DEMOKEDES. — DARIUS INVADES SCYTHIA.
Darius had now acquired full authority throughout the Persian empire,
having put down the refractory satrap Orœtês, as well as the revolted
Medes and Babylonians. He had, moreover, completed the conquest of
Ionia, by the important addition of Samos; and his dominion thus
comprised all Asia Minor, with its neighboring islands. But this
was not sufficient for the ambition of a Persian king, next but one
in succession to the great Cyrus. The conquering impulse was yet
unabated among the Persians, who thought it incumbent upon their
king, and whose king thought it incumbent upon himself, to extend the
limits of the empire. Though not of the lineage of Cyrus, Darius had
taken pains to connect himself with it by marriage; he had married
Atossa and Artystonê, daughters of Cyrus,—and Parmys, daughter of
Smerdis, the younger son of Cyrus. Atossa had been first the wife of
her brother Kambysês; next, of the Magian Smerdis, his successor;
and thirdly of Darius, to whom she bore four children.[466] Of those
children the eldest was Xerxês, respecting whom more will be said
hereafter.
[466] Herodot. iii, 88; vii, 2.
Atossa, mother of the only Persian king who ever set foot in Greece,
the Sultana Validi of Persia during the reign of Xerxês, was a person
of commanding influence in the reign of her last husband,[467] as
well as in that of her son, and filled no inconsiderable space even
in Grecian imagination, as we may see both by Æschylus and Herodotus.
Had her influence prevailed, the first conquering appetites of Darius
would have been directed, not against the steppes of Scythia, but
against Attica and Peloponnesus; at least, so Herodotus assures us.
The grand object of the latter in his history is to set forth the
contentions of Hellas with the barbarians or non-Hellenic world;
and with an art truly epical, which manifests itself everywhere
to the careful reader of his nine books, he preludes to the real
dangers which were averted at Marathon and Platæa, by recounting the
first conception of an invasion of Greece by the Persians,—how it
originated, and how it was abandoned. For this purpose,—according
to his historical style, wherein general facts are set forth as
subordinate and explanatory accompaniments to the adventures of
particular persons,—he give us the interesting, but romantic, history
of the Krotoniate surgeon Dêmokêdês.
[467] Herodot. vii, 3. ἡ γὰρ Ἄτοσσα εἶχε τὸ πᾶν κράτος. Compare
the description given of the ascendency of the savage Sultana
Parysatis over her son Artaxerxês Mnêmon (Plutarch, Artaxerxês,
c. 16, 19, 23).
Dêmokêdês, son of a citizen of Krotôn named Kalliphôn, had turned
his attention in early youth to the study and practice of medicine
and surgery (for that age, we can make no difference between the
two), and had made considerable progress in it. His youth coincides
nearly with the arrival of Pythagoras at Krotôn, (550-520,) where the
science of the surgeon, as well as the art of the gymnastic trainer,
seem to have been then prosecuted more actively than in any part
of Greece. His father Kalliphôn, however, was a man of such severe
temper, that the son ran away from him, and resolved to maintain
himself by his talents elsewhere. He went to Ægina, and began to
practice in his profession; and so rapid was his success, even in his
first year,—though very imperfectly equipped with instruments and
apparatus,[468]—that the citizens of the island made a contract with
him to remain there for one year, at a salary of one talent (about
three hundred and eighty-three pounds sterling, an Æginæan talent).
The year afterwards he was invited to come to Athens, then under the
Peisistratids, at a salary of one hundred minæ, or one and two-thirds
of a talent; and in the following year, Polykratês of Samos tempted
him by the offer of two talents. With that despot he remained, and
accompanied him in his last calamitous visit to the satrap Orœtês: on
the murder of Polykratês, being seized among the slaves and foreign
attendants, he was left to languish with the rest in imprisonment and
neglect. When again, soon after, Orœtês himself was slain, Dêmokêdês
was numbered among his slaves and chattels and sent up to Susa.
