CHAPTER VIII

A CLASSIC INSTANCE OF GERMAN PROPAGANDA

In those August and September days Germany had no intention of

precipitating Turkey immediately into the war. As I had a deep interest

in the welfare of the Turkish people and in maintaining peace, I

telegraphed Washington asking if I might use my influence to keep Turkey

neutral. I received a reply that I might do this provided that I made my

representations unofficially and purely upon humanitarian grounds. As

the English and the French Ambassadors were exerting all their effort to

keep Turkey neutral, I knew that my intervention in the same interest

would not displease the British Government. Germany, however, might

regard any interference on my part as an unneutral act, and I asked

Wangenheim if there could be any objection from that source.

His reply somewhat surprised me, though I saw through it soon afterward.

“Not at all,” he said. “Germany desires, above all, that Turkey shall

remain neutral.”

Undoubtedly Turkey’s policy at that moment precisely fitted in with

German plans. Wangenheim was every day increasing his ascendancy over

the Turkish Cabinet, and Turkey was then pursuing the course that best

served the German aims. Her policy was keeping the Entente on

tenterhooks; it never knew from day to day where Turkey stood, whether

she would remain neutral or enter the war on Germany’s side. Because

Turkey’s attitude was so uncertain Russia was compelled to keep large

forces on the Caucasus, England was obliged to strengthen her forces in

Egypt and India, and to maintain a considerable fleet at the mouth of

the Dardanelles. All this worked in beautifully with Germany’s plans,

for these detached forces just so much weakened England and Russia on

the European battle-front. I am now speaking of the period just before

the Marne, when Germany expected to defeat France and Russia with the

aid of her ally, Austria, and thus obtain a victory that would have

enabled her to dictate the future of Europe. Should Turkey at that time

be actually engaged in military operations, she could do no more toward

bringing about this victory than she was doing now, by keeping

considerable Russian and English forces away from the most important

fronts. But, should Germany win this easy victory with Turkey’s aid, she

might find her new ally an embarrassment. Turkey would certainly demand

compensation, and she would not be particularly modest in her demands,

which most likely would include the return of Egypt and perhaps the

recession of Balkan territories. Such readjustments would have

interfered with the Kaiser’s plans. Thus he had no interest in having

Turkey as an active ally, except in the event that he did not win his

speedily anticipated triumph. But, if Russia should make great progress

against Austria, then Turkey’s active alliance would have great military

value, especially if her entry should be so timed as to bring in

Bulgaria and Rumania. Meanwhile Wangenheim was playing a waiting game,

making Turkey a potential German ally, strengthening her army and her

navy, and preparing to use her, whenever the moment arrived for using

her, to the best advantage. If Germany could not win the war without

Turkey’s aid, Germany was prepared to take her in as an ally; if she

could win without Turkey, then she would not have to pay the Turk for

his co-operation. Meanwhile the sensible course was to keep her prepared

in case the Turkish forces became essential to German success.

The duel that now took place between Germany and the Entente for

Turkey’s favour was a most unequal one. The fact was that Germany had

won the victory when she smuggled the _Goeben_ and the _Breslau_ into

the Sea of Marmora. The English, French, and Russian Ambassadors well

understood this, and they knew that they could not make Turkey an active

ally of the Entente; they probably had no desire to do so, but they did

have hopes that they could keep her neutral. To this end they now

directed all their efforts. “You have had enough of war,” they would

tell Talaat and Enver. “You have fought three wars in the last four

years; you will ruin your country absolutely if you get involved in this

one.” The Entente had only one consideration to offer Turkey for her

neutrality, and this was an offer to guarantee the integrity of the

Ottoman Empire. The Entente Ambassadors showed their great desire to

keep Turkey out of the war by their disinclination to press to the limit

their case against the _Breslau_ and the _Goeben_. It is true that they

repeatedly protested against the continued presence of these ships, but

every time the Turkish officials maintained that they were Turkish

vessels.

