Mr. Gladstone introduced the second Home Rule Bill in February, 1893. In

the discussion he pointed out how incredibly wasteful the method of

governing Ireland was; the Irish Civil Government grants, which had

averaged from 1833 to 1837 £762,000, had risen between 1888 and 1892 to

£4,042,000, and the cost of local government in Ireland was twice as much

per head as the like cost in England.

Under the scheme of 1886 Irish representatives were not to sit in the

Imperial Parliament, but the Government found that under existing

financial arrangements there must be financial connection, unless

Parliament was prepared to face a different system of trade laws between

the two countries, and provision must be made for that connection. Mr.

Gladstone, therefore, reversed the decision of the Government in 1886. He

proposed to retain Irish representatives at Westminster, reduced in number

to 80. They were not to vote on purely British questions, but in his

opinion it would be difficult to make that distinction as far as the mass

of business was concerned. The Irish representatives would not vote on any

tax which was not to be levied in Ireland or on any grant of money for

other than Imperial purposes as scheduled in the Bill. By this means

Ireland would have a voice, if emergency, such as war, rendered fresh

taxation necessary.

In the interval between 1886 and 1893 knowledge had been gained to some

extent as to what constituted the “true” revenue of Ireland, and the

Inland Revenue thought it possible to levy in Great Britain the Excise

duties collected in Ireland on articles consumed in Great Britain and

_vice versa_. These Excise duties represented the greater part of the sum

of £1,400,000, previously described as the difference between duties, so

to speak, belonging to Ireland and duties collected in Ireland, a

difference estimated in 1893 at £1,800,000. If Ireland retained that

difference, as contemplated by the scheme of 1886, it was equivalent to a

grant from Great Britain to Ireland. On the other hand the Customs were

not able to make the separation thought possible by the Excise.

With these facts before him Mr. Gladstone made an entire change in the

financial scheme. As in 1886, he held that Ireland must make a proper

contribution to Imperial expenditure, but he abandoned the principle,

adopted in 1886, of obtaining that contribution by a quota of

one-fifteenth of Imperial expenditure, that is a contribution of £2 by

Ireland to £28 by Great Britain. He retained instead the whole of the

Customs revenue collected in Ireland as the Irish contribution. He

proposed that Great Britain should pay any excess of the charge of

constabulary over £1,000,000, out of the contribution, the balance

representing Ireland’s share of Imperial expenditure. He justified the

change on the ground that as the management of trade was reserved to the

Imperial Government, the management of the Customs so closely connected

with trade should be Imperial also. The Customs were expected to produce a

net revenue of £2,370,000. He estimated it as equivalent to about 4 per

cent. of Imperial expenditure whereas the actual contribution was about 12

per cent. The contribution would, of course, vary as the net Customs

revenue rose or fell. On the other hand the Irish Government were to take

all the rest of the “true” revenue of Ireland and to defray out of it all

local Irish expenditure, including a fixed sum of £1,000,000 towards the

cost of the constabulary and Dublin police, which were temporarily to

remain Imperial services. Customs and Excise duties were to be regulated

and collected by the Imperial authority which was also to fix postal

rates; but all other taxes were to be imposed by the Irish Legislature.

The interests of existing judges, and existing civil servants, and of her

constabulary, which remained under the control of the Viceroy, were

secured. The constabulary would be gradually replaced by a force under the

control of the Irish authority. Two Exchequer Judges would be appointed to

guard observance of the Act, and appeals lay to the Privy Council which

would try on the motion of the Viceroy, or of the Secretary of State, any

question as to invalidity of an Irish Act. These arrangements might after

fifteen years be subject to revision in pursuance of an address to Her

Majesty from the House of Commons or the Irish Legislative Assembly.

The receipts and expenditure of the Irish Government under this scheme

would have stood as follows:

RECEIPTS.

(1) Excise true revenue exclusive of licences £3,220,000

(2) Local taxes:

Stamps, Income-tax, Excise licenses £1,495,000

(3) Postal revenue £740,000

(4) Other non-tax revenue £205,000

Total £5,660,000

EXPENDITURE.

(1) Civil Government charges, except Constabulary £3,210,000

(2) Collection of Inland revenue £160,000

(3) Postal service £790,000

(4) Contribution to Irish Constabulary £1,000,000

Total £5,160,000

Surplus £500,000

The Bill passed the House of Commons, but the financial clauses were

greatly recast in Committee. The changes originated in the fact that the

Inland revenue had overestimated the “true” revenue of Excise by a very

considerable sum, and the error would have reduced to an insignificant sum

the free starting balance for the Irish Government provided in the

original scheme. Mr. Gladstone decided in consequence not to keep the

Customs revenue as Ireland’s contribution to Imperial expenditure, but to

let that revenue fall into the common stock of Irish revenue and to take

out of that common stock one third of the “true” Irish revenue. This third

was to cover Ireland’s contribution to Imperial expenditure together with

one third of the cost of the Irish constabulary and Dublin police. Ireland

was to meet all her local charges out of the remaining Irish revenue. The

Imperial Government was to retain for six years the imposition and

collection of all taxes; the Irish Government having only supplementary

powers of taxation. At the end of six years the Irish contribution was to

be revised, and Ireland would be empowered to impose taxes other than

Customs and Excise, and she would collect taxes, the Customs alone being

retained by the Imperial authorities. The “true” revenue derived from the

Customs and Excise was to be ascertained by a Joint Committee of the

Treasury and the Irish Government. The financial result of these changes

is shown in the following figures:

(1) Customs:

Revenue collected in Ireland £2,136,000

_Add_ estimated allowance for duties paid in Great Britain on articles

consumed in Ireland £266,000

Total estimated Irish revenue £2,402,000; Amount Payable to Irish

Exchequer Two-Thirds £1,601,000

(2) Excise:

(_a_) Spirits. Revenue collected in Ireland £4,112,000

_Deduct_ duties ascertained to be paid in Ireland on spirits consumed

in Great Britain £1,872,000

Total £2,240,000

(_b_) Beer. Revenue collected in Ireland £811,000

_Deduct_ estimated allowance for duties paid in Ireland on beer

consumed in Great Britain £187,000

Total £624,000

(_c_) Licence duties collected in Ireland £194,000

Total estimated £3,058,000; payable to Exchequer £2,039,000

(3) Stamp duties collected in Ireland £707,000 estimated, £471,000

payable

(4) Income-tax collected in Ireland £552,000 estimated, £368,000 payable

(5) Crown Lands amount estimated to be due to £65,000 estimated, £43,000

payable

Total £6,784,000 estimated, £4,522,000 payable

(6) Miscellaneous Irish Revenue £138,000 estimated, £138,000 payable

Totals £6,922,000 estimated, £4,660,000 payable

Irish Expenditure, 1892-3.

(1) Civil Government charges (exclusive of Constabulary and salary of

Lord-Lieutenant, but inclusive of local charges met out of

local taxation account) £3,123,000

(2) Constabulary charges (£1,459,000) two-thirds of £973,000

(3) Estimated deficit on postal account £52,000

Total £4,148,000

Surplus £512,000

Total £4,660,000

The schemes of 1893 again illustrate the difficulties inherent in a

severance of the two Exchequers. The revise left more points open for

difference between the two Governments, and it had the serious defect of

revision after the short interval of six years.

The original scheme was far preferable. The retention of the Customs as

the Imperial contribution reduced opportunity for conflicts of opinion to

a minimum, and the interval of fifteen years before revision left ample

time for the new Irish Government to put its house in order. I venture to

think it would have been wise to make good the error in estimating the

“true” revenue of Ireland (which invalidated the scheme) by an Imperial

Grant, at all events for a time. Under the scheme the Imperial Government

provided £500,000 for the constabulary. If it had granted £300,000 or

£400,000 more, the net Imperial contribution derived from the Customs

would have been reduced to say £1,400,000, not a large sacrifice for the

end in view—reconciliation with Ireland.

The Bill as amended passed the House of Commons but was thrown out in the

Lords. This Parliament refused to accept Mr. Gladstone’s proposals to give

Ireland Home Rule, and nineteen years elapsed before a third Home Rule

Bill was submitted to Parliament.

In the three schemes of 1886 and 1893 the Imperial contribution was very

similar, perhaps somewhat larger in 1893. In all three schemes, also, the

net gain to the British Exchequer was reduced by the grant from that

Exchequer of £500,000 to the cost of the Irish Constabulary.

The difficulty of devising a financial scheme fairly simple and workable,

which was experienced in 1886 and 1893, has been disappointing, but not

discouraging. It was inevitable but it can be surmounted.

THE BILL OF 1912

In 1911, Mr. Asquith pledged the Government to take up again in the

ensuing session the question of Home Rule. In 1910 the Conservative Party,

at least a considerable part of it, in presence of a probable dissolution

on the Parliament Bill, showed, as in 1885, a disposition to coquette with

Home Rule, but the movement came to nothing, and the Party settled into

determined opposition to the Home Rule policy, submitting themselves to

the lead of the Ulster extremists, who preached sedition in no measured

terms. In other respects, the prospects of Home Rule are fairly

favourable. England, apart from Scotland, Wales, and Ireland, still

returns a majority opposed to Home Rule, but public opinion does not show

any signs of vigorous or violent opposition as in 1886. The Liberals, the

Irish, and the Labour Party are united in its favour. The passing of the

Land Acts is rapidly removing the agrarian evil, and the landlords have

not the same cause for anxiety as formerly. The grant of Local Government

is working well, and in spite of much poverty the condition of the people

is improving. Lastly, the passing of the Parliament Act has made it

possible, in spite of opposition in the Lords, to pass a Home Rule Act

within the limits of the present Parliament.

On April 11th, the Prime Minister introduced the Government Bill. He

regarded it as the first step in a comprehensive policy of devolution. It

retains permanently at Westminster 42 Irish Members, so that Ireland will

have a voice, not only on questions in the Imperial Parliament which

concern Ireland, but on questions of Imperial interest, such as war and

peace. The Bill of 1886 reserved to the Imperial Parliament certain

questions. The Bill of 1893 also made necessary reservations, though its

tendency was towards more complete autonomy; but in the interval between

1893 and 1912 great changes have taken place, and the Imperial Government

finds itself hampered by new liabilities. The Old-Age Pension Act, the

Land Purchase Act of 1903, the National Insurance Act, and Labour

Exchanges have added very greatly to Irish expenditure. On the other hand,

the contribution to Imperial expenditure, unluckily for the British

taxpayer, has disappeared. The problem is, therefore, a new one, and the

Government solves it, at all events for the present, by keeping in its own

hands a large number of Services, as will be seen hereafter.