[468] Herodot. iii, 131. ἀσκευής περ ἐὼν, καὶ ἔχων οὐδὲν τῶν
ὅσα περὶ τὴν τέχνην ἔστιν ἐργαλήϊα,—the description refers to
surgical rather than to medical practice.
That curious assemblage of the cases of particular patients
with remarks, known in the works of Hippokratês, under the
title Ἐπιδήμιαι (Notes of visits to different cities), is very
illustrative of what Herodotus here mentions about Dêmokêdês.
Consult, also, the valuable Prolegomena of M. Littré, in his
edition of Hippokratês now in course of publication, as to
the character, means of action, and itinerant habits of the
Grecian ἰατροί: see particularly the preface to vol. v, p. 12,
where he enumerates the various places visited and noted by
Hippokratês. The greater number of the Hippokratic observations
refer to various parts of Thrace, Macedonia, and Thessaly; but
there are some, also, which refer to patients in the islands of
Syros and Delos, at Athens, Salamis, Elis, Corinth, and Œniadæ
in Akarnania. “On voit par là combien étoit juste le nom de
Periodeutes ou voyageurs donnés à ces anciens médecins.”
Again, M. Littré, in the same preface, p. 25, illustrates
the proceedings and residence of the ancient ἰατρός: “On se
tromperoit si on se représentoit la demeure d’un médecin d’alors
comme celle d’un médecin d’aujourd’hui. La maison du médecin
de l’antiquité, du moins au temps d’Hippocrate et aux époques
voisines, renfermoit un local destiné à la pratique d’un grand
nombre d’opérations, contenant les machines et les instrumens
nécessaires, et de plus étant aussi une boutique de pharmacie.
Ce local se nommait ἰατρεῖον.” See Plato, Legg. i, p. 646, iv,
p. 720. Timæus accused Aristotle of having begun as a surgeon,
practising to great profit in surgery, or ἰατρεῖον, and having
quitted this occupation late in life, to devote himself to the
study of science,—σοφιστὴν ὀψιμαθῆ καὶ μισητὸν ὑπάρχοντα, καὶ τὸ
πολυτίμητον ἰατρεῖον ἀρτίως ἀποκεκλεικότα (Polyb. xii, 9).
See, also, the Remarques Retrospectives attached by M. Littré
to volume iv, of the same work (pp. 654-658), where he dwells
upon the intimate union of surgical and medical practice in
antiquity. At the same time, it must be remarked that a passage
in the remarkable medical oath, published in the collection of
Hippokratic treatises, recognizes in the plainest manner the
distinction between the physician and the operator,—the former
binds himself by this oath not to perform the operation “even
of lithotomy, but to leave it to the operators, or workmen:”
Οὐ τεμέω δὲ οὐδὲ μὴν λιθιῶντας, ἐκχωρήσω δὲ ἐργάστῃσιν ἀνδράσι
πρήξιος τῆσδε (Œuvres d’Hippocrate, vol. iv, p. 630, ed. Littré).
M. Littré (p. 617) contests this explanation, remarking that the
various Hippokratic treatises represent the ἰατρός as performing
all sorts of operations, even such as require violent and
mechanical dealing. But the words of the oath are so explicit,
that it seems more reasonable to assign to the oath itself a
later date than the treatises, when the habits of practitioners
may have changed.
