and sent to the rear. "There go the men," the Rebels were heard to say,
by some of our surgeons who were in Gettysburg, at the time Pickett's
Division marched out to take position--"There go the men that will go
through your d--d Yankee lines, for you," A good many of them did "go
through our lines for us," but in a very different way from the one they
intended--not impetuous victors, sweeping away our thin lines with ball
and bayonet, but crestfallen captives, without arms, guarded by the true
bayonets of the Union, with the cheers of their conquerors ringing in
their ears. There was a grim truth after all in this Rebel remark.
Collected, the prisoners began their dreary march, a miserable,
melancholy stream of dirty gray, to pour over the crest to our rear.
Many of the officers were well dressed, fine, proud gentlemen, such men
as it would be a pleasure to meet, when the war is over. I had no desire
to exult over them, and pity and sympathy were the general feelings of
us all upon the occasion. The cheering of our men, and the unceremonious
handling of the captured flags was probably not gratifying to the
prisoners, but not intended for taunt or insult to the men; they could
take no exception to such practices. When the prisoners were turned to
the rear and were crossing the crest, Lieut. Col. Morgan, General
Hancock's Chief of Staff, was conducting a battery from the artillery
reserve, towards the Second Corps. As he saw the men in gray coming over
the hill, he said to the officer in command of the battery: "See up
there! The enemy has carried the crest. See them come pouring over! The
old Second Corps is gone, and you had better get your battery away from
here as quickly as possible, or it will be captured." The officer was
actually giving the order to his men to move back, when close
observation discovered that the gray-backs that were coming had no arms,
and then the truth flashed upon the minds of the observers. The same
mistake was made by others.
In view of the results of that day--the successes of the arms of the
country, would not the people of the whole country, standing there upon
the crest with General Meade, have said, with him: "Thank God?"
I have no knowledge and little notion of how long a time elapsed from
the moment the fire of the infantry commenced, until the enemy was
entirely repulsed, in this his grand assault. I judge, from the amount
of fighting and the changes of position that occurred, that probably the
fight was of nearly an hour's duration, but I cannot tell, and I have
seen none who knew. The time seemed but a very few minutes, when the
battle was over.
When the prisoners were cleared away and order was again established
upon our crest, where the conflict had impaired it, until between five
and six o'clock, I remained upon the field, directing some troops to
their position, in conformity to the orders of General Meade. The enemy
appeared no more in front of the Second Corps; but while I was engaged
as I have mentioned, farther to our left some considerable force of the
enemy moved out and made show of attack. Our artillery, now in good
order again, in due time opened fire, and the shells scattered the
"Butternuts," as clubs do the gray snow-birds of winter, before they
came within range of our infantry. This, save unimportant outpost
firing, was the last of the battle.
Of the pursuit of the enemy and the movements of the army subsequent to
the battle, until the crossing of the Potomac by Lee and the closing of
the campaign, it is not my purpose to write. Suffice it that on the
night of the 3d of July the enemy withdrew his left, Ewell's Corps, from
our front, and on the morning of the 4th we again occupied the village
of Gettysburg, and on that national day victory was proclaimed to the
country; that floods of rain on that day prevented army movements of any
considerable magnitude, the day being passed by our army in position
upon the field, in burying our dead, and some of those of the enemy, and
in making the movements already indicated; that on the 5th the pursuit
of the enemy was commenced--his dead were buried by us--and the corps of
our army, upon various roads, moved from the battlefield.
With a statement of some of the results of the battle, as to losses and
captures, and of what I saw in riding over the field, when the enemy was
gone, my account is done.