In 1885-6 Ireland contributed a surplus of considerably more than

£2,000,000 to Imperial expenditure; in 1895-6, £2,000,000.(103) The

Government estimates the true revenue of Ireland in 1912-13 at

£10,839,000; and the expenditure on Irish services at £12,354,000.

Therefore the new Irish Government will start with a deficit of

£1,515,000. That deficit is now charged on the British taxpayer. It

results from British management of Irish finance, for, on the one hand,

Irish revenue is limited by the relatively limited means of Irish

taxpayers; on the other hand, England has regulated Irish expenditure on

the lavish scale of her own expenditure.

The Government lays down certain principles on which Home Rule finance

will be based:

(1) Ireland must manage her own finance and must have powers of

taxation consistent with leaving to the Imperial Government a

field of taxation sufficiently wide for Imperial needs.

(2) The Budgets of the two countries must not hamper each other.

(3) Ireland must bear the cost of any increase arising hereafter

on Irish services, but she must benefit by economies in those

services.

(4) She must have power to reduce taxation if her economies permit

it.

The scheme which will give effect to these principles may be described as

follows.

In the first place the Imperial Government retains in its own hands the

imposition and collection of all Irish taxes, the Post Office duties alone

excepted, which will be transferred to the Irish Government. _Normal_

increase in Irish Revenue will not be applied to Irish services. It will

reduce the deficit. The Irish Government, however, will have supplementary

powers of taxation.

An Irish Exchequer and an Irish Consolidated Fund will be created, and an

Irish Auditor-General appointed. Further, a joint Exchequer Board,

consisting of Treasury and Irish officers, will adjust the accounts

between the two Exchequers, based upon what it declares to be the actual

cost of Irish services when the Act comes into operation. If the Irish

Government, using its supplementary powers of taxation, increases or

reduces taxes, the Exchequer Board will vary accordingly the sum to be

paid by the British to the Irish Exchequer on account of Irish

expenditure, and it will determine the effect of any other changes taking

place in the relations between the two Exchequers. Lastly, if and when

normal increase of Irish revenue puts an end, during a period of three

years, to the existing deficit, the Exchequer Board will make a report to

that effect, and the financial arrangement between the two countries will

then be reconsidered in order to secure a fair contribution from Ireland

to Imperial expenditure.

The Government, as I have stated, estimates the revenue of 1912-13 at

£10,839,000. That sum represents the whole “true” revenue of Ireland,

viz., taxes and miscellaneous, £9,485,000; Post Office Revenue,

£1,354,000. The Imperial Government adds to this revenue of £10,839,000 a

free gift of £500,000 at the cost of the British taxpayer, in order to

give the Irish Government a fair start. The total Irish income in the year

1912-13 will therefore be £11,339,000.

On the other side of the account, the Imperial Government retains in its

own hand various Irish Services, termed in the Bill “_Reserved Services_,”

described later. It transfers from the British to the Irish Exchequer the

sum allotted to Irish Expenditure (outside the Reserved Services),

estimated in 1912-13 at £5,462,000, the cost of the Postal Service

£1,600,000,(104) and £500,000, the free gift mentioned above, making a

total transfer of £7,562,000.

If in the future the sum of £5,462,000 allotted to Irish Expenditure and

the free gift of £500,000 are exceeded, the Irish Legislature must provide

the necessary ways and means.

The transfer of £7,562,000 from the British to the Irish Exchequer leaves

a balance on the British Exchequer on the Irish Account of £3,777,000(105)

free to that extent to meet the charge of the Reserved Services.

These Reserved Services are:

(1) Old-age Pensions £2,664,000

(2) National Insurance Labour Exchange £191,500

(3) Land Purchase £761,000

(4) Constabulary £1,377,500

(5) Collection of Revenue £298,000

Total £5,292,000

Therefore the excess of Irish Expenditure in 1912-13 over Irish Revenue as

provided results in a deficit of £1,515,000 payable by the British

taxpayer, and if the free gift of £500,000 by the British taxpayer

included in the provided revenue be added, the total charge on the British

taxpayer in 1912-13 on account of Irish Expenditure is £2,015,000.

This annual gift of £500,000 is after three years to diminish yearly by

£50,000, until a minimum of £200,000 is reached, which will eventually

represent the gift of Great Britain to Ireland, until prosperity or good

management enables Ireland to pay her own way, and at the last to make a

contribution to Imperial Expenditure.

The Government estimates a normal growth in Irish Revenue of £200,000 a

year, which, to the extent it is realised, will reduce the deficit payable

by the British taxpayer.

The Imperial guarantee on Irish Land Stock is to continue in full force.

EFFECT OF FUTURE MODIFICATION

If the Imperial Parliament increases or reduces taxation, the change will

not affect the Irish Budget, for the transferred sum will remain

unaltered.

The Irish Parliament will have power to reduce taxes levied in Ireland. It

will also have power to impose taxes. It may add at will to Excise duties,

and if so the Customs duties on beer or spirits must vary with the Excise

duties. It may levy new duties which do not interfere with the Imperial

system of taxation—for instance, a house duty, or establishment licences.

It may add to Income-tax or death duties, and also to Customs duties

(other than beer and spirits) provided that the addition does not exceed

10 per cent. of their yield. This 10 per cent. resembles the “centimes

additionels” which are levied in foreign countries on direct taxes, and

are applicable there to local expenditure. But the Irish Parliament must

not trench on Imperial taxes. This increase or reduction of Irish duties

will not affect the British Exchequer, but it will increase or diminish

the “sum transferred” to the Irish Exchequer.

The Irish Parliament will not have power to tax articles not subject to

Imperial taxes for the time being. If in the exercise of its power it

differentiates Customs or Excise duties in the two countries, there will

be a differential duty on such goods passing from one to the other.

Public Works Loans granted before the passing of the Home Rule Act will

remain under the management of the Imperial Government. Future loans will

be managed by the Irish Government.

The Irish Parliament will have power to raise loans on the security of the

“transferred” revenue, sufficient provision being made for interest and

sinking fund. If the Irish Government desires it, the Exchequer Board

above-mentioned, may issue an Irish Loan, deducting the charge from the

sum “transferred” to Ireland.

Such are the provisions of the Bill. It cannot be denied that they appear

complicated, but they will be found less so in practice. The machinery of

financial administration in a great State is necessarily complicated, and

a radical change in that machinery involves a multitude of changes in

detail for which the reforming Act must provide. Root and branch opponents

of Home Rule naturally criticise those provisions, and exaggerate with

_Ulster_ vehemence the administrative difficulties which attend radical

change, but the advocates of great measures, while recognising

difficulties can take juster views of their extent, and they know that

they can be surmounted.

In the first place an expert body (the Exchequer Board) will interpret the

financial provisions of the Act. It will consist of two members appointed

by the Treasury and two by the Irish Government, and a chairman appointed

by the Crown. Their decision is to be final. On these questions there is

therefore no power reserved to the Imperial Government, which might cause

friction. The Chairman should probably be a man of judicial rank. Possibly

a case might arise in which a revision of the Board’s decision would be

needed. So far this important section of the machinery is not complicated.

In the next place the Imperial Government remains responsible and liable

for all the “reserved” services. Here again there is no complication.

_Thirdly_, the Customs and Excise Clauses appear complicated, but they are

for the most part machinery clauses, common to Revenue Acts. _Fourthly_,

the Free Trade Clause offends of course the Unionist-Protectionist party,

but its merits need not be discussed here. I venture to doubt where

Ireland is likely to set up a Protectionist policy against Great Britain.

Our market is too important to her. If such a policy were established,

history tells us that British Protectionists will not consult Irish

interests. Lastly a certain, but not a great, inconvenience will attend

the taking of an official record of goods passing between the two

countries essential to determining the true revenue of Ireland.

Thus the apparent complications of the Bill dwindle greatly on

examination. The Bill of 1912 is no doubt much less simple than that of

1893 as introduced by Mr. Gladstone, but that Bill was not, however, so

simple as it appeared. It was based on the principle of autonomy, but it

retained great powers in Imperial hands. In fact it gave autonomy as far

as autonomy was practicable. Circumstances have changed much since 1893,

and the problem is now in some respects easier. The pivot and crux of Mr.

Gladstone’s scheme, the Imperial contribution, has, for the time,

disappeared.

Sir Henry Primrose’s Committee adopted unanimously and unhesitatingly the

principle of simplicity. They recommend that the power of imposing and

levying all taxation in Ireland, subject to reservations on questions of

trade and of foreign relations should rest with the Irish Government. They

urge that that policy accords with the general policy of Home Rule, as

removing causes of friction, as avoiding need for revision of the

arrangement (excepting a future question as to an Imperial contribution),

it terminates the extravagance inherent in the partnership, and makes the

responsibility of the Irish Government for Irish administration complete.

The Committee examine the objections to the grant of complete power of

taxation, viz., that (1) it would break up the fixed unity of the realm;

(2) that it would impair facilities of trade between the two countries;

(3) and that it is at variance with the principle of a Customs Union, said

to be a feature common to federations.

On the first point the Committee reply:

(1) That in their view the Irish Government should have power to

impose Customs duties only for the purpose of raising revenue, and

that the Imperial Government should reserve questions of tariff,

and foreign relations. Thus fiscal unity on important points would

be maintained. For sixty years from the Union separate machinery

existed for the collection of different rates of duty in the two

countries. If Union could dispense with fiscal unity, _a fortíorí_

can any less close form of association do so.

(2) The Committee do not attach importance to the second

objection. The Custom House does not seriously trammel the

convenience of traders between this country and the Continent, and

it was found endurable when the variance between England and

Ireland was more formidable than now.

(3) On the third objection the Committee argue that a Customs

Union is indispensable, when the boundaries of federated states

form a ring fence. It is not indispensable when, in a case like

that of England and Ireland, the two countries are separated by

sea.

These reserves diminish, of course, the severe simplicity of the scheme,

and the Committee’s answers to objections admit some inconvenience to

trade, but a great change like that of Home Rule must have some drawbacks,

and in the opinion of Home Rulers, the end to be gained far more than

compensates for slight inconveniences which attend its execution. It is

certain, moreover, that, whatever may be the measure adopted, it will be

necessary to take means for ascertaining the “true” Revenue of Ireland,

and to that extent there must be some slight interference with trade.

