FOOTNOTES:

[69] I have not complete evidence of this fact.

[70] This chiefly alludes to the officers of the corps.

[71] This was afterwards discovered to be a forgery.

[72] I mean not in two or three weeks.

[73] Taylor is an excellent _steady_ officer, has great weight with the

regiment, (particularly the men); and _though_ he signed some papers,

is, I feel satisfied, true to his country and the Government.

[74] There are two distinct measures now in progress; one, _an appeal

to Bengal_; and the other, _a plan_ to obtain, by operation of a

combined nature, if they cannot by remonstrance, the repeal of the

orders of the 1st of May.

[75] I sent Colonel Barclay a copy of my speech to the regiment on the

15th of July; and yet _I am accused_ by the Government of Fort St.

George of not making this communication.

No. II.

_The_ JOURNAL _of Lieutenant-Colonel_ MALCOLM, _at Masulipatam,

from the 4th to the 22d of July 1809_.

_4th July._ Landed from the Victor sloop of war at 10 o'clock A. M. Was

received by several officers, Major Storey, Captain Andrews, Captain

Cotgreve, and some others, at the pier-head. As I went in at the Fort

gate the European sentry stopped me, apparently to take my sword, but

was ordered to desist by one of the officers. As I went to Captain

Andrews' quarters I showed the orders appointing me to the command

of the regiment and the garrison, as well as those for the military

committee. Captain A. said he hoped I would not insist on taking the

command, in the situation affairs were then in. I said I must, and

desired the fort-adjutant to be sent for, to publish the orders. After

we arrived at Captain A.'s house we were joined by several officers.

Among others were Major Hazlewood, 24th, Captain Kelly of the 19th,

and Messrs. Forbes, Nixon, and Lieutenant Spankie, of the European

regiment. A long, desultory, and warm discussion took place, in which

I stated all those arguments that I thought could moderate their minds

and bring them to a better feeling. I particularly insisted on the

consequences that must attend any of those desperate measures they

had intended; and entreated them not to rush into a course which was

likely to be so ruinous to themselves, and to have such dangerous

consequence to their country at a moment when every man should feel

it his duty to die, rather than promote, by any act, the designs of

her numerous and implacable enemies. I called to their recollection,

that the inquiry that was instituted was quite of a military nature,

and such as they had themselves required; and that to oppose my

authority, or to object to this investigation, was at once to declare

war with Government. I added to this declaration an assurance, that

no proceeding that was not in consistence with military usage would

result from the investigation. Their answers were, for the first two

hours of this discussion, made under the strong influence of passion.

They had already, they said, taken their line: they knew they had gone

too far to retract; and they were certain of support from the whole

army, to whom they had pledged themselves. They had first expected,

they said, force would be employed; and their preparations had been

made in concert with the Hyderabad force to meet that emergency. They

could, they said, show me the plan. I replied, with great warmth, I did

not desire to see it. Such were my feelings, that I would not for the

world have the guilt of such knowledge upon my mind. They recounted

at great length, and with much heat, all the grievances they shared

with others, and those that particularly related to the European

regiment, which had been, they said, calumniated and stigmatized; one

officer removed, and another banished, without a hearing: and when

they remonstrated, they were told from head-quarters they _were to be

disbanded_: and, after this communication, they were driven to mutiny

by a large party (100 men) being ordered, professedly as a punishment,

to act as marines on board his Majesty's ships. I told them, I was

aware that much misrepresentation had taken place, and they might

have some reason to complain; but the merits of the case could never

be known without a full and temperate investigation: and it was on

that account the committee was ordered, _even before the Government

insisted on the marines embarking_[76]. They had therefore, as a body

of officers, their choice, either to recognise my authority and allow

this proceeding to take its course, or to place themselves at once

in opposition to Government: there was no medium. They wished me to

promise an amnesty for all that had been done here; or, at least, that

I would recommend one. I said I would do neither; I would do my duty,

and what I was ordered. I had thought it, I added, no departure from

my duty to speak to them in the manner I had done, and should be happy

if any thing I had said brought them to reason and reflection. They

retired to another room; and I was informed by Major Hazlewood, that I

had wrought such a change in them, that he hoped they would abandon the

violent resolution they had taken.

