Transcriber's Notes:
Underscores "_" before and after a word or phrase indicate _italics_
in the original text.
Equal signs "=" before and after a word or phrase indicate =bold=
in the original text.
Small capitals have been converted to SOLID capitals.
Illustrations have been moved so they do not break up paragraphs.
Deprecated spellings have been preserved.
Typographical and punctuation errors have been silently corrected.
TECHNIQUE OF MODERN TACTICS
A STUDY OF TROOP LEADING
METHODS IN THE OPERATIONS
OF DETACHMENTS OF ALL ARMS
BY
P. S. BOND
_Major, Corps of Engineers, U. S. Army_,
AND
M. J. McDonough
_Major, Corps of Engineers, U. S. Army_.
THIRD EDITION, REVISED AND ENLARGED
_Adopted by the War Department as a preparation for the War College;
Bulletin 4, War Department, 1915._
_Adopted by the War Department as a text for garrison schools and in
the examination of officers for promotion. For issue to
organizations of the Army and the Militia; Bulletin 3, War
Department, 1914._
_Adopted by the War Department as one of the books recommended by
the Division of Militia Affairs for the use of the Organized
Militia. Circular No. 3, Division Militia Affairs, War Department,
1914._
_Adopted as a text for the garrison course for all officers of the
Marine Corps--Orders No. 18, 1914, U. S. Marine Corps._
_Adopted as a text for use in the Marine Officers’ School, Norfolk,
Virginia._
_Adopted as a text for use in the Coast Artillery School, Fort
Monroe, Virginia._
_Recommended for study and reference in the National Guard Division
of New York; G. O. 4, 1914, Headquarters Division, N. G. N. Y._
_Used as a reference at the Army Service Schools, Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas._
_For sale by Book Department, Army Service Schools, Ft. Leavenworth,
Kan., by the U. S. Cavalry Association, Ft. Leavenworth, and by the
publishers._
The Collegiate Press
GEORGE BANTA PUBLISHING COMPANY
MENASHA, WISCONSIN
_Copyright 1916
by
P. S. BOND_
PREFACE TO THIRD EDITION
The cordial reception that has been accorded this volume by the Army,
the Marine Corps, the National Guard, Military Schools, Training Camps,
etc., has made necessary a second and third editions. The present
edition embodies the essential modifications contained in the 1914 F.
S. R., and the act of June 3, 1916.
The chief reason leading to the publication of the volume in the first
instance was the authors’ belief that the excellent instruction given
at the Leavenworth Schools should be disseminated to the widest extent
practicable among all those in the United States who are charged with
preparation for the active physical defense of the nation. To assist
in such an extension of military education, there seemed a need for a
volume which would collect and make available within a small compass,
the fruits of the study, observation, and experience of those officers
who have unceasingly devoted themselves to the improvement of American
tactical training.
It is well that the traditional indifference of the American people
toward military preparedness is in this day being rudely disturbed.
Fate has hitherto been lenient to the growing American nation. It has
not demanded the full or the logical forfeit proportionate to the
laxity displayed by us in meeting former crises. In the Revolution,
fate was indeed kind to the Colonists. In the War of 1812 it awarded
us greatly more than our efforts merited, and seemed to overlook the
pitiful inefficiency of our land forces. At sea the brilliant series of
naval exploits was made possible only by the unfaltering determination
of the naval chieftains serving under a supine administration that
desired to lock up the navy in home ports. In the Mexican War, in
permitting us to conduct two campaigns without the loss of a single
battle, and in spite of a woeful deficiency in men, in equipment, and
in administrative support, fate was more than indulgent.
In the Civil War fate did not assess the full retribution of disruption
of the Union, which it might logically have done, but it did exact for
our neglect of preparation an immense payment in blood and treasure.
This indulgence of fate may be not wholly a kindness. To the extent
that it violates justice, it merely postpones the final reckoning and
tends to lull its recipient into a false sense of national security,
resulting from unearned success. The nation has not yet experienced the
chastening discipline of defeat. In the future, therefore, we must not
be surprised when full compensation is exacted if, as an adult people,
we continue to misread the true import of history and persist in our
traditional negligence.
A people may not logically assume great responsibilities without making
timely provision for the discharge of those responsibilities. Sooner or
later an exact accounting will be had. History shows many examples of
nations which have paid the price of their neglect. Despite the hopes
of Utopians history shows that human nature undergoes no progressive
change, and it shows to the present day no substantial diminution in
the frequency of wars.
That our people are beginning to manifest an intelligent interest in
the condition of the National defense cannot fail to be gratifying
to those whose lives are consecrated to such defense. Such interest
is a vital support and an inspiration to the defenders. It is hoped
that this volume may be of assistance in guiding to some extent the
awakening interest.
In the first edition the subjects of air craft and motor vehicles were
not treated, because although it was recognized from the outset that
these machines would exert a very great influence upon the conduct of
war, their tactics was at the time largely speculative. Such is not the
case today.
CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE
Introduction 5
Organization of the U. S. Army. Road distances
and camp areas 10
I The preparation and solution of tactical problems.
Bibliography 19
II Field orders 37
III Patrolling 45
IV Advance guards 56
V Rear guards. Flank guards 70
VI Marches, Change of direction of march, Camps
and bivouacs 83
VII Convoys 95
VIII Artillery tactics 109
IX Cavalry tactics 144
X Outposts 170
XI Combat. Attack and defense 204
XII Organization of a defensive position 248
XIII Combat-Attack and defense of a river line, Withdrawal
from action, Rencontre or meeting engagement,
Delaying action, Pursuit, Night attacks,
Machine guns 277
XIV A position in readiness 308
XV Sanitary tactics 318
XVI The rifle in War 324
XVII Division tactics and supply 337
XVIII Air craft and Motor vehicles in War 381
Glossary 393
Index 405
LIST OF PLATES
FIGURE FACING PAGE
I Diagrammatic analysis of tactical problems 31
II Typical arrangements of a convoy on the march 104
III Typical arrangements of a convoy on the march 107
IV Battery of artillery on the march 126
V Trajectories and cones of dispersion of shell
and shrapnel 134
VI Heavy field artillery in action 135
VII Cavalry mounted attack diagrams 163
VIII Diagram of an outpost 195
IX Infantry attack diagrams 219
X Standard field trenches 265
XI Illustrating Problem No. 1, Field Fortification 274
XII Illustrating Problem No. 2, Field Fortification 276
XIII Regimental sanitary troops in battle 320
XIV Diagram illustrating the evacuation system of
the medical department 322
XV A division on the march 342
XVI Camp of a division 358
XVII Diagram showing movements of the supply and
ammunition trains of a division during a march 368
XVIII Outline of the system for supplying an army in the
field 375
PAGE
INTRODUCTION 5-9
ORGANIZATION OF THE U. S. ARMY.
ROAD DISTANCES. CAMP AREAS 10-17
CHAPTER I
THE PREPARATION AND SOLUTION OF
TACTICAL PROBLEMS 18-36
PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE SOLUTION OF TACTICAL PROBLEMS (table) 18
THE APPLICATORY SYSTEM OF MILITARY INSTRUCTION 19
Kinds of problems. Map problems, terrain exercises,
war games, tactical walks and rides, field maneuvers 19-20
Problems of decision 19
Troop leading problems 19
Limitations of terrain exercises 19
General form and details of tactical problems 20-21
General and special situation 20
Estimate of the situation 21-22
The mission 21-22
General and special assumptions 22-23
Use of maps 23
Visibility problems 24
Principles of the Art of War 24
Military responsibility and the peace training of officer 24-25
Mental processes and methods in the solution of
tactical problems 25-28
Independent solutions. Personality of the author 26-27
Simplicity of plan 27
Advantages of the initiative 27
Reviews of solutions 27-28
Apparatus required 28
DIAGRAMMATIC ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS 29-31
SUGGESTIONS FOR THE PREPARATION OF PROBLEMS 31-33
BIBLIOGRAPHY 33-36
CHAPTER II
FIELD ORDERS 37-44
Forms for orders. Verbiage of orders, how acquired 37-38
Administrative and routine matters 38
What to include in orders 38-39
Detailed instructions usually inadvisable 38
KINDS OF ORDERS--verbal, written, dictated, individual,
combined 39
STRUCTURE OF ORDERS 39-40
The 5 paragraph form. Contents of numbered paragraphs 39-40
Marginal distribution of troops 40
Map references. Signature 40
Transmission of orders. Receipts for orders 40
Simple English. Short sentences. Arguments and discussions.
Ambiguity 40
Abbreviations. Description of localities 41
Amount of information contained in an order 41-42
Plan of the commander. Good and bad news 41
Trespassing upon the province of a subordinate 42
Division of responsibility with a subordinate 42
Equivocal language 42
Discussion of contingencies 42
Advantages of combined orders 42
Copies of dictated orders 42
Proper time for the issue of orders 42-43
PRELIMINARY OR PREPARATORY ORDERS. Assembly orders 43
Time required for preparation and circulation of orders 43-44
Motor cars and motorcycles 44
Consonance of orders and plans. Minor details 44
Duty of staff officers in the preparation of orders 44
CHAPTER III
PATROLLING 45-55
CLASSIFICATION OF PATROLS 45
COMPOSITION AND STRENGTH. Commander 45
Mounted and dismounted patrols. Auto patrols 45-47
Functions of mounted orderlies 46
Cavalry and aeronautical services 47
Motor cars for patrolling 47
INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN PATROL LEADER BEFORE THE START 47-48
ACTION TAKEN BY THE LEADER BEFORE THE START 48-49
Preliminary arrangements, equipment, inspection
of patrol, etc. 48-49
CONDUCT OF PATROL 49-55
Formations. Gaits 49-50
Routes. Reconnoitering 50
Advance by “successive bounds” 50
Woods and defiles 50
Detachments from the patrol 50
Houses, villages and inclosures. Rendezvous 50
Corrections to maps 50
Watering the horses 50
Civilians preceding patrol 50
Combats--when justifiable 51
Prisoners 51
Lookout points. Halts. March outposts 51
Hostile patrols. Conduct in case of attack, etc. 51
Exchange of information with friendly patrols 51
Signs of the enemy 52
Accomplishment of the mission 52
Main and secondary roads 52
Interviewing inhabitants. Bivouac of patrol 53
Hearsay evidence 53
MESSAGES. How transmitted. Relay posts 53-54
Form and contents of messages 54
WHAT TO REPORT 54-55
Prompt transmission of information 54
First certain information of enemy 54
Final reports 55
Negative messages 55
Use of telegraph and telephone 55
CHAPTER IV
ADVANCE GUARDS 56-69
STRENGTH AND COMPOSITION 56-58
Advance guards of various organizations 56
Machine guns 56
Mounted men. Advance guard cavalry. Duties 56
Engineers. Signal and sanitary troops 56-58
Artillery. Field trains 57-58
Splitting organizations to form advance guard 57
Leading troops 57
Removal of obstacles to the march 58
THE START--DETAILS OF. Initial point 58
Route of advance guard 58
Outpost troops and cavalry 58
Assembly of field trains 58
Assembly in column of route. Elongation 59
ASSEMBLY ORDER 59
Calculations of times of starting for various organizations 59
Interference of routes 59
Subdivisions of advance guard 60
DISTANCES. How regulated 60
Cavalry advance guards 60-63
RECONNAISSANCE 60-62
Duty of cavalry. Independent and advance cavalry 60-62
Parallel roads 61
Flank guards 61
Mounted point 61
Method of “offset patrolling,” by infantry 61
Connecting files 61
Operations of advance cavalry 61-62
Communication with neighboring troops 62
Important features of the terrain 62
Places of advance guard and supreme commanders 62
March outposts 62
Control of means of communication 62
Civilians not to precede advance guard 63
Conduct of advance guard on meeting the enemy 63
Passage of bridges and defiles 63
OUTLINE OF SOLUTION OF SMALL ADVANCE GUARD PROBLEMS 64
EXAMPLES OF ADVANCE GUARD ORDERS 65-69
CHAPTER V
REAR GUARDS. FLANK GUARDS 70-82
STRENGTH AND COMPOSITION OF REAR GUARDS IN RETREAT 70-72
Rear guard on a forward march and in retreat 70
Delaying actions 70
Reinforcements of rear guard 70
Outpost troops 70
Infantry. Cavalry. Artillery 70-71
Use of motor cars in retreat and pursuit 71
Engineers--duties in retreat 71
Machine guns. Signal and sanitary troops 71
Field trains 71
Subdivisions of rear guard 71
Tactical employment of cavalry 72
DISTANCES--HOW REGULATED. Progress of main body 72
CONDUCT OF REAR GUARD 72-75
Contact with enemy. Observation of routes adjacent
to line of march or retreat 72
Covering the main body 72-73
Delaying actions of a rear guard 73
Reinforcement of rear guard 73
Requirements of a delaying position 73-74
Use of cavalry, artillery and machine guns in delaying
the enemy 73-74
Withdrawal of outpost 73
Masking the fire of the delaying position 73
Use of flank positions for delaying the enemy 73
Security of line of retreat from delaying position 73
Advantages of a single determined stand 74
Keeping rear guard in hand. Simplicity of movements 74
Latitude allowed rear guard commander 74
Special patrols from main body 74
Flank detachments 74-75
Retreating upon the front of a defensive position 75
Offensive tactics by rear guards 75
Supreme commander with rear guard 75
EXAMPLE OF RETREAT ORDER 75-77
STRENGTH AND COMPOSITION OF FLANK GUARDS 78-79
Movements in two columns 78-79
Cavalry, artillery, machine guns, signal and sanitary
troops and field trains with a flank guard 78
Wagon trains, routes and escorts. Double column 78-79
FLANK GUARDS-WHEN REQUIRED 79-80
Considerations influencing the decision as to use of
a flank guard 79
Examples of use of flank guards 80
Flank guards with large and small forces 80-81
Distance between flank guard and main body, obstacles
and communicating routes 80-82
Convoys, armored autos, auto transport for escort 80
Cavalry flank guards 81
CONDUCT OF FLANK GUARDS 81-82
Formation 81
Reconnaissance on exposed flank. Contact with enemy 81
Duty of cavalry with a flank guard 81
Bringing on a decisive engagement 81
Communication with other troops. Relation of flank guard
to rear guard 81-82
Reinforcement of flank guard 82
Latitude allowed flank guard commander 82
CHAPTER VI
MARCHES. CHANGE OF DIRECTION
OF MARCH. CAMPS AND BIVOUACS 83-94
ARRANGEMENT OF TROOPS ON THE MARCH 83-84
Marches in peace time 83
Intermingling of foot and mounted troops 83
Auto truck trains 83
Artillery and trains. Protection of long columns of wagons 83
Handling of trains on the march 83-84
Separation of trains and troops 84
Passage of defiles 85
Alternation of organizations in column on successive days 85
Advance guards, rear guards and leading troops 85
Distribution of troops in camp. Camping in column 85
Independent mission for cavalry. Prospects of combat,
and tactical use of cavalry 85
Place of the supreme commander 85-86
Distances between elements in a flank march 86
TIMES OF STARTING FOR FOOT AND MOUNTED TROOPS AND TRAINS 86-87
Early starting 86
Late arrivals in camp 87
Night marches 87-89
Movements by rail 87
Movements by motor car 87
TABLE OF TIMES OF SUNRISE AND SUNSET 88
MANNER OF STARTING THE MARCH 88-89
Initial point 88
Regulation of march. End of a day’s march 89
LENGTH AND SPEED OF MARCHES 89-90
Forced marches. Marches by green troops.
