ETHICAL THOUGHT BEFORE CHRIST
Apart from the writings of the New Testament, which are the primary
source of Christian Ethics, a comprehensive view of our subject would
include some account of the ethical conceptions of Greece, Rome and
Israel, which were at least contributory to the Christian idea of the
moral life. Whatever view we take of its origin, Christianity did not
come into the world like the goddess Athene, without preparation, but
was the product of many factors. The moral problems of to-day cannot
be rightly appreciated except in the light of certain concepts which
come to us from ancient thought; and Greco-Roman philosophy as well as
Hebrew religion have contributed not a little to the form and trend of
modern ethical inquiry.
All we can attempt is the briefest outline, first, of the successive
epochs of Greek and Roman Ethics; and second, of the leading moral
ideas of the Hebrews as indicating the preparatory stages in the
evolution of thought which finds its completion in the Ethics of
Christianity.
I
Before the golden age of Greek philosophy there was no Ethics in the
strictest sense. Philosophy proper occupied itself primarily with
ontological questions--questions as to the origin and constitution of
the material world. It was only when mythology and religion had lost
their hold upon the cultured, and the traditions of the poets had come
to be doubted, that inquiries as to the meaning of life and conduct
arose.
{36}
The Sophists may be regarded as the pioneers of ethical science. This
body of professional teachers, who appeared about the fifth century in
Greece, drew attention to the vagueness of common opinion and began to
teach the art of conduct. Of these Protagoras is the most famous, and
to him is attributed the saying, 'Man is the measure of all things.'
As applied to conduct, this dictum is commonly interpreted as meaning
that good is entirely subjective, relative to the individual. Viewed
in this light the saying is one-sided and sceptical, subversive of all
objective morality. But the dictum may be regarded as expressing an
important truth, that the good is personal and must ultimately be the
good for man as man, therefore for all men.
1. It was _Socrates_, however, who, as it was said, first called
philosophy from heaven to the sphere of this earth, and diverted men's
minds from the consideration of natural things to the affairs of human
life. He was indeed the first moral philosopher, inasmuch as that,
while the Sophists merely talked at large about justice and virtue, he
asked what these terms really meant. Living in an age when the old
guides of life--law and custom--were losing their hold upon men, he was
compelled to find a substitute for them by reflection upon the meaning
and object of existence. For him the source of evil is want of
thought, and his aim is to awaken men to the realisation of what they
are, and what they must seek if they would make the best of their
lives. He is the prophet of clear self-consciousness. 'Know thyself'
is his motto, and he maintains that all virtue must be founded on such
knowledge. A life without reflection upon the meaning of existence is
unworthy of a man.[1] Hence the famous Socratic dictum, 'Virtue is
knowledge.' Both negatively and positively Socrates held this
principle to be true. For, on the one hand, he who is not conscious of
the good and does not know in what it consists, cannot possibly pursue
it. And, on the other hand, if a man is once alive to his real good,
how can he do otherwise than pursue it? No one therefore does {37}
wrong willingly. Let a man know what is right, and he will do it.
Knowledge of virtue is not, however, distinct from self-interest.
Every one naturally seeks the good simply because he sees that the good
is identical with his ultimate happiness. The wise man is the happy
man. Hence to know oneself is the secret of well-being. Let each be
master of himself, knowing what he seeks, and seeking what he
knows--that, for Socrates, is the first principle of Ethics, the
condition of all moral life. This view is obviously one-sided and
essentially individualistic, excluding all those forms of morality
which are pursued unconsciously, and are due more to the influence of
intuitive perception and social habit than to clear and definite
knowledge. The merit of Socrates, however, lies in his demand for
ethical reflection, and his insistence upon man not only acting
rightly, but acting from the right motive.
