VON JAGOW, ZIMMERMAN, AND GERMAN-AMERICANS
Our train drew into the Berlin station on the morning of February 3rd,
1916. The date is worth mentioning, for that marked an important crisis
in German-American relations. Almost the first man I met was my old
friend and colleague, Ambassador James W. Gerard. Mr. Gerard told me
that he was packing up, and expected to leave Berlin at any moment, for
he believed that a break between Germany and the United States was a
matter only of days, perhaps of hours. At that time Germany and the
United States were discussing the settlement of the _Lusitania_ outrage.
The negotiations had reached a point where the Imperial Government had
expressed a willingness to express her regrets, pay an indemnity, and
promise not to do it again. But the President and Mr. Lansing insisted
that Germany should declare that the sinking of the _Lusitania_ had been
an illegal act. This meant that Germany at no time in the future could
resume submarine warfare without stultifying herself and doing something
which her own Government had denounced as contrary to international law.
But our Government would accept nothing less, and the two nations were
therefore at loggerheads.
“I can do nothing more,” said Mr. Gerard. “I want to have you talk to
Zimmerman and von Jagow, and perhaps you can give them a new point of
view.”
I soon discovered from my many callers that the atmosphere in Berlin was
tense and exceedingly anti-American. Our country was regarded everywhere
as practically an ally of the Entente, and I found that the most absurd
ideas prevailed concerning the closeness of our relations with England.
Thus it was generally believed that Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, the British
Ambassador in Washington, met regularly with President Wilson’s Cabinet
and was consulted on all our national policies.
At three o’clock Mr. Gerard took me to the Foreign Office and we spent
an hour there with von Jagow. Von Jagow was a small, slight man of
nervous disposition. He lighted cigarette after cigarette during our
interview. He was apparently greatly worried over the American
situation. Let us not suppose that the German Government regarded
lightly a break with the United States. At that time their newspapers
were ridiculing and insulting us and making fun of the idea that Uncle
Sam would go to war. The contrast between these journalistic vapourings
and the anxiety, even the fear, which this high German official
displayed much impressed me. The prospect of having our men and our
resources thrown on the side of the Entente he did not regard
indifferently, whatever the Berlin Press might say.
“It seems to us a shame that Mr. Lansing should insist that we declare
the _Lusitania_ sinking illegal,” von Jagow began. “He is acting like a
technical lawyer.”
“If you want the real truth,” I replied, “I do not think that the United
States is particular or technical about the precise terms that you use.
But you must give definite assurances that you are sorry for the act,
say that you regard it as an improper one, and that it will not occur
again. Unless you do this, the United States will not be satisfied.”
“We cannot do that,” he answered. “Public opinion in Germany would not
permit it. If we should make a declaration such as you outline the
present Cabinet would fall.”
“But I thought that you had public opinion here well under control,” I
answered. “It may take a little time, but certainly you can change
public sentiment so that it would approve such a settlement.”
“As far as the newspapers are concerned,” said von Jagow, “that is true.
We can absolutely control them. However, that will take some time. The
newspapers cannot reverse themselves immediately; they will have to do
it gradually, taking two or three weeks. We can manage them. But there
are members of Parliament whom we can’t control, and they would make so
much trouble that we would all have to resign.”
“Yet it seems to me,” I rejoined, “that you could get these members
together, explain to them the necessity of keeping the United States out
of the war, and that they would be convinced. The trouble is that you
Germans don’t understand conditions in my country. You don’t think that
the United States will fight. You don’t understand President Wilson; you
think that he is an idealist and a peace man, and that under no
circumstances will he take up arms. You are making the greatest and most
costly mistake that any nation could make. The President has two sides
to his nature. Do not forget that he has Scotch-Irish blood in him. Up
to the present you have seen only the Scotch side of him. That makes him
very cautious, makes him weigh every move, makes him patient and
long-suffering. But he has also all the fire and combativeness of the
Irish. Let him once set his jaws and it takes a crowbar to open them
again. If he once decides to fight, he will fight with all his soul, and
to the bitter end. You can go just so far with your provocations but no
farther. You are also greatly deceived because certain important members
of Congress, perhaps even a member of the Cabinet, have been for peace.
But there is one man who is going to settle this matter--that is the
President. He will settle it as he thinks right and just, irrespective
of what other people may say or do.”
Von Jagow said that I had given him a new impression of the President.
But he still had one more reason to believe that the United States would
not go to war.
