CHAPTER VI.

SENSATIONS OF MOTION.

I treat of these in a separate chapter in order to give them the

emphasis which their importance deserves. They are of two orders:

1) Sensations of objects moving over our sensory surfaces; and

2) Sensations of our whole person's translation through space.

=1) The Sensation of Motion over Surfaces.=--This has generally been

assumed by physiologists to be impossible until the positions of

_terminus a quo_ and _terminus ad quem_ are severally cognized, and the

successive occupancies of these positions by the moving body are

perceived to be separated by a distinct interval of time. As a matter of

fact, however, we cognize only the very slowest motions in this way.

Seeing the hand of a clock at XII and afterwards at VI, I judge that it

has moved through the interval. Seeing the sun now in the east and again

in the west, I infer it to have passed over my head. But we can only

_infer_ that which we already generically know in some more direct

fashion, and it is experimentally certain that we have the feeling of

motion given us as a direct and simple _sensation_. Czermak long ago

pointed out the difference between _seeing the motion_ of the

second-hand of a watch, when we look directly at it, and noticing the

fact that it has _altered its position_, whilst our gaze is fixed upon

some other point of the dial-plate. In the first case we have a specific

quality of sensation which is absent in the second. If the reader will

find a portion of his skin--the arm, for example--where a pair of

compass-points an inch apart are felt as one impression, and if he will

then trace lines a tenth of an inch long on that spot with a

pencil-point, he will be distinctly aware of the point's motion and

vaguely aware of the direction of the motion. The perception of the

motion here is certainly not derived from a preëxisting knowledge that

its starting and ending points are separate positions in space, because

positions in space ten times wider apart fail to be discriminated as

such when excited by the compass-points. It is the same with the retina.

One's fingers when cast upon its peripheral portions cannot be

counted--that is to say, the five retinal tracts which they occupy are

not distinctly apprehended by the mind as five separate positions in

space--and yet the slightest _movement_ of the fingers is most vividly

perceived as movement and nothing else. It is thus certain that our

sense of movement, being so much more delicate than our sense of

position, cannot possibly be derived from it.

_Vierordt, at almost the same time, called attention to certain

persistent illusions, amongst which are these_: If another person gently

trace a line across our wrist or finger, the latter being stationary, it

will feel to us as if the member were moving in the opposite direction

to the tracing point. If, on the contrary, we move our limb across a

fixed point, it will seem as if the point were moving as well. If the

reader will touch his forehead with his forefinger kept motionless, and

then rotate the head so that the skin of the forehead passes beneath the

finger's tip, he will have an irresistible sensation of the latter being

itself in motion in the opposite direction to the head. So in abducting

the fingers from each other; some may move and the rest be still, but

the still ones will feel as if they were actively separating from the

rest. These illusions, according to Vierordt, are survivals of a

primitive form of perception, when motion was felt as such, but ascribed

to the whole 'content' of consciousness, and not yet distinguished as

belonging exclusively to one of its parts. When our perception is fully

developed we go beyond the mere relative motion of thing and ground, and

can ascribe absolute motion to one of these components of our total

object, and absolute rest to another. When, in vision for example, the

whole field of view seems to move together, we think it is ourselves or

our eyes which are moving; and any object in the foreground which may

seem to move relatively to the background is judged by us to be really

still. But primitively this discrimination is not perfectly made. The

sensation of the motion spreads over all that we see and infects it. Any

relative motion of object and retina both makes the object seem to move,

and makes us feel ourselves in motion. Even now when our whole field of

view really does move we get giddy, and feel as if we too were moving;

and we still see an apparent motion of the entire field of view whenever

we suddenly jerk our head and eyes or shake them quickly to and fro.

Pushing our eyeballs gives the same illusion. We _know_ in all these

cases what really happens, but the conditions are unusual, so our

primitive sensation persists unchecked. So it does when clouds float by

the moon. We _know_ the moon is still; but we _see_ it move faster than

the clouds. Even when we slowly move our eyes the primitive sensation

persists under the victorious conception. If we notice closely the

experience, we find that any object towards which we look appears moving

to meet our eye.