Our own losses in killed, wounded and missing I estimate at
_twenty-three thousand_. Of the "missing" the larger proportion were
prisoners, lost on the 1st of July. Our loss in prisoners, not wounded,
probably was _four thousand_. The losses were distributed among the
different army corps about as follows: In the Second Corps, which
sustained the heaviest loss of any corps, a little over _four thousand
five hundred_, of whom the missing were a mere nominal number; in the
First Corps a little over _four thousand_, of whom a great many were
missing; in the Third Corps _four thousand_, of whom some were missing;
in the Eleventh Corps nearly _four thousand_, of whom the most were
missing; and the rest of the loss, to make the aggregate mentioned, was
shared by the Fifth, Sixth and Twelfth Corps and the cavalry. Among
these the missing were few; and the losses of the Sixth Corps and of the
cavalry were light. I do not think the official reports will show my
estimate of our losses to be far from correct, for I have taken great
pains to question staff officers upon the subject, and have learned
approximate numbers from them. We lost no gun or flag that I have heard
of in all the battle. Some small arms, I suppose, were lost on the 1st
of July.
The enemy's loss in killed, wounded and prisoners I estimate at _forty
thousand_, and from the following data and for the following reasons: So
far as I can learn we took _ten thousand_ prisoners, who were not
wounded--many more than these were captured, but several thousands of
them were wounded. I have so far as practicable ascertained the number
of dead the enemy left upon the field, approximately, by getting the
reports of different burying parties. I think his dead upon the field
were _five thousand_, almost all of whom, save those killed on the first
of July, were buried by us--the enemy not having them in their
possession. In looking at a great number of tables of killed and
wounded in battles I have found that the proportion of the killed to the
wounded is as _one_ to _five_, or more than five, rarely less than five.
So with the killed at the number stated, _twenty-five thousand_
mentioned. I think _fourteen thousand_ of the enemy, wounded and
unwounded, fell into our hands. Great numbers of his small arms, two or
three guns, and forty or more--was there ever such bannered harvest?--of
his regimental battle-flags, were captured by us. Some day possibly we
may learn the enemy's loss, but I doubt if he will ever tell truly how
many flags he did not take home with him. I have great confidence
however in my estimates, for they have been carefully made, and after
much inquiry, and with no desire or motive to overestimate the enemy's
loss.
The magnitude of the armies engaged, the number of the casualties, the
object sought by the Rebel, the result, will all contribute to give
Gettysburg a place among the great historic battles of the world. That
General Meade's concentration was rapid--over thirty miles a day was
marched by some of the Corps--that his position was skillfully selected
and his dispositions good; that he fought the battle hard and well;
that his victory was brilliant and complete, I think all should admit. I
cannot but regard it as highly fortunate to us and commendable in
General Meade, that the enemy was allowed the initiative, the offensive,
in the main battle; that it was much better to allow the Rebel, for his
own destruction, to come up and smash his lines and columns upon the
defensive solidity of our position, than it would have been to hunt him,
for the same purpose, in the woods, or to unearth him from his
rifle-pits. In this manner our losses were lighter, and his heavier,
than if the case had been reversed. And whatever the books may say of
troops fighting the better who make the attack, I am satisfied that in
this war, Americans, the Rebels, as well as ourselves, are best on the
defensive. The proposition is deducible from the battles of the war, I
think, and my own observation confirms it.
