of 1824 and the autocratic power of the
soldier upheld with bayonets; the army and the people, whose relations
had always been, and in Mexico always had to be, those of wolf and
lamb; the regular troops and the National Guards, who loved each other
as fire loves water; General Salas reluctantly taking orders from
Citizen Farías, and both of them doing obeisance to Liberator Santa
Anna, whom both distrusted; and all coöperating to revive a federal
constitution, which had been found in practice unworkable, and needed,
in the opinion of everybody, to be redrawn.[21.3]
Such a state of things argued insincerity; and in fact many had taken
up the cry of Federalism at this time simply because the failure
of reactionary designs had made the word a popular appeal, and
because--nearly all the former leaders of that school having been
crushed by the Centralists--there seemed to be room for new aspirants;
while the state of things indicated also that more troubles were soon
to arrive, since evidently no final solution of the political problem
had been achieved, and such a welter of principles, traditions and
methods was a loud invitation to the demagogue and the schemer. _Don
Simplicio_ predicted that new stars were to flash out soon in the
political heavens, and then disappear before the astronomers would have
time to name them; and it added significantly, "The comets will be
found to be all tails."[21.3]
In particular the field was open for radical democracy. Calm judgment
is never listened to in a period of excitement, and the Mexicans, like
the French of 1792, instead of resorting to the practical Anglo-Saxon
rule of compromising differences, believed in carrying principles to
their logical end. Centralism and monarchical ideas had failed to
render the nation happy; democracy was therefore the panacea, and the
more of it the better. The demoralized condition of the people promoted
this dangerous policy. Referring to all those concerned with public
affairs, a thoughtful writer of the day characterized them as ignorant,
destitute of honor, patriotism, morality, good faith or principles of
any kind, and influenced exclusively by self-interest and ambition;
and naturally men of the opposite kind held aloof in disgust and
despair. For these reasons the conservative wing of the Federalists,
led by Pedraza and known as the Moderados (_Moderates_), found itself
distanced in the race for support; and the Puros--that is to say, pure
Federalists and democrats--gained the ascendency at once.[21.3]
Their acknowledged leader, as we have seen, was the patriotic though
indiscreet Farías, but he was more honest than brilliant, and a
man stepped forward now who reversed that description. This man
was Rejón. A keen, subtle mind, a bold, unfaltering will, a ready,
plausible tongue and a tireless ambition quite indifferent about
means, characterized him chiefly, and for the present crisis these
were redoubtable qualifications. The Spanish minister once remarked,
after conversing with him, that it was impossible to trust a person who
possessed no principles except the transient interests of his ambition.
And Rejón had another qualification that was no less important. Though
unworthy of confidence and everywhere distrusted, Santa Anna counted as
an essential factor in all plans, a power that each party felt it must
have; and Rejón was believed at this time to represent Santa Anna.[21.3]
[POLITICS AT MEXICO]
The aims and to some extent the methods of the radical faction were
borrowed from the United States, but without regard to differences
of race, experience and present circumstances. Government, they
maintained, should be completely democratic and completely secular; and
they dreamed of this consummation almost voluptuously, as a Mussulman
dreams of paradise. They held public meetings, where everybody was
free to speak; and in these disorderly gatherings they discussed
religious freedom, the seizure of Church property, the reformation
of the clergy, the secularization of marriage and education, the
necessity of destroying military domination in politics, and the
capital punishment of all suspected monarchists. In short, from the
conservative point of view, they passed sentence of death on society.