2. While Socrates was the first to direct attention to the nature of
virtue, it received from _Plato_ a more systematic treatment. Platonic
philosophy may be described as an extension to the universe of the
principles which Socrates applied to the life of the individual. Plato
attempts to define the end of man by his place in the cosmos; and by
bringing Ethics into connection with Metaphysics he asks What is the
idea of man as a part of universal reality? Two main influences
combined to produce his conception of virtue. First, in opposition to
the Heraclitean doctrine of perpetual change, he contended for
something real and permanent. Second, in antagonism to the Sophistic
theory of the conventional origin of the moral law, he maintained that
man's chief end was the good which was fixed in the eternal nature of
things, and did not consist in the pursuit of transient pleasures.
Hence, in two respects, Plato goes beyond Socrates. He puts opinion,
which is his name for ordinary consciousness, between ignorance and
knowledge, ascribing to it a certain measure of truth, and making it
the starting-point for reflection. And further, he transforms the
Socratic idea of morality, rejecting the notion that its principle is
to be found in a mere calculation of pleasures, {38} and maintaining
that particular goods must be estimated by the good of life as a whole.
Plato's philosophy rests upon his doctrine of ideas, which, as the
types of permanent reality, represent the eternal nature of things; and
the problem of life is to rise from opinion to truth, from appearance
to reality, and attain to the ideal principle of unity. The highest
good Plato identifies with God, and man's end is ultimately to be found
in the knowledge of, and communion with, the eternal.
The human soul he conceived to be a mixture of two elements. In virtue
of its higher spiritual nature it participates in the world of ideas,
the life of God: and in virtue of its lower or animal impulses, in the
corporeal world of decay. These two dissimilar parts are connected by
an intermediate element called by Plato _thymos_ or courage, implying
the emotions or affections of the heart. Hence a threefold
constitution of the soul is conceived--the rational powers, the
emotional desires, and the animal passions. If we ask who is the good
man? Plato answers, it is the man in whom these three elements are
harmonised. On the basis of this psychology Plato classifies and
determines the virtues--adopting the four cardinal virtues of Greek
tradition as the fundamental types of morality. Wisdom is the quality,
or condition of all virtue and the crown of the moral life: courage is
the virtue of the emotional part of man; temperance or moderation, the
virtue of the lower appetites: while justice is the unity and the
principle of the others. Virtue is thus no longer identified with
knowledge simply. Another source of vice besides ignorance is assumed,
viz., the disorder and conflict of the soul; and the well-being of man
lies in the attainment of a well-ordered and harmonious life. As
health is the harmony of the body, so virtue is the harmony of the
soul--a condition of perfection in which every desire is kept in
control and every function performs its part with a view to the good of
the whole. Morality, however, does not belong merely to the
individual, but has its perfect realisation in the state in which the
three elements of the soul have their {39} counterpart in the threefold
rank of society. Man is indeed but a type of a larger cosmos, and it
is not as an individual but as a citizen that he finds his station and
duties, and is capable of realising his true life.
Thus we see how Plato is led to correct the shortcomings of
Socrates--his abrupt distinction between ignorance and knowledge, his
vagueness as to the meaning of the good, and his tendency to emphasise
the subjective side of virtue and withdraw the individual from the
community of which he is essentially a part. But in developing his
theory of ideas Plato has represented the true life of man as
consisting in the knowledge of, and indeed in absorption in, God, a
state to which man can only attain by the suppression of his natural
impulses and withdrawal from earthly life: and though there is not
wanting in Plato's later teaching the higher conception of the
transformation of the animal passions, he is not wholly successful in
overcoming the dualism between impulse and reason which besets some of
the earlier dialogues.
It is a striking proof of the vitality of Plato that his teaching has
affected every form of idealism and has helped to shape the history of
religious thought in all ages. Not only many of the early Fathers,
such as Clement and Origen, but the Neo-Platonists of Alexandria, the
Cambridge Platonists of the seventeenth century, and also the German
theologians, Baur and Schleiermacher, have recognised numerous
coincidences between Christianity and Platonism: as Bishop Westcott has
said, 'Plato points to St. John.'[2] His influence may be detected in
some of the greatest Christian poetry of our own country, especially in
that of Wordsworth and Tennyson. For Plato believes, in common with
the greatest of every age, in 'that inborn passion for perfection,'
that innate though often unconscious yearning after the true, the
beautiful, the good,
'Those obstinate questionings
Of sense and outward things,'
which are the heritage of human nature.
