PREFACE.

I have hitherto abstained from controversy regarding the late unhappy

proceedings at Madras. The part which I had taken in these proceedings

had placed me in possession of much information, and I had given a

shape to my sentiments upon the subject; but the knowledge of these

was limited to a few intimate friends, and to them only under the

strictest injunctions of secrecy. I have been applied to more than

once for papers and information upon this subject, but have invariably

refused; as I deemed it improper to give publicity in any mode to

communications, whether verbal or in writing, which had been, at the

moment at which they were made, considered as private, or confidential.

Nothing could have led me to a departure from this principle but a

perusal of the dispatch under date the 10th of September, 1809, from

the Government of Fort St. George to the Secret Committee of the Court

of Directors, printed by order of the House of Commons. That dispatch

contains an implied censure upon my conduct, which nothing but a

conviction of its justice could induce me to pass over in silence.

Injustice is aggravated by the power of the individual or body by

whom it is committed, and by the want of ability or opportunity in

the person who suffers to repel the attack. Had not this dispatch

been printed by order of the House of Commons, my character would

have secretly received a deep and incurable wound: for as it is not

likely the Honourable the Court of Directors could have ever thought it

possible that so deliberate and grave an authority as the Government

of Fort St. George, could (without adequate grounds) have pronounced

censure on the character of an officer who stood at the moment as high

in rank and trust as the local Government of India had power to raise

him[1], it becomes probable, that most of those who read this dispatch

would be satisfied, without a minute examination of the documents by

which it was accompanied: and if any readers went into this detail,

and were struck with the remarkable difference between the apparent

premises and the conclusions drawn from them, it is more likely they

would conclude, that grounds, not yet brought before them, existed,

which would warrant the assertions made by Government, than that they

should ever suppose the latter had committed such an injustice towards

any individual in their service.

I cannot, on this occasion, limit myself to an account of my mission to

Masulipatam, which is that part of my conduct to which the Government

of Fort St. George exclusively refers: justice to my own character

demands that I should give a narrative (accompanied by an Appendix of

original documents), which will show, in a clear and concise manner,

the part I took, and the advice I gave, throughout the whole of those

unhappy and guilty proceedings which have lately afflicted our country

in India. To render this narrative intelligible to all, I shall prefix

a general view of the principal acts of the Government of Fort St.

George, from the commencement to the termination of the late violent

agitations on the coast. My object in this publication is to vindicate

myself, not to attack others. A plain statement of indisputable

facts will show, that though my judgment might on some occasions

have been wrong, I was invariably actuated by an indefatigable zeal,

and an undeviating principle of public duty; that I predicted at the

commencement, and at different stages of the proceeding, every event

of importance that occurred; that if any one of the many slighted

suggestions which I offered had met with attention, the most serious

evils would have been averted; and that my efforts were such as ought

to have entitled me to the praise and gratitude of those by whom I now

find my conduct misrepresented and my character calumniated.

Sir George Barlow has, I observe, from the volume of papers printed

by order of the House of Commons, placed upon record a number of my

private and confidential communications. This I did not anticipate;

and these letters were written in a less guarded style, and with more

warmth, than they would have been, if I had foreseen the public use to

be made of them. I do not, however, conceive that I have any right to

complain of this act: the letters contain not one sentiment of which

I am ashamed: they were all on public subjects: and that alone, when

they were addressed to Sir George Barlow or his Secretary, rendered

them public. But I must claim to myself an equal privilege in bringing

forward such private documents as are necessary to prove what I have

stated, and to defend myself from those imputations which have been

thrown upon my character from a partial, and, I trust I shall prove, a

most unfair statement of my conduct when employed at Masulipatam.

I should feel unworthy of that station which I hope I hold in life,

if any motive upon earth had such power over my mind as to make me

silent under reflections (which I deemed unjust) upon my conduct:

and where those have been, from any cause, (however unforeseen,)

brought before the public, my reply must of course be submitted to

the same tribunal. This is a circumstance which I by no means regret.

Publications in England on the affairs of India have been rare,

except on some extraordinary epochs, when attention has been forcibly

drawn to that quarter; and a groundless alarm has been spread of the

mischiefs which (many conceive) must arise from such free disclosure,

and consequent full discussion, of the acts of the Indian Governments.

This practice, in my opinion, will have a direct contrary effect. It

must always do great and essential good. The nature of our possessions

in India makes it necessary that almost absolute power should be given

to those entrusted with governments in that quarter; and there cannot

be a better or more efficient check over these rulers than that which

must be established by the full publicity given to their acts, and the

frequent discussion of all their principles of rule. Such a practice

will expose imprudence and weakness, however defended by the adherence

of powerful friends in England: and it will be more certain to prevent

oppression, or injustice, than the general provisions of law, which

may be evaded; or the check of superiors, who may, from conceiving

the cause of an individual identified with that of authority itself,

feel themselves condemned to support proceedings which they cannot

approve. This practice, in short, (restrained, as it always must be,

by the laws of our country within moderate bounds,) must have the most

salutary effects. Its inconveniences are obvious, but trifling when

compared to the great and permanent benefits which it must produce: and

I am confident that every effort made to repress such discussion is not

merely a sacrifice to personal feeling, and to momentary expedience,

of one of the best and most operative principles of the British

Constitution; but a direct approximation to the principles of that

oriental tyranny, which it is, or ought to be, our chief boast to have

destroyed.

PART I.

OBSERVATIONS

ON

THE CAUSES AND PROGRESS

OF THE

_DISTURBANCES IN THE MADRAS ARMY_

OBSERVATIONS, &c.

Some agitation, though of a trifling nature, had prevailed among the

Company's officers on the coast establishment from a period as far back

as the publication of the Regulations of the year 1796, which they

conceived to entitle them to a complete equalization of allowances with

the officers of the Bengal establishment. These feelings had little

time for operation in the course of that active and brilliant service

in which the Madras army was employed during the administration of Lord

Wellesley. The increase of establishment rendered necessary to preserve

the great accession of territory acquired by that nobleman, occasioned

a promotion, that, for a period, silenced their discontent; but that

spirit was revived in the year 1805 and 1806, when, in addition to

their former grievance, they conceived that there was an evident and

injurious partiality shown towards his Majesty's officers, who were

said to be promoted to commands and staff situations to the injury

of the officers of the Company's service. Addresses to Government

and to the Court of Directors were at this period agitated and in

circulation; but none, to my knowledge, were brought forward; owing,

perhaps, to the orders from the Honourable the Court of Directors,

who, it would appear, had, on private representation, adopted some

measures to redress those grievances of which the army at that moment

complained. This spirit of discontent might have died of itself; or, at

all events, it would have been more easily repressed, had not the flame

of discord burst out in a higher quarter. The quarrel which occurred

between the Governor, Sir George Barlow, and the Commander-in-Chief,

General McDowall, may, no doubt, (as it led to those measures which

Government adopted towards the general staff of the coast army,) be

deemed the remote source of all the violent and indefensible acts

of the army, and in that view merits a short notice. The mind of

General McDowall was much irritated at his not being appointed to

council; and he gave way, in consequence, to a language of complaint

and discontent, of which, it must be concluded, he could never have

calculated the effect. Every act of Government that affected the wishes

or interests of either an individual or a class of officers naturally

caused complaints, which the Commander-in-Chief certainly did not

discourage. He must have thought that the influence and importance of

a seat in council would have enabled him more easily to have satisfied

or silenced their murmurs; and he cannot be supposed to have felt much

sorrow that Government should have experienced the inconvenience of an

exclusion which he considered as so great a personal grievance: and

when his mind was further irritated by what he deemed to be slight

and neglect, on the part of Sir George Barlow, of his rights in his

military character of Commander-in-Chief, these feelings had probably

a wider action. In the temper which I have shown the coast army was in

at this moment, it is not surprising, when they saw such an example

of discontent, and felt unrepressed by that high authority which was

immediately over them, that they should have been more bold, and that

their violence should have taken a more formidable shape towards

Government, against which this spirit was, by the proceeding of the

Commander-in-Chief, very unadvisedly and inconsiderately, however

unintentionally, directed. But if a want of reflection on one part (few

will accuse General McDowall of more than want of reflection) led to

such consequences, can we say there was much more wisdom on the other,

which, if it did not provoke, never made one attempt to prevent, the

occurrence of those evils with which it was threatened? A cold, even,

mechanic course of action, which gave great attention to the ordinary

rules of public business dignified with the name of public principles,

but none to human nature, was opposed at this period to the proceedings

of the Commander-in-Chief and the army; and had the effect, which was

to be expected, of accelerating that crisis which it was so important

to avoid.

