mere reference to a cause of some sort, for it would then be as
comprehensive as all the feelings or changes of the mind,--our hope,
fear, anger, pity,--which we ascribe to some cause or antecedent,
as much as our tastes and smells; it is the reference of certain
feelings to a _corporeal_ cause, that is say, to a cause _extended_
and _resisting_. If, for example, without any previous knowledge of
external things, on the first sensation of fragrance, or sweetness,
or sound, or colour, we could be supposed to be capable of believing
that there was some cause of this new state of our being, this would
not be _perception_, in the sense in which he uses that term; and yet
but for our organ of touch, or at least but for feelings which are
commonly ascribed to that organ, it would be manifestly impossible
for us to make more than this vague and general inference. When a
rose is present, we find, and have uniformly found, that a certain
sensation of fragrance arises, which ceases when the rose is removed.
The influence of association, therefore, operates in this, as in every
other case of ordinary co-existence. We do not merely suppose that
the sensation has some cause, as we believe that our joys and sorrows
have a cause, but we ascribe the fragrance to the external substance,
the presence of which we have found to be so essential to the
production of it. Perception in every case, as I have said, in which
it is to be distinguished from the prior sensation, is a reference
of this prior sensation to a _material cause_;--and this complex
notion of a material cause,--that is to say, of something extended
and resisting,--mere smell, mere taste, mere hearing, mere vision,
never could have afforded. I have already explained how this notion
of matter, as it appears to me, is produced, or may be imagined to be
produced. A train of muscular feelings has been frequently repeated,
so that the series has become familiar to the infant, constituting in
its remembrance the notion of a certain progressive length.--When all
the known antecedent circumstances have been the same, the well-known
series is suddenly broken, so as to excite in the mind of the infant
the notion of a cause which is not in itself;--this cause, which is
something foreign to itself, is that which excites the particular
muscular feeling of resistance,--and it is combined with the notion
of a certain length, because it uniformly supplies the place of what
has been felt as a certain length, so as at last, by the operation of
the common laws of association, to become truly representative of it,
or rather to involve it in one complex feeling, in the same manner as
colour, in vision, seems to involve whole miles of distance. Such is
all that seems to me to constitute what Dr Reid would term perception,
even with respect to the feelings commonly termed tactual;--and in all
the other classes of sensations it is obviously nothing more than the
suggestion of these associate feelings, in the same way as any other
feelings, in our trains of thought and emotions, are suggested by
those conceptions or other feelings which have frequently accompanied
them.--It is sufficient to think of a mind, possessing all the
other susceptibilities of sensation, _but those_ which give us the
perceptions commonly ascribed to touch, to be sensible how truly what
we term perception in the other senses, is the mere suggestion of
these. If we were capable only of smelling,--or had no other sensations
than those of mere taste, mere sound, mere colour,--what perception
could we have had of a material cause of these sensations?--and if
it be to the mere suggestion of the object of another sense that
we owe what is termed perception in all these sensations,--in what
circumstance does the reference of these to a resisting and extended
substance, differ from any other of the common references which the
principle of association enables us to make?
“Sensation,” says Dr Reid, “can be nothing else than it is felt to be.
Its very essence consists in being felt; and when it is not felt, it is
not. There is no difference between the sensation and the feeling of
it; they are one and the same thing.”[110] But this is surely equally
true, of what he terms _perception_, which, as a state of mind, it must
be remembered, is, according to his own account of it, as different
from the object perceived, as the sensation is. We may say of the
mental state of perception too, in his own language, as indeed we
must say of all our states of mind, whatever they may be, that it can
be nothing else than it is felt to be. Its very essence consists in
being felt; and when it is not felt, it is not. There is no difference
between the perception and the feeling of it; they are one and the same
thing. The sensation, indeed, which is mental, is different from the
object exciting it, which we term material; but so also is the state of
mind which constitutes perception; for Dr Reid was surely too zealous
an opponent of the systems, which ascribe every thing to mind alone,
or to matter alone, to consider the perception as itself the object
perceived. That in sensation, as contradistinguished from perception,
there is no reference made to an external object, is true; because,
when the reference is made, we then use the new term of perception;
but that in sensation there is no object distinct from that act of the
mind by which it is felt; no object independent of the mental feeling,
is surely a very strange opinion of this philosopher; since what he
terms perception, is nothing but the reference of this very sensation
to its external object. The sensation itself he certainly supposes to
depend on the presence of an external object, which is all that can be
understood, in the case of perception, when we speak of its objects,
or, in other words, of those external causes, to which we refer
our sensations; for the material object itself, he surely could not
consider as forming a part of the perception which is a state of the
mind alone. To be the object of perception, is nothing more than to be
the foreign cause or occasion, on which this state of the mind directly
or indirectly arises; and an object, in this only intelligible sense,
as an occasion, or cause of a certain subsequent effect, must on his
own principles, be equally allowed to sensation. Though he does not