He had not been long at that capital, when Darius, leaping from his
horse in the chase, sprained his foot badly, and was carried home
in violent pain. The Egyptian surgeons, supposed to be the first
men in their profession,[469] whom he habitually employed, did
him no good, but only aggravated his torture; for seven days and
nights he had no sleep, and he as well as those around him began to
despair. At length, some one who had been at Sardis, accidentally
recollected that he had heard of a Greek surgeon among the slaves
of Orœtês: search was immediately made, and the miserable slave
was brought, in chains as well as in rags,[470] into the presence
of the royal sufferer. Being asked whether he understood surgery,
he affected ignorance; but Darius, suspecting this to be a mere
artifice, ordered out the scourge and the pricking instrument, to
overcome it. Dêmokêdês now saw that there was no resource, admitted
that he had acquired some little skill, and was called upon to do his
utmost in the case before him. He was fortunate enough to succeed
perfectly, in alleviating the pain, in procuring sleep for the
exhausted patient, and ultimately in restoring the foot to a sound
state. Darius, who had abandoned all hopes of such a cure, knew no
bounds to his gratitude. As a first reward, he presented him with
two sets of chains in solid gold,—a commemoration of the state in
which Dêmokêdês had first come before him,—he next sent him into the
harem to visit his wives. The conducting eunuchs introduced him as
the man who had restored the king to life, and the grateful sultanas
each gave to him a saucer full of golden coins called staters;[471]
in all so numerous, that the slave Skitôn, who followed him, was
enriched by merely picking up the pieces which dropped on the floor.
Nor was this all. Darius gave him a splendid house and furniture,
made him the companion of his table, and showed him every description
of favor. He was about to crucify the Egyptian surgeons who had been
so unsuccessful in their attempts to cure him; but Dêmokêdês had
the happiness of preserving their lives, as well as of rescuing an
unfortunate companion of his imprisonment,—an Eleian prophet, who had
followed the fortunes of Polykratês.
[469] About the Persian habit of sending to Egypt for surgeons,
compare Herodot. iii, 1.
[470] Herodot iii, 129. τὸν δὲ ὡς ἐξεῦρον ἐν τοῖσι Ὀροίτεω
ἀνδραπόδοισι ὅκου δὴ ἀπημελημένον, παρῆγον ἐς μέσον, πέδας τε
ἕλκοντα καὶ ῥάκεσιν ἐσθημένον.
[471] Herodot. iii, 130. The golden stater was equal to about
1_l._ 1_s._ 3_d._ English money (Hussey, Ancient Weights, vii, 3,
p. 103).
The ladies in a Persian harem appear to have been less
unapproachable and invisible than those in modern Turkey; in
spite of the observation of Plutarch, Artaxerxês, c. 27.
But there was one favor which Darius would on no account grant; yet
upon this one Dêmokêdês had set his heart,—the liberty of returning
to Greece. At length accident, combined with his own surgical skill,
enabled him to escape from the splendor of his second detention, as
it had before extricated him from the misery of the first. A tumor
formed upon the breast of Atossa; at first, she said nothing to any
one, but as it became too bad for concealment, she was forced to
consult Dêmokêdês. He promised to cure her, but required from her
a solemn oath that she would afterwards do for him anything which
he should ask,—pledging himself at the same time to ask nothing
indecent.[472] The cure was successful, and Atossa was required to
repay it by procuring his liberty. He knew that the favor would
be refused, even to her, if directly solicited, but he taught her
a stratagem for obtaining under false pretences the consent of
Darius. She took an early opportunity, Herodotus tells us,[473] in
bed, of reminding Darius that the Persians expected from him some
positive addition to the power and splendor of the empire; and when
Darius, in answer, acquainted her that he contemplated a speedy
expedition against the Scythians, she entreated him to postpone it,
and to turn his forces first against Greece: “I have heard (she
said) about the maidens of Sparta, Athens, Argos, and Corinth, and
I want to have some of them as slaves to serve me—(we may conceive
the smile of triumph with which the sons of those who had conquered
at Platæa and Salamis would hear this part of the history read by
Herodotus);—you have near you the best person possible to give
information about Greece,—that Greek who cured your foot.” Darius
was induced by this request to send some confidential Persians into
Greece to procure information, along with Dêmokêdês. Selecting
fifteen of them, he ordered them to survey the coasts and cities
of Greece, under guidance of Dêmokêdês, but with peremptory orders
upon no account to let him escape or to return without him. He next
sent for Dêmokêdês himself, explained to him what he wanted, and
enjoined him imperatively to return as soon as the business had been
completed; he farther desired him to carry away with him all the
ample donations which he had already received, as presents to his
father and brothers, promising that on his return fresh donations
of equal value should make up the loss: lastly, he directed that a
storeship, “filled with all manner of good things,” should accompany
the voyage. Dêmokêdês undertook the mission with every appearance of
sincerity. The better to play his part, he declined to take away what
he already possessed at Susa,—saying, that he should like to find his
property and furniture again on coming back, and that the storeship
alone, with its contents, would be sufficient both for the voyage and
for all necessary presents.