I agree with the Committee in their preference for the simplicity of

complete autonomy.

Sir Henry Primrose and his colleagues agree to a great extent with a

Minority Report of the Financial Relations Committee (1896), signed by

Lord Farrer, Mr. Bertram Currie and myself. The advantages of complete

autonomy are obvious, and I cannot avoid a regret that it has not been

possible to adopt it. I note, however, that the greatest Irish authority

on Irish Government, Lord Macdonnell, though in favour of Home Rule, is

entirely opposed to the grant of fixed autonomy to Ireland.

We must not misunderstand the relations of the Committee to the

Government. They were not appointed to draw a Home Rule Bill. They were to

ascertain and consider the fiscal relations between Ireland and other

parts of the United Kingdom as they exist to-day, paying special regard to

the changes which have taken place in revenue and expenditure since 1896,

the date of the Report of the Royal Commission; to distinguish between

Irish Local Expenditure and Imperial Expenditure in Ireland; and to

consider, in the event of Home Rule being established, how the revenue

required to meet the necessary expenditure should be provided. The

function of the Committee was, therefore, purely financial. They had to

collect financial information, a necessary preliminary to a consideration

of the Bill, and to advise as to the method of providing the revenue

required. They had no mission to examine the political conditions which

must be satisfied by a Bill designed to effect a Constitutional

Revolution. That was the function of the Cabinet. The Committee, limiting

itself to its instructions, recommended the method of raising revenue

which they thought wisest, independently of any but financial

considerations. The Government consider the question from a wider point of

view. Their measure must be founded on policy as well as finance. They do

not adopt the Committee’s recommendations. They decide to retain for a

time, more or less indefinite, a closer relation between the two financial

systems. Much as I should like greater simplicity, a study of their

measure leads me to the conclusion that its provisions are, in the main,

wise. Let us then consider how far the provisions of the actual Bill

satisfy the conditions needed to insure the success of Home Rule.

In the first instance, and for an uncertain number of years, the Imperial

Government keeps a tight hand upon the Irish Government. It reserves large

powers enabling it to reject, postpone, or test the validity of Irish

Bills. It regulates and levies all taxes, and fixes postal rates. It

secures the interests of various classes of public servants, and retains

temporarily the police under its own control. It fixes Irish Local

Expenditure at a certain sum, and it issues that sum yearly to the Irish

Government together with a free gift of £500,000 a year for three years,

falling gradually to a permanent gift of £200,000. _Normal_ increase of

Irish Revenue is appropriated to reduce the deficit to be borne by the

British Exchequer. If, therefore, the Irish Government increases its own

expenditure beyond the fixed sum allotted to it, it must find the revenue

required, and for that purpose powers of taxation are given to it.

The nursing hand of the mother is, in fact, present at every point of the

Bill, but it must be remembered that a hostile step-mother may, at any

time, replace the kindly mother.

There is no escape from the conclusion that these reservations restrict

the autonomous power of the Irish Government. On the other hand, the whole

spirit of the Bill marks the greater part of them as temporary. The Bill,

in fact, confers autonomy by gradual steps, and holds out prospects that

eventually the relations between the two countries will be simple and

workable. At the outset, and for some time onward, the Irish Government,

freed from liability for the costly “reserved” services which the

“partnership” has bestowed or inflicted on Ireland, will occupy itself

with the organisation of its own home administration. It starts with no

previous experience of administration, and it is clearly desirable that it

should proceed by steps, gathering experience as it goes. Its field of

work at first should not be too wide, and six years is not too long a

period for it to reform and reconstitute its administrative organisation.

This is its first duty, and it undertakes it under favourable conditions.

In six years the constabulary will be transferred automatically from the

charge of the Imperial Government to that of the Irish Government with the

sum allotted to its support.(106) That sum will be increased by any saving

which accrues to the British Exchequer from the transfer, and in

determining that sum regard is to be had to the _prospect_ of any increase

or decrease in the cost of the service, expected to arise from causes not

being matters of administration.

In the next place, the Irish Parliament may, at any time, on twelve

months’ notice assume the legislative and executive control of three

reserved services, viz., Old-age Pensions, National Insurance, and Labour

Exchanges. If they are taken over, the sum transferred with them will be

determined on the same principle as in the case of the constabulary.

Autonomy, therefore, in regard to these services is granted to the Irish

Government, and they will only be retained under the control of the

Imperial Government, if, and so long as the Irish Government desires it.

The Postmaster-General said in his speech on the introduction of the Bill

that the old-age pension charge is now practically at its maximum,

gradually diminishing, and the Primrose Committee (paragraph 54), estimate

the charge at the time when the Bill becomes law at £3,000,000. The

question then arises what will be the amount transferred, if the Irish

Government, seeing its way to more economical administration, were to give

at once the twelve months’ notice and take over the service at the end of

a year. It would not, I presume, be £2,664,000 the charge at which the

Treasury in its “outline of financial provision” (paper 6154), estimated

it in 1912-13, but £3,000,000, modified to some extent by the prospect of

reduction.

The cost of National Insurance and Labour Exchanges is estimated by the

Treasury in 1912-13 at £191,500, increasing by £300,000 in ten or fifteen

years. If the Irish Government were in like manner to take them over, the

amount transferred would, I presume, be £190,000 with a sum added

representing the prospect of increase.

In the event then of those services being taken over by the Irish

Government, they would considerably exceed their charges as estimated by

the Treasury for 1912-13, and the excess would entail a corresponding

increase of charge on the British taxpayer, to be counterbalanced

gradually by the normal increase of Irish revenue, which the

Postmaster-General estimates, with due reserve, at £200,000 a year, and by

the gradual reduction (£50,000 a year) of the free gift of the British

taxpayer from £500,000 to £200,000.

It must be remembered that these increased charges on the British taxpayer

are not the result of Home Rule, they are an inheritance from the

“partnership.”

When these services are transferred from the Imperial to the Irish

Government, the Imperial Government will only retain control over the land

purchase charges and the regulation and collection of taxes. The former

will apparently remain permanently with the Imperial Government, involving

an estimated increase of charge on the British taxpayers of £450,000 a

year (Treasury Paper 6154). With regard to the latter, it is clearly

desirable that at the outset the Imperial Government should be responsible

for levying and collecting taxes. If difficulties on that subject should

arise in parts of Ireland, the Imperial Government will settle them with

an authority which the new Irish Government cannot possess. Clause 26,

however, holds out a possibility hereafter of extended autonomy to

Ireland. If for three years the revenue of Ireland exceeds the expenditure

on Irish services by the Imperial and Irish Governments, the Parliament of

the United Kingdom will revise the financial provisions of the Home Rule

Act, with a view to securing a proper contribution from Irish revenues to

Imperial expenditure, and extending the powers of the Irish Government

_with respect to the __ imposition and collection of taxes_, and if

extension were then granted in a liberal spirit, there would be little

left to desire.

CONCLUSION

I have thus traced the gradual progress towards autonomy contemplated by

the Act. It justifies the conclusion that the Government favours autonomy,

but seeks to achieve that end gradually and tentatively. With the path

thus marked out, it lies with the nation to pursue steadily and resolvedly

the great end of reconciliation with Ireland.

It is impossible to consider Home Rule in its financial aspect, without

casting a look backward and comparing the result which would have followed

the grant of Home Rule in 1886 with the result which has followed its

refusal. In the former case Ireland would have been reconciled long ago.

She would have been mistress in her own house, and it would have been her

interest as well as her policy so to conduct her administration as to

insure the success of her autonomy. She would have had full opportunity

for reorganising her establishments on a reasonable scale, substituting

for an expensive military police an ordinary police, with a saving, as Mr.

Gladstone once pointed out, of £900,000 a year. She would have been able

to maintain the reasonable contribution to Imperial expenditure which it

is her duty as an integral part of the United Kingdom to provide. It would

have been worth the while of Great Britain to make a great sacrifice at

the outset to attain this solution of the Irish problem, and long before

now the solution would have been complete.

The Conservative Party refused Home Rule. They have held power during

sixteen out of the twenty-five years elapsed in the interval, and they

have had full opportunity to try their alternative policy. That policy has

not indeed been the twenty years of “resolute Government,” a euphemism for

coercion, advocated by Lord Salisbury. They have tried a policy of bribes

and doles, with the result that the Imperial contribution of over

£2,000,000 made in 1885 has been dissipated, and that Irish local

expenditure alone shows now a deficit of £1,500,000 and a steadily

increasing deficit. In short, a total burthen of between £3,500,000 and

£4,000,000 has been inflicted on the British taxpayer. The Leader of the

Conservatives has now announced with splendid audacity that if the

“partnership” continues, if the Conservatives are allowed still to

mis-rule Ireland, and to maintain the baleful spirit of ascendancy, they

will endeavour to develop in every possible way the resources of Ireland.

That is to say, the policy of bribes and doles is to continue at the

expense of the British taxpayer. Let the British taxpayer note that, and

let him note also that the Conservative Party will find the ways and means

for these bribes and doles not by taxes on the wealthy, but by taxes on

the food of the people. Ireland will accept the doles; but she will not be

satisfied. She will still clamour at our gates for Home Rule, as she has

clamoured since 1886, and she will get Home Rule, but the burthen on the

British taxpayer will be then how much greater than now?

Appendix

This Report of the Primrose Committee, the Treasury outline of financial

provisions, and the speech of the Postmaster-General on the introduction

of the Bill offer some vague estimates, perhaps more properly guesses, of

Irish finance, one of which, Old-age Pensions, extends to twenty years. It

may be interesting to throw these figures together, not (God forbid) as an

estimate, but as illustrating opinion prevalent among the experts engaged

in the preparation of the Bill.

Income:

Estimate for the year 1912-1913 10,839,000

_Add_ free gift of £500,000 to be reduced in nine years to 200,000

The Postmaster-General’s Estimate of £200,000 normal yearly increase

of revenue in twenty years 4,000,000

Income in twenty years (round figures) 15,000,000

Expenditure:

Sum transferred to Ireland 1912-1913 5,462,000

Post Office, 1912-1913 1,600,000

Old-age pensions (Treasury Paper) 2,800,000

Land purchase (£761,000 in 1912-1913 increased by £450,000) 1,211,000

Insurance £191,500 in 1912-1913 increased by £300,000 491,500

(Say) 11,564,500-11,600,000

Balance available for Constabulary, collection of Revenue, Imperial

contribution and Irish services.