Santa Anna did not sympathize with their programme. He wished society
to live--for him, and he was conducting now an equivocal correspondence
with men hostile to the Puros. But it probably suited his purpose to
have them succeed for a time, and to have the substantial citizens add
to their litany, "From Rejón deliver us, good Lord!" He himself had
played the part of the Lord before now, and was willing to do so again,
though he preferred the more terrestrial name of dictator.[21.3]
Of course property felt the menace, and it had reason to do so. During
the latter part of September, 1846, an editorial in the official
journal, commonly attributed to Rejón, intimated that if the rich did
not contribute for the war, the people would know where to find their
wealth; and even foreign houses were threatened. The British minister
forced a prompt retraction of this language so far, at least, as his
fellow-countrymen were concerned; but within two weeks a number of
capitalists were invited to loan $200,000 with an intimation that,
unless they did so, the money would be taken. Every one understood that
the leopard, though now comparatively silent, had not changed his spots
and would not, and hence four élite militia corps, familiarly known as
the Polkos, were formed at Mexico to protect life and property. One
of these, called the Victoria battalion, was composed of merchants,
professional men and scions from wealthy families. Another, which
bore the name of Hidalgo, consisted of clerks; and the Bravos and
Independencia battalions, made up largely of artisans, represented the
industrial interests of the city. The ministry, who desired to exclude
such persons from the National Guard, opposed the recognition of these
corps; but, supported by Salas, the substantial citizens carried the
day.[21.3]
An equally natural reaction caused by radical violence was political.
In the hope of welding the Federalists into a harmonious party, the
council of government had been revived, and members of both wings had
been appointed to it. Santa Anna, in order to establish his particular
friend Haro at the head of the treasury, next proposed to transfer
Farías from that office to the presidency of the council. This was
understood--correctly, no doubt--as a move to eliminate him virtually
from the government, and was fiercely denounced; but Santa Anna then
remarked that should Salas for any reason drop out, the president of
the council would take his place at the head of the government, and
Pedraza could have the post in case Farías preferred to remain as
he was.[21.1] This put a new look on the matter, and the programme
was carried out; but the Puro attacks upon their rivals continued to
excite bitter resentment. When it was arranged that Farías and Pedraza
should publicly shake hands, and crowds gathered to witness the amazing
ceremony, it failed to occur. The Moderados belonging to the council
resigned; the body ceased to enjoy prestige and influence; and Farías
lost all official power. Naturally some of the blame for this result
was laid to the charge of the Pedrazists. Partisan rancor grew still
more savage. The fury of the French revolution was rivalled. "We must
finish with our enemies or die ourselves," cried one factional organ;
"the scaffold must be raised; we must drink their hearts' blood."
Bankhead described the situation as one of "universal terror and
distrust."[21.3]
About the middle of October there came an explosion. Apparently
Rejón demanded that Salas initiate the Puro reforms, and the acting
Executive, who was not only weak and incompetent but obstinate,
resented the pressure, and turned his face toward the Moderados. To
the Puros this looked reactionary, and he was charged with a design to
prevent Congress from assembling. Next it was required of Salas that
he should give way to Farías as the representative of the new régime,
and probably there were threats at least of bringing this change
about, if necessary, through an insurrection of the populace.[21.2]
Then Salas, with the Hidalgo battalion of which he was the commander,
took possession of the citadel. The people, alarmed by rumors that a
sack was contemplated, flew to arms; and Rejón found it necessary to
moderate his tone.[21.3]
[AN EXPLOSION]
When the Executive, as was inevitable, dismissed him from office, he
submitted; and Santa Anna himself, though his orders to Rejón had
been to hold the post whatever Salas might do, found public sentiment
at the capital too strong for him, and concluded to accept the change.
