DEALINGS WITH FOREIGN POWERS. 1525-1527.
Negotiations between Fredrik and Gustavus.--Treachery of
Norby.--Sunnanvaeder and the Cabinet of Norway.--Overthrow and Death
of Norby.--Trial and Execution of Knut and Sunnanvaeder.--Debt to
Lubeck.--Treaty with Russia; with the Netherlands.--Dalarne and the
Lubeck Envoys.--Swedish Property in Denmark.--Province of
Viken.--Refugees in Norway.
The Swedish Revolution was the work of three nations, all foes at heart,
endeavoring to effect a common object on utterly divergent grounds.
Gustavus wished to free his country from a tyrant's rule, while
Fredrik's purpose was to gain the throne of Denmark, and Lubeck's was to
crush her rival in the Baltic trade. Without the alliance of these three
parties, it is not likely that any one of them could have gained his
end. So long, therefore, as the common object was in view, each felt an
assurance that the others would not fail. It was only when Christiern's
power was altogether gone that this triple alliance was dissolved.
The varying hopes of Christiern may be gauged with singular accuracy by
Fredrik's show of friendship to Gustavus. One cannot read the despatches
sent from Denmark without observing a constant change of attitude; the
monarch's feelings cooling somewhat as the chance that Christiern would
recover Denmark grew more remote. At the moment when Norby returned to
Bleking, the movements of Christiern caused the monarch much alarm, and
his letters to Gustavus were filled with every assurance of good-will.
This assurance, however, Gustavus took at little more than it was worth.
So long as Knut and Sunnanvaeder were protected by Fredrik's officers in
Norway, the Danish monarch's assurances of friendship carried little
weight. Gustavus seems not to have appealed to Fredrik in this matter
till every effort to persuade the Danish officers in Norway had been
tried. He wrote even to the Norwegian Cabinet, and begged them to keep
the promises made to him in Malmoe. While in the midst of these
entreaties, a letter came from Fredrik asking for the release of certain
prisoners, among them Norby's daughter, whom Gustavus had captured in
the war with Norby. This was the very opportunity which Gustavus craved.
He wrote back that in the same war in which these prisoners had been
taken, some guns belonging to him had been lost, and he offered to
exchange the prisoners for the guns. He requested, further, that Fredrik
command his officers in Norway to yield the refugees. While this answer
was on the road, Fredrik received a note from Norby, to whom Gustavus
had written to say that Fredrik had promised that the guns should be
returned. Fredrik, therefore, wrote Gustavus that these guns were not in
his possession, but if the Danish prisoners were surrendered, he would
try to get them. When this letter came, the monarch was indignant.
Fredrik, it was clear, was playing with him, and hoped to get the
prisoners and give nothing in return. The answer which the monarch made
was this: "We have just received your letter with excuses for the
detention of our guns and ammunition, along with a request for the
surrender of Soren Brun, whom you assert we captured in a time of truce.
Of such a truce we wish to inform you we are ignorant. He was lawfully
taken, inasmuch as he was one of Norby's men.... As to our ammunition
you say that it was captured from you and carried off to Gotland. If so,
it was no fault of ours. We have written frequently about it, but have
met with nothing but delays. If Norby, who you say has sworn allegiance
to you, holds this ammunition in Visby Castle, it is unquestionably in
your power to order that it be returned. So soon as this is done, the
prisoners shall be released." Before this determined letter arrived in
Denmark, Fredrik had modified his plans, for news had come that
Christiern's fleet was on the way to Norway, intending to winter there
and make an incursion into Denmark in the spring. Fredrik, therefore,
despatched a note to Norby telling him to yield the ammunition, and
wrote Gustavus that the guns were ready, and if he would send his
officers to Denmark for them they should be delivered. A few days later
an officer of Fredrik wrote Gustavus that property of Danish subjects
had been seized in Sweden, and begged that the persons wronged be
recompensed. To this Gustavus answered that Swedish subjects had been
treated in the same way in Denmark, and promised to observe the treaty
if the Danes would do so in return. He likewise wrote to Fredrik
thanking him for his action relating to the guns, declaring that he
would send for them as requested, and as soon as they were yielded
would set the prisoners free.[122]
This amicable adjustment of their difficulty was on paper, but much more
shuffling was required before it was reduced to fact. Gustavus feared
that Fredrik was in league with Norby, and rumor had it that Norby was
preparing for another war. Late in 1525, the pirate wrote the Swedish
officer in Kalmar that he had come to terms with Fredrik, and that all
the injury which he had done to Sweden had been forgiven. To this the
officer replied: "I fail to see how Fredrik can have promised that you
may keep our ammunition." Norby at all events did keep it, and early in
1526 Gustavus wrote: "We hear that Norby has let fall calumnies against
us. We place no confidence whatever in him, especially as he is growing
stronger every day.... From his own letters we discover he has no
thought of giving up our ammunition." To Fredrik himself the monarch
wrote: "From Norby's letters we learn he has no intention of obeying
your commands." In the same strain Gustavus addressed the Danish
Cabinet, and expressed the hope that Norby was not acting under their
behest. If the Cabinet's assertion can be trusted, he was not; for
several of the Cabinet wrote Gustavus to keep an eye on Norby, as he was
raising a large force in Bleking despite their orders to him to desist.
