BOOK III.

LIFE OF PLATO.

I. Plato was the son of Ariston and Perictione or Potone, and a citizen

of Athens; and his mother traced her family back to Solon; for Solon

had a brother named Dropidas, who had a son named Critias, who was

the father of Callæschrus, who was the father of that Critias who was

one of the thirty tyrants, and also of Glaucon, who was the father of

Charmides and Perictione. And she became the mother of Plato by her

husband Ariston, Plato being the sixth in descent from Solon. And Solon

traced his pedigree up to Neleus and Neptune. They say too that on the

father’s side, he was descended from Codrus, the son of Melanthus, and

they too are said by Thrasylus to derive their origin from Neptune. And

Speusippus, in his book which is entitled the Funeral Banquet of Plato,

and Clearchus in his Panegyric on Plato, and Anaxilides in the second

book of his History of Philosophers, say that the report at Athens was

that Perictione was very beautiful, and that Ariston endeavoured to

violate her and did not succeed; and that he, after he had desisted from

his violence saw a vision of Apollo in a dream, in consequence of which

he abstained from approaching his wife till after her confinement.

II. And Plato was born, as Apollodorus says in his Chronicles, in the

eighty-eighth Olympiad, on the seventh day of the month Thargelion, on

which day the people of Delos say that Apollo also was born. And he died,

as Hermippus says, at a marriage feast, in the first year of the hundred

and eighth Olympiad, having lived eighty-one years. But Neanthes says

that he was eighty-four years of age at his death. He is then younger

than Isocrates by six years; for Isocrates was born in the archonship of

Lysimachus, and Plato in that of Aminias, in which year Pericles died.

III. And he was of the borough of Colytus, as Antileon tells us in

his second book on Dates. And he was born, according to some writers,

in Ægina, in the house of Phidiades the son of Thales, as Phavorinus

affirms in his Universal History, as his father had been sent thither

with several others as a settler, and returned again to Athens when the

settlers were driven out by the Lacedæmonians, who came to the assistance

of the Æginetans. And he served the office of choregus at Athens, when

Dion was at the expense of the spectacle exhibited, as Theodorus relates

in the eighth book of his Philosophical Conversations.

IV. And he had brothers, whose names were Adimantus and Glaucon, and a

sister called Potone, who was the mother of Speusippus.

V. And he was taught learning in the school of Dionysius, whom he

mentions in his Rival Lovers. And he learnt gymnastic exercises under

the wrestler Ariston of Argos. And it was by him that he had the name

of Plato given to him instead of his original name, on account of his

robust figure, as he had previously been called Aristocles, after the

name of his grandfather, as Alexander informs us in his Successions. But

some say that he derived this name from the breadth (πλατύτης) of his

eloquence, or else because he was very wide (πλατὺς) across the forehead,

as Neanthes affirms. There are some also, among whom is Dicæarchus in the

first volume on Lives, who say that he wrestled at the Isthmian games.

VI. It is also said that he applied himself to the study of painting, and

that he wrote poems, dithyrambics at first, and afterwards lyric poems

and tragedies.

VII. But he had a very weak voice, they say; and the same fact is stated

by Timotheus the Athenian, in his book on Lives. And it is said that

Socrates in a dream saw a cygnet on his knees, who immediately put forth

feathers, and flew up on high, uttering a sweet note, and that the next

day Plato came to him, and that he pronounced him the bird which he had

seen.

VIII. And he used to philosophize at first in the Academy, and afterwards

in the garden near Colonus, as Alexander tells us in his Successions,

quoting the testimony of Heraclitus; and subsequently, though he was

about to contend for the prize in tragedy in the theatre of Bacchus,

after he had heard the discourse of Socrates, he learnt his poems,

saying:—

Vulcan, come here; for Plato wants your aid.

And from henceforth, as they say, being now twenty years old, he became a

pupil of Socrates. And when he was gone, he attached himself to Cratylus,

the disciple of Heraclitus, and to Hermogenes, who had adopted the

principles of Parmenides. Afterwards, when he was eight and twenty years

of age, as Hermodorus tells us, he withdrew to Megara to Euclid, with

certain others of the pupils of Socrates; and subsequently, he went to

Cyrene to Theodorus the mathematician; and from thence he proceeded to

Italy to the Pythagoreans, Philolaus and Eurytus, and from thence he went

to Eurytus to the priests there; and having fallen sick at that place, he

was cured by the priests by the application of sea water, in reference to

which he said:—

The sea doth wash away all human evils.

And he said too, that, according to Homer, all the Egyptians were

physicians. Plato had also formed the idea of making the acquaintance of

the Magi; but he abandoned it on account of the wars in Asia.

IX. And when he returned to Athens, he settled in the Academy, and that

is a suburban place of exercise planted like a grove, so named from an

ancient hero named Hecademus, as Eupolis tells us in his Discharged

Soldiers.

In the well-shaded walks, protected well

By Godlike Academus.

And Timon, with reference to Plato, says:—

A man did lead them on, a strong stout man,

A honeyed speaker, sweet as melody

Of tuneful grasshopper, who, seated high

On Hecademus’ tree, unwearied sings.

For the word academy was formerly spelt with E. Now our philosopher

was a friend of Isocrates; and Praxiphanes composed an account of a

conversation which took place between them, on the subject of poets, when

Isocrates was staying with Plato in the country.

X. And Aristoxenus says that he was three times engaged in military

expeditions; once against Tanagra; the second time against Corinth,

and the third time at Delium; and that in the battle of Delium he

obtained the prize of pre-eminent valour. He combined the principles of

the schools of Heraclitus, and Pythagoras and Socrates; for he used

to philosophize on those things which are the subjects of sensation,

according to the system of Heraclitus; on those with which intellect is

conversant, according to that of Pythagoras; and on politics according to

that of Socrates.

XI. And some people, (of whom Satyrus is one,) say that he sent a

commission to Sicily to Dion, to buy him three books of Pythagoras from

Philolaus for a hundred minæ; for they say that he was in very easy

circumstances, having received from Dionysius more than eighty talents,

as Onetor also asserts in his treatise which is entitled, Whether a wise

Man ought to acquire Gains.

XII. And he was much assisted by Epicharmus the comic poet, a great part

of whose works he transcribed, as Alcimus says in his essays addressed

to Amyntas, of which there are four. And in the first of them he speaks

as follows:—“And Plato appears to utter a great many of the sentiments

of Epicharmus. Let us just examine. Plato says that that is an object

of sensation, which is never stationary either as to its quality or its

quantity, but which is always flowing and changing; as, for instance,

if one take from any objects all number, then one cannot affirm that

they are either equal, or of any particular things, or of what quality

or quantity they are. And these things are of such a kind that they

are always being produced, but that they never have any invariable

substances.”

But that is a subject for intellect from which nothing is taken, and

to which nothing is added. And this is the nature of things eternal,

which is always similar and the same. And, indeed, Epicharmus speaks

intelligibly on the subject of what is perceived by the senses and by the

intellect:—

_A._ But the great Gods were always present, nor

Did they at any moment cease to be;

And their peculiar likeness at all times

Do they retain, by the same principles.

_B._ Yet chaos is asserted to have been

The first existent Deity.

_A._ How can that be?

For ’tis impossible that we should find

Any first principle arise from anything.

_B._ Is there then no first principle at all?

_A._ Nor second either in the things we speak of;

But thus it is—if to an even number,

Or e’en an odd one, if you so prefer it,

You add a unit, or if you deduct one,

Say will the number still remain the same?

_B._ Certainly not.

_A._ So, if you take a measure

A cubit long, and add another cubit,

Or cut a portion off, the measure then

No longer is the same?

_B._ Of course it is not.

_A._ Now turn your eyes and thoughts upon mankind—

We see one grows, another perishes

So that they all exist perpetually

In a condition of transition. That

Whose nature changes must be different

At each successive moment, from the thing

It was before. So also, you and I

Are different people now from what we were

But yesterday; and then, again, to-morrow

We shall be different from what we’re now;

So that, by the same rule, we’re always different.

And Alcimus speaks as follows:—“The wise men say that the soul perceives

some things by means of the body, as for instance, when it hears and

sees; but that it also perceives something by its own power, without

availing itself at all of the assistance of the body.” On which account

existent things are divisible into objects of sensation and objects of

understanding. On account of which Plato used to say, that those who

wished to become acquainted with the principles of everything, ought

first of all to divide the ideas as he calls them, separately, such as

similarity, and unity, and multitude, and magnitude, and stationariness,

and motion. And secondly, that they ought to form a notion of the

honourable and the good, and the just, and things of that sort, by

themselves, apart from other considerations. And thirdly, that they

ought to ascertain the character of such ideas as are relative to one

another, such as knowledge, or magnitude, or authority; considering that

the things which come under our notice from partaking of their nature,

have the same names that they have. I mean that one calls that just which

partakes of the just; and that beautiful which partakes of the beautiful.