It may be here necessary to explain what was meant by the term public

principle. It was constantly used at Madras (with some deviation, I

conceive, from its highest and most dignified sense) to denote the

rules of public business founded either in precedent or in written law,

and certainly well adapted for order and convenience in the common

course of affairs. But if such rules were sufficient, no talents

would be necessary to govern mankind. A copying clerk, or even the

regulation-book which he copies, might rule a state. Success in this

endeavour (the object of which is to render the task of Government

simple and easy) will be always agreeable to the character of the

Government. The more despotic that is, the more easily may we preserve

inviolate such rules or principles. For though great commotions will

occur in the most despotic states, and force their rulers to an

occasional deviation from such principles, these deviations will be

unfrequent to what must arise in more free and liberal governments,

in which that constant attention which it is necessary to pay to

men's tempers, and to those pretensions and rights upon which such

an order of things is grounded, must produce a much more frequent

departure from the exact letter (and sometimes from the spirit) of

those unbending rules. It is this fact which renders the task of

government so much more difficult in those states than in any others.

Any man (who has obsequious slaves to govern) can, if he has memory to

recollect the principles of rule, be a despot, or a despot's deputy;

but far different qualities are required where the minds of those under

authority are of a freer and bolder stamp: over such a society those

alone are fit to rule, who, fully informed of all its component parts,

can judge the periods when the temporary departure from an established

principle will effect more in the cause of authority than its rigid

observance; when lenity is more powerful than severity, and mildness

and moderation tend more to restore order and to maintain tranquillity,

than all the force of a violent government.

The intelligent reader will perceive, that, in contrasting free and

despotic governments, I refer exclusively to rules of administration.

Laws are, no doubt, more inflexible in free states than in others. But

even respecting laws it may be observed, that the general principle

prevails: for the legislative power in free states shows a disposition

to repeal or modify laws in reference to the interests, the opinions,

sometimes even to the prejudices, of great bodies of the people;

while the despot has no maxim, but that all must be subject to the

authority of Government. There is, no doubt, a great distinction in

every community between civil and military bodies: the laws for the

government of the latter are, of course, more arbitrary and unbending;

but, even in these bodies there is a _national character_ that will

compel attention. The same principles cannot be applied to an English

as a Russian army: and it is when such bodies are in an agitated and

convulsed state, that these characteristic distinctions are most

prominent and discernible. It is on such emergencies that a statesman

will succeed in averting a danger, which will only be increased by

every measure of the mere rote follower of public rules. Cicero[2]

has observed, that "it appears to be the dictate of sound policy, to

act in accommodation to particular conjunctures, and not obstinately

persevere in one invariable scheme, when the public circumstances,

together with the sentiments of the best and wisest members of the

community, are evidently changed. In conformity to this notion, the

most judicious reasoners on the art of government have universally

condemned an inflexible perseverance in one uniform tenor of measures.

The skill of the pilot is shown in weathering the storm at least,

though he should not gain his port." Public merit (agreeable to

the extended view of that great orator and statesman, as expressed

afterwards) consists in "having been inflexible in our intentions for

the public welfare, and not by a positive perseverance in certain

favourite modes of obtaining it."

It will be unnecessary to trace the petty differences which took

place between the Commander-in-Chief and the Governor: the general

character and evil effect of these differences have been described.

The first act which led to serious discussions, was the former

placing the Quarter-Master-General, Lieutenant-Colonel Munro, in

arrest. The nature of this case is well known: and few, I imagine,

can doubt that Government had _a right_ to command his release: but

it will remain a question with many, how far a knowledge of the

character and actual temper of the Commander-in-Chief, the state of

the army, and other circumstances, would have warranted Government

in forbearing to use _this right_. It is nonsense to say, that it

would, by so forbearing and moderate a proceeding, have abandoned

an officer entitled to protection. This language, if it means any

thing, implies that Government did not conceive there were at that

moment thirteen officers, either in the King's or Company's service,

on the coast, upon whose honesty and honour it could rely. This is a

proposition which appears too extravagant for notice: but, even if this

point be conceded, will it be said, if Colonel Munro had suffered an

additional injustice by the sentence of a violent and partial court

martial, that the Government was, in that extreme case, deprived of

the right to protect that officer? On the contrary, would not the

necessity for the exercise of that right have been, under such an

event, much more apparent and unobjectionable. It may be asked, if any

circumstances could justify Government in so pusillanimous a conduct,

as that of forbearing to exercise an admitted right, and of allowing

a court martial to judge upon a public act which it had recognised

and approved? It is to be replied, that such conduct might, on many

occasions, be the result of prudence and of fortitude. It is weakness,

not firmness, that takes an early alarm at danger, and by showing a

want of confidence in all the subordinate aids of its power, creates,

by its suspicion, that defection which it apprehends. In the recent

case of Sir Francis Burdett, the House of Commons did not abandon its

exclusive right, but it forbore the exercise of that right, and, with a

confidence and wisdom worthy of so enlightened and august an assembly,

allowed a question, which involved its rights and authority, to be

discussed in a court of law. There can, I should conceive, be no doubt

whatever, that had Colonel Munro been tried on the charges preferred

against him, he would have been honourably acquitted; and the influence

and reputation of his accusers would have been in no slight degree

lessened: an object which, in itself, was of consequence at that period

to Government.

It is a remarkable fact, that the officers who had signed the charges

against Colonel Munro, were, on reflection, and from learning the

sentiments of the Judge-Advocate-General, so convinced that the

charges they had made were either groundless or illegal, that they

wrote to the Commander-in-Chief to suspend the prosecution of them.

This certainly proves (if any proof was wanting) that there could

have been no doubt of the result of a court martial, grounded on the

state of general feelings, as far as that regarded the charges against

Lieutenant-Colonel Munro; for if the accusers themselves had shown

they distrusted the cause they had so rashly adopted, there could,

assuredly, be no apprehension of the judgment of thirteen officers of

rank (all of whom, if it had been thought necessary, might have been

chosen from his Majesty's service) giving a biassed or unjust sentence.

The Government of Madras, in their dispatch to the Court of Directors

upon this subject, draw a directly opposite conclusion from this fact,

which, they say, "proves in itself the inexpediency of their having

had recourse to such a proceeding;" but they state no grounds for this

conclusion. In the whole course of this affair they appear to have

been much, if not solely, guided by the opinion of their law officers:

and no man can peruse the letter of Lieutenant-Colonel Leith upon this

subject, without a just respect for the talents and extensive legal

knowledge of that public officer. But those that think great, numerous,

and obvious evils resulted from the decision of Government on the

case of Lieutenant-Colonel Munro, will not immediately perceive the

necessity of its having been governed by rules of law in its decision

on a question which clearly involved the most serious considerations

of state policy. They will think, and with justice, this was a

question not for lawyers, but statesmen; who, in the exercise of their

legitimate discretion, are in the situation in which Mr. Burke has so

well described legislators; and therefore, like them, "ought to do

what lawyers cannot, for they have no rules to bind them but the great

principles of reason and equity and the general sense of mankind;

these they are bound to obey and follow: and rather to enlarge and

enlighten law by the liberality of legislative reason, than to fetter

and bind their high capacity by the narrow constructions of subordinate

artificial justice."

Several months previous to General McDowall's departure for England,

that officer had been called upon by the Governor to repress a

Memorial to the Governor General, on the subject of late reductions,

which was stated to be in agitation at the principal stations of the

army. General McDowall had written circular letters to forbid such

proceedings; and nothing further appeared upon this subject till that

officer, on the 23d of January 1809, forwarded and strongly recommended

to notice a Memorial to the Honourable the Court of Directors signed

by a number of the officers of the army, and containing, in moderate

and not disrespectful language, a statement of what they deemed their

grievances, which chiefly referred to the equalization of their

allowances with the Bengal establishment, the hardship of the several

reductions of emolument which they had lately sustained, and the

partiality in appointment to commands which they conceived was still

shown to his Majesty's officers. General McDowall forwarded, at the

same time, another Memorial, which was also addressed to the Court

of Directors, and signed by a number of officers commanding native

corps, regarding the injury they conceived they had sustained by the

abolition of the tent contract. The principle of both these Memorials

was strongly condemned by the Government. The former, they informed the

Commander-in-Chief, would be sent to the Governor General in Council;

and the latter was returned, as relating to a subject which had already

been decided.

There were many circumstances connected with these addresses, which

confirm the truth of those sentiments I before expressed regarding

the feelings by which General McDowall allowed himself to be governed

at this moment: but the state of his mind, and the operation that

was likely to have upon the officers of the army, was a subject

that merited the serious consideration of Government; which, unless

satisfied that there was no danger from the progress of such a spirit

of discontent as then existed, should either have adopted _at that

moment_ some decided measures to repress that evil, or have carefully

avoided every act of aggravation. If both of these Memorials had been

merely permitted to go as numbers of the dispatch to England, those

by whom they were signed would have thought nothing more of their

grievances till an answer was received from the Directors: and that,

if contrary to their wishes, would have been deemed final, and the

Directors would assuredly not have censured Government for a slight

departure from established rules at a period when, from extraordinary

events, of a nature never likely to happen again, the army was not

only in a state of great agitation, but the civil power had lost the

aid of that high military authority on which it would in common times

have relied to subdue so dangerous a spirit. Few will contend that

there would have been any loss of either dignity or of strength in

such a proceeding: and how completely, had it been adopted, would

the turbulent and seditious be deprived of one of their chief means

of increasing irritation[3]. But this question appears to have been

decided, like every other, upon an abstract consideration of its own

merits as a single and insulated question; and in that light the

decision was _undoubtedly right_: but if it had been viewed, as it

certainly should, in its relation to the actual state of the army,

_it was as certainly wrong_. It had an evident and malignant action

throughout all the troubles that ensued. And this absolute, and, as

they deemed it, unnecessary and ungracious refusal to allow their

grievances to be even heard by the Court of Directors, combined with

the punishment[4] with which it was accompanied, rankled to the last in

the minds of the discontented, and indeed appeared to be one of the few

subjects, on the hardship and injustice of which the most moderate of

those concerned agreed with the most violent.