It must be recollected that the Irish Government has to provide for

increase of Irish services beyond £5,462,000 by taxation.

VI.—The Judiciary, The Police, And The Maintenance Of Law And Order. BY

THOMAS F. MOLONY, K.C., HIS MAJESTY’S SECOND SERJEANT-AT-LAW, CROWN

COUNSEL FOR DUBLIN.

(1) _The Judiciary_

The Supreme Court of Judicature in Ireland is at present constituted as

follows: The Lord Chancellor, the Lord Chief Justice, the Master of the

Rolls, the Lord Chief Baron of the Exchequer, two Lords Justices of

Appeal, two Judges of the Chancery Division and six Puisne Judges of the

King’s Bench Division. On the occurrence of the next vacancy in the office

of Lord Chief Baron the office is to be abolished and a Puisne Judge

appointed instead. Since the year 1897, six judgeships have been abolished

in Ireland, and a large saving thereby effected. The duties formerly

discharged by the Probate and Matrimonial Judge, the Admiralty Judge and

the two Bankruptcy Judges have been transferred to the King’s Bench

Division and the number of the Puisne Judges of the King’s Bench Division

has been reduced by two.(107) With every desire for economy it is believed

that the Supreme Court Bench cannot be further reduced without interfering

with the efficiency of the public service. The Lord Chancellor of Ireland

is appointed by having the Great Seal delivered to him by the Crown, and

all the other Judges are appointed by His Majesty by Letters Patent. There

are also in Ireland five Recorders and sixteen County Court Judges, who

are appointed by the Lord-Lieutenant. The County Court Judges in Ireland

are also Chairmen of the Quarter Sessions of their respective counties. No

Judge of the Supreme Court or of the County Court can be removed from his

office except upon the address of both Houses of Parliament. Under the

Home Rule Bill the position of existing judges is to remain unchanged, and

future judges are to be appointed by the Irish Executive, and can only be

removed by a joint address of both Houses of the Irish Parliament which

gives them the same independence that the existing Judges now enjoy. Under

the Bill of 1893, the Imperial Executive was to have the appointment of

Judges for six years after the passing of the Act, but there seems to be

no justification for the suspensory period and it has been wisely dropped

from the present measure. The Irish Executive will not be “irresponsible

and inexperienced” as Mr. J. H. Campbell says in “Against Home Rule—The

Case for the Union” (page 54), but will be composed of men who for many

years have served in the Imperial Parliament, and are well qualified from

their ability and experience to at once take up the reins of Government.

(2) _The Police_

There are two distinct police forces in Ireland. The Dublin Metropolitan

force(108) has jurisdiction over the Dublin Metropolitan District, which

includes the whole of the City of Dublin and portion of the County. It

consists of 2 Commissioners, 7 Superintendents, 25 Inspectors, 187

Sergeants and 1,060 Constables, and costs £154,181 per annum.(109) Portion

of the cost is met by a police tax of 8d. in the £ on the rateable value

of the district, but a substantial balance—in the present year amounting

to £96,466—is borne by the Treasury. The Royal Irish Constabulary(110) has

jurisdiction over the rest of Ireland, including Belfast. It consists of 1

Inspector-General, 1 Deputy Inspector-General, 3 Assistant

Inspectors-General, 37 County Inspectors, 195 District Inspectors, 235

Head Constables, 2,068 Sergeants and 8,182 Constables. It costs £1,413,069

per annum, the whole of which is borne by the Treasury.(111) There is a

fundamental difference between the two forces. The Dublin force has been

founded on the model of the London Metropolitan Police, and is essentially

a civilian force. It is admirably trained in police duties, and has always

discharged its duty to the satisfaction of the citizens. The Royal Irish

Constabulary is drilled and trained in the use of the revolver, rifle, and

sword in the same manner as are the armed forces of the Crown, and is in

every essential a military organization. There is a reserve force always

kept at the Depôt in the Phœnix Park which at a moment’s notice is

available for service in any part of Ireland. The Bill proposes that the

control of the Dublin Metropolitan Police be transferred immediately to

the Irish Executive, but that the Royal Irish Constabulary shall remain

under Imperial control for six years. An Irish Executive which could not

control the police force of its own metropolis would be in a ridiculous

position, and no believer in self-government can object to the immediate

transfer of the Dublin force to the Irish Executive, and indeed, many

think that the same course ought to be adopted with regard to the Royal

Irish Constabulary. It has for a long period, been a constant source of

complaint that the numbers of the Royal Irish Constabulary, and its

consequent cost, are entirely out of proportion to the wants of the

country. It was created in a time of agrarian disturbance which has long

since passed away, and now that Ireland has been for many years far more

free from serious crime than either England or Scotland, it is absurd that

in Ireland it should cost 6s. 8d. per head of the population for police,

while an equally efficient force can be provided, in England for 3s. 4d.

per head, and in Scotland for 2s. 5d. per head. In Ireland there is one

policeman for every 365 inhabitants, while in England and Wales there is

only one for every 727 inhabitants.(112)

(3) _Law and Order_

The maintenance of law and order is the first duty of a Government, and if

it could be proved that the proposed measure of Home Rule for Ireland

would lead to crime and disorder, the cause would lose many of its more

prominent adherents. To those, however, who are interested in the

administration of the law—and particularly the criminal law—it is obvious

that Home Rule will have the effect of still further diminishing crime,

and will also enable considerable saving to be effected in the sums now

spent on law charges and criminal prosecutions. At the present time, and

indeed for many years past, Ireland has been practically crimeless. The

Judges at the Spring Assizes, 1912, were unanimous in describing all the

counties in Ireland, except two, as peaceable and orderly, and free from

serious crime. In two counties—Fermanagh and Carlow—there were no cases

whatever for trial, and it was only in Galway and Clare that

dissatisfaction was expressed with the present state of affairs, and even

in those counties the affected districts comprised a very limited area.

The following table taken from the report of the General Prisons Board for

Ireland for 1910, shows how the Government have been able to close prisons

in consequence of the diminution of crime and reduction in the number of

prisoners:

“The number of prisons and bridewells,” says the report, “under

the control of the General Prisons Board on the 1st April,

1878—the date when the local prisons and bridewells were

transferred to the Board—and now is as follows:—

1878. 1910.

4 Convict 1 Convict

Prisons. Prison.

38 Local 1 Joint Convict

Prisons. and Local

Prison.

95 Bridewells. 15 Local

Prisons.

6 Bridewells.”

The Unionist Associations of Ireland have recently published a handbook

called “The Home Rule ‘Nutshell’ Examined by an Irish Unionist” in which

it is stated (p. 69) “The only crime that is complained of in Ireland is

the organized crime due to the inspired agitation of the United Irish

League. Without that Ireland would be _comparatively crimeless_.” No proof

has ever been given that the United Irish League has taken any part in the

organization of crime, and beyond all doubt in many instances it has been

instrumental in preventing it. It cannot, of course, be denied that in

certain parts of the country instances of boycotting and cattle driving

occur, but such occurrences will certainly not increase, and are more

likely to cease altogether when Ireland is governed by an Irish Executive

chosen by the people, and responsible to the people for the good

government of the country. The Unionist complaint is, not so much that an

Irish Executive will not be able to enforce the law, but that it will be

unwilling to do so in certain cases, and will exercise a dispensing power

as to whether the decrees of the Courts shall or shall not, in particular

cases, be enforced.(113) If it were within the power of the Executive to

prevent the police or military from being called upon to protect the civil

officers of the law in the discharge of their duties, it would, no doubt,

be possible to paralyze the administration of justice, but it is well

settled that a sheriff, or anybody charged with the execution of a writ of

a competent Court, has the right to require the assistance of constables,

and indeed of any of the liege subjects of the Crown, and that the

Executive has no power to prevent such assistance being given. This was

laid down by the Common Law Judges in England in the well-known case of

“_Miller_ v. _Knox_”(114) and still more emphatically by the Lord Chief

Baron (Palles) of the Exchequer in Ireland in the case of the Woodford

prisoners at the Connaught Winter Assizes of 1886.(115) The Lord Chief

Baron said:

“I desire it to be thoroughly understood that the execution of the

decrees of the judiciary in this country does not depend—as it

does not, I believe, in any civilised country—upon the will of the

Executive who, for the moment, may happen to be in office. Into

the execution of our writ we cannot allow any question of party

politics to enter. If the law be wrong, let the law be altered by

the Legislature, and the judges will, at the moment, carry out the

law as altered. They cannot look beyond the law. They cannot, in

the administration of that law, contemplate alterations at a

future time. Their sworn duty is to give to him who asks it that

which he is entitled to by law. It is not competent to them, or to

any other person, to go behind the law and to ask whether, in his

own opinion, or in the opinion of others, the law is just or

unjust. With them the only consideration must be that is the law.

They are bound to pronounce the law. From that pronouncement there

is an appeal to the highest court in the realm. But when judgment

is once given—the judgment of a court of law, acting within the

scope of its jurisdiction—it is not competent to anyone in this

kingdom, I care not how high he may be, to say that a writ

regularly issued on foot of that judgment shall not be executed,

or to prevent those who by law are bound to aid in its execution

from giving that aid and assistance which the Constitution

requires.”

In 1893 the County Inspector of the Royal Irish Constabulary in County

Kerry, by the direction of the Executive, refused the assistance of the

Constabulary to the Sheriff of the County, when he desired to execute

certain writs of the superior Courts in the night time. The Sheriff

thereupon applied to the Queen’s Bench Division for an attachment against

the County Inspector, and the Court unanimously made the order.(116) The

Lord Chief Justice (Lord O’Brien) in giving judgment said (p. 238):

“I wish to point out that, according to the opinion of all the

judges who were called in to advise the House of Lords in the case

of _Miller_ v. _Knox_,(117) refusal, unjustified by the occasion,

as, in my opinion, the refusal in the present case was, to protect

the sheriff in the execution of his duty, when protection is

sought by him, in the honest exercise of his discretion, to enable

him to discharge his duty in the execution of civil process, is

punishable, by indictment, by criminal information, and, as was

established in _Miller_ v. _Knox_ by the summary process of this

court. The official, be he Under Secretary or Chief Secretary (I

do not, of course, refer to his Excellency the Lord-Lieutenant),

who directed Mr. Waters not to comply with the sheriff’s demand

for protection, has rendered himself amenable to the criminal law,

is liable to be tried by indictment, to have a criminal

information exhibited in this court against him, or to be attached

by the summary process of this court.”