There being little hope that Fredrik would force the pirate to obey,
Gustavus ventured to arrange the matter for himself. It so happened at
this moment that one of Norby's vessels, laden with arms and ammunition,
stranded on the coast not far from Kalmar. The monarch's officers
hurried to the spot, and seized what ammunition they could find. This
stroke, however, was in some degree offset by a reprisal which Norby
managed to secure upon the coast of Bleking. Matters now appeared so
serious that the king addressed himself to Norby. "We find," he said,
"that a part of the ammunition taken from the wreck off Kalmar is our
own. All the rest of it you may have, provided we are given the guns and
ammunition promised us by Fredrik.... As soon as these are handed over,
your daughter and the other prisoners shall be freed." This proposition
would have satisfied any man but Norby. To him it seemed unfair. The
fleet of Christiern was looked for early in the spring, and Norby
thought by waiting to obtain more favorable terms. He wrote back,
therefore, that, though Fredrik may have told Gustavus he should have
his guns, he could not have them, for in the treaty recently drawn up
between himself and Fredrik, it had been stipulated that all injury done
by him to Sweden should be forgotten, and a part of this injury
consisted in the seizure of these guns. Norby closed his letter with an
offer to hold a personal conference with the king. The reply which Norby
had to this proposal was sharp and warm. "We shall permit no nonsense,"
wrote the king. If Norby wanted his daughter, let him return the guns.
"As to a personal meeting with you, we cannot spare the time." Norby's
pride apparently was not touched by this rebuke. He wrote again, simply
repeating what he had said before, and in reply obtained another letter
from the king. "We have already told you," wrote Gustavus, "that you may
have your daughter when we get our guns. We were promised them by the
treaty of Malmoe, which we desire in every particular to observe. And we
will hand over the property belonging to you in the wreck off Kalmar, if
you will forward to that town our ammunition together with a promise in
writing never from this day forth to wrong us or our men." This letter,
dated on the 4th of March, was the last communication that passed
between the pirate and the king. Norby had at length discovered that he
could not dupe the king, and Gustavus deemed it folly to continue parley
with one whose only object was to use up time.[123]
Unable to accomplish anything with Norby, it was more than ever
important that Gustavus should be on terms of amity with Fredrik. For
the moment it appeared that Fredrik would be fair. At all events, he had
made Gustavus a generous promise about the guns, and his Cabinet kept
Gustavus constantly informed about the acts of Norby. In February, when
the lakes were frozen, the monarch sent, as Fredrik had suggested, for
his ammunition, and intrusted to the same emissary a letter for the
Danish king. This letter was in reply to one from Fredrik, asking for
the surrender of a Danish refugee. Gustavus could not comply with his
request, for the refugee was gone; but he seized again the opportunity
to mention Sunnanvaeder. "We earnestly entreat you," were his words, "to
write your Cabinet in Norway no longer to protect this man or any of his
party." It was certainly time that something should be done by Fredrik,
for at the very moment while Gustavus was writing this appeal, the
Norwegian Cabinet were issuing a passport for the traitors through their
realm; and to a request from Gustavus for their surrender, the Cabinet
offered the absurd excuse that the fugitives themselves protested they
were innocent. "However," it was added, "the fugitives will return if
they are given your assurance that they may be tried, as priests, before
a spiritual tribunal." In this reply the reason for the detention of the
fugitives leaked out. They were high in office in the Church, and the
archbishop of Trondhem, with whom they had taken refuge, feared the
Lutheran tendencies of the king. Fredrik did not wholly share this fear,
and on the 4th of March for the first time addressed the archbishop,
commanding him to revoke the passport of the renegades. This letter
producing no immediate effect, Gustavus waited about six weeks, and then
despatched to the Cabinet of Norway a safe-conduct for the renegades to
be tried before "a proper tribunal," and, if adjudged not guilty, to
return to Norway. The passport was directed to the Cabinet of southern
Norway, to whom the monarch used these words: "We marvel much at the
language of your northern brothers, and particularly that they are
deceived by the treachery of these rascals, which is well known hundreds
of miles from here, and might be known in Norway if the people were not
blind. I might tell you how they lay a long while in Dalarne, and in the
name of the people sent deceitful letters through the land, to stir up
hostility against us. But as soon as the people began to leave them, and
the Dalesmen announced that these letters were not issued with their
consent, they betook themselves to Norway.... If, now, the fugitives
will come before a proper tribunal, we cannot and we would not refuse to
let them do so. We therefore send a safe-conduct to guard them against
all wrong, according to their request. If they do not come, it will be
manifest whether they are innocent." The safe-conduct, it may be well to
say, ran only to the 10th of August following, and no notice apparently
was taken of it till near the expiration of that time.[124]
Gustavus now devoted himself to the task of fighting Norby. The pirate
had given the king of Denmark a written promise that he would do no
injury to Sweden, but it was very soon apparent that this promise was
not likely to be kept. By the end of January Norby's acts so far aroused
suspicion that Gustavus ordered spies to enter Bleking and discover
Norby's plans. No very definite information, however, was obtained,
probably for the reason that Norby did not know his plans himself. He
was waiting for intelligence from Christiern. Late in March Gustavus
fancied the pirate was preparing to depart for Norway. A few days
afterwards, Brask wrote the monarch: "A report is spread that Norby has
seized some seven or eight small craft and two large ships. I do not
comprehend his purpose. Merchants just arrived from Denmark add that the
Germans have handed Gotland over to the Danes, though on the other hand
it is declared that Lubeck has sent a strong force of men and ammunition
to the isle." The day following the writing of this letter, Gustavus
despatched a note to Finland, with a warning to beware of Norby, for the
news had reached him secretly that the pirate was about to make an
incursion into Finland. This was followed, after a week's interval, by
another letter announcing that Norby's fleet was lying at anchor, all
ready to set sail. The monarch's apprehensions proved to be unfounded.