But the most valuable contribution to the subject is the paper of G. H.

Schneider,[27] who takes up the matter zoölogically, and shows by

examples from every branch of the animal kingdom that movement is the

quality by which animals most easily attract each other's attention. The

instinct of 'shamming death' is no shamming of death at all, but rather

a paralysis through fear, which saves the insect, crustacean, or other

creature from being _noticed at all_ by his enemy. It is paralleled in

the human race by the breath-holding stillness of the boy playing 'I

spy,' to whom the seeker is near; and its obverse side is shown in our

involuntary waving of arms, jumping up and down, and so forth, when we

wish to attract someone's attention at a distance. Creatures 'stalking'

their prey and creatures hiding from their pursuers alike show how

immobility diminishes conspicuity. In the woods, if we are quiet, the

squirrels and birds will actually touch us. Flies will light on stuffed

birds and stationary frogs. On the other hand, the tremendous shock of

feeling the thing we are sitting on begin to move, the exaggerated start

it gives us to have an insect unexpectedly pass over our skin, or a cat

noiselessly come and snuffle about our hand, the excessive reflex

effects of tickling, etc., show how exciting the sensation of motion is

_per se_. A kitten cannot help pursuing a moving ball. Impressions too

faint to be cognized at all are immediately felt if they move. A fly

sitting is unnoticed,--we feel it the moment it crawls. A shadow may be

too faint to be perceived. If we hold a finger between our closed eyelid

and the sunshine we do not notice its presence. The moment we move it to

and fro, however, we discern it. Such visual perception as this

reproduces the conditions of sight among the radiates.

In ourselves, the main function of the peripheral parts of the retina is

that of sentinels, which, when beams of light move over them, cry 'Who

goes there?' and call the fovea to the spot. Most parts of the skin do

but perform the same office for the finger-tips. Of course _movement of

surface under object is (for purposes of stimulation) equivalent to

movement of object over surface_. In exploring the shapes and sizes of

things by either eye or skin the movements of these organs are incessant

and unrestrainable. Every such movement draws the points and lines of

the object across the surface, imprints them a hundred times more

sharply, and drives them home to the attention. The immense part thus

played by movements in our perceptive activity is held by many

psychologists to prove that the muscles are themselves the

space-perceiving organ. Not surface-sensibility, but 'the muscular

sense,' is for these writers the original and only revealer of objective

extension. But they have all failed to notice with what peculiar

intensity muscular movements call surface-sensibilities into play, and

how largely the mere discernment of impressions depends on the mobility

of the surfaces upon which they fall.

Our _articular surfaces are tactile organs_ which become intensely

painful when inflamed. Besides pressure, _the only stimulus they receive

is their motion upon each other_. To the sensation of this motion more

than anything else seems due the perception of the position which our

limbs may have assumed. Patients cutaneously and muscularly anæsthetic

in one leg can often prove that their articular sensibility remains, by

showing (by movements of their well leg) the positions in which the

surgeon may place their insensible one. Goldscheider in Berlin caused

fingers, arms, and legs to be passively rotated upon their various

joints in a mechanical apparatus which registered both the velocity of

movement impressed and the amount of angular rotation. The minimal felt

amounts of rotation were much less than a single angular degree in all

the joints except those of the fingers. Such displacements as these,

Goldscheider says, can hardly be detected by the eye. Anæsthesia of the

skin produced by induction-currents had no disturbing effect on the

perception, nor did the various degrees of pressure of the moving force

upon the skin affect it. It became, in fact, all the more distinct in

proportion as the concomitant pressure-feelings were eliminated by

artificial anæsthesia. When the joints themselves, however, were made

artificially anæsthetic, the perception of the movement grew obtuse and

the angular rotations had to be much increased before they were

perceptible. All these facts prove, according to Herr Goldscheider, that

_the joint-surfaces and these alone are the seat of the impressions by

which the movements of our members are immediately perceived_.