And each of these primary species is eternal, and is to be understood

by the intellect, and is not subject to the influence of external

circumstances. On which account he says, that ideas exist in nature as

models; and that all other things are like them, and, as it were, copies

of them. Accordingly Epicharmus speaks thus about the good, and about the

ideas.

_A._ Tell me, is flute-playing now a thing at all?

_B._ Of course it is.

_A._ Is man then flute-playing?

_B._ No, nothing of the sort.

_A._ Well, let us see—

What is a flute-player? what think you now

Of him—is he a man, or is he not?

_B._ Of course he is a man.

_A._ Think you not then

The case is just the same about the good.

That the good is something by itself, intrinsic

And he who’s learnt, does at once become

Himself a good man? just as he who’s learnt

Flute-playing is a flute-player; or dancing,

A dancer; weaving, a weaver. And in short,

Whoever learns an art, does not become

The art itself, but just an artist in it.

Plato, in his theory of Ideas, says, “That since there is such a thing

as memory, the ideas are in existent things, because memory is only

conversant about what is stable and enduring; and that no other thing

is durable except ideas, for in what way,” he continues, “could animals

be preserved, if they had no ideas to guide them, and if, in addition

to them, they had not an intellect given to them by nature?” But as it

is they recollect similitudes, and also their food, so as to know what

kind of food is fit for them; which they learn because the notion of

similarity is implanted naturally in every animal; owing to which notion

they recognize those of the same species as themselves. What is it then

that Epicharmus says?

Eumæus’ wisdom?—not a scanty gift

Appropriated to one single being;

But every animal that breathes and lives,

Has mind and intellect.—So if you will

Survey the facts attentively, you’ll find,

E’en in the common poultry yard, the hen

Brings not her offspring forth at first alive,

But sits upon her eggs, and by her warmth,

Cherishes them into life. And all this wisdom

She does derive from nature’s gift alone,

For nature is her only guide and teacher.

And in a subsequent passage he says:—

There is no wonder in my teaching this,

That citizens please citizens, and seem

To one another to be beautiful:

And so one dog seems to another dog

The fairest object in the world; and so

One ox seems to another, ass to ass,

And swine to swine.

And these and similar speculations are examined and compared by Alcimus

through four books, where he shows how much assistance Plato has derived

from Epicharmus. And that Epicharmus himself was not indisposed to

appreciate his own wisdom, one may learn from these lines, in which he

predicts that there will arise some one to imitate him:—

But as I think, I surely foresee this,

That these my words will be preserved hereafter

In many people’s recollection. And

Another man will come, who’ll strip my reasons

Of their poetic dress, and, clothing them

In other garments and with purple broidery

Will show them off; and being invincible,

Will make all rivals bow the knee to him.

XIII. Plato also appears to have brought the books of Sophron, the

farce-writer,[31] to Athens, which were previously neglected; and to have

availed himself of them in his Speculations on Morals: and a copy of them

was found under his head.

XIV. And Plato made three voyages to Sicily, first of all for the purpose

of seeing the island and the craters of volcanoes, when Dionysius, the

son of Hermocrates, being the tyrant of Sicily, pressed him earnestly

to come and see him; and he, conversing about tyranny, and saying that

that is not the best government which is advantageous for one individual

alone, unless that individual is pre-eminent in virtue, had a quarrel

with Dionysius, who got angry, and said, “Your words are those of an old

dotard.” And Plato replied, “And your language is that of a tyrant.” And

on this the tyrant became very indignant, and at first was inclined to

put him to death; but afterwards, being appeased by Dion and Aristomenes,

he forebore to do that, but gave him to Pollis, the Lacedæmonian, who

happened to have come to him on an embassy just at that time, to sell

as a slave. And he took him to Ægina and sold him; and Charmander, the

son of Charmandrides, instituted a capital prosecution against him, in

accordance with the law which was in force, in the island of Ægina,

that the first Athenian who landed on the island should be put to death

without a trial; and he himself was the person who had originally

proposed that law, as Phavorinus says, in his Universal History. But when

some one said, though he said it only in joke, that it was a philosopher

who had landed, the people released him. But some say that he was brought

into the assembly and watched; and that he did not say a word, but stood

prepared to submit to whatever might befall him; and that they determined

not to put him to death, but to sell him after the fashion of prisoners

of war. And it happened by chance that Anniceris, the Cyrenean, was

present, who ransomed him for twenty minæ, or, as others say, for thirty,

and sent him to Athens, to his companions, and they immediately sent

Anniceris his money: but he refused to receive it, saying that they were

not the only people in the world who were entitled to have a regard for

Plato. Some writers again say, that it was Dion who sent the money, and

that he did not refuse it, but bought him the garden in the Academy. And

with respect to Pollis it is said that he was defeated by Chabrias, and

that he was afterwards drowned in Helice, in consequence of the anger of

the deity at his treatment of this philosopher. And this is the story

told by Phavorinus in the first book of his Commentaries. Dionysius,

however, did not remain quiet; but when he had heard what had happened he

wrote to Plato not to speak ill of him, and he wrote back in reply that

he had not leisure enough to think at all of Dionysius.

XV. But he went a second time to Sicily to the younger Dionysius,

and asked him for some land and for some men whom he might make live

according to his own theory of a constitution. And Dionysius promised

to give him some, but never did it. And some say that he was in danger

himself, having been suspected of exciting Dion and Theotas to attempt

the deliverance of the island; but that Archytas, the Pythagorean, wrote

a letter to Dionysius, and begged Plato off and sent him back safe to

Athens. And the letter is as follows:—

ARCHYTAS TO DIONYSIUS, GREETING.

“All of us who are the friends of Plato, have sent to you Lamiscus

and Photidas, to claim of you this philosopher in accordance with the

agreement which you made with us. And it is right that you should

recollect the eagerness which you had to see him, when you pressed us

all to secure Plato’s visit to you, promising to provide for him, and

to treat him hospitably in every respect, and to ensure his safety both

while he remained with you, and when he departed. Remember this too that

you were very delighted indeed at his arrival, and that you expressed

great pleasure at the time, such as you never did on any other occasion.

And if any unpleasantness has arisen between you, you ought to behave

with humanity, and restore the man unhurt; for by so doing you will act

justly, and do us a favour.”

XVI. The third time that he went to Sicily was for the purpose of

reconciling Dion to Dionysius. And as he could not succeed he returned

back to his own country, having lost his labour.

XVII. And in his own country he did not meddle with state affairs,

although he was a politician as far as his writings went. And the

reason was, that the people were accustomed to a form of government

and constitution different from what he approved of. And Pamphile, in

the twenty-fifth book of his Commentaries, says that the Arcadians

and Thebans, when they were founding a great city, appointed him its

lawgiver; but that he, when he had ascertained that they would not

consent to an equality of rights, refused to go thither.

XVIII. It is said also, that he defended Chabrias the general, when he

was impeached in a capital charge; when no one else of the citizens would

undertake the task: and as he was going up towards the Acropolis with

his client, Crobylus the sycophant met him and said, “Are you come to

plead for another, not knowing that the hemlock of Socrates is waiting

also for you?” But he replied, “And also, when I fought for my country I

encountered dangers: and now too I encounter them in the cause of justice

and for the defence of a friend.”

XIX. He was the first author who wrote treatises in the form of

dialogues, as Phavorinus tells us in the eighth book of his Universal

History. And he was also the first person who introduced the analytical

method of investigation, which he taught to Leodamus of Thasos. He

was also the first person in philosophy who spoke of antipodes, and

elements, and dialectics, and actions (ποιήματα), and oblong numbers,

and plane surfaces, and the providence of God. He was likewise the first

of the philosophers who contradicted the assertion of Lysias, the son

of Cephalus, setting it out word for word in his Phædrus. And he was

also the first person who examined the subject of grammatical knowledge

scientifically. And as he argued against almost every one who had lived

before his time, it is often asked why he has never mentioned Democritus.

XX. Neanthes of Cyzicus says, that when he came to the Olympic games

all the Greeks who were present turned to look at him: and that it was

on that occasion that he held a conversation with Dion, who was on

the point of attacking Dionysius. Moreover, in the first book of the

Commentaries of Phavorinus, it is related that Mithridates, the Persian,

erected a statue of Plato in the Academy, and put on it this inscription,

“Mithridates, the son of Rhodobates, a Persian, consecrated an image of

Plato to the Muses, which was made by Silanion.”

XXI. And Heraclides says, that even while a young man, he was so modest

and well regulated, that he was never once seen to laugh excessively.

XXII. But though he was of such a grave character himself, he was

nevertheless ridiculed by the comic poets. Accordingly, Theopompus, in

his Pleasure-seeker, says:—

For one thing is no longer only one,

But two things now are scarcely one; as says

The solemn Plato.

