different ideas are connected together, I do not find that any
philosopher has attempted to enumerate or class all the principles of
association; a subject, however, that seems worthy of curiosity. To me
there appear to be only three principles of connexion among ideas, viz.
_resemblance_, _contiguity_ in time or place, and _cause_ or _effect_.
“That these principles serve to connect ideas, will not, I believe, be
much doubted. A picture naturally leads our thoughts to the original.
The mention of one apartment in a building naturally introduces an
inquiry or discourse concerning the others. And if we think of a
wound, we can scarcely forbear reflecting on the pain which follows
it. But that the enumeration is complete, and that there are no other
principles of association except these, may be difficult to prove to
the satisfaction of the reader or even to a man's own satisfaction.
All we can do, in such cases, is to run over several instances, and
examine carefully the principle which binds the different thoughts to
each other,--never stopping, till we render the principle as general as
possible. The more instances we examine, and the more care we employ,
the more assurance shall we acquire, that the enumeration which we form
from the whole is complete and entire.”[144]
On these paragraphs of Mr Hume, a few obvious criticisms present
themselves. In the first place, however, I must observe,--to qualify
in some degree the severity of the remarks which may be made on his
classification,--that it is evident, from the very language now quoted
to you, that he is far from bringing forward his classification as
complete. He states, indeed, that it appears to him, that there are no
other principles of connexion among our ideas than the three which he
has mentioned; but he adds, that though the reality of their influence
as connecting principles will not, he believes, be much doubted, it may
still be difficult to prove, to the satisfaction of his reader, or even
of himself, that the enumeration is complete; and he recommends, in
consequence, a careful examination of every instance of suggestion, in
the successive trains of our ideas, that other principles, if any such
there be, may be detected.
But to proceed to the actual classification, as presented to us by
Mr Hume. A note, which he has added to the paragraph that contains
his system, affords perhaps as striking an instance as is to be found
in the history of science of that illusion, which the excessive love
of simplicity tends to produce, even in the most acute and subtile
philosopher, so as to blind, to the most manifest inconsistencies, in
his own arrangement, those powers of critical discernment which would
have flashed instant detection on inconsistencies far less glaringly
apparent in the speculations of another. After stating, that there
appear to him to be only the three principles of connexion already
mentioned, Mr Hume adds, in a note,--as an instance of other connexions
apparently different from these three, which may, notwithstanding, be
reduced to them,--
“_Contrast_ or _contrariety_, also, is a species of connexion among
ideas. But it may perhaps be considered as a mixture of causation and
resemblance. Where two objects are contrary, the one destroys the
other, _i. e._ is the cause of its annihilation, and the idea of the
annihilation of an object implies the idea of its former existence.”
When we hear or read for the first time this little theory of the
suggestions of contrast, there is, perhaps no one who does not feel
some difficulty in believing it to be a genuine speculation of that
powerful mind which produced it. Contrast, says Mr Hume, is a mixture
of _causation_ and _resemblance_. An object, when contrasted with
another, destroys it. In destruction there is causation; and we cannot
conceive destruction, without having the idea of former existence.
Thus, to take an instance,--Mr Hume does not deny, that the idea of
a _dwarf_ may suggest, by contrast, the idea of a _giant_; but he
says that the idea of a dwarf suggests the idea of a giant, because
the idea of a dwarf _destroys_ the idea of a giant, and thus, by the
connecting principle of causation involved in all destruction, may
suggest the idea destroyed; and he adds, as an additional reason for
the suggestion, that the idea of the annihilation of a giant implies
the idea of the former existence of a giant. And all this strange and
complicated analysis,--this explanation, not of the _obscurum per
obscurius_, which is a much more intelligible paralogism, but of the
_lucidum per obscurum_, is seriously brought forward by its very acute
author, as illustrating the simple and familiar fact of the suggestion
of opposites, in contrast, by opposites.
In the first place, I may remark, that in Mr Hume's view of contrast,
it is not easy to discover what the resemblance is of which he
speaks, in a case in which the objects in themselves are said by him
to be so contrary, that the one absolutely destroys the other by
this contrariety alone; and, indeed, if there be truly this mixed
resemblance in contrast, what need is there of having recourse to
annihilation or causation at all, to account for the suggestion,
since the resemblance alone in this, as in every other case, might
be sufficient to explain the suggestion, without the necessity of
any separate division;--as the likeness of a single feature in the
countenance of a stranger, is sufficient to bring before us in
conception the friend whom he resembles, though the resemblance be in
the single feature only.
In the second place, there is no truth, if, indeed, there be any
meaning whatever, in the assertion that in contrast one of the
objects destroys the other; for, so far is the idea of the dwarf from
destroying the idea of the giant, that, in the actual case supposed,
it is the very reason of the existence of the second idea; nay, the
very supposition of a perceived contrast implies that there is no such
annihilation; for both ideas must be present to the mind together, or
they could not appear either similar or dissimilar, that is to say,
could not be known by us as contrasted, or contrary, in any respect.
It is, indeed, not very easy to conceive, how a mind so acute as that
of Mr Hume should not have discovered that grossest of all logical and
physical errors, involved in his explanation, that it accounts for
the existence of a feeling, by supposing it previously to exist as
the _cause_ of _itself_. If as he says, the idea of the annihilation
of an object implies the idea of its former existence--an assertion
which is by no means so favourable as he thinks to his own theory--it
must surely be admitted, that no annihilation can take place before
the existence of that which is to be annihilated. Whether, therefore,
we suppose, that the idea of the dwarf, which suggests the idea of
the giant, annihilates that idea, or is itself annihilated by it,
the two ideas of the dwarf and the giant must have existed, before
the annihilation of either. The _suggestion_, in short, which is
the difficulty, and the only difficulty to be explained, must have
completely taken place, _before_ the principle can even be imagined to
operate, on which the suggestion itself is said to depend.
Such minute criticism, however, is perhaps more, than it is necessary
to give to a doctrine so obviously false, even sanctioned as it is by
so very eminent a name.
FOOTNOTES:
[138] “Like the tall cliff beneath the impassive frost.”--ORIG.
[139] Cawthorn.--Regulation of the Passions, &c. v. 15-20.
[140] Painted--ORIG.
[141] Pleasures of Imagination, Book III. v. 312-352.
[142] Aristot. de Memor. and Reminisc. c. ii.-v. II. p. 86. Edit. Du
Val.
[143] De Mente Humana, C. I. Sect. xvi. p. 138, 139.
[144] Hume's Inquiry concerning Human Understanding, Sect. III.
END OF VOL. FIRST.
Transcriber's notes:
Obvious typos have been corrected, but obsolete spellings have been
retained (e.g. “develope”, “controul”, “recal”).
Italic text has been marked with _underscores_.
Text originally in small capitals has been made UPPER CASE.
Inconsistent hyphenation (e.g. “co-exist” and “coexist”) has been
retained.
Footnotes have been numbered consecutively and gathered at the end of
each lecture.
The original edition sometimes lacked appropriate opening or closing
quotation marks; they have been added where evident based on other
editions of the work.
Greek characters follow the original and may contain diacritical
errors.