I have before informed you, that in consequence of instructions I
received from the honourable the Governor, through the medium of
Lieutenant-Colonel Barclay, military secretary, I proceeded (without
waiting the assembly of the committee that was ordered) to make an
inquiry into the conduct of the garrison of Masulipatam. I considered
that the best form in which I could make this inquiry, was to collect
from Lieutenant-Colonel Innes every information he could give, and to
obtain such evidence from the officers of the garrison as appeared
necessary to establish the leading facts of the transactions it was
my object to investigate. I judged that a minute and formal personal
examination of the parties was equally unnecessary to the object of
the preliminary inquiry with which I was charged, and unsuited to the
temper of the times, or to the fulfilment of those objects which I
conceived the honourable the Governor to have had in view at the time I
was appointed to the command of the garrison of Masulipatam.
The officers of the garrison whom I called upon for information, were
of course cautious in committing to writing, or indeed in verbally
stating, any thing that might criminate themselves: and I was induced,
by many reasons, to avoid any examination of the men of the European
regiment, or native battalion. Such evidence was not necessary to
the establishment of the principal facts; and it could not have
been obtained without a complete sacrifice of that temper which it
was my object to maintain until the Government was in possession of
the general result of my inquiry, and of that important information
regarding the state of not only the garrison of Masulipatam, but of
other stations in the army, which my employment upon this duty had
enabled me to collect.
I enclose a statement given in by Lieutenant-Colonel Innes, with an
Appendix, and two private notes in reply to queries I put to him,
subsequent to his delivering me his first statement.
I also enclose a paper, which contains the substance of the information
given me by Captain Andrews of the European regiment, and Captain Kelly
of the 1st battalion 19th regiment of native infantry, and which was
corroborated by several of the officers of the garrison. I transmit a
paper from Lieutenant Nixon, the Adjutant, whom I examined relating to
the different causes which had led to agitate the minds of the men of
the European regiment, and to make them, as well as their officers,
forget their duty.
You are in possession of Major Storey's public letter, stating the
nature of the situation in which he was placed, and the steps which
he adopted. In addition to that document I enclose the substance of a
verbal declaration which Major Storey made to me upon this subject, and
which shows the leading consideration which he states to have governed
his conduct upon this occasion.
These enclosures will throw complete light upon the conduct of
both Lieutenant-Colonel Innes and the officers of the garrison of
Masulipatam: and I shall, in the course of the few observations which
I feel it my duty to offer upon their contents, state such additional
facts as came to my knowledge from verbal communications upon this
subject.
It is not possible to contemplate the conduct of the officers of
Masulipatam throughout the different stages of this transaction,
without constant reference to the general discontent and disaffection
to Government which, at the moment of their proceedings, prevailed
in the minds of a large proportion of the officers of the Company's
army on this establishment, and which must be considered as one of the
chief, if not the sole cause of their excesses.
Lieutenant-Colonel Innes appears, from his statement, to have joined
the corps he was appointed to command with an impression that the
officers of it were disaffected to Government, and with a resolution to
oppose and correct such improper principles in whatever place or shape
he met them.
He landed at Masulipatam on the 7th May, and was invited on the same
day to dine at the mess of the regiment; and it was after dinner, on
this first day of their intercourse, that the ground-work was laid
of all their future disputes. The only substantial fact adduced by
Lieutenant-Colonel Innes on this occasion, and admitted by the other
parties, was, that "the friends of the army" was given as a toast,
at this meeting, by Lieutenant D. Forbes, and seconded by Lieutenant
Maitland, quarter-master of the corps. This toast Lieutenant-Colonel
Innes requested might be changed for "the Madras army;" but his
proposition was not acceded to, and he, in consequence, left the table.
This appears to be the only proved fact. Several observations are
stated by Lieutenant-Colonel Innes to have been made by officers at
the table, that were disrespectful to Government, and contrary to the
principles of subordination and good order: but the only one of these
observations that he specifies, is ascribed to Lieutenant Maitland
in a letter to that gentleman, which forms a number of the Appendix.