There can be no doubt, therefore, that the Irish Executive will be bound

to give assistance and protection to sheriffs or other lawful officers

executing any legal process of a competent Court, and if such assistance

is not given the Courts will be able to assert their supremacy in the

various ways pointed out by the Lord Chief Justice.

A great deal of capital has recently been made in the Unionist Press on

account of the promulgation of the _Motu Proprio_ “_Quantavis

Diligentia_.” It has been asserted that this decree applies to Ireland and

will necessarily embarrass catholic officials in the discharge of their

public duty. The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Dublin has, however, fully

explained the meaning of the decree, and has shown that it does not apply

to any country where there has prevailed against it, as there has long

prevailed against it in Ireland, a custom invested with the conditions

required by the Canon Law.(118) He further says (p. 36):

“The excommunication of the clause _Cogentes_, is not decreed

against all who oblige lay judges to compel the attendance of

ecclesiastics in their courts. It is decreed against those who do

this in violation of the Canon Law. There must first, then, be a

canonical offence. It is to that offence that the clause

_Cogentes_ attaches the penalty of excommunication. But, there

being no canonical offence in the discharge of their duty by our

Catholic Judges, and Catholic Law Officers of the Crown, our

Catholic Police Magistrates and Catholic Policemen, and our laity

in general—who were so ludicrously paraded before the public a few

weeks ago as the unhappy victims of the _Motu Proprio_—there is in

their case no offence to which an ecclesiastical penalty can be

attached, and so, no ecclesiastical penalty is incurred.”

Nothing is to be feared in Ireland from the _Motu Proprio_ “_Quantavis

Diligentia_,” and there is really no necessity for the restrictions

contained in Section 3 of the Bill, although no person will object to

their insertion as a matter of precaution. The Unionists profess to be

alarmed at the prospects of Ireland under Home Rule; but when their fears

are analyzed they are seen to be illusory, and when their arguments are

considered they are found to amount to a single assertion that a great

measure of reform is not to be passed, and the will of the people is not

to prevail, because a small minority is irrevocably opposed to any measure

which will give to the Irish people power to manage their own affairs.

When Unionists complain of an occasional case of boycotting or

cattle-driving—and it is almost all they have to complain of now—they

should read Lord Durham’s report on Canada in 1838, and they will see how

favourably Ireland, even in its darkest hour, contrasts with the Canada of

that day. Lord Durham adopted the courageous policy of trusting the

people, and his policy brought peace, prosperity and contentment to that

country. Mr. Asquith’s great measure is an embodiment of the same policy,

and will be attended with the same results, and indeed the situation could

not be better summed up than it was by Mr. John Redmond in the House of

Commons three years ago.(119)

“As it happened in Canada, so it will happen in Ireland—when you

throw responsibility on the shoulders of the people, and not till

then. Then respect for law will arise in Ireland; then confidence

in the administration of justice will arise; and when that day

comes, I am perfectly convinced that Ireland will become the most

peaceable and most law-abiding, as she is to-day the most

crimeless, part of your Empire.”

VII.—The Present Position Of The Irish Land Question. BY JONATHAN PIM,

K.C.

INTRODUCTORY

The following chapter contains an account of the change which has been

wrought by legislation in the position of the Irish tenant farmer and

labourer during the last forty years. The change is large—the benefit and

improvement equally great. The task is, however, not much more than half

completed. The holdings purchased, or agreed to be purchased, by tenants

under the Purchase Acts amount to about 378,000. There remain to be

purchased about 227,000. The Congested Districts Board have done good work

in the congested districts, but what has been done has hardly gone beyond

the experimental stage. The experiments have, to a large extent,

succeeded, but their very success enlarges the vista of work to be done in

the future. The work of the District Councils in providing better

dwellings for agricultural labourers is perhaps more nearly completed.

Nevertheless, much still remains to be done.

Under the second section of the proposed Bill “to amend the provision for

the Government of Ireland,” the “general subject matter of the Acts

relating to Land Purchase in Ireland” is reserved. This would seem to

include the Land Purchase work of the Congested Districts Board, but it is

doubtful if it would include any part of the Labourers’ Acts. Taken in

conjunction with the whole scheme of the Bill, and especially with its

financial provisions, the wisdom of this reservation is evident. That work

which has gone so far and has been so beneficial in its operation should

be stopped, or even hampered, in its development, would be an injury

which, even the undoubted benefits a Home Government will bring with it

would scarcely out-weigh. No doubt Ireland, if thrown altogether on her

own resources, could, after a few years’ time, continue the work of land

purchase and could finally complete it, but the interregnum would be most

mischievous. All those who had not purchased would be dissatisfied, and

the Irish Government would be subjected to a pressure which they would

find it hard to resist. The danger would be two-fold. On the one hand the

Government might attempt to raise money at an excessive rate of interest

and would thereby embarrass themselves financially; on the other hand an

attempt might be made to force the Government to pass a “Compulsory

Purchase Act” and to fix the price of purchase at a much lower figure than

could be obtained under a system of free agreement. The Imperial

Government itself runs no risk in reserving Land Purchase; on the

contrary, it will run less risk under Home Rule than it does now. At the

present moment, there is due to the Treasury a sum of about £71,000,000,

money advanced for the purchase of land. The amount of the annual

instalments payable on this sum is about £2,226,785, and on the 31st of

March, 1912, there was due for arrears the sum of £44,156.(120) The

purchase annuitants have up to the present discharged their obligations in

a most faithful and honest manner. There is not the slightest reason to

think that they will act differently in the future, but if, as some

political prophets seem to consider possible, they do, in the future,

strike against the payment of the instalments they themselves will be the

principal sufferers, for under the proposed Bill the Treasury may, out of

the sum to be transferred to the Irish Government, before making the

transfer, deduct each year the amount then due on account of purchase

annuities. This, if it happened to any large extent, would render fresh

taxation necessary—a contingency which would certainly not be desired by

the Irish Government. The proposed Bill does not contain any specific

provision giving power to the Irish administration, in the case of local

repudiation, to make the counties in which repudiation had taken place

repay to the Irish Treasury such sums as they had been forced to pay to

the Imperial Treasury. If such a provision were inserted, it would make

the position of the Treasury extremely secure.

When Mr. Gladstone introduced his first Home Rule Bill in 1886, the land

war was at its height. The country was, on the one hand, full of intense

and unreasoning bitterness and resentment, and, on the other hand, of

unreasoning terror of the consequences of the change of administration.

There are many persons, to-day convinced believers in the policy of Home

Rule, who do not regret that the Bill of 1886 failed to pass. Things were

not very much better in 1893, although, owing to the Land Act of 1881, the

land war was slowly losing its fierceness. Since then a slow, but no less

deep and far-reaching, change has passed over the tenant farmers of

Ireland. The bitterness and discontent which rightly possessed them during

the whole of the last century have at last given way to more kindly and

contented feelings. This is due in a great measure to the large remedial

measures passed first by Mr. Gladstone’s Government of 1880 to 1895, and

afterwards by the Conservative Administration between 1896 and 1905; but

it is perhaps even more due to the feeling which has slowly grown up among

the agricultural population that, at last, they are being listened to, and

that their wants are being attended to, imperfectly, no doubt, but still

with sympathy and with a desire to do what can be done to meet them.

Whatever dangers may attend the granting of Home Rule now, they will not

be the dangers which terrified and controlled public opinion in 1886 and

1893. Almost all the confusion, trouble, and crime of last century was due

to the vicious absurdity of the Irish land code and to the miserable

condition of the Irish tenant farmers produced thereby. That is now

changed and Ireland has become a quiet and comparatively crimeless

country. The danger which many foresee under a Home Government is of a

different kind. It is rather that the overwhelming peasant vote may render

the administration unduly parsimonious and so unwilling to place any

additional burden on the owners of land that a kind of political

stagnation may arise therefrom. Ireland cannot, of course, be kept

permanently out of the great movements of European thought, but, for the

moment, it may be safely alleged that in no part of Europe is property

safer.

Part I. The Fair Rent Acts and the Land Purchase Acts.(121)

Two Classes of Occupiers of Land in Ireland—Economic and Uneconomic.

The occupiers of Irish agricultural holdings are of two classes—those

whose farms are economic, and those whose farms are uneconomic. By an

economic holding is meant one of sufficient productive capacity to support

a family at a reasonable standard of comfort without help from outside

sources. One class holds land of a fertility, quantity, and situation that

enables the occupier to live at a reasonable standard of comfort out of

the produce, and pay a rent. The other class also lives on and partly out

of land, but land of a character, quantity, or situation that will not

support a family at a proper standard of living without extraneous help.

In the case of the first class, the fairness of the rent is the most

important consideration; in the case of the second, the land and rent are

often minor elements in the struggle for existence. The land is either so

limited in amount or of so unproductive a character that, without outside

help such as the wages of labour, or help from friends and relations, the

income of this class would sink below the line necessary for subsistence,

and actual starvation would ensue. It has often been pointed out that

agricultural rent is in many cases paid in Ireland for farms out of which

no true economic rent is earned. This means, as every economist knows,

that, were the ordinary and necessary cost of production, including the

remuneration of labour, deducted from the returns from the cultivation of

land, no surplus would remain for the payment of rent. Consequently, the

rent paid for such land is not true agricultural rent. It is more of the

nature of house-rent paid by working men in towns, who, out of the wages

that they earn in their various employments, spend certain portions in

food, clothing, and shelter. But the Irish peasant, who tries to support

his family on an insufficient farm, has not the advantage of having a

demand for his labour at hand. He has either to emigrate, to migrate, or

to live below the proper standard of decency and comfort. Consequently, he

is neither in the position of the farmer nor of the labourer. He is the

occupier of a piece of land on which he builds his cabin, and pays a rent

which is supposed to be agricultural, but which is really not earned out

of the land, but is paid out of whatever other supplementary income he is

able to obtain by working for wages in other countries; or by

contributions from outside sources. The Irish Fair Rent Acts are supposed

to deal only with agricultural holdings. The rents fixed under them are

intended to be agricultural and economic rents. It is evident to anyone

who has examined the circumstances of the small holdings of the West of

Ireland, that the rents assessed on them under the Land Acts in many cases

are not agricultural rents, but are payments more of the nature of site

rents, or the rents of non-agricultural holdings, which were not supposed

to be subject to the provisions of the Irish Fair Rent Acts at all. Were

the Land Acts strictly administered, unquestionably the greater portion of

the small holdings on the western seaboard and other parts of Ireland

would have been excluded, and applications to fix agricultural rents on

them would have been dismissed.