They soon returned, and said they had done so, and submitted to my

authority. Government had, they said, by the act of selecting me,

taken the only step that could have stopped for an instant the course

of operations which they, in concert with the whole of the Company's

army, had resolved instantly to commence, in order to obtain redress

of their intolerable grievances: and they desired me to understand,

that it was consideration for a brother officer, who held that high

place in their esteem, which he did in that of the whole army, that

induced them to lay aside for the present all their schemes, and

to yield him their obedience: and, as a proof of the truth of this

sentiment, they declared I was the only officer of rank in India they

would have admitted into the garrison; and that it had been resolved

to have shut the gates on the Commander-in-Chief, had he arrived, as

was once expected. I was too well satisfied with the substance of

their submission to authority, to quarrel about the form of it. I

instantly ordered the sentries to be taken off Lieutenant-Colonel

Innes, and waited upon that officer, who I found (as was to be

expected) much irritated at what had occurred: but I discovered, from

his communications, too much cause for those excesses that had taken

place. He is, I make no doubt, a good and a conscientious man; but

his imprudence, combined with the impressions he brought from Madras,

and the unguarded private communications he has since received, and

made public, from a very high authority, were calculated to goad men

into mutiny in common times, and could not fail of producing that

effect at a moment like the present, when the whole of the Company's

army is in a state of open disaffection to Government. I explained to

Lieutenant-Colonel Innes the reasons that had led to my appointment,

and advised him to be moderate and guarded, which he promised me he

would.

I dined this evening with the mess of the regiment. There were a great

number of gentlemen of other corps present. Their usual toast of "the

friends of the army" was given with three times three, and I joined in

it, with an observation, "that it was a very general toast, as I was

assured it included most men both in India and England." After we had

sat some time, and had a number of songs, a gentleman sung a sea-song,

in which the expression "common cause" was frequently repeated. This

was caught at by some of the younger officers, who were heated; and,

at their motion, the whole rose to drink the "common cause." As I

could not mistake the meaning they attached to this toast, I felt for

a moment embarrassed, but, rising and filling a bumper, I immediately

repeated, in as loud and as warm a manner as I could, "_the common

cause of our Country_;" and my amendment was received and drank with

acclamation. I soon afterwards left their table, and heard, as I

retired, my health toasted with three times three. Thus closed the most

anxious day I ever passed in my life. May my efforts be successful in

reclaiming these men from the errors into which they have plunged!

_5th July._ I had a visit from several of the gentlemen I saw

yesterday, at Mr. Savage's Gardens, (my place of residence). They seem

yet to be uneasy and unsettled in their minds. They showed me several

papers from different stations in the army, by most of which they were

called upon to act instantly, and with a decided spirit: the strongest

assurances given them of support and co-operation. Arrack for the

Europeans had, I found, been sent to Gundoor, the first march towards

Hyderabad; and every thing was prepared to move as to-day. They again

repeated their wish for some general assurance of not suffering for

what had passed; and this was accompanied by some hints on the line

they might be forced to pursue regarding me; though they expressed

the concern with, which they would have resort to such an extreme. I

smiled, and said, they could not expect, from the knowledge they had of

my character, that any motive on earth would ever induce me to deceive

them, or to evade my duty; that to give them a promise of amnesty that

I was not authorized to give them, would be deceit; and to be deterred

from doing what I conscientiously thought my duty, from any fear of

consequences, was, they must be satisfied, altogether unworthy of that

reputation I had hitherto supported. They went away (after showing

me some further papers, which they had just received, of the same

character I had seen before) apparently satisfied with my answer. They

communicated to me a report that had been drawn out of my conversation

of yesterday, which they meant, they said, to send to Hyderabad, &c.

and begged I would correct it, lest they should have misstated any of

my observations. I thanked them for their candour, and corrected the

paper; the circulation of which appeared to me calculated to do good.

The senior officers in this garrison are impelled to throw off their

allegiance from a consciousness of having already gone too far, and

seeing their only hope of individual safety in all being equally

involved in the deepest guilt; while their juniors are flattered by the

importance which they obtain in times of anarchy and trouble, and see

nothing but distinction in being the first to step forward in what they

deem the general cause of the army. I have written Sir G. Barlow my

full sentiments on the present unprecedented and alarming situation of

affairs.

