COMBAT--ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF A RIVER LINE,
WITHDRAWAL FROM ACTION, RENCONTRE,
DELAYING ACTION, PURSUIT, NIGHT
ATTACKS, MACHINE GUNS.
There are certain natural obstacles, mountain ranges, deserts,
and rivers, continually utilized by military forces, which afford
special aid to the defender while imposing peculiar conditions on the
assailant. The attack and defense of such obstacles follow accepted
principles of combat, but involve the application of certain special
measures adapted to the nature of the obstacle. Each case must be
treated in accordance with the conditions thereof and set rules are
seldom applicable. The following paragraphs indicate some of the
principles and expedients that may find application in the attack and
defense of a river line.
ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF A RIVER LINE.
A defensive line lying behind an unfordable stream cannot be carried by
the usual frontal (or enveloping) attack, because of the obstacle in
front of the attacker.
The attacker is limited to the existing bridges or fords to effect his
passage, unless he can contrive to throw temporary bridges or ferry his
troops across. The attacker will endeavor to cross by means of hasty
bridges or ferries:
(a) Under cover of darkness.
(b) Secretly at a point not under observation, or not sufficiently
guarded by the defense.
(c) At some point where, from the nature of the terrain, the
superiority of the attacker’s fire (infantry or artillery
or both,) the defender cannot bring to bear a
sufficient volume of effective fire to prevent the construction
of bridges and the passage of the attacker’s troops.
(a) and (b) will be of limited application. If the defender has
destroyed the bridges the attacker will usually be forced to construct
hasty bridges under cover of the fire of his infantry and artillery.
_Methods of attack of a river line._ The following methods of forcing
passage are then open to the attacker.
1. _A turning movement._ The attacker proceeds a considerable distance
up or down stream seeking an unguarded passage beyond the flanks of
the defender’s line. This method if successful avoids the great losses
in killed and wounded which might result from a frontal attack. It has
the disadvantages of all turning movements, namely that it requires
a considerable amount of time, that it may uncover the attacker’s
line of retreat or communications, and that the defender may change
his dispositions to meet the turning movement, which will thus gain
nothing, etc., etc. A wide turning movement would not usually be
undertaken by a force less than a division.
2. _A turning movement combined with a holding attack._ The attacker
holds the defender to his position with a portion of his force and with
the rest executes a turning movement and (after passage) attacks the
enemy’s flank and uncovers the principal crossings. The forces for the
turning movement and for the holding attack must neither be so weak
(nor the separation so great) as to give the defender an opportunity
to defeat them in detail. Such a proceeding then ordinarily implies a
large force and a considerable numerical superiority over the defense.
3. _Frontal attack at one point._ The attacker may throw his entire
strength against one point of passage, using an existing bridge or
ford, or improvising a crossing (bridge or ferry). The passage is
covered by heavy fire of infantry, machine guns or artillery from the
attacker’s side of the river. This is the simplest and most direct form
of attack on a river line. The defender will probably be able to meet
it with his entire force. A strong fire superiority over the defender
at the point of attack is absolutely essential. This ordinarily implies
a considerable superiority of force, especially in artillery. If the
attacker, due to his superiority of force, particularly when coupled
with favorable conditions of terrain, can bring to bear such a fire as
to prevent the defender from effectually covering the crossing with
_his_ fire, the passage may be made with small loss. Without a marked
fire superiority the passage if effected at all will be exorbitantly
costly. The attacker relies chiefly on the superiority of his artillery
fire for success.
4. _Frontal attacks at two or more separated points._ This will be the
usual form of attack on a river line. For a force not larger than a
reinforced brigade there would usually be but two attacks with possibly
a demonstration at a third point. Of this form of attack there are also
two cases:
(a) Two co-ordinate attacks. Both attacks are made strong and the
reserve is held in a convenient central location to reinforce at the
proper time whichever attack gives more promise of success. The success
of either attack usually insures that of the other.
(b) A main attack accompanied by a feint. The object of the feint is to
induce the defender to believe that it is to be the main attack, and
to throw his reserves in to meet it. The main attack is then launched
when the defender has used up his reserves. The attacker’s reserves
should be placed with a view to supporting the main attack. If however,
they can at the same time be so placed as to also be available to
support the feint this may be an advantage, as it may be possible to
drive home the feint by throwing in the reserves if the defender throws
_his_ reserves against the main attack. This form of attack may also be
accompanied by a demonstration by the cavalry at a third point.
4 (b) will be a usual form of attack on a river line and is covered
more in detail in the following discussion.
_The feint_ should fulfill the following conditions:
1. The point selected should be one where a crossing is possible so
that the enemy may be induced to believe that the feint is to be the
real attack.
2. The feint should be so distant from the main attack in respect to
time of transit that the enemy’s reserves committed to oppose either
attack cannot be withdrawn in time to repel the other.
3. It should be possible to conceal from the defender the number of
troops engaged in the feint. If he recognizes it as a feint he will,
of course, not throw in his reserves to meet it. This requires that
there be cover or concealment for the troops engaged in the feint,
sufficient to prevent the enemy from being sure of their numbers, and
that the feint be pushed with as great vigor as if it were the main
attack.
_The main attack_ should fulfill the following conditions:
1. The point selected should be at the site of an existing bridge
or ford, or a place where it is possible to ferry troops across or
construct temporary bridges.
2. There should be cover both for the approach to the position and in
the vicinity of the position itself. The advantages of cover are as
follows:
(a) Troops can be collected close to point of passage without
defender’s knowledge as to their numbers or even their presence, and
attack launched suddenly at close range.
(b) Cover reduces the effect of the defender’s fire.
(c) The attacker’s reserves can be brought up without the defender’s
knowledge, or at least without betraying their numbers.
It is very essential that the numbers engaged in both the feint and
the main attack should be concealed from the defender until it is too
late for him to profit by this knowledge, which reveals the attacker’s
intentions.
3. Conversely the ground on the defender’s side should not afford him
cover from the fire of the attacker within effective range of the
crossing.
4. The terrain generally should be such as to increase the
effectiveness of the attacker’s fire and diminish that of the defender,
for unless the attacker can establish fire superiority there is no
chance for his success except by stealth. A terrain which enables the
attacker to bring a cross fire to bear on the defender is favorable.
Superiority of fire is especially necessary when the attacker has to
construct bridges for the passage. It will often be necessary to ferry
troops to the far bank to protect the bridge builders.
5. The ground on the defender’s side should be such that the first of
the attacking troops to cross can seize a good defensive position from
which they can hold the defender in check and uncover the crossing for
the remaining troops.
6. The point selected should be so distant from or located with respect
to the point of feint that the defender’s reserves if thrown in to
oppose the feint cannot be withdrawn in time to repel the main attack.
