LXI. Again, of things indifferent, they call some preferred (προηγμένα),

and others rejected (ἀποπροηγμένα). Those are preferred, which have some

proper value (ἀξίαν), and those are rejected, which have no value at all

(ἀπαξίαν ἔχοντα). And by the term proper value, they mean that quality

of things, which causes them to concur in producing a well-regulated

life; and in this sense, every good has a proper value. Again, they

say that a thing has value, when in some point of view, it has a sort

of intermediate power of aiding us to live conformably to nature; and

under this class, we may range riches or good health, if they give any

assistance to natural life. Again, value is predicated of the price

which one gives for the attainment of an object, which some one, who

has experience of the object sought, fixes as its fair price; as if we

were to say, for instance, that as some wheat was to be exchanged for

barley, with a mule thrown in to make up the difference. Those goods

then are preferred, which have a value, as in the case of the mental

goods, ability, skill, improvement, and the like; and in the case of the

corporeal goods, life, health, strength, a good constitution, soundness,

beauty; and in the case of external goods, riches, glory, nobility of

birth, and the like.

Rejected things are, in the case of qualities of the mind, stupidity,

unskilfulness, and the like; in the case of circumstances affecting

the body, death, disease, weakness, a bad constitution, mutilation,

disgrace, and the like; in the case of external circumstances, poverty,

want of reputation, ignoble birth, and the like. But those qualities

and circumstances which are indifferent, are neither preferred nor

rejected. Again, of things preferred, some are preferred for their own

sakes, some for the sake of other things, and some partly for their own

sakes and partly for that of other things. Those which are preferred for

their own sakes, are ability, improvement, and the like; those which are

preferred for the sake of other things, are wealth, nobility of birth,

and the like; those which are preferred partly for their own sake, and

partly for that of something else, are strength, vigour of the senses,

universal soundness, and the like; for they are preferred, for their own

sakes, inasmuch as they are in accordance with nature; and for the sake

of something else, inasmuch as they are productive of no small number of

advantages; and the same is the case in the inverse ratio, with those

things which are rejected.

LXII. Again, they say that that is duty, which is preferred, and which

contains in itself reasonable arguments why we should prefer it; as

for instance, its corresponding to the nature of life itself; and this

argument extends to plants and animals, for even their nature is subject

to the obligation of certain duties. And duty (τὸ καθῆκον) had this name

given to it by Zeno, in the first instance, its appellation being derived

from its coming to, or according to some people, ἀπὸ τοῦ κατά τινας

ἥκειν; and its effect is something kindred to the preparations made by

nature. Now of the things done according to inclination, some are duties,

and some are contrary to duty; and some are neither duties nor contrary

to duty. Those are duties, which reason selects to do, as for instance,

to honour one’s parents, one’s brothers, one’s country, to gratify one’s

friends. Those actions are contrary to duty, which reason does not

choose; as for instance, to neglect one’s parents, to be indifferent to

one’s brothers, to shirk assisting one’s friends, to be careless about

the welfare of one’s country, and so on. Those are neither duties, nor

contrary to duty, which reason neither selects to do, nor, on the other

hand, repudiates, such actions, for instance, as to pick up straw, to

hold a pen, or a comb, or things of that sort.

Again, there are some duties which do not depend on circumstances, and

some which do. These do not depend on circumstances, to take care of

one’s health, and of the sound state of one’s senses, and the like. Those

which do depend on circumstances, are the mutilation of one’s members,

the sacrificing of one’s property, and so on. And the case of those

actions which are contrary to duty, is similar. Again, of duties, some

are always such, and some are not always. What is always a duty, is to

live in accordance with virtue; but to ask questions, to give answers, to

walk, and the like, are not always duties. And the same statement holds

good with respect to acts contrary to duty.

There is also a class of intermediate duties, such as the duty of boys

obeying their masters.

LXIII. The Stoics also say that the mind is divisible into eight parts;

for that the five organs of sensation, and the vocal power, and the

intellectual power, which is the mind itself, and the generative power,

are all parts of the mind. But by error, there is produced a perversion

which operates on the intellect, from which many perturbations arise, and

many causes of inconstancy. And all perturbation is itself, according

to Zeno, a movement of the mind, or superfluous inclination, which is

irrational, and contrary to nature. Moreover, of the superior class of

perturbations, as Hecaton says, in the second book of his treatise on

the Passions, and as Zeno also says in his work on the Passions, there

are four kinds, grief, fear, desire, and pleasure. And they consider

that these perturbations are judgments, as Chrysippus contends in his

work on the Passions; for covetousness is an opinion that money is a

beautiful object, and in like manner drunkenness and intemperance, and

other things of the sort, are judgments. And grief they define to be an

irrational contraction of the mind, and it is divided into the following

species, pity, envy, emulation, jealousy, pain, perturbation, sorrow,

anguish, confusion. Pity is a grief over some one, on the ground of his

being in undeserved distress. Envy is a grief, at the good fortune of

another. Emulation is a grief at that belonging to some one else, which

one desires one’s self. Jealousy is a grief at another also having what

one has one’s self. Pain is a grief which weighs one down. Perturbation

is grief which narrows one, and causes one to feel in a strait. Sorrow

is a grief arising from deliberate thought, which endures for some

time, and gradually increases. Anguish is a grief with acute pain.

Confusion is an irrational grief, which frets one, and prevents one from

clearly discerning present circumstances. But fear is the expectation

of evil; and the following feelings are all classed under the head of

fear: apprehension, hesitation, shame, perplexity, trepidation, and

anxiety. Apprehension is a fear which produces alarm. Shame is a fear

of discredit. Hesitation is a fear of coming activity. Perplexity is a

fear, from the imagination of some unusual thing. Trepidation is a fear

accompanied with an oppression of the voice. Anxiety is a fear of some

uncertain event.

Again, desire is an irrational appetite; to which head, the following

feelings are referrible: want, hatred, contentiousness, anger, love,

enmity, rage. Want is a desire arising from our not having something

or other, and is, as it were, separated from the thing, but is still

stretching, and attracted towards it in vain. And hatred is a desire that

it should be ill with some one, accompanied with a certain continual

increase and extension. Contentiousness is a certain desire accompanied

with deliberate choice. Anger is a desire of revenge, on a person who

appears to have injured one in an unbecoming way. Love is a desire not

conversant about a virtuous object, for it is an attempt to conciliate

affection, because of some beauty which is seen. Enmity is a certain

anger of long duration, and full of hatred, and it is a watchful passion,

as is shown in the following lines:—

For though we deem the short-liv’d fury past,

’Tis sure the mighty will revenge at last.[90]

But rage is anger at its commencement.

Again, pleasure is an irrational elation of the mind over something

which appears to be desirable; and its different species are enjoyment,

rejoicing at evil, delight, and extravagant joy. Enjoyment now, is a

pleasure which charms the mind through the ears. Rejoicing at evil

(ἐπιχαιρεκακία), is a pleasure which arises at the misfortunes of others.

Delight (τέρψις), that is to say turning (τρέψις), is a certain turning

of the soul (προτροπή τις ψυχῆς), to softness. Extravagant joy is the

dissolution of virtue. And as there are said to be some sicknesses

(ἀῤῥωστήματα), in the body, as, for instance, gout and arthritic

disorders; so too are those diseases of the soul, such as a fondness for

glory, or for pleasure, and other feelings of that sort. For an ἀῤῥώστημα

is a disease accompanied with weakness; and a disease is an opinion of

something which appears exceedingly desirable. And, as in the case of the

body, there are illnesses to which people are especially liable, such as

colds or diarrhœa; so also are there propensities which the mind is under

the influence of, such as enviousness, pitifulness, quarrelsomeness, and

so on.

There are also three good dispositions of the mind; joy, caution, and

will. And joy they say is the opposite of pleasure, since it is a

rational elation of the mind; so caution is the opposite of fear, being

a rational avoidance of anything, for the wise man will never be afraid,

but he will act with caution; and will, they define as the opposite of

desire, since it is a rational wish. As therefore some things fall under

the class of the first perturbations, in the same manner do some things

fall under the class of the first good dispositions. And accordingly,

under the head of will, are classed goodwill, placidity, salutation,

affection; and under the head of caution are ranged reverence and

modesty; under the head of joy, we speak of delight, mirth, and good

spirits.

LXIV. They say also, that the wise man is free from perturbations,

because he has no strong propensities. But that this freedom from

propensities also exists in the bad man, being, however, then quite

another thing, inasmuch as it proceeds in him only from the hardness and

unimpressibility of his nature. They also pronounce the wise man free

from vanity, since he regards with equal eye what is glorious and what is

inglorious. At the same time, they admit that there is another character

devoid of vanity, who, however, is only reckoned one of the rash men,

being in fact the bad man. They also say that all the virtuous men are

austere, because they do never speak with reference to pleasure, nor do

they listen to what is said by others with reference to pleasure. At the

same time, they call another man austere too, using the term in nearly

the same sense as they do when they speak of austere wine, which is used

in compounding medicines, but not for drinking.