=2) Sensations of Movement through Space.=--These may be divided, into

feelings of rotation and feelings of translation. As was stated at the

end of the chapter on the ear, the labyrinth (semicircular canals,

utricle and saccule) seems to have nothing to do with hearing. It is

conclusively established to-day that the semicircular canals are the

organs of a sixth special sense, that namely of rotation. When

subjectively excited, this sensation is known as _dizziness_ or

_vertigo_, and rapidly engenders the farther feeling of nausea.

Irritative disease of the inner ear causes intense vertigo (Ménière's

disease). Traumatic irritation of the canals in birds and mammals makes

the animals tumble and throw themselves about in a way best explained by

supposing them to suffer from false sensations of falling, etc., which

they compensate by reflex muscular acts that throw them the other way.

Galvanic irritation of the membranous canals in pigeons cause just the

same compensatory movements of head and eye which actual rotations

impressed on the creatures produce. Deaf and dumb persons (amongst whom

many must have had their auditory nerves or labyrinths destroyed by the

same disease which took away their hearing) are in a very large

percentage of cases found quite insusceptible of being made dizzy by

rotation. Purkinje and Mach have shown that, whatever the organ of the

sense of rotation may be, it must have its seat in the head. The body is

excluded by Mach's elaborate experiments.

The semicircular canals, being, as it were, six little spirit-levels in

three rectangular planes, seem admirably adapted to be organs of a sense

of rotation. We need only suppose that when the head turns in the plane

of any one of them, the relative inertia of the endolymph momentarily

increases its pressure on the nerve-termini in the appropriate ampulla,

which pressure starts a current towards the central organ for feeling

vertigo. This organ seems to be the cerebellum, and the teleology of

the whole business would appear to be the maintenance of the upright

position. If a man stand with shut eyes and attend to his body, he will

find that he is hardly for a moment in equilibrium. Incipient fallings

towards every side in succession are incessantly repaired by muscular

contractions which restore the balance; and although impressions on the

tendons, ligaments, foot-soles, joints, etc., doubtless are among the

causes of the compensatory contractions, yet the strongest and most

special reflex arc would seem to be that which has the sensation of

incipient vertigo for its afferent member. This is experimentally proved

to be much more easily excited than the other sensations referred to.

When the cerebellum is disorganized the reflex response fails to occur

properly and loss of equilibrium is the result. Irritation of the

cerebellum produces vertigo, loss of balance, and nausea; and galvanic

currents through the head produce various forms of vertigo correlated

with their direction. It seems probable that direct excitement of the

cerebellar centre is responsible for these feelings. In addition to

these corporeal reflexes the sense of rotation causes compensatory

rollings of the eyeballs in the opposite direction, to which some of the

subjective phenomena of _optical vertigo_ are due. Steady rotation gives

no sensation; it is only starting or stopping, or, more generally

speaking, acceleration (positive or negative), which impresses the

end-organs in the ampullæ. The sensation always has a little duration,

however; and the feeling of reversed movement after whirling violently

may last for nearly a minute, slowly fading out.

The cause of the _sense of translation_ (movement forwards or backwards)

is more open to dispute. The seat of this sensation has been assigned to

the semicircular canals when compounding their currents to the brain;

and also to the utricle. The latest experimenter, M. Delage, considers

that it cannot possibly be in the head, and assigns it rather to the

entire body, so far as its parts (blood-vessels, viscera, etc.) are

movable against each other and suffer friction or pressure from their

relative inertia when a movement of translation begins. M. Delage's

exclusion of the labyrinth from this form of sensibility cannot,

however, yet be considered definitively established, so the matter may

rest with this mention.

Psychology: Briefer Course · 第 6 / 27 章