In that letter, Lieutenant-Colonel Innes, after regretting that
Lieutenants Maitland and Forbes had not made the apology he required
of them for their conduct on the evening of the 7th May, adds, "I will
still forward any explanations you may state to me with respect to the
_observations you made_ at the _mess_ on the 7th instant so _publicly_,
with respect to the _Nizam's_ detachment, and officers who are not
friends of the army." Lieutenant Maitland, in his reply to this letter,
states his hope that Government will not decide upon Lieutenant-Colonel
Innes's report until he has an opportunity of defending himself: and
further observes, "Until I received your letter this day, I never knew
for what words or actions of mine an apology was required; for _I most
solemnly deny_ ever having given any opinion, in any manner, regarding
the Nizam's detachment and its officers, that night, or at any other
time, in your presence."
When Lieutenant-Colonel Innes left the mess-room, which he did, as
has been before stated, in consequence of their refusing to change
the toast to "the Madras army," as he had proposed, it appears the
officers proceeded to drink their original toast in the manner they
were accustomed to drink it, with three cheers: and these, it is not
unlikely, may have been mistaken by Lieutenant-Colonel Innes for
further marks of disrespect to him, and consequently to the authority
by which he was appointed: but the officers of the regiment, who
were present at table, deny the existence or expressions of any such
sentiment.
These different statements cannot be deemed surprising, when the nature
of this meeting is considered. The parties could, indeed, hardly have
been personally known to each other: and although no doubt can be
entertained of the goodness of Lieutenant-Colonel Innes's motives, and
the laudable character of his zeal for the Government he served, it is
perhaps to be regretted that his first effort to correct the principles
of the officers of his corps should have been made at a convivial
scene, where it was to be supposed men would be less under restraint
than in any other situation, and therefore less disposed to attend to
either the voice of counsel or authority.
But Colonel Innes, from his statement, appears sensible of this fact.
He observes, after recapitulating the motives that led him to report
_privately_ the conduct of the officers of the regiment at the dinner
on the 7th of May, to a confidential staff officer, from whom he
received what he terms 'his original instructions,' "I at the same
time particularly requested, that no _public notice_ might be taken
of what I found it expedient to state, unless I should be compelled
subsequently to bring the business reluctantly forward officially;
having intimated that I expected an apology to be tendered to me by
Lieutenants D. Forbes and Maitland for their improper conduct on that
evening, when the general orders of the 1st of May last were commented
upon at the mess-room of the Madras European regiment."
That such was the impression upon Colonel Innes's mind, is confirmed
by a note from him to Mr. Nixon, the adjutant of the regiment, in
which he asserts, that he made no official report of the occurrence.
It appears, however, that, contrary to Lieutenant-Colonel Innes's
expressed expectation, you considered it your duty to notice the
private communication he had made of the occurrences of the evening
of the 7th May; and the letter which the Adjutant-General wrote to
Lieutenant-Colonel Innes upon that subject, under date the 17th May,
was immediately put into the regimental orderly book of the corps.
It would be superfluous for me to dwell upon the irritation which
the measures that were adopted upon this occasion, and the mode of
carrying them into execution, excited in the minds of the officers of
the regiment. The nature and extent of that irritation are sufficiently
explained in the accompanying documents. Its grounds were the supposed
incorrectness of Lieutenant-Colonel Innes's private communications
to head-quarters; the neglect with which the representations of the
officers of the regiment upon this subject were treated; the hardship
of a respectable staff officer being disgraced by a removal from his
station, without knowing of what he was accused, or being permitted
to say one word in his defence; and the unusual and extraordinary
measure of detaching (as a punishment) an officer of the regiment to
the command of a post where there was not one man of his corps, and the
refusal of a court martial to the officer on whom this unprecedented
mark of disgrace had been inflicted.
