China, Nepal and Tibet.
It requires the erudition and investigations of experts to write with
any adequacy about the earlier relations between China and Tibet. I
must therefore confine myself here only to the existing state of those
relations.
Tibet is nominally a protectorate of China, and as such she is bound
to pay a tribute to the Suzerain State. In days gone by, Tibet used
to forward this tribute to China, but subsequently the payment was
commuted against expenses which China had to allow Tibet, on account
of the Grand Prayer which is performed every year at Lhasa for the
prosperity of the Chinese Emperor. As a result of this arrangement,
Tibet ceased to send the tribute and China to send the prayer fund.
The loss of Chinese prestige in Tibet has been truly extraordinary
since the Japano-Chinese War. Previous to that disastrous event, China
used to treat Tibet in a high-handed way, while the latter, overawed
by the display of force of the Suzerain, tamely submitted. All is
now changed, and instead of that subservient attitude Tibet regards
China with scorn. The Tibetans have come to the conclusion that their
masters are no longer able to protect and help them, and therefore
do not deserve to be feared and respected any more. It can easily be
understood how the Chinese are mortified at this sudden downfall of
their prestige in Tibet. They have tried to recover their old position,
but all their endeavors have as yet been of no avail. The Tibetans
listen to Chinese advice when it is acceptable, but any order that is
distasteful to them is utterly disregarded.
While I was staying in Lhasa a yellow paper, containing the Chinese
Emperor’s decree issued at the termination of the Boxer trouble,
was hung up in the square of that city. The decree was addressed to
all the eighteen provinces of China and all her protectorates. It
warned the people under pain of severe penalty against molesting and
persecuting foreigners, as they, the people, were too frequently liable
to do from their ignorance of the state of affairs abroad and their
misunderstanding of the motives of the foreigners who came to their
respective districts. These foreigners, the decree continued, have
really come to engage in industrial pursuits or in diffusing religion,
and for other purposes beneficial alike to the people and themselves.
In order to promote these aims of mutual benefit, the middle kingdom
has been opened so as to allow foreigners freedom of travelling to
any place they wish, and so, concluded the decree, this policy of
welcome and hospitality should be adopted in all the provinces and
protectorates.
Two other decrees of like import arrived afterwards and were similarly
posted up, and I thought at that time that the allies must have entered
Peking, and that this decree must have been issued as a result of the
conclusion of peace between the Powers and China.
The decree, however, failed to produce any particular impression on
the Tibetans. I asked a high Government official what Tibet was going
to do with the order set forth in the decree, and whether the Tibetan
Government, in the face of that injunction, could refuse, for instance,
to allow Englishmen to enter the country. The official scornfully
replied that his Government was not obliged to obey an order which the
Chinese Emperor issued at his own pleasure. And besides it was highly
doubtful whether the Emperor, who was an incarnation of a high saint,
could have issued a decree of that nature, which he must have known to
be utterly opposed to the interests and traditional policy of Tibet.
It was more probably clandestinely issued by some wicked men near the
Emperor’s person, as a result of bribes received from foreigners. It
did not deserve to be trusted, much less to be obeyed, declared my
Tibetan friend.
Whatever be the motive, therefore, the Tibetans are utterly indifferent
to most of the decrees coming from China, and treat them like so many
gamblers’ oaths, neither more nor less.
Whether it be from polygamous customs or from other causes, the fact
remains, though it is not possible to prove it by accurate statistical
returns, that the population of Nepāl is rapidly increasing. It must
be remembered that the Government takes great pains to increase its
population, in order to expand its interests both at home and abroad,
and, probably under the impression that polygamy is conducive to that
end, it is encouraging this questionable practice. In Nepāl therefore
even a man who can hardly support his family has two or three wives,
and one who is better off has many more. Apparently this policy is
attended with success, so far as the main object aimed at is concerned,
for I have never seen so many children anywhere as I saw in Nepāl,
where every family consisted of a large number of boys and girls.
Be the cause what it may, the beneficial effect of this steady advance
of population is plainly visible in that country, where almost every
nook and corner of available land is brought under tillage, where woods
are tended with extreme care, and even the remote forests inhabited by
wild beasts are made to contribute their share to the stock of lumber,
of which a large portion is annually exported to lower India. Already
the population of Nepāl appears to be too large for the limited area
of the country, and so a considerable emigration is taking place. Thus
we find the Nepālese serving in the army of the Indian Government, or
pursuing trade or opening up wild lands in Sikkim or at Darjeeling.
Above all the Nepālese seem to cast their longing glances towards
Tibet as the best field for their superfluous population; for Tibet,
while possessing an area about twelve-fold that of Nepāl, is far more
thinly populated. They even seem to be prepared to go through the
ordeal of war, if necessary, to secure that best outlet for their needy
population, which cannot find sufficient elbowroom at home. Perhaps
the Nepāl Government has that contingency in view in maintaining,
as it does, a standing army which is evidently far above its home
requirements in numerical strength.