“How about the German-Americans?” he asked.
“I can tell you all about them,” I answered, “because I am one of them
myself. I was born in Germany and spent the first nine years of my life
here. I have always loved many things German, such as its music and its
literature. But my parents left this country because they were
dissatisfied and unhappy here. The United States gave us a friendly
reception and a home, and made us prosperous and happy. There are many
millions just like us; there is no business opportunity and no social
position that is not open to us. I do not believe that there is a more
contented people in the world than the so-called German-Americans. We
have one loyalty and one love, and that is for the United States. Take
my children--they are German-Americans of the second generation. Their
sympathies all through this war have been with England and her Allies.
My son is here with me; he tells me that if the United States goes to
war he will enlist immediately. Do you suppose in case we should go to
war with Germany that they would side with you? The idea is simply
laughable. And the overwhelming mass of German-Americans feel precisely
the same way.”
“But I am told,” said von Jagow, “that there will be an insurrection of
German-Americans if your country makes war on us.”
“Dismiss any such idea from your mind,” I replied. “The first one who
attempts it will be punished so promptly and so drastically that such a
movement will not go far. And I think that the loyal German-Americans
themselves will be the first to administer such punishment.”
“We wish to avoid a rupture with the United States,” said von Jagow,
“but we must have time to change public sentiment here. There are two
parties here, holding diametrically opposed views on submarine warfare.
One believes in pushing it to the limit, irrespective of consequences to
the United States or any other Power. The present Cabinet takes the
contrary view; we wish to meet the contentions of your President, but
the militaristic faction is pushing us hard. They will force us out of
office if we declare the _Lusitania_ sinking illegal or improper. I
think that President Wilson should understand this. We are working with
him, but we must go cautiously. I should suppose that Mr. Wilson, since
he wishes to avoid a break, would prefer to have us in power. Why should
he take a stand that will drive us out of office and put in here people
who will make war inevitable between Germany and the United States?”
“Do you wish Washington to understand,” I asked, “that your tenure of
office depends on your not making this declaration?”
“We certainly do,” replied von Jagow. “I wish that you would telegraph
Washington to that effect. Tell the President that, if we are displaced
now, we shall be succeeded by people who advocate unlimited submarine
warfare.”
He expressed himself as amazed at my description of President Wilson and
his willingness to fight. “We regard him,” said von Jagow, “as
absolutely a man of peace. Nor do we believe that the American people
will fight. They are far from the scene of action, and what, after all,
have they to fight for? Your material interests are not affected.”
“But there is one thing that we will fight for,” I replied, “and that is
moral principle. It is quite apparent that you do not understand the
American spirit. You do not realise that we are holding off, not because
we have no desire to fight, but because we wish to be absolutely fair.
We first wish to have all the evidence in. I admit that we are reluctant
to mix in foreign disputes, but we shall insist upon our right to use
the ocean as we see fit, and we don’t propose to have Germany tell us
how many ships we can sail and where they are to go. The American is
still, perhaps, a great powerful youth, but, once he gets his mind made
up that he is going to defend his rights, he will do so irrespective of
consequences. You seem to think that Americans will not fight for a
principle; you apparently have forgotten that all our wars have been
over matters of principle. Take the greatest of them all--the Civil War,
from 1861 to ’65. We in the North fought to emancipate the slaves; that
was purely a matter of principle, our material interests were not
involved. And we fought that to the end, although we had to fight our
own brothers.”
“We don’t want to be on bad terms with the United States,” von Jagow
replied. “There are three nations on whom the peace of the world
depends--England, the United States, and Germany. We three should get
together, establish peace and maintain it. I thank you for your
explanation; I understand the situation much better now. But I still
don’t see why your Government is so hard on Germany and so easy with
England.”
I made the usual explanation that we regarded our problem with each
nation as a distinct matter, and could not make our treatment of Germany
in any way conditional on our treatment of England.
“Oh yes,” replied von Jagow rather plaintively. “It reminds me of two
boys playing in a yard. One is to be punished first and the other is
waiting for his turn. Wilson is going to spank the German boy first and,
after he gets through, then he proposes to take up England.
“However,” he concluded, “I wish you would cable the President that you
have gone over the matter with me and now understand the German point of
view. Won’t you please ask him to do nothing until you have reached the
other side and explained the whole thing personally?”
I made this promise and cabled immediately.
