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CHRISTIANITY AND ETHICS
A Handbook of Christian Ethics
by
ARCHIBALD B. D. ALEXANDER, M.A., D.D.
Author of 'A Short History of Philosophy,'
'The Ethics of St. Paul,' etc.
London: Duckworth & Co.
3 Henrietta St., Covent Garden
1914
All rights reserved
{v}
PREFACE
The object of this volume is to present a brief but comprehensive view
of the Christian conception of the moral life. In order to conform
with the requirements of the series to which the volume belongs, the
writer has found the task of compression one of almost insurmountable
difficulty; and some topics, only less important than those dealt with,
have been necessarily omitted. The book claims to be, as its title
indicates, simply a handbook or introduction to Christian Ethics. It
deals with principles rather than details, and suggests lines of
thought instead of attempting an exhaustive treatment of the subject.
At the same time, in the author's opinion, no really vital question has
been overlooked. The treatise is intended primarily for students, but
it is hoped that it may prove serviceable to those who desire a
succinct account of the moral and social problems of the present day.
A fairly full bibliography has been added, which, along with the
references to authorities in the body of the work, may be helpful to
those who wish to prosecute the study. For the convenience of readers
the book has been divided into four sections, entitled, Postulates,
Personality, Character, and Conduct; and a detailed synopsis of
contents has been supplied.
To the Rev. W. R. Thomson, B.D. of Bellshill, Scotland, who read the
chapters in type, and generally put at his disposal much valuable
suggestion, the author would record his most sincere thanks.
{vii}
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
PAGE
A PLEA FOR THE STUDY OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS . . . . . . . . . . 1
SECTION A--POSTULATES
CHAPTER I
THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF ETHICS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
I. General Definition.
II. Distinctive Features--1. Ideal; 2. Norm; 3. Will.
III. Is Ethics a Science?
IV. Relation to--1. Logic; 2. Aesthetics; 3. Politics.
V. Dependence upon--1. Metaphysics; 2. Psychology.
CHAPTER II
THE POSTULATES OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
I. Philosophical Ethics.
II. Dogmatics.
III. Theological Presuppositions--
1. Christian Idea of God.
2. Christian Doctrine of Sin.
3. Human Responsibility.
IV. Authority and Method.
CHAPTER III
ETHICAL THOUGHT BEFORE CHRIST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
I. In Greece and Rome--Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Stoics.
Stoicism and St. Paul.
II. In Israel--1. Law; 2. Prophecy; 3. Poetry.
Preparatory Character of pre-Christian Morality.
SECTION B--PERSONALITY
CHAPTER IV
THE ESTIMATE OF MAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
I. Conflicting Views of Human Nature--
1. Man by nature Morally Good.
2. Man by nature Totally Depraved.
3. The Christian View.
II. Examination of Man's Psychical Nature--
1. The Unity of the Soul.
2. The Divine in Man.
3. The Physical and Mental Life.
III. Appeal of Christianity to the Mind.
CHAPTER V
THE WITNESS OF CONSCIENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
I. Treatment of Conscience--
1. In Greek Poetry and Philosophy.
2. In Old Testament.
3. In New Testament.
II. Nature and Origin of Conscience--
1. Intuitionalism.
2. Evolutionalism.
III. Validity of Conscience--
1. The Christian View.
2. The Moral Imperatives.
3. The Permanence of Conscience
CHAPTER VI
'THE MIRACLE OF THE WILL' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
Is Man free to choose the Good?
Creative Power of Volition.
Aspects of Problem raised.
I. Scientific--
Man and Physical Necessity.
II. Psychological--
Determinism and Indeterminism.
Criticism of James and Bergson.
Spontaneity and Necessity.
III. Theological--
Divine Sovereignty and Human Freedom.
Jesus and Paul--Challenge to the Will.
Freedom--a Gift and a Task.
SECTION C--CHARACTER
CHAPTER VII
MODERN THEORIES OF LIFE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
I. Naturalistic Tendency--
1. Materialistic--
(1) Idyllic or Poetic--Rousseau.
(2) Philosophic--Feuerbach.
(3) Scientific--Haeckel.
2. Utilitarian--Hobbes, Bentham, Mill.
3. Evolutionary--Spencer.
4. Socialistic--Marx, Engels.
5. Individualistic--
(1) Aestheticism--Goethe, Schiller.
(2) Subjectivism--
(_a_) Pessimism--Schopenhauer.
(_b_) Optimism--Nietzsche.
II. Idealistic Tendency--
1. Kant--Categorical Imperative.
2. Fichte and Hegel--Idea of Personality.
3. James--Pragmatism.
4. Bergson--Vitalism.
5. Eucken--Activism.
CHAPTER VIII
THE CHRISTIAN IDEAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
Life, as the highest Good.
I. Life, in its Individual Aspect--
1. Its Intensity.
2. Its Expansion.
3. 'Eternal Life.'
II. Life, in its Social Aspect--
1. 'The Kingdom of God'--
Eschatological Interpretation.
Untenableness of _Interimsethik_.