Rejón's conduct had excited so much dissension and alarm, that his
removal gratified all sensible persons at Mexico. The rumors and the
disturbance were now attributed officially to agents of the United
States, and comparative quiet returned.[21.3]
The aims of Santa Anna and those of the Puros may have been exactly
contrary in these events; but both overshot the mark, and they suffered
a common loss of prestige. As one method of restoring it, they induced
the governors of San Luis Potosí and Querétaro to declare that within
their jurisdictions the Liberator would be recognized as head of the
nation until the assembling of Congress; but their principal scheme
was to carry the Presidential election. Congress, chosen on the first
day of November, was to elect, and it consisted chiefly of men termed
by well-to-do citizens "the dregs of society"--that is to say, poorly
educated radicals taken from the masses.[21.3]
This appeared to ensure a Puro triumph, yet there were serious
difficulties. Rejón had been discredited, and the former administration
of Farías had left painful memories. Besides, it was feared that his
election would offend Santa Anna, who of course was not on very cordial
terms now with the tribune of the people, and preferred to have a weak
man like Salas, with whom satisfactory relations had grown out of the
Rejón episode, continue in power. At one time Almonte seemed to be the
Puro favorite; but finally it was decided to cast the Presidential vote
for Santa Anna, who could not legally hold the chief political and the
chief military offices at the same time and would no doubt remain with
the army, and to elect Farías to the Vice Presidency as the actual
executive.[21.3]
Even this combination, however, met with strong and unexpected
opposition. The conservatives and moderates were naturally against it;
certain states--for the voting was done by these quasi sovereignties as
units--could not forgive Santa Anna for past misdeeds, and the powerful
Church party looked upon Farías as Antichrist. Finally Escudero
of Chihuahua, whose delegation held the balance of power, opened
negotiations with Farías, and that gentleman declared in writing his
willingness to "join loyally" with any one who desired "in good faith
the welfare of the country." Holding this instrument--a weapon, should
there be need of it--in their hands, a number of the Moderados, who
realized his honesty, vigor and good intentions, and believed now that
he would give them a share in the administration, accepted the Puro
candidates, and on December 22 by a narrow majority these were elected.
The news produced a commotion; but without encountering serious
opposition Farías took up the reins of government at once.[21.3]
His primary aim was to support the war. This he intended to do because
he felt an ardent patriotism, but other reasons also lay in his mind.
Abominating the military class, he desired to have as many as possible
of the corrupt officers left on the field, and he designed to keep the
army so busy, that it would not be able to prevent the states, which
were generally Federalist and democratic in sentiment, from organizing
their strength, and making sure that no tyrannical central power would
ever raise its front again. But the first requirement for military
operations was money. Farías had, therefore, to take up immediately the
financial problem, and he found it most difficult.[21.3]
Of all the fields of Mexican misgovernment the worst had been the
treasury, for it not only required a care and a good judgment that
were peculiarly foreign to the national temperament, but provided
opportunities for illegitimate gains that were most congenial. During
Spanish rule the needs of the country had been fully met, and about
nine millions a year, almost half of the revenues, left as a surplus.
Under Itúrbide a financial system which three centuries of able
administration had built up was despised, and with mines abandoned,
agriculture discouraged, commerce paralyzed, honesty relaxed, taxes
diminished for the sake of popularity, and expenses increased for the
sake of glory, the foundations of ruin were promptly laid. The logical
superstructure soon mounted high in the shape of two British loans,
which bound Mexico to pay about twenty-six million dollars in return
for about fifteen, a large part of which was practically thrown away by
her agents.[21.5]
[FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES]
The expulsion of the rich and thrifty Spaniards, the costs of civil
wars, in which the nation paid for both sides, unwise and unstable
fiscal systems, borrowing at such rates as four per cent a month,
incredibly bad management,[21.4] and methods of accounting that made it
impossible for the minister of the treasury to know the actual state of
things, were enough to complete the edifice; but they were supplemented
with peculation, embezzlement, multiplication of offices, collusion
between importers and customhouses, and systematic smuggling winked at
by half-starved officials. Revenue after revenue was mortgaged, and by
1845 the government found itself entitled to only about thirteen per
cent of what entered the treasury.[21.5]
Since the beginning of hostilities our blockade, assisted by new
methods of wholesale smuggling, had greatly reduced the income from
duties, which had always been the principal reliance; the adoption of
the federal system had given the best part of the internal revenue
to the states; and the residue was almost wholly eaten up by the
officials. The foreign debt amounted now to more than fifty millions
and the domestic debt was nearly twice as great. Every known source of
income had been anticipated. Freewill offerings had proved illusory.