In addition to these subjects of complaint, the officers seem to have
considered the publication of the letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Conway
in the orderly book, as an unnecessary promulgation of the displeasure
and censure they had incurred among the men of the regiment: and
Lieutenant-Colonel Innes would appear to have been sensible, sometime
afterwards, that this was the fact, as he desired the letter to be
expunged from the orderly book.
You will observe, from the documents I enclose, all that took place
connected with the appointment of Lieutenant Spankie, regarding which
an impression was received by the officers of the regiment, from a
communication made by Lieutenant-Colonel Innes, on the ground of a
private letter, which he stated to them he had received from you, that
it was in contemplation to disband the regiment, and place the officers
on half-pay, if they did not alter their conduct; but that the fate
of the corps would in a great degree be determined by the step which
Lieutenant Spankie might take; that is, by his refusal or acceptance of
the station of quarter-master. This idea (which I cannot think it was
ever the intention of your letter to convey) was directly intimated by
Lieutenant-Colonel Innes in the following private note to Lieutenant
Spankie.
"MY DEAR SIR,
"I believe I forgot to remark, that your situation and Lieutenant
Fenwick's are very different now. Under existing circumstances it was
equally proper for him to decline accepting of the quarter-mastership,
as it is absolutely proper and necessary that you should accede to the
General's wishes, to save a whole regiment. Think of this.
"Yours truly,
(Signed) "J. INNES."
This proceeding could not but greatly increase the irritation that
before existed: it gave too much ground for the propagation of a
belief, that the general punishment of the whole corps might depend
upon the conduct of an individual (a young officer in the corps), on a
question of a particular and personal nature; and it was not possible
for an impression to have been made more calculated to increase the
irritation and spirit of discontent which before prevailed in the
regiment.
I shall now proceed to a concise view of the circumstances which relate
to the order for the embarkation of a detachment of the Madras European
regiment for marines, and of the occurrences which took place on the
25th June: regarding which, however, the documents already in your
possession are so ample, as to require little further information upon
the subject.
When Lieutenant Forbes was directed to proceed to Penang, and a party
of marines, under Lieutenant Maitland, to be in readiness to embark
on board the Fox frigate, no idea appears to have been entertained of
opposition to these orders. Though the officers of the corps felt,
that Lieutenants Forbes and Maitland being particularly ordered on
these duties could only be as a punishment, and to avoid the stigma
which they conceived this proceeding would bring upon the corps, they
solicited Lieutenant-Colonel Innes to allow other officers to exchange
with Lieutenant Maitland and Lieutenant Forbes, and at the same time
assured him there was not an officer in the regiment that was not ready
to take the tour of duty. This application (which proves the officers
had no intention at that period of resisting the orders of Government,)
was refused by Lieutenant-Colonel Innes, for reasons stated in his note
to me of the 22d July, which forms a number of the Appendix.
Before the orders were received at Masulipatam for an increased
number of marines embarking on board his Majesty's ships Piedmontese
and Samarang, the minds of the officers of that garrison had been
much inflamed by communications they had received from the different
stations of the army. These expressed (agreeable to the statement of
Captain Andrews and Captain Kelly) a general opinion of the illegality
of the orders regarding Lieutenant Forbes and Lieutenant Maitland, and
of the unjust manner in which the Madras European regiment had been
treated. It was also reported from a variety of quarters, that the
regiment was to be dispersed and disbanded: and these reports obtained,
from the nature of preceding occurrences, a very ready belief both
among the officers and men of the corps.
There can, however, be no doubt that the garrison at Masulipatam, as
well as other stations with which they communicated, contemplated
the detachment of so large a party as that ordered from the European
regiment, as a serious diminution of their strength, and consequently
injurious to the interests of the confederacy against Government, in
which they were so deeply engaged; and that this consideration in some
degree influenced them to that criminal course which they pursued: but
I do not believe that this motive, unaided by others, would have led
them at that moment to so bold and daring an opposition to orders.