And Anaxandrides in his Theseus, says:—

When he ate olives like our worthy Plato.

And Timon speaks of him in this way, punning on his name:—

As Plato placed strange platitudes on paper.[32]

Alexis says in his Meropis:—

You’ve come in time: since I’ve been doubting long,

And walking up and down some time, like Plato;

And yet have hit upon no crafty plan,

But only tir’d my legs.

And in his Ancylion, he says:—

You speak of what you do not understand,

Running about like Plato: hoping thus,

To learn the nature of saltpetre and onions.

Amphis says in his Amphicrates:—

_A._ But what the good is, which you hope to get

By means of her, my master, I no more

Can form a notion of, than of the good

Of Plato.

_B._ Listen now.

And in his Dexidemides he speaks thus:—

O Plato! how your learning is confined

To gloomy looks, and wrinkling up your brows,

Like any cockle.

Cratinas in his Pseudypobolimæus, says:—

You clearly are a man, endued with sense,

And so, as Plato says, I do not know;

But I suspect.

Alexis, in his Olympiodorus speaks thus:—

My mortal body became dry and withered:

But my immortal part rose to the sky.

Is not this Plato’s doctrine?

And in his Parasite he says:—

Or to converse alone, like Plato.

Anaxilas also laughs at him in his Botrylion, and Circe, and his Rich

Women.

XXIII. And Aristippus, in the fourth book of his treatise upon Ancient

Luxury, says that he was much attached to a youth of the name of Aster,

who used to study astronomy with him; and also to Dion, whom we have

already mentioned. And some say that he was also attached to Phædrus,

and that the following epigrams which he wrote upon them are evidences of

the love he felt for them:—

My Aster, you’re gazing on the stars (ἀστέρες),

Would that I were the heavens, that so I might

Gaze in return with many eyes on thee.

Another of his epigrams is:—

Aster, you while among the living shone,

The morning star. But now that you are dead,

You beam like Hesperus in the shades below.

And he wrote thus on Dion:—

Once, at their birth, the fates did destine tears

To be the lot of all the Trojan women.

And Hecuba, their Queen—to you, O Dion,

As the deserved reward for glorious deeds,

They gave extensive and illustrious hopes.

And now you lie beneath your native soil;

Honoured by all your countrymen, O Dion,

And loved by me with ardent, lasting love.

And they say that this epigram is inscribed upon his tomb at Syracuse.

They say, also, that he was in love with Alexis, and with Phædrus, as I

have already mentioned, and that he wrote an epigram on them both, which

runs thus:—

Now when Alexis is no longer aught,

Say only how beloved, how fair he was,

And every one does turn his eyes at once.

Why, my mind, do you show the dogs a bone?

You’re but preparing trouble for yourself:

Have we not also lost the lovely Phædrus!

There is also a tradition that he had a mistress named Archianassa, on

whom he wrote the following lines:—

I have a mistress fair from Colophon,

Archianassa, on whose very wrinkles

Sits genial love: hard must have been the fate,

Of him who met her earliest blaze of beauty,

Surely he must have been completely scorched.

He also wrote this epigram on Agathon:—

While kissing Agathon, my soul did rise,

And hover’d o’er my lips; wishing perchance,

O’er anxious that it was, to migrate to him.

Another of his epigrams is:—

I throw this apple to you. And if you

Love me who love you so, receive it gladly,

And let me taste your lovely virgin charms.

Or if that may not be, still take the fruit,

And in your bosom cherish it, and learn

How fleeting is all gracefulness and beauty.

And another:—

I am an apple, and am thrown to you,

By one who loves you: but consent, Xanthippe;

For you and I shall both with time decay.

They also attribute to him the following epigram on the Eretrians who had

been surprised in an ambuscade:—

We were Eretrians, of Eubœan race?

And now we lie near Susa, here entomb’d,

Far from my native land.

And this one also:—

Thus Venus to the muses spoke:

Damsels submit to Venus’ yoke,

Or dread my Cupid’s arms.

Those threats, the Virgins nine replied,

May weigh with Mars, but we deride

Love’s wrongs, or darts, or charms.

Another is:—

A certain person found some gold,

Carried it off, and in its stead

Left a strong halter neatly roll’d.

The owner found his treasure fled;

And powerless to endure his fortune’s wreck,

Fitted the halter to his hapless neck.

XXIV. But Molon, who had a great dislike to Plato, says “There is not

so much to wonder at in Dionysius being at Corinth, as in Plato’s being

in Sicily.” Xenophon, too, does not appear to have been very friendlily

disposed towards him: and accordingly they have, as if in rivalry of

one another, both written books with the same title, the Banquet, the

Defence of Socrates, Moral Reminiscences. Then, too, the one wrote the

Cyropædia and the other a book on Politics; and Plato in his Laws says,

that the Cyropædia is a mere romance, for that Cyrus was not such a

person as he is described in that book. And though they both speak so

much of Socrates, neither of them ever mentions the other, except that

Xenophon once speaks of Plato in the third book of his Reminiscences. It

is said also, that Antisthenes, being about to recite something that he

had written, invited him to be present; and that Plato having asked what

he was going to recite, he said it was an essay on the impropriety of

contradicting. “How then,” said Plato, “can you write on this subject?”

and then he showed him that he was arguing in a circle. But Antisthenes

was annoyed, and composed a dialogue against Plato, which he entitled

Sathon; after which they were always enemies to one another; and they say

that Socrates having heard Plato read the Lysis, said, “O Hercules! what

a number of lies the young man has told about me.” For he had set down a

great many things as sayings of Socrates which he never said.

Plato also was a great enemy of Aristippus; accordingly, he speaks ill

of him in his book on the Soul, and says that he was not with Socrates

when he died, though he was in Ægina, at no great distance. He also had

a great rivalry with Æschines, for that he had been held in great esteem

by Dionysius, and afterwards came to want, and was despised by Plato, but

supported by Aristippus. And Idomeneus says, that the speech which Plato

attributes to Crito in the prison, when he counselled Socrates to make

his escape, was really delivered by Æschines, but that Plato attributed

it to Crito because of his dislike to the other. And Plato never makes

the slightest mention of him in any of his books, except in the treatise

on the Soul, and the Defence of Socrates.

XXV. Aristotle says, that the treatises of Plato are something between

poems and prose; and Phavorinus says, when Plato read his treatise on

the Soul, Aristotle was the only person who sat it out, and that all the

rest rose up and went away. And some say that Philip the Opuntian copied

out the whole of his books upon Laws, which were written on waxen tablets

only. Some people also attribute the Epinomis to him. Euphorion and

Panætius have stated that the beginning of the treatise on the Republic

was often altered and re-written; and that very treatise, Aristoxenus

affirms, was found almost entire in the Contradictions of Protagoras;

and that the first book he wrote at all was the Phædrus; and indeed

that composition has a good many indications of a young composer. But

Dicæarchus blames the whole style of that work as vulgar.

XXVI. A story is told, that Plato, having seen a man playing at dice,

reproached him for it, and that he said he was playing for a trifle; “But

the habit,” rejoined Plato, “is not a trifle.” On one occasion he was

asked whether there would be any monument of him, as of his predecessors

in philosophy? and he answered, “A man must first make a name, and the

monument will follow.” Once, when Xenocrates came into his house, he

desired him to scourge one of his slaves for him, for that he himself

could not do it because he was in a passion; and that at another time

he said to one of his slaves, “I should beat you if I were not in a

passion.” Having got on horseback he dismounted again immediately, saying

that he was afraid that he should be infected with horse-pride. He used

to advise people who got drunk to look in the glass, and then they would

abandon their unseemly habit; and he said that it was never decorous to

drink to the degree of drunkenness, except at the festivals of the God

who had given men wine. He also disapproved of much sleeping: accordingly

in his Laws he says, “No one while sleeping is good for anything.”

Another saying of his was, “That the pleasantest of all things to hear

was the truth;” but others report this saying thus, “That the sweetest of

all things was to speak truth.” And of truth he speaks thus in his Laws,

“Truth, my friend, is a beautiful and a durable thing; but it is not easy

to persuade men of this fact.”

XXVII. He used also to wish to leave a memorial of himself behind, either

in the hearts of his friends, or in his books.

XXVIII. He also used to travel a good deal as some authors inform us.

XXIX. And he died in the manner we have already mentioned, in the

thirteenth year of the reign of Philip of Macedon, as Phavorinus mentions

in the third book of his Commentaries; and Theopompus relates that Philip

on one occasion reproached him. But Myronianus, in his Resemblances, says

that Philo mentions some proverbs that were in circulation about Plato’s

lice; implying that he had died of that disease.