The next event of consequence, was the publication of a general order,

under date the 28th January, by the Commander-in-Chief, censuring

Lieutenant-Colonel Munro for his appeal to the civil Government against

his decision; an act which General McDowall deemed destructive of

subordination, subversive of discipline, and a violation of (what he

termed) the sacred rights of the Commander-in-Chief. There can, I

should conceive, be little doubt regarding the character of this order.

It is certainly indefensible. It in substance arraigned the exercise

of an act of authority, the legality of which General McDowall had

recognised by his obedience a few days before, and in this view was

highly disrespectful to Government, who were justly incensed at the

proceedings; and who, in an order under date the 31st of January,

removed General McDowall from the command of the army, which it

appeared he had not then resigned, though on his way to Ceylon for the

purpose of proceeding to England. The links that bound the cause of

General McDowall to that of the officers of the Company's army on the

coast, were neither strong nor durable: a common feeling of discontent

against Government had united them for a moment, but there was no

cohesion either from similar objects or interests; and the Government

order, as far as related to General McDowall, could have given rise

to no serious consequences: but the suspension from the service, in

the same order, of Major Boles, the Deputy-Adjutant-General, on the

ground of his having given currency to the obnoxious order of the

Commander-in-Chief, had an immediate and electric effect over the whole

army. There was hardly an officer in either the King's or Company's

service that did not doubt the justice of this measure, or that did

not feel that it inflicted a vital wound on the first principles of

military discipline; and the universal clamour and indignation that it

excited, was no doubt the proximate and direct cause of the rebellion

that ensued.

The merits of this unhappy act of power have been fully investigated in

England; and the general opinion seems decidedly against the Government

of Fort St. George. The wisdom and expediency of the act is defended

by none; and some of the first law authorities[5] in England doubt its

justice. The subject has been completely exhausted; and I shall say no

more upon it, than that there, perhaps, never was so complete a want

of knowledge displayed of the character of military feeling, as in the

attempt made to prevail upon Major Boles to degrade himself in his own

profession, by making an apology for having performed what he deemed

his duty, and what he could not have expressed regret for having done,

without an admission of guilt. The urgency with which this apology was

sought, is of itself a proof that the Government had been precipitate.

How much more manly, wise, and dignified, would it have been to have

rescinded the resolution which had been taken, on the plain ground

of a conviction that Major Boles had erred from want of knowledge,

and without intention of offence; and such must have been the actual

sentiments which were entertained of his conduct, or Government could

never have professed itself ready to accept a slight apology. But

a little stickling spirit about supposed dignity, more worthy of a

wrong-headed individual engaged in an affair of honour, than a great

Government, prevented this obvious measure, and produced irremediable

mischief to the state.

On the 1st of February, the day subsequent to that on which Major Boles

was suspended, an order was issued, suspending the Adjutant-General,

Lieutenant-Colonel Capper, for the same offence, that of being

concerned in circulating the offensive order of the Commander-in-Chief.

The only difference in the facts of this case from that of Major Boles,

(they were alike in principle), was, that Colonel Capper, the moment

he heard of Major Boles's suspension, made a declaration, that the

circumstance of his being with General McDowall was the sole cause that

had led to Major Boles's name being affixed to orders which it was

his (the Adjutant-General's) duty to sign; and that he considered all

responsibility connected with the office of Adjutant-General rested

solely with him, as principal. The generous object of this gallant and

meritorious officer (who was lost on his passage to England), was to

exculpate his deputy. He did not, however, succeed in that object; and

his free avowal of the principal share he had in the circulation of

the order was instantly taken as the ground for inflicting a similar

punishment on him.

From the hour that these measures were adopted, the state of the army

underwent a complete revolution. The most discontented had, till this

period, been cautious in their measures, and aimed at no more than

obtaining some attention to what they deemed their grievances. There

is no doubt, that before these orders were issued a very general

spirit of dissatisfaction prevailed; but there was no danger of that

taking any mutinous or rebellious shape. Many, and among these some of

the most respectable officers in the army, had up to this date taken

no concern in those proceedings that had offended Government: but the

suspension of Colonel Capper and Major Boles (particularly the latter,

who, it was perfectly known, had no share in the councils of the

Commander-in-Chief, and whose act of signing and issuing the obnoxious

order was therefore exclusively ministerial,) effected a complete and

dangerous change in the general temper. All seemed to be actuated

by the same resentment at measures which they deemed arbitrary and

unjust; and many officers of the highest rank and first respectability,

both in his Majesty's and the Honourable Company's service, joined in

reprobating the principle upon which it was adopted. The subsequent

efforts made to prevail upon Major Boles to sign an apology, and the

letter circulated by the commanding officer of the forces, General

Gowdie, which condemned that officer for not having acceded to this

proposition, had the double effect of increasing the indignation at

Government and the popularity of Major Boles, who was, after this

act, deemed an honourable martyr in a cause which it was the duty of

every military officer to support. Before the more moderate, and with

them all those officers of his Majesty's service who had given way to

their first feelings, had recovered from their error, numbers of the

more violent in the Company's service were irretrievably pledged to

violent and guilty proceedings, into which there is no doubt they were

deluded by the force of example, and the assurance that the cause in

which they were engaged was general. The first of their acts which

attracted the notice of Government, was the agitation and preparation

of an address to the Governor General, remonstrating against the acts

of the Government of Fort St. George, and soliciting the removal

of Sir George Barlow; and an address, or letter, to Major Boles,

conveying to that officer a contribution for his support during what

the addressers deemed his unjust suspension. The Government, in an

order dated the 1st of May, 1809, suspended Captain J. Marshall and

Lieutenant-Colonel Martin, on the ground of their being principally

concerned in preparing the Memorial[6] (or, as it is termed in this

order, "seditious paper,") addressed to the Governor General; and the

same punishment was inflicted upon Lieutenant-Colonel the Honourable

Arthur St. Leger, on the ground of his having promoted the circulation

of the Memorial in the corps under his command. Major J. de Morgan

was suspended for nearly similar reasons. Captain James Grant,

commanding the body-guard of the Governor, (but then absent on service

in Travancore,) had signed the address to Major Boles; and, from a

feeling congenial with his candid and gallant character, he deemed

concealment of this act dishonourable, nor could he reconcile to his

mind the propriety of continuing to hold his appointment with the line

he had pursued. He wrote, therefore, a private letter to Major Barclay,

(Military Secretary to the Governor,) stating the reasons that had led

him to resign the command of the body-guard, and desiring that Sir

George Barlow might be informed of his motives; and he enclosed (that

the information of the Governor regarding the actual state of the

feeling of the army might be complete,) a copy of the letter to Major

Boles. He was suspended on the ground of having signed the address

to Major Boles; which document, it was stated in the order, he had

forced on the attention of the Governor in Council. Lieutenant-Colonel

Robert Bell, the commanding officer of the artillery, was removed

from all military charge and command, on the ground (as was stated

in the orders,) of his having promoted the circulation of a paper

similar in substance (to that address) among the officers under his

command. Lieutenant-Colonel Chalmers was removed from his immediate

command, on the charge of not having reported to Government, or exerted

himself to repress, the exceptionable proceedings of the officers

under his orders: and Lieutenant-Colonel Cuppage was removed, on the

same ground, from the staff situation of Adjutant-General, to which

(though he then held a station of command in Malabar,) he had been

appointed: while Captain Coombes was deprived of his staff office of

Assistant-Quarter-Master-General in Mysore, on the general grounds

of being concerned in these reprehensible proceedings. This order

concluded by a panegyric upon the discipline and fidelity which

the troops in his Majesty's service had invariably shown, and by a

compliment to all those of the Company's service who had not taken

a share in these reprehensible proceedings, but particularly the

subsidiary force at Hyderabad, the conduct of which was stated to have

been most satisfactory and exemplary.