At three o’clock I had an engagement to take tea with a director of the
Orient Bank and his wife. I had been there only a few minutes when
Zimmerman was announced. He was a different kind of man from von Jagow.
He impressed me as being much stronger, mentally and physically. He was
tall, even stately in his bearing, masterful in his manner, direct and
searching in his questions, but extremely pleasing and insinuating.
Zimmerman, discussing the German-American situation, began with a
statement which I presume he thought would be gratifying to me. He told
me how splendidly the Jews had behaved in Germany during the war and how
deeply under obligations the Germans felt to them.
“After the war,” he said, “they are going to be much better treated in
Germany than they have been.”
Zimmerman told me that von Jagow had told him about our talk, and asked
me to repeat part of it. He was particularly interested, he said, in my
statements about the German-Americans, and he wished to learn from me
himself the facts upon which I based my conclusions. Like most Germans,
he regarded the Germanic elements in our population as almost a part of
Germany.
“Are you sure that the mass of German-Americans would be loyal to the
United States in case of war?” he asked. “Aren’t their feelings for the
Fatherland really dominant?”
“You evidently regard those German-Americans as a distinct part of the
population,” I replied, “living apart from the rest of the people and
having very little to do with American life as a whole. You could not
make a greater mistake. You can purchase a few here and there who will
make a big noise and shout for Germany, but I am talking about the
millions of Americans of German ancestry. These people regard themselves
as Americans and nothing else. The second generation particularly resent
being looked upon as Germans. It is practically impossible to make them
talk German; they refuse to speak anything but English. They do not read
German newspapers and will not go to German schools. They even resent
going to Lutheran churches where the language is German. We have more
than a million German-Americans in New York City, but it has been a
great struggle to keep alive one German theatre; the reason is that
these people prefer the theatres where English is the language. We have
a few German clubs, but their membership is very small. The
German-Americans prefer to belong to the clubs of general membership,
and there is not a single one in New York, even the finest, where they
are not received upon their merits. In the political and social life of
New York there are few German-Americans who, as such, have acquired any
prominent position, though there are plenty of men of distinguished
position who are German in origin. If the United States and Germany go
to war, you will not only be surprised at the loyalty of our German
people, but the whole world will be. Another point: if the United States
goes in, we shall fight to the end, and it will be a very long and a
very determined struggle.”
After three years I have no reason to be ashamed of either of these
prophecies. I sometimes wonder what Zimmerman now thinks of my
statements.
After the explanation, Zimmerman began to talk about Turkey. He was very
interested in finding out whether the Turks were likely to make a
separate peace. I bluntly told him that the Turks felt themselves to be
under no obligations to the Germans. This gave me another opportunity.
“I have learned a good deal about German methods in Turkey,” I said. “I
think it would be a great mistake to attempt similar tactics in the
United States. I speak of this because there has been a good deal of
sabotage there already. This in itself is solidifying the
German-Americans against you, and is, more than anything else, driving
the United States into the arms of England.”
“But the German Government is not responsible,” said Zimmerman. “We know
nothing about it.”
Naturally I could not accept that statement on its face value--recent
developments have shown how mendacious it was--but we passed to other
topics. The matter of the submarine came up again.
“We have voluntarily interned our Navy,” said Zimmerman. “We can do
nothing at sea except with our submarines. It seems to me that the
United States is making a serious mistake in so strongly opposing the
submarine. You have a long coastline and you may need the U-boat
yourself some day. Suppose one of the European Powers, and particularly
Japan, should attack you. You could use the submarine to good purpose
then. Besides, if you insist on this proposed declaration in the
_Lusitania_ matter, you will simply force our Government into the hands
of the Tirpitz party.”
Zimmerman now returned again to the situation in Turkey. His questions
showed that he was much displeased with the new German Ambassador, Graf
von Metternich. Metternich, it seemed, had not made a success of winning
the goodwill of the reigning powers in Turkey and had been a trial to
the German Foreign Office. Metternich had shown a different attitude
toward the Armenians from Wangenheim, and he had made sincere attempts
with Talaat and Enver to stop them. Zimmerman now told me that
Metternich had made a great mistake in doing this and had destroyed his
influence at Constantinople. Zimmerman made no effort to conceal his
displeasure over Metternich’s manifestation of a humanitarian spirit. I
now saw that Wangenheim had really represented the attitude of official
Berlin, and I thus had confirmation, from the highest German authority,
of my conviction that Germany had silently acquiesced in those
deportations.