By ceasing to make payments on account of the debt in May, 1846, the
government had largely increased its income, of course, but it had
forfeited all title to financial sympathy; and the high officials,
who robbed the treasury still in this time of supreme distress, had
stripped it of all title to respect.[21.5]
The government, therefore, had no real credit. Men who made this kind
of gambling their business would now and then furnish a little money
for a brief term at an exorbitant rate. In February, 1846, for example,
a loan was placed at a total sacrifice of about thirty-seven per cent.
But when the treasury was authorized to borrow fifteen millions in a
regular way, nobody cared to furnish any part of the sum. New taxes
were equally vain. In October, 1846, the government imposed a special
war "contribution" in order to save the Mexicans, it explained, from
becoming foreigners in their own country, like the Spaniards of
Florida; and the chief result was to enrage a handful of persons, who
found they had been silly enough to pay while almost everybody else
had laughed. In November a forced loan was demanded of the clergy,
but the project aroused such opposition that substantially it had to
be given up. The whole gamut of methods, even violence, has been tried
in vain, said the ministry in December. Business was dead, confidence
gone, capital in hiding or sojourning abroad; and if by good luck a bag
of silver dropped into the treasury, it seemed to evaporate instantly.
Financially, reported the Spanish minister, the situation of the
country was "truly frightful."[21.5]
To make it more, not less, frightful, there did exist one vast
accumulation of riches. This was the property belonging to the Church.
No one could seriously deny that the nation had authority to use, in
a time of dire need, funds that had been given to the organization in
days of plenty, for this was a principle of Spanish law, and the Crown
had exercised the right without so good an excuse. There was also
a particular reason in the present instance, for the wealth of the
Church, aside from articles used in worship, consisted mainly of land,
and, as virtually no land tax existed in Mexico, it was escaping the
common burden--a burden, too, that was peculiarly for its advantage,
since in the case of American conquest it was bound to lose its
exclusive privileges. Besides, there was the saying of its Founder,
"Freely ye have received, freely give."[21.5]
[THE POLICY OF FARÍAS]
Very naturally, then, people had been casting their eyes for some time
at the riches of the Church. In June, 1844, _El Siglo XIX_, the most
thoughtful newspaper of Mexico, had suggested raising funds for the
Texas war by mortgaging some of its property; and a few months later
Duff Green, then on the ground, had expressed the opinion that Mexico
would have to choose between that resource and forced loans. In July,
1845, the correspondent of the London _Times_ dropped a similar hint
in that journal, and in the course of the year it became a popular
idea, that the Church could perform a great public service, and at the
same time vastly strengthen its own position, by providing means for
the anticipated war against the United States. In October, 1846, the
_Monitor Republicano_ suggested once more a mortgage of ecclesiastical
property; and at one time the government actually decided upon the
measure. Bankhead admitted that he could see no other resource. These
hints were not, however, acted upon by the clergy; and after many long
discussions they would only agree to advance $10,000 or $20,000 a month
for a limited period. This was to insult the nation, exclaimed the
_Monitor Republicano_.[21.5]
Charged now with full responsibility, Farías met the issue squarely.