The account given by Lieutenant-Colonel Innes of the proceedings of the
25th June, is, I am satisfied, perfectly correct. It is impossible for
me to afford any further information than what you will derive from
that document. To Major Storey's official letter, and the substance
of that officer's verbal declaration to me, (which forms a number
of the Appendix,) I can only add my conviction of two facts; 1st,
That Lieutenant-Colonel Innes had it not in his power to coerce the
obedience of the garrison in the state it was in; and, 2dly, That had
bloodshed taken place, it would (as Major Storey states in his verbal
declaration) have been the signal for the Company's officers at many
other stations throwing off their allegiance to Government.
The accompanying deposition of Lieutenant and Adjutant Nixon is
entitled to some attention. There is no doubt of the general facts
which that officer has stated; they are indeed proved by the conduct
of the men of the European regiment, who gave a ready support to their
officers in an act which they must have known was mutinous, which it is
not likely they would have done if they had not received unfavourable
impressions of the intentions of Government. These impressions,
however, were only the predisposing causes: the immediate impulse under
which the deluded men of the regiment acted, was a wish to support
officers who had been long with them, and a feeling of resentment at
threatened coercion; and, under the action of this impulse, they would,
no doubt, have opposed any troops that had been brought against them.
Though nothing can justify mutiny, it is impossible, when we consider
that the non-commissioned officers and men of the Madras European
regiment acted on this occasion at the call of almost all their
regimental officers, not to acquit them in a very great degree of
that share of criminality which must attach to all the individuals
implicated in such proceedings. I am satisfied of the truth of what
Lieutenant Nixon states regarding the discontent that exists among the
men of this corps who have enlisted for an unlimited period of service.
These men gave me a petition upon this subject, and prayed I would
bring it to your notice. I communicated this petition to Major-General
Pater, as I thought it implied, from the terms in which it was
expressed, that they were aware of their situation, and were disposed
to maintain their obedience to Government. It was at all events clearly
to be inferred from the mode and substance of this representation, that
those by whom it was made were sensible of the nature of the times, and
thought them favourable for the accomplishment of their object.
It is impossible for me to state what officers have been most culpable
in those irregular and unmilitary proceedings into which I have been
directed to inquire; but, with the exception of those stated in
Lieutenant-Colonel Innes's letter, (who had, in fact, no means of
being useful,) I believe that all the officers present with the Madras
European regiment, and the 1st battalion of the 19th regiment, were
implicated in the general guilt. Those who took the most forward part,
are stated in Lieutenant-Colonel Innes's letters.
The company of artillery stationed out of the Fort had no concern
whatever in these transactions, and has remained throughout perfectly
faithful to its duty and to Government.
I need hardly state that the native officers and men of the garrison
of Masulipatam had no concern in this mutiny. They fell in on their
parade, on the day of the 25th June, because a number of the officers
of the corps called upon them to do so.
It is a justice I owe to Major Storey and to Captain Andrews, senior
officer of the European regiment, to state, that from the 25th June
until the 4th of July, the day on which I took the command, the utmost
subordination and good order had been observed by the troops, and
the duty of the garrison had been carried on with as great regularity
and order as if nothing had occurred to disturb the usual routine of
military discipline.
I feel it would be presumption in me to offer any opinion upon the
subject of my inquiry, and I have therefore confined myself to the
object of bringing before you, in as clear and concise a manner as I
could, the leading and principal facts of those proceedings which I was
directed to investigate.
I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your most obedient servant,
(Signed) JOHN MALCOLM,
Lieut.-Col. Com.
Madras,
1st August, 1809.
STATEMENT _of Lieutenant-Colonel_ INNES.
"TO LIEUTENANT-COLONEL MALCOLM.