In brief the selection of the points for the feint and main attack and
the dispositions for and conduct of the action should be such as to
deceive the defender as to the intentions of the attacker, until it is
too late for him to prevent the passage. The separation between the
two attacks instead of being a disadvantage, as would ordinarily be
the case, is an advantage, in that the defender’s reserves committed
to repel one attack cannot be withdrawn in time to meet the other. The
danger of a counter attack by the defender before the attacker has
crossed, is very slight.
_Conduct of the attack._ On approaching the river line the attacker
reconnoiters all possible points of passage within a reasonable
distance of the line of march. Bridges which may be used should be
seized to prevent the enemy from destroying them. This duty will be
performed by the cavalry if it is strong enough. If the attacker spends
the night near the proposed point of passage the outpost troops will
guard the points of passage in his immediate front, while the cavalry
patrols the flanks and if practicable crosses the river and gains
contact with the enemy. The artillery, especially heavy artillery if
it be present, may take position and fire on the enemy in order to
annoy him, prevent him from intrenching, destroying bridges, etc.
This firing will ordinarily be discontinued at dark, but may be kept
up at intervals throughout the night if it is apparent that any real
advantage is gained thereby--if not it should be omitted as the
ammunition is heavy and expensive.
Just before dawn is a favorable time for the attack on a river line,
as the troops can be moved under cover of darkness to their positions
and the attack launched just before daybreak. Night movements of troops
to position must be of the simplest nature. Anything complicated is
extremely liable to result in confusion.
In camping behind a river line prior to an attack, troops should be
conveniently disposed with reference to their use in the action of the
following day.
The artillery takes, if practicable, a position from which it can
support both attacks. It will in the first instance strongly support
the feint, shifting its fire later to the main attack with change
of position if necessary. Cross fire is very advantageous, and it is
permissible to divide the artillery if it is evident that a distinct
advantage is thus gained. To support an attack the artillery must
be within effective range of the known or probable positions of the
hostile infantry and artillery which will oppose that attack.
Machine guns and infantry may support either attack with fire of
position when the terrain is favorable. The reserves may often be
advantageously employed in this fashion.
If the attack is made at dawn the troops on outpost cover the assembly
and preliminary dispositions for the attack and join their proper
organizations as the attack is launched. Crossings between the two
attacks or near the flanks of either must either be destroyed before
the attack or observed (and if necessary defended) during its progress.
Otherwise the enemy might use them to cross and make a counter attack.
Provisions against this should be made. Ordinarily this duty will fall
to the outposts or the cavalry, but if necessary (as when there is no
outpost) special detachments may be assigned to guard crossings which
for any reason have not been disabled, or places where crossings are
possible, and whose positions are such as to threaten the safety of the
attacker.
The feint is usually launched first and pushed with great vigor,
supported by the artillery. While the feint is in progress the troops
for the main attack assemble as close as practicable to the point of
passage and deliver their attack on receipt of the supreme commander’s
order.
The cavalry guards the flanks and may be used to make a demonstration,
“without incurring heavy losses,” against some point on the flank. Such
demonstration should usually be made dismounted and may deceive the
enemy by causing him to believe that the demonstration is the feint
and the feint the main attack. If practicable the cavalry crosses
the stream and operates against the enemy’s flank and rear. For this
purpose the cavalry should be concentrated on one flank, a small
detachment being sent to cover the other flank. Cavalry may be used
later to press the pursuit of the defeated force.
The reserve occupies a central _concealed_ position, preferably one
from which it can reinforce either attack, but especially the main
attack.
The two attacks may be designated in the orders by the names of their
commanders, as “Col. A’s column.” They should never be referred to as
“the feint” or the “main attack.”
The bulk of the infantry will naturally be for the main attack. Thus
in a brigade one regiment might be assigned to the feint, one to the
main attack and one to the reserve. The reserve would probably be later
thrown into the main attack. Circumstances will govern in each case. If
there is no intention of pushing home the feint a battalion might be
sufficient for this purpose. It must be borne in mind, however, that
the object of the feint is to deceive the defender. Hence it must not
be so weak that the defender will readily detect its unreality, nor at
a point where the crossing is plainly impossible.
The engineer commander makes a preliminary reconnaissance of the
proposed point or points of crossings. The engineer troops collect
under cover (as close as practicable to the point of passage) material
for crossings or additional crossings (bridges). This should be done in
advance of the opening of the attack if practicable.
The duties of the engineers in a river line attack may then be
summarized as follows:
(1) Preliminary reconnaissance or examination of proposed
points of passage with a view to the construction of bridges
(or fords).
(2) Preparation and assembly of bridge material near site of
proposed bridges.
(3) Construction of bridges or operation of ferries under protection
of the infantry. Ferriage of troops to cover the operations of
the bridge builders.
(4) Removal of obstacles to passage.
etc., etc.
If there be two attacks both intended to force a passage some engineers
may be assigned to each, there being no objection to dividing the
engineers. The mounted engineers may accompany the cavalry.
_Defense of a river line._ The defense of a river line will be based
upon the methods of attack as outlined in the foregoing. The essential
features of a river line defense are as follows:
1. The most probable points of passage will be held by small
detachments (infantry sometimes reinforced by artillery) sufficiently
strong to check a sudden rush of the enemy and to develop his
intentions (whether to actually force a passage at the point in
question or merely to make a feint.)
2. The bridges or fords which might be used by the enemy will be
destroyed or obstructed if possible--unless the defense feels able to
hold them and contemplates their use later on.
3. The curtains between the probable points of crossing, and the stream
line well to the flanks of the enemy’s line will be actively patrolled
by the cavalry which also maintains communication between the various
infantry detachments and the reserve.
4. A strong reserve is held back of the line in a central position
conveniently placed with reference to the roads leading to various
parts of the position, ready to reinforce the threatened point as soon
as the attacker’s intentions are developed.
5. Intrenchments and other defensive preparations may be made at the
most probable points of attack if time and other conditions permit.
They should not be allowed, however, to hold a large portion of the
defender’s force to one locality, as it must remain mobile to meet the
moves of the attacker.
The defender may:
(a) Catch the attacker astride of the stream and defeat him
in detail.
(b) Let him cross and then drive him back on the river.
(c) Prevent his passage entirely.
The latter is usually the safest method. Due to the defender’s
inferiority and the natural difficulties attendant upon such a
movement, a counter attack involving _a crossing of the stream_ will be
of rare occurrence.
The secret of success in the defense of a river line is to detect
promptly the intentions of the attacker so that they may be frustrated
by the judicious use of the defender’s reserves. This requires that
defender’s force be kept _mobile_. Aerial reconnaissance will be of the
greatest assistance in detecting the attacker’s intentions.
