It is related by Laud, in his Diary, that when he was standing one day,
during dinner, near his unfortunate master, then Prince Charles, the
prince, who was in cheerful spirits, talking of many things as occasion
offered, said, that if necessity compelled him to choose any particular
profession of life, he could not be a lawyer; "for," said he, "I can
neither defend a bad cause, nor yield in a good one." "_Sic in
majoribus succedas, in aeternum faustus!_" was the aspiration which
his faithful servant and fellow victim breathed, when he recorded this
trait of Christian character in private notes, which, beyond all doubt,
were never intended to be seen by any eyes but his own. Even then, the
practice had become so much an exercitation of subtlety, on the part of
its professors, to the utter disregard of its original end and object,
that, as Donne strongly expressed himself, the name of "law" had been
"strumpeted." It has been asked, if this be the fault of the men or of
the institutions--of the lawyers or of the law? and maintained that
the original fault is in the law: a conclusion more charitable than
satisfactory; for, by whom has the law been made what it is, but by
the lawyers?
By the Roman laws, every advocate was required to swear that he would
not undertake a cause which he knew to be unjust, and that he would
abandon a defence which he should discover to be supported by falsehood
or iniquity. This is continued in Holland at this day; and if an
advocate brings forward a cause there, which appears to the court
plainly iniquitous, he is condemned in the costs of the suit: the
example will, of course, be very rare; more than one, however, has
occurred within the memory of persons who are now living. The possible
inconvenience that a cause just in itself might not be able to find a
defender, because of some strong and general prejudice concerning it, is
obviated in that country by an easy provision: a party who can find no
advocate, and is nevertheless persuaded of the validity of his cause,
may apply to the court, which has, in such cases, the discretionary
power of authorizing or appointing one.--_Ibid._
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