{40}
3. The Ethics of _Aristotle_ does not essentially differ from that of
Plato. He is the first to treat of morals formally as a science,
which, however, in his hands becomes a division of politics. Man, says
Aristotle, is really a social animal. Even more decisively than Plato,
therefore, he treats man as a part of society. While in Plato there is
the foreshadowing of the truth that the goal of moral endeavour lies in
godlikeness, with Aristotle the goal is confined to this life and is
conceived simply as the earthly well-being of the moral subject.
'Death,' he declares, 'is the greatest of all evils, for it is the
end.' Aristotle begins his great work on Ethics with the discussion of
the chief good, which he declares to be happiness or well-being. But
happiness does not consist in sensual pleasure, nor even in the pursuit
of honour, but in an 'activity of the soul in accordance with
reason.'[3] There are required for this life of right thinking and
right doing not only suitable environment but proper instruction.
Virtue is not virtuous until it is a habit, and the only way to be
virtuous is to practise virtue. To be virtuous a man's conduct must be
a law for him, the regular expression of his will. Hence the virtues
are habits of deliberate choice, and not natural endowments. Following
Plato, Aristotle sees that there is in man a number of impulses
struggling for the mastery of the soul, hence he is led to assume that
the natural instincts need guidance and control. Moderation is
therefore the one chief virtue; and moral excellence consists in an
activity which at every point seeks to strike a 'mean' between two
opposite excesses. Virtue in general, then, may be defined as the
observation of the due mean in action. Aristotle also follows Plato in
assigning the ideal good to contemplation, and in exalting the life of
reason and speculation above all others. In thus idealising the
contemplative life he was but reflecting the spirit of his race. This
apotheosis of knowledge infected all Greek thought, and found
exaggerated expression in the religious absorption of Neo-Platonism.
{41}
Without dwelling further upon the ethical philosophy of Aristotle, a
defect which at once strikes a modern in regard to his scheme of
virtues is that benevolence is not recognised, except obscurely as a
form of magnanimity; and that, in general, the gentler virtues, so
prominent in Christianity, have little place in the list. The virtues
are chiefly aristocratic. Favourable conditions are needed for their
cultivation. They are not possible for a slave, and hardly for those
engaged in 'mercenary occupations.'[4] Further, it may be remarked
that habit of itself does not make a man virtuous. Morality cannot
consist in a mere succession of customary acts. 'One good custom would
corrupt the world,' and habit is frequently a hindrance rather than a
help to the moral life. But the main defect of Aristotle's treatment
of virtue is that he tends to regard the passions as irrational, and he
does not see that passions if wholly evil could have no 'mean.' Reason
pervades all the lower appetites of man: and the instincts and desires,
instead of being treated as elements which must be suppressed, ought to
be regarded rather as powers to be transformed and employed as vehicles
of the moral life. At the same time there are not wanting passages in
Aristotle as well as in Plato which, instead of emphasising the
avoidance of excess, regard virtue as consisting in complementary
elements--the addition of one virtuous characteristic to another--'that
balance of contrasted qualities which meets us at every turn in the
distinguished personalities of the Hellenic race, and which is too
often thought of in a merely negative way, as the avoidance of excess
rather than as the highest outcome of an intense and many-sided
vitality.'[5]
4. After Aristotle philosophy rapidly declined, and Ethics degenerated
into popular moralising which manifested itself chiefly in a growing
depreciation of good as the end {42} of life. The conflicting elements
of reason and impulse, which neither Plato nor Aristotle succeeded in
harmonising, gave rise ultimately to two opposite interpretations of
the moral life. The _Stoics_ selected the rational nature as the true
guide to an ethical system, but they gave to it a supremacy so rigid as
to threaten the extinction of the affections. The _Epicureans_, on the
other hand, fastening upon the emotions as the measure of truth,
emphasised the happiness of the individual as the chief good--a
doctrine which led some of the followers of Epicurus to justify even
sensual enjoyment. It is not necessary to dwell upon the details of
Epicureanism, for though its description of the 'wise man,' as that of
a person who prudently steered a middle course between passion and