Though the right of suspending officers from the service till the

pleasure of the Court of Directors was known, is one that has been very

properly vested in the local Governments of India, they possess no

power which should be exercised with such extreme caution. It never can

be wisely exercised in any cases but those of most clearly established

guilt, where trial would either endanger the authority of Government,

or expose its dignity to the highest insult and degradation; which

is indeed one, and perhaps the most effectual, mode of endangering

its existence. Every officer is conscious, when he enters the public

service, that he subjects himself to military law, but not to arbitrary

power. There are, however, (as has been shown), extreme cases, which

create exceptions that interfere with his right to this jurisdiction:

but when the ruling power is compelled to act contrary to usage, it is

bound, in all such cases, to establish the necessity of its so acting,

by an exposure both of the nature of the crime and of the proof of its

having been committed[7]. The King of England may, no doubt, strike any

officer's name out of his army without assigning any reason; but his

adviser would incur serious responsibility; and an inferior authority

exercising this great power should be still more cautious, lest the

very purpose for which it was granted be perverted, by the destruction

of that general confidence in the justice of their rule, upon which the

power of departure (when the safety of the state absolutely requires

it) from ordinary forms of law is grounded. No sense of expedience,

or desire to strike terror, (by the mere display of arbitrary power,)

can warrant the slightest deviation from principles so essential to

preserve the temper and order of a military body under this alarming

though legal departure from its usual rights and privileges.

It was a remarkable fact, relative to the orders issued on that date,

that (unless in the case of Captain Grant, who had come forward to

accuse himself[8] of the act for which he was punished) no proof

of the guilt of any of the others was brought forward. They were,

indeed, almost all suspended, removed, and disgraced, on the grounds

of private information; which, supposing it true, could not, from its

nature, and the resentment to which it would expose individuals, be

publicly stated. The consequence was, that many of the individuals

who had been thus condemned and punished without a hearing, loudly

declared their innocence, and brought strong presumptive evidence to

support their assertion. They were generally believed; and a sense of

their particular wrongs, added to the alarm caused by the sweeping use

which Government had on this occasion made of its right of suspending

officers without trial, greatly aggravated the discontented, who felt

an almost maddening motive to action in the immediate contemplation of

the ruin and disgrace which threatened some of the most honourable and

distinguished of those that had taken any share in their proceedings.

The obvious and acknowledged source of the crimes which Government had

at this moment to punish, was its own act--the recent suspension of

Lieutenant-Colonel Capper and Major Boles; and it ought to have been

evident, that the orders of the 1st of May would aggravate, in the

highest degree, the general agitation which that measure had produced;

and almost every paragraph of this order would appear as if intended

for that object. The thanks given in it to his Majesty's troops were

no doubt merited, but invidious; and, being so, could never have been

desired by that body; many of whom, though they had been led (by the

operation of the principles of the distinct constitution of the army

to which they belonged,) to renounce every share in the proceedings of

the discontented officers in the Company's service, still participated

in their feelings: but the useless irritation of this part of the

order appears a trifling error when compared to that eulogium which

it so unfortunately bestowed on the Hyderabad force, whose officers,

however much circumstances might have prevented their coming forward,

could not possibly, as a body, have a separate interest from the rest

of that army to whom they were on this occasion held forth as a corps

on whose fidelity Government had peculiar confidence. The operation

of such praise was inevitable: the Company's officers at Hyderabad

were not only exposed to the reproach of inaction in what were deemed

objects of common interest, but to the accusation of being in part the

cause of the ruin of some of the most popular officers of the army: for

the discontented argued, that if Government had not thought it could

rely on their support, it never would have had recourse to so bold

and arbitrary a course of measures. Correct information regarding the

temper of this force would have satisfied Government that there was

no good ground for this eulogium; and the slightest reflection on the

common motives of human action would have prevented its being made. The

Company's officers at Hyderabad treated the praise bestowed upon them

with scorn, disclaimed all right to it in an address to Government,

and, abandoning that moderation which had before characterized their

proceedings, they commenced with all the zeal of converts in their new

career. In their ardour to make amends for the past, they took the lead

in violence. Their numbers and apparent unanimity inspired them with

fatal confidence: and this force, who were excited to action by a weak

and unwise attempt to divide them from the rest of the army, became the

most active promoters of sedition, and gave an example of opposition to

Government, in which their repentance came too late to prevent the ruin

of many of those who were betrayed, by a reliance on them, into the

adoption of the same unjustifiable course.

The general spirit of indignation which the orders of the 1st of

May were calculated to excite, must have been foreseen; but it was

perhaps expected, that the terror struck by so decided and vigorous a

proceeding would repress the effects of this spirit, and alarm even

the most violent into order and obedience. If such was the intention,

the measure was certainly inadequate to the end proposed. When we

bear in mind the inflamed state of the minds of a great majority of

the officers of the coast army, was it reasonable to expect, that the

suspension from the service, and the removal from their commands, of

a few of the most popular (including some of the most moderate[9])

officers in the service, would strike a panic in a body of men

so agitated? Was it not more likely that they would deem this a

repetition of what they had before considered injustice, and rush on

the extreme of violence? It could have no other effect; and therefore,

if it had been resolved to take no steps to conciliate or restore the

temper of the army, this was the period (before their combinations

were matured,) that a severe and wise Government would have chosen

to come to issue; and, had the danger been fully met at this moment,

those consequences which resulted from the line pursued would, in

all human probability, have been avoided: but if the object of the

Government of Fort St. George had been the ruin of its own army, no

measures could have been more calculated to effect that object than

those pursued. The character of its acts till the 1st of May has been

fully shown. It would be as tedious as useless to dwell upon the many

trifling but irritating measures to which it had recourse from that

period till the 26th of July. These measures were, if not oppressive,

all marked by a spirit of the most provoking suspicion, and never

contained one particle of that generous feeling of noble confidence,

which, by exalting the character of authority, attaches those that are

wavering, reclaims the insubordinate to their duty, and, by giving a

motive in which they have a pride, recalls the most guilty to the path

of honour and virtue. A bare catalogue of a few of the expedients to

which the Government resorted will be sufficient to show the nature of

the whole. Some officers were removed from the command of corps, and

sent to distant stations, without any reason being assigned; others

were insulted, by being ordered away from the Presidency and other

places at a few hours' warning, upon the ground of private information

regarding their conversation or actions. Leave to visit the Presidency

was refused to all officers. An institution of cadets (boys) was

dissolved, because they had a quarrel with one of their comrades in

consequence of his going to Lady Barlow's ball. A corps was removed

to a distant and unpleasant (if not unhealthy) station, because its

officers refused to dine with the Governor. But the conduct of the

officers of the European regiment at Masulipatam, in consequence of

a dispute about a toast at their mess-table, and the measures that

precipitated a mutiny in that garrison, (the particulars of which will

be stated in my narrative,) forms one of the completest examples of the

character of that system of irritation pursued by the Government of

Fort St. George, during this short but important and eventful period.

In viewing this system, we ought not to take any single case, but look

at the whole; and we shall find it, as such, fully adequate to the end

which it effected, of making a brave and meritorious though mistaken

body of men rush upon their own ruin; and of greatly weakening, if not

destroying, by its probable operation on the attachment and allegiance

of our native army, the most essential of all those principles, on the

preservation of which must depend the future safety and existence of

our empire in India.

The mutiny which an imprudent measure of Government (the particulars

of which will be hereafter stated) brought on at Masulipatam, was

one of the first acts of open violence committed by the officers on

the coast establishment. As the Governor of Fort St. George thought

it might be quelled by means short of coercion, he directed me to

proceed to that garrison, in the hope that I should recall the

officers to their duty. But his other measures ill accorded with the

avowed principles of that conciliatory and moderate proceeding. It

had long been reported throughout the army, that Government intended

to make such a distribution of the native corps as would place them

under the complete check of his majesty's regiments. The alarm, and

indeed despair, caused by this report, were excessive and general.

The numerous officers of the Company's army who had become engaged in

guilty combinations, thought their destruction was certain, and that

union and resistance offered the only hope of safety. It might not

have been the intention of Government to make such an impression; but

is it not clear to the most common understanding which reflects on

what had passed, and the actual state of feeling in the army, that

this impression must have been produced[10]? Was it not evident that

the mutiny at Masulipatam had been caused by the mere rumour of this

intention on the part of Government? And could it be expected by the

most weak, or infatuated, that the actual execution of this plan would

not produce the same effect in a situation such as Hyderabad, where the

spirit of disaffection was more violent, and the power of resistance

as great, if not greater. It is hardly possible to make any other

conclusion, but that those who advised this measure foresaw the result,

and thought that such an act of open disobedience would give the colour

of unavoidable necessity to the extreme measures[11] which they then

contemplated. It produced its natural effect--the order for the march

of the 2d battalion of the 10th regiment from Hyderabad to Goa was

disobeyed, and the Company's officers at that station forced down a

precipice of guilt, at which, in spite of their violent language, they

shuddered. This act of open disobedience, accompanied by a violent and

seditious paper styled their _Ultimatum_[12], which they transmitted to

the Governor, constituted the immediate grounds upon which Government

adopted the extreme measure of the 26th of July, of calling upon all

the European officers of the native corps to sign a test of their

fidelity, and, on their refusal, of separating the officers from their

men.