Norby had important business nearer home. Christiern had not wintered in
Norway, as some persons had supposed he would, but had continued his
efforts to raise a force in Holland. His efforts had been attended with
some measure of success, and early in May the Swedish Cabinet had word
that Christiern had despatched a force of seven or eight thousand men
under Gustaf Trolle to make an attack on Denmark. While this fleet was
believed to be under sail, the tortuous Norby wrote to Denmark that he
was ready to sacrifice his life for Fredrik, and took the opportunity to
charge Gustavus with every sort of crime. The expedition of Christiern
appears to have miscarried, but it so startled Fredrik that he hastened
to rid himself of his doubtful ally, Norby. On pretence of wanting an
escort for his daughter, about to sail for Prussia, he asked the pirate
to come to Copenhagen. Norby, willing though he was to sacrifice his
life for Fredrik, thought he scented bait. He could not go, he said,
unless he did so in his own vessel attended by seven hundred of his men,
and as an additional guaranty demanded at the outset that his men be
paid. This was a little more than Fredrik could digest. His answer was a
letter to Gustavus, declaring that the pirate was in constant
communication with Christiern, and meantime spared no efforts to stir up
discord between Gustavus and himself. He was now preparing with a fleet
and body of seven hundred men to make an incursion into Sweden. Should
this occur, Gustavus might rely upon the aid of Fredrik. For this
generous assurance Gustavus in his answer thanked the king, and
promised, in return, that if the pirate should make war on Denmark,
Fredrik might count on him. Despite these mutual promises of fidelity,
neither party relied much on the other. Gustavus, in a letter to his
Cabinet in Finland, openly declared his discontent with Fredrik.
However, a common danger kept the allies together, and early in August
Gustavus sent a fleet to Kalmar Sound with orders to make an incursion
into Bleking on the north, at the same moment that Fredrik's fleet was
attacking Norby from the south. For some reason Fredrik did not hear of
the Swedish movement till the day was won. On August 24 the Danish and
Lubeck fleets were lying off the coast of Bleking, and, thinking that an
attack would soon be made by land, bore down upon the fleet of Norby. It
was an unequal contest, and the allied fleets were victorious. Seven of
Norby's vessels were captured, with four hundred of his men. The
conquerors then entered Bleking, and placed the district once more under
Danish rule. Norby himself escaped across the Baltic Sea to Russia.
There he expected to enlist the grand duke in a war against Gustavus. He
found, however, that he had mistaken the opinions of his host. The grand
duke threw him into prison, where he remained two years. At the end of
that time he was set at liberty by request of Charles V., under whose
banner he then enlisted. After serving about a year, he was killed
outside the walls of Florence, whither he had been sent with the
emperor's forces to storm the town. "Such was the end," so runs the
chronicle, "of one who in his palmy days had called himself a friend of
God and an enemy to every man."[125]
Meantime matters had progressed to some extent with Norway. On the 22d
of July, the passport issued for the refugees having nearly expired
without intimation that it would be used, Gustavus wrote to Fredrik:
"Sunnanvaeder and the other fugitives are still maintained with honor in
Norway, and are continually plotting new revolt. They receive especial
favor from the archbishop of Trondhem, who is said to have appointed one
of them his deacon. We have written frequently about them to the Cabinet
of Norway, but the more we write the more honor they receive." This
charge was proved by subsequent events to be a trifle hasty. Scarce had
the letter been despatched when Knut, who was probably the least guilty
of the two conspirators, arrived. He came by order of the archbishop of
Trondhem, and along with him came a letter from the archbishop,
declaring that, as the king had promised the fugitives they should be
tried by prelates of the Church, one of them was surrendered.
Sunnanvaeder would likewise have been handed over but that he was ill.
The archbishop closed by urging Gustavus to show mercy. It is to be
noted that the king had never promised that the tribunal should consist
of prelates. What he had said was that they should be tried before a
"proper tribunal." Doubtless it was customary that priests should not be
tried by laymen, but the practice was not invariably followed, and the
language of the passport was enough to throw the conspirators on their
guard. In a case of conspiracy against the crown, the Swedish Cabinet
would seem to be a proper tribunal, and as a matter of fact it was
before the Cabinet that this case was tried. The Cabinet consisted of
the archbishop of Upsala, three bishops, and eight laymen. Their decree
was, in the first place, that the passport did not protect Knut from
trial, and secondly, that he was guilty of conspiracy against the crown.
The decree was dated August 9. On that very day the king of Denmark
wrote Gustavus that he had ordered the archbishop of Trondhem to give no
shelter to the traitors, and added: "We are told that you are ready to
promise them a trial before yourself and the Swedish Cabinet, after
which they shall be permitted to go free." Gustavus had never promised
that they should go free, and it was preposterous for anybody to expect
it. The only object of the trial was to give the traitors an opportunity
to prove their innocence, and if they failed to do so, it was only fair
that they should suffer. As soon as the decree was signed, Gustavus
wrote the archbishop of Trondhem that Knut had been found guilty, but
that his life should be spared to satisfy the archbishop, at any rate
until Gustavus could learn what the archbishop proposed to do with the
other refugees. A similar letter was sent also by the Cabinet, declaring
that "many serious charges were made against Knut, which he was in no
way able to disprove." One of the Cabinet members, who had been asked by
the archbishop to intercede for Knut, wrote back: "His crime is so
enormous and so clearly proved by his own handwriting, that there is no
hope for him unless by the grace of God or through your intercession."