ORDERS FOR ATTACK OF A RIVER LINE.
Detch., 1st Div., 1st Blue Army Corps,
PLAINVIEW, PA.,
Field Orders, } 16 May, '16, 3:00 a. m.
No. -- }
Gettysburg-Antietam 3" map.
1. No further information of the enemy nor of our division.
2. This detachment will attack the enemy along the line of the CONEWAGO
Creek from BRIDGE S. H. to BRIDGE 502W, northeast of PLAINVIEW.
3. (a) The Light Artillery Battalion and the Howitzer Battery under
command of Major Y will support both attacks. The Light Artillery
Battalion will move at once via 552 and take up a position west of
crossroads 561; the Howitzer Battery will move at once via 517--507W to
a position near WOODSIDE S. H. Fire will first be opened in support of
Col. B’s attack.
(b) The 2d Infantry and 1 platoon, Co. A, 1st Engrs., under Col.
C, will move at once via country road east of and parallel to the
588--FIDLER--BENDER’S CHURCH road, and will attack and cross at 523W,
moving thence east against the enemy on the 586 RIDGE north of HERSHEY
MILL.
The 1st Infantry and Co. A, 1st Engrs. (less 1 platoon), under Col. B,
will move at once to a covered position off the road near PLAINVIEW,
and when so ordered will attack and cross at 502W. The troops on
outpost (less detachments guarding the HERSHEY MILL and FORD) will join
the regiment as the attack is launched.
The 3d Infantry (less Co. M) will move at once via 576--666 to a
covered position near 605 and then form in readiness, awaiting
orders. Co. M, 3rd Infantry, will at once report to Maj. Y, 1st Light
Artillery, as escort for the artillery. One platoon of this company
will be sent to relieve the cavalry detachment at the farm house near
529.
(c) The 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry (less 1 plat.) will cross the
CONEWAGO Creek west of BRIDGE S. H., cover our left and operate
against the enemy’s right and rear. The platoon now near 529 when
relieved by Co. M, 3rd Inf., will cross the CONEWAGO at or southeast of
529 and cover our right. Reconnaissance of the enemy’s flanks and rear.
The roads leading north will be observed as far west as CENTER MILLS
and as far east as BOWLDER.
(d) The Engrs. with Cols. B and C will construct, under their orders,
additional crossings at 523W and 502W, as soon as the attacks begin.
4. The 1st Ambulance Co. will move at 5 a. m. to D. WIRT and there
await orders.
When the issue of extra ammunition is completed the empty battalion
ammunition wagons will assemble off the road opposite Ambulance Co. No.
1.
5. Messages to HILL 707.
A,
Brigadier General.
(How and to whom communicated. Report of dispositions to superior
commander.)
_Notes_: The troops are sent to their positions under cover of darkness
to avoid detection by aerial scouts, etc.
In this case either or both of the attacks may succeed, so that neither
is a true “feint.” Gen. A will throw in his reserve where there is the
greater chance of success.
The artillery commander will confer with Cols. B and C to the end that
he may intelligently aid their assaults by artillery fire.
Detch., 1st Div., 1st Blue Army Corps,
HEIDLERSBURG, PA.,
Field Orders, } 2 May, '15, 9:45 p. m.
No. -- }
Gettysburg 3" map.
1. A hostile force, estimated to be a weak infantry brigade reinforced
by a squadron and a battalion of light artillery, is across the
CONEWAGO in our front. It has an infantry battalion intrenched at
HERSHEY MILL, two battalions at PLAINVIEW, and a battalion northeast
of WOODSIDE S. H., with small detachments opposite the fords above
the mouth of BEAVERDAM CREEK. Red cavalry has been seen near TABLE
ROCK, BRIDGE S. H., PLAINVIEW, NEWCHESTER and the mouth of the LITTLE
CONEWAGO. Our division is already in possession of the CONEWAGO
crossings south of HAMPTON and will attack a hostile force of all arms
in position near NEW OXFORD tomorrow morning.
2. This command will attack the river line at daybreak to effect the
capture of GETTYSBURG.
3. (a) The artillery battalion (less Btry. A) will be in position in
observation about 800 yards south of HEIDLERSBURG at 4:00 a. m. Btry.
A will be in a position in observation just south of BELMONT S. H. at
4:15 a. m. The artillery will support the attacks of the 1st and 2d
Infantries.
(b) The 1st Infantry, with one platoon of engineers and a light ponton
division, will attack at 4:00 a. m. to force a crossing at HERSHEY MILL.
(c) The 2d Infantry with the remainder of the engineer company, and two
ponton divisions will move via 601 CROSSROADS and mass near BELMONT S.
H. by 3:00 a. m. The engineers will then assemble their ponton material
on the left bank 1 mile down stream of Bridge 502W on the HARRISBURG
road, and ferry the 1st Bn., 2d Inf., to the grove on right bank. This
battalion will cover this crossing while the engineers throw two ponton
bridges at this point. The remainder of the 2d Inf. will be deployed
on the high ground near 529 CROSSROAD by 4:30 a. m., covering the ARCH
BRIDGE (300 yards to the southwest). When ordered by me, the 1st Bn.
will rush the position of the hostile force opposite the ARCH BRIDGE,
supported by fire of position from the remainder of the 2d Inf. A party
of engineers will then clear the ARCH BRIDGE of obstructions.
(d) The 3d Inf. will follow the 2d and form in two columns opposite the
ponton bridges in readiness to cross on orders from me.
(e) The cavalry (less Tr. A) will make a dismounted demonstration at
BRIDGE S. H. at 4:00 a. m. and cover the right. Troop A will cover the
left and keep up communication with our division.
(f) The wire sec. Sig. will keep me connected with the infantry
regiments and will run one wire for artillery use as the artillery
commander may direct.
(x) Troops on outpost are relieved at 3:00 a. m.
4. Am. Companies, the Amb. Co., and Engr. Tn. report at Heidlersburg at
5:00 a. m. The Sp. Tn. and F. Tn, remain at MUD CREEK.
5. Messages to BELMONT S. H. after 3:00 a. m.
A,
Brig. Gen.
Copies to: C. O’s. of Inf. Regts., Arty., Cav.,
Engrs., Sig. sec., Tns.
Report by wire to C. G., 1st Div.
General A adds verbally: “It is now 9:45 p. m. Set your watches.”
WITHDRAWAL FROM ACTION.
A withdrawal from action whether on the offensive or defensive may
result from any of the following causes:
1. Direct orders from superior commander to break off the engagement
and withdraw.
2. Notification from a superior commander that he has completed or is
withdrawing from an engagement of which the combat in question was a
side issue.