asceticism, was one which exercised considerable influence upon the
morals of the age, it is the doctrines of Stoicism which more
especially have come into contact with Christianity. Without
discussing the Stoic conception of the world as interpenetrated and
controlled by an inherent spirit, and the consequent view of life as
proceeding from God and being in all its parts equally divine, we may
note that the Stoics, under the influence of Platonism, regarded
self-realisation as the true end of man. This idea they expressed in
the formula, 'Life according to nature.' The wise man is he who seeks
to live in all the circumstances of life in agreement with his rational
nature. The law of nature is to avoid what is hurtful and strive for
what is appropriate. Pleasure, though not the immediate object of man,
arises as an accompaniment of a well-ordered life. Pleasure and pain
are, however, really accidents, to be met by the wise man with
indifference. He alone is free who acknowledges the absolute supremacy
of reason and makes himself independent of earthly desires. This life
of freedom is open to all: since all men are members of one body. The
slave may be as free as the consul, and in every station of life each
may make the world serve him by living in harmony with it.
There is a certain sublimity in the ethics of Stoicism which has always
appealed to noble minds. 'It inspired,' {43} says Mr. Lecky, 'nearly
all the great characters of the early Roman Empire, and nerved every
attempt to maintain the dignity and freedom of the human soul.'[6] But
we cannot close our eyes to its defects. Divine providence, though
frequently dwelt upon, signified little more for the Stoic than destiny
or fate. Harmony with nature was simply a sense of proud
self-sufficiency. Stoicism is the glorification of reason, even to the
extent of suppressing all emotion. Sin is unreason, and salvation lies
in an external control of the passions--in indifference and apathy
begotten of the subordination of desire to reason.
The chief merit of Stoicism is that in an age of moral degeneracy it
insisted upon the necessity of integrity in all the conditions of life.
In its preference for the joys of the inner life and its scorn of the
delights of sense; in its emphasis upon individual responsibility and
duty; above all, in its advocacy of a common humanity and its belief in
the relation of each human soul to God, Roman Stoicism, as revealed in
the writings of a Seneca, an Epictetus, and a Marcus Aurelius, not only
showed how high Paganism at its best could reach, but proved in a
measure a preparation for Christianity, with whose practical truths it
had much in common.
The affinities between Stoicism and Paulinism have been frequently
pointed out, and the similarity in language and thought can scarcely be
accounted for by coincidence. There are, however, elements in Stoicism
which St. Paul would never have dreamt of assimilating. The material
conception of the world, the self-conscious pride, the absence of all
sense of sin, the temper of apathy, and unnatural suppression of
feelings were ideas which could not but rouse the apostle's strongest
antagonism. But, on the other hand, there were characteristics of a
nobler order in Stoic morality which, we may well believe, Paul found
ready to his hand and did not hesitate to incorporate in his teaching.
Of these we may mention, the Immanence of God, the idea of Wisdom, the
conception of freedom as {44} the prerogative of the individual, and
the notion of brotherhood as the goal of humanity.[7]
The Roman Stoics, notwithstanding their theoretic interest in moral
questions, lived in an ideal world, and hardly attempted to bring their
views into connection with the facts of life. Their philosophy was a
refuge from the evil around them rather than an effort to remove it.
They seek to overcome the world by being indifferent to it. In
Neo-Platonism--the last of the Greek schools of philosophy--this
tendency to withdraw from life and its problems becomes still more
marked. Absorption in God is the goal of existence and the essence of
religion. 'Man is left alone with God without any world to mediate
between them, and in the ecstatic vision of the Absolute the light of
reason is extinguished.'[8]
Meagre as our sketch of ancient thought has necessarily been, it is
perhaps enough to show that the debt of religion to Greek and Roman
Ethics is incalculable. It lifted man above vague wonder, and gave him
courage to define his relation to existence. It caused him to ask
questions of experience, and awakened him to the value of life and the
meaning of freedom, duty, and good. Finally, it brought into view
those contrasted aims of life and society which find their solution in
the Christian ideal.[9]
II
Christianity stands in the closest relation with _Hebrew religion_.