Progressive increase in length of marches.
Marches by large and small bodies 89
Halts 89
Days of rest 89
Speed of infantry, mixed troops, artillery and trains 90
TABLE OF RATES OF MARCH OF DIFFERENT ARMS 90
Elongation 90
Limiting depths of fords 90
Selection of route 90
Effects of temperature on marching troops 91
Artillery and trains in double column 91
CHANGE IN DIRECTION OF MARCH 91-92
Reasons for change of direction.
“Marching to the sound of the guns” 91
“Containing” a hostile force 91
Manner of changing direction. Use of a flank guard 91-92
Safety of trains in changing direction 92
EXAMPLE OF ORDER FOR CHANGE OF DIRECTION OF MARCH 92-93
CAMPS AND BIVOUACS 93-94
When to bivouac 93
Time of issue of halt order. Arrangements for
distribution of troops in camp 93
Requirements of a camp site 93-94
Assignment with reference to convenience of arrival and
departure. Camping in column 94
Use of buildings for shelter. Billeting 94
CHAPTER VII
CONVOYS 95-108
Definition of convoy 95
Vulnerability of a convoy. Limit of size. Straggling 95
Flank marches by convoys. Moving trains on separate road 95
General rule for position of covering troops 95
Subdivisions and dispositions of escort 95-96
Motor convoys 96
ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE MARCH 96-97
Division of wagon train into sections 96
Classification of wagons-army, hired, impressed 96
Teamsters and wagonmasters 96
Order of march 96
Field train of escort 96
Police guards, infantry and cavalry 96-97
Duties of quartermaster in charge of wagons 96-97
THE ESCORT 97-100
Commander. Duty of escort 97-98
Strength and composition of escort 98-100
Infantry, cavalry, artillery, machine guns, engineers 98
Motor transport for escort. Armored cars. Motor cars
in pursuit of a convoy 98
DISTRIBUTION AND DUTIES OF TROOPS 98
Subdivisions and relative strengths 98-99
Reconnaissance. Dispersion of fighting force 99
Position of main body of escort 99
Infantry in middle of a long column of wagons 99
Police guards 99
Advance cavalry and scouting parties 99
Mounted and dismounted point 99
Establishing contact with friendly troops in direction of march 99
Selection of defensive positions and camp sites 99
Engineers 99
Flank guards 99-100
Method of employing the cavalry of the escort 100
Rear guards. Strength, position, duties 100
Routes available for the march. Considerations governing
the selection of route. Topography 100-101
Rate of progress and halts 101
Position and movements of the enemy 101
Defensive measures to be adopted. Lines of retreat.
Alternative routes 101
Localities favorable for the attack of a convoy 101
Change of direction of march. Precautions 101-102
Parking the convoy for the night. Measures for the
security of the camp 102
Change of route in moving back and forth 102
CONDUCT ON ENCOUNTERING THE ENEMY 102-103
Halting or parking the convoy prematurely 102
Localities favorable for defense 102
Details of defensive operations. Messages to adjacent
friendly troops 102-103
ATTACK OF A CONVOY 103
Cavalry, armored cars 103
Obstacles. Ambuscades 103
Usual method of attack 103
Damaging the convoy by long range fire 103
CONVOYS OF PRISONERS. Strength of escort. Conduct 104
EXAMPLE OF ORDER FOR THE MARCH OF A CONVOY 107-108
CHAPTER VIII
ARTILLERY TACTICS 109-148
MATERIEL OF LIGHT FIELD ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY 109-110
Subdivisions of a battery 109
Signal equipment. Ammunition 109
Description of carriage and sights.
Weights behind the teams 109-110
Front covered by fire of a battery 110
DISPOSITIONS OF ARTILLERY ON THE MARCH. Combat trains.
Field trains. Protection of long columns 110
Usual dispositions of battery and combat trains in action 110
Concealment from hostile observation 110-111
DUTIES OF ARTILLERY PERSONNEL. Artillery commander.
Regimental commander. Battalion commander.
Battery commander. Lieutenants. Reconnaissance officer.
Sergeants and corporals. Scouts, signalers,
agents and route markers 111-113
Artillery officers with supreme commander and with
advance guard 113
KINDS OF FIRE. Masked and unmasked fire. Defilade. Fire for
adjustment, demolition, registration and effect. Direct
and indirect laying. Salvo fire, continuous fire, volley
fire and fire at will. Time fire and percussion fire.
Area of burst of shrapnel. Fire at single and at
successive ranges, sweeping fire 113-116
Individual and collective distribution. Adjustment 116
Firing data. Aiming point 116
OBSERVATION AND CONTROL OF FIRE 117-118
Post of officer conducting the fire 117
Battery commander’s station and auxiliary observing
stations. Location 117
Aiming points. Location 117-118
TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF FIELD ARTILLERY 118-128
Covering the front of a defensive position 118
Considerations governing the dispositions of
artillery in attack 118-120
Position in interval between frontal and enveloping attack.
Position on the flank 120
Ranges in attack and defense 120
Mission of the artillery 120-121
Operations of attacker’s artillery during the combat 120-121
Dispositions and employment of artillery in defense.
Dagger batteries 121-122
Advantages enjoyed by defense 121-122
Firing over heads of friendly troops 122
Movements to position 122
Supports for the artillery. Machine guns 122
Positions and duties of artillery. By whom prescribed 122
Positions “for immediate action,” “in observation,” and
“in readiness.” Subdivision for action 122-124
Positions of field and combat trains. Communication 123
Subdivision of battalions and batteries 123
Grouping of artillery. Fire control 124-125
Artillery “reserves.” Number of guns to place in action 123-124
Positions of ammunition trains 124
Special tasks and duties of artillery. Counter batteries,
infantry batteries, etc. 124
“Prepare for action.” “March Order” 125
Changes of position during action. Why, how and when made.
Economy of ammunition 125-126
Co-operation of artillery and other arms 126
Dummy emplacements 126
Horse artillery 126
Ranges, targets, ammunition employed, etc. 126
Oblique, enfilade and frontal fire 127
Moving across country to position 127
Supports for the artillery 127
Ranging and bracketing 127
ARTILLERY WITH ADVANCE GUARDS, REAR GUARDS AND OUTPOSTS 127-128
PROBLEM INVOLVING A BATTERY IN POSITION.
(Duties of personnel. B. C. and auxiliary observing
stations. Limbers and combat trains. Field trains.
Communication. Moving to position, etc., etc.) 128-130
BATTALION OR LARGER UNIT IN ACTION 130-132
EMPLOYMENT OF HEAVY FIELD ARTILLERY 132-136
Heavy field ordnance of U. S. Army.
Description, ranges, etc. 132-133
Organization and methods of fire 133-135
Tactical employment. Heavy artillery on the march 133-136
Motor transport 136
EMPLOYMENT OF MOUNTAIN ARTILLERY 136-138
Description of materiel. Tactical employment 136-138
ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY 138-139
Types of guns 138
Effective ranges 138
Observation and fire control 139
Function of anti-aircraft artillery 139
REMARKS CONCERNING THE TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT
OF LIGHT FIELD ARTILLERY 139-143
Subdivision of battalions 140
Positions for artillery and combat trains 140
Concealment and covered approach to position 140-141
Positions between frontal and enveloping attacks 140
Positions for direct fire 140
Flash defilade 140
Ranges 141
Movements of artillery daring an action 141
Elimination of “dead space” 141
Reconnaissance 141
Battery commander’s station 141
Use of shrapnel and shell. Ranging 141
The artillery duel. Firing over heads of infantry 141
Proper targets for artillery. Co-operation with other arms 141
Place of artillery commander 142
General positions for artillery in attack and defense 142
Orders and instructions to artillery. What to include
and what to omit 142-143
CHAPTER IX
CAVALRY TACTICS 144-169
USES OF CAVALRY IN CAMPAIGN SUMMARIZED 144
Improper uses of cavalry. Division of the cavalry forces 144
Conservation of energies of men and horses. Night work 144
Wagons and pack trains with cavalry 144-145
Artillery, signal troops and mounted engineers with cavalry 145
Discretionary powers of the cavalry commander and nature
of the instructions to be given him 145-146
Cavalry in masses seeks hostile cavalry 146
ARMY AND DIVISIONAL CAVALRY. Duties 146
Cavalry with advance, rear and flank guards, outposts
and detachments 147
Cavalry in delaying actions 147
Independent cavalry. When employed 147-148
Principal duties of the independent cavalry.
Range of its operations.
Return to main camp at night 148
Contact with the enemy. Reports 148
Functions of cavalry and aeronautical services 149
Overthrow of hostile cavalry. How accomplished 149
Cavalry screen 149
Contact squadrons and strategic patrols 149-150
Means of transmitting information. Relay and collecting
stations, etc. Field wireless equipment, automobiles,
motorcycles, etc. 150
CAVALRY IN COMBAT 150-160
Methods of offensive action. Mounted charge, mounted
and dismounted fire action 150-151
Dismounted fire action, when employed 151
Advantages of remaining mounted. Mounted reserve 151-152
Mounted reconnaissance 152
Horse holders. Mobility and immobility of horses. Coupling 152
Time required to dismount and to mount 152
Horse artillery, machine guns and mounted engineers
with cavalry. Functions 152-153
Training of cavalry for pioneer work 153
CAVALRY vs. INFANTRY 153-155
Mounted attack on infantry, when practicable 153
The element of surprise 153
Dismounted action 153
Turning movements by cavalry. Delaying actions. Successive
positions. Harrassing the flanks of a pursuing enemy 153
Mounted reserves and combat patrols 154
Security of led horses 154
Requirements of a delaying position 154
Time to withdraw. How close enemy may be allowed to approach.
Provisions for withdrawal 154-155
CAVALRY vs. CAVALRY 155-160
Mounted action and element of surprise 155
Recall of detachments 155
Preparations for the charge 156
Ground scouts and combat patrols 156
Protection of the flanks 156
Dismounted fire action in support of mounted action.
Machine guns and artillery fire 156-157
Division of troops for mounted action. Formations and gaits 157-158
Approach to position 157-158
Formation for and delivery of charge. The rally 158
Duties of support, reserve and dismounted troops 158-159
Distance at which charge should be launched 159
Wheeled vehicles and pack trains during combat 159
Carriage of extra ammunition and rations 159
Most favorable times for attacking cavalry, mounted 159-160
SOLUTION OF PROBLEMS IN CAVALRY COMBAT,
FOR SMALL FORCES. Procedure and orders 160-164
THE CAVALRY SCREEN 164-165
Position and duties of cavalry screen 164-165
Offensive and defensive screens 165
Front covered by screen 165
Daily marching rates of cavalry and patrols 165
CAVALRY PATROLS 165-166
Classification and functions 165-166
Reconnoitering and screening patrols. Tactical and
strategical patrols 165-166
Nature of information gathered. Distances from supporting
troops, radii of action 165-166
Combat by patrols 166
Strength of patrols 166
LESSONS IN CAVALRY TACTICS FROM THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 166-169
CHAPTER X
OUTPOSTS 170-203
DUTIES OF THE OUTPOST 170
Outpost in advance and retreat, how detailed 170
STRENGTH AND COMPOSITION 170-174
General rule for strength of outpost 170
Considerations influencing the decision as to the
strength of an outpost 170-171
Front covered by a battalion as a support 171
Outposts in close and in open country. Influence of roads 171
Cavalry and other mounted troops on outpost. Effect on
strength of infantry outpost 171-172
Proportions of cavalry and infantry on outpost 172
Apportioning the burden of outpost duty 172
Duties and assignments of mounted troops on outpost 172
Artillery, machine guns, engineers, signal and sanitary
troops on outpost 172-173
Distribution of the elements of a large command in camp 173
Outposts of small commands 174
Use of cavalry for the security of a stationary command 174
Organization of a cavalry outpost 174
INTEGRITY OF TACTICAL UNITS, how preserved 175
Strength of supports, pickets, sentry squads and cossack posts 175
Assignment of patrols 175
LOCATION OF OUTPOST 176-177
Selection of camp site and outpost line 176
Distance at which enemy must be held 176
Line of resistance. Obstacles in front of position.
Security of the flanks 176
Outpost on the line of a river 176
Influence of roads on disposition of outpost.
Rule for general guidance 176-177
Contact with enemy 177
Special mounted patrols 177
Regimental sectors of an outpost line 177
LIMITS OF FRONT OF AN OUTPOST 177-178
Line of resistance 178
Security of the flanks. Detached posts 178
Interior guards 178
DISTANCES AND INTERVALS IN AN OUTPOST 179-180
Relative positions of reserve, supports and outguards 179
Position of outpost or advance cavalry 179
Depth of the outpost 179
Intervals between adjacent groups 179-180
Bivouac in line of battle 180
Guarding the line of a stream. Bridge heads 179-180
THE RESERVE. Post. Camping arrangements. Cavalry and
mounted men. Artillery. Field trains 180-181
Field trains of the supports 181-182
THE SUPPORTS. Strength and composition 181
Patrolling. Assignment of the cavalry of an outpost 181-182
Stations of supports. Influence of roads 182
Support sectors 182
Selection and preparation of defensive positions 182-183
Machine guns. Company wagons of supports 182
Fires, tent pitching, meals, etc. 183
Number of supports from one reserve 183
Numerical designation of supports 183
OUTGUARDS AND SENTINELS 183-184
Disposition of outguards. Influence of roads 183
Classification of outguards. Numerical designation 183
Strength of outguards 183
Intrenching, meals, concealment 184
Reliefs for sentinels and patrols 184
Examining posts 184
Communications within the outpost.
