CHAPTER VIII

EXISTENCE

36. +Application of the Right in General.+

37. +Extension of the Right to Subjects of the State.+

§ 36. Application of the Right

Besides the general rights of _independence_, _equality_,

_jurisdiction_, _property_, and _intercourse_, the right of existence in

its exercise may lead to certain acts for which the general principles

of international law do not provide rules.[90]

(_a_) In face of actual dangers immediately threatening its existence, a

state may take such measures as are necessary for self-preservation,

even though not sanctioned by international law. Such measures, however,

must be from "a necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelming, and

leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation," and further

"must be limited by that necessity and kept clearly within it."[91] The

wide discussion of the case of the _Virginius_ involved the principle of

the limits of the right of self-defense.[92]

(_b_) The right to act in a manner which international law does not

sanction or denies, even though it may be strictly to preserve the

existence of the state so acting, cannot be upheld as freeing it from

responsibility for such acts, and these acts may be regarded as hostile

by states affected by them.

(_c_) As the domestic acts of a state are not within the province of

international law, a state has the right to administer its internal

affairs in such manner as it may determine fit to secure and further its

existence. It may adopt any form of government; may plan for its growth

by developing its resources, by encouraging immigration; may strengthen

defenses and forces; may regulate trade, commerce, and travel. While

acts of this character may work injury to other states, they are not in

general just grounds for war, but may properly be met by like acts on

the part of other states.

§ 37. Extension of the Right to Subjects of the State

As the subjects of a state are necessary for its existence, the right of

self-preservation has been held to justify certain acts of states to

secure to their subjects in their relations with foreign states such

rights as the foreign states would accord to their own subjects under

similar circumstances. That a local tribunal within a purely domestic

division of a state cannot secure to foreigners rights to which they are

entitled, in no way frees that state, whose sovereignty extends over

such domestic division, from responsibility for violation of the

foreigner's right. International law recognizes only the personality of

the sovereign political unity, and cannot cognize the administrative and

other subdivisions. Hall says, "States possess a right of protecting

their subjects abroad which is correlative to their responsibility in

respect of injuries inflicted upon foreigners within their

dominions."[93] "Fundamentally, however, there is no difference in

principle between wrongs inflicted by breach of a monetary agreement and

other wrongs for which the state, as itself the wrong-doer, is

immediately responsible. The difference which is made in practice is in

no sense obligatory; and it is open to governments to consider each case

by itself, and to act as seems well to them on its merits."[94]

International Law · 第 3 / 13 章