But men there are who think that nothing was gained or done well in this
battle, because some other general did not have the command, or because
any portion of the army of the enemy was permitted to escape capture or
destruction. As if one army of a hundred thousand men could encounter
another of the same number of as good troops and annihilate it! Military
men do not claim or expect this; but the McClellan destroyers do, the
doughty knights of purchasable newspaper quills; the formidable warriors
from the brothels of politics, men of much warlike experience against
honesty and honor, of profound attainments in ignorance, who have the
maxims of Napoleon, whose spirit they as little understand as they do
most things, to quote, to prove all things; but who, unfortunately, have
much influence in the country and with the Government, and so over the
army. It is very pleasant for these people, no doubt, at safe distances
from guns, in the enjoyment of a lucrative office, or of a fraudulently
obtained government contract, surrounded by the luxuries of their own
firesides, where mud and flooding storms, and utter weariness never
penetrate, to discourse of battles and how campaigns should be conducted
and armies of the enemy destroyed. But it should be enough, perhaps, to
say that men here, or elsewhere, who have knowledge enough of military
affairs to entitle them to express an opinion on such matters, and
accurate information enough to realize the nature and the means of this
desired destruction of Lee's army before it crossed the Potomac into
Virginia, will be most likely to vindicate the Pennsylvania campaign of
Gen. Meade, and to see that he accomplished all that could have been
reasonably expected of any general of any army. Complaint has been, and
is, made specially against Meade, that he did not attack Lee near
Williamsport before he had time to withdraw across the river. These were
the facts concerning this matter:
The 13th of July was the earliest day when such an attack, if
practicable at all, could have been made. The time before this, since
the battle, had been spent in moving the army from the vicinity of the
field, finding something of the enemy and concentrating before him. On
that day the army was concentrated and in order of battle near the
turnpike that leads from Sharpsburg to Hagerstown, Md., the right
resting at or near the latter place, the left near Jones' crossroads,
some six miles in the direction of Sharpsburg, and in the following
order from left to right: the 12th corps, the 2d, the 5th, the 6th, the
1st, the 11th; the 3d being in reserve behind the 2d. The mean distance
to the Potomac was some six miles, and the enemy was between Meade and
the river. The Potomac, swelled by the recent rain, was boiling and
swift and deep, a magnificent place to have drowned all the Rebel crew.
I have not the least doubt but that Gen. Meade would have liked to drown
them all, if he could, but they were unwilling to be drowned, and would
fight first. To drive them into the river then, they must be routed.
Gen. Meade, I believe, favored an attack upon the enemy at that time,
and he summoned his corps commanders to a council upon the subject. The
1st corps was represented by William Hayes, the 3d by French, the 5th by
Sykes, the 6th by Sedgwick, the 11th by Howard, the 12th by Slocum, and
the Cavalry by Pleasanton. Of the eight generals there, Wadsworth,
Howard and Pleasanton were in favor of immediate attack, and five,
Hayes, French, Sykes, Sedgwick and Slocum were not in favor of attack
until better information was obtained of the position and situation of
the enemy. Of the _pros_ Wadsworth only temporarily represented the 1st
corps in the brief absence of Newton, who, had a battle occurred, would
have commanded. Pleasanton, with his horses, would have been a spectator
only, and Howard, with the _brilliant 11th corps_, would have been
trusted nowhere but a safe distance from the enemy--not by Gen. Howard's
fault, however, for he is a good and brave man. Such was the position of
those who felt sanguinarily inclined. Of the _cons_ were all of the
fighting generals of the fighting corps, save the 1st. This, then, was
the feeling of these generals--all who would have had no responsibility
or part in all probability, _hankered_ for a fight--those who would have
had both part and responsibility, did not. The attack was not made. At
daylight on the morning of the 14th, strong reconnoissances from the
12th, 2d and 5th corps were the means of discovering that between the
enemy, except a thousand or fifteen hundred of his rear guard, who fell
into our hands, and the Army of the Potomac, rolled the rapid, unbridged
river. The Rebel General, Pettigrew, was here killed. The enemy had
constructed bridges, had crossed during all the preceding night, but so
close were our cavalry and infantry upon him in the morning, that the
bridges were destroyed before his rear guard had all crossed.
Among the considerations influencing these generals against the
propriety of attack at that time, were probably the following: The army
was wearied and worn down by four weeks of constant forced marching or
battle, in the midst of heat, mud and drenching showers, burdened with
arms, accoutrements, blankets, sixty to a hundred cartridges, and five
to eight days' rations. What such weariness means few save soldiers
know. Since the battle the army had been constantly diminished by
sickness or prostration and by more straggling than I ever saw before.