2. Christ's View of Kingdom--
(1) A Present Reality--a Gift.
(2) A Gradual Development--a Task.
(3) A Future Consummation--a Hope.
III. Life, in its Godward Aspect--
1. Holiness.
2. Righteousness.
3. Love.
CHAPTER IX
STANDARD AND MOTIVE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
I. Christ as Example--
1. Portrayal by Synoptists--
(1) Artlessness of Disciples.
(2) Naturalness of Jesus,
2. Impression of Power--
(1) Power of Loyalty to Calling.
(2) Power of Holiness.
(3) Power of Sympathy.
3. Value of Jesus' Example for Present Life--
Misconception of Phrase 'Imitation of Christ.'
II. The Christian Motive--
1. Analysis of Springs of Conduct--
(1) Divine Forgiveness.
(2) Fatherhood of God.
(3) Sense of Vocation.
(4) Brevity of Life.
(5) Idea of Immortality.
2. Question as to Purity of Motive--
(1) Charge of Asceticism.
(2) Charge of Hedonism.
3. Doctrine of Rewards--
(1) In Philosophy.
(2) In Christianity--(_a_) Jesus; (_b_) Paul.
CHAPTER X
THE DYNAMIC OF THE NEW LIFE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
I. Divine Power--
Operative through Christ's
1. Incarnation and Life.
2. Death and Sacrifice.
3. Resurrection and Indwelling Presence.
II. Human Response--
1. Repentance--
(1) Contrition--Confession--Resolution.
(2) Question of 'Sudden Conversion.'
(3) 'Twice Born' or 'Once Born.'
2. Faith--
(1) In Ordinary Life.
(2) In Teaching of Jesus.
(3) The Pauline Doctrine.
3. Obedience--
(1) Active Appropriation of Grace.
(2) Determination of Whole Personality.
(3) Gradual Assimilation.
SECTION D--CONDUCT
CHAPTER XI
VIRTUES AND VIRTUE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
Definition of Virtue.
I. The Natural Basis of the Virtues--
'The Cardinal Virtues.'
II. The Christian Transformation of the Virtues--
1. The New Testament Account.
2. Cardinal Virtues, Elements of Christian Character.
3. Place of Passive Virtues in Life.
III. The Unification of the Virtues--
1. Unity in Relation to God.
2. Love, Spring of all Virtues,
3. 'Theological Virtues,' Aspects of Love.
CHAPTER XII
THE REALM OF DUTY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
I. Aspects of Duty--
1. Duty and Vocation.
2. Conflict of Duties--
(1) Competing Obligations.
(2) 'Counsels of Perfection.'
(3) Indifferent Acts.
3. Rights and Duties--
(1) Claim of 'Natural Rights.'
(2) Based on Worth of Individual.
(3) Christian Idea of Liberty.
II. Spheres of Duty--
1. Duties in Relation to Self--
(1) Self-Respect.
(2) Self-Preservation.
(3) Self-Development--
Self-regarding Duties not prominent in Scripture.
Self-Realisation through Self-Sacrifice.
2. Duties in Relation to Others--
(1) Regard for Man: Brotherly Love--
(_a_) Justice.
(_b_) Veracity.
(_c_) Judgment.
(2) Service--
(_a_) Sympathy.
(_b_) Beneficence.
(_c_) Forgiveness.
(3) Example and Influence.
3. Duties in Relation to God--
(1) Recognition.
(2) Obedience--Passive and Active.
(3) Worship--Reverence, Prayer, Thanksgiving.
CHAPTER XIII
SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230
I. The Family--
1. Origin and Evolution of Family.
2. Christian view--
(1) Christ's Teaching on Marriage.
(2) State Regulation and Eugenics.
(3) Tendencies to Disparagement.
3. Family Relationships--
(1) Parents and Children.
(2) Woman's Place and Rights.
(3) Child Life and Education.
II. The State--
1. Basis of Authority--
Tolstoy and Anarchism.
'Social Contract.'
2. State, in New Testament.
3. Modern Conceptions--
Views of Augustine and Hegel.
(1) Duty of State to Citizens.
(2) Duty of Citizens to State.
(3) The Democratic Movement--
Reciprocity of Service and Sense of Brotherhood.
III. The Church--
1. Relation of Church and State.
2. Purpose and Ideal of Church--
(1) Worship and Edification.
(2) Witness to Christ.
(3) Evangelisation of Mankind.
3. The Church and the Social Problem--
(1) Christ's Teaching as to Industry and Wealth.
(2) Attitude of Early Church to Society.
(3) Of Roman and Reformed Churches.
4. Duty of Christianity to the World--
The Missionary Imperative and Opportunity.