* * * * *
In a few days we had taken the steamer at Copenhagen, and on February
22nd I found myself once more sailing into New York Harbour.
INDEX
Abdul-Hamid, 6, 9, 186, 188
Adrianople, 9, 19, 173, 178
Ægean Coast, Greek population of, 30
Ægean Coast deportations, 31
Alsace-Lorraine, 59
American ammunition for Allies, 103
American and Turkish relations, 103
Angora deportations, 205
Angora, Typhus at, 170
Archangel, 70
Armenians, American assistance of, 227-239
Armenians, Destruction of, 211
Armenians, History of, 188
Armenians massacred, 111, 189, 198
Armenian politics, 186, 191
Armenian soldiers, 186, 198
Armenian State Church, 189
Arrogant Turks, 180
Assassination of Austrian Heir, 37
Assassination of Nazim, 9
Bagdad, 182
Bagdad Railway, 59, 241
Balkans smouldering, 35
Balkanzug, The, 179, 259
Baltic, The, 70
Bastinado, The, 201
Bedri Bey, 87, 97, 100, 123, 163, 167, 204
Berlin, February, 1916, 261
Bethlehem Steel Co., 103
Bethmann-Hollweg, 55
Billings, C. K., 9, 23
Black Sea, Control of, 51
“Blacksmith of Bashkale,” 202
Bompard, 17, 82
Bosnia and Herzegovina, 7, 37, 57, 177
Bosphorus, The, 36, 53, 71
“Boss System” in Turkey, 12
Bouvet, The, 140, 147
_Breslau_, The, 45, 63, 140, 252
Brest-Litovsk, Treaty of, 117
British Records, Burning of, 83
Bronsart, 40, 96, 130
Bruère, Henry, 23
Bulgaria, 118, 147, 159, 173
Bulgaria up for auction, 176
Bulgaria joins Central Powers, 177
Burial permits, 184
Burlesque gun, A, 144
Bustány Effendi, 23, 78
Cabinet Council, A Turkish, 160
Calais, 60
Caliph, The, 10
Capitulations, The, 73, 183
Capitulations, Abrogation of, 74
Churchill, Winston, 124, 135
Commander Stoker, 170
Committee of Union and Progress, 8, 10, 18, 82, 113, 130, 188, 204, 231
Constantinople, Control of, 1
Constantinople, Coup d’Etat, 8
Constantinople, Decorations to order, 146
Constantinople, Eve of war in, 39
Constantinople, Exodus from, 131
Constantinople, Germans in, 66
Constantinople, Panic in, 123, 129
Constantinople, Peace negotiations (1915), 116
Constantinople, Street signs in, 187
Concentration Camp, A, 158
_Corcovado_, The, 40, 45, 48, 58
Crisis, The German-American, 261
Cromer Commission, The, 128
Crown Prince Youssouf, 258
Dardanelles, The, 3, 47, 51, 60, 67
Dardanelles, Closing of the, 70
Dardanelles closed by Germans, 68
Dardanelles defences inspected, 133
Dardanelles, Fortifications of the, 137, 152
Dardanelles, First bombardment of, 94
Dardanelles, Further bombardments of, 121, 124, 130
Dardanelles, Land attack on, 155, 158
Dardanelles, Mines in the, 143
Dardanelles, Withdrawal from the, 179
Dedeagatch Railway, 173, 177
Deportations of Armenians, 202
Deportations of Greeks, 31
Deportations from Angora, 205
Deportations from Harpoot, 209
Deportations as a policy, 241
Der Tag, 139
Diplomatic conversation, A, 157
Djavid Bey, 52, 68, 78, 94, 138, 141, 144
Djemal Pasha, 7, 9, 33, 64, 81
Djemal Pasha’s personality, 112-3, 187, 239
Djevdet Bey, 195, 202
Dolci, Monsignor, 171
_E_15, 170
Eau-de-Cologne, 136
England’s Declaration of War, 58
Enver Pasha, 7, 64, 68, 85, 113, 129, 133, 153, 165, 171, 187
Enver Pasha at home, 74
Enver Pasha’s German sympathies, 20
Enver Pasha’s wedding, 25
Enver Pasha raises an army, 42
Enver Pasha’s personality, 19