They also pronounce the wise to be honest-hearted men, anxiously

attending to those matters which may make them better, by means of some

principle which conceals what is bad, and brings to light what is good.

Nor is there any hypocrisy about them; for they cut off all pretence in

their voice and appearance. They also keep aloof from business; for they

guard carefully against doing any thing contrary to their duty. They

drink wine, but they do not get drunk; and they never yield to frenzy.

Occasionally, extraordinary imaginations may obtain a momentary power

over them, owing to some melancholy or trifling, arising not according to

the principle of what is desirable, but contrary to nature. Nor, again,

will the wise man feel grief; because grief is an irrational contraction

of the soul, as Apollodorus defines it in his Ethics.

They are also, as they say, godlike; for they have something in them

which is as it were a God. But the bad man is an atheist. Now there are

two kinds of atheists; one who speaks in a spirit of hostility to, and

the other, who utterly disregards, the divine nature; but they admit

that all bad men are not atheists in this last sense. The good, on the

contrary, are pious; for they have a thorough acquaintance with the laws

respecting the Gods. And piety is a knowledge of the proper reverence

and worship due to the Gods. Moreover they sacrifice to the Gods, and

keep themselves pure; for they avoid all offences having reference to

the Gods, and the Gods admire them; for they are holy and just in all

that concerns the Deity; and the wise men are the only priests; for they

consider the matters relating to sacrifices, and the erection of temples,

and purifications, and all other things which peculiarly concern the

Gods. They also pronounce that men are bound to honour their parents,

and their brethren, in the second place after the Gods. They also say

that parental affection for one’s children is natural to them, and is a

feeling which does not exist in bad men. And they lay down the position

that all offences are equal, as Chrysippus argues in the fourth book of

his Ethic Questions, and so say Persæus and Zeno. For if one thing that

is true is not more true than another thing that is true, neither is one

thing that is false more false than another thing that is false; so too,

one deceit is not greater than another, nor one sin than another. For the

man who is a hundred furlongs from Canopus, and the man who is only one,

are both equally not in Canopus; and so too, he who commits a greater

sin, and he who commits a less, are both equally not in the right path.

Heraclides of Tarsus, indeed, the friend of Antipater, of Tarsus, and

Athenodorus, both assert that offences are not equal.

Again, the Stoics, as for instance, Chrysippus, in the first book of his

work on Lives, say, that the wise man will take a part in the affairs of

the state, if nothing hinders him. For that he will restrain vice, and

excite men to virtue. Also, they say that he will marry, as Zeno says,

in his Republic, and beget children. Moreover, that the wise man will

never form mere opinions, that is to say, he will never agree to anything

that is false; and that he will become a Cynic; for that Cynicism is a

short path to virtue, as Apollodorus calls it in his Ethics; that he

will even eat human flesh, if there should be occasion; that he is the

only free man, and that the bad are slaves; for that freedom is a power

of independent action, but slavery a deprivation of the same. That there

is besides, another slavery, which consists in subjection, and a third

which consists in possession and subjection; the contrary of which is

masterhood, which is likewise bad.

And they say, that not only are the wise free, but that they are also

kings, since kingly power is an irresponsible dominion, which can only

exist in the case of the wise man, as Chrysippus says in his treatise

on the Proper Application of his Terms made by Zeno; for he says that

a ruler ought to give decisions on good and evil, and that none of the

wicked understand these things. In the same way, they assert that they

are the only people who are fit to be magistrates or judges, or orators,

and that none of the bad are qualified for these tasks. Moreover, that

they are free from all error, in consequence of their not being prone to

any wrong actions. Also, that they are unconnected with injury, for that

they never injure any one else, nor themselves. Also, that they are not

pitiful, and that they never make allowance for any one; for that they do

not relax the punishments appointed by law, since yielding, and pity, and

mercifulness itself, never exist in any of their souls, so as to induce

an affectation of kindness in respect of punishment; nor do they ever

think any punishment too severe. Again, they say that the wise man never

wonders at any of the things which appear extraordinary; as for instance,

at the stories about Charon, or the ebbing of the tide, or the springs

of hot water, or the bursting forth of flames. But, say they further,

the wise man will not live in solitude; for he is by nature sociable and

practical. Accordingly, he will take exercise for the sake of hardening

and invigorating his body. And the wise man will pray, asking good things

from the Gods, as Posidonius says in the first book of his treatise on

Duties, and Hecaton says the same thing in the thirteenth book of his

treatise on Extraordinary Things.

They also say, that friendship exists in the virtuous alone, on account

of their resemblance to one another. And they describe friendship itself

as a certain communion of the things which concern life, since we use

our friends as ourselves. And they assert that a friend is desirable for

his own sake, and that a number of friends is a good; and that among the

wicked there is no such thing as friendship, and that no wicked man can

have a friend.

Again, they say that all the foolish are mad; for that they are not

prudent, and that madness is equivalent to folly in every one of its

actions; but that the wise man does everything properly, just as we say

that Ismenias can play every piece of flute-music well. Also, they say

that everything belongs to the wise man, for that the law has given them

perfect and universal power; but some things also are said to belong to

the wicked, just in the same manner as some things are said to belong

to the unjust, or as a house is said to belong to a city in a different

sense from that in which a thing belongs to the person who uses it.

LXV. And they say that virtues reciprocally follow one another, and that

he who has one has all; for that the precepts of them all are common,

as Chrysippus affirms in the first book of his treatise on Laws; and

Apollodorus, in his Natural Philosophy, according to the ancient system;

and Hecaton, in the third book of his treatise on Virtues. For they

say that the man who is endued with virtue, is able to consider and

also to do what must be done. But what must be done must be chosen, and

encountered, and distributed, and awaited; so that if the man does some

things by deliberate choice, and some in a spirit of endurance, and some

distributively, and some patiently; he is prudent, and courageous, and

just, and temperate. And each of the virtues has a particular subject

of its own, about which it is conversant; as, for instance, courage is

conversant about the things which must be endured: prudence is conversant

about what must be done and what must not, and what is of a neutral

or indifferent character. And in like manner, the other virtues are

conversant about their own peculiar subjects; and wisdom in counsel and

shrewdness follow prudence; and good order and decorum follow temperance;

and equality and goodness of judgment follow justice; and constancy and

energy follow courage.

Another doctrine of the Stoics is, that there is nothing intermediate

between virtue and vice; while the Peripatetics assert that there is a

stage between virtue and vice, being an improvement on vice which has not

yet arrived at virtue. For the Stoics say, that as a stick must be either

straight or crooked, so a man must be either just or unjust, and cannot

be more just than just, or more unjust than unjust; and that the same

rule applies to all cases. Moreover, Chrysippus is of opinion that virtue

can be lost, but Cleanthes affirms that it cannot; the one saying that it

can be lost by drunkenness or melancholy, the other maintaining that it

cannot be lost on account of the firm perceptions which it implants in

men. They also pronounce it a proper object of choice; accordingly, we

are ashamed of actions which we do improperly, while we are aware that

what is honourable is the only good. Again, they affirm that it is of

itself sufficient for happiness, as Zeno says, and he is followed in this

assertion by Chrysippus in the first book of his treatise on Virtues, and

by Hecaton in the second book of his treatise on Goods.

“For if,” says he, “magnanimity be sufficient of itself to enable us to

act in a manner superior to all other men; and if that is a part of

virtue, then virtue is of itself sufficient for happiness, despising all

things which seem troublesome to it.” However, Panætius and Posidonius

do not admit that virtue has this sufficiency of itself, but say that

there is also need of good health, and competency, and strength. And

their opinion is that a man exercises virtue in everything, as Cleanthes

asserts, for it cannot be lost; and the virtuous man on every occasion

exercises his soul, which is in a state of perfection.

LXVI. Again, they say that justice exists by nature, and not because

of any definition or principle; just as law does, or right reason, as

Chrysippus tells us in his treatise on the Beautiful; and they think

that one ought not to abandon philosophy on account of the different

opinions prevailing among philosophers, since on this principle one would

wholly quit life, as Posidonius argues in his Exhortatory Essays. Another

doctrine of Chrysippus is, that general learning is very useful.

And the School in general maintain that there are no obligations of

justice binding on us with reference to other animals, on account of

their dissimilarity to us, as Chrysippus asserts in the first book of his

treatise on Justice, and the same opinion is maintained by Posidonius

in the first book of his treatise on Duty. They say too, that the wise

man will love those young men, who by their outward appearance, show a

natural aptitude for virtue; and this opinion is advanced by Zeno, in

his Republic, and by Chrysippus in the first book of his work on Lives,

and by Apollodorus in his Ethics. And they describe love as an endeavour

to benefit a friend on account of his visible beauty; and that it is an

attribute not of acquaintanceship, but of friendship. Accordingly, that

Thrasonides, although he had his mistress in his power, abstained from

her, because he was hated by her. Love, therefore, according to them is a

part of friendship, as Chrysippus asserts in his essay on Love; and it is

not blameable. Moreover, beauty is the flower of virtue.