Not only was he determined to carry on the war, but the letters of
Santa Anna had been, and were, most urgent. November 7 the General
demanded that "no step" should be neglected, if it could "help to
prevent the name of Mexican from soon becoming the object of ridicule
and contempt for the whole world." "Do not reply that the government
cannot obtain funds," he wrote later; "This would be saying that the
nation has ceased to exist ... so rich a nation cannot lack money
enough to support its independence, nor can the government say that
it has no authority to look for the money." These letters evidently
referred to ecclesiastical property, and they were followed up at New
Year's with almost daily communications of the same tenor. Such fearful
urgency had a good excuse, for the government was now sending him no
funds.[21.6]
It had none. Although Farías kept faith with Escudero, the Moderados
as a party showed the radical chief no mercy; the Centralists loathed
the apostle of federalism; all conservatives detested the typical
democrat, and the clericals abominated the extinguisher of titles. All
the old ladies thought him worse than Luther, and many of every kind
and condition rebelled at his brusque and tactless ways. No person
of substance would lift a finger to support his measures. A cloud of
distrust, passion, hostility and mortal hatred--mostly an emanation
from the whole wretched past of the country--grew thicker about him
each day. Raise money he could not. Moreover he probably felt little
desire to do so by any of the ordinary methods. One of his cardinal
principles was the necessity of destroying the fuero, the political
strength and the intellectual domination of the Church by reducing its
wealth; and now the demand of Santa Anna, the army and the nation that
funds be provided for the war, appeared to make this policy opportune
and even irresistible.[21.6]
A committee of Congress reported against the plan of borrowing on
the security of Church property; but that signified little, for no
practical substitute was offered. There were fears that the army
would break up. There were fears that for self-protection it would
proclaim a dictatorship or march upon the capital. Santa Anna's
warning and threatening communications were shown to Congress. The
legislators tried to evade the issue, but they were told that all
the responsibility rested upon their shoulders; that it was for them
to choose between the salvation and the ruin of the fatherland; and
on January 7 they grappled with the problem. Behind them--tireless,
uncompromising, inexorable--the Executive insisted upon action; and
behind him stood Santa Anna, demanding the same thing and promising to
support it.[21.9]
The session lasted virtually until January 11. The debates were hot,
and they were bitter. To make use of the Church lands, it was argued,
would invade the rights of property, lay upon one class of society the
general burden, and, should the lands be sold, involve a tremendous
loss of values, since there was little ready money in the country,
and few would have the means and inclination to purchase. The country
must be saved, answered Rejón, Juárez and their allies; is there any
other resource?--point it out. "If the Yankee triumphs," cried one
speaker, "what ecclesiastical property or what religion will be left
us?" And upon these principal themes were played an infinite number
of variations in all the possible tones of Mexican eloquence and
fury.[21.9]
Just before midnight on the ninth, however, the turmoil ceased; the
handsome chamber of the Deputies became still. High above the throne in
front glimmered pallidly the sword of Itúrbide; in letters of gold, on
the semi-circular wall at the rear, all the names of the Beneméritos
of Mexico reflected the subdued light; shadows filled the galleries;
exhausted members half-slumbered in their chairs, and others talked
wearily here and there in groups; but the stillness was momentous,
for the first article of a new law had been passed, authorizing the
Executive to raise fifteen millions, for the purposes of the war,
by pledging--if necessary, even selling--property vested in the
Church.[21.7] Minor discussions followed. The religious, charitable and
educational work of the clergy was guarded completely; many provisions
designed to hamper the realization of the main purpose were accepted in
order to conciliate opposition; and at length, on January 11, the plan
became law.[21.9]
[A CRISIS AT MEXICO]
"The crisis is terrible," wrote the minister of relations two days
later, and well he might. All the fierceness and intrigues of
partisan politics, all the cunning of high and low finance, all the
subtleties of priestcraft and all the terrors of a haughty Church came
into play.[21.8] Freely we have received, but we will not give, and
anathema to him who takes, was in effect the dictum of the prelates.
For a time it looked as if no official would venture, at the peril
of excommunication, to promulgate the law; but Farías and Juárez
found a man, and he was appointed governor of the Federal District,
in which lay the capital, for that purpose. Then came protests from
the "venerable" clergy, complaints from state governments, mutinies
of troops, and civilian insurrections organized by priests. Cries of
"_Viva la religión!_ Death to the government!" resounded in the streets
of the capital. Ministers of state were hard to find, and they soon
went out of office. Minor officials resigned so rapidly they could
hardly be counted. Santa Anna, after hailing the law as the salvation
of the country, turned against it. Moderados in Congress, encouraged by
the outcry, hurled epithets harder than stones at the Puros.[21.9]
On the other hand some of the Deputies, the regular troops at the
capital, who expected to profit by the law, the comandante general of
Mexico, the National Guards and the democratic masses rallied to the
support of the government; and Farías, his long head erect, and his
face, always thoughtful and sad, now anxious but set, appealed to the
patriotism of the nation, made the most of his authority as chief of
the state, and held to his course with inflexible energy and courage.