Clearing and marking routes 184
OUTPOST PATROLS 184-187
The cordon and patrol systems of outpost 184
Reconnoitering patrols. Strength and composition.
Radius of action. Functions 185
Special information patrols 185
Visiting patrols. Strength. Radius of action 185-186
Reliefs for patrols 186
Patrolling during the day 186
Patrols from the reserve 186
Patrolling by supports. Mounted men 186-187
Patrolling by pickets 187
Night signals 187
DAY AND NIGHT POSITIONS AND DUTIES OF ELEMENTS
OF AN OUTPOST 187-189
Posting of reserve, supports, outguards and sentinels.
Patrolling by day and by night 187-188
Preparation of defensive positions. Reconnaissance 187
Times for assuming day and night positions 187
Time of relief of outpost 188
Position and duties of advance cavalry by day and by night 188-189
Independent cavalry 189
Standing patrols 189
Cavalry patrolling on the flanks of an outpost 189
CAVALRY OUTPOSTS. Organization. Patrolling.
Disposition of horses 189-190
MARCH OUTPOSTS. Duties of cavalry 190-191
OUTPOST ORDERS 191-192
Issue of halt order 191-192
Orders of advance guard and outpost commanders 191
ESTABLISHING THE OUTPOST 191-193
Selection of camp site 191
Use of maps 192
Inspection of terrain by advance guard and outpost commanders 192
Inspection of outpost dispositions 193
Demolitions, obstacles, etc. 193
OUTPOST SKETCHES AND TABLES 193-196
OUTLINES OF HALT AND OUTPOST ORDERS 196-199
VERBAL OUTPOST ORDER FOR A SMALL COMMAND 199-200
ADVANCE GUARD COMMANDER’S HALT AND OUTPOST ORDER 200-202
OUTPOST COMMANDER’S FIRST ORDER 202-203
CHAPTER XI
COMBAT. ATTACK AND DEFENSE 204-247
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS 204-205
Offensive and defensive tactics 204
Raw troops, how utilized 204
Passive defense--when to be adopted 204
Fire superiority keynote of success 204
Dispersion, complicated movements, half-hearted measures 204
Uncovering the line of retreat and main body 204-205
Concentration of forces. Detachments--when permissible 205
Containing and covering forces 205
Night attacks. Night movements--when advisable 205
Examination of terrain preliminary to attack. Use of maps 205
Attacks offering no chance of success 205
Reconnaissance during an action 205
Integrity of tactical units 205
FORMS OF ATTACK 205-209
Advantages and disadvantages of frontal and of
enveloping attacks 206
Considerations influencing the decision as to form and
direction of attack 206-207
Considerations influencing selection of flank
to be enveloped 207
Best dispositions for attacking infantry the
primary consideration 207
Envelopment of both hostile flanks 207
Combined frontal and enveloping attacks 208
Relative strengths of frontal and enveloping attacks 208
Density of firing line in attack 208
Strength of supports 208
Envelopment to be provided for in first deployment 208
Convergence of fire. Separation of frontal and
enveloping attacks 209
ADVANCING TO THE ATTACK.
Formation in approaching the position 209
Establishment of fire superiority 209
Conjunction of movement 209
Cover for advancing troops. Contact during advance 209
ASSIGNMENT OF FRONTS 210-211
Covering the defender’s line 210
Landmarks and guiding points. Routes 210
Extension of defender’s line to meet enveloping attack 210
Orders to the attacking columns 210-211
RESERVES 211-212
Need for reserves. The influence of their judicious
use on the course of the action 211
Concentration of force at critical point 211
Relative strength of reserves in attack and in defense 211
Battalion supports. Regimental and brigade reserves 211
Employment of local reserves 211
Supports and reserves in defense. Position of the reserves.
Division of reserves 211
Distances of supports and reserves from firing line 212
PROTECTION OF THE FLANKS 212-214
Necessity for protecting the flanks. Means employed 212
Obstacles and field of fire 212
Cavalry and mounted men on the flanks 212
Infantry flank combat patrols. Strength and duties 212-213
Duty of flank organization in providing protection 213
Supreme commander’s orders for flank protection 213
Reconnaissance to the front 213
Strength of flank combat patrols 213-214
Ammunition in combat trains. When and by whom issued.
Time required for issue. Disposition of empty wagons
of combat trains 214
Ammunition trains 214
Amount of ammunition available. How carried on the march 214
Expenditure of ammunition in attack and defense.
Long range fire in attack and in defense 214-215
Economy of ammunition 215
INTRENCHMENTS, OBSTACLES, ETC. 215-217
Intrenchments in attack and in defense. Time required for
construction. Objects of intrenchments in defense 215-216
Location and construction of firing and of support trenches.
Communicating trenches 216
Duties of engineers in intrenching, removal of obstacles, etc. 216
Obstacles, nature and effect. Artificial obstacles 216-217
Location of obstacles 217
Obstacles to be covered by fire of defense 217
Measuring and marking ranges 217
FRONTAGES IN ATTACK AND IN DEFENSE 217-219
Density of the firing line. Strength of supports and reserves 219
THE ATTACK OF A POSITION BY A SMALL INFANTRY FORCE 219-225
Disposal of trains 220
Examination of terrain 220
Orders to subordinates 220
ATTACK ORDER FOR A SMALL FORCE 220-223
Routes to position 223
Issues of ammunition 223
Description of localities 223-224
Hostile artillery fire 224
Hostile reinforcements 224
Designation of enemy’s line 224
Engineers, signal and sanitary troops in attack 224
Dressing stations and slightly wounded stations 224-225
REMARKS CONCERNING AN ATTACK BY A REINFORCED BRIGADE 225-228
Reconnaissance and preliminary orders of the commander 225
Locating the enemy’s flanks 226
Considerations prior to attack 226
Assignment of regiments 226-227
Conjunction of holding and enveloping attacks 227
Provisions for the protection of the flanks 227
Duties of cavalry prior to and during the action 227
Dispositions of attacking artillery 227-228
Reserve, station and functions 228
Engineers, signal and sanitary troops and trains during
the attack. Dressing stations. Empty ammunition wagons 228
Station of the supreme commander during the action 228
REMARKS CONCERNING ADVANCE GUARD ACTION 228-230
Occasions for committing the advance guard to action 228-229
Considerations influencing the decision as to action to be
taken on meeting the enemy. Mission of the command
as a whole 229
Advantages of frontal attack by advance guard 229
Pursuit of a defeated enemy 229-230
Supreme commander with advance guard 230
THE OCCUPATION OF A DEFENSIVE POSITION 230-236
Considerations prior to the occupation of a defensive
position. Requirements of a position 230-231
Position in readiness, when to be assumed 231
Positions farther to front or rear. Rencontre engagements 231
Time that small forces can maintain themselves
against larger 231-232
Effect of improvements in weapons on power of defense 232
Delaying and decisive actions 232
Posts of artillery in defense 232
Obstacles in front of position. Passages for counter attack 232
Probable direction of hostile attack. Posting the reserve 232
Division of defensive line into sections and assignment
of troops 232-233
Use of machine guns in defense 232-233
Openings in the line 233
Detailed organization of sectors or sections 233
Density of firing line. Influence of terrain 233
Employment of large reserves in defense 233
Long range fire in defense 233
Delaying actions. Cavalry in delaying actions 233
Marking ranges and clearing field of fire 233-234
Preparation of position for defense 234
Disposal of empty wagons of combat trains 234
Direct fire by artillery in defense 234
Duties of the cavalry 234
Security to the front during the preparation
and occupation of the position 234
Machine guns. “Dagger” batteries 234-235
Flank combat patrols. General and special measures for
the security of the flanks 235
Security of the lines of retreat 235
Employment of reserves and engineers in the preparation
of the position 235
Dressing station 235
Strong reserves characteristic of active defense 235
Advanced posts and advanced positions 235
THE COUNTER ATTACK 236-238
Eventual assumption of offensive 236
Employment of the general reserve 236
Concealment of troops for counter attack 236
Time and manner of delivering the counter attack 236-237
Supporting points in rear of line 237
Artillery of defense 237
Selection of terrain to favor counter attack 237
Suggestions as to the conduct of an active defense 237-238
Aggressive employment of large reserves by defense 237
Most favorable opportunity for a counter-stroke 238
ORDER FOR A FRONTAL ATTACK BY AN ADVANCE GUARD 238-242
ORDER FOR AN ENVELOPING ATTACK BY A REINFORCED BRIGADE 243-244
ORDER FOR THE OCCUPATION OF A DEFENSIVE POSITION 244-247
CHAPTER XII
THE ORGANIZATION OF A DEFENSIVE POSITION 248-276
Field and permanent fortification 248
Defensive principles applicable to portions of
an extended line 248
Small forces in intrenched positions 248
PRINCIPAL REQUIREMENTS OF A DEFENSIVE POSITION 248-249
The rôle of field fortifications 248-249
Selection of the general line from a map 249
Study of details on the terrain 249
Reconnaissance by supreme and subordinate commanders 249
Necessity for an examination of the position from the
enemy’s point of view 249-250
Matters to be considered in the organization of
a defensive position 250
Field of fire for the infantry 250
Utilization of natural advantages of the terrain 250-251
Thin defensive lines. Dummy trenches 251
Location and disposition of the fire trenches 251
Offsets, re-entrants and salients 251
SUPPORTING POINTS. Location with reference to the terrain 251-252
Closed works and rifle trenches in field fortification 252
Development of frontal and cross fire 252
Covering the foreground with fire. Expedients by which
this may be accomplished 252-253
Cross fire of adjacent supporting points.
Distribution of trenches. Removal of obstructions to
fire. Construction of obstacles to enemy’s advance 252-253
Traverses. Head cover. Grenade nets. Concealment of trenches 253
Intervals in the defensive line. Discontinuity of trenches 253-254
Defensive lines in close country 254
Division of front into sections or sectors 254
Relative strength of firing line, supports and reserves 254
Purpose of field fortifications. Misuse thereof 254-255
Supporting points by whom organized 255
Portable and park tools 255
DETAILS IN THE ORGANIZATION OF A REGIMENTAL SECTOR 255
DETAILS IN THE ORGANIZATION OF A BATTALION SUPPORTING POINT 255-256
Relative importance of different tasks 256-257
Relative importance of near and distant fields of fire
under various conditions 257
Distance of battalion supports behind the firing line 257
Natural cover. Support and communicating trenches 257
Utilization of natural features 257
Posts and duties of and cover for reserves 257
Division of reserves 257
Position fire by supports and local reserves 257-258
Study of ground in location of trenches. Avoidance
of unnecessary labor 258
Removal of trees from field of fire. Filling ravines
and hollows 258
Blending the works with the terrain for concealment 258
Employment of engineers. Demolitions, obstacles,
communications, measuring ranges, head and overhead
cover, observing stations, splinter-proofs, works in
the second line of defense, etc. 258
Division and assignment of engineer troops. Tasks of
engineers, by whom indicated 258-259
Provisions for security to front and flanks during the
organization of the position 259
Location of artificial obstacles. Distance in front
of firing line 259
ORGANIZATION OF THE FLANKS 259-260
Protection of the flanks, natural obstacles,
fortifications and reserves 259
Flanks “in the air” 259
Refusing the line to provide security for a flank 260
Echeloning trenches to the rear on a flank 260
Concealment of works. Utilization of natural features
of the terrain 260
TABLE OF PERSONNEL, TIME AND TOOLS REQUIRED FOR VARIOUS
TASKS IN CONNECTION WITH FIELD FORTIFICATION 261
Character of soils 261
Simple standing and completed standing trenches 261
Size of individual tasks. Reliefs for workers 261-262
BRITISH EXPERIENCES IN TRENCH WARFARE 262-266
Concealment of trenches from hostile artillery 262
Limited field of fire better than loss of concealment 262
Concealment of obstacle 262
Accuracy of modern artillery fire 262
Narrow and deep trenches 262
Position of support trenches 262
Communicating trenches 262-263
Parados. Dummy parapets 263
Recesses under parapet. Ceiling 263
Head and overhead cover. Loopholes 263
Night attacks 263
Frontal and cross fire. Straight trenches 263
Dressing stations. Latrines. Drainage 263-265
Machine guns 265
Cover and concealment for reserves 265
Barbed wire entanglements. Concealment 265
Repair of obstacles. Supports for wire 265
Illumination 265
Echeloned trenches on the flanks 265
Conspicuous features of field fortifications
as seen by aeronauts 265-266
Resemblance of modern trench warfare to siege operations 266
Power of defense of modern weapons 266
Need for artillery support 266
The guiding principles of field fortification 266-267
PRACTICAL PROBLEMS IN FIELD FORTIFICATION, WITH SOLUTIONS 267-276
CHAPTER XIII
COMBAT--ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF A RIVER LINE,
WITHDRAWAL FROM ACTION, RENCONTRE, DELAYING
ACTION, PURSUIT, NIGHT ATTACKS, MACHINE GUNS 277-307
Mountain ranges, deserts and rivers as obstacles 277
ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF A RIVER LINE 277-288
Use of existing bridges and fords,
hasty bridges and ferries 277-278
METHODS OF ATTACK OF A RIVER LINE. Turning movement.
Turning movement combined with holding attack.