XXX. He was buried in the Academy, where he spent the greater part of

his time in the practice of philosophy, from which his was called the

Academic school; and his funeral was attended by all the pupils of that

sect. And he made his will in the following terms:—“Plato left these

things, and has bequeathed them as follows.—The farm in the district of

the Hephæstiades, bounded on the north by the road from the temple of

the Cephisiades, and on the south by the temple of Hercules, which is

in the district of the Hephæstiades; and on the east by the estate of

Archestratus the Phrearrian, and on the west by the farm of Philip the

Chollidian, shall be incapable of being sold or alienated, but shall

belong to my son Adimantus as far as possible. And so likewise shall my

farm in the district of the Eiresides, which I bought of Callimachus,

which is bounded on the north by the property of Eurymedon the

Myrrhinusian, on the south by that of Demostratus of Xypeta, on the east

by that of Eurymedon the Myrrhinusian, and on the west by the Cephisus;—I

also leave him three minæ of silver, a silver goblet weighing a hundred

and sixty-five drachms, a cup weighing forty-five drachms, a golden ring,

and a golden ear-ring, weighing together four drachms and three obols.

Euclides the stone-cutter owes me three minæ. I leave Diana her liberty.

My slaves Tychon, Bictas, Apolloniades, and Dionysius, I bequeath to

my son; and I also give him all my furniture, of which Demetrius has

a catalogue. I owe no one anything. My executors shall be Sosthenes,

Speusippus, Demetrius, Hegias, Eurymedon, Callimachus, and Thrasippus.”

This was his will. And on his tomb the following epigrams were inscribed.

First of all:—

Here, first of all men for pure justice famed,

And moral virtue, Aristocles lies;

And if there e’er has lived one truly wise,

This man was wiser still; too great for envy.

A second is:—

Here in her bosom does the tender earth

Embrace great Plato’s corpse.—His soul aloft

Has ta’en its place among the immortal Gods.

Ariston’s glorious son—whom all good men,

Though in far countries, held in love and honour,

Remembering his pure and god-like life.

There is another which is more modern:—

_A._ Eagle, why fly you o’er this holy tomb?

Or are you on your way, with lofty wing,

To some bright starry domicile of the Gods?

_B._ I am the image of the soul of Plato,

And to Olympus now am borne on high;

His body lies in his own native Attica.

We ourselves also have written one epigram on him, which is as follows:—

If fav’ring Phœbus had not Plato given

To Grecian lands, how would the learned God

Have e’er instructed mortal minds in learning?

But he did send him, that as Æsculapius

His son’s the best physician of the body,

So Plato should be of the immortal soul.

And others, alluding to his death:—

Phœbus, to bless mankind, became the father

Of Æsculapius, and of god-like Plato;

_That_ one to heal the body, _this_ the mind.

Now, from a marriage feast he’s gone to heaven,

To realize the happy city there,

Which he has planned fit for the realms of Jove.

These then are the epigrams on him.

XXXI. His disciples were, Speusippus the Athenian, Zenocrates of

Chalcedon, Aristotle the Stagirite, Philip of Opus, Histiæus of

Perinthus, Dion of Syracuse, Amyclus of Heraclea, Erastus and Coriscus of

Sceptos, Timolaus of Cyzicus, Eudon of Lampsacus, Pithon and Heraclides

of Æmus, Hippothales and Callippus, Athenians, Demetrius of Amphipolis,

Heraclides of Pontus, and numbers of others, among whom there were also

two women, Lasthenea of Mantinea, and Axiothea of Phlius, who used even

to wear man’s clothes, as we are told by Dicæarchus. Some say that

Theophrastus also was a pupil of his; and Chamælion says that Hyperides

the orator, and Lycurgus, were so likewise. Polemo also asserts that

Demosthenes was. Sabinus adds Mnesistratus of Thasos to the number,

quoting authority for the statement in the fourth book of his Meditative

Matter; and it is not improbable.

XXXII. But as you, O lady, are rightly very much attached to Plato, and

as you are very fond of hunting out in every quarter all the doctrines

of the philosopher with great eagerness, I have thought it necessary

to subjoin an account of the general character of his lectures, and of

the arrangement of his dialogues, and of the method of his inductive

argument; going back to their elements and first principles as far as

I could, so that the collection of anecdotes concerning his life which

I have been able to make, may not be curtailed by the omission of any

statement as to his doctrines. For it would be like sending owls to

Athens, as the proverb is, if I were to descend to particular details.

They say now, that Zeno, the Eleatic, was the first person who composed

essays in the form of dialogue. But Aristotle, in the first book of his

treatise on Poets, says that Alexamenus, a native of Styra, or Teos,

did so before him, as Phavorinus also says in his Commentaries. But it

seems to me that Plato gave this kind of writing the last polish, and

that he has therefore, a just right to the first honour, not only as

the improver, but also as inventor of that kind of writing. Now, the

dialogue is a discourse carried on by way of question and answer, on

some one of the subjects with which philosophy is conversant, or with

which statesmanship is concerned, with a becoming attention to the

characters of the persons who are introduced as speakers, and with a

careful selection of language governed by the same consideration. And

dialectics is the art of conversing, by means of which we either overturn

or establish the proposition contended for, by means of the questions and

answers which are put in the mouths of the parties conversing. Now, of

the Platonic discourse there are two characteristics discernible on the

very surface; one fitted for guiding, the other for investigating.

The first of these has two subordinate species, one speculative, the

other practical; and of these two again, the speculative is divided into

the natural and the logical, and the practical into the ethical and the

political. Again, the kind fitted for investigating has also two primary

divisions with their separate characteristics, one object of which is

simply practice, the other being also disputatious: and the first of

these two is again subdivided into two; one of which may be compared

to the art of the midwife, and the other is as it were tentative;

the disputatious one is also divided into the demonstrative and the

distinctive.

But we are not unaware that some writers distinguish the various

dialogues in a different manner from what we do. For they say that

some of them are dramatic, and others narrative, and others of a mixed

nature. But they, in this division, are classifying the dialogues in a

theatrical rather than in a philosophical manner. Some of the dialogues

also refer to subjects of natural philosophy, such as the Timæus. Of the

logical class, there are the Politics, the Cratylus, the Parmenides, and

the Sophist. Of the ethical kind there is the defence of Socrates, the

Crito, the Phædo, the Phædrus, the Banquet, the Menexenus, the Clitophon,

the Epistles, the Philebus, the Hipparchus, and the Rival Lovers. Of

the political class there is the Republic, the Laws, the Minos, the

Epinomis, and the Atlanticus. Of the midwife description we have the

two Alcibiades’s, the Theages, the Lysis, the Laches. Of the tentative

kind, there is the Euthyphro, the Meno, the Ion, the Charmides, and the

Theætetus. Of the demonstrative description, we have the Protagoras,

and of the distinctive class the Euthydemus, the two Hippias’s, and the

Gorgias. And this is enough to say about the dialogues as to what they

are, and what their different kinds are.

XXXIII. But since there is also a great division of opinion respecting

them, from some people asserting that in them Plato dogmatizes in a

positive manner, while others deny this, we had better also touch upon

this part of the question. Now, dogmatizing is laying down dogmas, just

as legislating is making laws. But the word dogma is used in two senses;

to mean both that which we think, and opinion itself. Now of these,

that which we think is the proposition, and opinion is the conception

by which we entertain it in our minds. Plato then explains the opinions

which he entertains himself, and refutes false ones; and about doubtful

matters he suspends his judgment. His opinions of matters as they appear

to him he puts into the mouth of four persons, Socrates, Timæus, an

Athenian poet, and an Eleatic stranger. But the strangers are not, as

some people have supposed, Plato and Parmenides, but certain nameless

imaginary characters. Since Plato asserts as undeniable axioms all the

opinions which he puts into the mouth of Socrates or Timæus. But when

he is refuting false propositions, he introduces such characters as

Thrasymachus, and Callicles, and Polus, and Gorgias, and Protagoras,

Hippias too, and Euthydemus, and men of that stamp. But when he is

demonstrating anything, then he chiefly uses the inductive form of

argument, and that too not of one kind only, but of two. For induction is

an argument, which by means of some admitted truths establishes naturally

other truths which resemble them. But there are two kinds of induction;

the one proceeding from contraries, the other from consequents. Now,

the one which proceeds from contraries, is one in which from the answer

given, whatever that answer may be, the contrary of the principle

indicated in the question must follow. As for instance. My father is

either a different person from your father, or he is the same person.

If now your father is a different person from my father, then as he is

a different person from a father, he cannot be a father. If, on the

other hand, he is the same person as my father, then, since he is the

same person as my father, he must be my father. And again, if man be not

an animal, he must be either a stone or a piece of wood; but he is not

a stone or a piece of wood, for he is a living animal, and capable of

independent motion. Therefore, he is an animal. But, if he is an animal,

and a dog or an ox is likewise an animal, then man must be an animal, and

a dog, and an ox.—This then is the method of induction in contradiction

and contention, which Plato was accustomed to employ, not for the purpose

of establishing principles of his own, but with the object of refuting

the arguments of others.