Enver Pasha’s visit to Robert College, 76
Enver Pasha and Armenian Massacres, 226
Enver Pasha’s marksmanship, 235
Failure of “Holy War,” 110
Falkenhayn interview, 254
Farewell to Talaat and Enver, 256
Farewell to the Sultan, 257
Fisher, Admiral, 121
Fitzgerald, Lt., 170
Foreigners, Deportations of, 160
Foreigners leave Turkey, 87, 95
Foreigners, Treatment of, 97, 156
Fourth of July, 1914, 38
Fourth Turkish Army, 112
Franco-Russian Alliance, 3
Fuad Pasha, 133, 136
Gallipoli, 145, 153
Garroni, Marquis, 56
_General_, The, 67, 81
Gerard, James W., 261
German Caste organisation, 3
German Imperial Conference, 54
German Incentive to murder, 109
German Military Mission, 21, 26
German propaganda, 65, 71, 104
German responsibility for war, 55
German scheme to rouse Islam, 105
German Wireless Station in Turkey, 40
Germans disillusioned, 70
Germany and Armenian Massacres, 240
Germany and International Law, 47
Germany’s first Peace Terms, 119
Germany precipitating the War, 54 59
German-Americans, 263, 265
Giers, M. de, 17, 27, 82
_Gloucester_, H.M.S., 44, 48
_Goeben_, The, 45, 63, 146, 149, 252
Goltz, von der, 41, 121, 150
Grand Vizier, The, 28, 51, 64, 68, 79, 81, 94, 159, 235
Greek deportations, 31, 212
Greek Islands, 30, 49
Greek purchase of Dreadnoughts, 35
Greeks, Treatment of, 32, 213
Grey, Sir Edward, 165
“Hadji Wilhelm,” 65
Halil Bey, 236
Hamidié, Fort, 140, 148
Hoffman, Philip, 164
“Holy War,” The, 105, 111, 146
Hostages on Gallipoli, 165
Humann, 18, 40, 43
Humann and the Armenians, 247
_Ikdam_, The, 104-6
Isolation of Turkey, 147, 180
Jagow, von, 261
January, 1915, 118
January, 1916, 179
Jihad, The, 105, 110
Junkers, The, 3, 119
Kaiser, The, 192
Kiamil Pasha, 9
Kilid-ul-Bahr, 146, 148
Kitchener, Lord, 29
Koloucheff, 159, 175
Konia, 170
Kühlmann, von, 117, 120
Kum Kalé, 139, 144
Landing on Gallipoli, The, 155
Leipzig, Lt.-Col., Death of, 245
Lepsius, Dr., 226
_Levant Herald_, The, 169
Levantines, 153
Lichnowsky, Prince, 117
Liman von Sanders, 26, 28, 40, 130
Limpus, Admiral, 26, 66
London, Treaty of, 30
_Lusitania_, The, 261
Macedonia, 176
Mallet, Sir Louis, 17, 29, 68, 79, 83
Mark Antony, 112
Marne, Battle of the, 1, 59
Massacre of Armenians, 111, 180
_Medilli_, The, 48
Mère Elvira, 98
Mesopotamia, 182, 202
Messina, 47
_Mesudie_, The, 138
Metternich, Count, 255, 267
Mexico, 17
Millets, 184
Mizzi, Dr., 169
Mobilisations, 39
Mohammed V., 7
Mohammed V.’s personality, 10
Mosque of Santa Sophia, 130, 183
Murder of a Nation, The, 198
Mutius, von, 28, 37, 117
Nagara Point, 137, 149
Napoleon, 19
Naval preparations, 33
Navy, Turkish, 66
Nazim Pasha, 9
New Turkey, 180
Nossig, Dr., 249
Odessa raided by Turks, 81
Oppenheim, Baron, 65
Optical illusion, 141
Otranto, 48
Ottoman Empire, 3, 15, 147, 180, 188
Ottoman Turks, 182
Pallavicini, 37, 56, 70, 96, 119, 123, 159
Pallavicini’s personality, 5-6
Pan-Germany, 2, 31, 241
Pan-Turkism, 114, 186
Peace Campaign, 115, 254
Pears, Sir Edwin, 167
Pola, 47
Poland, 59
Policy, Turkish, 76
President Wilson, 117
Prince Lichnowsky, 117
Propaganda, German, 65, 71
Prussian Military System, 3
Prussian Teachings, 240
_Queen Elizabeth_, The, 139, 145, 149
Race psychology, 181
Rayah, 183
Red Sultan, The, 186, 188
Religious hatred, 106