Confusion of Treatment of Occupiers of Economic and Uneconomic Holdings.

The importance of the view here put forward lies mainly in the fact that

until the passing of the Act of 1891, under which the Congested Districts

Board was created, no attempt was made to distinguish between the two

classes of occupiers of Irish land. The occupiers of economic and

uneconomic farms were subject to the same laws, and were treated in the

same manner. No attempt was ever made to distinguish between the man who

could make his rent out of his land and the man who could not. Both were

included in the Fair Rent provisions of the Act of 1881, as it was

administered, and a rent was assessed on what was practically the site for

a cabin as if it were a farm. This confusion of treatment of two different

problems renders it necessary to trace the evolution of the Irish Land

Acts if we are to understand intelligently the problem that presents

itself in dealing with congestion in Ireland, and it is accordingly

proposed to sketch shortly the steps by which Irish land legislation has

advanced, and how it at present deals with the various classes of holdings

that have to be taken into consideration.

Special treatment for the congested districts was not thought of in the

earlier remedial Land Acts. The Act of 1881, if strictly administered, as

we have seen, would have excluded most of the holdings in such districts.

After twenty years’ experience of this Act it was found that its

provisions, even though amended repeatedly, did not meet the special

difficulties. The Congested Districts were not withdrawn from the

operations of the various Land Acts—merely additional powers were given

for ameliorating the condition of the people in the defined localities.

The Land Act of 1881 is naturally regarded in Ireland as the sheet-anchor

of the peasant—as the Magna Charta of his rights. On the other hand, it

has been looked on by many land-owners as an unjustifiable invasion of

their rights, and it has often been blamed for results which it recorded

rather than caused. To justify that Act of 1881, we must understand the

preceding conditions that governed the tenure of land in Ireland.

Complaints against Irish rents are not confined to recent years or to the

last century. A continuous stream of emigration of Protestant dissenters

from Ulster went on during the early part of the eighteenth century, and

the Irish Government of the day was much concerned at losing so many of

their most loyal citizens. In 1729 the Lord-Lieutenant forwarded a report

on the subject to the King, which states:

“One great reason given by the people themselves for leaving the

Kingdom is the poverty to which that part of the country is

reduced, occasioned in a great measure, they say, by raising of

rents in many places above the real value of land, or what can be

paid out of the produce of them, if any tolerable subsistence be

allowed to the farmers using their utmost industry.”

Complaint was also made of the uncertain tenures, the short leases, and

“the usual method of late when lands are out of lease,” which was “to

invite and encourage all persons to make proposals and set them to the

highest bidder without regard to the tenants in possession.”

Relation of Landlord and Tenant in Ireland prior to 1860.

The relation of landlord and tenant in Ireland was, down to the year 1860,

based on tenure, not on contract. The old feudal tenures imported from

England were, during the last two or three centuries, modified and altered

by the existing Irish customs. The result was that a period of much doubt

and confusion arose, and an extraordinary collection of Acts dealing with

land was placed on the Irish Statute Book. In the reign of George III.

upwards of sixty of these Acts were passed for Ireland, while six sufficed

for England. The following reigns were equally productive in agrarian

legislation, and the condition of the occupiers became more and more

unsettled and unsatisfactory, and “wild doctrines,” to quote the words of

the eminent authors of a standard work on Irish Land Tenure, published in

1851, were agitated, including “extravagant demands for fixity of tenure

and compulsory valuation of rents.”

The relation of landlord and tenant, based on tenure that prevailed down

to the year 1860, gave no security of occupation to the tenant, and did

not protect his improvements, but the cost of ejectment and the legal

difficulties of proof that accompanied it exercised a powerful restraining

influence in preventing capricious eviction.

Position of Tenants under the Common Law as regards Eviction—in the case

of Leaseholds.

During the eighteenth and early part of the nineteenth centuries, while

many Irish tenants held under leases or written contracts the great

majority were tenants from year to year. Under the Common Law both in

England and Ireland, the right of the landlord to recover possession of

the land in the case of a lease or written contract depended on the

covenants and conditions in the contract, and no ejectment could take

place unless for “a condition broken.”

In the Case of Yearly Tenancies.

In the case of tenancies not created by writing—tenancies from year to

year—there was no power of eviction for non-payment of rent under the

Common Law. The tenant of such a tenancy could only be ejected by a notice

to quit, which notice must expire with the termination of the year of his

tenancy. This system caused much difficulty to the landlord, as the onus

lay on him of proving the commencement of the tenancy, and, frequently,

even where the tenant had failed to pay the rent, eighteen months passed

before possession could be obtained.

The Common Law of England and the tribunals that administered it

discouraged the forfeiture of tenants’ interests, and the landlord was

held strictly to the technical proofs required by law.

The Irish Ejectment Code—how it Pressed against the Tenant.

In Ireland a different course was followed. The Irish “Ejectment Code,”

which originated in the reign of Queen Anne, had for its object, to quote

an eminent Irish lawyer, the expediting and facilitating the eviction of

the tenant. It got rid of every formality by which the old Common Law

delayed and obstructed the forfeiture of the tenant’s estate. Statute

after Statute was passed for this purpose. The whole principle of the

Common Law was reversed. Chief Justice Pennefather judicially declared

that it was a code of law made solely for the benefit of the landlord, and

against the interest of the tenant, and that it was upon this principle

that judges must administer and interpret it.

Facilities given for Evicting Leaseholders.

The landlord who sought to evict a tenant holding under lease was, down to

the year 1816, obliged to proceed in one of the Superior Courts of law, a

practice which caused much expense and delay. When the European peace came

in 1815, after the Battle of Waterloo, the fall in agricultural prices

rendered it difficult, if not impossible, for tenants to pay the high

rents which had been fixed while war prices ruled. An Act was immediately

passed (56 George III., c. 88) which enabled an ejectment to be obtained

in the County Courts at a small cost, and without delay. In this respect

Ireland was forty years ahead of England, as a similar jurisdiction was

not given to the English County Courts until 1856.

Facilities given for Evicting Yearly Tenants.

The Irish Ejectment Code applied only to tenants holding under leases or

written contracts. As the country advanced, landlords gradually ceased to

give leases, and the great majority of small tenants held from year to

year. To meet this state of things the Civil Bill Court Act of 1851

extended the ejectment for non-payment of rent to tenancies from year to

year. Under the English statutes no similar power was given, and the

English landlord was obliged in the case of non-payment of rent to first

serve the tenant with a Notice to Quit, and then proceed to evict him by

the slow and costly process of an action in the Superior Courts.

The Land Act of 1860 (Deasy’s Act).

From this sketch it will be seen that the law governing the relations of

landlord and tenant in Ireland became more and more favourable to the

owner. This tendency culminated in 1860, when, by “Deasy’s Act” (23 & 24

Vic., c. 154)—which was passed through Parliament without amendment—the

relation between landlord and tenant was defined as founded on contract

and not upon tenure. The Act proceeded on the assumption that the land is

the exclusive property of the landlord, and that the tenant’s interest is

nothing more than that of a person who has agreed to pay a certain

remuneration for the use of the soil for a limited period. It simplified

and increased the remedies of the landlord for recovering possession of

the land, and rendered efficient the law of ejectment for non-payment of

rent and on notice to quit. Thus a default in payment of one year’s rent

entitled a landlord to evict the tenant and get possession of the land,

with all improvements on it, even where such improvements many times

exceeded in value the amount due. So also, by serving a Notice to Quit,

the landlord could similarly get rid of the tenant without cause, and take

possession of the holding and all its improvements, no matter how valuable

these might be, and without having to pay any compensation. The governing

principle of the Act was that whatever attached to the freehold became

part of the freehold.

Position of the Irish Tenant from 1860-1870.—The Devon Commission reported

(1844) that farm Improvements are made by the Tenants.

During the ten years after the passing of “Deasy’s Act” the position of

the Irish tenant reached its nadir. He had no right of any kind, except

such as the contract under which he held gave him. Almost all the

improvements which rendered the land capable of being worked were made by

him. He had built the houses, erected the fences, made the roads, drained

and manured the land, reclaimed it from bog or mountain—generally at a

cost out of all proportion to the return—and yet he could be turned out

without compensation at the will of the owner, either by the service of a

Notice to Quit or by ejectment for non-payment of one year’s rent. That

the tenants in Ireland made the improvements was universally admitted. The

Devon Commission (presided over by a leading Irish landlord) in the year

1844, reported:

“It is well known that in England and Scotland before a landlord

offers a farm for letting, he finds it necessary to provide a

suitable farm-house, with necessary farm buildings for the proper

management of the farm. He puts the gates and fences in good

order, and he also takes upon himself a great part of the burden

of keeping the buildings in repair during the term; and the rent

is fixed with reference to this state of things. In Ireland the

case is wholly different. It is admitted on all hands, that

according to the general practice in Ireland, the landlord builds

neither dwelling house nor farm offices, nor puts fences, gates,

&c., into good order, before he lets his land to the tenant. The

cases in which the landlord does any of these things are the

exception. In most cases whatever is done in the way of building

or fencing is done by the tenant, and in the ordinary language of

the country—dwelling houses, farm buildings, and even the making

of fences, are described by the general word _improvements_, which

is thus employed to denote the general adjuncts to a farm, without

which, in England or Scotland, no tenant would be found to rent

it.”

Effects of Political and Economic Changes on the Relations between

Landlord and Tenant during the Nineteenth Century.

In the early part of the last century the landlords, for political as well

as commercial reasons, encouraged the increase of the tenantry. The

political system that prevailed gave the landlord who had a large number

of tenants considerable power. The economic conditions of the time made

small tillage farming productive, and the demand caused by an ever-growing

agricultural population increased the competition for land, and enabled

the rents to be raised. About the middle of the century all these

conditions altered. The combined influence of the Famine and of the

introduction of Free Trade made it the interest of most landlords to get

rid of their small tenants as expeditiously and as completely as possible.

Now came the era of pasture and larger farms. Although the population

rapidly decreased, the consolidation of farms kept up the competition for

land, and rents rose rapidly. The clearances so common from the Famine to

1870 were made in many cases quite irrespective of the non-payment of

rent.

Attempts at Reform.—Land Act of 1870.

This state of things led to outrage and constant agrarian disturbance.