CHAPTER XIV
CONCLUSION--THE PERMANENCE OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS . . . . . . . 245
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248
INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263
{1}
CHRISTIANITY AND ETHICS
INTRODUCTION
A PLEA FOR THE STUDY OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS
If, as Matthew Arnold says, conduct is three-fourths of life, then a
careful inquiry into the laws of conduct is indispensable to the proper
interpretation of the meaning and purpose of life. Conduct of itself,
however, is merely the outward expression of character; and character
again has its roots in personality; so that if we are to form a just
conception of life we have to examine the forces which shape human
personality and raise it to its highest power and efficiency. In
estimating the value of man all the facts of consciousness and
experience must be considered. Hence no adequate account of the end of
life can be given without regard to that which, if it is true, must be
the most stupendous fact of history--the fact of Christ.
If the Christian is a man to whom no incident of experience is secular
and no duty insignificant, because all things belong to God and all
life is dominated by the spirit of Christ, then Christian Ethics must
be the application of Christianity to conduct; and its theme must be
the systematic study of the ideals and forces which are alone adequate
to shape character and fit man for the highest conceivable
destiny--fellowship with, and likeness to, the Divine Being in whose
image he has been made. This, of course, may be said to be the aim of
all theology. The theologian must not be content to discuss merely
speculative problems about God and man. He must seek above {2} all
things to bring the truths of revelation to bear upon human practice.
All knowledge has its practical implicate. The dogma which cannot be
translated into duty is apt to be a vague abstraction.
In all ages there has been a tendency to separate truth and duty. But
knowledge has two sides; it is at once a revelation and a challenge.
There is no truth which has not its corresponding obligation, and no
obligation which has not its corresponding truth. And not until every
truth is rounded into its duty, and every duty is referred back into
its truth shall we attain to that clearness of vision and consistency
of moral life, to promote which is the primary task of Christian Ethics.
It is this practical element which gives to the study of morals its
justification and makes it specially important for the Christian
teacher. In this sense Ethics is really the crown of theology and
ought to be the end of all previous study.
As a separate branch of study Christian Ethics dates only from the
Reformation. It was natural, and perhaps inevitable that the first
efforts of the Church should be occupied with the formation and
elaboration of dogma. With a few notable exceptions, among whom may be
mentioned Basil, Clement, Alquin and Thomas Aquinas, the Church fathers
and schoolmen paid but scanty attention to the ethical side of
religion. It was only after the Reformation that theology, Roman and
Protestant alike, was divided into different branches. The Roman
Catholic name for what we style Ethics is 'moral philosophy,' which,
however, consists mainly of directions for father confessors in their
dealing with perplexed souls. Christian Ethics appears for the first
time as the name of a treatise by a French theologian of the
Calvinistic persuasion--Danaeus, whose work, however, is confined to an
exposition of the Decalogue. The first recorded work of the Lutheran
church is the _Theologia Moralis_, written in 1634, by George Calixtus.
But the modern study of the subject really dates from {3}
Schleiermacher (1768-1834), who divides theology into two sections,
Dogmatics and Ethics, giving to the latter an independent treatment.
Since his time Ethics has been regarded as a separate discipline, and
within the last few decades increasing attention has been devoted to it.
This strong ethical tendency is one of the most noticeable features of
the present age. Everywhere to-day the personal human interest is in
evidence. We see it in the literature of the age and especially in the
best poetry, beginning already with Coleridge and Wordsworth, and
continued in Tennyson and Browning. It is the inner life of man as
depicted to us by these master singers, the story of the soul, even
more than the delineation of nature which appeals to man's deepest
experience and evokes his finest response. We see it in the art of our
times, which, not content to be a mere expression of sensuous beauty or
lifeless nature, seeks to be instinct with human sympathy and to become
the vehicle of the ideas and aims of man. We see it in modern fiction,
which is no longer the narration of a simple tale, but the subtle
analysis of character, and the intricate study of the passions and
ambitions of common life. History to-day is not concerned so much with
recording the intrigues of kings and the movements of armies as with
scrutinising the motives and estimating the personal forces which have
shaped the ages. Even in the domain of theology itself this tendency
is visible. Our theologians are not content with discussing abstract
doctrines or recounting the decisions of church councils, but are
turning to the gospels and seeking to depict the life of Jesus--to
probe the secret of His divine humanity and to interpret the meaning
for the world of His unique personality.
Nor is this tendency confined to professional thinkers and theologians,
it is affecting the common mind of the laity. 'Never was there a
time,' says a modern writer, 'when plain people were less concerned
with the metaphysics or the ecclesiasticism of Christianity. The
construction of systems and the contention of creeds which once
appeared the central themes of human interest are now {4} regarded by
millions of busy men and women as mere echoes of ancient controversies,
if not mere mockeries of the problems of the present day.' The Church
under the inspiration of this new feeling for humanity is turning with
fresh interest to the contemplation of the character of Jesus Christ,
and is rising to a more lofty idea of its responsibilities towards the
world. More than ever in the past, it is now felt that Christianity
must vindicate itself as a practical religion; and that in view of the
great problems--scientific, social and industrial, which the new
conditions of an advancing civilisation have created, the Church, if it
is to fulfil its function as the interpreter and guide of thought, must
come down from its heights of calm seclusion and grapple with the
actual difficulties of men, not indeed by assuming a political rôle or
acting as a divider and judge amid conflicting secular aims, but by
revealing the mind of Christ and bringing the principles of the gospel
to bear upon the complex life of society.