“If that is so,” Sir Louis Mallet would urge, and his argument was

unassailable, “why don’t you remove the German officers and crew?” That

was the intention, the Grand Vizier would answer. The Turkish crews that

had been sent to man the ships which had been built in England, he would

say, were returning to Turkey, and they would be put on board the

_Goeben_ and the _Breslau_ as soon as they reached Constantinople. But

days and weeks went by; these crews came home, and still Germany manned

and officered the cruisers. These backings and fillings naturally did

not deceive the British and French Foreign Offices. The presence of the

_Goeben_ and the _Breslau_ was a standing _casus belli_, but the Entente

Ambassadors did not demand their passports, for such an act would have

precipitated the very crisis which they were seeking to delay, and, if

possible, to avoid--Turkey’s entrance as Germany’s ally. Unhappily, the

Entente’s promise to guarantee Turkey’s integrity did not win Turkey to

their side.

“They promised that we should not be dismembered after the Balkan wars,”

Talaat would tell me, “and see what happened to European Turkey then.”

Wangenheim constantly harped upon this fact. “You can’t trust anything

they say,” he would tell Talaat and Enver; “didn’t they all go back on

you a year ago?” And then with great cleverness he would play upon the

only emotion which really actuates the Turk. The descendants of Osman

hardly resemble any people I have ever known. They do not hate, they do

not love; they have no lasting animosities or affections. They only

fear. And naturally they attribute to others the motives which regulate

their own conduct. “How stupid you are!” Wangenheim would tell Talaat

and Enver, discussing the English attitude. “Don’t you see why the

English want you to keep out? It is because they fear you. Don’t you see

that, with the help of Germany, you have again become a great military

power? No wonder England doesn’t want to fight you!” He dinned this so

continually in their ears that they finally believed it, for this

argument not only completely explained the attitude of the Entente, but

it flattered Turkish pride.

Whatever may have been the attitude of Enver and Talaat, I think that

England and France were more popular with all classes in Turkey than was

Germany. The Sultan was opposed to war; the heir-apparent, Youssouff

Izzadin, was openly pro-Ally; the Grand Vizier, Saïd Halim, favoured

England rather than Germany; Djemal, the third member of the ruling

triumvirate, had the reputation of being a Francophile--he had recently

returned from Paris, where the reception he had received had greatly

flattered him; a majority of the Cabinet had no enthusiasm for Germany;

and public opinion, so far as public opinion existed in Turkey, regarded

England, not Germany, as Turkey’s historic friend. Wangenheim,

therefore, had much opposition to overcome, and the methods which he

took to break it down form a classic illustration of German propaganda.

He started a lavish publicity campaign against England, France, and

Russia. I have described the feelings of the Turks at losing their ships

in England. Wangenheim’s agents now filled columns of purchased space in

the newspapers with bitter attacks on England for taking over these

vessels. The whole Turkish Press rapidly passed under the control of

Germany. Wangenheim purchased the _Ikdam_, one of the largest Turkish

newspapers, which immediately began to sing the praises of Germany and

to abuse the Entente. The _Osmanischer Lloyd_, published in French and

German, became an organ of the German Embassy. Although the Turkish

Constitution guaranteed a free Press, a censorship was established in

the interest of the Central Powers. All Turkish editors were ordered to

write in Germany’s favour, and they obeyed instructions. The _Jeune

Turc_, a pro-Entente newspaper, printed in French, was suppressed. The

Turkish papers exaggerated German victories and completely manufactured

others; they were constantly printing the news of Entente defeats, most

of them wholly imaginary. In the evening Wangenheim and Pallavicini

would show me official telegrams giving the details of military

operations, but when, in the morning, I would look in the newspapers, I

would find that this news had been twisted or falsified in Germany’s

favour. A certain Baron Oppenheim travelled all over Turkey

manufacturing public opinion against England and France. Ostensibly he

was an archæologist, while in reality he opened offices everywhere from

which issued streams of slanders against the Entente. Huge maps were

pasted on walls, showing all the territory which Turkey had lost in the

course of a century. Russia was portrayed as the nation chiefly

responsible for these “robberies,” and attention was drawn to the fact

that England had now become Russia’s ally. Pictures were published,

showing the grasping powers of the Entente as rapacious animals,

snatching away at poor Turkey. Enver was advertised as the “hero” who

had recovered Adrianople; Germany was pictured as Turkey’s friend; the

Kaiser suddenly became “Hadji Wilhelm,” the great protector of Islam,

and stories were even printed that he had become a convert to

Mohammedanism. The Turkish populace was informed that the Moslems of

India and of Egypt were about to revolt and throw off their English

“tyrants.” The Turkish man-on-the-street was taught to say _Gott Strafe

England_, and all the time the motive-power of this infamous campaign

was German money.