Now, the inductive kind of argument drawn from consequents is of a

twofold character. The one proving a particular opinion by an admitted

fact of an equally particular nature; or else going from particulars to

generals. And the first of these two divisions is the oratorical one,

the second the dialectic one. As for instance, in the former kind the

question is whether this person has committed a murder; the proof is that

he was found at the time covered with blood. But this is the oratorical

method of employing the induction; since oratory is conversant about

particulars, and does not concern itself about generals. For its object

is not to ascertain abstract justice, but only particular justice.

The other is the dialectic kind, the general proposition having been

established by particular ones. As for instance, the question is whether

the soul is immortal, and whether the living consist of those who have

once been dead; and this proposition Plato establishes in his book on

the Soul, by a certain general proposition, that contraries arise out

of contraries; and this identical general proposition is established by

certain particular ones. As, for instance, that sleep follows on waking,

and waking from sleeping, and the greater from the less, and reversely

the less from the greater. And this kind of induction he used to employ

for the establishment of his own opinions.

XXXIV. Anciently, in tragedy, it was only the chorus who did the whole

work of the play; but subsequently, Thespis introduced one actor for the

sake of giving the chorus some rest, and Æschylus added a second, and

Sophocles a third, and so they made tragedy complete. So in the same

manner, philosophical discourse was originally uniform, concerning itself

solely about natural philosophy; then Socrates added to it a second

character, the ethical: and Plato a third, the dialectic: and so he

brought philosophy to perfection.

XXXV. But Thrasybulus says that he published his dialogues as the

dramatic poets published their tetralogies. For, they contended with

four plays, (and at four festivals, the Dionysiac, the Lenæan, the

Panathenæan, and the Chytri), one of which was a satiric drama, and

the whole four plays were called a tetralogy. Now, people say, the

whole of his genuine dialogues amount to fifty-six; the treatise on the

Republic being divided into ten books, (which Phavorinus, in the second

book of his Universal History, says may be found almost entire in the

Contradictions of Protagoras), and that on Laws into twelve. And there

are nine tetralogies, if we consider the Republic as occupying the place

of one book, and the Laws of another. He arranges, therefore, the first

tetralogy of these dialogues which have a common subject, wishing to show

what sort of life that of the philosopher may have been. And he uses two

titles for each separate book, taking one from the name of the principal

speaker, and the other from the subject.

This tetralogy then, which is the first, is commenced by the Euthyphron,

or what is Holy; and that dialogue is a tentative one. The second is the

Defence of Socrates, a moral one. The third is the Criton, or What is to

be done, a moral one. The fourth is the Phædo, or the Dialogue on the

Soul, a moral one.

The second tetralogy is that of which the first piece is the Cratylus, or

the correctness of names, a logical one. The Theætetus, or Knowledge, a

tentative one. The Sophist, or a dialogue on the Existent, a logical one.

The Statesman, or a dialogue of Monarchy, a logical one.

The first dialogue in the third tetralogy is the Parmenides, or a

dialogue of Ideas, a logical one. The second is the Philebus, or on

Pleasure, a moral one. The Banquet, or on the Good, a moral one. The

Phædrus, or on Love, a moral one.

The fourth tetralogy opens with the Alcibiades, or a treatise on the

Nature of Man, a midwife-like work. The second Alcibiades, or on Prayer,

a piece of the same character. The Hipparchus, or on the Love of Gain, a

moral one. The Rival Lovers, or a treatise on Philosophy, a moral one.

The first dialogue in the fifth is the Theages, or another treatise on

Philosophy, another midwife-like work. The Charmides, or on Temperance,

a tentative essay. The Laches, or on Manly Courage, midwife-like. The

Lysis, or a dissertation on Friendship, also midwife-like.

The sixth tetralogy commences with the Euthydemus, or the Disputatious

Man, a distinctive dialogue. Then comes the Protagoras, or the Sophists,

a demonstrative one. The Gorgias, or a dissertation on Rhetoric, another

distinctive one. And the Meno, or on Virtue, a tentative dialogue.

The seventh begins with the two Hippias’s. The first being a dissertation

on the Beautiful, the second one on Falsehood, both distinctive. The

third is the Ion, or a dissertation on the Iliad, a tentative one. The

fourth is the Menexenus, or the Funeral Oration, a moral one.

The first dialogue in the eighth is the Clitophon, or the Exhortation,

a moral piece. Then comes the Republic, or the treatise on Justice, a

political one. The Timæus, or a dissertation on Nature, a dialogue on

Natural Philosophy. And the Critias, or Atlanticus, a moral one.

The ninth begins with the Minos, or a treatise on Law, a political work.

The Laws, or a dissertation on Legislation, another political work. The

Epinomis, or the Nocturnal Conversation, or the Philosopher, a third

political one.

XXXVI. And this last tetralogy is completed by thirteen epistles, all

moral; to which is prefixed as a motto, εὖ πράττειν, just as Epicurus

inscribed on his εὖ διάγειν, and Cleon on his χαίρειν. They are, one

letter to Aristodemus, two to Archytas, four to Dionysius, one to

Hermeias, Erastus, and Coriscus, one to Leodamas, one to Dion, one to

Perdiccas, and two to the friends of Dion.

XXXVII. And this is the way in which some people divide his works. But

others, among whom is Aristophanes, the grammarian, arrange his dialogues

in trilogies; and they make the first to consist of the Republic, the

Timæus and the Critias.

The second of the Sophist, the Statesman, the Cratylus.

The third of the Laws, the Minos, the Epinomis.

The fourth of the Theætetus, the Euthyphro, the Defence of Socrates.

The fifth of the Crito, the Phædo, the Epistles.

And the rest they arrange singly and independently, without any regular

order. And some authors, as has been said already, place the Republic at

the head of his works: others begin with the Greater Alcibiades: others

with the Theages; some with the Euthyphro, others with the Clitophon;

some with the Timæus, some with the Phædrus, others again with the

Theætetus. Many make the Defence of Socrates the first piece.

There are some dialogues attributed to him which are confessedly

spurious. The Midon, or the Horse-breeder; the Eryxias, or Erasistratus;

the Alcyon; the Acephali, or Sisyphi; the Axiochus; the Phæacians; the

Demodorus; the Chelidon; the Seventh; the Epimenides. Of which the Alcyon

is believed to be the work of a man named Leon; as Phavorinus tells us in

the seventh book of his Commentaries.

XXXVIII. But he employs a great variety of terms in order to render his

philosophical system unintelligible to the ignorant. In his phraseology

he considers wisdom as the knowledge of things which can be understood

by the intellect, and which have a real existence: which has the Gods

for its object, and the soul as unconnected with the body. He also, with

a peculiarity of expression, calls wisdom also philosophy, which he

explains as a desire for divine wisdom. But wisdom and experience are

also used by him in their common acceptation; as, for instance, when he

calls an artisan wise (σοφὸς). He also uses the same words in different

senses at different times. Accordingly he uses φαῦλος in the sense of

ἁπλοῦς, _simple_, in which meaning also the word occurs in Euripides, in

the Licymonius, where the poet speaks of Hercules in the following terms:—

Mean looking (φαῦλος), rude, virtuous in great affairs,

Measuring all wisdom by its last results,

A hero unrefined in speech.

But Plato uses the word sometimes even for what is beautiful; and

sometimes for small and insignificant; and very often he uses different

words to express the same idea. Accordingly, besides the word ἰδέα for

a class, he uses also εἶδος, and γένος, and παράδειγμα, and ἀρχὴ, and

αἴτιον. Sometimes he uses opposite expressions for the same thing;

accordingly, he says that it is an object of sensation that exists, while

at other times he says it is that which does not exist; speaking of it

as existing because of its origin, and as non-existent with reference to

its continual changes. Then again, he defines his ἰδέα as something which

is neither moving nor stationary, at one time calling the same thing, at

another time one thing, at a third time many things. And he is in the

habit of doing this in many instances.

And the explanation of his arguments is three-fold. For first of all, it

is necessary to explain what each thing that is said is; secondly, on

what account it is said, whether because of its bearing on the principal

point, or figuratively, and whether it is said for the purpose of

establishing an opinion of his own, or of refuting the arguments brought

forward by the other party to the conversation; and thirdly, whether it

has been said truly.

XXXIX. But since there are some particular marks put in his books, we

must also say something about them. × indicates peculiar expressions and

figures of speech, and generally any peculiarities of Plato’s style. When

doubled it points to the doctrines and peculiar opinions of Plato; ※

when dotted all round, points to some select bits of beautiful writing.

When doubled and dotted it indicates corrections of some passages. A

dotted obelus indicates hasty disapprovals. An inverted sigma dotted

all round points out passages which may be taken in a double sense, and

transpositions of words. The Ceraunium[33] indicates a connection of

philosophical ideas. An asterisk points out an agreement in doctrine. And

an obelus marks the rejection of the expression or of the passage. These

then are the marginal marks which occur, and the writings of which Plato

was the author:—which, as Antigonus the Carystian says, in his treatise

on Zeno, when they had been but lately published, brought in some gain to

the possessors, if any one else was desirous of reading them.