Even Brask wrote: "He has won the king's ill-favor in many ways, for
which he can offer no defence." Against such a pressure of public
opinion the archbishop of Trondhem dared no longer stand, and on the 22d
of September despatched Sunnanvaeder to the king, adding, with the
mendacity of a child, that he had detained him in Norway only in order
that he might not flee. Gustavus, with grim humor, thanked him for his
solicitude, and begged him now to return all other refugees. Sunnanvaeder
was kept in jail till the 18th of February, 1527. He was then brought
before a tribunal consisting of the entire Chapter of Upsala, two
bishops, and a number of laymen. The king produced some sixty letters
written by the traitor, establishing his conspiracy beyond the shadow of
a doubt. He was condemned at once, and executed the same day outside the
Upsala walls. Three days later, his accomplice, Knut, was similarly put
to death in Stockholm. Thus ended a conspiracy which had cost the
monarch infinite annoyance, and which during a period of three years had
been a constant menace to the realm.[126]
What most annoyed the king at this time was the importunate demands of
Lubeck. Ever since Gotland, in the summer of 1525, had fallen into the
hands of Lubeck, Gustavus had appreciated the necessity of keeping the
Hanseatic town in check. So early as August of that year the monarch
wrote Laurentius Andreae: "You have advised us to cling to Lubeck and
place no confidence in the Danes, since they have always played us
false. We are not sure, however, that even Lubeck can be trusted, for we
have no certainty what she has in mind, especially as she is sheltering
in Gotland that outspoken traitor, Mehlen." The Swedish envoys, who had
arrived in Lubeck too late to meet the Danes, as had been agreed in
Malmoe, seem to have reached no terms with Lubeck, and, when they
returned to Sweden in September, Gotland was in Lubeck's hands, and
Lubeck had announced her purpose of defending Mehlen. Her strongest hold
on Sweden lay in the fact that Sweden was still her debtor in a very
large amount. Early in 1526 this burden had become so great that the
Cabinet passed an act decreeing that two thirds of all the tithes
accrued for the year just ended should be surrendered by the Church to
meet the nation's debt. The announcement of this levy made Lubeck for
the moment more importunate than before. Believing that the money would
soon be pouring in, she kept her envoys constantly dogging the monarch's
steps, and in the month of April Gustavus wrote: "Our creditors will
scarce permit us to leave the castle-gate." They were, therefore, as
greatly disappointed as Gustavus when the money did not come. In June
Gustavus wrote that he had got together ten thousand marks,--a mere
nothing,--and that Lubeck had written to demand immediate payment of the
whole. "Her envoys have now closed our doors so tight that it is hardly
possible for us to go out." It was clear that some new scheme must be
devised, and on the 23d of June the king applied to certain members of
his Cabinet. "We have now," he wrote, "as frequently before, had letters
from Lubeck demanding in curt language the payment of her debt. You are
aware that we have often, especially in Cabinet meetings, asked you to
suggest some mode of meeting this requirement, and have never yet been
able to elicit any tangible response. Indeed, you have not had the
matter much at heart, but have rather left it to be arranged by us. You
have, it is true, suggested that the tithes be used, but we find that,
though we much relied upon them, they are but a tittle. Our entire taxes
for last year, including iron, skins, butter, salmon, amounted to
somewhat over ten thousand marks. This sum, which would naturally be
used to pay the expenses of our court, has been handed over to pay the
debt. The tithes received, which we were assured would be a considerable
sum, are shown by our books not to have exceeded two thousand marks in
all. The treasury balance has now run so low that we have but a trifle
left, and our soldiers, who are now much needed to keep off Christiern
and Norby, must be paid. We therefore beg you take this matter seriously
to heart, and devise some means by which the debt may soon be paid....
It is utterly impossible from the taxes alone to keep an army and pay
this heavy debt, for the taxes are no greater than they were some years
ago, though the expenses are very much increased; and, moreover, we have
no mines to turn to, as our fathers had." This urgent appeal inspired
the Cabinet to act, and at a meeting held in August they provided that a
new tax be laid on every subject in the realm. In the table that
accompanied this Act, the amounts to be contributed by the different
provinces were accurately fixed, as well as the amounts to be collected
in the towns. The bishops, too, were called upon to furnish each his
quota, based upon an estimate of his means: the archbishop of Upsala
paying four thousand marks, the bishop of Abo three thousand marks,
Linkoeping two thousand five hundred marks, Skara and Strengnaes each two
thousand marks, Vesteras one thousand marks, and Vexioe five hundred
marks. The amount imposed on Abo seems unreasonably large, which is
probably to be accounted for by the fact that Abo was not present at the
meeting. Brask, in writing to Abo, told the bishop that his quota was
three thousand marks, but did not name to him the individual amounts to
be contributed by the other bishops. Gustavus, in a letter to the
members of his Cabinet in Finland, was even more unfair. He told them
that Abo was to pay three thousand marks, and added that Linkoeping and
Skara were to pay the same. Brask's letter is particularly important in
that it puts the balance of the debt to Lubeck at forty-five thousand
Lubeck marks, equivalent to ninety thousand Swedish marks, of which
amount the archbishop and bishops were expected to raise fifteen
thousand marks. Brask, with his usual shrewdness, urged the king to pay
the debt that autumn, and thus get rid of Lubeck before the winter came.
Gustavus doubtless shared with him this view, but there were several
grave difficulties in the way. Early in October the monarch held a
conference with the Lubeck envoys, and found the balance, as they
figured it, to be larger than he had supposed. Moreover, the peasants in
the north of Sweden declared they could not spare the funds, and urged
Gustavus to postpone the levy till a more convenient time. So that at
the close of 1526 the Lubeck envoys were still clamoring for their
pay.[127]
The cramped position in which Gustavus was held by Lubeck made it of
great importance that he should be on amicable terms with other powers.