Much as the philosophy of Greece and Rome have contributed to
Christendom, there is no such intimate relation between them as that
which connects Christian Ethics with the morality of Israel. Christ
Himself, and still more the Apostle Paul, assumed as a substratum of
{45} their teaching the revelation which had been granted to the Jews.
The moral and religious doctrines comprehended under the designation of
the 'law' served, as the apostle said, as a _paidagogos_ or usher whose
function it was to lead them to the school of Christ.
At the outset we are impressed by the fact that the Ethics of Judaeism
was inseparable from its religion. Moral obligations were conceived as
divine commands, and the moral law as a revelation of the divine will.
At first Jehovah was simply a tribal deity, but gradually this
restricted view gave place to the wider conception of God as the
sovereign of all men. The divine commandment is the criterion and
measure of man's obedience. Evil, while it has its source and head in
a hostile but subsidiary power, consists in violation of Jehovah's will.
There are three main channels of Hebrew revelation, commonly known as
the _Law_, the _Prophecy_, and _Poetry_ of Old Testament.
1. LAW
(1) _The Mosaic Legislation_ centering in the Decalogue[10] is the
first stage of Old Testament Ethic. The ten commandments, whether
derived from Mosaic enactment or representing a later summary of duty,
hold a supreme and formative place in the teaching of the Old
Testament. All, not even excepting the fourth, are purely moral
requirements. They are, however, largely negative; the fifth
commandment only rising to positive duty. They are also merely
external, regulative of outward conduct. The sixth and seventh protect
the rights of persons, while the eighth guards outward property.
Though these laws may be shown to have their roots in the moral
consciousness of mankind, they were at first restricted by Israel in
their scope and practice to its own tribes.
(2) _The Civil laws_ present a second factor in the ethical education
of Israel. The 'Book of the Covenant'[11] reveals a certain
advancement in political legislation. Still the {46} hard and legal
enactments of retaliation--'An eye for an eye and a tooth for a
tooth'--disclose a barbarous conception of right. Alongside of these
primitive laws must be set those of a more humane nature--laws with
regard to release, the permission of gleaning, the privileges of the
year of jubilee.
(3) _The Ceremonial laws_ embody a third element in the moral life of
Israel. These had to do chiefly with commands and prohibitions
relative to personal conduct--'Meats and drinks and diverse washings';
and with sacrifices and forms of ritual worship.[12]
With regard to the moral value of the commandments two opposite errors
are to be avoided. We must not refuse to recognise in the Old
Testament the record of a true, if elementary and imperfect, revelation
of God. But also we must beware of exalting the commandments of the
Old Dispensation to the level of those of the New; and thus
misunderstanding the nature and relation of both.
The Christian faith is in a sense the development of Judaeism, though
it is infinitely more. The commandments of Moses, in so far as they
have their roots in the constitution of man, have not been superseded,
but taken up and spiritualised by the Ethic of the Gospel.
2. PROPHECY
The dominant factor of Old Testament Ethics lay in the influence
exerted by the prophets. They, and not the priests, are the great
moralists of Israel. The prophets were speakers for God, the
interpreters of His will. They were the moral guides of the people,
the champions of integrity in political life, not less than witnesses
for individual purity.[13]
We may sum up the ethical significance of the Hebrew prophets in three
features.