Frontal attacks at one or more points 278-279
Object of feint attack 279
Conditions to be fulfilled by feint 279-280
Conditions to be fulfilled by main attack 280-281
Necessity of deceiving the defender 281
Counter attack by the defender 281
CONDUCT OF THE ATTACK 281-283
Reconnaissance. Seizure of bridges 281
Outpost troops, cavalry and artillery 281-282
Time for attack. Night movements 281
Camping prior to attack 281
Artillery positions in attack of a river line 281-282
Machine guns. Position fire by infantry 282
Duties of the outpost 282
Launching the feint and main attack 282
Demonstrations on flank by cavalry. Pursuit 282
Position of reserve 283
Engineer reconnaissance. Construction of crossings 283
DEFENSE OF A RIVER LINE 284
General dispositions for and essential elements of
a river line defense 284
Alternative plans for defense. Counter attacks 284
Prompt detection of enemy’s intentions 284
Need of mobile reserves 284
Aerial reconnaissance 284
ORDERS FOR ATTACK OF A RIVER LINE 285-288
WITHDRAWAL FROM ACTION 288-295
Occasions for withdrawal 288
Difficulty of withdrawing troops committed to an action 288-289
Sacrifice of a portion of the command to save the remainder 289
Withdrawal under cover of darkness 289
Intrenching the advanced position in attack 289
Removal of trains, ambulance company and wounded 289
Requirements of supporting position to be occupied
by the reserves 289-290
Masking fire of supporting position 290
Flank positions 290
Long range fire. Cover. Getaway 290
Distance to rear of supporting position 290
Artillery fire during withdrawal. Withdrawal of artillery.
Ammunition trains 291
General rule for withdrawal 291
Order of withdrawal of troops and conditions influencing same 291
Rendezvous positions for retiring troops 292
Stream crossings 292
Utilization of several lines of retreat 292
Successive supporting positions to cover withdrawal 292
Formation of and troops for rear guard 292
Cavalry and signal troops 292-293
Transmission of orders 293
EXAMPLES OF VERBAL ORDERS FOR A WITHDRAWAL FROM ACTION 293-295
RENCONTRE OR MEETING ENGAGEMENT 295-297
Advantages of prompt action. Seizing the initiative 295
Reconnaissance prior to attack 295
Greatest possible force to be launched at enemy 296
Direction of deployment and of attack.
Machine guns and artillery 296
General duties of an advance guard. Proper strength
and distance from main body 296-297
Maneuvering zone for main body 296
Place of the supreme commander on the march 297
DELAYING ACTION 297-300
Offensive and defensive tactics in delaying actions 297
Use of long thin lines and weak supports 297
Necessity for a secure line of retreat 297
Delay of enemy, how accomplished 297
Necessity for good field of fire at mid and long ranges 297-298
Occupation of the geographical crest 298
Relative difficulty of withdrawing infantry and cavalry 298
Deceiving the enemy as to the strength of the position.
Risk involved 298
Assumption of the offensive. Obstacles 298-299
Number of successive positions to be occupied 299
Advantages of a determined stand 299
Danger of decisive engagement 299
Selection and preparation of delaying positions 299
Tendency of troops to break straight to rear 299
Flank positions. Distance between positions.
Step by step defensive. Rallying 299
Demolitions. Ambuscades 299
Line of an unfordable stream as a delaying position 300
Seizure of a position well to the front.
Orderly occupation of the position 300
Artillery and machine guns in delaying actions 300
Issue of ammunition for delaying actions 300
PURSUIT 300-302
Energetic pursuit necessary to reap fruits of victory 300
Fresh troops necessary for pursuit 301
Prompt initiation of pursuit 301
Cavalry, horse artillery and motor cars 301
Continuous contact with enemy 301
Gaining the flanks and rear 301
Seizure of bridges and defiles 301
Pursuit on a broad front 301
ORDER FOR A PURSUIT 301-302
NIGHT ATTACKS 302-304
Essential features of night attacks 302-303
Simplicity of plan 303
Importance of preliminary reconnaissance 303
Infantry, cavalry and artillery in night attacks 303
Badges and watchwords 303
Depth of attacking formations. Formed reserves 303
Night attacks by large and by small forces 303
Assembly for attack 303
Precautions to insure surprise of the enemy 303-304
Point of attack. False attacks and demonstrations 304
Rendezvous for assembly after the attack 304
Collection of scattered forces in case of failure 304
Time for delivery of attack 304
Night attack of a bridge head 304
Protection against night attacks. Field of fire 304
Artificial illumination. Alarm signals. Obstacles.
Close ranges for fire 304
Use of the bayonet. Machine guns 304
MACHINE GUNS. 304-307
Extensive use in modern warfare 304
Effective ranges and rates of fire.
Need for skilled operators 304-305
Pack and motor transport 305
Chief purpose of machine guns 305
Ammunition supply. Most favorable targets 305
Artillery vs. machine guns 305-306
Offensive and defensive use. Mobility 305-306
Immobilization of machine guns 305
Dispersion of guns 306
Supports for machine guns 306
SPECIAL CASES IN WHICH MACHINE GUNS MAY
BE EFFECTIVELY EMPLOYED 306-307
CHAPTER XIV
A POSITION IN READINESS 308-317
When to assume a position in readiness. Examples 308
CONSIDERATIONS PRIOR TO THE OCCUPATION OF A
POSITION IN READINESS 308-309
Cross roads. Cover. Lines of retreat 309
Reconnaissance of enemy and his possible lines of approach 309
Intrenching. “Framework” of position 309-310
Influence of ill-advised intrenchments 309-310
Posts of the artillery and combat trains. Firing data 310
Concentration of the forces. Advanced posts 310
Obstacles in front of the position 310
Duties of the cavalry 311
Security provided by the other arms 311
Issue of ammunition. Field trains and sanitary troops 311-312
Security of lines of retreat 312
Short movements to a position in readiness 312
ORDER FOR A POSITION IN READINESS WHILE ON THE MARCH 312-314
FIRST ORDER FOR A RETREAT, DELAYING THE ENEMY 314-317
CHAPTER XV
SANITARY TACTICS 318-323
SANITARY PERSONNEL AND MATERIEL WITH COMBATANT TROOPS 318
GENERAL DUTY OF THE SANITARY UNITS 318
Capacities of ambulance companies and field hospitals 319
SANITARY STATIONS DURING COMBAT. Battalion collecting
stations. Regimental aid stations. Dressing stations.
Slightly wounded stations. Location, duties, etc. 319-320
POLICE OF THE BATTLEFIELD. Transportation of wounded 321-322
CHAPTER XVI
THE RIFLE IN WAR 324-336
Location of firing line with respect to geographical
and military crests 324
The skyline 324
Grazing effect and plunging fire 324
Firing line in retreat or in delaying actions 324
Location of supports with respect to firing line 324
Defilade on reverse slopes. Formations of supports 324-325
Position fire in attack and in defense 325
RELATIVE VULNERABILITIES OF DIFFERENT FORMATIONS
UNDER AIMED AND UNDER SWEEPING FIRE OF SMALL ARMS 325-326
Effects of oblique and enfilade fire 326
Squad and platoon columns. Successive thin lines 326-327
Formations in approaching combat position.
Proper time for deployment 326
Effect of slopes on vulnerability 326-327
Deployment of squad and platoon columns 326-327
ADVANCE UNDER SHRAPNEL FIRE 327-329
Area covered by burst of shrapnel 327
Vulnerability of lines of skirmishers and of squad columns 327-328
Effect of oblique and enfilade fire, errors in range,
direction and burst 327-328
Squad columns, when employed 328
Vulnerability of lines of platoon columns 328
Use of successive thin lines, advantages and disadvantages 328-329
Slow, controlled fire. Rapid fire. Volley fire 329
Maximum and minimum rates of fire 329
Tendency of troops to fire rapidly 329
Ranges at which fire is opened in attack and in defense.
Firing on cavalry and artillery 329-330
Number of rounds to fire. Density of firing line 330
Effect of visibility of target and prominent landmarks
on dispersion and distribution 330
Methods of designating and identifying indistinct targets 330-331
Use of combined sights. Battle sights 331
Targets for attacker and for defender 331
Concentration of fire on critical points. How accomplished 331
Assignment of fronts. Covering the enemy’s line with fire 331-332
Overlapping and switching fire. Platoon sectors 331-332
Too great refinement to be avoided 332
DUTIES OF PERSONNEL IN A FIRE FIGHT. Major. Captain.
Chief of Platoon. Platoon Guide. Squad leader 332-334
Orders of the Captain 334
A CATECHISM OF THE RIFLE IN WAR 334-336
CHAPTER XVII
DIVISION TACTICS AND SUPPLY 337-380
MARCHES 337-344
Length of a day’s march. Marching rate. Rest days 337
Strength of advance guard. Splitting tactical units 337
Different arms and auxiliary troops with an advance guard 337
Position of division commander 337
Initial point of march and time of departure, in march orders 337
Rotation of units in position in column during a march 337-338
Division cavalry on the march. Time of starting. Duty 338
Distribution of artillery on the march. Artillery with
advance guard. Heavy field artillery.
Combat trains of the artillery 338-339
Artillery with flank guards or in two column formation 339
Artillery in rencontre engagements. Right of way for
firing batteries 339-340
Engineer troops and bridge trains on the march 340
Road space and capacities of light and heavy bridge equipage 340
Distribution and duties of signal troops on the march.
Telegraph and telephone lines 340-341
Time of starting the march. Details of the start. Assembly
of trains. Escort for trains. March outposts 341
ORDER FOR THE FORWARD MARCH OF A DIVISION 342-344
COMBAT 344-353
Time required for deployment of a division 344
FRONTAL AND ENVELOPING ATTACKS 344-345
Separation of attacks. Coordination. Launching the
attack. Obstacles of terrain 344-345
TURNING MOVEMENTS. Advantages and disadvantages 345
Plan of attack based on best dispositions of the infantry 345
Development and attack orders 346
FRONTAGES FOR DEPLOYMENT OF LARGER UNITS 346
Timing the advance. Signals 346
Distance from hostile line at which brigades deploy 346
Position of reserves 346-347
Depth of deployment. Distribution in depth 347-349
CONSIDERATIONS INFLUENCING DEPTH OF DEPLOYMENT 348
Dispositions of artillery 349
Release of trains on entering combat 349
Posts of artillery and small arms ammunition 349
Sanitary and engineer trains 349
Ambulance companies and field hospitals.
Stations and duties 349-350
Messages during combat 350
DUTIES SUBSEQUENT TO COMBAT. Evacuation of wounded.
Police of battlefield. Replenishment of ammunition
and rations. Prisoners. Trains. Instructions to
commander of line of communications 350-351
ORDER FOR A DIVISION ATTACK 351-353
CAMPING 353-360
TACTICAL AND SANITARY REQUIREMENTS OF A CAMP SITE 353-354
EXAMPLE OF A DIVISION CAMP ILLUSTRATED AND DISCUSSED 354-356
Routine orders in connection with camp. Issues,
disposal of empty wagons, etc. 356
ORDER FOR CAMPING AND OUTPOSTING OF A DIVISION 357-360
SUPPLY 360-380
AUTHORIZED TRAINS OF A DIVISION 360-361
Bakery train. Engineer train 361
SOURCES OF SUPPLY FOR ARMIES IN THE FIELD 361
Purchase and requisition. Methods 361-362
Authority of field Commander 362
Living off the country 362
Base depot. Advance supply depot. Means of transportation 362-367
Zone of the advance 364
Multiple lines of communication 364
The supply unit 364
Classes of trains. Ammunition, supply and field trains.
General supply trains. Combat trains 365-368
Access to trains by troops. Excessive size of trains 365
Methods of replenishing trains 366-367
Rations carried by individual soldiers and in trains 366-367
General supply column. Flying depots and refilling points 367
Personnel of field transport service 368
EXAMPLE OF THE SUPPLY OF A DIVISION ON THE MARCH,
WITH DISCUSSION 368-370
Problem of the supply of an advancing division
mathematically illustrated 370-372
Refilling points. Location 372
Maintenance of advance supply depot well to the front
Railroads and steamboats 372
Field bakery on line of communications 372
GENERAL RULES FOR GUIDANCE OF SUPPLY OFFICERS 372-373
Supply of Sherman’s army in the Atlanta campaign,
and of Grant’s army in the campaign of '64 373
Protection of supply depot 373
Camping place of division trains.
Issues of rations and ammunition 373-375
Access to trains by troops 375
Supplies for the cavalry 375
Arrangement of division trains on the march according
to probable needs 376
Stations of trains during combat 376
Rates of march of wagon trains 376-377
Supplies obtained locally 377-378
Miscellaneous data on supply and transportation 378-380
Table of rations, kinds, weights, number of rations
to an army wagon, a railroad car, ship’s ton, etc. 379
CHAPTER XVIII
AIR CRAFT AND MOTOR VEHICLES IN WAR 381-390
History of development 381
Precursors of air craft of today 381
Aeroplanes and airships 381
Development of scope in military operations 381
Tendency to exaggerate importance and minimize limitations 381
CHARACTERISTICS 381-383
Aeroplanes, flying radius, speed, carrying capacity,
starting and landing, susceptibility to hostile fire 381-382
Dependability for immediate service 381
Machine and engine fragile 382
Care and repair of aeroplanes. Need of highly trained personnel 382
Development. Types of craft, destroyers, battleplanes,
artillery spotters, scouts 382
Equipment. Organization. Motor trucks as tenders 382
Airships, flying radius, speed, ability to hover over spot,
carrying capacity, effect of rain and darkness 382-383
Reconnaissance, wireless equipment 383
Target afforded 383
Large crews required 383
Bases of operation 383
Balloons. Hydroaeroplanes 383
Armor and armament of aircraft 383
DUTIES OF AIRCRAFT. Strategic and tactical reconnaissance 383-384
Verification by actual contact 384
Prevention of hostile reconnaissance 384
Direction of artillery fire. Air raids 384
Messenger and staff duty 384
PRACTICABLE HEIGHTS FOR OBSERVATION 384-385
Altitude and speed demanded by reconnaissance 385
Fire of small arms and anti-aircraft artillery 385
Use of field glasses 385
Relative vulnerabilities of airships and aeroplanes 385
DEFENSIVE MEASURES 385-386
Command of the air. Tactics of aircraft 385
Anti-aircraft artillery. Methods of fire 385-386
POWERS AND LIMITATIONS OF AIR CRAFT 386
THE MOTOR CAR IN WAR 387-390
Tactical movements of troops by auto 387
Facility of loading, dispatch and unloading 387
Difficulty of interrupting motor transport 387
Concentration of reserves at critical points 387
Motor cars in retreat and pursuit 387
Motor transport for artillery 387
Armored cars 387
Overseas operations 388
Motor cars for staff transportation 388
Motor trucks for supply. Advantages over animal transport 388
Motor kitchens 388
Effect of motor transport on distance of an army from its base 388
Economic size of motor trucks for supply 388-389
Use of motor trucks on railroads 389
Motor ambulances 389
Service of information. Motor patrols 389
Motors as adjunct to aero service 389
Necessity for motor cars in modern war 389
Employment of motor cars in groups of the same type 389-390
Animal transport for field and combat trains 390
INTRODUCTION.