Not only was he determined to have the law respected, but he demanded
that it should be made effective. Chaos was the result. "When we
look for a ray of hope," said _El Republicano_, "we discover nothing
but alarms, anxieties and every probability of social dissolution."
"Furious anarchy," was Haro's description of the scene. There must soon
be a crash, he added; "the Devil is running away with us."[21.9]
Peaceful interests were not, however, entirely forgotten amid this
turbulence. During the second week of January Moses Y. Beach,
proprietor and editor of the New York _Sun_, arrived at Vera Cruz
from Havana. He carried a British passport. Besides his wife Mrs.
Storms, a remarkably clever newspaper woman, accompanied him.
Presumably she was to play the part of secretary, for Beach had large
financial enterprises in mind, and confidential clerical assistance
would certainly be necessary. For some reason letters were written
from Cuba to Santa Anna and the authorities at Vera Cruz denouncing
him as an American agent; and the party had to go through with a
tedious examination of three days, for the comandante general had been
expressly ordered to watch all suspicious foreigners hailing from the
United States. But the ordeal was passed satisfactorily, and on the
twenty-third or twenty-fourth of January Beach arrived at the capital.
Letters from Roman Catholic prelates of the United States and Cuba gave
him a confidential standing at once in the highest Church circles;
his project of a canal across the Isthmus of Tehuantepec excited the
lively interest of Santa Anna's particular friends; and his plan for a
national bank brought him into friendly relations with Farías and the
other Puro leaders.[21.10]
Still, the presence of this agent of civilization did not restore
tranquillity. On February 4 the government contrived by shrewd
management to put a law through Congress, which in effect gave it
autocratic power to raise five millions, and thus cut through the
complications and restrictions that had rendered the action of January
11 substantially inoperative. The wrath of the Church blazed afresh. At
all hazards Antichrist must be put down. Already they had concluded to
supply Santa Anna with money, in return of course for his aid against
Farías, and now they opened negotiations with the Moderados. This
party, however, thought it would be good tactics to divide the Puros
by supporting Farías, provided he would let them control his policy,
and they so proposed; but the impracticable fellow, who was battling
for principles and not place, declined the offer. Finally the Puros
themselves, realizing that all the other factions were against their
chief, decided that under his leadership they could not succeed, and
resolved to throw him overboard.[21.11]
[INSURRECTION AT MEXICO]
While they were casting about for a method, a certain Person advised
the clericals to offer an organized resistance against the laws
of January 11 and February 4, and circumstances made that course
easy. General Peña y Barragán, suspected of conspiring against the
government, was placed under temporary arrest, and this made him eager
to head a revolution. Farías, understanding that the Independencia
battalion could not be trusted, ordered it to Vera Cruz, imagining that
it would not refuse to march against the enemy. But on various more
or less valid pretexts it did so; the other three élite battalions
joined with it; and on February 27 they declared that Farías and
Congress, having lost the confidence of the nation, had forfeited
their authority, demanding at the same time the annulment of the
"anti-religious" laws.[21.12] Amidst the ringing of bells and burning
of gunpowder, the city echoed with the cries, "Death to Gómez Farías!