"SIR,
Paragraph 1. "Previous to my being appointed to command the Madras
European regiment, I was informed that the officers of that corps had
given some very improper toasts on the day that Captain J. Marshall
had dined at their mess here, which fully expressed their political
principles, and how highly they disapproved of the previous measures of
Government, adopted after Lieutenant-General McDowall's leaving Madras
for Europe, whose cause and party they support.
Par. 2. "Impressed with the recollection of this circumstance, when I
went to dine at the mess of the Madras European regiment, the day I
landed here to assume the command, I determined neither to permit, or
to pass over unnoticed, any such scene as was reported to have occurred
on the day above alluded to, so extremely improper, and subversive of
that high respect which is due to Government from every officer of the
army of Fort St. George.
Par. 3. "What actually did take place on the evening of the 7th
May last, and which rendered it not only proper, but absolutely
requisite for me to quit the mess-room at an early hour, I deemed it
my indispensable duty next day to communicate, in a private manner,
to a confidential staff officer 'from whom I received my original
instructions,' in order to show the officer commanding the army in
chief, and the Honourable the Governor of Fort St. George, the violent
spirit of discontent, undisguised disapprobation, and determined
opposition to the measures of Government, which even then existed
amongst the officers of that corps, and which was previously well known
at head-quarters.
Par. 4. "I at the same time particularly requested that no _public
notice_ might be taken of what I found it expedient to state, unless
I should be compelled subsequently to bring the business reluctantly
forward officially; having intimated, that I expected an apology to be
tendered to me by Lieutenants D. Forbes and Maitland for their improper
conduct on that evening, when the general orders of the 1st May were
commented upon at the mess-room of the Madras European regiment.
Par. 5. "The next morning I went to breakfast with Captain Andrews
(who had dined at the mess the previous evening), and requested of
him to acquaint the officers composing the mess, that I was under the
necessity of declining to become a member of their society, 'as I had
proposed,' owing to existing circumstances that did not accord with my
ideas or sentiments of subordination, which was my imperious duty to
restrain.
Par. 6. "Contrary, however, to my expectation, the information I
had originally given was acted upon, being considered of such a
tendency that it could not be passed over, as I had requested,
and which ultimately led to the publication of the orders by the
officer commanding the army in chief, reprimanding the officers of
the Madras European regiment, removing Lieutenant Maitland from the
quarter-mastership, and ordering Lieutenant D. Forbes to command at
Condapillee; as also the appointment of Lieutenant Maitland to command
a detail of the corps ordered to serve as marines, and Lieutenant D.
Forbes to command a detail of the corps at Prince of Wales Island.
Those measures were no doubt adopted with a view of checking any
future symptoms of insubordination amongst the officers of the
Madras European regiment. So far, however, from being attended with
the desired effect, they only tended to increase the former state of
irritation, and their determination on resistance to the orders of
the officer commanding the army in chief, and Government, when their
fractious arrangements were fully organized, and ready to be carried
into execution by the disaffected, as has since been fully confirmed by
their late and daring mutiny.
Par. 7. "When I transmitted Lieutenant D. Forbes's application to
head-quarters for a general court martial, it was accompanied by
my official letter, and report of the circumstances which occurred
on the evening of the 24th May last, at the mess-room of the M. E.
regiment, and which is now subjoined for your information; as also the
correspondence which subsequently passed between me and the officers of
the Madras European regiment upon this interesting subject, now under
consideration; which I felt it my duty to forward to head-quarters for
the consideration of the Commander-in-Chief, for the reasons assigned
in my two notes addressed to Lieutenant and Adjutant Nixon. It only
therefore remains for me to add, that what I honestly, candidly, and
conscientiously stated to have taken place at the mess of the M. E.
regiment on the evening of the 7th of May last, was the substance of
what actually passed, and, to the best of my recollection, in nearly
the same words, (or words to the same effect,) as I most solemnly
declare upon my honour, and am ready to confirm upon oath.
(Signed) "J. INNES, Lieut.-Col."
"Masulipatam,
19th July, 1809."