_6th July._ I went into the Fort to-day, and saw the regiment under

arms. I also visited the hospital and barracks. I had afterwards a

long and serious conversation with an officer (A.), who spoke not his

own sentiments, he said, but those of the garrison, when he entreated

from me a pledge that I would not oppose any proceedings this garrison

might feel itself forced to take, in co-operation with other parts of

the army. I smiled at this proposition, which, as I told the gentleman,

required a concession which it was altogether unworthy of me to make;

and that the gentlemen who had desired him to make it would be sensible

that it was so, if they gave it a second thought. I added, "I shall,

however, put your minds at rest, if you will put mine." I will take

no step relative to the officers of this garrison, except in a fair,

open, manly manner; and I expect, in return, they will make no secret

attempts, or underhand efforts, to injure or oppose my authority. He

went away, after assuring me that he was convinced what I had stated

would give satisfaction, and that the officers under my command

would be solicitous to show me they were deserving of that temper

and consideration with which I treated them. I spoke to a number of

officers to-day, and circulated a number of my private letters among

them. This mark of confidence would, I knew, please; and the sentiments

expressed in these papers were calculated to bring them back to reason

and reflection. I wrote again fully to Sir George Barlow.

_7th July._ I went early into the Fort. From conversations I had with

several officers, I found that I had succeeded in my efforts to

restore the temper of the garrison; that they felt grateful for the

moderation which I had shown; and some were sorry they had been so

warm in their expressions at their first interview. I saw this day

a communication from Hyderabad, and one from Jaulnah; both of which

forces were prepared to support the garrison in the event of their

acting in opposition to Government.

_8th July._ Nothing particular occurred this day. Some further

communications from the westward were shown to me; one of which

strongly recommended Masulipatam being kept, and not abandoned; and

a force of two battalions of sepoys and one regiment of cavalry were

promised to support the garrison, and the corps of the district, all of

whom they appeared to think would join. I entered at great length this

day into the whole subject with M. H., who, I knew, was in intimate

communication with all the senior officers, and had some influence

even with the junior. I pointed out to this officer what must be the

consequence of the whole or any part of the Company's army plunging

down that precipice, on the brink of which they were now standing.

I exposed the falseness of that confidence on which numbers were

proceeding; how they would be deserted by their brethren and their

men, when Government was compelled to declare them in rebellion. I

pointed out how wretched their means, how unconnected their plans; and

demanded, if even they had double the numbers, if he thought, after the

chain of discipline was once broken, and when they were commanded by

committees, and every boy thought he possessed the right to question

the authority of his superior, whether it was possible to oppose

the organized army that must, under all circumstances, remain with

Government, and which must every day gain strength from their ranks?

The whole of the king's army was, I said, decidedly with Government:

and if the last step was taken, many of the Company's officers, and

those probably who had the most influence with the native troops, would

range on the side of authority. I knew this, I said, to be fact,

because I had letters, fully expressive of their sentiments, from some

of the best and most popular officers in the army. I was myself, I

said, of that opinion, and proud to state it. I had been in this army

since I was twelve years of age; and such was my regard for my brother

officers, that I would give my life to see the present unfortunate

disputes happily adjusted: but if any circumstances whatever led these

officers to rise in rebellion against their King and Country, and such

they would do the moment they threw off their allegiance to the legal

constituted authority in India, I must stand in the opposite rank:

and I was convinced so many would be found of the same sentiments,

that Government must triumph, though I allowed such a triumph would

be one over its own strength, and consequently more mournful than

the most signal defeat from a foreign enemy. I added, that I would,

for the sake of argument, suppose, what I conceived impossible, that

Government was destroyed in the conflict, what would be the consequence

of this victory to a few officers who had led the natives of India to

the murder of their countrymen and to the destruction of the British

Government? Would these natives allow them to live and rule over them?

Or would they not be tempted to practise, for the last time, the lesson

they had been taught, and get rid at once of a race whose rule they

had been taught to consider as oppressive and tyrannical? Supposing

they did not, would the King and people of England be ready to make

peace with men whose hands were red with the blood of their countrymen?