No one who reflects upon the spirit of the times will doubt that there
are reasons of urgent importance why this aspect of Christian life and
duty, which we have been considering, should be specially insisted upon
to-day. Of these the first and foremost is the prevalence of a
materialistic philosophy. Taking its rise in the evolutionary theories
of last century, this view is now being applied with relentless logic
as an interpretation of the problems of society by a school of
socialistic writers. Man, it is said, is the creature of heredity and
environment alone. Condition creates character, and relief from the
woes of humanity is to be sought, not in the transformation of the
individual but in the revolutionising of the circumstances of life. As
a consequence of this philosophy of externalism there is a filtering
down of these materialistic views to the multitude, who care, indeed,
little for theories, but are quick to be affected by a prevailing tone.
Underlying the feeling of unrest and dissatisfaction, so marked a
feature of our present day life, there is distinctly discernible among
the masses a loosening of religious faith and a slackening {5} of moral
obligation. The idea of personality and the sense of duty are not so
vivid and strong as they used to be. A vague sentimentalising about
sin has taken the place of the more robust view of earlier times, and
evil is traced to untoward environment rather than to feebleness of
individual will. And finally, to name no other cause, there is a
tendency in our day among all classes to divorce religion from life--to
separate the sacred from the secular, and to regard worship and work as
belonging to two entirely distinct realms of existence.
For these reasons, among others, there is a special need, as it seems
to us, for a systematic study of Christian Ethics on the part of those
who are to be the leaders of thought and the teachers of the people.
The materialistic view of life must be met by a more adequate Christian
philosophy. The unfaith and pessimism of the age must be overcome by
the advocacy of an idealistic conception which insists not only upon
the personality and worth of man, involving duties as well as rights,
but also upon the supremacy of conscience in obedience to the law of
Christ. Above all, we need an ethic which will show that religion must
be co-extensive with life, transfiguring and spiritualising all its
activities and relationships. Life is a unity and all duty is one,
whether it be duty to God or duty to man. It must be all of a piece,
like the robe of Christ, woven from the top to the bottom without seam.
It takes its spring from one source and is dominated by one spirit. In
the Christianity of Christ there stand conspicuous two great ideas
bound together, indeed, in a higher--love to God the Father. These are
personal perfection and the service of mankind--the culture of self and
the care of others. 'Be ye perfect' and 'love your neighbour as
yourself.' It is the glory of Christianity to have harmonised these
seemingly competing aims. The disciple of Christ finds that he cannot
realise his own life except as he seeks the good of others; and that he
cannot effectively help his fellows except by giving to them that which
he himself is. This, as we take it, is the Christian conception of the
moral life; and it is {6} the business of Christian Ethics to show that
it is at once reasonable and practical.
The present volume will be divided into _four_ main parts, entitled,
_Postulates_, _Personality_, _Character_ and _Conduct_. The _first_
will deal with the meaning of Ethics generally and its relation to
cognate subjects; and specially with the Philosophical, Psychological
and Theological presuppositions of Christian Ethics. The _second_ part
will be devoted to man as moral subject, and will analyse the
capacities of the soul which respond to the calls and claims of the new
Life. The _third_ Section will involve a consideration of the
formative Principles of Character, the moulding of the soul, the
Ideals, Motives and Forces by means of which the 'New Man' is
'recreated' and fashioned. _Finally_, under Conduct, the Virtues,
Duties and Rights of man will be discussed; and the various spheres of
service and institutions of society examined in relation to which the
moral life in its individual and social aspects is manifested and
developed.
{7}
SECTION A
POSTULATES
{9}
CHAPTER I
THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF ETHICS
Philosophy has been defined as 'thinking things together.' Every man,
says Hegel, is a philosopher, and in so far as it is the natural
tendency of the human mind to connect and unify the manifold phenomena
of life, the paradox of the German thinker is not without a measure of
truth. But while this is only the occasional pastime of the ordinary
individual, it is the conscious and habitual aim of the philosopher.
In daily life people are wont to make assumptions which they do not
verify, and employ figures of speech which of necessity are partial and
inadequate. It is the business of philosophy to investigate the
pre-suppositions of common life and to translate into realities the
pictures of ordinary language. It was the method of Socrates to
challenge the current modes of speaking and to ask his fellow-men what
they meant when they used such words as 'goodness,' 'virtue,'
'justice.' Every time you employ any of these terms, he said, you
virtually imply a whole theory of life. If you would have an
intelligent understanding of yourself and the world of which you form a
part, you must cease to live by custom and speak by rote. You must
seek to bring the manifold phenomena of the universe and the various
experiences of life into some kind of unity and see them as
co-ordinated parts of a whole.