Though a violent agitation certainly existed at this time throughout

almost all ranks of the officers of the Company's army, this agitation

had a variety of shades, which it is of importance to consider. Many

officers in the Company's service had no share whatever in those

proceedings which had met with the disapprobation of Government: but

these, though they severely condemned the conduct of the disaffected,

and regretted their errors, could not but be alive to the character

and reputation of the army to which they belonged; they were, of

course, anxious for measures that would retrieve the service from that

disgrace and ruin with which it was threatened: and it was the natural

wish of this class (who were stronger in influence than numbers,)

that Government should endeavour to reclaim the discontented to their

duty by some act that mixed as much consideration and indulgence for

the errors into which they had fallen, with a vigorous exertion of

its authority as it was possible to mix, without a sacrifice of its

strength and dignity.

The next, and a very principal if not a numerous class, were officers

of some rank and influence, who had gradually, and without reflection,

involved themselves in proceedings, the scope and extent of which they

had never contemplated till they had gone too far to retract. They had

persuaded themselves that Government would yield to the representations

of the army; and the hope of success, added to the fear of being

accused of defection, had hitherto kept them firm to the general cause:

but these men, at the period of which I speak, contemplated their

situation with affliction and horror; they saw themselves borne away

in a tide that they could not resist: they conceived, from a false

but imperious sense of honour, which, from a singular but powerful

principle of human nature, was felt to be the more binding because at

variance with duty, that they were pledged to support the rest; or,

more properly speaking, not to abandon them. They were sensible too

late of having lost their authority and control over the younger and

more violent part of the service, and regretted their proceedings; but

at the same time saw, under the rigid course pursued by Government, no

safety but in union. This class of men would have rushed to any door

that had been opened to their retreat; they would have made a stand on

any ground that the clemency or generosity of Government had afforded

them; and would not only have reclaimed themselves, but the rest; for

they were, generally speaking, of that rank and character who had the

chief influence with the troops; and, if extremes had been resorted to,

with them on the side of Government, the others must have submitted, as

their efforts at resistance would have been quite hopeless. The last

and most numerous, though certainly the least powerful party among

the officers of the coast army, were those who, unfortunately for its

reputation, had the chief management of all the criminal proceedings.

This party, which consisted of a few wrong-headed and violent old

officers, and almost all the junior part of the service, completely

took the lead in their correspondence and deliberative committees;

in both of which a very violent and indecent tone of proceeding

was adopted; and the authority of commanding officers of corps was

apparently suspended by the principle of equality introduced in their

proceedings. But this loss of power was more apparent than real; for,

though the commanding officers may have had little more influence in

the committee than the youngest officers, their military authority

(generally speaking) remained, and that must have given them, whenever

they had the courage to exert it, a very commanding influence over the

whole: and this circumstance establishes what has been before stated,

that the most numerous, clamorous, and violent, were in fact the least

powerful party in the army, though they have assumed a style in the

written documents, as if they were the undisputed and uncontrolled

leaders of the whole of the Company's army.

The objects of the different classes of officers were, of course, as

various as their feelings. The first could have no wish, but such a

settlement as should vindicate the dignity of Government, and, as far

as possible, spare the character and reputation of the service. They

were too well aware of the nature of those causes that had led the

discontented astray, not to hope that every effort might be made to

reclaim the misguided; but they were prepared, if such efforts failed,

to have acted with a forward and animated zeal in support of lawful

authority, and to have contributed their efforts to reduce men who

had shown themselves unworthy of kindness and indulgence. The next

class that has been described required more aid from the consideration

of Government, before they could disentangle themselves from those

unfortunate pledges into which they had entered. They felt that, after

having proceeded so far, they would have been disgraced if they had,

by their retreat, left their associates to be punished. These officers

thought they could not abandon the cause before it was at least

ascertained none should suffer for what had passed; but they had become

fully sensible of the deep guilt in which they were involved: and

though many of this class had entered into a pledge to have obtained

what was termed a redress of grievances (inclusive of a complete

repeal of the orders of the 1st of May), they were not disposed to

persevere to the extent of disobedience in the pursuit of this object:

and had Government, in addition to an act of amnesty, held out the

slightest prospect that the officers of the army would, by an immediate

return to good order and duty, acquire a claim upon the clemency and

consideration of the Court of Directors, which might operate favourably

to those officers who were suspended, and who were the object of their

painful solicitude, this class would have used their utmost efforts to

reclaim the more turbulent, and, in the event of those efforts failing,

have employed all their influence and authority with the troops, to

have prevented any injury to the state, from the violence or insanity

of the rest.

It is difficult to say what were the objects of the last class among

the officers of the coast army. This, it has been stated, were the

most numerous and most violent, but the least powerful; though

it was probably judged otherwise by Government, from this party

having throughout conducted the proceedings of the committees, and

correspondence, and having always exaggerated its means, and assumed,

from a desire to intimidate, a tone as if it spoke the sentiments of

all the officers of the army.

One of the earliest motives to action with this class, was a personal

hatred of Sir George Barlow[13], and of some officers on the general

staff who were supposed to be his chief advisers. This feeling had

latterly absorbed every other. From indulging it, they persuaded

themselves that they were compelled to the indefensible extremes they

had adopted, and thus found an alleviation of that misery in which

a sense of guilt had involved them. It would be difficult to state

the objects which men acting under the dominion of such passions

had in view. They, in fact, did not well know themselves what they

desired: but there were, I believe, very few among this class even,

so completely unreasonable, as to approve of that paper called

_the Ultimatum_, which the officers of the Hyderabad force had the

presumption to send to Government.

Such was the diversified temper of the numerous officers of the

Company's army on the coast when the test was proposed for universal

subscription. In describing that measure, it is perhaps more essential

to attend to the mode in which it was carried into execution, than its

substance. The Government of Fort St. George had, in consequence of

the information which I gave them from Masulipatam[14], assembled a

field force near Madras. The majority of this camp was formed of his

Majesty's troops: but the senior officers of the Company's troops,

who composed a part of this corps, were men of whose violence, in

whatever situation they were placed, Government could entertain no

apprehension[15]; and every thing might have been expected, under the

slightest management, from their good sense and moderation. Sir George

Barlow, it is true, sent for some of these officers, and appeared to

treat them with confidence in some discussions he had with them on the

state of the army: but one fact will suffice to show the character of

this confidence, and the general impressions which his conduct on this

occasion was likely to make. Lieutenant-Colonel Rumley (who commanded

the native cavalry at the Mount, and was one of those respectable

officers who were honoured with his confidence,) received, during this

period, an extraordinary communication from Major Russel, of an attempt

to excite the native officers of the cavalry against their European

commanders. It appears of importance to insert this written report, as

drawn up by the Major himself. It is as follows:

"On the afternoon of the 23d ultimo[16], Secunder Khan Subahdar

came to me, on my return from Madras to camp, and said he had been

very anxious to see me for several hours, as something of a very

extraordinary nature had occurred. That walking in the vicinity of the

lines he had been accosted by a brahmin, who asked him if he was not

the senior officer of cavalry, and said he had business of the greatest

importance to communicate to him. He then proceeded to disclose to him,

that he had been sent by Colonel Munro to inform the native troops that

their officers had sent in a petition to Sir George Barlow to be put on

Bengal allowances, which Sir George had informed them the resources of

this country would not admit; and, in consequence of this refusal, they

had resolved to mutiny: that in case the officers should propose to

engage them in seizing the person of Sir George, it was their duty to

say he was their Governor, and that they would not act in such a cause.

The only way, _he further said, in which the demand of the officers

could be complied with, was by taking away a proportion of the pay of

the native officers and men_. That if Secunder Khan would undertake

to persuade all the men and officers to act in this manner, he should

receive a handsome jagheer: and he was further informed, that Colonel

Munro had dispatched emissaries or letters to communicate the same to

all the native corps in the army. That he had no occasion to apprehend

injury from any one, as he might observe Sir George had suspended every

person who acted in opposition to his wishes[17]."

Colonel Rumley was naturally indignant at a proceeding which he

was convinced (from the whole behaviour of Sir George Barlow) could

not have his sanction, and which he deemed, at the moment, to be an

impolitic and dangerous expedient of a person who, enjoying a large

share of his confidence, might have acted on this occasion without his

knowledge. With these impressions, he hastened to give full information

of the circumstance to Sir George Barlow; but his report was received

without either emotion or surprise; and he was forced to conclude, from

no notice being taken of it, that the measure of which he complained

had been adopted by authority. The circumstance became public after

Colonel Rumley returned to camp, and the minds of most of the officers

were greatly inflamed at this glaring instance of what they deemed

unmanly duplicity.

A short account of the mode in which the test was proposed to the

officers at Fort St. George and the camp near the Mount, will convey,

better than any general detail, the character of the measure. The

following is a copy of that remarkable document:--

"We, the undersigned officers of the Honourable Company's service,

do in the most solemn manner declare, upon our word and honour[18]

as British officers, that we will obey the orders and support the

authority of the Honourable the Governor in Council of Fort St. George,

agreeable to the tenor of the commission which we hold from that

Government."