And as there are three kinds of lives; the theoretical, the practical,

and the logical; they say that the last is the one which ought to be

chosen. For that a logical, that is a rational, animal was made by nature

on purpose for speculation and action. And they say that a wise man will

very rationally take himself out of life, either for the sake of his

country or of his friends, or if he be in bitter pain, or under the

affliction of mutilation, or incurable disease. And they also teach that

women ought to be in common among the wise, so that whoever meets with

any one may enjoy her, and this doctrine is maintained by Zeno in his

Republic, and by Chrysippus in his treatise on Polity, and by Diogenes

the Cynic, and by Plato; and then, say they, we shall love all boys

equally after the manner of fathers, and all suspicion on the ground of

undue familiarity will be removed.

They affirm too, that the best of political constitutions is a mixed one,

combined of democracy, and kingly power, and aristocracy. And they say

many things of this sort, and more too, in their Ethical Dogmas, and they

maintain them by suitable explanations and arguments. But this may be

enough for us to say of their doctrines on this head by way of summary,

and taking them in an elementary manner.

LXVII. They divide natural philosophy into the topics of bodies, and

of principles, and of elements, and of Gods, and of boundaries, and of

place, and of the vacuum. And they make these divisions according to

species; but according to genera they divide them into three topics,

that of the world, that of the elements, and the third is that which

reasons on causes. The topic about the world, they say, is subdivided

into two parts. For that in one point of view, the mathematicians also

have a share in it; and according to it it is that they prosecute their

investigations into the nature of the fixed stars and the planets; as,

for instance, whether the sun is of such a size as he appears to be, and

similarly, whether the moon is; and in the same way they investigate

the question of spherical motion, and others of the same character. The

other point of view is that which is reserved exclusively for natural

philosophers, according to which it is that the existence and substance

of things are examined, [for instance, whether the sun and the stars

consist of matter and form,] and whether the sun is born or not born,

whether it is living or lifeless, corruptible or incorruptible, whether

it is regulated by Providence, and other questions of this kind.

The topic which examines into causes they say is also divisible into

two parts; and with reference to one of its considerations, the

investigations of physicians partake of it; according to which it is

that they investigate the dominant principle of the soul, and the

things which exist in the soul, and seeds, and things of this kind.

And its other division is claimed as belonging to them also by the

mathematicians, as, for instance, how we see, what is the cause of our

appearance being reflected in a mirror, how clouds are collected, how

thunder is produced, and the rainbow, and the halo, and comets, and

things of that kind.

LXVIII. They think that there are two general principles in the universe,

the active and the passive. That the passive is matter, an existence

without any distinctive quality. That the active is the reason which

exists in the passive, that is to say, God. For that he, being eternal,

and existing throughout all matter, makes everything. And Zeno, the

Cittiæan, lays down this doctrine in his treatise on Essence, and so does

Cleanthes in his essay on Atoms, Chrysippus in the first book of his

Investigations in Natural Philosophy, towards the end, Archedemus in his

work on Elements, and Posidonius in the second book of his treatise on

Natural Philosophy. But they say that principles and elements differ from

one another. For that the one had no generation or beginning, and will

have no end; but that the elements may be destroyed by the operation of

fire. Also, that the elements are bodies, but principles have no bodies

and no forms, and elements too have forms.

Now a body, says Apollodorus in his Natural Philosophy, is extended in

a threefold manner; in length, in breadth, in depth; and then it is

called a solid body; and the superficies is the limit of the body having

length and breadth alone, but not depth. But Posidonius, in the third

book of his Heavenly Phænomena, will not allow a superficies either

any substantial reality, or any intelligible existence. A line is the

limit of a superficies, or length without breadth, or something which

has nothing but length. A point is the boundary of a line, and is the

smallest of all symbols.

They also teach that God is unity, and that he is called Mind, and Fate,

and Jupiter, and by many other names besides. And that, as he was in the

beginning by himself, he turned into water the whole substance which

pervaded the air; and as the seed is contained in the produce, so too, he

being the seminal principle of the world, remained behind in moisture,

making matter fit to be employed by himself in the production of those

things which were to come after; and then, first of all, he made the

four elements, fire, water, air, and earth. And Zeno speaks of these in

his treatise on the Universe, and so does Chrysippus in the first book of

his Physics, and so does Archedemus in some treatise on the Elements.

LXIX. Now an element is that out of which at first all things which are

are produced, and into which all things are resolved at last. And the

four elements are all equally an essence without any distinctive quality,

namely, matter; but fire is the hot, water the moist, air the cold, and

earth the dry—though this last quality is also common to the air. The

fire is the highest, and that is called æther, in which first of all the

sphere was generated in which the fixed stars are set, then that in which

the planets revolve; after that the air, then the water; and the sediment

as it were of all is the earth, which is placed in the centre of the rest.

LXX. They also speak of the world in a threefold sense; at one time

meaning God himself, whom they call a being of a certain quality, having

for his peculiar manifestation universal substance, a being imperishable,

and who never had any generation, being the maker of the arrangement and

order that we see; and who, after certain periods of time, absorbs all

substance in himself, and then re-produces it from himself. And this

arrangement of the stars they call the world, and so the third sense

is one composed of both the preceding ones. And the world is a thing

which is peculiarly of such and such a quality consisting of universal

substance, as Posidonius affirms in his Meteorological Elements, being a

system compounded of heaven and earth, and all the creatures which exist

in them; or it may be called a system compounded of Gods and men, and of

the things created on their account. And the heaven is the most remote

circumference of the world, in which all the Divine Nature is situated.

Again, the world is inhabited and regulated according to intellect

and providence, as Chrysippus says, in his works on Providence, and

Posidonius in the thirteenth book of his treatise on Gods, since mind

penetrates into every part of the world, just as the soul pervades us;

but it is in a greater degree in some parts, and in a less degree in

others. For instance, it penetrates as a habit, as, for instance, into

the bones and sinews; and into some it penetrates as the mind does, for

instance, into the dominant principle. And thus the whole world, being

a living thing, endowed with a soul and with reason, has the æther as

its dominant principle, as Antipater, of Tyre, says in the eighth book

of his treatise on the World. But Chrysippus, in the first book of his

essay on Providence, and Posidonius in his treatise on Gods, say that the

heaven is the dominant principle of the world; and Cleanthes attributes

this to the sun. Chrysippus, however, on this point contradicts himself;

for he says in another place, that the most subtle portion of the æther,

which is also called by the Stoics the first God, is what is infused in

a sensible manner into all the beings which are in the air, and through

every animal and every plant, and through the earth itself according to a

certain habit; and that it is this which communicates to them the faculty

of feeling.

They say too, that the world is one and also finite, having a spherical

form. For that such a shape is the most convenient for motion, as

Posidonius says, in the fifteenth book of his Discussions on Natural

Philosophy, and so says Antipater also in his essay on the World. And

on the outside there is diffused around it a boundless vacuum, which is

incorporeal. And it is incorporeal inasmuch, as it is capable of being

contained by bodies, but is not so. And that there is no such thing as

a vacuum in the world, but that it is all closely united and compact;

for that this condition is necessarily brought about by the concord

and harmony which exist between the heavenly bodies and those of the

earth. And Chrysippus mentions a vacuum in his essay on a Vacuum, and

also in the first book of his treatise on the Physical Arts, and so

does Apollophanes in his Natural Philosophy, and so does Apollodorus,

and so does Posidonius in the second book of his discourses on Natural

Philosophy. And they say that these things are all incorporeal, and all

alike. Moreover, that time is incorporeal, since it is an interval of the

motion of the world. And that of time, the past and the future are both

illimitable, but the present is limited. And they assert that the world

is perishable, inasmuch as it was produced by reason, and is one of the

things which are perceptible by the senses; and whatever has its parts

perishable, must also be perishable in the whole. And the parts of the

world are perishable, for they change into one another. Therefore, the

whole world is perishable. And again, if anything admits of a change for

the worse it is perishable; therefore, the world is perishable, for it

can be dried up, and it can be covered with water.

Now the world was created when its substance was changed from fire to

moisture, by the action of the air; and then its denser parts coagulated,

and so the earth was made, and the thinner portions were evaporated and

became air; and this being rarefied more and more, produced fire. And

then, by the combination of all these elements, were produced plants and

animals, and other kinds of things. Now Zeno speaks of the creation, and

of the destruction of the world, in his treatise on the Universe, and so

does Cleanthes, and so does Antipater, in the tenth book of his treatise

on the World. But Panætius asserts that the world is imperishable.

Again, that the world is an animal, and that it is endued with reason,

and life, and intellect, is affirmed by Chrysippus, in the first volume

of his treatise on Providence, and by Apollodorus in his Natural

Philosophy, and by Posidonius; and that it is an animal in this sense,

as being an essence endued with life, and with sensation. For that which

is an animal, is better than that which is not an animal. But nothing is

better than the world; therefore the world is an animal. And it is endued

with life, as is plain from the fact of our own soul being as it were

a fragment broken off from it. But Boethus denies that the world is an

animal.