The almost studied indifference of the American people toward
reasonable preparation for the contingency of war makes more urgent the
duty of all officers or those who hope to become officers, to do all
in their power in advance to prepare themselves and those committed to
their care for the immense responsibilities that will rest upon them
when the storm bursts upon the nation.
The modern theory of war as exemplified in the practice of the
so-called military nations, is that all the resources of the
state--moral, physical and intellectual--should be at the disposal
of the government for use in case of war. War is the most critical
condition of the modern state with its highly developed and peculiarly
sensitive and vulnerable industrial and commercial systems. For the
successful prosecution of a conflict on which the very fate of the
nation may depend, every ounce of its strength should be available.
The aim is to strike immediately with all the force at the nation’s
command. That state is best prepared which can most rapidly bring to
bear its resources in men and materials. In this modern theory is
involved the principle that every able-bodied male citizen owes to the
state the obligation of service. This principle is not incompatible
with democratic ideals and is recognized in theory by our own
constitution. Personal service to be truly effective must be universal,
compulsory and regular. It constitutes the true and only solution of
the problem of adequate defense. All other solutions are makeshifts
resulting from the attempt to get something without paying the cost.
All have been tried again and again by the United States and other
countries, and all have invariably been found wanting.
War today is one of the most highly developed of the arts--the field of
the expert and the professional. This being the case there is more than
ever before a need for adequate preparation in advance of the outbreak
of war. The unprepared people or government who now-a-days find
themselves on the brink of hostilities with a nation that is trained
for the struggle, must expect inevitably to pay a severe national
penalty.
The preparation of a nation for war is of two kinds; one of material
things, the construction of forts, arsenals, fabrication of weapons,
munitions, etc., the other the training of its people. While both are
essential, the latter is the more important, as well as the more
difficult to provide. The American people, in fancied security, have
steadfastly refused to pass laws or vote funds for adequate military
preparation, either in materiel or personnel. It is evident that we
regard the risk as insufficient to warrant the insurance, and we prefer
to court war and pay its cost in blood and pensions, not to mention the
risk of huge indemnities and the loss of valuable territory, national
prestige and honor. We insure our own insignificant lives and pitiful
possessions but refuse to insure the life of the nation.
The systematic and intelligent progress that has marked our industrial
growth has been conspicuously lacking in our military affairs. “Whether
we may be willing to admit it or not,” says General Upton, “in the
conduct of war we have rejected the practice of European nations and,
with little variation, have thus far pursued the policy of China.”
As to the amount of the risk involved in our policy of national defense
or, as some would say, our lack of policy, it has increased by leaps
and bounds with the constantly augmented military strength of the other
great nations of the earth. This strength is hundreds of times as
great as in the days of our thirteen colonies. The seas, which we have
hitherto regarded as barriers for our protection, are today favorable
avenues for the transport of troops and materials. As to the imminence
of the risk we may gain an insight from contemplation of the present
situation in Europe, and consideration of the effect of our vast
undefended territory and wealth upon the envy and cupidity of other
powerful states less fortunately situated than ourselves.
Preparedness for national defense, says Hudson Maxim, is simply a
quarantine against the pestilence of war.
The best training for war is, of course, the actual experience of
warfare; but for practical purposes this school is too limited to be
of much assistance to the actors in person. If a reasonable period
of peace intervenes between wars the actors of one war are to a very
limited extent only, those having experience of the previous conflict.
Even the general lessons of war are too quickly set aside. How little
military knowledge has the present generation of Americans to show for
the priceless expenditure of the Nation in the unsurpassed school of
the Civil War. Wars are fought by the very young men of the country,
and this is true not only of the rank and file but also of the majority
of the commanders. The hope of the nation lies therefore, in its
youth, and how shall this youth be trained?
The duty devolves upon the older officers. There is no higher mission
for older officers in time of peace than the systematic development
of the talents of the younger officers entrusted to their care. These
young officers will be the leaders in the next great war and the fate
of the nation may indeed depend upon them. The nation, therefore, has
every right to demand of the superiors that nothing will be left undone
that may prepare these youths for the trial. Thus will the superiors
be exerting their powerful influence upon the course of the coming
war. The methods available are the study of history, working of map
problems, and terrain exercises, tactical rides or walks, the war
game--all in connection with field maneuvers with troops.
Correct training for service in campaign must aim to develop the sound
characteristics of the individual, rather than to bind him to a system.
The eternal fighting unit being the man, and no two men being created
alike, anything which unduly hampers the initiative or self reliance of
the officer, though intended as an aid, is in fact a restraint. Hence
the caution cannot be too oft repeated that the officer must exert
himself to keep aloof from rigid forms or models or precedents because,
as in the military service there are no actual equals in rank, so there
is no complete precedent for a military situation. Each situation is
unique, as is also the man who meets it.
Nevertheless in the broad training of large numbers of young men
the whims of the individual must not be confused with his sound
characteristics, lest the results of his training be as a crop of
weeds. The desire to develop the essential traits of each individual’s
character is not a reason for haphazard instruction or lack of system.
Those charged with the education of officers can accomplish broader
results if their methods are based on systematic effort with the
fundamental idea that the system is an aid to the individual, rather
than that the individual is an agent of the system.
Outside of campaign the officer obtains his schooling from the
experience of handling men and from individual study. These sources are
complementary, neither is complete without the other. The commander
receives his education not only in the saddle, but at his desk. It is
fortunate that this is so, because if outdoor maneuvers with troops
were alone of value, the greater part of his time would have to be
spent unprofitably. And no single effort expended in the peace training
of officers will give greater results in the supreme test of war than
the inculcation of habits of ceaseless industry.
On Von Moltke’s estimate of the value of tactical problems as a
preparation for war we get an interesting side-light in an incident
related of him by a French officer who, prior to the Franco-Prussian
War, was on a mission to Berlin. Von Moltke was speaking of the
decadence of French military training at that time, and he said to the
officer: “Have you even the superficial smattering of the elements of
the military art? I am tempted to doubt it. I wager that you do not
know the most valuable piece of furniture of an officer in garrison.
Come with me,” and so saying the old Prussian led his visitor into a
small bed chamber suitable for a sub-lieutenant, containing a small bed
without curtains, three straw chairs, shelves of books from floor to
ceiling, and in the center a blackboard on an easel, the floor littered
with pieces of chalk. “It is with this,” said Von Moltke, “that we beat
our adversaries every morning, and as for art, here is all we want,”
and he exhibited a series of topographic sketches.
The purpose then of this volume is to supply in compact form the
help needed by the instructor,--or the student working alone--in the
applicatory method of study. It is not intended as a text alone; its
principal rôle is that of a guide to those engaged in the study of
practical problems in tactics, either as instructor or student--for
the preparation or solution of those problems. It is believed to
be the only single work overlooking, from this point of view, the
entire field of minor tactics. Nearly everything contained in this
volume can be found elaborated in special treatises, but time is of
value to the military student and this work gives in a single volume
authoritatively the data that must otherwise be searched for through
a small library. The organizations used in the text are those of the
American service, but the tactical principles discussed are of general
application. They pertain however, primarily to systematic organized
warfare against a civilized foe, and have but a limited application
to “bushwhacking,” guerrilla and savage warfare. Furthermore they are
applicable especially to the warfare of the open field, with its rapid
changes in situation, rather than the trench deadlocks so nearly akin
to siege warfare which, under modern conditions, may often characterize
the operations of highly trained belligerents in large forces of
nearly equal strength. Many minor details given in Field Service
Regulations, Infantry Drill Regulations, and other manuals, are of
necessity omitted. This volume is not intended to take the place of the
authorized government publications.
The apparently deliberate evasion of definite or even approximate
statements as to formations, strength, distances, intervals, etc.,
and the frequent repetition of the phrase, “this depends upon
circumstances,” which characterize many writings on the subject of
tactics, give rise to a desire, frequently expressed, for more specific
information on these and similar matters. So far as seemed practicable
the authors have endeavored herein to satisfy this desire. This is done
with the full knowledge that warfare cannot be pursued as an exact
science, and that the endeavor to be specific may in some instances
elicit criticism.
Whatever one attempts he should be familiar with the methods which
have characterized good practice in that particular line of endeavor.
When confronted with a specific case the individual searches for the
underlying principles which find application therein, and it is here
that his resourcefulness and originality are called into play. The
authors in each case discussed have endeavored to state clearly all
the principles which may be applicable, giving at the same time some
concrete illustrations in figures, distances, etc., of simple cases.
These illustrations are not to be considered as models or patterns.
Their purpose is solely that of illustrating the manner in which the
stated principles are exemplified by a stated case.
For the officer charged with the conduct of garrison schools, militia
instruction, field maneuvers, war games, the preparation of lectures
and problems, etc., it is believed this volume will form a valuable
ready reference. And of equal importance will it be to the officer
of the army or militia, compelled for any reason to study alone. To
such, the book is a silent instructor, a guide, a critic. To officers
preparing for promotion examination, and to those at the Service
Schools or in preparation therefor, it has special application.
If merit be found in the work, the credit is due to the large number
of officers of the army, many of them recognized authorities, with
whose assistance and under whose advice, inspiration, and guidance it
has been produced. Criticisms or suggestions for improvement will be
appreciated by the authors.
ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY.
The following organization is a simple summary of that given in Field
Service Regulations, 1914, (F.S.R.), as amended by the Act of June 3,
1916.
A typical _army corps_ consists of:
Headquarters
2 or more infantry divisions
1 or more cavalry brigades or a cavalry division
1 field artillery brigade
1 telegraph battalion
1 field signal battalion
There will be included such ammunition, supply, engineer and sanitary
trains as the President may deem necessary. A corps is the appropriate
command of a Lieutenant General.
A typical _infantry division_ consists of:
Headquarters
3 infantry brigades
1 regiment of cavalry
1 brigade of field artillery
1 regiment of engineers
1 field signal battalion
1 aero squadron
1 ammunition train
1 supply train
1 engineer train
1 sanitary train
A division is the appropriate command of a Major General.
A typical _cavalry brigade_ consists of the headquarters and three
cavalry regiments. When the brigade acts independently, horse artillery
may be attached.
A typical _cavalry division_ consists of:
Headquarters
3 cavalry brigades
1 regiment of field artillery (horse)
1 battalion of engineers (mounted)
1 field signal battalion (mounted)
1 aero squadron
1 ammunition train
1 supply train
1 engineer train
1 sanitary train
A light bridge train and 1 or more pack trains are attached when
necessary.
A _brigade_ consists of 3 regiments (inf. or cav.) When operating alone
or independently it usually has auxiliary troops attached. A brigade is
the appropriate command of a Brigadier General.
_Line of communications._ For each army corps or important
expeditionary force about to take the field, a _base_ is selected and
equipped and a service of the _line of communications_ established,
both under the control of the commander of the army corps or
expeditionary force.
The _staffs_ of brigades and higher units shall be as prescribed by the
President of the United States. Typical _staffs_ are as follows:
Brigade, including cavalry brigade
1 brigade adjutant, major (1 civilian clerk)
2 aides, lieutenants
Division, including cavalry division
1 chief of staff, colonel
2 assistant chiefs of staff, majors or captains
1 division adjutant, major
1 division inspector, major
1 judge advocate, major
(for above, 6 civilian clerks)
1 chief quartermaster, lieut. colonel
1 chief surgeon, lieutenant colonel
3 aides, captains or lieutenants
When necessary the commanders of the engineers and signal troops may
be directed, in addition to their other duties, to act, respectively,
as chief engineer and chief signal officer. When a division acts
independently, a chief engineer, (lieutenant colonel) may be detailed
on the staff of the division commander.
Corps.
1 chief of staff, brigadier general
1 adjutant general, colonel
1 inspector general, colonel
1 judge advocate, colonel or lieutenant colonel
1 chief quartermaster, colonel
1 chief surgeon, colonel
1 chief engineer, colonel
1 chief ordnance officer, colonel, or lieutenant colonel
1 chief signal officer, colonel or lieutenant colonel
3 aides, with the rank of lieutenant colonel
(each of the above is assisted by one or more subordinates
and the necessary clerical force)
_Details of organization._
INFANTRY.
A company:
1 captain
1 1st lieutenant
1 2d lieutenant
100 enlisted men
Provided: That the President may increase each company by
50 enlisted men
A machine gun company:
1 captain (mounted)
1 1st lieutenant (mounted)
2 2d lieutenants (mounted)
53 enlisted men
4 guns (2 platoons)
A battalion:
1 major (mounted)
1 adjutant (mounted)
4 companies
A regiment:
1 colonel (mounted)
1 lieutenant colonel (mounted)
headquarters company, 1 captain, 58 enlisted men (8 mounted);
includes part of the noncommissioned staff of regiment and
battalions band, mounted orderlies, etc. supply company,
2 officers, 10 enlisted men, and one wagoner for each
authorized wagon of field and combat trains
3 battalions
1 machine gun company
CAVALRY.