When men thus begin to reflect on the origin and connection of things,
three questions at once suggest themselves--what, how, and why? What
is the world? How do I know it? and why am I here? We might briefly
classify the three great departments of human thought as attempts {10}
to answer these three inquiries. What exists is the problem of
Metaphysics. What am I and how do I know? is the question of
Psychology. What is my purpose, what am I to do? is the subject of
Ethics. These questions are closely related, and the answer given to
one largely determines the solution of the others. The truths gained
by philosophical thought are not confined to the kingdom of abstract
speculation but apply in the last resort to life. The impulse to know
is only a phase of the more general impulse to be and to act. Beneath
all man's activities, as their source and spring, there is ever some
dim perception of an end to be attained. 'The ultimate end,' says
Paulsen, 'impelling men to meditate upon the nature of the universe,
will always be the desire to reach some conclusion concerning the
meaning of the source and goal of their lives.' The origin and aim of
all philosophy is consequently to be sought in Ethics.
I. If we ask more particularly what Ethics is, definition affords us
some light. It is to Aristotle that we are indebted for the earliest
use of this term, and it was he who gave to the subject its title and
systematic form. The name _ta ethika_ is derived from _êthos_,
character, which again is closely connected with _ethos_, signifying
custom. Ethics, therefore, according to Aristotle is the science of
character, character being understood to mean according to its
etymology, customs or habits of conduct. But while the modern usage of
the term 'character' suggests greater inwardness than would seem to be
implied in the ancient definition, it must be remembered that under the
title of Ethics Aristotle had in view, not only a description of the
outward habits of man, but also that which gives to custom its value,
viz., the sources of action, the motives, and especially the ends which
guide a man in the conduct of life. But since men live before they
reflect, Ethics and Morality are not synonymous. So long as there is a
congruity between the customs of a people and the practical
requirements of life, ethical questions do not occur. It is only when
difficulties arise as to matters of right, for which the {11} existing
usages of society offer no solution, that reflection upon morality
awakens. No longer content with blindly accepting the formulae of the
past, men are prompted to ask, whence do these customs come, and what
is their authority? In the conflict of duties, which a wider outlook
inevitably creates, the inquirer seeks to estimate their relative
values, and to bring his conception of life into harmony with the
higher demands and larger ideals which have been disclosed to him.
This has been the invariable course of ethical inquiry. At different
stages of history--in the age of the Sophists of Ancient Greece, when
men were no longer satisfied with the old forms of life and truth: at
the dawn of the Christian era, when a new ideal was revealed in Christ:
during the period of the Reformation, when men threw off the bondage of
the past and made a stand for the rights of the individual conscience:
and in more recent times, when in the field of political life the
antithesis between individual and social instincts had awakened larger
and more enlightened views of civic and social responsibility--the
study of Ethics, as a science of moral life, has come to the front.
Ethics may, therefore, be defined as the science of the end of
life--the science which inquires into its meaning and purpose. But
inasmuch as the end or purpose of life involves the idea of some good
which is in harmony with the highest conceivable well-being of
man--some good which belongs to the true fulfilment of life--Ethics may
also be defined as the science of the highest good or _summum bonum_.
Finally, Ethics may be considered not only as the science of the
highest good or ultimate end of life, but also as the study of all that
conditions that end, the dispositions, desires and motives of the
individual, all the facts and forces which bear upon the will and shape
human life in its various social relationships.
II. Arising out of this general definition three features may be
mentioned as descriptive of its distinctive character among the
sciences.
{12}
1. Ethics is concerned with the _ideal_ of life. By an ideal we mean
a better state of being than has been actually realised. We are
confessedly not as we should be, and there floats before the minds of
men a vision of some higher condition of life and society than that
which exists. Life divorced from an ideal is ethically valueless.
Some conception of the supreme good is the imperative demand and moral
necessity of man's being. Hence the chief business of Ethics is to
answer the question: What is the supreme good? For what should a man
live? What, in short, is the ideal of life? In this respect Ethics as
a science is distinguished from the physical sciences. They explain
facts and trace sequences, but they do not form ideals or endeavour to
move the will in the direction of them.
2. Ethics again is concerned with a _norm_ of life, and in this sense
it is frequently styled a normative science. That is to say, it is a
science which prescribes rules or maxims according to which life is to
be regulated. This is sometimes expressed by saying that Ethics treats
of what _ought to be_. The ideal must not be one which simply floats
in the air. It must be an ideal which is possible, and, therefore, as
such, obligatory. It is useless to feel the worth of a certain idea,
or even to speak of the desirability of it, if we do not feel also that
it ought to be realised. Moral judgments imply an 'ought,' and that
'ought' implies a norm or standard, in the light of which, as a
criterion, all obligation must be tested, and according to which all
conduct must be regulated.