3. Strong reinforcements of enemy approaching, especially from a
flank. In this case the time element will govern. If the commander
believes he has a good chance to gain a tactical decision and get his
troops in hand before the arrival of the hostile reinforcements he
may be justified in continuing the action. But if the preservation
of his force is of vital importance (as when he is the sole covering
detachment of some important city) he should avoid serious risks.
4. When the general situation will be bettered by a withdrawal.
5. When there is an opportunity to contain the enemy with a portion
of the force and throw the remainder into a larger and more important
combat. In this case a portion only of the force is withdrawn.
6. When there is no longer any hope of a favorable decision.
etc., etc.
In the earlier stages of a combat it is often possible to effect a
withdrawal in an orderly manner. When, however, the troops are fully
committed to the action, withdrawal will be a difficult and dangerous
operation. A retreat over a fire swept zone will usually result in
far greater losses than sustained during the advance. It is difficult
to keep the troops in hand and a panic in one organization is very apt
to be communicated to the entire force. This should be most carefully
guarded against to the end that the retreat shall not become a complete
rout. An orderly withdrawal under fire will usually be possible only
when the terrain is favorable and there is a reserve still in hand. It
is more difficult to break off an action in defense than in attack, as
the assailant is approaching.
If the situation is critical the cavalry may be thrown in to check
the enemy. The artillery continues its fire regardless of the risk of
losing guns. It may be necessary to sacrifice a portion of the command
to save the remainder.
When a retreat is necessary the best means to effect it without great
loss and confusion is to hold fast until nightfall and then withdraw
under cover of darkness. If in attack, the advanced position should be
intrenched and stubbornly held. It will usually be easier to hold out
against a considerably superior force than to effect an orderly retreat
in broad daylight over a fire swept zone.
A withdrawal of a force fully committed to an action should therefore
be attempted in daylight only when such a course seems to be
unavoidable.
No fixed program can be laid down for a withdrawal as the mode of
procedure is dependent on the terrain, the extent to which the troops
have become engaged, and other conditions. Every effort must be made
to place distance and a rear guard between the enemy and the retiring
troops, and order must be restored as promptly as possible without
unduly delaying the march.
The first step in the withdrawal is the prompt removal of the trains,
ambulance companies and wounded. These are sent at once to the rear
and routed in such manner as not to interfere with the movement of the
combatant troops.
The reserve is sent promptly to a supporting position in rear and to
a flank of the line of retreat, to cover the withdrawal of the troops
committed to the action. In selecting this position the following
points should be considered:
1. The position should be so located as to cover the retreat of the
troops engaged before it can become a rout. If the troops are closely
engaged and the enemy still in good morale the position might have
to be closer than when these conditions did not obtain, and a second
supporting position might be required to cover the withdrawal of troops
from the first, and so on.
2. It should be so located as not to interfere with the retreat
nor have its fire masked by the retiring troops. As these troops
must retire straight to the rear, at least in the beginning of the
withdrawal, the supporting position should ordinarily be on a flank of
the line of retreat.
3. It must be possible to bring to bear a strong fire at effective and
long ranges, on any hostile troops which attempt to pursue.
4. The position should be such as to permit a safe and timely
withdrawal of the covering troops occupying it. It is desirable to have
good cover from the enemy’s fire immediately in rear of the position.
The geographical crest of a ridge, or a position in front of an open
wood fulfills this condition.
5. No rule can be given as to the distance of the supporting position
in rear of the firing line except that it should be as far back as
conditions will permit, so that the troops therein may not themselves
become so closely engaged as to require the occupation of a second
supporting position to cover their withdrawal. It must on the other
hand (see 1.) be close enough to prevent the enemy from turning the
withdrawal into a rout. The distance should seldom be less than one
mile nor ordinarily more than two miles. The successive covering
positions in any case must be so selected as to permit the most prompt
withdrawal with the least loss, confusion and injury to morale of the
force _as a whole_.
Artillery and cavalry are particularly useful as supporting troops to
cover a retreat, as they can later be withdrawn more readily than the
infantry.
It is desirable that the reserve be in its supporting position before
the first troops on the firing line begin to withdraw, but if time
is pressing the withdrawal of the first troops may be ordered at the
same time, for of course the movement of any troops on the firing line
cannot be started as promptly as that of the reserve, which is not
under fire. Allowance for this should be made in issuing orders.
Artillery fire should be maintained with undiminished volume until the
safety of the retreating troops is assured. The artillery position
during the withdrawal should be at a suitable range in rear of the
supporting position of the reserve and not too far to the flank. If not
already in such position the artillery will withdraw thereto usually
by battery, the remaining batteries increasing their rate of fire
meantime. Each battery upon reaching its new position will re-open
fire as promptly as possible. If in an exposed position the artillery
should have a support, either a company from reserve, the engineers, or
cavalry.
If ammunition trains accompany the command they should be placed in
a safe position, but should not be too far to the rear as it may be
necessary to replenish the combat trains.
The order of withdrawal of the troops engaged (infantry) will depend
on conditions. The rule for all cases is that the withdrawal should
be effected in such a manner as to cause the least possible loss,
confusion and delay _in the force as a whole_.
The troops which are most exposed should be withdrawn first if this
can be done without risk of a rout, which might involve other troops.
Otherwise these troops will be left to the last. This will, of
course, increase their losses and the confusion attendant upon their
withdrawal, but may be the safest procedure considering the force as
a whole. The troops most exposed will ordinarily be those most hotly
engaged with the enemy. Hence in a combat in which some of the troops
have been fully committed to the action those most closely engaged
should ordinarily be withdrawn _last_. If, however, the enemy’s
reinforcements are approaching from a flank and are already close
enough to be a menace, the troops on the exposed flank would generally
be the first to withdraw. When other considerations are not paramount
the troops farthest from the line of retreat will be first withdrawn.
Care should be taken that the withdrawal of certain troops does not
unduly expose those remaining on the line. The circumstances of each
particular case must determine the manner in which the withdrawal shall
be effected, and the only rule that can be given is that stated in the
preceding paragraph.
In a brigade action the withdrawal is usually effected by regiment.
The troops last to withdraw are notified of the plan and cover the
withdrawal of the others by a vigorous fire without, however, advancing
further. They are withdrawn by a later order as soon as the other
troops are well started on their retreat.
Each organization is informed as to the general line of retreat
and a rendezvous position designated sufficiently far to the rear.
If necessary to avoid interference the route for each fraction is
designated. It is to be remembered that so long as they are within
range of the hostile fire or even for a considerable time thereafter
the troops will retire as best they can straight to the rear from
their line of battle. Hence a precise route for the early part of the
withdrawal should not generally be prescribed.
The retiring troops should be drawn in hand and formed in column of
route as soon as practicable. This will require ordinarily from 3 to 5
miles, or even more, depending on how seriously they have been engaged,
the activity of the pursuit, if any, the nature of the terrain, etc. In
retreating across a stream all available crossings should be utilized
to avoid delays resulting from congestion.