XL. These now were his chief opinions. He affirmed that the soul was

immortal and clothed in many bodies successively, and that its first

principle was number, and that the first principle of the body was

geometry. And he defined it as an abstract idea of spirit diffused in

every direction. He said also, that it was self-moving and threefold. For

that that part of it which was capable of reasoning was situated in the

head, that that portion which was affected by passion was seated around

the heart, and that which was appetitive was placed around the navel and

the liver. And that it is placed in the middle of the body, and embraces

it at the same time in all its parts, and that it consists of elements;

and that when it is divided according to harmonic intervals it forms

two connected circles; of which the inner circle is divided into six

portions, and makes in all seven circles; and that this is placed on the

left hand of the diameter, and situated in the interior. But the other

is on the right hand of the same line; on which account, and because it

is one only, it is the superior of the two. For the other is divided

internally; and this too, is the circle of that which is always the same;

the other, the circle of that which is changeable and different. And the

one he says is the motion of the soul, but the other is the motion of the

universe and of the planets.

On the other side, the division of the circles from the centre to the

extremities, being harmoniously appropriated to the essence of the soul,

the one knows existing things and establishes harmony between them,

because it is itself composed of harmonious elements. The circle of what

is changeable, engenders opinion by its regular movements; but the circle

of that which is always the same produces knowledge.

XLI. Plato lays down two primary causes or principles of all things, God

and matter, which he also calls mind, and the cause. And he defines

matter as something without shape and without limitation, and says that

from it all concretions arise. He affirms also that as it was moving

about at random, it was brought by God into one settled place, as God

thought order better than disorder; and that this nature is divided into

four elements, fire, water, air, and earth, of which the world itself and

everything in it was made. But he says that the earth is the only thing

that is unchangeable, as he considers the cause to be the difference of

the figures of which it is composed; for he says that the figures of the

others are homogeneous; for that they are all composed equally of scalene

triangles. The figure of the earth, however, is peculiar to itself;

for the element of fire is a pyramid; of air, an octagon; of water, an

eicosagon; and of the earth, a cube; owing to which these things cannot

be changed into earth, nor earth into them. He teaches also that these

elements are not separated so as to occupy each a peculiar and distinct

place; for the spherical motion collects and compresses all the small

things towards the centre, and the small things separate the great ones,

on which account the species, as they change, do also change their

positions.

Moreover he asserts that the world is one, and has been produced,

since it has been made by God, in such a manner as to be an object

of sensation. And he considers it endowed with life, because that

which is so endowed, is superior to that which is not, and it must be

the production of the most excellent producer. It is also one, and

illimitable; because the model after which it was made was one; and it

is spherical, because its creator was of that form; for it also contains

all other animals, and God who made it comprises all forms. And it is

smooth, and has no instruments whatever all round it, because it has no

need of any. But the whole world remains imperishable, because it cannot

be resolved into God; and God is the cause of universal production,

because it is the nature of the good to be productive of good; and the

best is the cause of the production of the heaven; for the best of all

productions can have no other cause than the best of all intelligible

existences. And since God is of that character, and since heaven

resembles the best, inasmuch as it is at least the most beautiful of all

things, it cannot be like anything else that is produced, except God.

He also teaches that the world consists of fire, water, air, and earth;

of fire, in order that it may be visible; of earth, in order that it may

be firm; of water and air, that it may not be destitute of proportion;

for two middle terms are indispensable to keep the solid bodies in due

proportion to one another, and to realize the unity of the whole. In

short, the world is formed of all the elements together, in order that it

may be perfect and imperishable.

Again, time is the image of eternity; eternity subsists for ever; but the

motion of the heaven is time; for day, and night, and the months, and all

such divisions, are parts of time, on which account there could be no

such thing as time apart from the nature of the world; for time existed

contemporaneously and simultaneously with the world. And it was with

reference to time that the sun, and the moon, and the planets were made;

and it was in order that the number of the seasons might be manifest, and

that the animals might partake of number, that God kindled the light of

the sun; and that the moon was above the circle of the earth, and that

the sun was next to it, and in the still higher circles were the planets.

And that the universe was animated, because it was altogether bound up

in animated motion, and that the race of all other animals was produced

in order that the world might be made perfect, and resembling an animal

such as could be comprehended by intellect. Since then God had life, the

heaven also must have life; and the Gods are to a great extent composed

of fire. And there are three other races of animals, those which fly in

the air; those which live in the water; those which walk in the earth.

The oldest of all the deities in heaven is the Earth; she was formed in

order to be the dispenser of night and day; and as she is placed in the

centre, she is constantly in motion around the centre.

And since there are two efficient causes, some things must, he says,

be affirmed to exist in consequence of intellect, and some from some

necessary cause. Now necessary causes are the air, fire, earth, and

water, these not being real elements, but rather receptacles; and

they too are formed of triangles in combination, and are resolvable

into triangles; and their elements are the scalene triangle and the

isosceles. These two before mentioned elements are the principles and

causes of things, of which the models are God and matter, which last must

necessarily be destitute of form, as is the case of other receptacles.

And that the cause of these things was a necessary cause, which,

receiving the ideas, produced the substances, and was moved by the

dissimilarity of its own power, and again by its motion compelled those

things which were moved by it to move other things in their turn.

But all these things were formerly moved without any reason or order;

but after they began to form the world by their combination, they then

received symmetry and regularity from God, according to the principles

applicable to them; for the efficient causes, even before the creation

of the heaven, were two in number. There was also a third, namely

production; but these were not very evident, but rather traces than

actual things, and quite devoid of regularity. But after the world was

made, then they too assumed a regular form and arrangement; but the

heaven was made of all existing bodies. And Plato considers that God is

incorporeal just as the soul is, and that it is owing to that that he is

not affected by any destruction or external circumstances. And ideas, as

we have said before, he defines as certain causes and principles, owing

to which it is that such and such things are by nature what they are.

XLII. On the subject of good and evil, these were his sentiments: that

the end was to become like God; and that virtue was sufficient of herself

for happiness, but nevertheless required the advantages of the body as

instruments to work with; such as health, strength, the integrity of

the senses, and things of that kind; and also external advantages, such

as riches, and noble birth, and glory. Still that the wise man would be

not the less happy, even if destitute of these auxiliary circumstances;

for he would enjoy the constitution of his country, and would marry, and

would not transgress the established laws, and that he would legislate

for his country, as well as he could under existing circumstances,

unless he saw affairs in an unmanageable condition, in consequence of

the excessive factiousness of the people. He thinks too that the Gods

superintend all the affairs of men, and that there are such beings

as dæmons. And he was the first person who defined the notion of the

honourable, as that which borders on the praiseworthy, and the logical,

and the useful, and the becoming, and the expedient, all which things are

combined with that which is suitable to, and in accordance with, nature.

XLIII. He also discussed in his dialogues the correctness of terms, so

that he was the first person who reduced the science of giving correct

answers, and putting correct questions to a system, which he himself used

to satiety.

XLIV. In his dialogues he used to speak of justice as a kind of law of

God, as being of influence sufficient to excite men to act justly, in

order to avoid suffering punishment as malefactors after death. Owing

to which he appeared to some people rather fond of mythical stories,

as he mingled stories of this kind with his writings, in order by the

uncertainty of all the circumstances that affect men after their death,

to induce them to abstain from evil actions. And these were his opinions.

XLV. He used too, says Aristotle, to divide things in this manner:—Of

good, some have their place in the mind, some in the body, and some are

wholly external. As, for instance, justice, and prudence, and manly

courage, and temperance, and qualities of that sort exist in the soul.

Beauty, and a good constitution, and health, and strength exist in the

body. But friends, and the prosperity of one’s country, and wealth, are

external goods. There are then three species of goods, some in the soul,

some in the body, and some external to either.

XLVI. There are also three species of friendship. For one kind is

natural, another that which arises from companionship; and the third

is that which is produced by ties of hospitality. We call that natural

friendship which parents feel towards their offspring, and relations

towards one another; and this is partaken of by other animals besides

men. We call that the friendship of companionship which arises from a

habit of association, and which has no reference to ties of blood, such

as the friendship of Pylades for Orestes. That which arises from ties

of hospitality is one which owes its origin to agreements, and which is

carried on by means of letters between strangers. There is, therefore,

natural friendship, and friendship between companions, and between

strangers. Some also add a fourth kind, namely, the friendship of love.