So early as 1523, he had sent ambassadors to Russia to ratify the treaty
made by Sture. They had returned, however, with announcement that the
grand duke's envoys would come to Stockholm and arrange the terms. This
promise had never been fulfilled. As soon, therefore, as opportunity was
found, the monarch prepared to send ambassadors again. The person to
whom the matter was intrusted was the monarch's brother-in-law, Johan
von Hoya. In November, 1525, this officer, who had just returned from an
expedition to Lubeck, set sail for Finland, where he already had been
granted fiefs, with orders to determine whether or not it was desirable
that the embassy should go. Considerable delay ensued because Gustavus
was in want of funds. He thought that since the expedition would be
mainly for the benefit of Finland, the cost of sending it should be
borne by her. It was, therefore, not till May of 1526, when Russian
depredations became unbearable in Finland, that an arrangement could be
made. Envoys then were sent to Moscow, and presented to the grand duke a
letter from Gustavus under date of 20th of May. In this document the
monarch stated that his envoys had once before been sent to Moscow to
ratify the treaty made with Sture, but for some reason had never reached
the capital. Since then great injury had been done in Finland by Russian
subjects. Gustavus desired, therefore, to renew the treaty, and begged
the grand duke to recompense his subjects, and also to make known to him
in what towns in Russia his subjects would be allowed to trade. This
letter appears to have been some months upon the road, for the grand
duke's answer was not given till the 2d of September. In this answer he
declared that the previous embassy of Gustavus had held a conference
with Russian envoys, and by them the treaty made with Sture had been
ratified. Swedish merchants were allowed to trade in all the towns of
Russia, and all wrongs done to Swedish subjects should be punished and
the persons injured recompensed. On the other hand, he should expect
Gustavus to punish his own subjects for wrongs which they had done in
Russia, and all buildings by them erected on Russian soil must be torn
down. While the Swedish envoys were returning with this letter, Norby
reached the grand duke and complained that Swedes had injured Russian
subjects in Lapland. The grand duke therefore ordered that Gustavus be
notified of the complaint, and asked to punish the offenders if the
charge were true. When the embassy returned to Sweden, and the monarch
found they had not yet obtained the grand duke's seal, he resolved to go
to Finland in the spring of 1527 and meet the Russian emissaries there.
This plan, however, was given up for lack of funds, and the Russian
emissaries were asked to meet the king in Stockholm. The offer was
accepted, the emissaries came, and after an elaborate exchange of costly
presents, both parties signed a ratification of the treaty made for
seventy years with Sture. The ratification was dated on the 26th of
May.[128]
The main reason why Gustavus dreaded a rupture between himself and
Lubeck was that it would cause great injury to his commerce. Immediately
after his election in 1523, the monarch in a moment of enthusiasm had
conferred on Lubeck, Dantzic, and their allies a perpetual monopoly of
Swedish trade. In an earlier century, when these so-called Vend Cities
controlled the Baltic trade, Lubeck would have claimed the monopoly even
without a grant. But another branch of the Hanse Towns had ere this
grown up in Holland, with a power so formidable that the Vend Cities
dared not assert their claim. So long, however, as the privileges
granted Lubeck were unrepealed, the Dutch Towns were reluctant to incur
her enmity by sending ships to Sweden. The result was that practically
all imports came from Lubeck, and when relations between that city and
Gustavus became a trifle strained, great difficulty was experienced in
obtaining food. To remedy this evil, the envoys sent to Lubeck in 1525,
finding themselves too late for the congress with the Danes, entered
into negotiations with the Dutch envoys that happened to be there. They
found at once that Holland wished to trade in Sweden, and was ready to
do so if the terms could be arranged. As a provisional measure, the
ambassadors on both sides promised, August 17, that the two nations
should remain at peace during the next three years, and before the end
of that time another congress should be held to make a more systematic
treaty. It was agreed further that in the coming autumn a consignment of
salt and other wares should be forwarded by the Dutch to Sweden.
Apparently this consignment did not come till the spring of 1526, but
both parties were eager to arrange a treaty, and it was agreed that a
congress for this purpose should be held in Bremen, May 20, 1526. This
congress was afterwards postponed, though the Swedish envoy brought a
ratification of the former treaty signed by Gustavus under date of May
12, 1526, and promised further that salt should be admitted into Sweden
free. A similar ratification was signed by Charles V., Sept. 19, 1526.
This accomplished, Holland opened negotiations with Sweden to the end
that all articles of commerce be placed upon the free-list along with
salt; and she requested further that all the Swedish harbors be open to
her ships. So ambitious a proposal terrified Gustavus. He would have
been rejoiced to grant it, but he feared by doing so to irritate Lubeck.
It is somewhat amusing to trace the steps by which he convinced himself
that such a course was right. Brask, as usual, was the first to question
whether Lubeck would consent. On the 9th of December, 1526, he wrote:
"I advocate the treaty, but I doubt much whether Lubeck will not raise
objections, for she has wished to have the Baltic to herself." A few
days later Gustavus put out a feeler to his Cabinet in the south of
Sweden. "So far as we know," he wrote with caution, "our relations with
Lubeck and the Vend Cities do not forbid this treaty." By the spring of
1527 he had grown more confident of his position, and wrote as follows:
"The provisional arrangement made with Holland has proved greatly to our
advantage. We now desire to make a perpetual treaty with her before
Whitsunday next, and for this purpose recommend that Olaus Magni be sent
at once to Amsterdam." Two weeks after this he added: "The privileges
which the German cities wrung from us in Strengnaes are so grinding that
we can no longer adhere to them in all their points." On the 22d of
April the monarch had so far removed his doubts as to commission Magni
to negotiate the treaty, and he intrusted him with a written promise
over the royal signature and seal, conferring on Holland, Brabant,
Zealand, and East and West Friesland the right to enter all the Swedish
rivers and harbors, on payment of the customary duties. It is noticeable
that in this document Gustavus did not remit the duties, as had been
desired, nor even promise that salt should be admitted free; and in the
letter to his envoy the diplomatic monarch used these words: "Do not be
too liberal, especially in the matter of duties. If they really insist
upon free-trade, you must discreetly avoid promising it, and suggest
that probably the privilege will be granted them as a favor." Brask, who
feared lest these negotiations might cause trouble, hastened to throw a
favorable light upon his own position. "You will remember," he wrote his
fellow-counsellors, "that I opposed the grant of these great privileges
to Lubeck, believing them injurious to the welfare of our people."