inform us, what he means by the term _object_, as peculiarly applied
to perception--(and indeed, if he had explained it, I cannot but think
that a great part of his system, which is founded on the confusion of
this single word, as something different from a mere external cause
of an internal feeling must have fallen to the ground,)--he yet tells
us, very explicitly, that to be the object of perception, is something
more than to be the external occasion, on which that state of the mind
arises which he terms perception; for, in arguing against the opinion
of a philosopher, who contends for the existence of certain images
or traces in the brain, and yet says, “that we are not to conceive
the images or traces in the brain to be perceived, as if there were
eyes in the brain; these traces are only occasions, on which, by the
laws of the union of soul and body, ideas are excited in the mind;
and, therefore, it is not necessary, that there should be an exact
resemblance between the traces and the things represented by them,
any more than that words or signs should be exactly like the things
signified by them:”[111]--He adds, “These two opinions, I think cannot
be reconciled. For if the images or traces in the brain are perceived,
they must be the _objects_ of perception, and not the occasions of
it only. On the other hand, if they are only the _occasions_ of our
perceiving, they are not perceived at all.”[112]--Did Dr Reid, then,
suppose that the feeling, whatever it may be, which constitutes
perception as a state of the mind, or, in short, all of which we are
conscious in perception, is not strictly and exclusively mental, as
much as all of which we are conscious in remembrance, or in love, or
hate;--or did he wish us to believe that matter itself, in any of its
forms, is, or can be, a part of the phenomena or states of the mind;--a
part therefore of that mental state or feeling which we term a
perception? Our sensations like our remembrances or emotions, we refer
to some cause or antecedent. The difference is, that in the one case we
consider the feeling as having for its cause some previous feeling or
state of the mind itself; in the other case we consider it as having
for its cause something which is external to ourselves, and independent
of our transient feelings,--something which, in consequence of former
feelings suggested at the moment, it is impossible for us not to regard
as extended and resisting.--But still what we thus regard as extended
and resisting, is known to us only by the feelings which it occasions
in our mind. What matter, in its relation to the percipient mind,
can be, but the cause or occasion, direct or indirect, of that class
of feelings which I term sensations or perceptions, it is absolutely
impossible for me to conceive.
The percipient mind, in no one of its affections, can be said to be
the mass of matter which it perceives, unless the separate existence,
either of matter or of mind, be abandoned by us, the existence of
which, Dr Reid would have been the last of philosophers to yield. He
acknowledges that our perceptions are consequent on the presence of
external bodies, not from any necessary connexion subsisting between
them, but merely from the arrangement which the Deity, in his wisdom,
has chosen to make of their mutual phenomena; which is surely to say,
that the Deity has rendered the presence of the external object the
occasion of that affection of the mind, which is termed perception; or,
if it be not to say this, it is to say nothing. Whatever state of mind
perception may be; whether a primary result of a peculiar power, or a
mere secondary reference of association that follows the particular
sensation, of which the reference is made, it is itself, in either view
of it, but a state of the mind; and to be the external occasion or
antecedent of this state of mind, since it is to produce, directly or
indirectly, all which constitutes perception, is surely, therefore, to
be perceived, or there must be something in the mere word _perceived_,
different from the physical reality which it expresses.
The confusion of Dr Reid's notions on this subject, seems to have
arisen from a cause, which has been the chief source of the general
confusion that prevails in intellectual science; and, indeed, it was
principally with the view of exhibiting this confusion, and its
source, to you _strongly_, that I have dwelt so long on a criticism,
which, to those among you who are not acquainted with the extensive
and important applications that have been made of this doctrine,
may, perhaps, have appeared of very little interest. Dr Reid, it
is evident, was not sufficiently in the habit of considering the
phenomena of the mind,--its perceptions, as well as its remembrances,
judgments, passions, and all its other affections, whatever these may
be,--in the light in which I have represented them to you, merely as
the mind affected, in a certain manner, according to certain regular
laws of succession, but as something more mysterious than the subject
of this sequence of feelings; for, but for this notion of something
more mysterious, the object of perception, and the external occasion
of that state of mind which we term perception, must have conveyed
precisely the same notion. To have a clear view of the phenomena of
the mind, as mere affections or states of it, existing successively,
and in a certain series, which we are able, therefore, to predict,
in consequence of our knowledge of the past, is, I conceive, to have
made the most important acquisition which the intellectual inquirer
can make. To say, merely, that it is to have learned to distinguish
that which may be known, from that which never can be known, and
which it therefore would be an idle waste of labour to attempt to
discover,--would be to say far too little. It is to see the mind, in
a great measure, as it is in nature, divested of every thing foreign,
passing instantly from thought to thought, from sensation to sensation,
in almost endless variety of states, and differing as completely from
that cumbrous representation of it, which philosophers are fond of
representing to us, as the planets revolving freely in the immense
space of our solar system, differ from those mimic orbs, which, without
any principle of motion in themselves, are, as it were, dragged along,
in the complex mechanism of our orreries.