(1) They were preachers of _personal righteousness_. In {47} times of
falsehood and hypocrisy they were witnesses for integrity and truth,
upholding the personal virtues of justice, sincerity, and mercy against
the idolatry and formalism of the priesthood. 'What doth the Lord
require of thee,' said Micah, 'but to do justly, to love mercy, and to
walk humbly with thy God.'[14] In the same strain Isaiah exclaimed,
'Bring no more vain oblations, but wash you and make you clean.'[15]
And so also Habakkuk has affirmed in words which became the keynote of
Paul's theology and the watchword of the Reformation--'The just shall
live by faith.'[16]
(2) They were the advocates of the _rights of man_, of equity and
justice between man and man. They denounce the tyranny of kings, and
the luxury of the nobles. They protest against the oppression of the
poor and befriend the toilers of the cities. They proclaim the worth
of man as man. They reveal Jehovah as the God of the common people,
and seek to mitigate the burdens which lie upon the enslaved and
down-trodden.
(3) They were the apostles of _Hope_. Not only did they seek to lift
their fellow-men above their present calamities, but they proclaimed a
message of peace and triumph which was to be evolved out of trouble. A
great promise gradually loomed on the horizon, and hope began to centre
in an anointed Deliverer. The Hebrew prophets were not probably
conscious of the full significance of their own predictions. Like all
true poets, they uttered greater things than they knew. The prophet
who most clearly outlines this truth is the second Isaiah. As he looks
down the ages he sees that healing is to be brought about through
suffering, the suffering of a Sinless one. Upon this mysterious figure
who is to rise up in the latter days is to be laid the burden of
humanity. No other, not even St. Paul himself, has grasped so clearly
the great secret of atonement or given so touching a picture of the
power of vicarious suffering as this unknown prophet of Israel.
{48}
3. THE POETICAL BOOKS
Passing from the prophets to the poets of Israel--and especially to the
book of Psalms--the devotional manual of the people, reflecting the
moral and religious life of the nation at the various stages of its
development--we find the same exalted character of God as a God of
Righteousness, hating evil and jealous for devotion, the same profound
sense of sin and the same high vocation of man. The Hebrew nation was
essentially a poetic people,[17] and their literature is full of
poetry. But poetry is not systematic. It is not safe, therefore, to
deduce particular tenets of faith or moral principles from passages
which glow with intensity of feeling. But if a nation's character is
revealed in its songs, the deep spirituality and high moral tone of
Israel are clearly reflected in that body of religious poetry which
extends over a period of a thousand years, from David to the Maccabean
age. It is at once national and personal, and is a wonderful record of
the human heart in its various moods and yearnings. Underlying all
true poetry there is a philosophy of life. God, for the Hebrew
psalmist, is the one pervading presence. He is not a mere
impersonation of the powers of nature, but a personal Being, righteous
and merciful, with whom man stands in the closest relations. Holy and
awful, indeed, hating iniquity and exacting punishment upon the wicked,
He is also tender and pitiful--a Father of the oppressed, who bears
their burdens, forgives their iniquities, and crowns them with tender
mercy.[18] All nature speaks to the Hebrew of God. He is no far-off
creator, but immanent in all His works.[19] He presides over mankind,
and provides for the manifold wants of his creatures. It is this
thought which gives unity to the nation, and binds the tribes into a
common brotherhood. God is their personal friend. In war and peace,
in worship and labour, at home and in exile, it is to Jehovah they look
{49} for strength and light and joy. He is their Shepherd and
Redeemer, under whose wings they trust. Corresponding to this sublime
faith, the virtues of obedience and fidelity are dwelt upon, while the
ideal of personal righteousness and purity is constantly held forth.
It is no doubt largely temporal blessings which the psalmists
emphasise, and the rewards of integrity are chiefly those of material
and earthly prosperity. The hope of the future life is nowhere clearly
expressed in the Old Testament, and while in the Psalter here and there
a dim yearning for a future with God breaks forth, hardly any of these
poems illumine the destiny of man beyond the grave. The hope of Israel
was limited mostly to this earth. The land beyond the shadows does not
come within their purview. Like a child, the psalmist is content to
know that his divine Father is near him here and now. When exactly the
larger hope emerged we cannot say. But gradually, with the breaking up
of the national life and under the pressure of suffering, a clearer
vision dawned. With the limitations named, it is a sublime outlook
upon life and a high-toned morality which the Psalter discloses.