Magni, in conformity with the king's injunctions, proceeded to the town
of Ghent, where he was given an audience of Margaret, regent of the
Netherlands. As soon as the letters of May 12, 1526, and April 18, 1527,
were translated for her, she raised a number of objections, chief of
which were that the latter letter did not provide that salt should be
admitted free, and did not seem to open to her vessels all the Swedish
ports. To these objections Magni answered that certain harbors were made
ports of entry out of convenience to Gustavus, and as to duties, Magni
seems to have assured her that they would probably be taken off. After
more palaver, Margaret signed a document accepting the offer assumed to
have been made by Sweden; namely, that vessels of the emperor might
enter all the rivers and harbors of Sweden, paying only the same duties
that were paid by Swedish subjects, salt, however, to be admitted free.
She expressed a hope, moreover, that other articles might be exempt from
duty too. To this document she attached her seal, July 29, 1527.[129]
It is particularly to be noted that Lubeck did not raise her voice
against the treaty. A probable solution is that she wished beyond all
else to secure her money, and felt that Sweden would be more able to
meet the debt in case she were allowed to trade with Holland. All
through the winter of 1527 Gustavus struggled to raise funds. Some
portions of the country seem to have responded freely, but in Dalarne
and other northern provinces it appeared likely that the levy would end
in actual revolt. In January Gustavus warned the people that all
responsibility in the matter lay with them. If Lubeck made war upon the
kingdom, it would be because of their unwillingness to pay the debt. As
a matter of fact, the Dalesmen had much reason for delay. The monarch,
by his ill-judged privileges to Lubeck, had kept the country in a state
of famine, from which it now was just beginning to emerge. Many of the
people were utterly devoid of means, and the new levy seemed like
wringing water from a stone. This in the course of time Gustavus
learned, and in March he prudently suggested to his officers that the
tax be modified in special cases. The Dalesmen, however, were not so
easily to be appeased. Other causes of complaint were rife among them,
and they formed a compact to the end that no tax should be paid until
these grievances had been redressed. On the 2d of April Gustavus
asserted that the Dalesmen had not contributed a cent. Brask, for
reasons that will be manifest later on, was in sympathy with the people,
and declared: "I fear danger, for the Dalesmen are reported to be
incensed, and rightfully incensed, against the king. If it lay with me,
I should remit a portion of the tax rather than give occasion for this
revolt." Gustavus, however, was still harassed by Lubeck, and dared not
take this step. As there were several matters to be straightened out in
Dalarne, he summoned a general diet of the realm. The Dalesmen showing
opposition, Gustavus urged the people in the south of Sweden to persuade
the people of Dalarne to come. "We should be glad," he urged, "if you
would write to the people of Dalarne, and ask them to lay their
complaints before the diet to be held in Vesteras. We shall there
explain our conduct, and if our people are not satisfied, shall gladly
resign the throne. The German envoys will be present, and the Dalesmen
can then adopt some means to quiet their incessant demands." All efforts
to persuade the Dalesmen failed. They despatched a long list of their
grievances to Stockholm, but they did not attend the diet. When the
other delegates came together, Gustavus laid these grievances before
them. The Dalesmen had complained, he said, that they were burdened with
heavy taxes. If they had been more obedient, a smaller army would have
been sufficient, and the taxes would not have been so heavy. He told
them, further, that the whole debt occasioned by the war amounted to
about one hundred thousand marks, of which sum a large portion was still
unpaid.[130] The outcome of the matter was that the delegates voted to
quell the insurrection in Dalarne, and if enough money could not now be
raised to pay the debt, to levy further taxes. These stringent measures
were not, however, put into effect at once. Gustavus was busy, in the
autumn of 1527, with other things; and furthermore a dispute had arisen
between himself and Lubeck as to the exact total of the debt. The year
closed, therefore, with the debt still hanging over Sweden's head. The
Lubeck envoys accepted all the goods and money they could get, the whole
amount thus paid in 1527 being in the neighborhood of 22,800 Swedish
marks.[131]
All through this period Gustavus was in constant negotiation with
Fredrik. Christiern's efforts to recover the crown had been brought to a
halt by the sudden collapse of Norby, and Fredrik had assumed in
consequence a more aggressive attitude toward Sweden. By the treaty
signed at Malmoe each monarch promised to protect the interests which
citizens of the other held within his realm. But the ink was scarcely
dry when complaints were heard that Fredrik had failed to substantiate
this clause. The most flagrant breach occurred in the case of property
owned in Denmark by Margaret, sister of the king of Sweden. So great
difficulty was experienced by Margaret in protecting this estate, that
early in 1526 the monarch counselled her to sell it. He wrote also to
certain Danish officers, and begged them to defend her rights. These
exhortations proving futile, Margaret sent her agent to the spot to see
what he could do. This only irritated the natives, and they fell upon
the agent with their fists. It was reported, too, that the deed was
ordered by an officer of Fredrik. At all events, the agent was given no
redress, and Gustavus, after urging Margaret's husband to appeal to
Fredrik, wrote finally to the Danish king himself. He laid the whole
affair before him, and declaring that he had ever upheld the rights of
Danes in Sweden, urged Fredrik to investigate the matter and punish
those by whom the violence had been committed. With this request the
Danish monarch promised to comply; and as we find no further mention of
the case, it is probable the quarrel was adjusted and the rights of
Margaret maintained.[132]
Another dispute originating in the Malmoe treaty concerned the province
of Viken, which lay along the Swedish frontier in the southeast part of
Norway. This province had joined Gustavus in the war with Christiern,
and after the war was over had continued under Swedish rule. In course
of time, however, the inhabitants grew eager to return once more to
Norway. With a view to satisfy their longing, Gustavus allowed them,
early in 1526, to be governed by Norwegian law and custom. Possibly this
would have appeased the natives, but Fredrik was desirous for more. He
thought that Viken, being originally a province of Norway, should be
ruled by him. He therefore wrote Gustavus, and begged a conference to
settle their respective claims. Gustavus, defrauded of his rights in
Gotland, answered that he would gladly hold a conference to settle all
matters of dispute between them. Fredrik waited nearly six months before
making his reply. He then informed Gustavus that the Danish envoys had
appeared in Lubeck at the day fixed for the conference, but that nothing
was accomplished simply because the Swedish envoys did not come. He
therefore urged Gustavus to name a time and place at which the question
of Viken should be settled. The Swedish monarch had learned by sad
experience that a conference with Denmark meant no benefit to him. He
answered that his envoys had been sent to Lubeck, as agreed, but had
failed through stress of weather to reach the place of meeting on the
day arranged. Gustavus appears not to have cared particularly to retain
the province, though he was not willing to yield it without obtaining
something in return. He saw no reason why Viken should be given up to
Fredrik unless Gotland should be given up to him. In answer, therefore,
to repeated solicitations, he declared his readiness to meet the Danish
king half-way; he would treat with him concerning Viken, but at the same
time some definite conclusion must be reached about the isle of Gotland.