In objecting, however, to Dr Reid's notion of perception, I am far from
wishing to erase the word from our metaphysical vocabulary. On the
contrary, I conceive it to be a very convenient one, if the meaning
attached to it be sufficiently explained, by an analysis of the complex
state of mind, which it denotes, and the use of it confined rigidly to
cases in which it has this meaning. Sensation may exist, _without_ any
reference to an external cause, in the same manner as we may look at
a picture, without thinking of the painter; or read a poem, without
thinking of the poet,--or it may exist _with_ reference to an external
cause; and it is convenient, therefore, to confine the term _sensation_
to the former of these cases, and _perception_ to the latter. But,
then, it must be understood, that the perception is nothing but the
suggestion of ideas associated with the simple _sensation_, as it
originally took place,--or is only another name for the original simple
sensation itself, in the cases, if any there be, in which sensation
involves immediately in itself, the belief of some existence external
to the sentient mind,--or is only a mere inference, like all our other
inferences, if it arise, in the manner in which I have endeavoured
to explain to you, how the notions of extension and resistance in
an external cause of our feelings, might arise, and be afterwards
suggested in association with other feelings that had frequently
accompanied it.
To give a brief summary, however, of the argument which I have
urged;--in that state of acquired knowledge, long after the first
elementary feelings of infancy, in which modified state alone, the
phenomena of the mind can become to us objects of reflective analysis,
certain feelings are referred by us to an external material cause. The
feelings themselves, as primarily excited, are termed _sensations_,
and, when followed by the reference to an external cause, receive the
name of _perceptions_, which marks nothing more in addition to the
primary sensations, than this very reference. But what is the reference
itself, in consequence of which the new name is given? It is the
suggestion of some extended resisting object, the presence of which
had before been found to be attended with that particular sensation,
which is now again referred to it. If we had had no sense but that
of smell; no sense but that of taste; no sense but that of sound; no
sense but that of sight; we could not have known the existence of
extended resisting substances, and, therefore, could not have referred
the pleasant or painful sensations of those classes to such external
causes, more than we refer directly to an external cause, any painful
or pleasing emotion, or other internal affection of the mind. In all
but _one_ class of our sensations, then, it is evident that what
Dr Reid calls _perception_, as the operation of a peculiar mental
faculty, is nothing more than a suggestion of memory or association,
which differs in no respect from other suggestions arising from other
coexistences or successions of feelings, equally uniform or frequent.
It is only in a single class of sensations, therefore,--that which
Dr Reid ascribes to touch,--that perception, which he regards as a
peculiar faculty, extending to all our sensations, can be said to
have any primary operation, even though we should agree with him in
supposing, that our belief of extended resistance is not reducible by
analysis, to any more general principles. If, however, my analysis
of the complex notion of matter be just, perception, in its relation
to our original sensations of touch, as much as in relation to the
immediate feelings which we derive from smell, taste, sight, and
hearing, is only one of the many operations of the suggesting or
associating principle. But, even on his own principles, I repeat, it
must be confined to the single class of feeling, which he considers as
tactual, and is not an original principle, coextensive with all the
original varieties of sensation. Even in the single class, to which it
is thus, on his own principles, to be confined, it is not so much what
he would term a faculty, as an intuitive belief, by which we are led
irresistibly, on the existence of certain sensations, to ascribe these
to causes that are external and corporeal; or, if we give the name of
faculty to this peculiar form of intuition, we should give it equally
to all our intuitions, and rank among our faculties, the belief of the
continued order of Nature, or the belief of our own identity, as much
as our belief of external things, if our senses themselves are unable
to give us any information of them.
FOOTNOTES:
[107] Account of the Life, &c. p. xci. prefixed to Reid's Works. Edin.
1803.
[108] Gray, de Princip. Cogit. Lib. I. v. 143--153.