3. Ethics, once more, is concerned with the _will_. It is based
specifically on the fact that man is not only an intellectual being
(capable of knowing) and a sensitive being (possessed of feeling) but
also a volitional being; that is, a being endowed with self-determining
activity. It implies that man is responsible for his intentions,
dispositions and actions. The idea of a supreme ideal at which he is
to aim and a norm or standard of conduct according to which he ought to
regulate his life, would have no meaning if we did not presuppose the
power of self-determination. {13} Whatever is not willed has no moral
value. Where there is no freedom of choice, we cannot speak of an
action as either good or evil.[1] When we praise or blame a man's
conduct we do so under the assumption that his action is voluntary. In
all moral action purpose is implied. This is the meaning of the
well-known dictum of Kant, 'There is nothing in the world . . . that
can be called good without qualification except a good will. A good
will is good, not because of what it performs or effects, not by its
aptness for the attainment of some proposed end, but simply by virtue
of the volition.'[2] It is the inner aim, the good will which alone
gives moral worth to any endeavour. It is not what I do but the reason
why I do it which is chiefly of ethical value. The essence of virtue
resides in the will, not in the achievement; in the intention or
motive, not in the result.
III. The propriety of styling Ethics a science has sometimes been
questioned. Science, it is said, has to do with certain necessary and
uniform facts of experience; its object is simply to trace effects from
causes and to formulate laws according to which sequences inevitably
result from certain ascertained causes or observed facts. But is not
character, with which Ethics confessedly deals, just that concerning
which no definite conclusions can be predicted? Is not conduct,
dependent as it is on the human will, just the element in man which
cannot be explained as the resultant of calculable forces? If the will
is free, and is the chief factor in the moulding of life, then you
cannot forecast what line conduct will take or predict what shape
character will assume. The whole conception of Ethics as a science
must, it is contended, fall to the ground, if we admit a variable and
incalculable element in conduct.
Some writers, on this account, are disposed to regard Ethics as an art
rather than a science, and indeed, like every normative science, it may
be regarded as lying midway between them. A science may be said to
teach us to know {14} and an art to do: but as has been well remarked,
'a normative science teaches to know how to do.'[3] Ethics may indeed
be regarded both as a science and an art. In so far as it examines and
explains certain phenomena of character it is a science: but in so far
as it attempts to regulate human conduct by instruction and advice it
is an art.[4] Yet when all is said, in so far as Ethics has to do with
the volitional side of man,--with decisions and acts of will,--there
must be something indeterminate and problematic in it which precludes
it from being designated an exact science. A certain variableness
belongs to character, and conduct cannot be pronounced good or bad
without reference to the acting subject. Actions cannot be wholly
explained by law, and a large portion of human life (and that the
highest and noblest) eludes analysis. A human being is not simply a
part of the world. He is able to break in upon the sequence of events
and set in motion new forces whose effects neither he himself nor his
fellows can estimate. It is the unique quality of rational beings that
in great things and in small things they act from ideas. The magic
power of thought cannot be exaggerated. Great conceptions have great
consequences, and they rule the world. A new spiritual idea shoots
forth its rays and enlightens to larger issues generations of men.
There is a mystery in every forth-putting of will-power, and every
expression of personality. Character cannot be computed. The art of
goodness, of living nobly, if so unconscious a thing may be called an
art, is one certainly which defies complete scientific treatment. It
is with facts like these that Ethics has to do; and while we may lay
down broad general principles which must underlie the teaching of every
true prophet and the conduct of every good man, there will always be an
element with which science cannot cope.
IV. It will not be necessary, after what has been said, to trace at
any length the relations between Ethics and the {15} special mental
sciences, such as Logic, Aesthetics, and Politics.
1. _Logic_ is the science of the formal laws of thought, and is
concerned not with the truth of phenomena, but merely with the laws of
correct reasoning about them. Ethics establishes the laws according to
which we ought to act. Logic legislates for the reason, and decerns
the laws which the intellect must obey if it would think correctly.
Both sciences determine what is valid; but while Logic is confined to
the realm of what is valid in reasoning, Ethics is occupied with what
is valid in action. There is, indeed, a logic of life; and in so far
as all true conduct must have a rational element in it and be guided by
certain intelligible forms, Ethics may be described as a kind of logic
of character.
2. The connection between Ethics and _Aesthetics_ is closer.
Aesthetics is the science of the laws of beauty, while Ethics is the
science of the laws of the good. But in so far as Aesthetics deals
with the emotions rather than the reason it comes into contact with
Ethics in the psychological field. In its narrower sense Aesthetics
deals with beauty merely in an impersonal way; and its immediate object
is not what is morally beautiful, but rather that which is beautiful in
itself irrespective of moral considerations. Ethics, on the other
hand, is concerned with personal worth as expressed in perfection of
will and action. Conduct may be beautiful and character may afford
Aesthetic satisfaction, but Ethics, in so far as it is concerned with
judgments of virtue, is independent of all thought of the mere beauty
or utility of conduct. Aesthetic consideration may indeed aid
practical morality, but it is not identical with it. It is conceivable
that what is right may not be immediately beautiful, and may indeed in
its pursuit or realisation involve action which contradicts our ideas
of beauty. But though both sciences have different aims they are
occupied largely with the same emotions, and are connected by a common
idealising purpose. In the deepest sense, what is good is beautiful
and what is beautiful is good; and {16} ultimately, in the moral and
spiritual life, goodness and beauty coincide. Indeed, so close is the
connection between the two conceptions that the Greeks used the same
word, _to kalon_, to express beauty of form and nobility of character.
