EQUALITY
43. +Equality in General.+
44. +Inequalities among States.+
(_a_) Court precedence.
(_b_) Matters of ceremonial.
(_c_) Weight of influence in affairs.
§ 43. Equality in General
The equality of states was an early premise of international law. This
equality, however wide may have been its meaning, as interpreted by some
of the earlier writers, can now be held to extend only to legal status.
A state from its very being as a sovereign unity must be legally equal
to any other state. Only those states members of the international
circle are regarded as possessed of this equality from the point of view
of international law. So far as legal attributes as _states_ extend, the
states members of the international circle are equal, yet that their
weight in the world of affairs may vary by virtue of other circumstances
must be admitted. The legal status of states is the same; regardless of
the form of state organization, whether monarchy or republic; regardless
of origin, whether by division or union of former states or even if
created in a region hitherto outside the jurisdiction of any state;
regardless of area, population, wealth, influence, etc.; regardless of
relations to other states provided sovereignty is not impaired;
regardless of any change in the form of state organization, as from a
republic to a monarchy or even of a temporary lapse in the exercise of
sovereignty.
§ 44. Inequalities among States
While all states, members of the family of states, are equal in
international law so far as their legal attributes are concerned, they
may be very unequal in other respects.
(_a_) One of the oldest marks of inequality is that of =court
precedence=, which for many years was a fertile source of difficulty,
and was at last settled to the extent of ranking by title of diplomatic
representative by the Congress of Vienna in 1815.[120]
(_b_) =Inequalities in matters of ceremonial= of various kinds have not
disappeared. These may be based upon tradition or conventional grounds,
and frequently give rise to difficulties if disregarded. These
ceremonials may be (1) political as between the sovereigns in their
official personal capacity as emperors, kings, dukes, etc., (2) court
and diplomatic in interstate negotiations, (3) treaty as in _alternat_
or in the alphabetical signing of treaties, (4) maritime ceremonial in
salutes, etc.
(_c_) =Inequalities in weight of influence in affairs.=
(1) In Europe there is distinctly recognized in political practice an
inequality of the states, and they are classed as "the great powers,"
"the minor powers," and sometimes such states as those of the Balkan
peninsula are referred to as "the little powers" or "third-rate states."
These divisions are based merely upon political grounds, and states may
pass from one division to another as their wealth, area, or influence
increases or decreases.
At the present time "the great powers," generally mentioned _officially_
upon the continent in the alphabetical order of their names in French,
_i.e._ _Allemagne_, _Angleterre_, _Autriche_, etc., are Germany, Great
Britain, Austria, France, Italy, and Russia. During the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries Spain was numbered with "the great powers." Sweden
was so ranked in the seventeenth century. Italy was counted with "the
great powers" after 1870. The union of several powers upon certain lines
of policy, since early in the nineteenth century, has been called "the
concert of Europe," "the primacy of the great powers," etc. It was not
the purpose of these great powers to establish new rules of
international law; but as enunciated by the five powers, Nov. 15, 1818,
it was "their invariable resolution never to depart, either among
themselves, or in their relations with other states, from the strictest
observation of the principles of the Rights of Nations."[121]
That the practice of the Great Powers has not been strictly in accord
with these expressed principles, a glance will show. The immediate
action of Austria, Russia, and Prussia in the Congress of Troppau, 1820,
carried the principle of interference in the internal affairs of states
so far that Great Britain found itself compelled to dissent. This
continuance of the policy of the Holy Alliance in putting down
movements in favor of popular liberty, wherever arising, led to gross
violations of international rights. Nor did Great Britain become a party
to the acts of the Congress of Verona in 1822, which led to intervention
to prevent changes in the internal organization of Spain in 1823. The
struggles of the Greeks for independence at about this time were
naturally regarded by those upholding the ideas of the Holy Alliance as
dangerous to those states desiring to prevent revolutionary movements.
But the narrow policy of the Alliance was gradually losing support. The
opposition of Great Britain and the death of Alexander of Russia in 1825
hastened its speedy fall. Meantime the idea of a collective authority in
the Great Powers had been maintained. This began to be exercised in
behalf of the Greeks in 1826, and has throughout the nineteenth century
been repeatedly exercised in the same behalf, sometimes unselfishly,
often from motives of mixed character. During the latter half of the
nineteenth century the Great Powers have continually kept a close
surveillance over Grecian affairs, and enforced their judgments in
regard to Greece by force (destruction of Turkish fleet at Navarino,
1827); by providing form of government and naming monarch (1829 and
later); by fixing and changing boundaries (1829 and often); by pacific
blockade (1827, 1850, 1886, 1897); by regulating financial affairs, and
by other means of varying degree of force.[122]
The Eastern question has particularly occupied the Concert, and the
disposition of the territory once within the Turkish jurisdiction has
offered a fertile field for varying policy.
The establishment of Belgium as a neutral state by the treaty to which
Belgium was itself a party afforded another example of the influence of
the Great Powers.
Since 1839 Egypt has also been subject to frequent control by the Great
Powers.
Since 1885 the unappropriated portion of Africa has been brought into
the range of action of the Concert by the theory of the sphere of
influence.
The Concert of the Great Powers shows then a policy which is liable to
change with expediency. The two great treaties of the Concert are those
of Paris, 1856, and Berlin, 1878. Of these Holland says, "The treaties
of Paris and of Berlin thus resemble one another, in that both alike are
a negation of the right of any one Power, and an assertion of the right
of the Powers collectively, to regulate the solution of the Eastern
question."[123] The fact that the action of the Great Powers has been
regarded as binding and tacitly accepted in Europe in certain questions
in the East, Egypt, Greece, and Belgium does not give the sanction of
international law to the action. The most that can be said is that it is
an alliance of a loose character, whose authority is in proportion to
the force behind its decisions.[124]
(2) Another feature in European politics giving rise to further
inequalities in practice was introduced by the alliance of Germany and
Austria in 1879 and Italy in 1883, which is now commonly known as the
Triple Alliance. This belt of powers separating Eastern from Western
Europe has materially affected the action of other powers.
The "friendly understanding" between France and Russia soon after the
Triple Alliance affords a measure of counter-check upon the action of
the other powers.
In spite of all these alliances and counter-alliances, the recognition
of the weight of the decisions of the congresses and conferences of the
Great Powers upon those subjects which are held to affect "the peace of
Europe" have an influence comparable to that which might be assigned to
a "Supreme Court of International Appeal."[125]
The United States upon the American continent in its enunciation of the
Monroe Doctrine, and the subsequent interpretation of it, has assumed a
position as arbiter among the American states in some respects similar
to that of the European Concert among the European states. This attitude
of the United States has weight in international practice, but cannot be
regarded as a part of international law.