Would they not rather, if they did not abandon this quarter of India

altogether, attempt its reconquest? And to what consequence would that

lead? You say, I added, that your grievances are intolerable, and that

if you abandon your attempts to obtain redress the coast army will be

disgraced, while, if you persist with firmness and spirit, Government

(which must be aware of all the consequences I have stated) must give

way. To this I answer: No grievances of the description this army now

has, can warrant its having recourse to arms, because they are such

as must come under the cognizance of the controlling and legislative

authorities in England, who are alone competent to notice and redress

them: and this army, so far from being degraded by a moderate

proceeding at a moment like the present, would raise its reputation

higher than ever; because it would prove to all the world that it

possessed a spirit of the highest loyalty and patriotism; and that when

a variety of circumstances had combined to throw it into a flame, the

action of these feelings had subdued every other, and it was contented

rather to suffer, till the superior authorities in England could judge

all those questions on which it thought itself aggrieved, than endanger

the general interest of the country. Would such sentiments, I asked,

redound to the disgrace or to the honour of this army? With respect,

I observed, to the probability of Government giving way, if assailed

with unanimity, firmness, and spirit, there was, I feared, a great

and dangerous error. Government could not give way, as it was termed,

beyond a certain point, without destroying itself; and it had better

fall by any hands than its own. It was the very pressure, I added, that

was brought against it, that forced it to resistance: and, besides,

what were the points which it was required to yield? In the present

agitated period of the army, every committee, every individual, had a

different opinion; and if it were possible to collect the general sense

of the army, I believe, in their present irritated state, concessions

would be required that would amount to the virtual abolition of the

existing local Government of this Presidency. It was no doubt, I

observed, the duty of Government to take every step that it could take

with dignity to restore temper, and to compose men's minds; but I, for

one, would never blame it for refusing its consent to its own death;

and such I should consider any act that made a substantial sacrifice

of its strength or authority. From the answer of the gentleman to whom

these observations were made, I could perceive that he and many others

had been led on from step to step, without contemplating the extreme

which was now so likely. It was also evident that the younger part of

the army were no longer manageable: they had run away with the rest,

who considered themselves too deeply pledged to retreat; and they

appeared afraid of the instant obloquy that was cast on every person

who withdrew himself.

_9th July._ As this was Sunday I went to a dressed parade of the

regiment, and afterwards visited the hospital and barracks. Nothing

particular occurred to-day: all the officers I saw seemed to have

returned to good temper; and I can have no fear of this garrison

breaking out into any extreme unless the example is given by other

parts of the army.

_10th July._ I went early into the Fort. A singular instance occurred

to-day, to show how little men reflect whose minds are in a state

of agitation. I was told, before I went to the Fort, that accounts

had been received of every thing in Madras being in a state of

confusion, and that some great event had happened there. When in the

Fort, the letter that gave rise to this belief was shown me. It was

dated Hyderabad the 5th July; and said a letter had that moment been

received from Madras reporting the confusion which had arisen at that

place; and stating that his correspondent, no doubt, "had heard of the

remarkable event that had occurred to give rise to it." The moment I

saw this communication I pointed out the date; and observed it was

an evident allusion to what had occurred at Masulipatam on the 25th

June, which had reached Madras the 30th; and the bustle it created

had been termed confusion, and sent round again, _via_ Hyderabad, to

Masulipatam. This was so clearly the fact, that the only astonishment

that was left, was how it had not struck somebody before. By letters

from Hyderabad it appears they make no secret of their proceedings.

One corresponding officer writes, who says he had received a most

extraordinary communication, from good authority, that the officers

of the Bengal army had sent in a Memorial to Lord Minto, praying the

removal of Sir G. H. Barlow. I laughed at this unfounded assertion,

and assured the person who told me, it was one of a thousand reports

circulated to inflame their feelings and mislead their judgment. They

have received great confidence from the address of the Bombay army[77],

which promises their warmest support in any measures they may take in

consequence of what they deem the unjust and arbitrary order of the 1st

of May.

By a letter from the committee at Hyderabad received to-day, this

garrison are advised to defend Masulipatam if they can. A junction

is proposed at Ongole or Condapilly. From the former station being

mentioned, it would appear as if a forward movement upon Madras had

been contemplated by some of the most violent.