Reprisals, 170
Requiem Mass, 37
Requisitions in Turkey, 41
Retreat from Mons, 60
“Revolution” at Van, 193
Robert College, 38, 73, 76
Rumania, 118
Rumania, Neutrality of, 148
Russia, 4
Russia, Isolation of, 70, 134
Russia, Strangling of, 125
Saïd Halim, 15, 28, 51, 64, 81, 235
St. Bartholomew’s Eve, 211
Sanders, Liman von, 26, 28, 40, 130, 248
Santa Sophia, 130, 183
“Saviour of Egypt,” 112
Scrap of Paper, A, 58
Secret Pamphlet, The, 106
Sedd-ul-Bahr, 144, 152
Serajevo, 37, 55, 57
Serbia, 37, 57, 148, 152, 177, 188, 260
Sheik-ul-Islam, The, 106
Siberian Railway, The, 71
Sicilian Vespers, The, 211
Simon, Robert E., 23
Smyrna, 30
Souchon, Admiral, 46, 67, 81
Stock Exchanges, 56
Stoker, Commander, 170
Sublime Porte, The, 9, 67, 127, 160
Submarine war, First warning of, 61
Submarine war, Unlimited, 264
_Sultan Selim_, 48
Tahsin Pasha, 193
Talaat Bey, 7, 8, 22, 50, 113, 128, 150, 167, 187, 203, 217
Talaat Bey and Armenian Massacres, 213
Talaat Bey at home, 91
Talaat Bey’s first Cabinet, 15
Talaat Bey as Minister of War, 20
Talaat Bey’s personality, 12
Talaat Bey’s policy, 64-79
Taylor, Major John, 29
“Three Thousand Civilians,” 153
Tocheff, M., 110
Treaty of Bucharest, 56
Tripoli, 7, 17
Troy, Plains of, 144
Turk, The, 181
Turk as torturer, 201
Turk, Attitude to Christians, 83
Turk, Pride of the, 181
Turkey on the eve of war, 80, 82
Turkey declares war, 85
Turkey, Isolation of, 147, 180
Turkey, Situation of (1915), 122, 128, 149
Turkish Army, 21, 28
Turkish Army review, 29
Turkish bankruptcy, 254
Turkish deportations, 159, 224
Turkish Dreadnoughts, 49
Turkish Empire, 3, 6, 32
Turkish Empire, Reforms in, 6
Turkish Expedition against Egypt, 114
Turkish Expedition against Egypt, Failure of, 121
Turkish Expedition in Caucasus, 114
Turkish Expedition in Caucasus, Failure of, 121
Turkish fears of Russia, 16
Turkish finances, 23
Turkish Government, Preparations for flight of, 122
Turkish mobilisation, 39
Turkish Navy, 50, 66
Turkish neutrality, 63
Turkish peace overtures (1916), 253
Turkish plots against Greece, 33
Turkish policy, 76
Turkish Press, 65, 104
Turkish requisitions, 41
Ultimatum of July, 1914, 37, 55
Usedom, Admiral, 259
Usher, Dr., 197
Van, 193
Vladivostock, 70
“Vulnerability of British Fleet,” 135
Wangenheim, Baron von, 2, 27, 34, 38, 45, 50, 53, 70, 151
Wangenheim’s ambition, 5
Wangenheim’s confidence in victory, 59
Wangenheim and American ammunition, 103
Wangenheim and Armenian Massacre, 245
Wangenheim, A last appeal to, 251
Wangenheim “between two fires,” 127
Wangenheim’s peace overtures, 118
Wangenheim’s personality, 3-4
Wangenheim’s plot against British, 123
Wangenheim’s principles, 115
Wangenheim’s promise, 96
Wangenheim’s vanity, 55
Wangenheim, death of, 252
War-weariness, 253
Weber Pasha, 69
Wehrle, Oberst, 138
Weitz, Paul, 18, 37, 177, 245
Welt-Politik, 117
Wertheim, Maurice, 44
White Slave Gang, 101
Wigram, Dr., 164
Wilson, President, 253
Wireless Station, A, 40
“World Empire or Downfall,” 5
Young Turks, 6, 11, 17, 75, 128, 180, 185, 192
Youssouf, Suicide of, 258
Zimmerman, 261, 265
Zion Sisters’ School, 97
Zion Sisters’ treasure saved, 100
Zionists, The, 249
End of Project Gutenberg's Secrets of the Bosphorus, by Henry Morgenthau