Previous to entering upon the documents alluded to, I will call your
attention to the two following paragraphs of the Governor General's
letter, addressed to Sir G. H. Barlow, Bart. K. B. Governor of Fort
St. George, dated 27th May, 1809; by which you will observe, I was
not only _sanctioned_, but _expected_ to give every information to the
Commander-in-Chief and Government, (from my official situation,) which
could tend to check disaffection in this division, and promote the
public service either by my own example and exertions, or by applying
to a higher authority to suppress it.
Par. 89. "We concur also entirely in the sentiment expressed in your
general orders of the 1st ultimo, that it is not sufficient for
officers holding commands to avoid a participation in such proceedings,
but that it is their positive and indispensable duty to adopt the
most decided measures for their suppression, and to report them to
the superior authorities. The purposes of tumult and sedition may as
effectually be promoted by their negative concurrence as by their
active participation.
Par. 90. "The neglect of duty is an offence varying only in degree
from a positive violation of it; and any officer who, apprised of the
progress of disorderly proceedings among those who are placed under his
immediate control, abstains from any attempt to suppress them either
by the exertion of his own authority or by an appeal to the superior
power, gives to those proceedings one mode of encouragement, and cannot
stand absolved of blame, nor found a claim to immunity, nevertheless to
a continuance of that implicit confidence which is attached to stations
of authority, on the basis of so culpable and mischievous a neutrality."
(A true copy.)
(Signed) "J. INNES, Lieut.-Col."
_Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel_ INNES _to the Adjutant-General of
the Army_.
"Fort St. George.
"SIR,
Paragraph 1. "I have the honour of reporting to you, for the
information of the officer commanding the army in chief, and the
Honourable the Governor in Council, the particulars of the daring and
premeditated mutiny which occurred here on Sunday the 25th June, about
two or three o'clock, P. M., when the three detachments of the M. E.
regiment were ordered to embark on board the fleet as marines.
Par. 2. "On the arrival of the Piedmontese frigate, and Samarang
sloop of war, at this place, I sent off a letter to Captain Foote
commanding the two ships, intimating that the three detachments of the
M. E. regiment were ready to embark, was he prepared and authorized
to receive them on board his ships. The non-commissioned officers and
privates appeared to be highly pleased at going on this duty.
Par. 3. "About sunset I observed a boat landing with some naval
officers; and having invited Captain Foote on shore, went down to meet
and receive him at the sea gate, to conduct him to my quarters, that we
might communicate fully on every subject which could tend to promote
the public service, in carrying the orders of the officer commanding
the army in chief into execution.
Par. 4. "Just as the naval officers were nearly landed, I was called
aside by Lieutenant Charles Forbes of the M. E. regiment, who was
accompanied by Captains Kelly and Harrington of the 1st battalion
19th regiment N. I., Lieutenant and Adjutant Nixon, and Lieutenant
and Quarter-Master Spankie of the M. E. regiment. Captain Kelly then
read a paper, which they were deputed to communicate to me not only by
the officers of the garrison, but those of this division, requesting
I would postpone the embarkation of the detachments of the M. E.
regiment till they could receive an answer to an address they had it in
contemplation to submit to the Commander-in-Chief, and the Honourable
the Governor in Council, _demanding_ a redress of _grievances_. To this
application I pointedly objected, having no authority to set aside the
instructions I received from the Commander-in-Chief.
Par. 5. "Lieutenant Spankie then boasted of their having the most
positive assurances of support from the troops at Hyderabad, Jaulnah,
the Bombay army, and every division on the coast. I then observed,
that I hoped those expectations would not induce them to resist the
embarkation, by being guilty of mutiny, and by trying whether the
troops would obey them or me. To order the whole in arrest, was _now_
my _only_ alternative. This, however, I could not attempt, or expect
their obedience to my authority, under existing circumstances, and
'standing alone.'