A troop:
1 captain
2 lieutenants
70 enlisted men (4 platoons)
Provided: That the President may increase each troop by
35 enlisted men
A machine gun troop:
4 officers
70 enlisted men
4 guns (2 platoons)
A squadron:
1 major
1 adjutant
4 troops
A regiment:
1 colonel
1 lieutenant colonel
2 veterinarians
headquarters troop, 1 captain, 54 enlisted men;
includes part of the non-commissioned staff of regiment
and squadrons, band, orderlies, etc. supply troop, 3 officers,
10 enlisted men and one wagoner for each authorized wagon of
field and combat trains
3 squadrons
1 machine gun troop
FIELD ARTILLERY.[1]
A battery:
1 captain
4 lieutenants
126 enlisted men
4 guns
12 caissons
(A mountain battery includes also 1 packmaster,
1 assistant packmaster and 3 cargadores)
Provided: That the President may increase each battery
by 64 enlisted men
A battalion:
1 major
1 captain
3 batteries for light or mountain artillery, 2 batteries
for horse or heavy field
A regiment of 2 battalions:
1 colonel
1 lieutenant colonel
1 captain
2 veterinarians
headquarters company, 2 officers, 67 enlisted men;
includes part of the non-commissioned staffs of regiment
and battalions, band, orderlies, etc. supply company,
2 officers, 10 enlisted men and 1 wagoner for each
authorized wagon of field and combat trains.
2 battalions. The number of battalions may be increased
with corresponding changes in the headquarters and
supply companies.
[Footnote 1: Field artillery includes mountain, light, horse, and heavy
artillery (field and siege types).]
The organization of horse artillery is similar to that of light
artillery. Most of the men are individually mounted. (See also
“Artillery tactics,” Chapter VIII.)
ENGINEERS.
A company:
1 captain (mounted)
3 lieutenants (mounted)
109 enlisted men (24 mounted)
Provided: That the President may increase each company
by 55 enlisted men.
A mounted company:
1 captain
3 lieutenants
74 enlisted men
Provided: That the President may increase each mounted
company by 37 enlisted men
A battalion:
1 major (mounted)
1 captain (mounted)
1 battalion sergeant major
3 master engineers, junior grade
3 companies
A mounted battalion:
1 major
2 captains
1 1st lieutenant
1 veterinarian
1 master engineer, senior grade
3 master engineers, junior grade
non-commissioned staff
3 mounted companies
A regiment:
1 colonel (mounted)
1 lieutenant colonel (mounted)
non-commissioned staff
2 master engineers, senior grade
1 wagoner for each authorized wagon of field and combat trains
2 battalions
Note.--Mounted engineers have no regimental organization.
A company with bridge equipage usually has 3 divisions of bridge
equipage. A battalion has therefore 9 divisions of bridge equipage,
3 light and 6 heavy. One division of the heavy equipage (225 ft. of
bridge) has 16 wagons and 84 mules. One division of the light equipage
(186 ft. of bridge) has 14 wagons and 56 mules.
SIGNAL CORPS.
The President is authorized to organize such numbers of companies,
battalions and aero squadrons of the Signal corps as the necessities of
the service may demand. Typical organizations are as follows:
Wire company: (all mounted)
1 captain
2 lieutenants
75 enlisted men
6 wire carts
1 instrument wagon
Radio company: (all mounted)
1 captain
2 lieutenants
75 enlisted men; 2 platoons of 2 radio sections each
(2 wheel and 2 pack)
3 combat wagons (2 radio, 1 instrument)
6 pack mules
Field battalion:
1 major
1 adjutant
n. c. staff
4 mounted orderlies
4 field wagons
1 shop wagon
2 companies, 1 wire and 1 radio
A wire company of signal troops has two platoons of two wire sections
each. The wire section has 5 miles of wire (single conductor, ground
return) and instruments (telegraph and telephone) for 4 stations. Each
radio section can set up one station, having a radius of about 200
miles for wheel sections and 30 miles for pack sections. The distances
are subject to great variations. (See also F. S. R. 1914.)
TRANSPORTATION.
Wagon company:
36 enlisted personnel
112 draft mules
6 saddle mules
27 wagons
Auto truck company:
37 enlisted personnel
27 auto trucks, freight
1 auto truck, supply
Pack train:
14 enlisted personnel
50 pack mules
14 saddle mules
Note:--The tables of organization are subject to change from time to
time. The latest tables of organization issued by the War Dept. should
be consulted for details.
WAR STRENGTH, IN ROUND NUMBERS, ROAD SPACE, AND DIMENSIONS OF CAMPS.
--(F. S. R., 1914.)
------------------------------+-----------------+---------+
| War strength, | |
| in | |
| round numbers | |
Units. +--------+--------+ |
| | |Vehicles,|
| | | guns. |
| Men. |(horses | |
| |mules). | |
------------------------------+--------+--------+---------+
Divisions: | | | |
Infantry | 22,000 | 7,500 | 900 |
Calvary | 10,000 | 12,000 | 500 |
Brigades: | | | |
Infantry | 5,500 | 520 | 67 |
Cavalry | 2,500 | 2,900 | 53 |
Artillery | 2,300 | 2,300 | 257 |
Smaller units (including | | | |
attached sanitary troops):| | | |
Infantry regiment | 1,860 | 170 | 22 |
Cavalry regiment | 1,250 | 1,430 | 26 |
Field artillery, light, | | | |
regiment | 1,150 | 1,150 | 128 |
Field artillery, horse, | | | |
regiment | 1,150 | 1,150 | 131 |
Field artillery, heavy, | | | |
regiment | 1,240 | 1,340 | 131 |
Field artillery, mountain, | | | |
regiment | 1,100 | 1,160 | |
Engineers, pioneer battalion| 490 | 160 | 12 |
Engineers, pioneer | | | |
battalion (mounted) | 270 | 370 | 11 |
Engineers, ponton | | | |
battalion | 500 | 820 | 145 |
Signal troops, field | | | |
battalion | 160 | 200 | 15 |
Signal troops, field cavalry| | | |
battalion | 170 | 200 | 11 |
Signal troops, aero | | | |
squadron (including | | | |
landing place 150 | | | |
yards by 350 yards) | 90 | | 16 |
Trains: | | | |
Infantry division-- | | | |
Ammunition | 260 | 750 | 162 |
Supply | 190 | 630 | 126 |
Sanitary[2] | 530 | 500 | 90 |
Engineer | 10 | 40 | 9 |
Cavalry division-- | | | |
Ammunition | 60 | 140 | 33 |
Supply | 220 | 860 | 75 |
Sanitary | 300 | 300 | 53 |
-------------------------------+--------+--------+---------+
------------------------------+------------------------------------+
| |
| Length of columns. |
| |
------------------------------+------------+----------+------------+
| | | |
| Organiz- | | Ammunition |
| ations, | + Field | supply, |
Units. | including | trains | sanitary, |
| combat | without | and |
| trains. | distance | engineer |
| | | trains. |
------------------------------+------------+----------+------------+
Divisions: | | | |
Infantry | 9.5 mi. | 11.0 mi. | 3.5 mi. |
Calvary | 8.0 mi. | 9.5 mi. | 1.5 mi. |
Brigades: | | | |
Infantry | 1.7 mi. | 2.0 mi. | |
Cavalry | 1.5 mi. | 1.9 mi. | |
Artillery | [3]2.6 mi. | 2.9 mi. | |
Smaller units (including | | | |
attached sanitary troops):| _Yards._ | _Yards._ | _Yards._ |
Infantry regiment | 970 | 1,150 | |
Cavalry regiment | 1,310 | 1,640 | |
Field artillery, light, | | | |
regiment | [4]1,720 | 2,800 | |
Field artillery, horse, | | | |
regiment | 1,960 | 3,160 | |
Field artillery, heavy, | | | |
regiment | 2,240 | 3,660 | |
Field artillery, mountain, | | | |
regiment | 1,520 | 2,540 | |
Engineers, pioneer battalion| 410 | 470 | |
Engineers, pioneer | | | |
battalion (mounted) | 350 | 440 | |
Engineers, ponton | | | |
battalion | 3,360 | 3,480 | |
Signal troops, field | | | |
battalion | 310 | 370 | |
Signal troops, field cavalry| | | |
battalion | 240 | 300 | |
Signal troops, aero | | | |
squadron (including | | | |
landing place 150 | | | |
yards by 350 yards) | 140 | 200 | |
Trains: | | | |
Infantry division-- | | | |
Ammunition | | | 2,440 |
Supply | | | 2,000 |
Sanitary | | | 1,530 |
Engineer | | | 150 |
Cavalry division-- | | | |
Ammunition | | | 500 |
Supply | | | 1,200 |
Sanitary | | | 890 |
------------------------------+------------+----------+------------+
--------------------------------+-----------------------
| Contracted camping
| space (troops
| and trains).
------------------------------+------------+------------
| |
Units. | | Approximate
| | number
| Yards. | of
| | acres.
| |
| |
------------------------------+-------------+------------
Divisions: | |
Infantry | | 180
Calvary | | 150
Brigades: | |
Infantry | | 19
Cavalry | | 18
Artillery | | 30
Smaller units (including | |
attached sanitary troops):| |
Infantry regiment | 160 by 180 | 6.2
Cavalry regiment | 200 by 200 | 8.2
Field artillery, light, | |
regiment | 240 by 300 | 14.7
Field artillery, horse, | |
regiment | 240 by 400 | 19.6
Field artillery, heavy, | |
regiment | 260 by 300 | 16.0
Field artillery, mountain, | |
regiment | 80 by 380 | 6.2
Engineers, pioneer battalion| 50 by 200 | 2.0
Engineers, pioneer | |
battalion (mounted) | 50 by 260 | 2.6
Engineers, ponton | |
battalion | 160 by 315 | 10.0
Signal troops, field | |
battalion | 30 by 240 | 1.7
Signal troops, field cavalry| |
battalion | 30 by 210 | 1.3
Signal troops, aero | |
squadron (including | |
landing place 150 | |
yards by 350 yards) | 175 by 350 | 12.5
Trains: | |
Infantry division-- | |
Ammunition | 75 by 380 | 5.8
Supply | 80 by 380 | 6.2
Sanitary[5] | 100 by 260 | 5.3
Engineer | 20 by 140 | .6
Cavalry division-- | |
Ammunition | 30 by 200 | 1.2
Supply | 80 by 280 | 4.6
Sanitary | 50 by 260 | 2.7
----------------------------------+------------+-----------
[Footnote 2: This table is based upon the road spaces occupied by
troops at war strength, infantry in column of squads, cavalry in column
of fours, artillery and trains in single column.
The spaces differ but little from the requirements of drill
regulations. On the march, after a command is straightened out on the
road, elongation always takes place. In calculating the length of a
column further allowance must, therefore, be made in accordance with
circumstances--sometimes as much as 25 per cent.
The contracted camping spaces afford sufficient room for a one-night
halt. They require that the animals and vehicles of a single troop,
battery, or company be placed on the same line with the men where
practicable to do so within the camp lengths above given; that the
men be in double shelter tents (or in double row of shelter tents),
and that the lines on which adjacent companies are established be
separated by distances not exceeding 11 yards for infantry and other
dismounted organizations, double carriage length for field artillery
(except mountain), and 12 yards for cavalry and remaining mounted
organizations. Latrines are placed on the opposite side of camp from
company kitchens and at a minimum distance of 50 yards from the men.
The camp areas given represent minimum requirements under favorable
conditions of terrain and should be increased whenever practicable,
particularly for sanitary reasons in those cases where a camp is to be
occupied for more than one day.
For approximate calculations, assume 1,600 meters = 1 mile; 5 miles = 8
kilometers; the number of acres in a rectangular tract = the product of
one-seventieth of the length in yards by one-seventieth of the width in
yards.]
[Footnote 3: Combat train 1 mile long.]
[Footnote 4: Combat train 840 yards long.]
[Footnote 5: Combat train 840 yards long.]
PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE SOLUTION OF TERRAIN EXERCISES,
MAP MANEUVERS, AND MAP PROBLEMS.
ESTIMATE OF SITUATION
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Do you understand it clearly?
Mission Has it changed at time considered?
In order to accomplish it must you temporarily adopt
another mission?
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Strength (Is he deficient in any particular arm?)
Position (Has he probably moved or is he likely to?)
Enemy Probable intentions?
Is he likely to be reinforced?
Is he deficient in training or morale or other quality?
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Strength (Are you deficient in any arm?)
Your Own Position of your troops (Are they in hand or scattered?)
Forces Are you likely to be reinforced?
Can you send for help?
(Do not ask for help unless you need it.)
Are your troops deficient in morale or training or
other quality?
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Conditions Favorable and unfavorable.
In good weather.
When covered with snow.
Condition of roads When frozen.
When muddy and rainy (slippery).
When thawing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Bridges.
Rivers--depth--fordable.
Hills.
Terrain Mountains.
Forests.
Is soil difficult to entrench?
What is your line of retreat? (Have you more than one?)
What is enemy’s line of retreat? (Has he more than one?)
Where is your base?
If enemy is in position which is his weak flank?
Which will endanger his retreat?
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Comparison Different courses open;
of Plans for Roads by which you may advance (retreat).
Accomplishing Roads by which enemy may advance (retreat).
Your Mission Defensive positions, if mission requires it.
Positions in readiness, if mission requires it.
Best plan for attack, if mission requires it.
Make your plan simple.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Rain and its effects.
Drouth--is water for drinking scarce?
Effect of floods.
Dust--Will it disclose your movements?
Weather Snow and its effects.
Are roads frozen?
Are roads thawing?
What is phase of moon? Does it favor night movements?
Are fogs or high winds likely to occur?
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Decision Clear and concise statement of what you propose to do.
Clear and concise statement of how you propose to do it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Make it simple.
Avoid dispersion.
Send away no detachments unless considered absolutely
necessary.
Look out for your flanks.
Plan for Provide for ample reserves properly distributed.
Carrying Do not commit too many men at the start until situation
Out Your is sized up.
Decision Take advantage of ground.
Do not neglect your reconnaissance.
Beware of half measures.
You must obtain fire superiority to win.
You can obtain fire superiority easier by an enveloping
attack,
other things being equal.
Give each element of your command a task.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
CHAPTER I.
THE PREPARATION AND SOLUTION OF TACTICAL PROBLEMS.
The solution of practical problems in tactics, either on the map or
on the terrain, constitutes what is known as the applicatory method
of instruction. It is the method followed by all modern armies, being
properly regarded as the best substitute possible in time of peace for
the actual experience of war. Indeed it is not to be regarded purely as
a substitute for actual experience, inasmuch as it affords opportunity
for the frequent and repeated application of principles to various
concrete cases. Actual warfare will furnish to the majority of officers
comparatively few opportunities of this kind.