Various suggestions for reform of the Land Laws were made, but such

proposals were usually denounced as confiscatory. Mr. Butt’s proposal in

1866 that sixty-three years’ leases, with power to the landlord of varying

the rent, when any accidental circumstances increased the value of the

land, should be given by every landlord to his tenants, was described by

Lord Dufferin as “communistic” and “as subversive of the rights of

property.” Mr. John Stuart Mill, speaking on a Land Bill introduced by Mr.

Chichester Fortescue (May 17th, 1865), denounced the policy of clearing

away the small tenants to make room for capitalist farmers. “You cannot,”

he said, “evict a whole nation.” Various attempts to alter the law were

defeated, until at length, in 1870, Mr. Gladstone took the matter in hand,

and passed his Landlord and Tenant Act—the beginning of a new Land Code.

The justification for the Act of 1870 was the same as for the Act of 1881,

which followed it. The tenant had made all the improvements on the land,

and yet had no legal property in them. He was liable to capricious

eviction from a holding, the value of which was often mainly due to his

labour, and he was subject to arbitrary increases of rent.

The Act of 1870 did three things: (1) It gave compensation for

disturbance; (2) it gave compensation for improvements; and (3) it

legalised the Ulster Tenant Right Custom.

_Compensation for Disturbance._

I.—Compensation for disturbance was strictly limited to such loss

as “_the Court shall find_” to have been sustained by the tenant.

The loss was often held to be the less the higher the rent. The

amount of compensation could in no case exceed £250, and was

limited to tenancies created after the passing of the Act. No

compensation was to be given to tenants who had sublet or

subdivided their holdings without the consent in writing of the

landlord, or to any tenant under a lease for thirty-one years or

upwards, and the landlord had a right of deduction from the amount

awarded, for deterioration, &c.

_Compensation for Improvements._

II.—The right to compensation for his improvements to be awarded

to a tenant when quitting his holding was subject to so large a

variety of exceptions as to greatly limit the number of tenants

able to take advantage of the provision.

Even when compensation was awarded, the landlord could deduct from

the amount any arrears due for rates and taxes and for the loss

due to the non-observance of express or implied covenants or

agreements, and the Court in awarding compensation was required in

reduction of the claim of the tenant to take into consideration

the time during which the tenant had enjoyed the advantages of

such improvements, and also any other benefits he had had.

_Ulster Custom._

III.—The legalization of the Ulster Custom did not prevent the

landlord from increasing the rent from time to time so as almost

to destroy the tenant’s interest. The Act did not define the

custom, and the onus lay on the tenant of establishing that the

particular usage under which he held was within it.

The three great reforms introduced by the Act of 1870, namely: (1) The

right to compensation for disturbance; (2) to compensation for

improvements; and (3) the legalization of the Ulster Custom—could only be

brought into operation by proceedings before the County Court Judges, who

were thus entrusted with the administration of the Act.

Failure of the Act of 1870, Causes of.

The Act of 1870 failed in its object mainly for three reasons:

(1) The great variety and complexity of the exceptions from the

benefits of the Act.

(2) The principle of administration which, as a rule, tended to

reduce the compensation to as low a figure as possible.

(3) The insecurity of tenure of the tenant, and the right the

landlord still had of raising the rent at his pleasure. Thus the

legalization of the Ulster Custom was of little use, as the

landlord could practically destroy all the tenant’s interest under

it by raising the rent. The only remedy was to surrender the

holding and go before the County Court Judge for compensation,

which was usually much less than the tenant-right would fetch if

sold in the open market.

To protect the interest and property of the tenant in his holding and in

his improvements, both of which had now legal recognition—it was necessary

to give him: (1) Security of tenure at a fair rent; and (2) a special and

expert tribunal to decide on the amount of the rent at which he was to

hold.

The Land Act of 1881.

The Act of 1881 effected these reforms. It gave the tenant the right to

sell his interest in his holding—subject to the landlord’s right of

pre-emption—it gave fixity of tenure at a fair rent—subject to a fifteen

years’ re-valuation—and it established a special tribunal to fix the

rents.

The principles of the present Irish Land Code—which comprises a large

number of statutes—are contained in the Acts of 1870 and 1881. The Act of

1870 recognised for the first time that the Irish tenant had a right of

occupation and a property in his improvements. But the Act failed because

it recognised these rights grudgingly, and left untouched the power of the

landlord to fix what rent he pleased. The Land Act of 1881 for the first

time safeguarded the property of the tenant, and reversed the policy of

the Act of 1860 (Deasy’s Act) by removing the Irish Land system from the

domain of contract, and, in a manner, bringing it back to tenure.

Differences between the English and the Irish Land Systems.

To understand the agrarian situation in Ireland it is necessary to keep in

mind the fundamental difference between the English and the Irish systems,

which was pointed out in the Report of the Devon Commission. In England,

speaking generally, agricultural farms are let by the owners fully

equipped with buildings, fences, farm roads, and other improvements

necessary for the proper working of the holding. The tenant contracts to

pay a rent for the farm so equipped, and, if he finds that the particular

holding does not suit him, he gives it up at the end of his contract term,

and goes elsewhere. Under this system, what Adam Smith termed “the

higgling of the market!” is the easiest test of land value, as it is of

all other commodities with regard to which competition is free. In

Ireland, on the other hand, the landlord, speaking generally, owns only

the soil. The equipment of each farm is the property of or has been

effected by the tenant, who is practically a hereditary occupier. The

houses, fences, drainage, reclamation, farm roads, and other such

necessary improvements have been made by the tenant or his predecessors in

title. The landlord owns the soil, and the tenant the necessary

agricultural equipment. Consequently, the tenant is not free. He cannot

walk out at the end of his term and leave behind him his houses, roads,

fences, and drains. Besides, if he goes out, he has nowhere else to

settle.

The pressure of competition is so great—as is natural in a country in the

greater part of which there is no other employment or industry than that

of agriculture—that, very large sums, often far in excess of the value of

the land, measured by any standard of productive capacity are paid for the

mere right to occupy. Again, the nature of the land, in large parts of

Ireland, is such as to prevent owners from working it on the English

system of equipped farms. In the poorer parts of the country the land can

only be made to yield a profit to the owner by being worked by small

occupying tenants, who, without any economic return, are willing to expend

their labour and that of their families. Were such land to be handed back

to the owners to be worked by them without the intervention of tenants no

profit could be obtained, and the land would go out of cultivation, being

below the margin of economic profit.

Here we have the explanation and the justification of the series of Land

Acts from 1870 to 1896. They were an attempt to adjust the law of landlord

and tenant to the facts of the case. Before 1870 the law regarded the

landlord as the sole owner of the farm, while, in fact, the tenant was the

co-owner. The Act of 1870 recognised, to a limited extent, the

co-ownership, but gave insufficient relief. The Act of 1881 gave a more

complete recognition and relief, and various amendments and extensions

were introduced by subsequent Statutes.

Irish Land Purchase and the extent to which it has been carried on by

State aid.

Side by side with the legal recognition of dual ownership in Ireland there

proceeded a system for the creation of a peasant proprietary by the aid of

State loans, when both parties were agreed. The principal Acts under which

advances of public money to enable tenants to become proprietors of their

holdings were made are:

The Irish Church Act, 1869.

The Landlord and Tenant (Ireland) Act, 1870.

The Land Law (Ireland) Act, 1881.

The Purchase of Land (Ireland) Act, 1885.

The Purchase of Land (Ireland) Act, 1891 and 1896.

The Irish Land Act, 1903 and 1907.

The Evicted Tenant Act, 1907.

The Irish Land Act, 1909.

Irish Church Act, 1869.

Under this Act the Church Temporalities Commissioners were empowered to

sell to tenants of Church Lands their holdings at prices to be fixed by

the Commissioners themselves. If the tenants refused to buy on the terms

offered to them, the Commissioners could sell to the public. The Church

Temporalities Commissioners were empowered, if they thought well, to take

payment, as to one-fourth only, in cash and to leave the other

three-fourths outstanding as a legal charge on the holding, to be paid off

in thirty-two years by sixty-four half-yearly instalments.

The Commissioners sold in all to 6,057 tenants at an average price of

twenty-two and two-thirds years’ purchase of the rents, and the total

amount of the money advanced on loan was £1,674,841, which was issued by

the Commissioners of Public Works.

The terms of repayment and the rate of interest charged on loans were

afterwards altered and reduced under the Purchase of Land Act of 1885,

Section 23.

Landlord and Tenant (Ireland) Act, 1870.

Under what are known as the “Bright Clauses” of this Act, the landlords

and tenants of agricultural or pastoral holdings could arrange for a sale

of their holdings with State aid to be carried out in the Landed Estates

Court. Upwards of two-thirds of the price agreed upon could be advanced by

the Board of Works, to be repaid in thirty-five years by an annuity, at

the rate of five per cent. on the loan. Under this Act 877 tenants

purchased their holdings, and the amount of loans issued was £514,536. The

total purchase money paid by the tenant purchasers for their holdings was

£859,000, being at the rate of twenty-three and one-third years’ purchase

of the rents.

The Act of 1881 (the “Gladstone Act”).

Under this Act the Land Commission thereby established was empowered to

make advances to tenants for the purchase of their holdings, and was

enabled to purchase estates for re-sale to the tenants. The limit of

advance was extended from two-thirds of the purchase-money (as in the Act

of 1870) to three-quarters. The terms of repayment were the same—an

annuity of five per cent. for thirty-five years.

Upwards of 731 tenants purchased under this Act, and the advances made

amounted to £240,801. These included advances to 405 tenants on seven

estates bought under the Act (Section 26) by the Land Commission in the

Landed Estates Court.

The Purchase of Land (Ireland) Act, 1885 (the “Ashbourne Act”).

Under this Act—commonly known as the “Ashbourne Act”—a sum of £5,000,000

was authorised to be advanced to the Land Commission to enable sales to be

carried out between landlords and tenants by agreement, and to enable the

Land Commission to purchase estates in the Landed Estates Court for the

purpose of re-selling them to the tenants. The Land Commission was

empowered to advance the entire of the purchase-money subject to the

retention of one-fifth by way of guarantee deposit for a period of about

seventeen and a half years, by which time an equivalent amount of the

capital advanced had been repaid by means of the sinking fund. This

deposit could be utilised if the tenant purchaser made default in his

repayment, and if the amount in default could not otherwise be recovered.

Thus the landlord vendor was made a guarantor for the repayment of the

annuity by the tenant purchaser. (Section 3.)

The advances made under this Act were to be repaid by annual instalments

(which included interest and sinking fund), extending over a period of

forty-nine years.