Again, that the world is one, is affirmed by Zeno, in his treatise on

the Universe, and by Chrysippus, and by Apollodorus, in his Natural

Philosophy, and by Posidonius, in the first book of his Discourses

on Natural Philosophy. And by the term, the universe, according to

Apollodorus, is understood both the world itself, and also the whole of

the world itself, and of the exterior vacuum taken together. The world,

then, is finite, and the vacuum infinite.

LXXI. Of the stars, those which are fixed are only moved in connection

with the movements of the entire heaven; but the planets move according

to their own peculiar and separate motions. And the sun takes an oblique

path through the circle of the zodiac, and in the same manner also does

the moon, which is of a winding form. And the sun is pure fire, as

Posidonius asserts in the seventh book of his treatise on the Heavenly

Bodies, and it is larger than the earth, as the same author informs us,

in the sixteenth book of his Disclosures on Natural Philosophy. Also

it is spherical, as he says in another place, being made on the same

principle as the world is. Therefore it is fire, because it performs all

the functions of fire. And it is larger than the earth, as is proved by

the fact of the whole earth being illuminated by it, and also the whole

heaven. Also the fact of the earth throwing a conical shadow, proves that

the sun is greater than it, and the sun is seen in every part, because

of its magnitude. But the moon is of a more earthy nature than the sun,

inasmuch as it is nearer the earth.

Moreover, they say that all these fiery bodies, and all the other

stars, receive nutriment; the sun from the vast sea, being a sort of

intellectual appendage; and the moon from the fresh waters, being mingled

with the air, and also near the earth, as Posidonius explains it in the

sixth book of his Discourses on Natural Philosophy. And all the other

stars derive their nourishment from the earth. They also consider that

the stars are of a spherical figure, and that the earth is immovable. And

that the moon has not a light of her own, but that she borrows it from

the sun. And that the sun is eclipsed, when the moon runs in front of it

on the side towards us, as Zeno describes in his work on the Universe;

for when it comes across it in its passage, it conceals it, and again it

reveals it; and this is a phenomenon easily seen in a basin of water.

And the moon is eclipsed when it comes below the shadow of the earth, on

which account this never happens, except at the time of the full moon;

and although it is diametrically opposite to the sun every month, still

it is not eclipsed every month, because when its motions are obliquely

towards the sun, it does not find itself in the same place as the sun,

being either a little more to the north, or a little more to the south.

When therefore it is found in the same place with the sun, and with the

other intermediate objects, then it takes as it were the diameter of the

sun, and is eclipsed. And its place is along the line which runs between

the crab and the scorpion, and the ram and the bull, as Posidonius tells

us.

LXXII. They also say that God is an animal immortal, rational, perfect,

and intellectual in his happiness, unsusceptible of any kind of evil,

having a foreknowledge of the world and of all that is in the world;

however, that he has not the figure of a man; and that he is the creator

of the universe, and as it were, the Father of all things in common, and

that a portion of him pervades everything, which is called by different

names, according to its powers; for they call him Δία as being the person

(δι’ ὃν) everything is, and Ζῆνα, inasmuch as he is the cause of life,

(τοῦ Ζῆν), or because he pervades life. And Ἀθηνᾶ, with reference to the

extension of his dominant power over the æther (εἰς αἰθέρα). And Ἥρα,

on account of his extension through the air (εἰς ἀέρα). And Ἥφαιστος,

on account of his pervading fire, which is the chief instrument of art;

and Ποσειδῶν, as pervading moisture, and Δημήτηρ, as pervading the

earth (Γῆ). And in the same way, regarding some other of his peculiar

attributes, they have given him other names.[91]

The substance of God is asserted by Zeno to be the universal world, and

the heaven; and Chrysippus agrees with this doctrine, in his eleventh

book on the Gods, and so also does Posidonius, in the first book of his

treatise on the same subject. Antipater, in the seventh book of his

treatise on the World, says that his substance is aërial. And Boethus,

in his treatise on Nature, calls the substance of God the sphere of the

fixed stars.

LXXIII. And his nature they define to be, that which keeps the world

together, and sometimes that which produces the things upon the earth.

And nature is a habit which derives its movements from itself, perfecting

and holding together all that arises out of it, according to the

principles of production, in certain definite periods, and doing the same

as the things from which it is separated. And it has for its object,

suitableness and pleasure, as is plain from its having created man.

LXXIV. But Chrysippus, in his treatise on Fate, and Posidonius, in the

second book of his work on Fate, and Zeno, and Boethus, in the eleventh

book of his treatise on Fate, say, that all things are produced by fate.

And fate, (εἱμαρμένη), is a connected (εἰρομένη) cause of existing

things, or the reason according to which the world is regulated.

LXXV. They also say that divination has a universal existence, since

Providence has; and they define it as an act on account of certain

results, as Zeno and Chrysippus, in the second book of his treatise on

Divination, and Athenodorus and Posidonius, in the twelfth book of his

discourses on Natural Philosophy, and in the fifth book of his treatise

on Divination, all agree in saying; for Panætius denies that it has any

certain foundation.

LXXVI. And they say that the substance of all existing things is Primary

Matter, as Chrysippus asserts in the first book of his Physics; and

Zeno says the same. Now matter is that from which anything whatever is

produced. And it is called by a twofold appellation, essence and matter;

the one as relating to all things taken together, and the other to things

in particular and separate. The one which relates to all things taken

together, never becomes either greater or less; but the one relating to

things in particular, does become greater or less, as the case may be.

LXXVII. Body is, according to them, a substance and finite; as Antipater

says, in the second book of his treatise on Substance; and Apollodorus,

in his Natural Philosophy, agrees with him. It is also subject to change,

as we learn from the same author; for if it were immutable, then the

things which have been produced out of it would not have been produced;

on which account he also says that it is infinitely divisible: but

Chrysippus denies that it is infinite; for that nothing is infinite,

which is divisible at all.

LXXVIII. He admits, however, that it is infinitely divisible, and that

its concretions take place over the whole of it, as he explains in the

third book of his Physics, and not according to any circumference or

juxtaposition; for a little wine when thrown into the sea, will keep its

distinctness for a brief period, but after that, will be lost.

LXXIX. They also say that there are some Dæmones, who have a sympathy

with mankind, being surveyors of all human affairs; and that there are

heroes, which are the souls of virtuous men, which have left their bodies.

LXXX. Of the things which take place in the air, they say that winter is

the effect of the air above the earth being cooled, on account of the

retirement of the sun to a greater distance than before; that spring is

a good temperature of the air, according to the sun’s approach towards

us; that summer is the effect of the air above the earth being warmed by

the approach of the sun towards the north; that autumn is caused by the

retreat of the sun from us … to those places from which they flow.[92]

LXXXI. And the cause of the production of the winds is the sun, which

evaporates the clouds. Moreover, the rainbow is the reflexion of the

sun’s rays from the moist clouds, or, as Posidonius explains it in his

Meteorology, a manifestation of a section of the sun or moon, in a cloud

suffused with dew; being hollow and continuous to the sight; so that it

is reflected as in a mirror, under the appearance of a circle. And that

comets, and bearded stars, and meteors, are fires which have an existence

when the density of the air is borne upwards to the regions of the æther.

That a ray of light is a kindling of sudden fire, borne through the air

with great rapidity, and displaying an appearance of length; that rain

proceeds from the clouds, being a transformation of them into water,

whenever the moisture which is caught up from the earth or from the sea,

by the sun, is not able to be otherwise disposed of; for when it is

solidified, it is then called hoar frost. And hail is a cloud congealed,

and subsequently dispersed by the wind. Snow is moisture from a congealed

cloud, as Posidonius tells us in the eighth book of his discourse on

Natural Philosophy. Lightning is a kindling of the clouds from their

being rubbed together, or else broken asunder by the wind, as Zeno tells

us in his treatise on the Universe; and thunder is the noise made by them

on the occasion of their being rubbed together or broken asunder; and

the thunderbolt is a sudden kindling which falls with great violence on

the earth, from the clouds being rubbed together or broken asunder, or,

as others say, it is a conversion of fiery air violently brought down to

the earth. A typhon is a vast thunderbolt, violent and full of wind, or

a smoky breath of a cloud broken asunder. A πρηστὴς is a cloud rent by

fire, with wind,[93] … into the hollows of the earth, or when the wind

is pent up in the earth, as Posidonius says in his eighth book; and that

some of them are shakings, others rendings, others emissions of fire, and

others, instances of violent fermentation.

LXXXII. They also think that the general arrangement of the world is in

this fashion; that the earth is in the middle, occupying the place of the

centre; next to which comes the water, of a spherical form; and having

the same centre as the earth; so that the earth is in the water; and next

to the water comes the air, which has also a spherical form.