_Kinds of problems._--Tactical problems may be solved on the map or on
the terrain. In the former class are included map problems, and one or
two-sided war games. Problems on the terrain include tactical walks
or rides, terrain exercises (without troops) and one and two-sided
field maneuvers (with troops). These problems are prepared with a view
to illustrating certain tactical principles. In some cases they call
especially for decision, in other cases they are intended to give
practice in the technique of carrying out a decision already made.
Often the two functions are combined in a single problem. The former
class are known as problems of decision. The latter are usually called
troop leading problems.
Each class of problem has its particular field, and tactical
instruction should not be limited to any one class. Problems involving
a decision as to a course of action for a large force must necessarily
be solved on a map, due to the inability of one man to see in person
the terrain that would be covered by a division, for example. Thus, for
the higher commanders, all problems of decision must of necessity be
map problems even if, as in actual warfare or maneuvers, the decision
is carried out on the terrain. Troop leading problems on the terrain
should, for similar reasons, generally be limited to forces not
exceeding a regiment in size. Problems involving the detailed location
of defensive works can be solved satisfactorily only on the ground and
should always take the form of terrain exercises.
The two-sided war game is played by two individuals or two groups under
the direction of an umpire. It is of peculiar value in that it calls
for quick and frequent decision and, by its form--particularly the
competition involved--it serves to stimulate interest.
The tactical walk or ride is an exercise on the terrain in which
various situations, either independent or continuous, are presented
by the instructor and discussed with the students. It has the defect
of failing to place upon the shoulders of most of the students the
responsibility of making a decision, and in this respect is inferior
to the terrain exercise in which each student is required to write out
his solution to every situation. The tactical ride, however, affords
opportunity for bringing out, more or less forcibly, certain tactical
principles which the instructor has in mind, and it may occasionally be
employed to advantage.
Field maneuvers are problems in which the solution, instead of being
written by the student, is actually executed on the terrain with troops.
The map problem will be the means of instruction most readily
available to the largest number of officers, but this should whenever
practicable, be supplemented by exercises on the terrain, both with and
without troops.
Tactical problems vary greatly in substance, in fact no two are alike.
In their general form, however, they are usually similar. The problem
will ordinarily open with a statement of the general conditions in the
theatre of war as a whole, the two combatants being usually designated
by colors, such as Blue and Red. This statement is called the “general
situation,” and is usually presumed to be known to both combatants,
at least in a general way. It is, of course, always imaginary, even
if the problem actually involves real troops. In small problems the
“general situation” may be omitted. The problem next sets forth in
some detail the circumstances of some particular body of troops on one
side, under the heading “special situation--Blue,” (or “Red.”) Under
this heading may be included a statement of the strength and position
of the troops under consideration (of which the student is assumed to
be the supreme or one of the subordinate commanders); information as to
friendly troops in the vicinity with a statement of their movements and
intentions (if necessary); the orders received from higher authority;
certain information concerning the enemy, more or less incomplete
and often unreliable, usually in the form of advices from higher
authority, messages and reports from subordinates, spies, deserters,
prisoners or civilians, newspapers, etc.; information as to the hour
and date at which the situation opens, weather, terrain, and such other
local conditions as may have a bearing on the situation; etc., etc.
The information set forth in the “special situation” in whole or in
part, may, or may not be known to the enemy. As to this the student
is generally required to judge for himself. The problem concludes
with a statement of certain “requirements,” the fulfillment of which
constitutes the “solution.” These requirements may include:
1. The “estimate of the situation,” with the decision and plan
of action of the commander.
2. The orders and messages issued by the commander.
3. Actions of the commander.
4. Sketches or plans of dispositions, etc.
The “estimate of the situation” is a logical process of thought,
terminating in a tactical “decision.” Such a process will be no
innovation in the brain of any thinking man, since it is characteristic
not only of tactics, but of all other serious affairs of life. It
involves a careful consideration and analysis of all the evidence
bearing upon the situation. The form given at the beginning of this
Chapter sets forth in brief and comprehensive manner the principal
points to be considered in making this estimate. It is intended to
guide and assist the mental process, by insuring consideration of
all matters of importance, but it should not be allowed to restrict
independent thought. Not all of these considerations will exert an
influence on the solution of any given problem. There is often some one
preponderating condition, seldom more than two or three, which really
influence the decision.
The most important consideration, which forms the basis of all
subsequent thought and action, is the _mission_ of the command. In a
force which is an integral part of a larger force the mission will
usually, although not always, be embodied in the orders of higher
authority. For an independent command, however, the mission must
generally be deduced from the commander’s knowledge of the wishes or
intentions of superior authority, and of the existing situation and
conditions. It is here that the judgment of the commander is called
into play, since the accomplishment of his true mission may require a
course of action entirely at variance with the orders he has received.
It is for this reason that orders too restrictive, and in too great
detail, should not be given to subordinates who are expected to
exercise to any considerable degree, independence of command. Their
initiative must not be unduly hampered, as unexpected developments may
entirely change the situation, and with it the mission. For example;
an independent command, sent forward to seize a certain town finds it
occupied by a superior force of the enemy, while another large force is
approaching from a flank, and threatening to cut off retreat. It is now
apparent that the original mission must be abandoned. The commander’s
new mission has become that of saving his command by a prompt retreat.
Gen. Von Verdy du Vernois says: “The officer who suddenly encounters
the enemy while patrolling with his platoon must conduct his actions
from a different point of view than if he commands his platoon as
skirmishers in front of his company. A division in an army corps will
generally be so situated that it must carry out an action, even though
it be completely annihilated in so doing, and then it would still be
promoting the general purpose; on the other hand, a division widely
separated from an army would, as a rule, utterly fail to accomplish
its mission if it allowed itself to be annihilated.” In such cases the
commander must consider whether his division is not worth more than the
accomplishment of his specific mission.
An estimate of the situation usually involves a careful consideration
of times and distances. The information as to the enemy will be more
or less incomplete, and often contradictory. Each item of information
must be carefully weighed to determine the degree of credibility to be
attached thereto, and from the preponderance of evidence the course of
action must be determined. The only absolutely reliable information of
the enemy is that obtained from the personal observation of trained
officers, and even this may sometimes be at fault.
In order to secure some degree of uniformity in the solution of map
problems and to avoid confusion of ideas, it is necessary to adopt
certain systematic assumptions. Those which bear on any particular
case will usually be stated in the problem, such as the condition of
the weather, fordability of streams, etc. The most usual of these
assumptions, however, are not ordinarily stated, but are always to be
understood. These are:
1. It is to be assumed that the (imaginary) troops under your command
are, unless otherwise expressly stated, brave, well disciplined
and experienced soldiers and that every subordinate is thoroughly
instructed, and fully competent, each within his own sphere.
2. It is to be assumed that the enemy will probably act with good
judgment, and make no mistakes. This usually means that he will take
that course of action which you would least desire to have him take, or
which would be, amongst the courses open to him, that most embarrassing
to you.
It is apparent, of course, that neither of these assumptions will
always hold in real life. We know that Gen. Lee’s plans for his
campaigns in Virginia and Maryland, were based very largely on his
knowledge of the personal characteristics of his opponents. Also, that
after the death of Jackson, he never again attempted such a movement
as that executed by Jackson’s corps at the battle of Chancellorsville.
Some assumptions, however, are necessary as a basis for systematic
study. Those adopted are the most natural and reasonable in the usual
case.
In order to successfully solve tactical problems the commander must be
able to read and interpret a map with rapidity and accuracy, and must
have an eye for ground forms. He must be familiar with the organization
of both his own and the opposing army, and acquainted with the powers
and limitations, and with the tactics of each arm of the service. He
must be familiar with the methods which constitute “good practice,”
and acquainted with military precedents. In this manner he best fits
himself to properly perform his high duty, for knowledge and experience
as well as character and intellect are necessary as a basis for
decision.
A good map, of course, affords a much quicker and better comprehension
of the general situation than can possibly be obtained by any one
individual on the terrain. In fact without good maps a large force
would be seriously hampered in its operations. As it is impossible
for any single individual to see in a limited time, or to comprehend
as a whole if he had seen, the extent of ground surface that would be
covered by a large force, terrain exercises should be limited to the
smaller units, or to portions only, of the larger forces, preferably
not larger than a regiment. By this is not meant that _field maneuvers_
should be limited to small bodies of troops. But for the higher
commanders all problems, either in office or field, with or without
troops, will be virtually map problems. The terrain exercises will be
limited in effect to the commanders of the smaller units.
One form of problem, easy of solution on the ground, is more difficult
on the map, i. e. _visibility problems_, the determination of whether
a certain point or locality is visible from a certain other point or
locality, a question often of grave importance in military operations.
Methods of solving visibility problems on the map are given in various
textbooks on mapping and topography. A little practice soon gives such
facility that the less critical problems of this kind can be solved by
inspection.
The tactical suggestions contained in this volume, are often referred
to as the “rules” or “principles” of the Art of War. It may be said
that they will apply to the majority of cases, otherwise they could
hardly be dignified under the title of “principles.” They are, however,
subject to frequent exception, and must always give way to judgment
and common sense. It is for this reason that the Art of War is the
most difficult branch of human endeavor. Experienced commanders will
continue to violate the “rules” when their judgment dictates such a
course, but unlike the tyro, they will do so with their eyes open,
fully appreciating the necessity for their action, and the risks
that are involved. They will, on occasion, throw aside the “rules,”
not through ignorance, but with the keen insight and ripe judgment
of trained intelligence, which will always be superior to rule and
precedent. War is an art, rather than a science. Its ever varying
problems cannot be solved by the application of rules of mathematical
rigidity. Scientific progress has indeed a great influence upon warfare
as upon other arts, but it can never replace the human element, and the
victories of the future no less than those of the past, will be won
by the talents and genius of the general, and the bravery, skill and
devotion of his soldiers.
It is responsibility above all else that develops character, initiative
and judgment. The knowledge of responsibility strengthens even the
weak, and often calls into action powers they were not previously
suspected of possessing. It is for this reason that the most important
object in the military training of officers is the development of
responsibility. The supreme commander and each subordinate within his
own sphere, should be required to exercise his own judgment, and be
responsible for his own actions. Thus alone can he be qualified to
meet the exigencies that are constantly arising in warfare. Military
writings are accordingly filled with cautions such as “Do not interfere
with your subordinates, nor usurp their prerogatives,” “Tell a
subordinate what you want him to do, not how he is to do it,” “Avoid
orders too much in detail,” etc., etc.
How then, in time of peace, may military responsibility, and the
benefits resulting therefrom be attained? When an officer reads
military history and textbooks on the Art of War, the responsibility
for the facts alleged or the conclusions and deductions made rests
entirely on the authors. The student gains from such works a certain
amount of knowledge, but he certainly assumes no mental responsibility.
When, however, he undertakes an independent solution of a tactical
_problem_ the entire responsibility for this solution rests on his
shoulders alone. Capt. Buddecke of the German Army says:
“After we have gained in the above manner a correct insight into the
details of the problem, we get to the main task, which is to think
ourselves completely into the spirit of the problem and to arrive at an
estimate and decision for our future course.
By repeatedly and quietly reading the problem, paying due regard to
the map in front of us, we gain, just as in focussing a telescope,
a clearer and clearer conception of the situation. The more we
succeed in placing ourselves mentally in the given situation and
recognizing all the details in their relation to the general problem,
the more we succeed in thinking ourselves into the soul of the
leader, in conceiving the magnitude of his task, and in sharing his
responsibility, the more eager we shall become to take over his duties
and play an active part in the operations.
The longer we pore over the map, the clearer will be our conception of
the measures which the situation demands. And in this it is important
to hold and consider carefully; that is, to follow out, to their
furthest effects, all the thoughts and ideas which come to us, often
passing like lightning through our brains, and suggesting various
lines of action. Often it is precisely these fleeting thoughts which
lead us to the right path. But ideas which are not fully thought
out and thoroughly weighed can not have a decisive influence on our
judgment and decision. A head which has a hundred thoughts, but which
can neither hold fast nor think out a single one, will always remain
undecided and irresolute in tactics.
Only by intensive reflection is found in the confusion, the Ariadne
thread which will lead us from the maze. However, although attention to
details is to be recommended, yet the larger points of view which we
have gained must not be lost in the consideration of minor details--a
mistake often made and naturally often leading to false conclusions. It
is rather our chief duty to find just these main points, and attention
to minor details is but a means to this end.
Character and intuition unconsciously weave their thread into this
labor of comprehension. To that which our brain devises is added, with
good or bad effects, that which our intuition presents; and from the
combined activity of both come as a product judgment and decision.
It is a delicate psychological process which takes place in the head
and breast of the tactician, and without doubt this inner effort is one
of the most stimulating and interesting of activities.
A tactical question awakens all our spiritual and mental powers. It
demands keenness and understanding, common sense and imagination,
firmness and patience, caution and daring, sense of locality and
memory, judgment and the power of decision. The whole character,
the whole disposition, the whole individuality of a man finds its
expression here. Thus the solution of a tactical problem reflects the
spirit of its author, since it is based on the peculiarities of his own
individual character. A hesitating character will, in doubtful cases,
prefer the defensive to the offensive. Kindred natures will follow
similar trains of thought and in the majority of cases reach similar
solutions.”
The independent solution of tactical problems affords a means of
training to both the intellect and the character superior to that
afforded by any other kind of tactical study save only the actual
experiences of war. In war a commander’s mistakes are paid for in
blood, and experience is dearly bought. In the solution of tactical
problems in peace the student’s mistakes are paid for at most only in
chagrin, the experience is cheap.
There is always more than one, and there may be many satisfactory
solutions to any problem. Hence the fact that two solutions differ
radically by no means proves that one or the other is wrong. Each
reflects the personality of its author, and either might accomplish
the desired result. A simple plan, based on a sound decision and
consistently carried out, will be better than the best plan executed in
a dilatory and half-hearted fashion. Above all the plan must be simple,
“Simplicity is the keynote of sane tactical procedure.” Complicated
maneuvers offer little promise of success.
The plan should not be based wholly, nor in general even chiefly upon
the known or probable movements of the enemy. The commander’s plan
should be dictated chiefly by his own mission. In war it is best to
lead, to retain the initiative, and to force the enemy to adapt his
plans to yours. Hence if in doubt it is usually best to follow a bold
and aggressive plan of action. Caution may avoid defeat, but boldness
alone wins victories.