In 1888, the £5,000,000 given under the Act of 1883 being practically

exhausted, an additional sum of £5,000,000 was advanced to the Land

Commission for the purposes of land purchase (51 and 52 Vic., c. 49).

Under the “Ashbourne” Acts 25,367 tenants (on 1,355 estates) became

purchasers of their holdings, and the loans made amounted to £9,992,536.

The rate of sale was seventeen years’ purchase of the rents. (Report of

the Irish Land Commission, 1902, p. 89.) Under these Acts 101 estates were

purchased in the Landed Estates Court for re-sale to tenants, and loans

were issued to 2,029 tenants, amounting to £531,277.

Purchase of Land Acts, 1891 and 1896 (the “Balfour Acts”).

The funds advanced to the Irish Land Commission for the purposes of land

purchase having again become exhausted, Mr. Balfour, in 1891, introduced a

new system under which the landlord or vendor was paid in a specially

created guaranteed Land Stock (exchangeable for Consols at the option of

the vendor), equal in nominal amount to the purchase money. This stock

bears interest at the rate of 2-¾ per cent. per annum, and cannot be

redeemed until the expiration of thirty years from the date of the passing

of the Act of 1891. The dividends and sinking fund payments required for

this stock are paid out of a “Land Purchase Account,” established by the

Land Commission (Section 4), to which all moneys received on account of

any purchase annuity for the discharge of an advance are paid. If this

Land Purchase Account is at any time insufficient to meet the dividends

and sinking fund payments (owing, for instance, to default in the

repayment of instalments), the deficiency is to be a charge on a

“Guarantee Fund,” established for the purposes of the Act (Section 5).

This fund consists of a cash portion and a contingent portion. The cash

portion is mainly made up of the Irish Probate Duty (now Estate Duty)

grant, and an Exchequer contribution, and the contingent portion consists

of the Irish share of the local taxation (Customs and Excise) duties and

certain local grants (Section 5). Any deficiency in the Land Purchase

account is to be paid out of this Guarantee Fund. This financial

expedient, of course, throws the securing of the repayment of the advances

for land purchase on the ratepayers of the county, as any default will be

recouped by deductions from the various payments and contributions in aid

of rates that make up the Guarantee Fund. The amount of stock that could

be issued for each county for purposes of Land Purchase was limited to

twenty-five times the share of the county in the guarantee fund by the Act

of 1891 (Section 9). This limit, having been reached in the case of Co.

Wexford, by Mr. Wyndham’s Purchase of Land (Ireland) Act, 1901 (1 Edw.

VII., c. 3) the limit was extended to fifty times the share of that county

in the guarantee fund. By the Act of 1903 (Section 46) the limit for each

county was raised to thirty times its share in the guarantee fund, which

limit might be further raised to sixty times where the Treasury, on the

certificate of the Lord-Lieutenant, were of opinion that such increase in

advances could be made without any risk of loss to the Exchequer.

Taken on the basis of the financial year 1909-10 the Guarantee Fund for

all counties of Ireland amounted to £2,797,126. On the above figures the

capitalized value of the Guarantee Fund on the thirty times basis is at

present £83,913,780, but owing to increases beyond this thirty times limit

which have been sanctioned by the Treasury, in certain counties the

present capitalized value of the fund stands at £89,323,685.

The total charge on the fund up to March 31st, 1910, was about 48-¾

million pounds in respect of advances made on the security of the fund,

and, taking pending applications for advances into account, the

approximate charges amounted at that date to about 105 millions.

The Act of 1891 was amended in various respects by Mr. Gerald Balfour’s

Act of 1896, which introduced, among other changes, a method of reducing

every decade (up to thirty years after the advance was made), the annuity

to be paid by the tenant purchaser. As under the “Ashbourne Act” of 1885,

this annuity was calculated at £4 per cent. on the purchase money, 2-¾ per

cent. being for interest, and 1-¼ per cent. being for sinking fund. Under

Mr. Gerald Balfour’s system, during the first decade after the purchase

the annuity is calculated on the original advance, and during the second

and third decades on the portion of the advance which is ascertained to be

unpaid at the end of the previous decade. At the end of the third decade

the annuity is calculated on the amount of the advance then outstanding

and runs until the entire debt is paid off. The Act of 1896 also permitted

the Land Commission to dispense with the whole or any part of the

guarantee deposit required under the Act of 1885 if the security for the

repayment of the advance was considered to be sufficient without it

(Section 29).

The number of loans issued under these Acts of 1891 and 1896 to tenant

purchasers up to March 31st, 1910, was 46,828, amounting in all to

£13,145,762, and being at the rate of 17.7 years’ purchase of the rents

(Land Commission Report, 1910, p. 110).

Irish Land Act, 1903 (the “Wyndham Act”).

I have traced the history of the Irish Land Acts down to 1896. Some short

Acts were added to the code during the following years to clear away

certain difficulties, and in 1903 Mr. Wyndham brought in and passed his

Irish Land Act, which may be said to have opened a new era in Irish

agrarian legislation. Under it a new body known as Estates Commissioners

was formed, and included in the Land Commission to administer land

purchase in Ireland.

Sales under previous Purchase Acts were carried out by holdings. A

landlord could agree with one or more of his tenants to sell them their

farms, and if the Land Commission, after examination, found that the

particular holding was security for the advance asked for by the tenant,

such advance was made irrespective of any other sales on the estate. The

Act of 1903 introduced the system of sales by “Estates.” A landlord, to

obtain the benefit of the Act, is obliged to sell his entire estate, or

such portion of it as the Land Commission considers fit to be regarded as

a separate estate for the purposes of the Act. The Commissioners, before

defining any lands to be an estate, have to consider all the circumstances

of the district and of the property. Once the estate is “declared,” the

holdings comprised in it are dealt with in accordance with the provisions

of the Act. Those of them that are subject to judicial rents and are

within certain “zones” laid down in the Act are freed from the liability

to inspection as to security or equity of price. The Act presumes that a

holding subject to a judicial rent which is sold at a price the annuity on

which is from 10 to 30 per cent. less than the judicial rent, where that

rent was fixed since the passing of the Act of 1896, or from 20 to 40 per

cent. less where the rent was fixed before that date, is good security for

the payment of the annuity, and that the agreed price is equitable.

Holdings not subject to the “zone” provisions are liable in inspection as

to security and as to equity of price.

The Act also introduced the system of sales of estates to the

Commissioners under Section 6 (the direct sales to tenants by landlords

being under Section 1). When a landlord is willing to sell in this manner,

the Commissioners, after due enquiry as to the price that should be paid

by each tenant for his holding, may offer to purchase the estate for the

purpose of re-selling to the occupiers, provided that at least

three-fourths of the tenants agree to purchase their holdings from the

Commissioners at the estimated price.

To encourage sales of estates, and to enable owners to get such a sum as

would give them their net income out of the purchase money, when

reinvested in suitable securities, the Act provided that a bonus of 12 per

cent. on the purchase money should be paid to the owner on the completion

of the sale. At the same time the tenant was enabled to borrow the

purchase money of his holding on easier terms. As we have seen, under the

former Purchase Acts, the annuity rate was fixed at 4 per cent., of which

2-¾ per cent. was for interest and 1-¼ per cent. for a sinking fund, the

accumulation of which, with compound interest, would repay the sum

advanced in about forty-three years. Under the Act of 1903 the annuity

rate which the tenant had to repay was reduced to 3-¼ per cent., of which

2-¾ per cent. is for interest and a ½ per cent. for sinking fund. This

reduction in the sinking fund lengthens the period over which the

repayment will extend to sixty-eight and a half years, and, of course,

renders it practically impossible to continue the system of giving decadal

reductions in the annuities. The decadal reductions, which were abolished

by the Act of 1903, worked out at about 15 per cent. reduction in the

annuity every ten years.

The Act of 1903 also enabled owners to sell their demesnes and untenanted

lands to the Commissioners, and to repurchase them, or so much of them as

the Commissioners approved, with the aid of advances made to them in the

same manner and under the same conditions as to tenant purchasers.

The Act also gave considerable powers to the Commissioners of dealing with

poor and uneconomic holdings. It enabled (Section 2) parcels of untenanted

lands on the sale of an estate to be sold to the following persons:

(_a_) A person being the tenant of a holding on the estate;

(_b_) A person being the son of a tenant of a holding on the

estate;

(_c_) A person being the tenant or proprietor of a holding not

exceeding five pounds in rateable value, situate in the

neighbourhood of the estate; and,

(_d_) A person who within twenty-five years before the passing of

this Act was the tenant of a holding to which the Land Law Acts

apply, and who is not at the date of the purchase the tenant or

proprietor of that holding: Provided that in the case of the death

of a person to whom an advance under this paragraph might

otherwise have been made, the advance may be made to a person

nominated by the Land Commission as the personal representative of

the deceased person.

This last class (_d_) was intended to provide for the reinstatement of

tenants evicted from their holdings within the prescribed time.

It also gives power to the Commissioners to purchase untenanted lands for

the purpose of enlarging holdings and of creating new holdings, and to

enable this work to be carried out satisfactorily, the Land Commission is

given all the powers conferred on the Congested Districts Board by their

Act of 1901 for facilitating re-sales of land.

The Evicted Tenants Act, 1907.

A large number of evicted tenants had been reinstated in their holdings

under the Act of 1903 or had been provided with new holdings where their

former holdings were not available. Large sums of money (drawn from the

Reserve Fund established under the Act of 1891, which was made available

by Section 43 of the Act of 1903) were expended in equipping these

holdings and in financing reinstated tenants where in the opinion of the

Estates Commissioners this was necessary. The provisions of the Act of

1903 were, however, found to be insufficient to carry out the intentions

of the legislature, and in 1907 Mr. Birrell passed an Evicted Tenants Act

which enabled the Estates Commissioners to acquire untenanted land

compulsorily for the purpose of providing holdings for tenants who, or

whose predecessors, had been evicted from their holdings since the year

1878, and who had applied to the Commissioners before May 1st, 1907. Up to

March 31st, 1911, as many as 12,398 persons had applied for holdings as

Evicted Tenants. Of these 6,276 were rejected by the Commissioners after

enquiry; 2,631 did not apply within the prescribed time; 2,830 were

actually reinstated in holdings; and 661 were still under consideration by

the Commissioners.

Irish Land Act, 1909 (Mr. Birrell’s Act).

The New Irish Constitution: An Exposition and Some Arguments · 第 6 / 11 章