A withdrawal may often be more promptly and safely effected by
utilizing several lines of retreat.
_If necessary_ to cover the withdrawal of the reserve a second
supporting position may be occupied by some of the troops from the
firing line, usually those first withdrawn, and hence the retreating
troops should be drawn in hand promptly and not allowed to get too
far to the roar until it is evident that the rear guard can cover the
retreat without assistance. If the enemy pursues vigorously and in
force, a second and even a third or fourth delaying position may be
required. (It is usually unnecessary, in problems, to consider more
than two such positions.)
The reserve (which occupies the first supporting position) together
with all available cavalry and artillery will ordinarily, upon
completion of the withdrawal, be formed into a rear guard to cover the
retreat. The artillery, after having been withdrawn to the supporting
position, may be placed under the orders of the rear guard commander,
who then takes charge, and gives all further orders for the security of
the retreat.
The cavalry, during the action, watches for and delays the advance of
the enemy’s reinforcements. Thereafter it reports to the rear guard
commander. Cavalry may delay the enemy’s advance by dismounted action
either directly across the line of retreat or on its flanks.
The signal troops promptly take up their wires and accompany the trains
or the reserve.
There will generally be no time to assemble the subordinate commanders
to receive orders. If in attack signals may be given to cease advance.
The supreme commander will give orders verbally to such officers as are
with him (Col. of reserve regt., Chief Surgeon, Engr., Arty, and Signal
comdrs.) and send messages by aides and orderlies to the commanders not
present (Cols. of regts. in firing line, Cav. comdr., Q. M. in charge
of trains, etc.)
The following will indicate the general form and verbiage of orders for
a withdrawal.
Verbally to Chief Surgeon:
“The enemy will soon be heavily reinforced. This detachment will
withdraw at once to Gettysburg.
“Remove the wounded as soon as possible to that place.
“The Baltimore turnpike must be kept clear for the movement of troops.”
Verbally to Col. A, 1st Inf. (in reserve):
“A hostile force of one brigade of infantry with a bn. of field
artillery is approaching our left. Head of advance guard was at
______ at -- o’clock, where our cavalry was delaying their advance.
This detachment will withdraw at once to Gettysburg via the Baltimore
Turnpike. The movement begins on our left.
“Move your regiment at once to ______ and take a position to cover the
withdrawal of the 2d and 3d Infantries, then follow as rear guard.
“The cavalry and artillery will be placed under your orders.
“Keep the roads clear for the other troops.”
(If necessary this regiment would be directed to send one company
to act as a support for the artillery. This should be avoided if
practicable. An escort for the trains, if considered necessary, could
be furnished by the reserve regiment or the cavalry, and covered in
orders.)
Verbally to Capt. S, Signal Corps:
“Take up your lines and with your company follow the trains to
Gettysburg via the Hanover Road.”
Verbally to Major A, 1st Field Artillery:
(Information of approach of hostile reinforcements and plan for
withdrawal or “You have heard my orders to Col. A.”)
“Col. A with the 1st Inf., your battalion and the cavalry will cover
the withdrawal and form the rear guard. The 1st Inf. moves at once to
______.
“Move by battery to ______, take position and check the enemy’s advance
with your fire. When your movement is completed report to Col. A for
further orders.”
(If an escort is to be furnished the artillery, Major A would be so
informed.)
By Aide to Col. B, 2d Inf. (on left of firing line):
(Information as to approach of hostile reinforcements and plan for
withdrawal as in orders to Col. A.)
“Withdraw at once to Germantown, thence via the Baltimore Turnpike to
beyond White Run, there to await orders.
“The 3d Inf. remains in position to cover your withdrawal, 1st Inf.
goes into position near ______, arty. near ______.”
By Aide to Col. C, 3d Infantry:
(Information and plan as in orders to Cols. A and B.)
“The 2d Inf. withdraws at once. Increase your fire as theirs ceases but
do not advance beyond your present position. I will send you further
orders for withdrawal.
“The 1st Inf., Arty. and Cav. will cover your withdrawal. 1st Inf.
takes position near ______, arty. near ______.”
By messenger to Capt. X, Q. M. in charge of trains:
“The enemy will soon be heavily reinforced. This detachment retires at
once to Gettysburg via the Baltimore Turnpike.
“Move the trains promptly via the Hanover Road to southern entrance of
Gettysburg and there await orders.”
By Aide to Major B, 1st Cavalry:
“Detachment retreats at once to Gettysburg via the Baltimore Turnpike.
Col. A commands the rear guard consisting of 1st Inf., arty. bn., and
your squadron. 1st Inf. takes position at ______ to cover withdrawal.
“When compelled to fall back report to Col. A for orders.”
When 2d Infantry has retired sufficiently to avoid interference with
retreat of 3d Infantry:
By Aide (or other mounted officer) to Col. C, 3d Inf.:
“Withdraw at once and continue your retreat via the Baltimore Turnpike
to just beyond Rock Creek, there to await orders.”
Having issued his orders and seen the movement started, the supreme
commander may, according to circumstances:
(a) Remain at the front to superintend the withdrawal, issuing such
additional orders as the situation may require, or:
(b) Leave measures for security in hands of the rear guard commander,
proceed to the rear and devote his attention to restoring order
amongst the retreating troops, selecting and occupying such additional
supporting positions as may be necessary, etc.
Conditions will determine which duty, (a) or (b), more urgently
requires the presence of the commander.
RENCONTRE OR MEETING ENGAGEMENT.
A rencontre engagement is one in which, from lack of timely
information, one or both sides have been unable to make complete
disposition for attack or defense, prior to the opening of the combat.
The advantage will usually lie with the side which acts the quicker and
strikes first. In general, a rencontre favors the stronger and more
aggressive combatant. The proper course then, is to strike the enemy
before he can complete his dispositions for either attack or defense.
If time is taken to make thorough reconnaissance before launching the
attack, the opportunity to surprise the enemy and to prevent him from
taking the initiative against us may be lost. Little fresh information
can be expected, the commander therefore, must be guided by his mission
and his previous knowledge of the situation as a whole. The lack of
knowledge as to the enemy must be compensated by boldness and rapidity
in seizing the initiative. A bold and impetuous attack which would
probably meet with disaster against a deployed enemy, is very apt to be
successful, even against a superior force. A blind attack should not be
made, however, unless the mission and the general situation seem to
call for it.
The greatest possible force should be launched promptly against the
enemy, when possible the entire main body. If time is pressing, the
advanced troops may be launched at once, being promptly reinforced
before their attack is checked. Otherwise the advanced troops may seize
important ground and hold the enemy, covering the deployment of the
troops in rear.