And even in modern times the expression 'a beautiful soul,' indicates
the intimate relation between inner excellence of life and outward
attractiveness. Both Aesthetics and Ethics have regard to that
symmetry or proportion of life which fulfils our ideas at once of
goodness and of beauty. In this sense Schiller sought to remove the
sharpness of Kant's moral theory by claiming a place in the moral life
for beauty. Our actions are, indeed, good when we do our duty because
we ought, but they are beautiful when we do it because we cannot do
otherwise, because they have become our second nature. The purpose of
all culture, says Schiller, is to harmonise reason and sense, and thus
to fulfil the idea of a perfect manhood.[5]
'When I dared question: "It is beautiful,
But is it true?" Thy answer was, "In truth lives beauty."'[6]
3. _Politics_ is still more closely related to Ethics, and indeed
Ethics may be said to comprehend Politics. Both deal with human action
and institution, and cover largely the same field. For man is not
merely an individual, but is a part of a social organism. We cannot
consider the virtues of the individual life without also considering
the society to which he is related, and the interaction of the whole
and its part. Politics is usually defined as the science of
government, which of course, involves all the institutions and laws
affecting men's relations to each other. But while Politics is
strictly concerned only with the outward condition of the state's
well-being and the external order of {17} the community, Ethics seeks
the internal good or virtue of mankind, and is occupied with an ideal
society in which each individual shall be able to realise the true aim
and meaning of life. But after all, as Aristotle said, Politics is
really a branch of Ethics, and both are inseparable from, and
complementary of each other. On the one hand, Ethics cannot ignore the
material conditions of human welfare nor minimise the economic forces
which shape society and make possible the moral aims of man. On the
other hand, Economics must recognise the service of ethical study, and
keep in view the moral purposes of life, otherwise it is apt to limit
its consideration to merely selfish and material ends.
V. While Ethics is thus closely connected with the sciences just
named, there are two departments of knowledge, pre-supposed indeed in
all mental studies, which in a very intimate way affect the science of
Ethics. These are Metaphysics on the one hand and Psychology on the
other.
1. Metaphysics is pre-supposed by all the sciences; and indeed, all
our views of life, even our simplest experiences, involve metaphysical
assumptions. It has been well said that the attempt to construct an
ethical theory without a metaphysical basis issues not in a moral
science without assumptions, but in an Ethics which becomes confused in
philosophical doubts. Leslie Stephen proposes to ignore Metaphysics,
and remarks that he is content 'to build upon the solid earth.' But,
as has been pertinently asked, 'How does he know that the earth is
solid on which he builds?' This is a question of Metaphysics.[7] The
claim is frequently made by a certain class of writers, that we
withdraw ourselves from all metaphysical sophistries, and betake
ourselves to the guidance of commonsense. But what is this commonsense
of which the ordinary man vaunts himself? It is in reality a number of
vague assumptions borrowed unconsciously from old exploded
theories--assertions, opinions, beliefs, accumulated, no one knows how,
{18} and accepted as settled judgments.[8] We do not escape philosophy
by refusing to think. Some kind of theory of life is implied in such
words, 'soul,' 'duty,' 'freedom,' 'power,' 'God,' which the
unreflecting mind is daily using. It is useless to say we can dispense
with philosophy, for that is simply to content ourselves with bad
philosophy. 'To ignore the progress and development in the history of
Philosophy,' says T. H. Green,[9] 'is not to return to the simplicity
of a pre-philosophic age, but to condemn ourselves to grope in the maze
of cultivated opinion, itself the confused result of these past systems
of thought which we will not trouble ourselves to think out.' The aim
of all philosophy, as Plato said, is just to correct the assumptions of
the ordinary mind, and to grasp in their unity and cohesion the
ultimate principles which the mind feels must be at the root of all
reality. We have an ethical interest in determining whether there be
any moral reality beneath the appearances of the world. Ethical
questions, therefore, run back into Metaphysics. If we take
Metaphysics in its widest sense as involving the idea of some ultimate
end, to the realisation of which the whole process of the world as
known to us is somehow a means, we may easily see that metaphysical
inquiry, though distinct from ethical, is its necessary
pre-supposition. The Being or Purpose of God, the great first cause,
the world as fashioned, ordered and interpenetrated by Him, and man as
conditioned by and dependent upon the Deity--are postulates of the
moral life and must be accepted as a basis of all ethical study. The
distinction between Ethics and Philosophy did not arise at once. In
early Greek speculation, almost to the time of Aristotle, Metaphysics
and Morals were not separated. And even in later times, Spinoza and to
some extent Green, though they professedly treat of Ethics, hardly
dissociate metaphysical from ethical considerations. Nor is that to be
wondered at when men are dealing with the first principles of all being
and life. Our view of God and of the {19} world, our fundamental
_Welt-Anschauung_ cannot but determine our view of man and his moral
life. In every philosophical system from Plato to Hegel, in which the
universe is regarded as having a rational meaning and ultimate end, the
good of human beings is conceived as identical with, or at least as
included in the universal good.