When negotiations had reached this point, they were interrupted for the
moment by a new dispute.[133]
Ever since the fall of Kalmar, Christina's boy had been in Stockholm,
under the surveillance of the king. Gustavus for some reason had never
liked the boy, and in April, 1527, he sent him to his mother with a
reprimand, at the same time urging that he be placed for a period under
the quiet influence of some rural town. This incident was the signal for
another conspiracy against the crown. This time the aspirant was a gay
young hostler, who conceived the desperate project of posing as the
regent's son. Relying on his own audacity and on the perennial state of
insurrection in the north of Sweden, he went to Dalarne with the story
that he had escaped the clutches of Gustavus, whose orders were that he
be put to death. He then proceeded from one village to another,
extolling the virtues of the young Sten Sture, and urging the people,
since they had sworn allegiance to his father, to do the same to him.
The support which he received was small. One or two villages were at
first deceived, but the majority of them told him flatly that he lied.
He therefore followed the course of earlier impostors, and betook
himself to Norway. Approaching first the archbishop of Trondhem, he told
his story and awoke the archbishop's interest by announcing that
Gustavus had fallen from the faith. It being bruited that certain of the
church dignitaries were on terms of friendship with this impostor, the
archbishop received him kindly, and though he refused to give him
shelter, promised he would take no steps to harm him. Gustavus then
addressed the archbishop and the Cabinet of Norway, urging that the
traitor be returned. He pointed out, moreover, that, Sten Sture having
been married only fourteen years before, it was impossible that this
traitor was his son. This argument producing no effect, Gustavus
prevailed upon Fredrik's emissaries, then in Stockholm, to join him in
his appeal. An answer then came back from the archbishop of Trondhem
that he had refused to shelter the impostor, though he had promised that
he would not harm him. Since then a letter had arrived from Dalarne
saying that the Swedish king was dead. The impostor had therefore
collected a band of refugees in Norway, and was now once more in Sweden.
With this mendacious explanation Gustavus was forced to be content. The
fraud had been discovered, and by the close of 1527 the insurrection in
Dalarne was practically at an end.[134]
FOOTNOTES:
[122] _Christ. II.'s arkiv_, vol. iv. pp. 1510-1511, 1517-1588 and
1568-1575; _Dipl. Dal._, vol. ii. pp. 66-67; _Handl. roer. Skand. hist._,
vol. xxiii. pp. 60-65; _Kon. Gust. den Foerstes registrat._, vol. ii. pp.
169-170, 187-188, 196-197, 204-206, 208-213, 218-219, 240-242, 252-257
and 278-285; and _Saml. til det Norske Folks Sprog og Hist._, vol. i.
pp. 484-485.
[123] _Christ. II.'s arkiv_, vol. iv. pp. 1576-1584, 1587-1591,
1593-1596 and 1602-1605; and _Kon. Gust. den Foerstes registrat._, vol.
iii. pp. 2-3, 13-15, 30-32, 38-39, 61-62, 78-80, 353-355, 364-365,
369-370 and 375-376.
[124] _Christ. II.'s arkiv_, vol. iv. pp. 1585-1587 and 1589-1593;
_Dipl. Dal._, vol. ii. pp. 82-83 and 89; _Handl. roer. Sver. inre
foerhall._, vol. i. pp. 23-25; _Kon. Gust. den Foerstes registrat._, vol.
iii. pp. 50-51, 55, 57-58, 59-60, 71, 367-369, 372, 373-374 and 381-384;
and _Saml. til det Norske Folks Sprog og Hist._, vol. i. pp. 485-486 and
488-495.
[125] Svart, _Gust. I.'s kroen._, pp. 84-85; _Christ. II.'s arkiv_, vol.
i. pp. 1-144 and vol. iv. pp. 1584, 1606-1612, 1614-1626, 1633-1635,
1639-1643 and 1646-1651; _Handl. roer. Skand. hist._, vol. xv. pp. 5-7,
19-24, 27-29 and 32-47; _Handl. till upplysn. af Finl. haefd._, vol. ii.
p. 158; _Kon. Gust. den Foerstes registrat._, vol. iii. pp. 46, 97-98,
110-111, 117, 167-169, 170-172, 188-190, 195-196, 199-200, 203-207,
218-220, 250-251, 256-260, 380-381, 386-393, 394-404, 406-407, 411-414
and 415-416; and _Sver. trakt._, vol. iv. pp. 104-105.