The deployment, of the leading troops at least, should generally be to
the front, straight at the enemy.
The attack should generally be frontal. As the knowledge of the enemy’s
strength and dispositions is usually very vague, turning or enveloping
movements will generally be slow, difficult to direct, and risky, but
may in some cases be employed to advantage.
Machine guns may be used with great advantage well to the front during
the opening stage of the attack. They can remain in action until the
hostile artillery opens.
The artillery should be brought into action with all possible speed.
Careful location and consolidation of units is of less importance than
in a deliberately planned attack. It is the duty of the advanced troops
to seize positions suitable for the artillery.
The machine guns of the advanced troops, and the artillery should
therefore be so disposed that they can be placed in action promptly.
It is the duty of an advance guard to protect the main body from
surprise, and if the enemy be encountered, to hold him until the main
body can make the necessary dispositions. If combat is possible,
therefore, the advance guard should be strong enough to fulfill
its proper functions. In coming into action the main body needs a
maneuvering zone. If it is cramped by being too close to the advance
guard it will be difficult to maneuver, and confusion and even disaster
may result. If the mission of the command is aggressive and it is
seeking combat, the advance guard should be strong enough to promptly
initiate an attack on the enemy when encountered, and the main body
should be close enough to render prompt support but not so close as to
be cramped in its deployment. The desiderata in such a case then, are
a strong advance guard and a maneuvering zone for the main body. If
the enemy be encountered in greatly superior strength retreat may be
advisable. But a strong and aggressive advance guard might, by a too
impetuous attack, commit the entire force to action against the will of
its commander. On the other hand if the advance guard be too weak to
secure the necessary delay, or the main body too close, the same result
may be experienced in a more disastrous form. Whenever practicable,
therefore, the supreme commander should be with the advance guard in
order to promptly estimate the situation when it arises, control the
very important first dispositions of the advance guard, and take the
other measures necessary, whether for attack or retreat.
DELAYING ACTION.
A hostile force may be delayed by either offensive or defensive
tactics. In many cases a vigorous attack will be the most effective,
if not the only means, of securing the desired delay. The following
remarks, however, pertain especially to delaying actions where
defensive tactics only are employed.
Delaying actions are the special duty of rear guards. (See “Rear
Guards,” also “Cavalry Tactics” and I. D. R.)
As delay only is sought it is permissible to occupy in such actions, a
much longer line than would be safe in a decisive engagement. A thin
firing line using much ammunition will generally answer. As the firing
line will not usually be reinforced, local supports and reserves may be
made very weak or dispensed with entirely. Local reserves are needed
chiefly for the protection of the flanks.
A good “getaway” is a prime requisite of a delaying position. If the
situation demands and the terrain is favorable other troops may be
posted to cover the withdrawal of the troops in the delaying action.
(See “Withdrawal from action.”)
Delay is caused by compelling the enemy to deploy and make dispositions
for a formal attack at as great a range as possible. Hence a good field
of fire at decisive ranges is essential and at long ranges desirable.
As the troops must be withdrawn before becoming closely engaged,
a good field of fire at short ranges (inside of 600 yds.) is not
necessary, in fact often a disadvantage, as the absence thereof will
facilitate withdrawal if it prevents the enemy from firing at short
and mid-ranges on the retreating troops. Hence in a delaying action
troops occupying a ridge may often be advantageously posted on the
geographical crest instead of the military crest. They may thus avoid
the fire to which they might be subjected during their retreat from the
military to the geographical crest, retreating at once to cover behind
the ridge.
Infantry can with difficulty he withdrawn from action when seriously
committed to a fire fight. After the enemy has arrived at short range
(600 or 700 yds.) an orderly withdrawal is generally impossible, and
unless the terrain affords protection the losses of the retreating
force will be severe. If the delaying force is very weak, and
especially if the position is extended (so that one or both flanks are
at a considerable distance from the line of retreat) the withdrawal
should generally commence as soon as the attacker has definitely
completed his deployment and launched his attack. If the delaying
force has considerable strength the enemy should be prevented as long
as possible from establishing that fire superiority without which he
cannot advance to decisive ranges. In any case, unless exceptionally
favorable conditions exist, the withdrawal should not be delayed (in
case of infantry) after the enemy has arrived within 1,000 yds. of the
position. Cavalry, on account of its greater mobility, is more suitable
for delaying actions than infantry. (See “Cavalry tactics.”)
In order to deceive the enemy as to the strength of the delaying
force the line may be considerably extended, unfavorable sections
being left unoccupied. If the enemy can be deceived and induced to
undertake a turning or enveloping movement instead of a prompt frontal
attack, much time may be gained. It must be borne in mind, however,
that such dispersion in the face of a strong, aggressive enemy, is
exceedingly risky, and conditions should be carefully considered
before it is undertaken. It will generally be permissible only in
the first position, as thereafter the enemy will probably be aware
that he has only a delaying force to deal with and will push his
subsequent attacks with more speed and less caution. If time allows,
portions of the position may be intrenched, even in ostentatious
fashion, both to strengthen the position and to deceive the enemy
(“dummy” intrenchments). The position need not be such as to favor the
assumption of the offensive, if this is not contemplated in a delaying
action. Hence obstacles which delay and embarrass the attacker’s
advance are of advantage to the defender in a delaying position.
The number of successive delaying positions to be occupied will
depend on the terrain, the relative strength of the opposing forces,
the time it is necessary to delay, etc. As great risk is involved in
each withdrawal, one determined stand in a good position (prepared
in advance, if practicable) while the enemy is still, possibly,
unacquainted with the strength and intentions of the force opposed
to him, will usually be preferable to several half-hearted stands. A
“determined stand” by a delaying force means a determined effort to
delay the enemy in establishing fire superiority and advancing within
1,000 yds. The action should not be unduly prolonged. The great danger
in a delaying action is that the force so engaged may be drawn into
decisive engagement and its retreat comprised.
The successive positions, if more than one is required, should be
selected, prepared (when practicable) and occupied in advance by a
portion of the troops. The force withdrawing from one position should
not retire directly upon that next in rear, in such a manner as to
mask its fire and possibly involve its defenders in the confusion of
the retreat. Retreating troops have a tendency to break straight to
the rear, and will naturally take the best and most apparent line of
retreat. When practicable, therefore, a delaying position should be
located somewhat to the flank of the natural line of retreat from the
one next in advance. The successive positions should not be so close
together nor so disposed that the troops in one may become involved
in the retreat from the next in front, and each position should cover
the retreat from the former position. A delaying action in successive
positions thus becomes a “step by step” defensive. The retreating
troops are rallied as promptly as possible, usually at a designated
locality in rear, in order to be available for further resistance. (See
“Withdrawal from action.”)