Par. 6. "At this instant the purser of the Piedmontese delivered to me
a letter from Captain Foote, annexed; which upon opening, it proved to
be an official letter from the chief secretary of Government, dated 22d
June 1809, ordering me to embark the detachment of H. M. 59th regiment
of foot on board the Samarang with the least delay. I then inquired of
the purser if he had not brought any other letter to me from Captain
Foote? He replied in the negative, nor did he hear of any detachment
being ordered on board but that of the 59th. This the deputation saw
and heard.
Par. 7. "But apprehending some mistake had occurred, I told the
deputation I expected a reply to my letter of that day, sent to
Captain Foote, which would elucidate the subject. At 10 o'clock P. M.
it reached me, referring me to his letter sent by the purser. I, of
course, concluded that the one from the secretary of Government was
the one he alluded to, and sent Captain Foote's letter to Lieutenant
and Adjutant Nixon directly: and we concluded that the detachments
of the Madras European regiment were not expected to embark; which I
communicated to the officers on parade next morning; adding, that they
must be prepared to embark at an hour's notice in any other ships that
might arrive to receive them on board, which appeared to give much
satisfaction, finding they were not going by this opportunity.
Par. 8. "About 1 o'clock P. M., 25th June, the Purser, and Mr.
Midshipman Shepperd, of the Samarang, returned from the Pettah to
my quarters; and, to my astonishment, put Captain Foote's first and
original letter (alluded to in his second) into my hand, which, by
mistake, they had omitted to do the previous evening. I then expressed
my regret at what had passed, although I was convinced it made no
difference; as I conceived, from what passed the evening before, that
the embarkation of the Madras European regiment's detachments would be
resisted by the _officers of the garrison_ at all events.
Par. 9. "I then sent for Lieutenant and Adjutant Nixon, showed him
Captain Foote's letter, (No. 4, annexed,) and directed him to have
the parties ready to go on board at 6 P. M., and to send the officers
ordered on this duty to receive my instructions. I at the same time
observed to the Adjutant, that, from what had passed the previous
evening, I had every reason to suppose the embarkation would be
resisted; and begged and conjured him to consider of the consequences;
and to inform the officers, that if they would pledge their _honour_
not to interfere with me in the _execution of my duty_, by carrying
the orders of the Commander-in-Chief and Government into execution,
it would afford me the highest satisfaction, and preserve order and
tranquillity.
Par. 10. "If, however, resistance was intended to be offered by the
_officers_ to the embarkation, I would reluctantly be reduced to the
disagreeable necessity of applying to Captain Foote of the Piedmontese
to land the marines of both ships, and every seaman who could be
spared, to see the orders of Government and the Commander-in-Chief
_respected_, and to enable me to carry them into execution.
Par. 11. "So soon as the order for embarking was made public, and shown
to the officers, they ran, in a disorderly, tumultuous, and mutinous
manner, to the barracks of the Madras European regiment and the 1st
battalion 19th regiment native infantry, calling on the men to arm,
and prevailed on them to join them in the mutiny, and opposition to
my orders, and those of the Commander-in-Chief and the Honourable the
Governor in Council.
Par. 12. "Captain Kelly, Lieutenant and Quarter-Master Spankie, and
some other officers, came over to my quarters, conjuring me not to
insist on the embarkation, or to send to Captain Foote for assistance,
which could only occasion the shedding of much innocent blood, and
endangering the loss of the country. All this passed before the naval
gentlemen. Their first observation was a most serious one, having got
the two corps to join them in the mutiny.
Par. 13. "Another party of officers came shortly after up to my
quarters, repeating what the other officers had done, and upbraiding
me with giving incorrect information to Government and the
Commander-in-Chief relative to what passed on the 7th ult. at the mess;
on which they acted, and dispersed the regiment, on my suggestions,
as a punishment, and which they never would accede to. Many other
observations passed I do not exactly recollect: but I again intimated
to the gentlemen, that, had they obeyed the orders issued, no mutiny
could have occurred, or the public service been impeded, by their
conduct and exertions.