_11th July._ I was with the officers of the regiment almost all this

day, and dined at the mess, of which I have become a member. Our dinner

was pleasant, and like that of a private party of gentlemen. I have

been particularly pleased to observe, that although they communicate

to me in confidence when I require it, no officer of the garrison ever

begins, when I am present, any conversation on the present situation

of the army; and when I speak to them upon it (as I frequently do),

they are much more moderate than they were. I have seen some of the

principal natives of this place, and find the events of the 25th

ultimo caused a very serious alarm, which was not dissipated before my

arrival. The defenceless inhabitants ascribe more influence to me than

I possess, and think nothing wrong can occur as long as I remain.

_12th July._ Very severe rains. I did not go into the Fort, and heard

nothing of consequence from any quarter.

_13th July._ Went into the Fort, inquired particularly from the

adjutant of the regiment, and found, from his report, that the privates

not only conceived they were to be dispersed and disbanded when the

order came for them to go as marines, but a report was even current in

the barracks, that they were going to Botany Bay. They were, he assured

me, now fully satisfied of the misrepresentations that had been made

to them; and he believed no discontent remained in the corps excepting

that which had long existed among the men enlisted for life; and which,

they had hopes, would have been altered before this, as Captain Andrews

had published an order, more than a twelvemonth ago, with a view of

quieting their minds; in which he stated, that Government had referred

the question to England. I desired Mr. Nixon to tell the sergeants that

I should inquire into this point, and do any thing in my power towards

obtaining them information of what had been done upon the subject.

_14th July._ I this morning inspected Captain Gibson's company of

artillery, and was highly pleased with their appearance. I addressed

them on parade, and told them the gratification I had received

from their steadiness under arms, and correct movements; adding my

conviction, that they would maintain, under all circumstances, the

high reputation they had acquired during the late Mahratta war. No

tappal[78] for the last three days, owing to the rain.

_15th July._ A regimental court martial sat yesterday on four men, and

the regiment was under arms at half past six, to see the sentences

carried into execution. I judged this a favourable opportunity of

addressing the corps; and, after the crimes and sentences of the

prisoners had been read, I made the following short speech:

"Regiment! As this is the first time I have met you upon such an

occasion, I forgive these men: but I desire you will not mistake the

motives of this act of lenity. It is my intention, as it is my duty, to

enforce the strictest discipline: and I must punish those that merit

it, not only to maintain the character of the corps, but to enable

me to grant indulgences to the good men of it, which I never can do

unless I punish the bad: but I trust, from what I have seen of your

conduct, I shall have little occasion to exercise severity. It is,

indeed, you must all feel, most incumbent upon you to preserve the

utmost regularity and order at the present period. A late occurrence

in the regiment, which has, I am satisfied, been solely produced by

misapprehension and misrepresentation, is on the point of becoming a

subject of investigation before a military court, who will inquire into

the causes by which it was produced. I shall therefore say nothing

on that subject: but I consider it my duty to declare to you at this

moment[79], _that it never was in the contemplation of Government to

disband or disperse this corps, and that it never meant to employ any

officer or man of_ the regiment in any manner or upon any service but

such as was suited to the honour and character of British soldiers,

and which it, of course, conceived both officers and men would be

forward to proceed upon. It was, soldiers, from a full conviction

that a serious misunderstanding alone of the intentions of Government

could have caused what has passed, that made me receive with pride and

gratification my nomination to the command of this regiment: and I am

convinced, from what I have already seen, that I shall (whenever I quit

that station) have to make a report which will add, if possible, to the

high reputation which the corps already enjoys; and satisfy all, that

as it is the first in rank of the infantry of this establishment, it is

also first in fidelity, loyalty, and attachment to the Government it

serves, and to its King and Country."

This address appeared to be received by both officers and men of the

corps with satisfaction; and I make no doubt of its effect. I was

withheld, by many and serious considerations, from haranguing the men,

or publishing any explanatory order to them, on my first arrival.

Such would, in the agitated state of the whole garrison, have been

completely misconstrued, and would probably have produced the very

opposite effect from what was intended.

_16th July._ I dined yesterday with the mess of the 1st battalion 19th

regiment N. I., and sat till a late hour. No toasts were given; and not

a word relating to the present situation of affairs escaped the lips of

any man present. I could not but be pleased with such good feeling, and

felt gratified at this mark of personal respect. The evening passed in

the utmost hilarity and good humour.