Every available artifice should be employed to delay the enemy,
destruction of bridges, ambuscades, etc. (For use of flanking positions
in delaying actions see “Rear Guards.”)
The line of an unfordable river is an excellent position for a delaying
action.
A force advancing to delay the enemy should seize a strong position as
far to the front as practicable. It should, however, avoid the danger
of a rencontre engagement with a superior force by pushing out too far.
Ample time must be allowed to occupy the position in an orderly fashion
without interference from the enemy.
Artillery is especially valuable with a delaying force as it can cause
the enemy to deploy at long range, and may alone effect the necessary
delay, thereby avoiding the necessity for committing the infantry to
action. Machine guns may also be employed to advantage. They should be
used boldly and sacrificed if necessary. In selecting positions for
delaying actions it should be borne in mind that the hostile artillery
must be kept at least 5,000 yds. away from wagons or troops in column
of route. Artillery within 5,000 yds. of a bridge or the mouth of a
defile may cause great losses to troops passing over or debouching
therefrom and ruinous losses to artillery or trains.
In a delaying action, where it is expected to occupy more than one
position, it will usually be inadvisable to issue _all_ the extra
ammunition of _all_ the troops prior to the occupation of the first
position. Troops plentifully supplied with ammunition have a tendency
to use an excessive quantity, and any organization which has expended
its ammunition is, of course, practically helpless until resupplied.
Judgment must therefore be exercised and the orders of the supreme
commander may properly prescribe the issues to be made. In the absence
of instructions the matter is left to the judgment of the battalion
commanders, who may in such case issue more or less than is advisable.
PURSUIT.
Only by means of an energetic pursuit can the full fruits of victory
be reaped. It is not the defeat of the enemy alone but his destruction
that we seek.
As the enemy retires from his position while still maintaining his
deployment, the attacking troops press forward against the retreating
lines in an endeavor to drive home a decisive attack before the enemy
can effect an orderly withdrawal. This is usually the most favorable
time for a crushing blow and supports and reserves should be used
liberally. Troops which have been actively engaged in a protracted
combat are usually in no condition for an active pursuit. Accordingly,
in anticipation of a systematic pursuit, all fresh troops should be
assembled for the purpose. Those which have been actually engaged are
reformed as soon as the danger of a counter attack is over. The pursuit
is initiated as promptly as possible in order to give the enemy no
opportunity for recovery. Cavalry and horse artillery, because of their
mobility, will be especially valuable in pursuit. Motor cars can be
utilized to great advantage for the movement of foot troops.
An effort is made to keep in continuous contact with the enemy, to
draw a large number of his troops into action, and to inflict all
possible losses. Great boldness will be the best policy as a vigorous
counter-stroke from a defeated force is not greatly to be feared. The
mobile troops will endeavor, not only to keep contact with the enemy,
but to gain his flanks and even his rear, to anticipate him in seizing
bridges and defiles. If unable to break down the enemy’s resistance the
mobile troops will seek to delay him until the pursuing infantry and
light artillery can come up.
Pursuit on a broad front is productive of best results as it
facilitates contact and makes it possible to turn the enemy out of any
position in which he may endeavor to make a stand.
ORDER FOR A PURSUIT
1st Div., 1st Blue Army Corps,
Hill 1 mi. north-northwest WASHINGTON S. H., PA.,
Field Orders } 28 Feb., '16, 8:15 a. m.
No. -- }
U. S. Geo. Sur. Map, Taneytown, Gettysburg sheets.
1. The enemy has retreated apparently towards HUNTERSTOWN in two or
more columns. Our cavalry is in contact with the Red at ST. LUKES
CHURCH.
2. We will pursue at once with two columns and attack the enemy
wherever found.
3. (a) The cavalry (less ½ troop and the troop north of HARNEY), with
the mounted engineers and 1 rad. sec. pack Sig., attached, will gain
contact with and delay hostile main columns.
(b) 3d Brig., reinforced by ½ tr. 2d Cav., 4th Art. Brig, (less
1 regt.), 1st Bn. 1st Engrs. (less 1 Co.), and 3d Amb. Co., via
bridge over ALLOWAY CREEK 1 mile north of 492--country road--TWO
TAVERNS--BONEAUVILLE--GRANITE HILL Station on HUNTERSTOWN.
(c) 1st Brig., reinforced by troop north of HARNEY, 1 regt. art., 1 co.
engrs., and 4th Amb. Co., via 478--515--LOW DUTCH road to 543--726--592
to HARRISBURG PIKE by road west of HUNTERSTOWN.
(d) 2d Brig. to follow right column at 1 mile.
(e) Sig. Bn. (less 1 rad. sec. pack) to march with right column between
the advance guard and main body and maintain communication from
division headquarters to the cavalry, the two columns and the 2d Brig.
(x) The march to be forced until the enemy is overtaken.
4. Messages to the head of the main body, right column.
A,
Maj. Gen.
Dictated to:
Staff.
C. O. 1st Inf. Brig. (senior officer with left column).
C. O. 2d Inf. Brig.
C. O. 3d Inf. Brig. (senior officer with right column).
C. O. 4th Art. Brig.
C. O. Engrs.
C. O. Sig.
Copy to C. O. 2d Cav., by aide.
Copy to C. O. troop north of Harney, by motorcyclist.
Copy to commander of trains, by motorcyclist.
Report of dispositions to C. G., 1st A. C., by wire.
Copy by mail.
NIGHT ATTACKS.
Night attacks frequently go astray. They should generally be attempted
only as a last resort when there is no hope of success by any other
means, and usually only by small forces.
The essentials of a night attack are:
1. Careful daylight reconnaissance or excellent guides or both.
2. Careful organization of the attacking force to avoid confusion
in the dark.
3. Retention of the troops in close order. Simple formations
are necessary as complicated ones cause confusion. The
rear lines follow at a short distance.
4. Use of the bayonet. Troops deployed on a wide front are
very difficult to handle and a bayonet attack in close formation
is preferable. In any case the premature discharge
of firearms is to be avoided. Pieces should
generally be unloaded.
5. The captured position must be immediately prepared for
defense and measures taken to oppose a counter attack.
A reserve should be kept in hand.
The first prerequisite of a night attack is a simple plan, and the next
a knowledge of the enemy’s dispositions and of the locality.
If intrenched positions are to be assaulted they should be
reconnoitered (during the day) by competent officers.
Night attacks are made mainly by infantry.
Cavalry and artillery cannot be safely maneuvered in close proximity to
the enemy at night except under very favorable conditions. They would
seldom be used in a night attack, and in any event should be held in
rear of the foot troops. All animals and vehicles had best be left
behind.
Troops for the assault are given badges and watchwords. They keep in
close touch.