This test was sent to the commanding officer of the forces assembled

at Fort St. George and the Mount, and it was accompanied by a circular

letter to the commanding officers of divisions, which was read to the

officers of the Company's service before their signature was required.

The substance of this letter was an order to assemble the Company's

officers at each station, to propose the test to them, and instantly

to remove from their corps all such as declined to sign it. They were

directed to be sent to such stations as the commanding officer chose,

and that they should there receive their allowances until the situation

of affairs and the temper of their minds should admit of their being

employed with advantage to the state.

This was, it must be recollected, the first public appeal that had

been made to the officers of the Company's service by the Government

of Madras since the orders of the 1st of May; and it certainly was not

of a character calculated to flatter the feelings of those to whom it

was addressed. It spoke to their sense of duty, and pride as officers;

but in the same breath told them they were not trusted, and that they

were to be coerced into order and submission. The high praises that

were given in this letter to the fidelity and loyalty of his Majesty's

troops were perfectly just; but quite unnecessary, as far as regarded

the allegiance and obedience of that part of the service; and could

therefore serve no purpose but to exasperate the feelings of the

officers of the Company's army. But the mode in which this measure was

carried into execution was the most characteristic of the Government by

whom it was adopted, and of itself was sufficient to account for its

complete failure, and indeed to make it very doubtful if it ever was

wished or intended that it should succeed.

No previous effort whatever was made to dispose the minds of the

senior and more reflecting part of the Company's officers in favour

of this measure, though such a step (which could have been adopted

in many ways without the slightest hazard) seemed essential to its

success. A short and peremptory summons was sent to every Company's

officer of the garrison of Fort St. George, to attend at the quarters

of Colonel Conran, the commanding officer. That officer read the

circular letter to which I have alluded to the astonished officers

whom he had assembled; and then, presenting the test, informed them

they must either sign immediately, or go to Pulicat, the place fixed

for their banishment. Can any man the least acquainted with the human

mind be surprised, that an almost general and indignant rejection was

the result of such a proceeding? Five regimental officers only could

be prevailed upon to sign it at this meeting; and the remainder were

immediately sent to Pulicat[19]. At the Mount the rejection was still

more general. Colonel Hare had the day before removed his tents across

the bridge of Marmalon, where all the officers were summoned at an

equally short notice. When Colonel Hare read the circular letter,

presented the test for signature, and told them that those who refused

their signature would not be allowed to return to camp, they refused

with one general sentiment of indignation at the manner in which they

had been treated, and were immediately separated from their corps[20].

The test was signed by all the staff-officers at the Presidency, and

by some officers who were there on leave: at Trichinopoly twenty-two

signed it, but few others at any other station of the army. In short,

the whole number of signatures did not amount to one hundred out of

about one thousand two hundred, which is near the number of officers on

the coast establishment in India.

The almost total failure of this expedient (if it ever was intended to

reclaim or fix any officers in the Company's service to their duty,)

will not surprise any man the least acquainted with human nature,

and with the temper of those to whom the measure was proposed. Those

officers, who had never departed from their duty in thought, word, or

deed, felt this test, which was a mere repetition of the obligation

of their commission, as at least an act of supererogation; and it was

painful, as it had a taint of suspicion in it. Others, who were in

some degree pledged to support their brother officers, conceived that

this was an indirect mode of obtaining their individual pledges to act

against them; and concluded, from its being proposed, that every hope

of an amnesty was at an end[21]; whilst the more violent only saw in it

the pursuit of plans which banished every expectation from their minds

of obtaining personal security, much less the object they had in view,

through any means but successful resistance.

The most moderate among these officers argued, that no opportunity

whatever had been given to the Company's army of retrieving itself;

and, guilty as it might have been, they said the memory of its former

fame merited some consideration; and an appeal to its loyalty and

duty, combined with an act of amnesty, would, they thought, if it had

been made to the officers of the Company's army with that confidence

which inspires attachment, have secured the fidelity of a great part

of them: and if it had been possible for Government to have gone

further, and to have promised, "that in the event of the conduct of

the army meriting such favour, they would recommend the case of the

officers who had been suspended to the indulgent consideration of

the Court of Directors[22]," they were confident all would have been

reclaimed to their duty. But had efforts so worthy, in their opinion,

of the clemency and greatness of Government failed in bringing all

to reason, they would have acted with the most ardent zeal against

men whom they should in such event not only have considered as rebels

to their country, but as destroyers of the reputation of the army to

which they belonged. There can be no doubt these were the sentiments

of many respectable officers of rank and influence: and had Government

adopted, on the 26th of July, any such measures of conciliation, it

would have been completely successful; and not only the hazard of a

contest, but all those disastrous consequences which were certain to

be the inevitable consequence of complete success, would have been

avoided. And can there be a doubt in the mind of any rational being but

it might have taken such a line, at the very moment that which has been

described was adopted, without any substantial sacrifice of either its

strength or dignity, and certainly with the greatest benefit to the

interests of the British nation in India?

The measure that was taken was supposed, by almost all the

discontented, to be a completion of that design which the Government

of Fort St. George had from the first (they conceived) entertained,

of relying solely on the King's troops; and they concluded, from

the substance as well as the mode in which the step taken on the

26th of July was carried into execution, that the Company's military

establishment on the coast was meant to be destroyed at the first blow;

and all were therefore included in one general mass, as fit objects of

suspicion and disgrace.

Government had, no doubt, a right to expect success in the execution

of this measure; it had a just reliance on the fidelity and attachment

of his Majesty's troops. A few regiments, who composed part of the

British army, could not have joined in such a confederacy without

incurring certain and indelible disgrace: and it had been the policy

of the Government of Fort St. George, from the first appearance of

dissatisfaction and discontent, to court the allegiance and flatter

the feelings of this branch of the service. And though no man can

calculate the temper that was lost, or the consequent evils that have

been produced by this proceeding, the limited object was undoubtedly

attained.

Sir George Barlow appears to have had great confidence in the

attachment of the native troops to Government; which, I believe, he

always thought was paramount to their attachment to their European

officers: and this was consequently calculated upon as one great means

of carrying his measures into prompt and successful execution: but

certainly the fulfilment of this hope depended upon the course pursued

by the European officers who commanded these men. There could be no

ground to make such a conclusion upon any general principles applicable

to military bodies, and much less so from the constitution, character,

or history of the native branch of the military establishment in

India. The difficulty that a body of officers have in any service,

is to keep soldiers to their duty: there is little in debauching

them from it. They are led by example: and to follow that of their

officers, is both a principle and a habit. The native troops of India

are perhaps more attached to their European officers than any others.

These officers are to them the only representatives they know of the

Government they serve; they are the sole link in the chain of their

attachment; and, with rare exceptions, their men are completely

devoted to them. The Governor might, perhaps, expect, that though this

feeling would operate in the first instance, it would soon give way

to a fear of losing all those solid benefits that the service of the

Company offers; and that the sepoys would never continue to attach

their fortunes to so desperate a cause as that of the officers must

soon appear. This is a natural conduct for a sensible and reflecting

man: but do soldiers think, or reflect deeply? Would not the increased

pay which their officers (if they were serious in rebellion) would be

likely to give, or, what is still more attractive to men like them,

a latitude to plunder, have more effect than twenty proclamations

to recall them to their duty. Besides, had this dreadful contest

continued, the passions would have had their way, and a few months

might have changed the character of our native soldiery, and rendered

them more formidable than all the enemies we ever had to encounter in

India.

It will at least appear, from what has been said on the subject, that

Government had no right to look to the fidelity and attachment of the

native troops, as a certain means of coercing their European officers

to obedience. But the fact was, that the sure ground of success, and

that on which the Government had more right to calculate (when it

resorted to extremes,) than all others put together, was the action of

the virtuous feelings and loyal principles of the Company's officers

themselves, and the total want of object, accord and combination, in

the execution of the indigested plans of the most violent. It was

well known that many of those officers had never brought their minds

to contemplate disobedience to the state: and the most guilty even, at

first proceeded on the idea that such an extreme would never occur.

They certainly had hoped that Government would yield, to avoid it: and

when they latterly found that result was not likely, they shuddered

at the crisis which they had precipitated. They had no object in view

that could justify to their own minds the extremes in which they were

involved; they found themselves on the point of being placed in the

situation of rebels, with minds altogether unsuited to act that part

which can alone give a hope of success to the cause of rebellion. They

could not (violent as they were against the Governor of Madras and some

others) bring their minds to believe they were enemies to a revered

King and beloved country; and they consequently wished to reconcile the

incompatible principles of opposition to the local Government, with a

spirit of fidelity to their employers, and loyalty to their sovereign.

There could be no doubt of their sincerity in these feelings: and,

from the clashing of such opposite principles of action, Government

had a right to expect irresolution, division, and distraction in their

councils and measures. It was certain that many would not join in any

act of disobedience, and that those who ventured on opposition would

proceed with alarm; and every moment of reflection would make them

view with increased horror the guilt in which they were involved, and

produce a wavering and hesitation that must soon have the effect of

losing them the confidence of their followers and of each other.