Poor fellows--they could not help it. The men were near the point when
further efficient physical exertion was quite impossible. Even the sound
of the skirmishing, which was almost constant, and the excitement of
impending battle, had no effect to arouse for an hour the exhibition of
their wonted former vigor. The enemy's loss in battle, it is true, had
been far heavier than ours; but his army was less weary than ours, for
in a given time since the first of the campaign, it had marched far less
and with lighter loads. These Rebels are accustomed to hunger and
nakedness, customs to which our men do not take readily. And the enemy
had straggled less, for the men were going away from battle and towards
home, and for them to straggle was to go into captivity, whose end they
could not conjecture. The enemy was somewhere in position in a ridgy,
wooded country, abounding in strong defensive positions, his main bodies
concealed, protected by rifle-pits and epaulements, acting strictly on
the defensive. His dispositions, his position even, with any
considerable degree of accuracy was unknown, nor could they be known
except by reconnoisances in such force, and carried to such extent, as
would have constituted them attacks liable to bring on at any moment a
general engagement, and at places where we were least prepared and least
likely to be successful. To have had a battle there then, Gen. Meade
would have had to attack a cunning enemy in the dark, where surprises,
undiscovered rifle-pits and batteries, and unseen bodies of men might
have met his forces at every point. With his not greatly superior
numbers, under such circumstances had Gen. Meade attacked, would he have
been victorious? The vote of these generals at the council shows their
opinion--my own is that he would have been repulsed with heavy loss with
little damage to the enemy. Such a result might have satisfied the
bloody politicians better than the end of the campaign as it was; but I
think the country did not need that sacrifice of the Army of the Potomac
at that time--that enough odor of sacrifice came up to its nostrils from
the 1st Fredericksburg field, to stop their snuffing for some time. I
felt the probability of defeat strongly at the time, when we all
supposed that a conflict would certainly ensue; for always before a
battle--at least it so happens to me--some dim presentiment of results,
some unaccountable fore-shadowing pervades the army. I never knew the
result to prove it untrue, which rests with the weight of a conviction.
Whether such shadows are cause or consequence, I shall not pretend to
determine; but when, as they often are, they are general, I think they
should not be wholly disregarded by the commander. I believe the Army of
the Potomac is always willing, often eager, to fight the enemy,
whenever, as it thinks, there is a fair chance for victory; that it
always will fight, let come victory or defeat whenever it is ordered so
to do. Of course the army, both officers and men, had very great
disappointment and very great sorrow that the Rebels _escaped_--so it
was called--across the river; the disappointment was genuine, at least
to the extent that disappointment is like surprise; but the sorrow to
judge by looks, tones and actions, rather than by words, was not of that
deep, sable character for which there is no balm.
Would it be an imputation upon the courage or patriotism of this army if
it was not rampant for fight at this particular time and under the
existing circumstances? Had the enemy stayed upon the left bank of the
Potomac twelve hours longer, there would have been a great battle there
near Williamsport on the 14th of July.
After such digression, if such it is, I return to Gettysburg.
As good generalship is claimed for Gen. Meade in the battle, so was the
conduct of his subordinate commanders good. I know, and have heard, of
no bad conduct or blundering on the part of any officer, save that of
Sickles, on the 2d of July, and that was so gross, and came so near
being the cause of irreparable disaster that I cannot discuss it with
moderation. I hope the man may never return to the Army of the Potomac,
or elsewhere, to a position where his incapacity, or something worse,
may bring fruitless destruction to thousands again. The conduct of
officers and men was good. The 11th corps behaved badly; but I have yet
to learn the occasion when, in the opinion of any save their own
officers and themselves, the men of this corps have behaved well on the
march or before the enemy, either under Siegel or any other commander.
With this exception, and some minor cases of very little consequence in
the general result, our troops whenever and wherever the enemy came,
stood against them storms of impassable fire. Such was the infantry,
such the artillery--the cavalry did less but it did all that was
required.
The enemy, too, showed a determination and valor worthy of a better
cause. Their conduct in this battle even makes me proud of them as
Americans. They would have been victorious over any but the best of
soldiers. Lee and his generals presumed too much upon some past
successes, and did not estimate how much they were due on their part to
position, as at Fredericksburg, or on our part to bad generalship, as at
the 2d Bull Run and Chancellorsville.