XLVII. Of political constitutions there are five species. There is one

kind which is democratical, a second which is aristocratical, a third is

oligarchical, a fourth monarchical, and the fifth is tyrannical. Now,

the democratical form of constitution exists in those cities in which

the multitude has the chief power, and elects magistrates, and passes

laws at its own pleasure. But an aristocracy is that form in which

neither the rich, nor the poor, nor the most illustrious men of the

city rule, but the most nobly born have the chief sway. And oligarchy is

that constitution in which the magistracies are distributed according

to some sort of rating: for the rich are fewer in number than the poor.

The monarchical constitution is either dependent on law or on family.

That in Carthage depends on law; that in Lacædemon and Macedonia on

family; for they select their sovereign out of some particular family.

But a tyranny is that kind of government in which the people are either

cajoled or constrained into being governed by a single individual. Forms

of government then, are divided into democracy, aristocracy, oligarchy,

monarchy, and tyranny.

XLVIII. Again, of justice there are three species. For there is one kind

which is conversant with the gods; a second which has reference to men;

and a third, which concerns the dead. For they who sacrifice according to

the laws, and who pay due respect to the temples, are manifestly pious

to the gods. And those who repay what has been lent to them, and restore

what has been deposited with them, act justly as to men. And those who

pay due respect to the tombs, clearly are pious towards the dead. There

is, therefore, one justice towards the Gods, a second towards men, and a

third towards the dead.

XLIX. In the same way, there are also three species of knowledge. There

is one kind which is practical, a second which is productive, a third

which is theoretical. For the science of building houses or ships, is

production. For one can see the work which is produced by it. Political

science, and the science of playing the flute, or the harp, or such

things as that, is practical; for one cannot see any visible result which

has been produced by them, and yet they are doing something. For one man

plays the flute or plays the harp, and another occupies himself with

state affairs. Again, geometrical, and harmonic, and astronomical science

are all theoretical, for they do nothing, and produce nothing. But the

geometrician theorizes as to what relation lines bear to one another; and

the harmonist speculates about sounds, and the astronomer about stars and

about the world. Accordingly, of sciences some are theoretical, others

productive, and a third species is practical.

L. Of medical science there are five species: one, pharmaceutical; a

second, manual; a third, conversant about the regulation of the manner

of life, and the diet; a fourth, the business of which is to detect

diseases; and the fifth is remedial. The pharmaceutical relieves

infirmities by means of medicines; the manual heals men by cutting and

cauterizing; the one which attends to the diet, gets rid of diseases

by altering and regulating the diet; the fourth produces its effects

by a thorough comprehension of the nature of the disease; and the last

relieves men from suffering by bringing prompt assistance at the moment.

Medical science, then, is divided into the pharmaceutical, the manual,

the dietetic, the diagnostic, and the remedial.

LI. Of law there are two divisions. For there is a written and an

unwritten law. The one by which we regulate our constitutions in our

cities, is the written law; that which arises from custom, is the

unwritten law. As, for instance, for a man to come naked into the market

place, or to wear woman’s clothes, are actions which are not prohibited

by any law, and yet we never do them because they are forbidden by the

unwritten law. Law, therefore, is divided into the written and the

unwritten law.

LII. Discourse is divided into five heads; one of which heads is that

which statesmen employ when they speak in the public assemblies; and

this is called political. Another division is that which orators use in

their written harangues, and bring forward for the sake of display in

panegyrics or reproaches, or impeachments. And such a description of

discourse as this is the rhetorical. A third class is that which private

individuals use when conversing with one another. This is called private

discourse. Another kind is that which is employed when men converse

by means of putting short questions and giving brief answers to those

who question them. This is called the dialectic kind of discourse.

The fifth division is that which artists adopt when conversing on

their own particular art, and this is called professional discourse.

Thus discourse, then, is divided into political, rhetorical, private,

dialectic, and professional.

LIII. Music again is divided into three species. For there is the music

of the mouth alone, such as song; secondly, there is the music which is

performed by the hands and mouth together, such as singing to the harp;

thirdly, there is that which is executed by the hands alone, such as harp

playing. Music, therefore, is divided into music of the mouth, music of

the mouth and hands, and music of the hands.

LIV. Nobleness of birth is divided into four species; the first is when

one’s ancestors are noble, and valiant, and just; in which case they

say that their posterity are nobly born. The second kind is when one’s

ancestors have been princes and rulers of nations, and their posterity

also we call noble. Another kind is when one’s ancestors have been

distinguished for personal renown, such, for instance, as is gained by

generalship or by victory at the games. For their offspring also we

address as nobly born. And the last kind is when a man is himself noble

in his spirit, and magnanimous. For that man also we call noble, and this

is the last kind of nobility. There is, therefore, nobility arising from

virtuous ancestors, from royal ancestors, from illustrious ancestors, and

from one’s own excellent qualities.

LV. Beauty also is divided into three kinds. For there is one kind

which is praiseworthy, as that of a beautiful face. Another which is

useful, as an instrument or a house, and things of that kind which are

beautiful, with reference to our use of them. There is also a beauty with

reference to laws, and habits, and things of that kind, which is likewise

beautiful, because of its utility. So that beauty again is looked at in

three ways, with reference to its praise, its utility, and to our use of

it.

LVI. The soul is divided into three parts; for one part of it is capable

of reason, another is influenced by appetite, the third part is liable to

passion. Of these the reasoning part is the cause of deliberating, and

reasoning, and understanding, and everything of that kind. The appetite

part is that portion of the soul which is the cause of desiring to eat,

and to embrace and things of that kind. The passionate part is the cause

of men feeling confidence and delight, and grief and anger. The soul

therefore is divided into the reasoning part, the appetitive part, and

the passionate part.

LVII. Of perfect virtue there are four species. One is prudence, one is

justice, the third is manly gallantry, and the fourth is temperance.

Of these, prudence is the cause of a man acting rightly in affairs;

justice is the cause of his acting justly in partnerships and bargains;

manly gallantry is the cause of a man’s not being alarmed amid dangers

and formidable circumstances, but standing firm; and temperance is the

cause of his subduing his appetites, and being enslaved by no pleasure,

but living decorously. So that virtue is divided into prudence, justice,

manly gallantry, and temperance.

LVIII. Rule is divided into five parts. One is rule according to law;

another is rule according to nature; a third kind is rule according to

custom; a fourth division is rule with reference to family; the fifth is

rule by force. Now when the rulers in cities are elected by the citizens,

then they rule according to law; those who rule according to nature are

the males, not only among men, but also among all other animals; for

everywhere we shall find it as a general rule that the male rules the

female; the rule of him who rules according to custom is such as this,

when schoolmasters rule their pupils, and teachers their disciples. Rule

according to family is that which prevails in places like Lacedæmon,

where hereditary sovereigns reign. For the kingdom there belongs to a

certain family; and in Macedonia they rule on the same principle. For

there, too, the kingdom depends on family. But those who rule by force,

only cajoling the citizens, rule in spite of them; and such a sway is

called rule by force. So that there is rule by law, and by nature, and by

custom, and by family, and by force.

LIX. Of rhetoric he speaks of six species. For when orators exhort the

people to make war upon or to form alliances against any one, this

species of oratory is called exhortation. When they persuade the people

not to make war, or to form alliances, but to keep quiet, this kind of

rhetoric is called dissuasion. The third species of rhetoric, is when any

one says that he has been injured by some one else, and impeaches that

person as guilty of many crimes; for this species is called accusation.

The fourth kind of rhetoric is called defence, when a man shows that he

has done no wrong, and that he is not guilty of anything out of the way.

Such a kind of speech they call a defence. The fifth species of rhetoric,

is when any one speaks well of another, and shows him to be virtuous and

honourable; and this kind is called encomium. The sixth species, is when

any one shows that another person is worthless; and this kind is called

blame. So that rhetoric is divided into encomium and blame, exhortation

and dissuasion, accusation and defence.

Speaking correctly is divided under four heads. One, the saying what is

right; one, the saying as much as is right; thirdly, the saying it to the

proper people; and fourthly, the saying it at the proper time. Now as to

the saying what is right, that is the saying what will be advantageous

both to the speaker and to the hearer. The saying as much as is right, is

saying neither more nor less than what is sufficient. The saying it to

the proper people, is supposing one is speaking to one’s elders who are

mistaken in any point, the using expressions proper to be addressed to

those older than one’s self; or, on the other hand, if one is addressing

those younger, then the using language such as is suitable to young

people. The saying it at the proper time, is speaking neither too soon

nor too late; for if one does, one will err and speak improperly.

LX. Beneficence is divided under four heads. For it may be exerted

either in money, or by personal exertion, or by knowledge, or by words.

In money when any one assists those who are in want, so as to put them

at ease with respect to money. And men benefit one another by personal

exertion when they come upon those who are being beaten and assist them.

Again, those who instruct, or heal, or who teach any good thing, benefit

others by their knowledge; and when one person comes down to the court

of justice as an advocate for another, and delivers some speech full of

sense and good feeling in his behalf, that man assists his friend by

words. So that there is one beneficence which is displayed in money,

another in personal exertion, a third by means of knowledge, and the

fourth kind by words.