In Nepāl the military department receives appropriations which are
quite out of proportion to those set apart for peaceful matters, as
education, justice and philanthropy. Indeed the Nepāl troops, the
famous Gurkhas, may even rival regular British troops in discipline and
effectiveness; they may perhaps even surpass the others in mountain
warfare, such as would take place in their own country. Certainly in
their capacity of enduring hardships and in running up and down hills,
bearing heavy knapsacks, they are superior to the British soldiers.
They very much resemble the Japanese soldiers in stature and general
appearance, and also in temperament. The one might easily be mistaken
for the other, so close is the resemblance between the two. In short,
as fighters in mountainous places the Gurkhas form ideal soldiers; and
it seems as though circumstances will sooner or later compel Nepāl to
employ for her self-defence this highly effective force. Russia is at
the bottom of the impending trouble, while Tibet supplies the immediate
cause.
The Russianising tendency of Tibet has recently put Nepāl on her guard,
and when intelligence reached Nepāl that Tibet had concluded a secret
treaty with Russia, that the Dalai Lama had received a bishop’s robe
from the Tsar, and that a large quantity of arms and ammunition had
reached Lhasa from S. Petersburg, Nepāl became considerably alarmed,
and with good reason. For with Russia established in Tibet, Nepāl
must necessarily feel uneasy, as it would be exposed to the danger of
absorption. The very presence of a powerful neighbor must subject Nepāl
to a great strain which can hardly be borne for long.
It is not surprising to hear that Nepāl is said to have communicated
in an informal manner with Tibet and to have demanded an explanation
of the rumors concerning the conclusion of a secret treaty between her
and Russia, adding that if that were really the case then Nepāl, from
considerations of self-defence, must oppose that arrangement even if
the opposition entailed an appeal to arms. What reply Tibet has made
to this communication is not accurately known, but that Nepāl sent an
informal message to this effect admits of no doubt.
Nepāl may be driven to declare war on Tibet should the latter persist
in pursuing her pro-Russian policy, and allow Russia to establish
herself in that country; and it is quite likely that England may be
pleased to see Nepāl adopt that resolute attitude. She may even extend
a helping hand, for instance by supplying part of the war expense, and
thus enabling Nepāl to prosecute that movement. The reason is obvious,
for England has nothing to lose but everything to gain from trouble
between Nepāl and Tibet, in which the former may certainly be expected
to win. But even if Nepāl is victorious her victory will bring her
only a small benefit, and the lion’s share will go to England; Nepāl
therefore would be placed in the rather foolish position of having
taken the chestnuts from the fire for the British lion to eat. The
present Ruler of Nepāl is too intelligent a statesman not to perceive
that--judging at least from my personal observations, when I was
allowed to see the Ruler, the Cabinet Minister. He knows that it would
be far better for his countrymen to content himself with the reality
of benefit rather than with the glory of a successful but necessarily
costly war. He should confine himself to making some arrangements
with Tibet by which the Nepālese may be enabled to enter, or settle
in Tibet, and to carry on profitable undertakings there. If once his
countrymen establish their influence in Tibet by virtue of economic
undertakings, then they may regard with comparative complacency any
advance of Russian influence in Tibet, for Nepāl would be in a position
to counteract that influence by peaceful means or even by war if
necessary.
Thus, it is hardly likely that Nepāl will go to extreme measures
towards Tibet, even if England should cleverly encourage her.
It must be remembered that the relations between the two countries are
not yet strained. The Tibetans do not seem to harbor any ill-feeling
towards their neighbors beyond the mountains, nor do they regard them
as a whole with fear, though they do fear the Gurkhas on account of
their valor and discipline. The Tibetan Government also seems to be
desirous of maintaining a friendly relation with Nepāl. For instance,
when on one occasion the Ruler of Nepāl sent his messenger to Tibet
to procure a set of Tibetan sūṭras, the Dalai Lama, who heard of that
errand, caused a set to be sent to Nepāl as a present from himself,
which is now kept in the Royal Library of Nepāl.
The Nepāl Government, on its part, appears to be doing its best to
create a favorable impression on the Tibetans. The Ruler, it must be
remembered, is not a Buḍḍhist but a Brāhmaṇa; still, he pursues the
policy of toleration towards all faiths, and is especially kindly to
Buḍḍhists. The Buḍḍhists from Tibet who are staying in Nepāl enjoy
protection from the Government, and the Ruler not unfrequently makes
grants of money or timber when Buḍḍhist temples are to be built in his
dominion. The care bestowed by the Ruler on the Buḍḍhists is highly
appreciated by their friends at home, and Nepāl is therefore favorably
situated for winning the hearts of the Tibetan people. It is easily
conceivable that with a judicious use of secret service funds Nepāl
might easily establish her influence in Tibet. This, however, cannot be
readily expected from that country, as internal conditions now are, for
order is far from being firmly established in that little kingdom, and
domestic troubles and administrative changes occur too frequently. Even
the Prime Minister, who wields the real power, has been assassinated
more than once, while changes have very frequently taken place in the
incumbency of that post. Nepāl is at present too deeply absorbed in her
internal affairs, and cannot spare either energy or money for pursuing
any consistent policy towards Tibet. Thus, though the military service
of Nepāl is sufficiently creditable, her diplomacy leaves much to be
desired.