The fight of the 1st of July we do not, of course, claim as a victory;
but even that probably would have resulted differently had Reynolds not
been struck. The success of the enemy in the battle ended with the 1st
of July. The Rebels were joyous and jubilant--so said our men in their
hands, and the citizens of Gettysburg--at their achievements on that
day. Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville were remembered by them. They
saw victory already won, or only to be snatched from the streaming
coat-tails of the 11th corps, or the "_raw Pennsylvania militia_" as
they thought they were, when they saw them run; and already the spires
of Baltimore and the dome of the National Capitol were forecast upon
their glad vision--only two or three days march away through the
beautiful valleys of Pennsylvania and "_my_" Maryland. Was there ever
anything so fine before? How splendid it would be to enjoy the poultry
and the fruit, the meats, the cakes, the beds, the clothing, the
_Whiskey_, without price in this rich land of the Yankee! It would,
indeed! But on the 2d of July something of a change came over the spirit
of these dreams. They were surprised at results and talked less and
thought more as they prepared supper that night. After the fight of the
3d they talked only of the means of their own safety from destruction.
Pickett's splendid division had been almost annihilated, they said, and
they talked not of how many were lost, but of who had escaped. They
talked of these "Yanks" that had _clubs_ on their flags and caps, the
trefoils of the 2d corps that are like _clubs_ in cards.
The battle of Gettysburg is distinguished in this war, not only as by
far the greatest and severest conflict that has occurred, but for some
other things that I may mention. The fight of the 2d of July, on the
left, which was almost a separate and complete battle, is, so far as I
know, alone in the following particulars: the numbers of men actually
engaged at one time, and the enormous losses that occurred in killed and
wounded in the space of about two hours. If the truth could be obtained,
it would probably show a much larger number of casualties in this than
my estimate in a former part of these sheets. Few battles of the war
that have had so many casualties altogether as those of the two hours on
the 2d of July. The 3d of July is distinguished. Then occurred the
"great cannonade"--so we call it, and so it would be called in any war,
and in almost any battle. And besides this, the main operations that
followed have few parallels in history, none in this war, of the
magnitude and magnificence of the assault, single and simultaneous, the
disparity of the numbers engaged, and the brilliancy, completeness and
overwhelming character of the result in favor of the side numerically
the weaker. I think I have not, in giving the results of this encounter,
overestimated the numbers or the losses of the enemy. We learned on all
hands, by prisoners and by the newspapers, that over two divisions
moved up to the assault--Pickett's and Pettigrew's--that this was the
first engagement of Pickett's in the battle, and the first of
Pettigrew's save a light participation on the 1st of July. The Rebel
divisions usually number nine or ten thousand, or did at that time, as
we understood. Then I have seen something of troops and think I can
estimate their numbers somewhat. The number of the Rebels killed here I
have estimated in this way: the 2d and 3d divisions of the 2d corps
buried the Rebel dead in their own front, and where they fought upon
their own grounds, by count they buried over _one thousand eight
hundred_. I think no more than about _two hundred_ of these were killed
on the 2d of July in front of the 2d division, and the rest must have
fallen upon the 3d. My estimates that depend upon this contingency may
be erroneous, but to no great extent. The rest of the particulars of the
assault, our own losses and our captures, I know are approximately
accurate. Yet the whole sounds like romance, a grand stage piece of
blood.
Of all the corps d'armie, for hard fighting, severe losses and
brilliant results, the palm should be, as by the army it is, awarded to
the "_Old Second_." It did more fighting than any other corps, inflicted
severer losses upon the enemy in killed and wounded, and sustained a
heavier like loss, and captured more flags than all the rest of the
army, and almost as many prisoners as the rest of the army. The loss of
the 2d corps in killed and wounded in this battle--there is no other
test of hard fighting--was almost as great as that of all Gen. Grant's
forces in the battle that preceded and in the siege of Vicksburg.
Three-eighths of the whole corps were killed and wounded. Why does the
Western Army suppose that the Army of the Potomac does not fight? Was
ever a more absurd supposition? The Army of the Potomac is grand! Give
it good leadership--let it alone--and it will not fail to accomplish all
that reasonable men desire.