Mississippi Squadron,
Flagship Black Hawk, off Red River,
March 2, 1864.
SIR: I came down here anticipating a move on the part of the army up
toward Shreveport, but as the river is lower than it has been known to
be for years, I much fear that the combined movement can not come off,
without interfering with plans formed by General Grant....
The Mississippi River is very quiet, and the rebels retreated into the
interior on hearing of the advance of the gunboats.
I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
David D. Porter
Rear-Admiral.
(Porter 1914:7)
With this communication to the Secretary of the Navy, Rear Admiral David
D. Porter foretold the crisis that would come close to destroying his
squadron of gunboats two months later. Low water on the Red River in
early March was an unexpected sight. Since 1855 the annual spring rise
had appeared without fail. But now in 1864, while Porter waited at the
mouth of the Red River for his fleet to assemble and for Major General
Nathaniel P. Banks’s army to begin its march north from Franklin,
Louisiana, the Red River’s water level was causing Porter to have doubts
about the upcoming campaign.
Doubts concerning the Red River Campaign were shared by other Federal
officers, but for different reasons. The necessity of a thrust up the
Red River in 1864 had been debated since the fall of Vicksburg the
previous year. Generals Grant and Sherman, and even the Red River
expedition’s commander, General Banks, believed that the North’s next
logical military objective was to capture Mobile, Alabama. But
Commanding General of the Army Henry W. Halleck and President Lincoln
felt that control of Texas was urgently needed to keep Mexico from
joining the Southern cause. The Red River presented the best route to
Texas.
[Illustration: Map of the Red River campaign, showing the routes of
the Union army and navy.]
RED RIVER CAMPAIGN
Army Route
Navy Route
SHREVEPORT
Loggy Bayou
Mansfield
Grand Ecore
Pleasant Hill
Sabine River
Red River
Bailey’s Dam
ALEXANDRIA
Ft. De Russy
Mississippi River
Porter’s Assembly Area
There was another underlying reason for the expedition, which may have
changed Banks’s mind. The Red River area was rumored to contain large
stores of cotton critically needed by the North. Some historians feel
that Banks’s desire to secure this cotton influenced his decision to
promote the campaign, and that the capture of cotton became all
important to him. After the campaign, the Joint Committee on the Conduct
of the War charged that the expedition failed because Banks and Porter
were overly concerned about capturing cotton. How much their attention
strayed is unknown, but it is true that competition between the army and
navy for cotton caused great tension during the campaign. At Alexandria
soldiers were angered “to see the navy seizing the cotton for prize on
land, while they did not get any” (J.C.C.W. n.d.:18,74).
Whatever the real motivation for the campaign, the official military
objective was Shreveport. Once Shreveport was in Union control, Texas
would lay open to invasion. To capture Shreveport, Banks’s army,
supported by Porter’s flotilla, would drive up the Red River while
another force under Major General Frederic Steele would move south from
Arkansas.
Opposing the Federal attack in Louisiana was Confederate Major General
Richard Taylor, who had only around 6,000 troops scattered throughout
Louisiana in Monroe, Alexandria, Marksville, and on Bayou Teche. Badly
outnumbered, Taylor worked to gather his forces and then waited for
reinforcements from Texas so he could eventually make a stand.
On March 12, 1864, Porter began his move up the Red River. Within three
days, he captured Fort De Russy, near Marksville, with the help of a
detachment of infantry. Meanwhile, Banks’s main army began its march
north from Franklin, Louisiana, fighting rain and muck.
[Illustration: Richard Taylor. Courtesy of the Louisiana State
Library.]
The forward units of the army reached Alexandria on March 24. Arriving
as a tired yet conquering army, they had already traveled 165 muddy road
miles. Still, “the colors were unfurled, the band struck up, and the men
marched through the streets” with Banks watching the troops pass in
review from a house veranda (Beecher 1866:298-299). Once assembled, the
Federal forces numbered nearly 30,000 troops, 13 gunboats, and 60
assorted transport vessels.
Here Banks and Porter had their second warning that the Red River was
not going to cooperate. It quickly became obvious that the expedition
would be delayed by the low water at the rapids. Although eventually the
water level rose, the expedition was forced to leave many vessels
behind. North of Alexandria, Porter’s fleet consisted of only 12
gunboats and 30 transports. To carry all the supplies needed by the
army, wagons had to be used to make up for the supply boats left in
Alexandria. Banks was also forced to leave behind troops to protect the
fleet and the town.
While they waited for the Red to rise, the soldiers and sailors had to
use the water for washing and cooking. As one member of the 114th New
York described it:
It is a dirty, sluggish stream, about the eighth of a mile wide,
flowing in an extremely crooked channel. Its bends and curves are so
exaggerated that they seem almost unnatural....
In all the water charged with mud which our men had been compelled to
drink, they had never before seen anything that came so near being a
compromise between earth and water as the Red River (Beecher
1866:299-300).
[Illustration: U.S. fleet in the Red River at Alexandria. Courtesy
of the Louisiana State Library.]
Naturally, the delays in Alexandria were a godsend to Confederate
General Taylor. Some 5,000 cavalry reinforcements arrived from Texas to
help block the Yankee advance from Alexandria. Now, despite still being
outnumbered, Taylor boldly looked for an opportunity to engage Banks
before they reached Shreveport. As Taylor later related in his memoirs,
“My confidence of success in the impending engagement was inspired by
accurate knowledge of the Federal movements, as well as the character of
their commander, General Banks, whose measure had been taken in the
Virginia campaigns of 1862 and since” (Taylor 1879:161).
Taylor’s opportunity came when Banks reached Grand Ecore, a landing
north of Natchitoches. There, Banks decided that the bulk of his land
forces would approach Shreveport along a narrow road, twisting away from
the Red River and passing through the villages of Pleasant Hill and
Mansfield. This decision prevented Banks’s army and Porter’s gunboats
from mutually supporting each other during their advance. The army soon
became strung out for some 20 miles along the slender road Banks chose.
Awaiting him near Mansfield on April 8 were Taylor’s smaller but better
concentrated forces. In the battle, the tired Federal troops panicked
and were thrown back down the road.
[Illustration: A Confederate charge at the Battle of Pleasant Hill.
From _Harper’s Weekly_, May 7, 1864 Courtesy of Edwin Adams Davis.]
The next day Banks was able to pull his army together. They stood
against Taylor’s attack at Pleasant Hill, forcing the Confederates to
withdraw. But despite this success, Banks was left with a disheartened
army that was quickly losing confidence in his leadership. After the
retreat to Grand Ecore, one “officer in high position” even suggested
putting Banks on a steamer to New Orleans (Hoffman 1877:96-97).