Poetry, indeed, idealises, and no doubt the Israelites did not always
live up to their aspirations; but men who could give utterance to a
faith so clear, to a penitence so deep, and to longings so lofty and
spiritual as these Psalms contain are not the least among the heralds
of the kingdom of Christ.
We cannot enlarge upon the ethical ideas of the other writings of the
Old Testament, the books of Wisdom, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and Job.
Their teaching, while not particularly lofty, is generally healthy and
practical, consisting of homely commonplaces and shrewd observations
upon life and conduct. The motives appealed to are not always the
highest, and frequently have regard only to earthly prosperity and
worldly policy. It must not, however, be overlooked that moral
practice is usually allied with the fear of God, and the right choice
of wisdom is represented as the dictate of piety not less than the
sanction of prudence. The writers of the Wisdom literature are the
{50} humanists of their age. As distinguished from the idealism of the
prophets, they are realists who look at life in a somewhat utilitarian
way. With the prophets, however, they are at one in regarding the
inferiority of ceremonial to obedience and sincerity. God is the ruler
of the world, and man's task is to live in obedience to Him. What God
requires is correct outward behaviour, self-restraint, and
consideration of others.
In estimating the Ethics of Israel the fact that it was a preparatory
stage in the revelation of God's will must not be overlooked. We are
not surprised, therefore, that, judged by the absolute standard of the
New Testament, the morality of the Old Testament must be pronounced
imperfect. In two respects at least, in intent and extent, it is
deficient.
(1) It is lacking in _Depth_. There is a tendency to dwell upon the
sufficiency of external acts rather than the necessity of inward
disposition. At the same time, in the Psalter and prophecy inward
purity is recognised.[20] Further, the character of Jehovah is
sometimes presented in a repellent aspect; as in the threatenings of
the second commandment; the treatment of the children of Achan and the
Sons of Korah; the seeming injustice of God, implied in the complaint
of Moses, and the protests of Abraham and David. But again there are
not wanting more kindly features of the Divine Being; and the
Fatherhood of God finds frequent expression. Though the penal code is
severe, a gentler spirit shines through many of its provisions, and
protection is afforded to the wage-earner, the dependent, and the poor;
while the care of slaves, foreigners, and even lower animals is not
overlooked.[21] Again, it has been noticed that the motives to which
the Old Testament appeals are often mercenary. Material prosperity
plays an important part as an inducement to well-doing. The good which
the pious patriarch or royal potentate contemplates is something which
is calculated to enrich himself or advance his people. But here we
must not forget that {51} God's revelation is progressive, and His
dealing with man educative. There is naturally a certain accommodation
of the divine law to the various stages of the moral apprehension of
the Jewish people. Gradually the nation is being carried forward by
the promise of material benefits to the deeper and more inward
appreciation of spiritual blessings.
(2) It is lacking in _Scope_. In regard to universality the Hebrew
ideal, it must be acknowledged, is deficient. God is usually
represented as the God of Israel alone, and not as the God of all men,
and the obligations of veracity, honesty, and mercy are confined within
the limits of the nation. It is true that a prominent commandment
given to Israel and endorsed by our Lord runs thus: 'Thou shalt love
thy neighbour as thyself.'[22] But the extent of the obligation seems
to be restricted by the context: 'Thou shalt not avenge nor bear any
grudge against the children of thy people.' It is contended that the
word translated 'neighbour' bears a wider import than the English term,
and is really applicable to any person. The larger idea is expressed
in vv. 33, 34, where the word 'stranger' or 'foreigner' is substituted
for neighbour. And there are passages in which the stranger is
regarded as the special client of God, and is enjoined to look to Him
for protection.
The Jews were not in practice, however, faithful to the humanitarianism
of their law, and, in keeping with other nations, showed a tendency to
restrict divine favours within the limits of their own land, and to
maintain throughout their history an attitude of aloofness and
repellent isolation which even amounted to intolerance towards other
races. In early days, however, the obligation of hospitality was
regarded as sacred.[23] Nor must we forget that, whatever may have
been the Jewish practice, the promise enshrined in their revelation
involves the unity of mankind; while several of the prophecies and
Psalms look forward to a world-wide blessing.[24] In Isaiah we even
read, 'God of the whole earth shall He be called.'[25]
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The stream of preparation for Christianity thus flowed steadily through
three channels, the Greek, the Roman, and the Jew. Each contributed
something to the fullness of the time.