[126] Svart, _Gust. I.'s kroen._, pp. 112-114; _Christ. II.'s arkiv_,
vol. iii. pp. 1075-1083, and vol. iv. pp. 1627-1628; _Dipl. Dal._, vol.
ii. p. 92, and vol. iii. pp. 30-32; _Handl. roer. Skand. hist._, vol.
xvi. pp. 18-20; _Kon. Gust. den Foerstes registrat._, vol. iii. pp.
207-208, 220-224, 326-327, 405-406, 408-410 and 419, and vol. iv. pp.
61-62; _Saml. til det Norske Folks Sprog og Hist._, vol. i. pp. 496-513;
and _Skrift. och handl._, vol. ii. pp. 267-268 and 270-271.
[127] _Alla riksdag. och moet. besluth_, vol. i. pp. 42-56; _Christ.
II.'s arkiv_, vol. iv. pp. 1492 and 1613; _Dipl. Dal._, vol. ii. pp.
79-80 and _Handl. roer. Skand. hist._, vol. xiv. pp. 89-90, vol. xv. pp.
29-32, and vol. xvi. pp. 15-16; _Handl. roer. Sver. inre foerhall._, vol.
i. pp. 15-18 and 30-31; _Handl. till upplysn. af Finl. haefd._, vol. ii.
pp. 185-187; _Kon. Gust. den Foerstes registrat._, vol. ii. pp. 190-191,
222-223 and 229-231, and vol. iii. pp. 15-16, 18-21, 32-34, 109-110,
122, 173-176, 179-181, 236-243, 248-249, 294-295, 308-309, 324-326 and
416-417; and _Svenska riksdagsakt._, vol. i. pp. 39-47.
[128] _Christ. II.'s arkiv_, vol. iv. pp. 1548-1553; _Handl. roer. Skand.
hist._, vol. xvi. pp. 107-113; _Handl. til uplysn. af Svenska hist._,
vol. i. pp. 121-123; _Handl. till upplysn. af Finl. haefd._, vol. ii. pp.
151-153, 156-157, 161-183, 193-195, 201-205 and 207-209, and vol. viii.
pp. 14-18; _Kon. Gust. den Foerstes registrat._, vol. ii. pp. 51-52,
225-226 and 242-244, vol. iii. pp. 132-135, 141-155, 287-288 and
429-430, and vol. iv. pp. 127-129, 147-148, 152-153, 196-198 and
411-413; and _Sver. trakt._, vol. iv. pp. 74-89.
[129] _Christ. II.'s arkiv_, vol. iv. pp. 1491-1492; _Dipl. Dal._, vol.
ii. pp. 90-91 and 115-116; _Handl. roer. Skand. hist._, vol. i. pp. 1-35
and vol. xvi. pp. 45-52 and 124-127; _Kon. Gust. den Foerstes
registrat._, vol. ii. pp. 201-204, 206-207, 227-228 and 262-265, vol.
iii. pp. 51-52, 111-112, 119-121, 308-309, 335-336 and 421-424, and vol.
iv. pp. 101-103, 113-116, 143-145, 413-414, 419-420 and 428-432;
Linkoeping, _Bibliotheks handl._, vol. i. pp. 193-199; and _Sver.
trakt._, vol. iv. pp. 106-124.
[130] This was clearly a misstatement. It has been already shown (p.
121) that in 1523 Gustavus put the debt at over 300,000 marks.
[131] _Alla riksdag. och moet. besluth_, vol. i. pp. 60-61; _Dipl. Dal._,
vol. ii. pp. 97, 99-101, 105-109 and 115-116; _Kon. Gust. den Foerstes
registrat._, vol. iv. pp. 6-7, 22-23, 64-65, 66-67, 83-85, 95-96,
102-103, 113-117, 131-132, 163-165, 170, 206-207, 257-259, 333-334,
419-420 and 445-446; and the documents cited in Handelmann's _Die
letzten Zeiten der hanseatischen Uebermacht im Norden_, p. 170. The
question of the Lubeck debt is ably treated by Forssell in his _Sver.
inre hist._, vol. i. pp. 134-138.
[132] _Christ. II.'s arkiv_, vol. iv. pp. 1666-1668; and _Kon. Gust. den
Foerstes registrat._, vol. iii. pp. 41, 57-58, 65, 76-78 and 291-292, and
vol. iv. pp. 48-49, 68-70 and 426-427.
[133] _Christ. II.'s arkiv_, vol. iv. 1622-1626, 1662-1664, 1669-1670
and 1671-1676; _Kon. Gust. den Foerstes registrat._, vol. iii. pp. 47-48
and 203-207, and vol. iv. pp. 45-47, 66-67, 102-103, 113-117, 285-286,
377-382, 398-399, and 439-440; and _Saml. til det Norske Folks Sprog og
Hist._, vol. i. pp. 328-336.
[134] Svart, _Gust. I.'s kroen._, pp. 104-112; _Dipl. Dal._, vol. ii. pp.
115-116; _Handl. roer. Skand. hist._, vol. xvi. pp. 124-127; _Kon. Gust.
den Foerstes registrat._, vol. iv. pp. 120, 348-349, 350-354, 415,
419-420, 438-439, 441-442 and 443-445; and _Saml. til det Norske Folks
Sprog og Hist._, vol. i. pp. 518-528.