_17th July._ Some of the officers of the garrison waited upon me

to-day with letters of a most violent tenor that they had received

from Hyderabad and other stations, in which they were reproached with

weakness for having admitted me. I was described in some of these

letters as a consummate politician, and consequently as the most

dangerous man Government could have sent among them. The garrison

were told I would _tamper with their men, cajole them_, and in the

end ruin the general cause. I was happy to find the sentiments of the

gentlemen who waited upon me were not in unison with those of their

correspondents; but they hinted their fears of the violence of the

younger officers of the garrison, who, they said, had been hurt at the

speech I made to the men on the 15th, which they thought was calculated

to excite the men against their officers. I appealed to an old officer

of the regiment, who was present, Whether he thought the speech had

any such tendency? He said it certainly had not struck him as in the

least objectionable. I observed, that the testimony of an officer like

him should satisfy others; and if it did not, I could not help it;

for in such times a man could not put his foot over the threshhold

without a misconstruction of the manner in which it was done. The

officers who waited on me this day gave me a paper, the purport of

which was to learn what assurances I could give them of a disposition

of the Government of Madras to redress their grievances; and, in the

event of my declining, to inform them what I thought the intentions of

Government were. It was signified, that if I did not, the confidence

of the garrison would be withdrawn from me, and they would consider

themselves released from all promises they made. I told them I could

make no communication of the nature they required, and that they might

act as they thought proper: I should, under all circumstances, do my

duty to the Government I served.

_18th July._ This morning M. H. waited upon me, and showed me a

communication from the established committee at Hyderabad to this

garrison, which called upon them to demand from me an assurance that

the orders of the 1st of May would be repealed; and, if that was

refused, instructed them to throw off the authority of Government,

and make me leave Masulipatam. I went over all the grounds I had

done before with this officer; and told him, that if the garrison

was so lost to all sense of duty and propriety as to act upon this

instruction, I must judge for myself, and take those steps which the

emergency demanded. He said, the senior officers, who had sent him,

were not disposed to attend to the call made upon them by the Hyderabad

Committee; but they, he added, had now little or no control over their

juniors, who were decidedly for having recourse to immediate violence.

I asked him to what lengths men (who had still some reflection) meant

to allow themselves to be borne away with the tide? The hour, I added,

was come, when they must decide. I then pointed out the ground on which

I thought they might, without injury to their honour, make a stand, and

rescue the deluded young men of the army, as well as themselves, from

destruction. I expressed my conviction of the men remaining with the

senior officers, and that the young men must be reclaimed to reason,

or at least be prevented from becoming rebels, if those who were their

seniors acted with a becoming spirit. This conference lasted two hours,

and M. H. went to communicate with the rest. There was, I understood,

a warm discussion for several hours; after which, two of the senior

officers waited upon me, and said they had with difficulty prevented

the rest from coming to extremes that day; but they had at last

agreed to wait six days (till the 24th), when, if they heard nothing

favourable to their hopes, they meant to take such steps as they

thought calculated to forward the objects they had in view. They at the

same time said they had, in consequence of the opinion of their brother

officers at other stations, determined to admit no investigation into

their past conduct. I observed, that if these were their resolutions

we must come to issue at once, and I must take those steps I judged

best to counteract their measures, as I considered their proposition of

adhering to their duty for a limited period of six days, was nothing

less than an open defiance; and their refusal to admit investigation

was a measure of the same stamp. I had meant, I said, in conformity

with authority I had received from Government, to have entered into

the investigation immediately (before the arrival of my colleagues);

and I had entertained an intention of proceeding to Madras with the

report, in the conviction that this garrison would have remained steady

in its duty: but I must now, I added, abandon all such plans, and meet

with that firmness which it was my duty to meet it, that dreadful

emergency which this garrison had so rashly precipitated. I then read

them a letter to Colonel McLeod[80], pointing out all the horrors of

the crisis to which they were rushing. They appeared forcibly struck

with what I said and read, and expressed their hope that their brother

officers would alter their resolution, and not impede the course of

proceeding which I intended to pursue. It might, they said, afford some

ray of hope of the present distractions being ended; for though they

knew my sentiments differed widely from theirs, and that I was devoted

to my duty to Government, they were also sensible that I had warm

feeling for the situation of my brother officers. I went, immediately

after this interview, to dine at the mess of the regiment, and (strange

inconsistency!) received every mark of respect and kindness from men

who had been debating all the morning whether they should enter into a

contest with me for the authority of the garrison!

