DEAR SIR,

I wrote you a hurried letter last night. I have since come to the

knowledge of many additional facts, and have had some time to reflect

on what I have seen and heard; and I should be as wanting in my duty

to you as to my country, if I was withheld, by any motive whatever, in

stating my sentiments in the most undisguised manner on the present

state of affairs: and whether you coincide in my opinion or not, you

can have no doubt regarding those motives that lead me to express, in

that sacred confidence, which your knowledge of my character authorizes

me to use, the conviction of my judgment on the steps necessary to be

taken upon the present unfortunate crisis.

I have now seen the concerted plans of almost the whole of the army

against the authority of Government; and can say, with almost an

assurance that I am correct, that there is not one Company's corps,

from Cape Comorin to Ganjam, that is not implicated in the general

guilt, and that is not pledged to rise against Government, unless

what they deem their grievances are redressed. Be assured, that no

commanding officer, whatever they may write, has any real authority

over their corps[70]: and though in some places (where there are King's

regiments) they are more guarded, their resolution is the same; and

they mean to act, the moment the example is shown by those parts of the

army whom they consider as most likely to be successful in their first

efforts. The Hyderabad and Jaulnah force are chiefly looked to, and the

northern division of the army; and the European regiment has, from what

they style its regimental grievances, become the corps from which they

expect the first act of opposition. Its late proceedings are applauded

and confirmed by the force at Hyderabad: and I know it was intended,

if there had been the slightest indication of any coercive measures,

or even had the Commander-in-Chief arrived, to have marched this corps

and the two sepoy battalions in the division to effect a junction

with the Hyderabad force, in order to organize an army to commence

hostilities with Government. Their march was to have taken place as

to-day; and it was, for five hours after my arrival, a subject of warm

discussion, whether I should be recognised or not as their commanding

officer? And, after stating every thing a man could state to reclaim

them to better feeling, I was obliged to give them the choice of the

extreme, of either immediately submitting to the order of Government,

or of opposing it. They chose at last the former; but placed it on the

grounds of that general respect which was paid by them, and all their

brother officers, to my character. I did not think it necessary to

fight regarding the grounds of their obedience on this point, being

satisfied with the substance, and particularly as I had received this

proof after they were informed of my sentiments and intentions. Though

an immediate open rebellion against Government has been prevented by my

arrival at Masulipatam, the danger is not past; and we must not deceive

ourselves, or any longer evade this serious question. The officers of

the Company's army on the coast are no doubt at this moment in a state

of actual insurrection against the Government; and this combination

against authority is every moment maturing and spreading wider. I have

seen the letter[71] from the Bombay army to that of the coast, and it

is unqualified in its condemnation of the orders of the 1st of May,

and its promise of support. Several private letters have been received

from Bengal. An address from that army, to the same effect as that of

Bombay, is expected: at all events they appear certain that no human

power will lead the Bengal troops to act against them. They calculate

upon opposition from the King's army, and their plans are concerted to

meet it. These deluded men are aware of the ruin they are bringing upon

themselves; but their infatuation is so great, that they are reconciled

to their ruin, in the expectation that it will equally involve that

Government against which their rage has been so industriously and so

successfully excited. All attempts to reason with men in the state

of mind they are in, appears vain. Even the circulation of the able

letter from Bengal is, as I apprehended, likely to inflame, instead

of appeasing their passions. It is so true, that when men's minds

have gone completely wrong, that which ought to put them right has,

in general, a direct contrary effect: and the fact is, that all

those correct principles and loyal feelings, which are so eloquently

expressed in the letter from the supreme Government, but serve to

impress them more forcibly with a sense of that guilt into which they

have so precipitately rushed, and to render them more desperate in

their proceedings, as they can (after what has passed, and particularly

late events at this place,) only see individual safety in all being

equally involved in the deepest guilt. I entreat you to be persuaded

that these sentiments are quite general; or, at least, that the few who

do not entertain them have neither the means nor the courage to oppose

their progress; and allow themselves, with an indefensible passiveness,

to be borne along with the tide. Under such a state of circumstances,

all hopes of this spirit of insurrection subsiding must be at an end.

Some steps must instantly be taken; and no good can result from the

application of any partial remedy. The disease is general, and the

remedy must be so also. It remains with you to decide on the measures

that are to be adopted. The first and most military, though not,

perhaps, the most political, that suggests itself, is the employment of

actual force. In such a contest, however, not only the means must be

calculated, but the result; and, as far as I can judge, success, even

in this extreme, would not save us from the most baneful consequences.

It seems therefore not wise to have resort to such a measure, till

every other that it is possible for Government to take, without the

annihilation of its own power and dignity, has been tried and failed.

Unqualified concession to the demands of the army, either in dismissing

public servants of Government, or in rescinding its orders, would be

a virtual resignation of its power, and cannot therefore be made. It

would, indeed, be better and more honourable, if _matters were at the

worst_, that Government should fall by any hands than its own. Should

Government not resolve on having immediate resort to force, one line

only remains that could at the present moment afford a rational hope

of the necessity of having recourse to that extreme being avoided, or

at least of its being resorted to with advantage; which is, to meet

the crisis at once, by a general order to something of the following

purport:

"Government finds, with concern, that it can no longer indulge that

sanguine hope which it once entertained, that the irritation which

a variety of causes have combined to produce in the minds of the

Company's army on the coast would subside; and as it is satisfied that

the evils which must result from the existence of those combinations

against its authority, that are now formed in almost every station,

will, if suffered to continue, be as injurious to the public interests,

as if those by whom these proceedings are carried on were in a state

of open hostility to Government; it feels compelled to anticipate

every extreme that can occur, and to publish to the army at large the

final resolutions which it has adopted under this extraordinary and

unparalleled situation of affairs: and these resolutions will, it

is satisfied, be found to combine as much attention to the feelings

of the army as it is possible to show without a sacrifice of the

public interest, and an abandonment of the authority and dignity of

Government. The Governor and Council can and does make every possible

allowance for feeling so strongly excited as those of the officers of

the coast army have been, and is disposed to refer that great agitation

of mind into which they have been thrown by a concurrence of causes

which must greatly mitigate, if they do not altogether extenuate, that

degree of criminality which must always attach to such proceedings:

and, under such impressions, he can view their extreme solicitude

regarding those of their brother officers whom he has thought it his

duty to suspend the service, with that consideration which is due

to a highly meritorious body of officers, acting under the strong

impulse of warm and honourable, but mistaken feelings. And with such

sentiments he cannot deem it derogatory to Government to state, that

he intends, in the full confidence that the officers of the coast

army will abandon their present dangerous course of proceeding, to

recommend to the Honourable the Court of Directors the restoration

to the service of those officers, whose suspension, and the reasons

which led to it, have been reported to them, and who are consequently

the only authority by which that act can be repealed: and he can have

no doubt, but the earnest desire of their brother officers, combined

with the high character which most of the officers under suspension

formerly held, will induce the Honourable Court to overlook their late

conduct, and comply with this recommendation. Acting upon the same

principle, Government is pleased to appoint Colonel Bell to the charge

of the battalion of artillery at the Mount, and Colonel Chalmers to the

command of the subsidiary force in Travancore. Lieutenant Maitland is

appointed quarter-master of the European regiment of infantry.

"The committee of inquiry ordered to assemble at Masulipatam is

repealed; and no act, either of any body, or of individual officers

in the Company's service, of which no cognizance has yet been taken,

and which occurred before the present date, will be made subject of

future notice, or even operate to the disadvantage of such body of

officers or individuals, unless they should, by a perseverance in

the same course, and a repetition of the same conduct, forfeit all

claim to such lenity and consideration at a moment when Government

has taken such steps to tranquillize the agitated minds of the army,

and to leave even the most mistaken without a plea for perseverance

in their present dangerous course. It must declare its positive and

final resolution neither to alter nor modify this proceeding. It

will yield no more to the entreaties or demands of the army: and if

any officers are so infatuated, and so lost to every consideration

of the public good and the general prosperity of their country, as

not immediately, on the promulgation of this order, to abandon their

present course of proceeding, Government must, however much it may

deprecate such an extreme, meet it with that firmness and courage which

becomes a constituted authority of the Empire of Great Britain. It

has contemplated this possible, though, it trusts, highly improbable

event; and the different officers entrusted with command are directed,

should any spirit of turbulence and insubordination appear among the

officers of the troops under their command, to punish the individuals

with all the severity of martial law. And should the operation of the

regular course of justice be impeded, either by a combination among

the officers or men, such will instantly be proclaimed rebels against

the legal authority of Government and their country; as Government is

perfectly satisfied that the public interests will receive more injury

from any effort to conciliate men who persevere (after what has passed)

in principles so opposite to the restoration of order and discipline,

than it even can meet from them as open enemies to their King and

Country."

I am aware that a thousand objections may be made to an order of this

nature; but it must only be tried by the times; matters have arrived

at such a crisis, that something decided must instantly be done. There

is not an hour for delay. And what I have suggested is only the first

proclamation in a war that seems to me, even with this step, almost

unavoidable. If human means could avoid it, this act will; for it holds

out every motive that can incline men to good and deter them from evil.

It concedes, no doubt, in some points; but the case is urgent, and the

spirit of concession is corrected by the firmness and resolution which

is mixed with it. But your own mind will suggest every thing. I am, as

you know, devoted to the cause of my country. It will depend upon you

where I am to act, if matters draw to an extreme. I should prefer my

station at Mysore, as that in which I have most influence, and could,

in consequence, contribute most to the support of the public interests.

I cannot conclude without again entreating you not to allow yourself to

be lulled into security, and to be satisfied of the absolute necessity

of taking some steps or another to save the state from the imminent

danger to which it is exposed. But inaction, even dangerous as it is,

may be better than the commencement of a coercive system, before steps

have been taken to gain more friends to Government than it has at

present in the army: and I confess I can see no mode of doing this but

by a measure which is completely decided and final; and which, while

it grants every indulgence even to erroneous feelings, looks to the

close of this great question with a moderate and conciliatory, but a

firm and manly spirit. I shall be most anxious for your sentiments,

as soon as possible, on the line I am to pursue at this place. The

question of the marines, and the removal of some of the officers, had,

I find, (for they have shown me all their papers,) been anticipated by

the other stations; and the opposition here was in part by instruction:

and subsequent letters sufficiently show, that this case is no longer

that one, nor of the garrison of Masulipatam, but of the whole army;

and that they are most deeply pledged to the support of each other.

Indeed _there cannot be a doubt_ but the punishment of any one would

cause the whole to break out. This I feel it my duty to avoid, as well

as to prevent their marching, which was their intention, and which they

expect to be called upon to do, till I know the general line you mean

to pursue.

I am, my dear sir, &c.

(Signed) JOHN MALCOLM.

TO SIR GEORGE BARLOW.

(_Private, and Secret._)

Masulipatam, 6th July.

Observations on the Disturbances in the Madras Army in 1809 · 第 10 / 52 题