But Germany was doing more than poisoning the Turkish mind; she was

appropriating Turkey’s military resources. I have already described how,

in January, 1914, the Kaiser had taken over the Turkish Army and

rehabilitated it in preparation for the European war. He now proceeded

to do the same thing with the Turkish Navy. In August Wangenheim boasted

to me that, “We now control both the Turkish Army and Navy.” At the time

the _Goeben_ and _Breslau_ arrived, an English mission, headed by

Admiral Limpus, was hard at work restoring the Turkish Navy. Soon

afterward Limpus and his associates were unceremoniously dismissed. The

manner of their going was really disgraceful, for not even the most

ordinary courtesies were shown them. The English naval officers quietly

and unobservedly left Constantinople for England--all except the Admiral

himself, who had to remain longer because of his daughter’s illness.

Night after night whole carloads of Germans landed at Constantinople

from Berlin; the aggregations to the population finally amounted to

3,800 men, most of them sent to man the Turkish Navy and to manufacture

ammunition. They filled the cafés every night, and they paraded the

streets of Constantinople in the small hours of the morning, howling and

singing German patriotic songs. Many of them were skilled mechanics, who

immediately went to work repairing the destroyers and other ships and

putting them in shape for war. The British firm of Armstrong and Vickers

had a splendid dock in Constantinople, and this the Germans now

appropriated. All day and night we could hear this work going on, and we

could hardly sleep because of the hubbub of riveting and hammering.

Wangenheim now found another opportunity for instilling more poison into

the minds of Enver, Talaat, and Djemal. The German workers, he declared,

had found that the Turkish ships were in a desperate state of disrepair,

and for this he naturally blamed the English naval mission. He said that

England had deliberately let the Turkish Navy go to decay, and he

asserted that this was all part of England’s plot to ruin Turkey!

“Look!” he would exclaim, “see what we Germans have done for the Turkish

Army, and see what the English have done for your ships!” As a matter of

fact, all this was untrue, for Admiral Limpus had worked hard and

conscientiously to improve the Navy, and had accomplished excellent

results in that direction.

All this time the Germans were working at the Dardanelles, seeking to

strengthen the fortifications, and preparing for a possible Allied

attack. As September lengthened into October, the Sublime Porte

practically ceased to be the headquarters of the Ottoman Empire. I

really think that the most powerful seat of authority at that time was a

German merchant-ship, the _General_. It was moored in the Golden Horn,

near the Galata Bridge, and a permanent stairway had been built, leading

to its deck. I knew well one of the most frequent visitors to this ship,

an American who used to come to the Embassy and entertain me with

stories of what was going on.

The _General_, this friend now informed me, was practically a German

club or hotel. The officers of the _Goeben_ and the _Breslau_ and other

German officers who had been sent to command the Turkish ships ate and

slept on board. Admiral Souchon, who had brought the German cruisers to

Constantinople, presided over these gatherings. Souchon was a man of

French Huguenot extraction; he was a short, dapper, clean-cut sailor,

very energetic and alert, and to the German passion for command and

thoroughness he added much of the Gallic geniality and buoyancy.

Naturally he gave much liveliness to the evening parties on the

_General_, and the beer and champagne which were liberally dispensed on

these occasions loosened the tongues of his fellow-officers. Their

conversation showed that they entertained no illusions as to who really

controlled the Turkish Navy. Night after night their impatience for

action grew; they kept declaring that, if Turkey did not presently

attack the Russians, they would force her to do so. They would relate

how they had sent German ships into the Black Sea in the hope of

provoking the Russian fleet to some action that would make war

inevitable. Toward the end of October my friend told me that hostilities

could not much longer be avoided; the Turkish fleet had been fitted for

action, everything was ready, and the impetuosity of these

_kriegslustige_ German officers could not much longer be restrained.

“They are just like a lot of boys with chips on their shoulders. They

are simply spoiling for a fight!” he said.

Secrets of the Bosphorus · 第 8 / 29 章