There is a certain manner in which tactical problems, particularly
map problems, should be solved in order to gain the greatest possible
benefit from this form of training. In brief this may be stated as
follows: solve the problem _yourself_, make a thorough, honest and
independent solution, and _write it out_. When you are fully satisfied
with your solution, and not until then, read the “approved solution,”
(if there be one) or submit your work to a reviewer for remark and
criticism. For a beginner the solution of a map problem may require
hours, even days. Becoming mentally wearied there is a strong tendency
to “slur over” parts of the solution which may appear for the instant
relatively unimportant; to be content with less than one’s best;
to solve portions of the problem, and then read the corresponding
portions of the approved solution, etc. Such tendencies are inimical
to progress, and they are, moreover, an indication of a weakness of
character which one should strive to overcome.
The statement of the problem should be read carefully, a number of
times, localities being noted and marked on the map. Having become
thoroughly impregnated with the situation, the student then proceeds
to make his mental estimate, jotting down the points that occur to
him, in pencil. For the beginner, at least, it is then best to write
out the estimate in full, using the form at the beginning of this
chapter as a guide, in order to early acquire the habit of making a
logical and complete estimate. If the problem calls for the estimate
and orders, and is accompanied by an approved solution, it is usually
well to complete the estimate to include the decision, and then read
the approved solution to the same point and compare. Then assume the
decision of the approved solution and write the orders necessary to
carry out that decision, comparing these on completion with those
of the approved solution. If the student writes orders based on his
own decision they might differ so greatly from those of the approved
solution that there would be no satisfactory basis for comparison.
Upon completing his independent solution the student should read the
approved solution, if there is one, and submit his work to a critic for
remark. The student’s mistakes and omissions in decision and detail
will then be plainly apparent. These he should carefully consider,
honestly acknowledge, and determine to avoid in future. They will thus
be strongly impressed on his mind as _practical experiences_. As has
been remarked, however, a difference or apparent difference in two
solutions is by no means proof that one of them is in error. It is, of
course, manifestly impossible that two solutions by different persons
could ever be exactly alike. It is not of problems in arithmetic that
we are speaking.
Take the problem as you find it, and do not waste time criticising and
attempting to pick flaws in the “situation.” Nature cannot be “faked,”
and it is difficult enough to create an imaginary situation which is
even reasonably plausible, a fact which each will appreciate when he
attempts to write a problem himself. To write a good problem is usually
a task more difficult than to solve one.
In the solution of map problems considerable advantage may be derived
from combined study with a congenial mate. Each man serves as a spur,
a critic and a guide to the other. They should work in company, each
independently, and then compare and discuss their results while these
are fresh in their minds.
The apparatus required for the solution of map problems is very simple;
including a “map measure” (wheel), scales, colored pins for marking the
positions of troops, etc., small rectangles of cardboard or sheet lead,
representing bodies of troops to the scale of the map, and colored
according to the arms of the service, etc., etc.
_Diagrammatic analysis and synthesis._ In both the solution and
preparation of problems it is frequently a great aid to comprehension
to lay out the situation (the combatant troops and critical features of
the terrain) in a diagrammatic form. This clears away for the time, the
mass of details which sometimes befog the main issues. Problems which
at first reading appear complicated, are often seen to be quite simple
when laid out in this manner, and the decision will often be plainly
apparent. As has been said heretofore, questions of time and distance
will usually be of great importance. Unless the troops are placed in
their proper relative positions at the epoch considered, incorrect
decisions are apt to result. A few examples will serve to illustrate
this method. (See Fig. I.)
_Fig. A._ A Blue division, acting as right flank guard to a Blue field
army, is marching east when it receives reports of a Red column of
all arms, advancing from the southeast toward the Blue flank with the
evident intention of attacking. The Blue division turns southeast
and advances in two columns against the Red force. In the resulting
encounter, it is evident, the Blues will be able to deploy and
establish a line of battle much faster than the Reds, provided the
latter continue to advance in one column. Should the Reds form two
columns to the front their march will be delayed while waiting for the
columns to form abreast.
_Fig. B._ A Blue army on the offensive, advancing east in two columns,
approaches the line of an unfordable river, passable only at the
bridges shown. A Red army also in two columns, is approaching the
stream from the opposite direction, for the purpose of checking the
Blue advance at the river. The Blue northern column reaches the
northern bridge in advance of the Red northern column, and effects a
crossing. The Blue southern column, on approaching the other bridge,
learns that the advance of the Red southern column has already reached
it, and that the Reds are making dispositions to dispute the passage.
The commander of the Blue northern column places his leading troops in
a defensive position (A-B) so selected that the Red northern column can
advance neither west nor south without first attacking the position.
With the remainder of his column he turns south and marches to attack
the right flank of the Red southern column in order to enable the Blue
southern column to effect a crossing.
[Illustration: Fig. I]
_Fig. C._ The advance guard of a large Blue force acting on the
offensive is marching south. The main body has been somewhat delayed,
and is several miles in rear. On approaching the screen, the Blue
advance guard commander learns that a Red force is approaching in two
columns. The aggregate strength of the two Red columns is considerably
greater than that of the Blue advance guard, although less than that of
the entire Blue force. To continue his advance and attack the superior
Red force in its two column formation, favoring rapid deployment, while
the Blue main body is still well to the rear, would be extremely apt
to prove disastrous to the Blue advance guard commander. He therefore
decides to seize the best defensive position available, one moreover
which he will have time to occupy in an orderly fashion, and there
hold the Reds until the arrival of the Blue main body, which will take
the tactical offensive upon its arrival.
_Fig. D._ A Blue army (A) and a Red army (B) are engaged in battle on
an east and west line. A Blue division is approaching the battlefield
from the southeast under orders to attack the left flank of the Red
position at B. While passing the screen on his right the commander
of the Blue division receives word from his patrols, which have been
beyond the screen, that a Red force, estimated to consist of at least
two divisions is approaching from the northeast, apparently with the
intention of reaching the right rear of the Blue position at A. The
Blue division commander at once decides to discontinue his advance
northwest, to change direction to the right, and to seize a defensive
position as far from the main battlefield as possible without risking
a premature or rencontre engagement with the superior Red force now
approaching. To facilitate the prompt occupation of the defensive
position selected he advances toward it in two columns. Here he hopes
to “contain” the Red force, keeping it out of the main battle until a
decision is reached, or until the main Blue army can make arrangements
to withdraw.
_Preparation of problems._ In the preparation of practical problems,
either map problems, terrain exercises, one or two-sided war games or
field maneuver problems, the following hints will be found useful:
1. Give the problem a semblance of reality, make the situations
plausible, and introduce as few unnatural conditions as possible. For
example, in a terrain exercise or field maneuver problem it is better
not to state that a certain stream is impassable when in fact it is
easily passable. Bridges which are assumed in the problem to have been
destroyed should be conspicuously placarded. Otherwise they are very
apt to be used. It is usually preferable, even in map problems, to make
the problem fit the terrain as it actually exists, rather than to alter
the terrain to fit the problem. In a map problem it is permissible
to assume that corn shown on the map has been cut, that woods where
underbrush is indicated are impassable for infantry, that streams are
swollen and roads muddy from recent rains, etc. But do not assume
that there is snow on the ground in July, or that corn is standing in
January. In maneuver problems it is always best to let the commanders
take the terrain as they find it.
2. Make the problem simple and brief, and omit ordinarily all data
which has no direct bearing upon the solution. Simple problems are best
for purposes of instruction. It is however, occasionally desirable
to introduce in the statement certain data which is really of no
importance in order to give the student practice in analyzing and
weighing information, and to teach him to base his decision on the best
of the information, and to avoid being led astray by unimportant or
conflicting reports. The commander must acquire by experience the power
to see and cleave to the main issues amidst the fog of uncertainty,
conflicting, erroneous and unimportant information, etc. The analysis
of information is a most important part of his duty, as upon this his
plan of action must be based.
3. The problem should be made instructive. Ordinarily it will be drawn
with a view to illustrating certain tactical principles. It should,
however, never be forced, but always allowed to develop naturally,
especially in war games and field maneuvers. The officer who prepares
the problem should not be disappointed if the solutions take a course
quite different from his expectations. Authorship confers no special
rights of interpretation.
4. Field maneuver problems should be made progressive and interesting
to both officers and men. Unless their interest can be sustained they
will get little benefit from the instruction. Unreality, unnecessary
fatigue, delays and inaction should be avoided. Officers charged
with the instruction of troops of the army or militia often lay out
schedules which allow insufficient time for relaxation, and this
results in dulling the interest of the troops thereby decreasing the
benefits obtained from the course of instruction.
5. Field maneuver problems should be adapted to the kind and number
of the troops which are to take part in them. Elaborate “general
situations” are usually undesirable. Each commander should be given
such information as he might reasonably be expected to have under real
conditions.
6. Where the situation given in the problem includes both real and
imaginary troops (as may be the case) great care should be taken
to avoid a contact or mixing of real and imaginary troops. This
complicates the situation, and introduces the most objectionable
element of unreality.
7. In field maneuver problems it is best to make the tasks of the
opposing commanders nearly equal. Arrange the troops and the situation
so that each has a chance to accomplish his mission. A commander cannot
be expected to put his heart into the game if he knows that he is bound
to fail in his mission, or certain to meet with defeat. On the other
hand, the knowledge that they have a chance to succeed, even against
superior numbers, stimulates the interest of both officers and men.
In map problems, however, the student may occasionally be given a
situation in which it is impossible for him to accomplish his mission.
8. In starting a field maneuver problem it is best to have the opposing
sides out of contact. Do not state in the situation that a commander
has a mounted patrol at such a point, unless the patrol is actually
there. Do not manufacture messages for real patrols, but allow them to
report what they actually learn. The commander should be allowed to
send out his own patrols.
9. The commander (in a field maneuver problem) should be allowed
ample latitude in making his decision, and should not be coerced into
any particular plan of action. It is well, however, to arrange the
situation so that a contact of the opposing sides will take place
at some suitable locality. This adds greatly to the interest of the
problem. It is desirable when practicable to have the problem end
within a reasonable distance of the camping place, in order to avoid a
long and fatiguing march thereafter.
10. Consider the distances that the troops must march during the day
and do not exceed what is reasonable under the conditions. A long rest
should be given at mid-day, and the troops should return to their
camp at a reasonable hour in the afternoon. If this does not allow
sufficient latitude temporary camps may be established at suitable
localities. A problem once commenced should, of course, be carried to
completion with the least possible interruption.
BIBLIOGRAPHY, ETC.
The “Gettysburg-Antietam Map” referred to in this volume is a 3 inch
map (3 in. to the mile) of the vicinity of Gettysburg, Pa., issued by
the Book Department, Army Service Schools, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas,
where it can be purchased for a nominal sum. It is the best map for its
particular purpose with which the authors are acquainted.
Maps on a scale of 1:62,500 (commonly called 1 inch maps) of many
portions of the United States, are now issued by the United States
Geological Survey (Washington) at a nominal cost. They are excellent
maps, and suitable for the solution of map problems, especially those
involving the operations of divisions or larger forces.
Special maps of the vicinity of Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and of
various other maneuver grounds used by the Army and the Militia, may be
obtained from the Book Department, Army Service Schools, or from the
War Department.
The following is a short list of books which will be found useful for
study and reference in connection with the subject of minor tactics.
Most of them have been consulted in the preparation of this volume.
Government publications may be obtained from the War Department,
Washington, D. C., by issue or purchase. The other works can be
obtained through the Book Department, Army Service Schools, Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas.
Field Service Regulations, U. S. A., 1914. Government Publication.
Drill Regulations of Inf., Cav., and Field Artillery. Government
Publications, (separate volumes)
Engineer Field Manual. Government Publication.
Organization of the bridge equipage of the U. S. Army. Government
Publication.
Bulletin No. 4, War Dept.
Notes on Field Fortification, Army Field Engineer School.
How to feed an army. Government Publication.
American Campaigns. Steele.
Applied minor tactics. Morrison.
Battle orders. Von Kiesling.
Cavalry in future wars. Von Bernhardi.
Cavalry in war and peace. Von Bernhardi.
Cavalry tactics as illustrated by the War of the Rebellion. Gray.
Conduct of war. Von der Goltz.
Critical study of German tactics. De Pardieu.
Criticisms on solutions of map problems. Boyd.
Duties of the General Staff. Von Schellendorff.
Elements of strategy. Fiebeger.
Essays, studies and letters of Col. Maude of the British Army.
(5 volumes)
Estimating tactical situations and composing field orders. Fitch.
Examination and repair of simple highway bridges. Sherrill.
Field fortification. Fiebeger.
Fortification. Clark.
Lectures on cavalry. Hayne.
Letters on applied tactics. (with maps) Griepenkerl.
Letters on strategy and tactics. (4 volumes) Hohenlohe.
Map maneuvers and tactical rides. Sayre.
Military policy of the U. S. Upton.
Military topography. Sherrill.
Napoleon’s maxims of war. Burnod.
Nation in arms. Von der Goltz.
Notes on bridges and bridging. Spalding.
On war. Clausewitz.
Organization and operation of the lines of communication in war. Furse.
Patrols, advance guards and outposts. Morrison.
Selected division problems. Gizycki and Litzmann.
Service of security and information. Wagner.
Some notes on the solution of tactical problems. Fiske.
Studies in applied tactics. Von Alten.
Studies in minor tactics. Army School of the Line.
Studies in the leading of troops. Du Vernois.
Supply of Sherman’s army in Atlanta campaign. Major and Fitch.
Tactical decisions and orders. Buddecke.
Tactical principles and problems. Hanna.
Tactics. Infantry, Cavalry and Field Arty. Balck. Two volumes.
Tactical ride. Du Vernois.
The art of reconnaissance. Henderson.
The principles of land defense. Thuillier.
The provisioning of the modern army in the field. Sharpe.
The regimental war game. Immanuel.
The rifle in war. Eames.
Times of sunrise and sunset in U. S. Willson. (Published Harvard
Co-operative Society)
Transportation of troops and materiel. Baker.
Troop leading and management of the sanitary service in war. Morrison
and Munson.
Von Moltke’s tactical problems.