The problem of Greek civilisation was the problem of _freedom_, the
realisation of self-dependence and self-determination. In the pursuit
of these ends Greece garnered conclusions which are the undying
possessions of the world. If to the graces of self-abasement, meekness
and charity it remained a stranger, it gave a new worth to the
individual, and showed that without the virtues of wisdom, courage,
steadfastness and justice man could not attain to moral character.
The Roman's gift was unbending devotion to _duty_. With a genius for
rule he forced men into one polity; and by levelling material barriers
he enabled the nations to commune, and made a highway for the message
of freedom and brotherhood. But, intoxicated with material glory, he
became blind to spiritual good, and in his universal toleration he
emptied all faiths of their content, driving the masses to
superstition, and the few who yearned for a higher life to withdrawal
from the world.
The Jewish contribution was _righteousness_. Not specially
distinguished by intellectual powers, nor gifted in political
enterprise, his endowment was spiritual insight, and by his dispersion
throughout the world he made others the sharers of his inheritance.
But his tendency was to keep his privilege to himself, or so to load it
with legal restrictions as to bar its acceptance for strangers; and in
his pride of isolation he failed to recognise his Deliverer when He
came.
Thus, negatively and positively, by failure and by partial attainment,
the world was prepared for Him who was the desire of all nations. In
Christ were gathered up the wisdom of the Greek, the courage of the
Roman, the righteousness of the Jew; and He who came not to destroy but
to fulfil at once interpreted and satisfied the longings of the ages.
[1] _Apologia_, pp. 38-9.
[2] Cf. Adam, _Vitality of Platonism_, p. 3.
[3] _Nic. Ethics_, bk. i. chap. 5.
[4] _histharnikai ergasiai_, Arist., _Politics_, iii. 'There is
nothing common between a master and his slave,' _Nic. Ethics_, viii.
[5] Butcher, _Harvard Lectures on Greek Subjects_, quoted by Barbour,
_Philos. Study of Christian Ethics_, p. 11. Cf. also Burnet, _Ethics
of Aristotle_, p. 73. 'The "mean" is really the true nature of the
soul when fully developed.'
[6] _Hist. of Europ. Morals_, vol. i. chap. ii.
[7] See Author's _Ethics of St. Paul_ for further discussion of
relation of Paul to Stoics.
[8] Cf. E. Caird, _Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers_,
vol. i. p. 48.
[9] Cf. Caird, idem. Pfleiderer, _Vorbereitung des Christentums in der
Griech. Philos._; Wenley, _Preparation for Christianity_.
[10] Exod. xx.; Deut. v.
[11] Ex. xx.-xxiii.
[12] Amos v. 25; Hos. vi. 6; Isa. i. 11-13.
[13] Cf. Wallace, _Lectures and Essays on Natural Theol. and Ethics_,
p. 183.
[14] Micah vi. 8.
[15] Isa. i. 13-17; Micah vi. 7.
[16] Hab. ii. 4; cf. Rom. i. 17; Gal. iii. 2.
[17] Though Houston Chamberlain, in his recent work, _The Foundations
of the Nineteenth Century_, maintains that they were 'a most prosaic,
materialistic people, without any real sense of poetry.'
[18] Ps. 51.
[19] Ps. 19.
[20] Ps. 51; Isa. 1.
[21] Deut. xxiv. 14, 15; Jer. xxii. 13-17; Matt. iii 5; Deut. xxv. 4.
[22] Lev. xix. 18.
[23] Gen. xviii. xix.
[24] Isa. lxi.; Ps. xxii. 27; xlviii. 2-10; lxxxvii.
[25] Isa. liv. 5.
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SECTION B
PERSONALITY
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