Par. 14. "Major Storey, who had been sent for by the officers in the
Fort to join in their mutiny, then came to my quarters, told me the
two corps were under arms, and would not be dismissed but by a proper
authority; and that he was called upon by the gentlemen to assume the
command, and put me under close arrest, for the preservation of the
garrison.
Par. 15. "I observed to Major Storey, that I neither could or would
acknowledge his illegal arrest, and usurped authority, (although he
might put me into close confinement,) for which he and the other
officers would have to answer hereafter; having not only mutinied, but
prevailed on the troops in garrison to do so, by ordering them under
arms, (without my authority,) which they prevailed upon them to resist.
Par. 15. "Major Storey then ordered my letters to be seized that were
coming from the post office, to be examined by him, and not to allow
any to pass out, or any gentleman to visit me, without his permission.
He then, 'I hear,' issued a garrison order, assuming the command, (as
Captain Andrews did of the Madras European regiment,) and sent off
letters to Hyderabad, Bombay, Travancore, and every other station and
encampment that had united with them in the diabolical conspiracy
against the Government of Fort St. George, as will appear on reference
to the register of letters dispatched after the mutiny from the post
office here; having completely laid aside the mask, publicly avowing
and boasting of the support they depended upon receiving from their
friends, in having their grievances redressed, imposed on them by their
tyrannical Government.
Par. 17. "Here it is requisite to observe, Lieutenant Cecil,
Dr. Anderson, and Mr. Assistant Surgeon Jones, of the Madras
European regiment, did not join in the mutiny; nor do I think the
non-commissioned and privates of the Madras European regiment, or
the native commissioned, non-commissioned and privates of the 1st
battalion 19th native infantry, would, had they not been _misguided_ by
their guilty officers, _who even_ then, 'I hear,' had some difficulty
to prevail on them to mutiny against my authority and that of the
Commander-in-Chief and Government.
Par. 18. "Lieutenant Cecil, who commanded the main-guard, having
declined on every occasion to join the other officers in their
disorderly and insubordinate conduct, by resisting the measures of
Government, was relieved from the duty of the main-guard by the
mutineers; not, however, till he had _twice_ waited on me, at the risk
of his life; the second time after I was arrested, when I told him to
submit, opposition being then of no use, and, being ill, to report
himself sick, to avoid future ill treatment from the mutineers.
Par. 19. "Finding my letters seized by the mutineers, I sent a letter
secretly to Captain Foote by his purser, with a request that copies of
it might be transmitted without delay to the Commander-in-Chief and the
Honourable the Governor in Council, for their information, having no
other means of reporting to them till I was liberated; when a statement
of circumstances would be duly forwarded, which will fully _prove_ that
nothing was wanting on my part to carry my instructions into execution
instantly, notwithstanding the state of affairs here, so frequently
reported since my assuming the command of the Madras European regiment
and this division; previous to which, their opposition to the measures
of Government (and confederacy alluded to,) had commenced with the
Madras and Bombay army.
Par. 20. "In justice to the purser of the Piedmontese, I must here
observe, that his mistake, in not delivering the letter sooner, was
of no other consequence but that of delaying the mutiny a few hours,
it being regularly organized, and resolved upon for some time past,
and my being arrested, that I might not impede their seditious
plans against Government, so actively carried on; _sorry I am to
add, with too much success_. Understanding that General Pater will
not reach this place before the 15th July, I forward this letter in
a private and secret manner, that Government may be in possession of
the fullest information on the 3d July, in case I may be put to death
by the mutineers before or after the arrival of Major General Pater,
commanding officer of this division.
(A true copy.)
(Signed) "J. INNES, Lieut. Col.
Commanding Masulipatam,
in charge N. D. of the Army."
_Private Note from Lieutenant-Colonel_ INNES _to
Lieutenant-Colonel_ MALCOLM, _dated Masulipatam, 20th July, 1809_.