Under such circumstances, there could be little doubt of the ultimate

success of Government in the measures adopted for subduing the

refractory European officers of the army. We shall now examine the

dangers by which these measures were likely to be attended. These were

numerous, and all of an alarming political magnitude[23]. The greatest,

was the shock which was given by this proceeding to that attachment

between the European officer and the natives under his command, which,

from the first establishment of the Company in India to the present

moment, had been looked upon as one of the principal, if not the

chief, sources of our strength in India. This body of officers has

been hitherto justly considered as the great means by which British

India was conquered, and by whose fidelity, knowledge and courage, it

was to be maintained. They were comparatively a few persons, through

whom a large foreign army was not only disciplined, but attached to

the present state. Their station was one of more than ordinary trust,

their duties very sacred, and they had for a long period of years

been distinguished by the manner in which these had been performed. A

part of them had been seduced, and misled into error, and ultimately

hurried away, by their passion and resentment against individuals in

authority, to the most criminal extremes. They certainly had merited,

in the strictness of military law, the most serious punishment;

and it was, no doubt, as far as the principles of that law were

concerned, most desirable, for the sake of example, that punishment

should be inflicted, particularly as those officers had in this

instance endeavoured to pervert that complete obedience which their

men owed them, into an engine of faction and revolt; and to render

the attachment of those under their command, which had been so long

considered the safety of their country, its future bane and danger.

That any body of officers should have, or conceive they had, the power

of furthering their own views or interests by means so desperate, and

so entirely subversive of the foundations of all order and government,

was, no doubt, an evil of great magnitude: but it should have been

recollected, that the connexion between the native soldiers and their

European officers is the cherished plant of a hundred years: and

before we can account those men wise who laid the axe to its trunk,

it must be proved that the existing spirit of insubordination among

the European officers was attended with dangers as imminent and

as incapable of remedy, as the evil that has been embraced by the

deliberate dissolution of this great bond of our strength and safety.

Some persons, who refer to a former occasion[24] on which the Indian

army are supposed in some degree to have overawed the Government into

a redress of their grievances, and viewing only one side of this great

question, may argue, that it was rather desirable to adopt a measure

that would prevent the European officers from having such reliance on

the support of their men, and teach the latter that they have a duty

paramount even to their obedience to their officers, in that which

they owe the state: but it is a great fallacy to conceive that such a

feeling can ever exist as an operative principle in the minds of such a

class of men; and if it did, it must weaken a devotion and attachment

that are quite essential to the preservation of our power in India[25].

The next positive evil that was certain to attend this course of

measure, was the destruction of that harmony which it had been the

labour of years to introduce and maintain between his Majesty's and the

Company's service, and which had so greatly contributed to our military

successes in India. It could hardly be expected that these would (for

some years at least) serve together again with those sentiments towards

each other which before inspired them: and nothing can be so dangerous

to our interests in India, as feelings of irritation and jealousy

being kindled betwixt the two services. Those who have cast away

this harmony, which has so long been deemed one of the chief sources

of our permanent strength, would perhaps see more security to the

Government of India in an irreconcileable division between the King's

and Company's troops. But there is no danger of an error, in predicting

that the date of our rule over India will be short, if our Government

in that quarter can only be supported by such weak and wretched

expedients as that of keeping up a principle of division among its own

officers.

The last positive and immediate evil which could not but attend this

measure, was that effect which it was calculated to produce among the

natives of all ranks and classes. Our strength in India has hitherto

greatly rested upon the supposed impossibility of any civil commotion

among ourselves: and the dissolution of this charm will give rise to a

thousand doubts regarding the stability of our power; and, in all human

probability, excite ambitious projects to assail it. This effect is of

a magnitude that in itself required every exertion should be made to

avoid an extreme that could not but make so general and dangerous an

impression regarding the character of our power in India. It must show

our enemies in that quarter that we are not exempt (as it has long been

believed we were) from those internal divisions and civil wars which

have accelerated the fate of the other conquerors of the East[26].

There is one more consideration connected with this question. The

comparative safety which appeared in the gradual removal of those

radical causes which created a spirit of discontent, over a system of

harsh coercion under the most unfavourable circumstances that could

be supposed, whether we consider the situation of Government or the

army. It is not necessary in this place to detail all those causes.

One of them, which excited great discontent (though certainly not

rebellion), was undoubtedly that system of reduction which at this time

threatened to leave the Company's officers in India without a motive

of action. They saw (at the period of its progress) no prospect of any

alteration in their condition that would, by elevating the service and

facilitating their return to their native country, make amends for

what they lost; and their minds gave way to greater despair, from an

impression that those who _they believed_ were founding their fortune

and reputation on the reduction of their allowances, took no interest

in obtaining any advantages to counterbalance what was taken from them.

This grievance, unallayed by a hope of redress, had an effect upon the

general temper of the army that merited the greatest attention.

But the fact is, the Government of Fort St. George never appear to have

taken any view of this subject, that comprehended those considerations

which have been stated. They seem to have decided every question, as it

arose, upon its own narrow ground, and to have always been fettered in

the forms of their own proceedings[27]. The order for the imposition of

the test which was prescribed to the Company's officers, was positive,

and vested no discretion. In stations where the superiority of his

Majesty's troops was decided, this character of the order could do no

mischief: but few of those acquainted with the circumstances can doubt,

that to the wisdom and forbearance of Lieutenant-Colonel the Honourable

Patrick Stuart, of his Majesty's 19th regiment, who took upon himself

to suspend the execution of this positive order, and to give time for

the action of reason upon minds under the sole dominion of passion, may

be attributed not only the safety of that corps, but the tranquillity

of Travancore. A similar conduct was observed by Lieutenant-Colonel

Forbes, of his Majesty's 80th regiment, who commanded in Malabar; and

by Colonel Gibbs, of the 59th regiment, at Bangalore: and the evidence

of these respectable officers must be conclusive with regard to the

actual temper of the Company's officers under their command, on the

day they received the orders of the 26th July, and prove to the most

incredulous, how easily men under the influence of such feelings as

they describe, might have been reclaimed by means far short of that

baneful measure which was adopted.

The force at Hyderabad continued but a short period in a state of

resistance; and they committed no act of violence. The impression

which Colonel Close's effort (though unsuccessful at the moment) had

made upon both the minds of European officers and natives, the effect

produced by the perusal of an order issued by Lord Minto on the 20th

of July, and the knowledge that his lordship was hourly expected at

Madras, deprived rebellion of its chief motive--personal hatred to

Sir George Barlow. And these circumstances, aided by the unremitted

conciliatory efforts of the commanding officer, Colonel Montresor,

and the Resident, Captain Sydenham, made a complete change in the

sentiments of this corps, who upon the 12th of August signed the

test: and as their example encouraged many corps of the army, but

particularly those that formed the garrison of Seringapatam, in a

rebellious resistance to Government, their defection from the cause

put an end to this horrid and unnatural contest: and Lord Minto, who

arrived a few days after this event, found a complete and unreserved

submission to his authority. Had he arrived a month earlier, he would

have saved an army from disgrace and ruin: and as it was, it is not

easy to calculate the good which his presence effected: but it is not

unreasonable to conclude, that the report even of his approach went

farther to terminate the partial rebellion that had occurred, than all

the violence of the Madras Government.

The whole of these proceedings ought to be held in constant remembrance

by all parties in future times. "As they have existed for our shame,

they ought to exist for our instruction[28]."

To the officers of the Indian army they are awfully instructive. They

will not consider a few remarks on the nature of that instruction as

unbecoming in one who has served with them for near twenty-eight years;

who came among them in childhood; whose fortune and character have been

acquired with them; whose affection and pride are, and always must be,

deeply interested in their reputation.

If they dispassionately consider these events, they will clearly

perceive the danger of the first approaches towards a military

combination, intended only to solicit a Government, but necessarily

tending to influence, to overawe, and to coerce it. The purity of

intention affords no security against this progress. Men who deliberate

and confederate with arms in their hands soon become impatient of the

slow course of redress by regular means. Indignant at refusals, or even

delays, which they deem unjust, they become familiar with the dangerous

idea of seeking more summary justice. They assemble, their passions are

kindled by communication of grievances, they are emboldened by a sense

of collective strength, and proceed from solicitations to threats,

disguised (from the great majority of those that use them) in the form

of predictions apparently flowing from an anxious desire to avert the

evils foretold.

Such addresses bring upon them censure and harsh imputation, which

they resent the more because they are not yet distinctly conscious

of intentions which merit them. Their language becomes still more

indecorous and violent; and some of their most conspicuous leaders are

punished. They have then unhappily placed themselves in a situation

where they are pushed forward on the road of guilt by the most virtuous

impulses of the human heart--fidelity towards each other, honourable

attachment to the distinguished members of their body become sufferers

in their cause, and indignation against what they (under the influence

of self-delusion) regard as insupportable tyranny, impel them onward

with irresistible force. Youth, with all its generous feelings, its

inexperience and its impetuosity, assumes the lead in their councils.