LXXXIII. And that there are five circles in the heaven; of which the

first is the arctic circle, which is always visible; the second is the

tropical summer circle; the third is the equinoctial circle; the fourth,

the winter tropical circle; and the fifth the antarctic, which is not

visible. And they are called parallel, because they do not incline to one

another; they are drawn however around the same centre. But the zodiac

is oblique, cutting the parallel circles. There are also five zones on

the earth; the first is the northern one, placed under the arctic circle,

uninhabitable by reason of the cold; the second is temperate; the third

is uninhabitable because of the heat, and is called the torrid zone; the

fourth is a temperate zone, on the other side of the torrid zone; the

fifth is the southern zone, being also uninhabitable by reason of the

cold.[94]

LXXXIV. Another of their doctrines is that nature is an artificial fire

tending by a regular road to production, which is a fiery kind of breath

proceeding according to art. Also, that the soul is sensible, and that

it is a spirit which is born with us; consequently it is a body and

continues to exist after death; that nevertheless it is perishable. But

that the soul of the universe is imperishable, and that the souls which

exist in animals are only parts of that of the universe. But Zeno, the

Cittiæan, and Antipater, in their treatise concerning the Soul, and

Posidonius also, all say that the soul is a warm spirit; for that by

it we have our breath, and by it we are moved. Cleanthes, accordingly,

asserts that all souls continue to exist till they are burnt up; but

Chrysippus says that it is only the souls of the wise that endure. And

they further teach that there are eight parts of the soul; the five

senses, and the generative faculties, and voice, and reason. And we see

because of a body of luminous air which extends from the organ of sight

to the object in a conical form, as it is asserted by Chrysippus, in the

second book of his Natural Philosophy, and also by Apollodorus. And the

apex of this cone is close to the eye, and its base is formed by the

object which is seen; so that that which is seen is as it were reported

to the eye by this continuous cone of air extended towards it like a

staff. In the same way, we hear because the air between the speaker and

the hearer is struck in a spherical manner; and is then agitated in

waves, resembling the circular eddies which one sees in a cistern when a

stone is dropped into it.

Sleep, they say, is produced by a relaxation of the æsthetic energies

with reference to the dominant part of the soul. And the causes of the

passions they explain to be the motions and conversions which take place

in connection with this spirit or soul.

LXXXV. Seed, they define as a thing of a nature capable of producing

other things of the same nature as the thing from which it has been

separated. And the seed of man, which man emits, is, together with

moisture, mixed up with the parts of the soul by that kind of mixture

which corresponds to the capacity of the parents. And Chrysippus says,

in the second book of his Natural Philosophy, that it is a spirit

according to substance; as is manifest from the seeds which are planted

in the earth; and which, if they are old, do not germinate, because all

their virtue has evaporated. And Sphærus says, that seed proceeds from

the entire body, and that that is how it is that it produces all the

parts of the body.

They also say that the seed of the female is unproductive; for, as

Sphærus says, it is devoid of tone, and small in quantity, and watery.

LXXXVI. They also say that that is the dominant part of the soul which is

its most excellent part; in which the imaginations and the desires are

formed, and whence reason proceeds. And this place is in the heart.

These then are the doctrines on the subject of natural philosophy

entertained by them, which it seems sufficient for us to detail, having

regard to the due proportions of this book. And the following are the

points in which some of them disagreed with the rest.

LIFE OF ARISTON.

I. Ariston the Bald, a native of Chios, surnamed the Siren, said, that

the chief good was to live in perfect indifference to all those things

which are of an intermediate character between virtue and vice; making

not the slightest difference between them, but regarding them all on a

footing of equality. For that the wise man resembles a good actor; who,

whether he is filling the part of Agamemnon or Thersites, will perform

them both equally well.

II. And he discarded altogether the topic of physics, and of logic,

saying that the one was above us, and that the other had nothing to do

with us; and that the only branch of philosophy with which we had any

real concern was ethics.

III. He also said that dialectic reasonings were like cobwebs; which,

although they seem to be put together on principles of art, are utterly

useless.

IV. And he did not introduce many virtues into his scheme, as Zeno did;

nor one virtue under a great many names, as the Megaric philosophers did;

but defined virtue as consisting in behaving in a certain manner with

reference to a certain thing.

V. And as he philosophized in this manner, and carried on his discussions

in the Cynosarges, he got so much influence as to be called a founder of

a sect. Accordingly, Miltiades, and Diphilus were called Aristoneans.

VI. He was a man of very persuasive eloquence, and one who could adapt

himself well to the humours of a multitude. On which account Timon says

of him:—

And one who, from Ariston’s wily race,

Traced his descent.

Diocles, the Magnesian, tells us that Ariston having fallen in with

Polemo, passed over to his school, at a time when Zeno was lying ill

with a long sickness. The Stoic doctrine to which he was most attached,

was the one that the wise man is never guided by opinions. But Persæus

argued against this, and caused one of two twin brothers to place a

deposit in his hands, and then caused the other to reclaim it; and thus

he convicted him, as he was in doubt on this point, and therefore forced

to act on opinion. He was a great enemy of Arcesilaus. And once, seeing

a bull of a monstrous conformation, having a womb, he said, “Alas! here

is an argument for Arcesilaus against the evidence of his senses.” On

another occasion, when a philosopher of the Academy said that he did not

comprehend anything, he said to him, “Do not you even see the man who is

sitting next to you?” And as he said that he did not, he said:—

Who then has blinded you, who’s been so harsh,

As thus to rob you of your beaming eyes?

VII. The following works are attributed to him. Two books of Exhortatory

Discourses; Dialogues on the Doctrines of Zeno; six books of

Conversations; seven books of Discussions on Wisdom; Conversations on

Love; Commentaries on Vain Glory; twenty-five books of Reminiscences;

three books of Memorabilia; eleven books of Apophthegms; a volume

against the Orators; a volume against the Rescripts of Alexinus; three

treatises against the Dialecticians; four books of Letters to Cleanthes.

But Panætius and Sosicrates say, that his only genuine writings are his

letters; and that all the rest are the works of Ariston the Peripatetic.

VIII. It is said that he, being bald, got a stroke of the sun, and so

died. And we have written a jesting epigram on him in Scazon iambics, in

the following terms:—

Why, O Ariston, being old and bald,

Did you allow the sun to roast your crown?

Thus, in an unbecoming search for warmth,

Against your will, you’ve found out chilly Hell.

IX. There was also another man of the name of Ariston; a native of Julii,

one of the Peripatetic school. And another who was an Athenian musician.

A fourth who was a tragic poet. A fifth, a native of Alæa, who wrote a

treatise on the Oratorical Art. A sixth was a peripatetic Philosopher of

Alexandria.

LIFE OF HERILLUS

I. Herillus, a native of Carthage, said that the chief good was

knowledge; that is to say, the always conducting one’s self in such a way

as to refer everything to the principle of living according to knowledge,

and not been misled by ignorance. He also said that knowledge was a habit

not departing from reason in the reception of perceptions.

On one occasion, he said that there was no such thing as a chief good,

but that circumstances and events changed it, just as the same piece of

brass might become a statue either of Alexander or of Socrates. And that

besides the chief good or end (τέλος[95]), there was a subordinate end

(ὑποτελίς) different from it. And that those who were not wise aimed at

the latter; but that only the wise man directed his views to the former.

And all the things between virtue and vice he pronounced indifferent.

II. His books contain but few lines, but they are full of power, and

contain arguments in opposition to Zeno.

III. It is said, that when he was a boy, many people were attached to

him; and as Zeno wished to drive them away, he persuaded him to have his

head shaved, which disgusted them all.

IV. His books are these. One on Exercise; one on the Passions; one on

Opinion; the Lawgiver; the Skilful Midwife; the Contradictory Teacher;

the Preparer; the Director; the Mercury; the Medea; a book of Dialogues;

a book of Ethical Propositions.

LIFE OF DIONYSIUS

I. Dionysius, the Deserter, as he was called, asserted that pleasure

was the chief good, from the circumstance of his being afflicted with

a complaint in his eyes. For, as he suffered severely, he could not

pronounce pain a thing indifferent.

II. He was the son of Theophantus, and a native of Heraclea.

III. He was a pupil, as we are told by Diocles, first of all of

Heraclides, his fellow citizen; after that of Alexinus, and Menedemus;

and last of all of Zeno. And at first, as he was very devoted to

learning, he tried his hand at all kinds of poetry. Afterwards, he

attached himself to Aratus, whom he took for his model. Having left Zeno,

he turned to the Cyrenaics, and became a frequenter of brothels, and in

other respects indulged in luxury without disguise.

IV. When he had lived near eighty years, he died of starvation.

V. The following books are attributed to him. Two books on Apathy; two

on Exercise; four on Pleasure; one on Riches, and Favours, and Revenge;

one on the Use of Men; one on Good Fortune; one on Ancient Kings; one on

Things which are Praised; one on Barbarian Customs.

These now are the chief men who differed from the Stoics. But the man who

succeeded Zeno in his school was Cleanthes, whom we must now speak of.

LIFE OF CLEANTHES

I. Cleanthes was a native of Assos, and the son of Phanias. He was

originally a boxer, as we learn from Antisthenes, in his Successions.