[109] On the Intellectual Powers, Essay II. c. 16.
[110] See before, p. 416.
[111] On the Intellectual Powers, Essay II. c. 8.
[112] Ibid.
LECTURE XXVIII.
ON DR REID'S SUPPOSED PROOF OF A MATERIAL WORLD--ON VISION--AND
ANALYSIS OF THE FEELINGS ASCRIBED TO IT.
In my Lecture of yesterday, Gentlemen, we were engaged in considering
the grounds of Dr Reid's claim to the honour of detecting and exposing
the fallacy of the hypothesis of _ideas_ as _images_, or things, in the
mind, distinct from the mind itself,--a claim which, though made by one
who has many other indubitable titles to our respect and gratitude, we
found, in this particular instance, to be inadmissible.
It appeared, on an examination of the original works of the eminent
philosophers who preceded him for more than a century, and even of the
common elementary treatises of the schools, that, though after the
Peripatetic hypothesis of species had been universally or generally
abandoned, the language of that hypothesis continued to subsist
metaphorically,--as it continues with equal force at this moment,--it
was only metaphorically that it did thus continue; and that when Dr
Reid, therefore, conceived,--in proving ideas not to be self-existing
things, separate and distinct from the percipient mind itself,--that
he was confuting what every body believed, he merely assumed as _real_
what was intended as _metaphorical_, and overthrew opinions which the
authors, to whom he ascribes them, would themselves have been equally
eager to overthrow. But there is yet another point, connected with the
theory of perception, on which he is believed to have made an important
addition to our metaphysical knowledge. I allude to his supposed proof
of the existence of a material world. In this, too, we shall find, that
he has truly added nothing to our former knowledge; that he has left
us, in short, our belief as originally felt by us, but has not supplied
us with the slightest evidence in addition to the force of that
original belief itself, nor given any additional strength to that very
belief, which before was confessedly irresistible.
The confutation of the scepticism on this subject, it is evident, may
be attempted in _two ways_,--by shewing the arguments urged by the
sceptic to be _logically false_; or by opposing to them the belief
itself, as of evidence either directly intuitive, or the result, at
least, of other intuitions, and early and universal associations and
inferences, so irresistible after the first acquisitions of infancy,
as to have then all the force of intuition itself. As long as Dr
Reid confines himself to the latter of these pleas, he proceeds on
safe ground; but his footing is not so firm when he assails the mere
logic of the sceptic,--for the sceptical argument, as a mere play
of reasoning, admits of no reply. It is vain for him to say, that
the scepticism proceeding, as he thinks, on the belief of ideas in
the mind, as the direct objects of perception, must fall with these
ideas; for, though the scepticism may be consistent with the belief of
ideas as separate existences in the mind, it does not depend, in the
slightest degree, on their existence or non-existence. We have only
to change the term _ideas_ into the synonymous phrase _affections or
states of the mind_, and the scepticism, if not stronger, is at least
in strength exactly what it was before. In the one case the sceptic
will say, that we are sensible of ideas only, not of external objects,
which may have no resemblance to our ideas; in the other case, that
perception is but a state of the mind as much as any of our other
feelings, and that we are conscious only of this, and other states or
affections of our mind, which have variously succeeded each other,
and not of external objects, which themselves can be no parts of
that train of mental consciousness. Whatever weight there may be in
the former of these sceptical theories, exists, I may say, even with
greater force, because with greater simplicity, in the second; and the
task, therefore, of proving by logic,--if logical proof were requisite
for our belief,--the existence of a material world, would remain as
laborious as before, after the fullest confutation of the system, which
might suppose perception to be carried on by the medium of little
images of bodies in the mind.
So far, indeed, would the confutation of this hypothesis as to
perception,--even if Dr Reid had truly overthrown it,--be from
lessening the force of the scepticism as to the existence of matter,
that, of two sceptics, one believing every thing with respect to
ideas which Dr Reid supposed himself to have confuted, and the other
believing ideas to be mere states of his mind, there can be no
question, that the former would be the more easy to be overcome, since
his belief would already involve the existence of SOMETHING separate
from the mind; while the other might maintain, that all of which he was
conscious, was the mere series of affections of his own mind, and that
beyond this consciousness he could know nothing.
Against the argument of one, who founds his very argument on his
consciousness merely, and professes to have no knowledge either of
little images, or of any thing else beyond his consciousness, it would
be as idle to urge, that ideas are not little images in the mind, as
it would have been for a Cartesian to attempt to confute the Newtonian
system of attraction, by a denial of the Ptolemaic spheres.