Death to the Puros!" Cannon were soon at the street corners, and the
usual scenes of a Mexican insurrection, fatal chiefly to peaceful
residents, were presently on exhibition. The clergy, there is ample
reason to believe, paid the costs, and priests left the confessionals
to herald this new crusade in the streets.[21.13]
After about nine days of indecisive skirmishing, however, the clericals
felt discouraged. The nation had not rallied to their cause as they
had expected. The sum of $40,000 was required for the next week of
fighting, and they hesitated. But again a certain Person urged them
on. The awkwardly drawn Plan was reduced to one article--Farías must
be deposed. On that almost all could agree. Monarchists, Centralists,
Santannistas, Clericals, Moderados, Puros were for once in happy
unison. Salas reappeared with some troops to take revenge on his old
enemy. And yet with epic heroism Farías, never faltering and never
compromising either his official dignity or his personal character,
held firmly on with his few soldiers and such of the populace as he
could arm. Again the battle raged, and again the innocent fell. But
who was it that directed this tempest? Who was the mysterious Person,
overwhelming the government of Mexico with darkness and confusion at
this critical hour? He was Moses Y. Beach, agent of the American state
department and adviser to the Mexican hierarchy. Permission had been
given him to bring about peace, if he could; and, unable to do this, he
seized the opportunity to help Scott.[21.13]
The time had now arrived for the Saviour of Society to appear, since
all rational persons were desperately tired of the vain struggle;
and Peña y Barragán wrote to Santa Anna, begging him to take
possession of the Presidential chair. Congress did nothing, for many
Deputies--fearing that it might act in a manner contrary to their
sentiments--remained away from the chamber, and a quorum could not be
assembled; but when Pedraza was arrested by the government, a large
group of Moderado members, feeling that Santa Anna's "victory" at
Buena Vista had confirmed his power, addressed him to the same effect
as Peña; and the Liberator, giving his best corps barely four days
of repose, and explaining his departure from the north as one more
sacrifice on the altar of his country, set out with a substantial body
of troops for Mexico.[21.14] Along his route women made wreaths and
threw them before his feet. Men of every faction acclaimed him; and
from Querétaro to the capital the road was filled with carriages, in
which all sorts of persons desiring to reach his ear strove to outdo
one another in despatch.[21.20]
On the first news of the insurrection Santa Anna's impression had been
that its ulterior aim was hostile to him,[21.15] for his partisans at
the capital supported the government; and, as a Puro envoy confirmed
this impression, he promised Farías military aid; but then appeared
Moderado agents with strong assurances and probably with stronger
financial arguments, and he went over, though not openly, to their side
of the controversy. Both parties were ordered by him to discontinue
hostilities, and both did so at once; for, as the clergy had now shut
their strong boxes, the insurgent officers were anxious to reëstablish
a connection with the national treasury, while the regulars of Farías
would not disobey Santa Anna. After the President's arrival at
Guadalupe Hidalgo a _Te Deum_ was celebrated there in honor of his
triumph over the Americans; and the next day, March 23, amidst real
demonstrations of joy, he formally superseded Farías, while a certain
Person[21.16]--diligently but vainly sought after by the police--was
hastily making his way through the mountains in the direction of
Tampico.[21.20]
[SANTA ANNA TRIUMPHANT]
Apparently Santa Anna had experienced the luckiest of turns. Precisely
when the Americans had shattered his plans, and he found himself
buried in the northern deserts with a broken, starving army,[21.17]
this insurrection gave him a splendid occasion for making a triumphal
march to the capital amid plaudits of gratitude and admiration, and
he now found himself at the summit of prestige and power.[21.18] In
reality, however, his situation was by no means entirely satisfactory.
Understanding that the Puros--who in reality had served him with
substantial good faith and therefore stood highest in his present
sympathy--had lost their dominant position, he allied himself with
their opponents; but the Moderados disliked and distrusted him still,
and he received at least one distinct notice that by taking their
side he was placing himself gratuitously in the hands of his enemies.
The Puros did not feel extremely grateful to him for merely avoiding
an open break with them; and, although it seemed wise to join in the
acclamations lest some worse thing befall them, they were already
sharpening their arrows against him. Indeed, they were believed to be
sharpening their daggers, and he took full precautions. The clergy had
trembled and recoiled on hearing that his arms had triumphed against
the Americans, and the Saviour of Society now appeared to lean toward
them--or toward their strong boxes; but they knew him well enough
to foresee, as they soon realized, that he intended to extort ample
compensation for all the favor shown them.[21.20]