And he came to Athens, having but four drachmas, as some people say, and

attaching himself to Zeno, he devoted himself to Philosophy in a most

noble manner; and he adhered to the same doctrines as his master.

II. He was especially eminent for his industry, so that as he was a

very poor man, he was forced to undertake mercenary employments, and

he used to draw water in the gardens by night, and by day he used to

exercise himself in philosophical discussions; on which account he was

called Phreantles.[96] They also say that he was on one occasion brought

before a court of justice, to be compelled to give an account what his

sources of income were from which he maintained himself in such good

condition; and that then he was acquitted, having produced as his witness

the gardener in whose garden he drew the water; and a woman who was a

mealseller, in whose establishment he used to prepare the meal. And the

judges of the Areopagus admired him, and voted that ten minæ should be

given to him; but Zeno forbade him to accept them.

They also say that Antigonus presented him three thousand drachmas.

And once, when he was conducting some young men to some spectacle, it

happened that the wind blew away his cloak, and it was then seen that

he had nothing on under it; on which he was greatly applauded by the

Athenians, according to the account given by Demetrius, the Magnesian,

in his essay on People of the same Name. And he was greatly admired by

them on account of this circumstance.

They also say that Antigonus, who was a pupil of his, once asked him why

he drew water; and that he made answer, “Do I do nothing beyond drawing

water? Do I not also dig, and do I not water the land, and do all sorts

of things for the sake of philosophy?” For Zeno used to accustom him to

this, and used to require him to bring him an obol by way of tribute.[97]

And once he brought one of the pieces of money which he had collected in

this way, into the middle of a company of his acquaintances, and said,

“Cleanthes could maintain even another Cleanthes if he were to choose;

but others who have plenty of means to support themselves, seek for

necessaries from others; although they only study philosophy in a very

lazy manner.” And, in reference to these habits of his, Cleanthes was

called a second Heracles.

III. He was then very industrious; but he was not well endowed by nature,

and was very slow in his intellect. On which account Timon says of him:—

What stately ram thus measures o’er the ground,

And master of the flock surveys them round?

What citizen of Assos, dull and cold,

Fond of long words, a mouth-piece, but not bold.[98]

And when he was ridiculed by his fellow pupils, he used to bear it

patiently.

IV. He did not even object to the name when he was called an ass; but

only said that he was the only animal able to bear the burdens which Zeno

put upon him. And once, when he was reproached as a coward, he said,

“That is the reason why I make but few mistakes.” He used to say, in

justification of his preference of his own way of life to that of the

rich, “That while they were playing at ball, he was earning money by

digging hard and barren ground.” And he very often used to blame himself.

And once, Ariston heard him doing so, and said, “Who is it that you are

reproaching?” and he replied, “An old man who has grey hair, but no

brains.”

When some one once said to him, that Arcesilaus did not do what he ought,

“Desist,” he replied, “and do not blame him; for, if he destroys duty as

far as his words go, at all events he establishes it by his actions.”

Arcesilaus once said to him, “I never listen to flatterers.” “Yes,”

rejoined Cleanthes, “I flatter you, when I say that though you say one

thing, you do another.” When some one once asked him what lesson he ought

to inculcate on his son, he replied, “The warning of Electra:”—

Silence, silence, gently step.[99]

When a Lacedæmonian once said in his hearing, that labour was a good

thing, he was delighted, and addressed him:—

Oh, early worth, a soul so wise and young

Proclaims you from the sage Lycurgus sprung.[100]

Hecaton tells us in his Apophthegms, that once when a young man said,

“If a man who beats his stomach γαστρίζει then a man who slaps his thigh

μηρίζει,” he replied, “Do you stick to your διαμηρίζει.” But analogous

words do not always indicate analogous facts. Once when he was conversing

with a youth, he asked him if he felt; and as he said that he did, “Why

is it then,” said Cleanthes, “that I do not feel that you feel?”

When Sositheus, the poet, said in the theatre where he was present:—

Men whom the folly of Cleanthes urges;

He continued in the same attitude; at which the hearers were surprised,

and applauded him, but drove Sositheus away. And when he expressed his

sorrow for having abused him in this manner, he answered him gently,

saying, “That it would be a preposterous thing for Bacchus and Hercules

to bear being ridiculed by the poets without any expression of anger, and

for him to be indignant at any chance attack.” He used also to say, “That

the Peripatetics were in the same condition as lyres, which though they

utter sweet notes, do not hear themselves.” And it is said, that when

he asserted that, on the principles of Zeno, one could judge of a man’s

character by his looks, some witty young men brought him a profligate

fellow, having a hardy look from continual exercise in the fields, and

requested him to tell them his moral character; and he, having hesitated

a little, bade the man depart; and, as he departed, he sneezed, “I have

the fellow now,” said Cleanthes, “he is a debauchee.”

He said once to a man who was conversing with him by himself, “You are

not talking to a bad man.” And when some one reproached him with his old

age, he rejoined, “I too wish to depart, but when I perceive myself to

be in good health in every respect, and to be able to recite and read, I

am content to remain.” They say too, that he used to write down all that

he heard from Zeno on oyster shells, and on the shoulder-blades of oxen,

from want of money to buy paper with.

V. And though he was of this character, and in such circumstances, he

became so eminent, that, though Zeno had many other disciples of high

reputation, he succeeded him as the president of his School.

VI. And he left behind him some excellent books, which are these. One

on Time; two on Zeno’s System of Natural Philosophy; four books of the

Explanations of Heraclitus; one on Sensation; one on Art; one addressed

to Democritus; one to Aristarchus; one to Herillus; two on Desire; one

entitled Archæology; one on the Gods; one on the Giants; one on Marriage;

one on Poets; three on Duty; one on Good Counsel; one on Favour; one

called Exhortatory; one on Virtues; one on Natural Ability; one on

Gorgippus; one on Enviousness; one on Love; one on Freedom; one called

the Art of Love; one on Honour; one on Glory; The Statesman; one on

Counsel; one on Laws; one on Deciding as a Judge; one on the Way of Life;

three on Reason; one on the Chief Good; one on the Beautiful; one on

Actions; one on Knowledge; one on Kingly Power; one on Friendship; one on

Banquets; one on the Principle that Virtue is the same in Man and Woman;

one on the Wise Man Employing Sophisms; one on Apophthegms; two books

of Conversations; one on Pleasure; one on Properties; one on Doubtful

Things; one on Dialectics; one on Modes; one on Categorems.

VII. These are his writings.

And he died in the following manner. His gums swelled very much; and,

at the command of his physicians, he abstained from food for two days.

And he got so well that his physicians allowed him to return to all his

former habits; but he refused, and saying that he had now already gone

part of the way, he abstained from food for the future, and so died;

being, as some report, eighty years old, and having been a pupil of Zeno

nineteen years. And we have written a playful epigram on him also, which

runs thus:—

I praise Cleanthes, but praise Pluto more;

Who could not bear to see him grown so old,

So gave him rest at last among the dead,

Who’d drawn such loads of water while alive.

LIFE OF SPHÆRUS.

I. Sphærus, a native of the Bosphorus, was, as we have said before, a

pupil of Cleanthes after the death of Zeno.

II. And when he made a considerable advance in philosophy he went to

Alexandria, to the court of Ptolemy Philopater. And once, when there

was a discussion concerning the question whether a wise man would allow

himself to be guided by opinion, and when Sphærus affirmed that he would

not, the king, wishing to refute him, ordered some pomegranates of wax

to be set before him; and when Sphærus was deceived by them, the king

shouted that he had given his assent to a false perception. But Sphærus

answered very neatly, that he had not given his assent to the fact that

they were pomegranates, but to the fact that it was probable that they

might be pomegranates. And that a perception which could be comprehended

differed from one that was only probable.

Once, when Mnesistratus accused him of denying that Ptolemy was a king,

he said to him, “That Ptolemy was a man with such and such qualities, and

a king.”[101]

III. He wrote the following books. Two on the World; one on the Elements

of Seed; one on Fortune; one on the Smallest Things; one on Atoms and

Phantoms; one on the Senses; five Conversations about Heraclitus; one on

Ethical Arrangement; one on Duty; one on Appetite; two on the Passions;

one on Kingly Power; on the Lacedæmonian Constitution; three on Lycurgus

and Socrates; one on Law; one on Divination; one volume of Dialogues on

Love; one on the Eretrian Philosophers; one on Things Similar; one on

Terms; one on Habits; three on Contradictions; one on Reason; one on

Riches; one on Glory; one on Death; two on the Art of Dialectics; one on

Categorems; one on Ambiguity; and a volume of Letters.

LIFE OF CHRYSIPPUS.

I. Chrysippus was the son of Apollonius, and a native of either Soli or

Tarsus, as Alexander tells us in his Successions; and he was a pupil of

Cleanthes. Previously he used to practise running as a public runner;

then he became a pupil of Zeno or of Cleanthes, as Diocles and the

generality of authors say, and while he was still living he abandoned

him, and became a very eminent philosopher.