_19th July._ I went into the Fort early this morning, and called upon

Colonel Innes to give me a full statement of all that had passed

relative to the origin of those discontents that terminated in the

mutiny of the 25th ultimo[81]. I also called upon Major Storey, Captain

Andrews, and Mr. Nixon, the adjutant of the regiment, to give me every

information they had relative to these transactions. I was waited

upon, soon after I went to the Fort, by two of the senior officers,

who were, they said, desired by all to state that a general confidence

and respect for my character had induced the garrison to change their

resolutions, and that they hoped I would follow the course of inquiry

I intended; and, after making the investigation, proceed, if I thought

it advisable, to Madras. They would, they said, during my absence be

as jealous of my honour as of their own, and promise not to depart in

the slightest degree from the path of duty and order, unless a rise in

other stations was to take place; of which, they said, they thought

there was no probability, particularly as they would write to inform

them of the pledge they had made, and entreat them not to make any call

upon them before my return to my command. I told them I felt obliged by

this mark of their regard and confidence; but I would not receive it,

if I thought it was made under any idea or expectation that I would be

the advocate of their cause, or that of the army. They disclaimed any

such idea. I would, they knew, from what they had seen, do my duty in

the manner I thought best. I was gratified with the pledge I received;

which, as M. H. afterwards privately observed, gave me a stronger tie

on the officers while I was absent than I could have had during the

same period, if present. The reasons which led me to resolve on going

to Madras were fully stated to Sir George Barlow in a letter under this

date.

Accounts were received this evening of the assembly of a force at

Madras. I anticipated the feeling this would make, and stated to an

officer present, when I received the letter, my conviction, that it

was in consequence of the many, and perhaps exaggerated, reports of

intended mutinies that had been consequent to that of Masulipatam.

_20th July._ General Pater arrived. I went to meet him, gave him a

return of the garrison, and made a full and confidential report of all

past proceedings. I found that the officers of standing, to whom I had

spoken so much on the danger of allowing young men to take such a lead

in the present discussions, had taken advantage of the good disposition

of the moment, as to carry a resolution, that the garrison committee,

which were mobbish meetings of the whole of the officers, should be

abolished, and the proceedings to be entirely carried on by the eleven

senior officers, by whose judgment all questions were in future to be

decided, and who were entirely to act for themselves, and not to follow

the instructions of other committees, or be influenced by the voice of

any person not a member of the committee. This measure I considered as

the first great step towards a return to reason and temper. I received

an invitation from the garrison to dine with them on the 22d. All the

gentlemen, civil and military, were invited to meet.

_21st July._ All was quiet. I received this day the most unequivocal

proofs of the desire of some of the senior officers to return to the

right path, if furnished with any ground on which they could absolve

themselves from the deep pledges they had made, and assert their right

to control their juniors.

_22d July._ General Pater looked at the regiment on parade, and

afterwards went, accompanied by his staff, to breakfast with

Lieutenant-Colonel Innes.

Captain Gibson of the artillery informed me, that though he had

received his leave to go to Madras, he would remain, if I advised him,

at Masulipatam. I spoke with General Pater; and it was his opinion,

as it was mine, that Captain Gibson should proceed. If he had been

ordered to stay after his leave was made public, it would have excited

suspicion, without any adequate benefit. Whether conciliatory or

coercive measures were adopted, Captain Moorhouse, who succeeded to

the command of the company of artillery, appeared equally, if not

better, suited to the charge at that crisis. He was a brave, excellent

officer, and had never for a moment even swerved from his duty; and his

character was respected even by the most violent of the disaffected.

Captain Gibson, on the contrary, having for a short time joined in

their schemes, had, when he (very meritoriously) checked himself in his

career of guilt, been considered a deserter from their cause, and had

become an object of their marked hatred and resentment. General Pater

dined with the officers of the garrison; and the best feeling possible

was shown at this entertainment. After dinner I proceeded by post to

Madras.

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