LXI. Again, Plato divides the end of all affairs into four species. An

affair has one end in accordance with law, when a decree is passed, and

when the law establishes it; it has an end in accordance with nature,

when it is such a thing as a day, or a year, or the seasons. It has an

end according to art, when it is architecture for instance, for a man

builds a house; or when it is ship-building, for it makes a ship. And

affairs also come to an end by chance, when they turn out differently

from what any one expected. So that an end of an affair is regulated

either by law, or by nature, or by art, or by chance.

LXII. Power again is divided into four species. There is one power which

we possess by our ability to reason and form conceptions by means of our

intellect. There is another power which we owe to the body, such as the

power of walking, or giving, or taking, and such like. There is a third

which we possess through the multitude of soldiers or riches, on which

account a king is said to have great power. And the fourth division of

power consists in the being well or ill treated, and treating others well

or ill; as, for instance, we may be sick, or we may be taught, or we may

be in vigorous health, and many more cases of that sort. So that one kind

of power dwells in the intellect, another in the body, another in an army

and riches, and another in our capacity as agents or patients.

LXIII. Of philanthropy there are three sorts. One which is displayed

in addressing people, when some persons address every one whom they

meet, and give them their right hand, and greet them heartily; another

species is when one is disposed to assist every one who is unfortunate.

The last kind is that sort of philanthropy which makes men pleasant

boon companions. So that there is one kind of philanthropy displayed in

addressing people, another in benefiting them, and a third in feasting

and making merry with them.

LXIV. Happiness is divided into five parts. For one part of it is wisdom

in counsel; another is a healthy condition of the sensations and general

health of body; a third is good fortune in one’s affairs; a fourth kind

is good reputation among men; a fifth is abundance of riches and of all

those things which are useful in life. Now wisdom in counsel arises from

good instruction, and from a person’s having experience of many things.

A healthy condition of the sensations depends on the limbs of the body;

as, for instance, when one sees with one’s eyes, and hears with one’s

ears, and smells with one’s nose, and feels with one’s body, just what

one ought to see, and hear, and smell, and feel. Such a condition as

this is a healthy condition. And good fortune is when a man does rightly

and successfully what a good and energetic man ought to do. And good

reputation is when a man is well spoken of. And abundance of riches is

when a man has such a sufficiency of everything which relates to the uses

of life, that he is able to benefit his friends, and to discharge all

public obligations in a splendid and liberal manner. And the man who has

all these different parts of happiness, is a perfectly happy man. So

that happiness is made up of wisdom in counsel, a good condition of the

sensations and health of body, good fortune, good reputation, and riches.

LXV. The arts are divided into three kinds. The first, the second, and

the third. The first are those of working mines and cutting wood, for

these are preparatory arts. The second are such as working metals and

carpentry, for they are alterative arts. For working in metals makes arms

out of iron; and carpentry makes flutes and lyres out of wood. The third

is the art which makes use of instruments; such as horsemanship, which

uses bridles; the military art, which uses arms; music, which uses flutes

and lyres. So that there are three species of art; one of which is the

first, another the second, and another the third.

LXVI. Good is divided into four kinds. One of which we mean when we speak

of a man endowed with private virtue, as good; another kind is that which

we indicate, when we call virtue and justice, good. A third kind is that

which we attribute to suitable food, and exercise, and medicine. The

fourth good, is that which we mean, when we speak of good flute playing,

good acting, and things of that sort. There are therefore four kinds of

good. One the having virtue; another, virtue itself; a third, useful food

and exercise; and fourthly, we call skill in flute playing and acting,

good.

LXVII. Of things existing, some are bad, some good, and some neither

one thing nor the other. Of these, we call those things bad, which

are invariably capable of doing injury, such as intemperance, folly,

injustice, and things of that sort. And the opposites to these qualities

are good. But those things, which may at times be beneficial, and at

times injurious, such as walking, sitting down, and eating; or which have

absolutely no power in any case to benefit or injure any one; these are

neither bad nor good. Of things existing then, there are some bad, and

some good, and some of a neutral character, neither bad nor good.

LXVIII. A good state of affairs with reference to the laws, is divided

under three heads. One when the laws are good, for that is a good state

of affairs; so too is it, when the citizens abide by the existing laws;

and the third case is, when although there are no positive laws,

still men are good citizens in deference to custom and to established

institutions; and this is also called a good state of affairs. So that

of these three heads, one depends on the laws being good, another on

obedience to existing laws, and the third on men yielding to good customs

and institutions.

So again, lawlessness is divided into three heads. One of which is,

when the laws are bad, both as concerns strangers, and the citizens;

another, when the citizens do not obey the laws that are established; and

the third is when there is actually no law at all. So that one kind of

lawlessness arises from bad laws, another from disobedience to existing

laws, and the third from the absence of laws.

LXIX. Contraries are of three sorts; for instance, we say that good

is contrary to evil, as justice to injustice, wisdom to folly, and so

on. Again, some evils are contrary to others, as extravagance is to

stinginess, and the being tortured with justice to the being tortured

with injustice. And such evils as these are the contraries of other

evils. Again, the heavy is contrary to the light, the swift to the slow,

the black to the white; so that some things which are of a neutral

character, neither good nor evil, are contrary to other things of a

neutral character. Of contraries then, there are some which are so, as

what is good is contrary to what is evil; others, as one evil is contrary

to another; and others again, as neutral things are contrary to other

things of a neutral character.

LXX. Of good things there are three kinds; for there are some which can

be possessed; others, which can be shared; others, which one realizes

in one’s self. Those which can be possessed, are those which it is

possible for a person to have, such as justice, or good health; those

can be shared, which it is not possible for a person to have entirely

to himself, but which he may participate in; as for instance, a person

cannot be the sole possessor of abstract good, but he may participate in

it. Those again a person realizes in himself, when they are such, that

he cannot possess them himself, or share them with others, and yet they

ought to exist; as for instance, it is good to be virtuous and just, but

yet a man does not possess the being virtuous, or participate in it;

but the being virtuous and just ought to exist in him. Of good things,

therefore, there are those which are possessed, those which are shared,

and those which ought to exist in a man.

LXXI. In the same manner, good counsel is divisible into three kinds.

For there is one kind which is derived from past time, another from the

future, another from the present. That which is derived from past time is

made up of instances, as for instance what the Lacedæmonians suffered by

trusting to such and such people. That which relates to the present, is

when what is wanted, is to show that the fortifications are weak, the men

cowardly, or the provisions scanty. That which concerns the future, is

when the speaker urges that no injury ought to be offered to ambassadors,

in order that Greece may not get an evil reputation; and supports his

argument by instances. So that good counsel has reference, firstly to

what is past, secondly to what is present, and thirdly to the future.

LXXII. Voice is divided into two parts, one of which is animated, and the

other inanimate. That is animated, which proceeds from living animals,

while sounds and echoes are inanimate. Again, animated voice may be

divided into that which can be indicated by letters, and that which

cannot; that which can be so indicated being the voice of men, and that

which cannot being the voice of animals; so that one kind of voice is

animated, the other inanimate.

LXXIII. Of existing things, some are divisible and some indivisible.

Again, those which are divisible, consist either of similar or of

dissimilar parts. Those which are indivisible are such as have no

separate parts, and are not formed by any combination, such as unity,

a point, or a sound. But those are divisible which are formed by some

combination; as, for instance, syllables, and symphonies, and animals,

and water, and gold. These too consist of similar parts, which are made

up of particles resembling one another, and of which the whole does

not differ from any part, except in number. As for instance, water and

gold, and everything which is fusible, and so on. And these consist of

dissimilar parts, which are made up of various things not resembling one

another; as for instance, a house, and things of that sort; so that of

existing things, some are divisible and others indivisible. And of those

which are divisible, some consist of similar and others of dissimilar

parts.

LXXIV. Again, of existing things, some are spoken of as having an

independent, and some only a relative existence. Those which are spoken

of as having an independent existence, are those which require nothing

else to be added to them, when we are explaining their nature; as man, a

horse, and the other animals; for these have no need of any additional

explanation. But those things are said to have a relative existence which

do require some additional explanation. As for instance, that which is

greater than something else, or less, or swifter, or more beautiful,

and so on. For that which is greater, is greater than something which

is less; and that which is swifter, is swifter than something else. So

that, of existing things, some are spoken of as independently, and other

relatively. And thus he divided them at first, according to Aristotle.

LXXV. There was also another man of the name of Plato, a philosopher of

Rhodes, a disciple of Panætius, as Seleucus, the grammarian says in the

first book of his treatise on Philosophy; and another was a Peripatetic,

a pupil of Aristotle; and there was a third, a pupil of Praxiphanes; and

there was besides all these, the poet of the Old Comedy.