II. He was a man of great natural ability, and of great acuteness in

every way, so that in many points he dissented from Zeno, and also

from Cleanthes, to whom he often used to say that he only wanted to

be instructed in the dogmas of the school, and that he would discover

the demonstrations for himself. But whenever he opposed him with any

vehemence, he always repented, so that he used frequently to say:—

In most respects I am a happy man,

Excepting where Cleanthes is concerned;

For in that matter I am far from fortunate.

And he had such a high reputation as a dialectician, that most people

thought that if there were such a science as dialectics among the Gods;

it would be in no respect different from that of Chrysippus. But though

he was so eminently able in matter, he was not perfect in style.

III. He was industrious beyond all other men; as is plain from his

writings; for he wrote more than seven hundred and five books. And he

often wrote several books on the same subject, wishing to put down

everything that occurred to him; and constantly correcting his previous

assertions, and using a great abundance of testimonies. So that, as in

one of his writings he had quoted very nearly the whole of the Medea of

Euripides, and some one had his book in his hands; this latter, when he

was asked what he had got there, made answer, “The Medea of Chrysippus.”

And Apollodorus, the Athenian, in his Collection of Dogmas, wishing to

assert that what Epicurus had written out of his own head, and without

any quotations to support his arguments, was a great deal more than all

the books of Chrysippus, speaks thus (I give his exact words), “For if

any one were to take away from the books of Chrysippus all the passages

which he quotes from other authors, his paper would be left empty.”

These are the words of Apollodorus; but the old woman who lived with him,

as Diocles reports, used to say that he wrote five hundred lines every

day. And Hecaton says, that he first applied himself to philosophy, when

his patrimony had been confiscated, and seized for the royal treasury.

IV. He was slight in person, as is plain from his statue which is in the

Ceramicus, which is nearly hidden by the equestrian statue near it; in

reference to which circumstance, Carneades called him Crypsippus.[102]

He was once reproached by some one for not attending the lectures of

Ariston, who was drawing a great crowd after him at the time; and he

replied, “If I had attended to the multitude I should not have been a

philosopher.” And once, when he saw a dialectician pressing hard on

Cleanthes, and proposing sophistical fallacies to him, he said, “Cease

to drag that old man from more important business, and propose these

questions to us who are young.” At another time, when some one wishing to

ask him something privately, was addressing him quietly, but when he saw

a multitude approaching began to speak more energetically he said to him:—

Alas, my brother! now your eye is troubled;

You were quite sane just now; and yet how quickly

Have you succumbed to frenzy.[103]

And at drinking parties he used to behave quietly, moving his legs about

however, so that a female slave once said, “It is only the legs of

Chrysippus that are drunk.” And he had so high an opinion of himself,

that once, when a man asked him, “To whom shall I entrust my son?” he

said, “To me, for if I thought that there was any one better than myself,

I would have gone to him to teach me philosophy.” In reference to which

anecdote they report that people used to say of him:—

He has indeed a clear and subtle head,

The rest are forms of empty æther made.[104]

And also:—

For if Chrysippus had not lived and taught,

The Stoic school would surely have been nought.

VI. But at last, when Arcesilaus and Lacydes, as Sotion records in

his eighth book, came to the Academy, he joined them in the study of

philosophy; from which circumstance he got the habit of arguing for and

against a custom, and discussed magnitudes and quantities, following the

system of the Academics.

VII. Hermippus relates, that one day, when he was teaching in the Odeum,

he was invited to a sacrifice by his pupils; and, that drinking some

sweet unmixed wine, he was seized with giddiness, and departed this life

five days afterwards, when he had lived seventy-three years; dying in the

hundred and forty-third olympiad, as Apollodorus says in his Chronicles.

And we have written an epigram on him:—

Chrysippus drank with open mouth some wine

Then became giddy, and so quickly died.

Too little reck’d he of the Porch’s weal,

Or of his country’s, or of his own dear life;

And so descended to the realms of Hell.

But some people say that he died of a fit of immoderate laughter. For

that seeing his ass eating figs, he told his old woman to give the ass

some unmixed wine to drink afterwards, and then laughed so violently that

he died.

VIII. He appears to have been a man of exceeding arrogance. Accordingly,

though he wrote such numbers of books, he never dedicated one of them

to any sovereign. And he was contented with one single old woman, as

Demetrius tells us, in his People of the same Name. And when Ptolemy

wrote to Cleanthes, begging him either to come to him himself or to send

him some one, Sphærus went to him, but Chrysippus slighted the invitation.

IX. However, he sent for the sons of his sister, Aristocreon and

Philocrates, and educated them; and he was the first person who ventured

to hold a school in the open air in the Lyceum, as the before mentioned

Demetrius relates.

X. There was also another Chrysippus, a native of Cnidos, a physician,

from whom Erasistratus testifies that he received great benefit. And

another also who was a son of his, and the physician of Ptolemy; who,

having had a false accusation brought against him, was apprehended and

punished by being scourged. There was also a fourth who was a pupil of

Erasistratus; and a fifth was an author of a work called Georgics.

XI. Now this philosopher used to delight in proposing questions of this

sort. The person who reveals the mysteries to the uninitiated commits

a sin; the hierophant reveals them to the uninitiated; therefore the

hierophant commits sin? Another was, that which is not in the city, is

also not in the house; but a well is not in the city, therefore, there is

not a well in the house. Another was, there is a certain head; that head

you have not got; there is then a head that you have not got; therefore,

you have not got a head. Again, if a man is in Megara, he is not in

Athens; but there is a man in Megara, therefore, there is not a man in

Athens. Again, if you say anything, what you say comes out of your mouth;

but you say “a waggon,” therefore a waggon comes out of your mouth.

Another was, if you have not lost a thing, you have it; but you have not

lost horns; therefore, you have horns. Though some attribute this sophism

to Eubulides.

XII. There are people who run Chrysippus down as having written a great

deal that is very shameful and indecent. For in his treatise on the

Ancient Natural Historians, he relates the story of Jupiter and Juno

very indecently, devoting six hundred lines to what no one could repeat

without polluting his mouth. For, as it is said, he composes this story,

though he praises it as consisting of natural details, in a way more

suitable to street walkers than to Goddesses; and not at all resembling

the ideas which have been adopted or cited by writers in paintings. For

they were found neither in Polemo, nor in Hypsicrates, nor in Antigonus,

but were inserted by himself. And in his treatise on Polity, he allows

people to marry their mothers, or their daughters, or their sons. And

he repeats this doctrine in his treatise on those things which are not

desirable for their own sake, in the very opening of it. And in the third

book of his treatise on Justice, he devotes a thousand lines to bidding

people devour even the dead.

In the second book of his treatise on Life and Means of Support, where he

is warning us to consider beforehand, how the wise man ought to provide

himself with means, he says, “And yet why need he provide himself with

means? for if it is for the sake of living, living at all is a matter

of indifference; if it is for the sake of pleasure, that is a matter of

indifference too; if it is for the sake of virtue, that is of itself

sufficient for happiness. But the methods of providing one’s self with

means are ridiculous; for instance, some derive them from a king; and

then it will be necessary to humour him. Some from friendship; and

then friendship will become a thing to be bought with a price. Some

from wisdom; and then wisdom will become mercenary; and these are the

accusations which he brings.”

But since he has written many books of high reputation, it has seemed

good to me to give a catalogue of them, classifying them according to

their subjects. They are the following:—

Books on Logic; Propositions; Logical Questions; a book of the

Contemplations of the Philosopher; six books of Dialectic Terms addressed

to Metrodorus; one on the Technical Terms used in Dialectics, addressed

to Zeno; one called the Art of Dialectics, addressed to Aristagoras; four

books of Probable Conjunctive Reasons, addressed to Dioscorides.

The first set of treatises on the Logical Topics, which concern things,

contains: one essay on Propositions; one on those Propositions which are

not simple; two on the Copulative Propositions, addressed to Athenades;

three on Positive Propositions, addressed to Aristagoras; one on Definite

Propositions, addressed to Athenodorus; one on Privative Propositions,

addressed to Thearus; three on the Best Propositions, addressed to Dion;

four on the Differences between Indefinite Propositions; two on those

Propositions which are enunciated with a reference to time; two on

Perfect Propositions.

The second set contains, one essay on a Disjunctive True Propositions,

addressed to Gorgippides; four on a Conjunctive True Proposition, also

addressed to Gorgippides; one called, the Sect, addressed to Gorgippides;

one on the argument of Consequents; one on questions touched upon in the

three preceding treatises, and now re-examined, this also is addressed

to Gorgippides; one on what is Possible, addressed to Clitus; one on the

treatise of Philo, on Signification; one on what it is that Falsehood

consists in.

The third set contains, two treatises on Imperative Propositions; two

on Interrogation; four on Examination; an epitome of the subject of

Interrogation and Examination; four treatises on Answer; an abridgment on

Answer; two essays on Investigation.

The fourth set contains ten books on Categorems, addressed to Metrodorus;

one treatise on what is Direct and Indirect, addressed to Philarchus; one

on Conjunctions, addressed to Apollonides; four on Categorems, addressed

to Pasylus.