The prudent and the moderate are either banished as traitors, or

compelled to be instruments of the more inconsiderate and daring. They

find that they have forfeited all expectation of a tolerable pardon.

They see no hopes of safety but in victory; and they are hurried on by

fear and despair, as well as anger and resentment, to rebellion.

Thus terminates in guilt the progress of men who began with innocence

and honour; and of whom each, if the termination had been foretold even

when he was far advanced in impropriety, might with sincerity have

exclaimed, "_Is thy servant a dog, that he should do this great thing?_"

Any event of such a rebellion would be most unfortunate to those

engaged in it, but success would be the greater misfortune, and indeed

the most severe punishment with which the justice of Providence could

visit their guilt.

Success would every where be a dreadful calamity to a body of

British officers betrayed into military rebellion against the

civil authorities of their country. Their success would be the

destruction of every source and guard of their own security, and of

every thing of which the defence peculiarly ennobles and endears the

profession of arms to a British soldier. In India, however, this

misfortune of success would have very bitter aggravations. As soon

as British officers had oppressed the lawful authority, they would

quickly discover what, in the tumult of dissension, their passions

had concealed from them, that they had, though unknowingly, raised

their arms against their country, which must espouse the cause of her

delegated authorities[29]. They would thus be proscribed and exiled by

a country, the hope of revisiting which is the basis of every plan and

expectation of their lives.

Apprehending mutiny among their soldiers, revolt among their subjects,

irruption from their Asiatic neighbours, or conquest by some European

state, no longer guarded by their own country, but the objects of her

just hostility, they would find themselves alone and unprotected in

the world. In this friendless situation they could be supported by no

generous enthusiasm, the child of patriotism and honour, which could

awaken no feeling in their bosom but shame and remorse. Their numbers

could only be kept up by adventurers, the refuse of the military

profession in Europe. The civil wars, inevitable in such a state of

things, would be not so much the consummation of their evils, as a

refuge from such intolerable calamities.

Happily for the British officers in India, (I speak not paradoxically,

but considerately,) no such calamity is probable. They are sure of

being haunted by so many "compunctious visitings of nature," from

the thoughts of their friends, of their Sovereign, of their beloved

country, as to impair that criminal energy necessary for the success of

desperate enterprizes. Theirs is not a country, or a state of manners,

or a system of religion and morality, which trains men to revolutionary

sternness and ferocity. Their failure was, and ever will be, certain.

But such convulsions bring dreadful consequences:--the loss of that

collective character which was the source of pride to each individual,

long regret and remorse, their hearts taught to dread generous and

social feeling; and the most distinguished of them, if not condemned to

death, still more unhappily abandoned to a dishonourable life.

In their native land they will meet little or none of that sympathy

which supports the sufferers for a general cause. Their discontent

appears to spring only from the most ignoble sources. Those who

have not visited India will not easily conceive that a pecuniary

retrenchment is chiefly felt (_which it really is_) as a degradation,

by an army already sufficiently excluded from the higher rewards of

valour: first shut out from military honours, and then from that

compensation for them which they had found in the prospect of returning

home to the exercise of generous virtue. Last, and worst of all, they

find that their more glaring and dangerous guilt has almost effaced the

remembrance of that misconduct which produced it, and given popularity

and character to those they deem their enemies.

To the British Governments of India these deplorable occurrences are

not less fertile in instruction. They will learn, that to preserve

the obedience of a military body, exiled almost for life in a distant

dependency, to civil bodies who are the temporary delegates of a

Commercial Company, is one of the most difficult problems of policy:

that such obedience is not always to be preserved by a rigid adherence

to official rules, nor restored by undistinguishing obstinacy clothed

in the garb of firmness. They will be taught by high authority, "_how

much ought to be done to avert a contest in which concession does not

find its place_[30]."

They will feel, that the difficulty of their policy respecting the army

will always be increased at moments when the necessities of the state

require extensive retrenchments. A wise Government will prepare the way

for such retrenchments, by evidently showing that they are necessary,

and that they are equitably imposed on all classes: they will not

disdain more particularly to satisfy those distinguished members of an

army, whose influence over their brethren is a principle of natural

discipline. They will redouble their vigilance to distribute military

honours and rewards with the strictest equity; and they will be

solicitous to display the appearance as well as the reality of kindness

towards the individuals of a body who are about to suffer.

When the passions of the moment have subsided, no man will believe

that a Governor, confessedly unpopular[31], introducing or maintaining

systems of retrenchment, necessary indeed, but most severe, and without

preparation, without public precaution or private conciliation, did

not, by these circumstances, most materially contribute to the unhappy

crisis which followed. The total omission of all those means which make

reformation popular, or even tolerable, will assuredly be regarded as

a great political offence. It will be considered as ridiculous to call

for particular proof that a cold and unfeeling manner tended to make

privations be felt as insults. No man of common sense will doubt that

a popular Governor may reconcile men to retrenchments, which, under a

Governor of an opposite character, may produce the most fatal effects.

A recent example might be found at no great distance from Madras, (if

any examples of what is so obvious were necessary,) of a Governor[32]

who had imposed greater retrenchments than Sir George Barlow, and who,

without any sacrifice of dignity, left his government, universally

beloved. But it will not be doubted that the Government of Madras

thus contributed their share towards maturing the discontents of the

army previous to the orders of General McDowall. Still less can it be

doubted, that by the suspension of Colonel Capper and Major Boles the

spark was struck out which fell on the combustible materials.

In the circumstances of the case, and after the restoration of the

surviving officer by his superiors, it is very mild language to call

this suspension an act of very doubtful justice. And it is most

certain, that an act of authority so harsh, and of such doubtful

justice, against officers who had such a fair appearance of mere

military obedience, and whose very fault, if they had one, must have

sprung from a zeal for military privileges, was of a nature to vibrate

through every nerve of an army. When the Government once did an act

which made two officers of rank at least appear to suffer unjustly for

the army, they entirely changed the character of the disputes. They

drove the generosity, honour, and justice of the army into rebellion.

They supplied the discontented with the colour of right, without which

no leaders are ever able to seduce multitudes to resistance. They

exalted pecuniary grievances into the feelings of generous sympathy and

wounded honour. They made it be thought disgraceful to abstain from

taking a part in a combination to prevent injustice. The moderate, the

disinterested, the loyal, even the timid and circumspect, were forced

into opposition,--by shame, by fear, by sympathy, by that tumultuous

combination of causes, generous and mean, which recruit the ranks of

insurgents, and change the murmurs of a few into the mutinous clamour

of the many. Whatever the evil intentions of a few may be, it is

always an act of real or supposed injustice which throws the multitude

into the hands of the ill-affected leaders. Before the suspension there

existed only discontents; after it, general disaffection, conspiracy,

and sedition.

The necessity of vesting the power of dismissing or suspending officers

in the Government will never be questioned by thinking men: but when it

is considered, that the operation of the general orders of the 1st of

May was, considering the rank and number of the suspended officers, not

a much less exertion of authority than if his Majesty were to strike a

tenth part of his general officers out of the list of the army, it will

not be wondered that this example of the precarious and degraded tenure

by which military rank was held, should have diffused universal dismay,

and reinforced resentment by despair.

The dispassionate observer, after remarking with wonder that every

expedient was omitted or rejected which could detach the misguided

from the ill-affected, or open a creditable retreat for the penitent,

will pause before the sword was drawn, to consider whether general

submission would then have been too dearly purchased by an amnesty

which should not have excluded from hope even the officers suspended on

the 1st of May.

It will be acknowledged, that the example of a sedition proceeding so

far without punishment, is an evil: but it was to be balanced against

other evils;--against the calamities of civil war; against the mischief

of rendering one part of our military force in India the enemies of

the other; against the evils of a victory which must be gained over

the spirit of the army, and consequently over the strength of the

Government.

It will be considered, whether a measure, _not of concession_, but _of

conciliation_[33], offered a prospect of greater evils than a plan of

division, such as Machiavelian politicians have sometimes employed

against the public enemy;--but which was now to be, for the first time,

employed against the only safeguard of the state;--a plan to make the

King's troops look down on the Company's with the proud contempt of

conquerors, and the Company's army feel towards the King's all the

mortified pride and secret indignation natural to the vanquished; a

plan for suppressing a rebellion of European officers by clandestinely

instigating a mutiny of native soldiers against them; a plan for

securing the Government by dividing and dispiriting the army, and for

founding general tranquillity upon a monstrous balance of officers

against soldiers, and of one army against another.

It will be ascribed to the unbending temper of Sir George Barlow, that

he did not perceive the probability of amnesty being at length granted,

after open resistance, by the humanity of the British Administration in

India and England, almost as general as that of which, before the sword

was drawn, he treated the proposal as every thing but a crime.

Future Governments will not be insensible to the dreadful dangers which

have been incurred, even if the character of British officers should

prevent the threatened evils from being realized; and they will see,

that though the policy of Great Britain has supported the cause of

authority, yet her equitable benevolence has virtually disavowed these

measures, by interposing to repair their harsher consequences.