Special arrangements should be made for the supply of ammunition.
The attacking formation usually has little depth (few supports and
reserves) but some formed troops must be kept in hand to occupy the
position in case of success.
The simpler the plan and smaller the force the more readily it can be
controlled and the better the chances for success.
A night attack by a large force is very apt to end in confusion.
The troops are assembled at a rendezvous, if practicable before dark.
They proceed under guides, or by compass bearing, to the point of
attack. This should be easy of recognition.
Roads liable to be commanded by the enemy’s artillery or machine guns
should be avoided.
Every precaution is taken to prevent information of the proposed attack
reaching the enemy. Reconnaissance is made cautiously, and orders are
issued just enough in advance to complete the necessary preliminaries.
Due to the difficulty of controlling men at night a single main attack
at a carefully selected point is usually preferable to several real
attacks at various points. False attacks or demonstrations may be made
for the purpose of deceiving the enemy.
A rendezvous for assembly of all troops _after_ the attack, must be
designated in advance. In case of failure it is very necessary to rally
the scattered forces of the attacker.
A night attack should generally be delivered when the bulk of the
defender’s forces will _probably_ be asleep, hence not too early in the
evening, say after 10:00 p. m.
In attacking a bridge head the main attack should be made on defender’s
main force. A secondary attack may be made on the troops actually at
the bridge. If either succeeds the mission is accomplished. A selected
party (of engineers if any are available) is sent along the bed of the
stream, with explosives in an effort to destroy the bridge, during the
confusion created by the two attacks.
If the defense apprehends a night attack provisions should be made for
sweeping the field of probable attack, construction of obstacles, etc.
If practicable artificial illumination and alarm signals in conjunction
with obstacles, etc., should be provided.
After dark every precaution is taken to provide against surprise. Fire
is not opened except at close range. Units in rear must be close at
hand to drive out with the bayonet any of the enemy who succeeds in
forcing an entrance to the position.
Machine guns are useful in repelling night attacks.
MACHINE GUNS.
The progress of tactics manifests itself in a great increase in the
number of machine guns in all modern armies. They are now employed by
all branches of the service, including the artillery.
Against masses of troops machine guns may be used to an extreme range
of 2500 yards. They are, however, primarily weapons for medium and
short ranges. At very great ranges their effect is comparatively
insignificant. They should seldom be employed beyond 1500 yds.
The rate of fire of machine guns may reach 600 shots per minute and in
some cases 900. 100 to 200 shots is regarded as slow fire, 200 to 300
ordinary fire, anything over 300 rapid fire. A machine gun is hence
equivalent to about 50 rifles.
Modern machine guns are fairly dependable weapons in the hands of men
trained to their use. Satisfactory results cannot be obtained if they
are operated by unskilled men.
Pack transportation is generally employed. Light trucks may be used to
transport both materiel and personnel, especially for anti aircraft
guns.
The chief purpose of machine guns is to produce a sudden and powerful
fire effect in the nature of a surprise, at short or mid range. It
is difficult to supply ammunition at the rate demanded by continuous
rapid fire of these weapons. The beaten zone is not great as compared
with that of rifle fire and diminishes rapidly as the range increases.
Slight errors in estimating distances may nullify the effect at long
ranges. Accordingly these weapons are most effective against masses of
troops which appear in the open at short ranges, usually at infrequent
intervals and for short periods only. Machine guns which remain in
action for a considerable period may usually be detected, and once
located they are easily silenced by artillery or concentrated rifle
fire. Hence their fire should be reserved until the opportunity for a
surprise is offered.
Machine guns accordingly are weapons of opportunity. Their mobility,
the ease and rapidity with which they are brought into action and
their high rate of fire makes them especially useful in meeting the
opportunities and crises of a combat. They may be used both defensively
and offensively, but their principal rôle is defensive. There are
instances of their successful employment as the principal defense of
portions of an intrenched position.
The lighter types of guns may be used in the trenches and may even
accompany the infantry in an advance.
In order that they may be free to meet the crises of the combat machine
guns generally should not be immobilized by being assigned to the
continuous defense of portions of a line. They are to be regarded as a
reserve of fire. They are most useful in rear of the flanks or in the
intervals of an advanced line, their fire being held in reserve until
needed.
In defense they may be used to reinforce the line at weak or threatened
points or to oppose envelopment. In opposing an infantry assault on an
intrenched position they are the most effective of all weapons. They
should be placed to enfilade the trenches in case of their capture.
In the offense they may be used for concentrating fire on sections of
the defenders’ line, thereby causing them to keep under cover, reducing
the effect of their fire, and enabling the friendly infantry to
advance. They are peculiarly effective for enfilading a line or rolling
up a flank. In some rare instances attacks of this nature have been
carried out by machine guns alone.
Machine guns should be used with great boldness in both attack and
defense. In the assault they are pushed rapidly forward to occupy the
captured position and oppose a counter attack.
Machine guns should generally remain with the regiments to which they
belong and under the control of the regimental commander. If unduly
dispersed they will be unable to take advantage of the opportunities
afforded. In special circumstances machine guns may be assigned by
platoon to units smaller than a regiment.
If employed in an exposed position the machine guns may have such
support as the situation demands.
Machine guns cannot compete with artillery and are of little effect
against thin lines of skirmishers.
Machine guns also find a useful field for employment in the following
cases:
1. In the delaying actions of a rear guard. They can force the attacker
to deploy at long range, and are readily withdrawn from action.
2. At the opening of a rencontre engagement. They can often force
the enemy to deploy at long range and may remain in action for a
considerable period before becoming targets for the hostile artillery.
Hence they are useful with an advance guard, and should generally be
well to the front.
3. In the pursuit of a defeated and partially demoralized enemy,
machine gun fire, boldly employed is very effective in completing the
rout. It is more readily concentrated and controlled than is rifle fire.
4. For repulsing or for supporting a cavalry charge.
5. In attacking or defending the flanks of a line.
6. When the enemy has no artillery they may be used with great boldness
and vigor at any stage of the action and to a certain extent fulfill
the functions of artillery within their effective ranges.
7. On outpost to sweep the avenues of approach and defend bridges and
defiles. For this purpose they may be barricaded.
8. For night attacks and in defense against night attacks. Machine
gun fire is of great volume and at night especially, is more easily
controlled than rifle fire.
9. Machine guns are most useful for supporting artillery in exposed
positions. For repelling surprise attacks on the artillery they will
often be more effective than an infantry escort.
10. Machine guns are commonly employed on battle or combat type
aeroplanes and dirigibles, primarily for the attack of or defense
against similar craft. Anti aircraft machine guns are employed in great
numbers for the attack of aeroplanes flying at low altitudes. At higher
altitudes they give way to anti aircraft artillery.