The fifth set contains, one treatise on the Five Cases; one on Things

defined according to the Subject; two on Enunciation, addressed to

Stesagoras; two on Appellative Nouns.

The next class of his writings refers to rules of Logic, with reference

to words, and speech which consists of words.

The first set of these contains, six treatises on Singular and Plural

Enunciations; five on Words, addressed to Sosigenes and Alexander; four

on the Inequality of Words, addressed to Dion; three on the Sorites

which refer to Words; one on Solecisms in the Use of Words, addressed to

Dionysius; one entitled Discourses, contrary to Customs; one entitled

Diction, and addressed to Dionysius.

The second set contains, five treatises on the Elements of Speech and of

Phrases; four on the Arrangement of Phrases; three on the Arrangement,

and on the Elements of Phrases, addressed to Philip; one on the Elements

of Discourse, addressed to Nicias; one on Correlatives.

The third set contains, two treatises against those who do not admit

Division; four on Ambiguous Expressions, addressed to Apollos; one,

Ambiguity in Modes; two on the Ambiguous Use of Figures, in Conjunctive

Propositions; two on the essay on Ambiguous Expressions, by Panthoides;

five on the Introduction to the Ambiguous Expressions; one, being an

abridgment of the Ambiguous Expressions, addressed to Epicrates; and a

collection of instances to serve as an Introduction to the Ambiguous

Expressions, in two books.

The next class is on the subject of that part of logic which is

conversant about reasonings and modes.

The first set of works in this class, contains, the Art of Reasoning

and of Modes, in five books, addressed to Dioscorides; a treatise on

Reasoning, in three books; one on the Structure of Modes, addressed to

Stesagoras, in five books; a comparison of the Elements of Modes; a

treatise on Reciprocal and Conjunctive Reasonings; an essay to Agathon,

called also an essay on Problems, which follow one another; a treatise,

proving that Syllogistic Propositions suppose one or more other terms;

one on Conclusions, addressed to Aristagoras; one essay, proving that

the same reasoning can affect several figures; one against those who

deny that the same reasoning can be expressed by syllogism, and without

syllogism, in two books; three treatises against those who attack the

resolution of Syllogisms; one on the treatise on Modes, by Philo,

addressed to Timostratus; two treatises on Logic, in one volume,

addressed to Timocrates and Philomathes; one volume of questions on

Reasonings and Modes.

The second set contains, one book of Conclusive Reasonings, addressed

to Zeno; one on Primary Syllogisms, which are not demonstrative; one on

the resolution of Syllogisms; one, in two books, on Captious Reasonings,

addressed to Pasylus; one book of Considerations on Syllogisms; one book

of Introductory Syllogisms, addressed to Zeno; three of Introductory

Modes, addressed also to Zeno; five of False Figures of Syllogism; one

of a Syllogistic Method, for the resolution of arguments, which are not

demonstrative; one of Researches into the Modes, addressed to Zeno and

Philomathes (but this appears to be an erroneous title).

The third set contains, one essay on Incidental Reasonings, addressed to

Athenades (this again is an incorrect title); three books of Incidental

Discourses on the Medium (another incorrect title); one essay on the

Disjunctive Reasons of Aminias.

The fourth set contains, a treatise on Hypothesis, in three books,

addressed to Meleager; a book of hypothetical reasonings on the Laws,

addressed also to Meleager; two books of hypothetical reasoning to serve

as an Introduction; two books of hypothetical reasonings on Theorems; a

treatise in two books, being a resolution of the Hypothetical Reasonings

of Hedylus; an essay, in three books, being a resolution of the

Hypothetical Reasonings of Alexander (this is an incorrect title); two

books of Expositions, addressed to Leodamas.

The fifth set contains, an introduction to Fallacy, addressed to

Aristocreon; an introduction to False Reasonings; a treatise in six

books, on Fallacy, addressed to Aristocreon.

The sixth set contains, a treatise against those who believe Truth and

Falsehood to be the same thing. One, in two books, against those who have

recourse to division to resolve the Fallacy, addressed to Aristocreon; a

demonstrative essay, to prove that it is not proper to divide indefinite

terms; an essay, in three books, in answer to the objections against

the non-division of Indefinite Terms, addressed to Pasylus; a solution,

according to the principles of the ancients, addressed to Dioscorides; an

essay on the Resolution of the Fallacy, addressed to Aristocreon, this is

in three books; a resolution of the Hypothetical Arguments of Hedylus,

in one book, addressed to Aristocreon and Apollos.

The seventh set contains, a treatise against those who contend that

the premisses on the Fallacy, are false; a treatise on Negative

Reasoning, addressed to Aristocreon, in two books; one book of Negative

Reasonings, addressed to Gymnasias; two books of a treatise on Reasoning

by Progression, addressed to Stesagoras; two books of Reasonings by

Interrogation, and on the Arrest,[105] addressed to Onetor; an essay, in

two books, on the Corrected Argument, addressed to Aristobulus; another

on the Non-apparent Argument, addressed to Athenades.

The eighth set contains, an essay on the Argument Outis, in eight books,

addressed to Menecrates; a treatise, in two books, on Arguments composed

of a finite term, and an indefinite term, addressed to Pasylus; another

essay on the Argument Outis, addressed to Epicrates.

The ninth set contains, two volumes of Sophisms, addressed to Heraclides,

and Pollis; five volumes of Dialectic Arguments, which admit of no

solution, addressed to Dioscorides; an essay, in one book, against the

Method of Arcesilaus, addressed to Sphærus.

The tenth set contains, a treatise in six books, against Custom,

addressed to Metrodorus; and another, in seven books, on Custom,

addressed to Gorgippides.

There are, therefore, works on Logic, in the four grand classes which we

have here enumerated, embracing various questions, without any connection

with one another, to the number of thirty nine sets, amounting in the

whole to three hundred and eleven treatises on Logic.

The next division comprises those works which have for their object, the

explanation of Moral Ideas.

The first class of this division, contains an essay, giving a description

of Reason, addressed to Theosphorus; a book of Ethical questions; three

books of Principles, to serve as the foundation of Dogmas, addressed

to Philomathes; two books of definitions of Good-breeding, addressed

to Metrodorus; two books of definitions of the Bad, addressed to

Metrodorus; two books of definitions of Neutral Things, addressed also

to Metrodorus; seven books of definitions of Things, according to their

genera, addressed to Metrodorus; and two books of Definitions, according

to other systems, addressed to Metrodorus.

The second set contains, a treatise on Things Similar, in three books,

addressed to Aristocles; an essay on Definitions, in seven books,

addressed to Metrodorus.

The third set contains, a treatise, in seven books, on the Incorrect

Objections made to Definitions, addressed to Laodamas; two books of

Probable Arguments bearing on Definitions, addressed to Dioscorides;

two books on Species and Genus, addressed to Gorgippides; one book on

Divisions; two books on Contraries, addressed to Dionysius; a book of

Probable Arguments relating to Divisions, and Genera, and Species; a book

on Contraries.

The fourth set contains, a treatise, in seven books, on Etymologies,

addressed to Diocles; another, in four books, on the same subject,

addressed to the same person.

The fifth set contains, a treatise in two books, on Proverbs, addressed

to Zenodotus; an essay on Poems, addressed to Philomathes; an essay, on

How one Ought to Listen to Poems, in two books; an essay, in reply to

Critics, addressed to Diodorus.

The next division refers to Ethics, looked at in a general point of view,

and to the different systems arising out of them, and to the Virtues.

The first set contains, an essay against Pictures, addressed to Timonax;

an essay on the Manner in which we express ourselves about, and form our

Conceptions of, each separate thing; two books of Thoughts, addressed to

Laodamas; an essay, in three books, on Conception, addressed to Pythonax;

an essay, that the Wise Man is not Guided by Opinion; an essay, in five

books, on Comprehension, and Knowledge, and Ignorance; a treatise on

Reason, in two books; a treatise on the Employment of Reason, addressed

to Leptines.

The second set contains, a treatise, that the Ancient Philosophers

approved of Logic, with Proofs to support the Arguments, in two books,

addressed to Zeno; a treatise on Dialectics, in four books, addressed

to Aristocreon; an answer to the Objections urged against Dialectics,

in three books; an essay on Rhetoric, in four books, addressed to

Dioscorides.

The third set contains, a treatise on Habit, in three books, addressed

to Cleon; a treatise on Art and Want of Art, in four books, addressed to

Aristocreon; a treatise, in four books, on the Difference between the

Virtues, addressed to Diodorus; a treatise, to show that all the Virtues

are Equal; a treatise on the Virtues, in two books, addressed to Pollis.

The next division refers to Ethics, as relating to Good and Evil.

The first set contains, a treatise in ten books, on the Honourable, and

on Pleasure, addressed to Aristocreon; a demonstration, that Pleasure is

not the Chief Good of Man, in four books; a demonstration that Pleasure

is not a Good at all, in four books; a treatise on what is said by …[106]