2. But if a sound metaphysical basis be a necessary requisite for the
adequate consideration of Ethics, _Psychology_ as the science of the
human soul is so vitally connected with Ethics, that the two studies
may almost be treated as branches of one subject. An Ethic which takes
no account of psychological assumptions would be impossible.
Consciously or unconsciously every treatment of moral subjects is
permeated by the view of the soul or personality of man which the
writer has adopted, and his meaning of conduct will be largely
determined by the theory of human freedom and responsibility with which
he starts. Questions as to character and duty invariably lead to
inquiries as to certain states of the agent's mind, as to the functions
and possibilities of his natural capacities and powers. We cannot
pronounce an action morally good or bad until we have determined the
extent and limits of his faculties and have investigated the questions
of disposition and purpose, of intention and motive, which lie at the
root of all conduct, and without which actions are neither moral nor
immoral. It is surely a mistake to say, as some do, that as logic
deals with the correctness of reasoning, so Ethics deals only with the
correctness of conduct, and is not directly concerned with the
processes by which we come to act correctly.[10] On the contrary,
merely correct action may be ethically worthless, and conduct obtains
its moral value from the motives or intentions which actuate and
determine it. Ethics cannot, therefore, ignore the psychological
processes of feeling, desiring and willing of the acting subject. It
is indeed true that in ordinary life men are frequently judged to be
good or bad, according to the outward effect of their actions, and
material results are often regarded as the sole {20} measure of good.
But while it may be a point of difficulty in theoretic morality to
determine the comparative worth and mutual relation of good affections
and good actions, all surely will allow that a certain quality of
disposition or motive in the agent is required to constitute an action
morally good, and that it is not enough to measure virtue by its
utility or its beneficial effect alone. Hence all moralists are agreed
that the main object of their investigation must belong to the
psychical side of human life--whether they hold that man's ultimate end
is to be found in the sphere of pleasure or maintain that his
well-being lies in the realisation of virtue for its own sake. The
problems as to the origin and adequacy of conscience, as to the meaning
and validity of voluntary action; the questions concerning motives and
desires, as to the historical evolution of moral customs, and man's
relation at each stage of his history to the social, political and
religious institutions amid which he lives--are subjects which, though
falling within the scope of Ethics, have their roots in the science of
the soul. The very existence of a science of Ethics depends upon the
answers which Psychology gives to such questions. If, for example, it
be decided that there is in man no such faculty or organ as conscience,
and that what men so designate is but a natural manifestation gradually
evolved in and through the physical and social development of man: or
if we deny the self-determining power of human beings and assume that
what we call the freedom of the will is a delusion (or at least, in the
last resort, a negligible element) and that man is but one of the many
phenomena or facts of a physical universe--then we may continue,
indeed, as some evolutionary and naturalistic thinkers do, to speak of
a science of Ethics, but such a science will not be a study of the
moral life as we understand it and have defined it.
Ethics, therefore, while dependent upon the philosophical sciences, has
its own distinct content and scope. The end of life, that for which a
man should live, with all its implications, forms the subject of moral
inquiry. It is {21} concerned not merely with what a man is or
actually does, but more specifically with what he should be and should
do. Hence, as we have seen, the word 'ought' is the most distinctive
term of Ethics involving a consideration of values and a relation of
the actual and the ideal. The 'ought' of life constitutes at once the
purpose, law, and reason of conduct. It proposes the three great
questions involved in all ethical inquiry--whither? how? and why? and
determines the three great words which are constantly recurring in
every ethical system--end, norm, motive. Moral good is the moral end
considered as realised. The moral norm or rule impelling the will to
the realisation of this end is called Duty. The moral motive
considered as an acquired power of the acting will is called Virtue.[11]
[1] Cf. Mackenzie, _Manual of Ethics_, p. 32; also Wuttke, _Christian
Ethics_ (Eng. Trans.), vol. i. p. 14.
[2] _Metaph. of Morals_, sect. i.
[3] Mackenzie, _Manual of Ethics_, p. 8. See also Muirhead, _Elements
of Ethics_.
[4] Hyslop, _Elements of Ethics_, p. 1.
[5] Schiller, _Über Anmuth und Würde_. Cf. also Ruskin, _Mod.
Painters_, vol. ii.; Seeley, _Natural Religion_, and Inge, _Faith and
its Psychology_, p. 203 ff. See also Bosanquet _Hist. of Aesthetic_.
We are indebted to _Romanticism_, and especially to Novalis in Germany
and Cousin in France for the thought that the good and the beautiful
meet and amalgamate in God.
[6] Browning.
[7] Cf. Newman Smyth, _Christian Ethics_, p. 8.
[8] See Author's _History of Philosophy_, p. 585.
[9] Introduction to Hume's _Works_.
[10] Mackenzie seems to imply this view. _Ethics_, p. 25.
[11] Cf. Haering, _Ethics of the Christian Life_, p. 9.
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