[472] Herodot. iii, 133. δεήσεσθαι δὲ οὐδενὸς τῶν ὅσα αἰσχύνην
ἐστὶ φέροντα. Another Greek physician at the court of Susa, about
seventy years afterwards,—Apollonidês of Kôs,—in attendance on a
Persian princess, did not impose upon himself the same restraint:
his intrigue was divulged, and he was put to death miserably
(Ktêsias, Persica, c. 42).
[473] Herodot. iii, 134.
Accordingly, he and the fifteen Persian envoys went down to Sidon
in Phenicia, where two armed triremes were equipped, with a large
storeship in company; and the voyage of survey into Greece was
commenced. They visited and examined all the principal places in
Greece,—probably beginning with the Asiatic and insular Greeks,
crossing to Eubœa, circumnavigating Attica and Peloponnesus, then
passing to Korkyra and Italy. They surveyed the coasts and cities,
taking memoranda[474] of everything worthy of note which they saw:
this Periplûs, if it had been preserved, would have been inestimable,
as an account of the actual state of the Grecian world about 518
B. C. As soon as they arrived at Tarentum, Dêmokêdês—now within
a short distance of his own home, Krotôn—found an opportunity of
executing what he had meditated from the beginning. At his request
Aristophilidês, the king of Tarentum, seized the fifteen Persians,
and detained them as spies, at the same time taking the rudders
from off their ships,—while Dêmokêdês himself made his escape to
Krotôn. As soon as he had arrived there, Aristophilidês released the
Persians, and suffered them to pursue their voyage: they went on to
Krotôn, found Dêmokêdês in the market-place, and laid hands upon him.
But his fellow-citizens released him, not without opposition from
some who were afraid of provoking the Great King, and in spite of
remonstrances, energetic and menacing, from the Persians themselves:
indeed, the Krotôniates not only protected the restored exile, but
even robbed the Persians of their storeship. The latter, disabled
from proceeding farther, as well by this loss as by the secession
of Dêmokêdês, commenced their voyage homeward, but unfortunately
suffered shipwreck near the Iapygian cape, and became slaves in
that neighborhood. A Tarentine exile, named Gillus, ransomed them
and carried them up to Susa,—a service for which Darius promised
him any recompense that he chose. Restoration to his native city
was all that Gillus asked; and that too, not by force, but by the
mediation of the Asiatic Greeks of Knidus, who were on terms of
intimate alliance with the Tarentines. This generous citizen,—an
honorable contrast to Dêmokêdês, who had not scrupled to impel the
stream of Persian conquest against his country, in order to procure
his own release,—was unfortunately disappointed of his anticipated
recompense. For though the Knidians, at the injunction of Darius,
employed all their influence at Tarentum to procure a revocation
of the sentence of exile, they were unable to succeed, and force
was out of the question.[475] The last words addressed by Dêmokêdês
at parting to his Persian companions, exhorted them to acquaint
Darius that he (Dêmokêdês) was about to marry the daughter of the
Krotoniate Milo,—one of the first men in Krotôn, as well as the
greatest wrestler of his time. The reputation of Milo was very great
with Darius,—probably from the talk of Dêmokêdês himself: moreover,
gigantic muscular force could be appreciated by men who had no relish
either for Homer or Solon. And thus did this clever and vainglorious
Greek, sending back his fifteen Persian companions to disgrace, and
perhaps to death, deposit in their parting ears a braggart message,
calculated to create for himself a factitious name at Susa. He paid
a large sum to Milo as the price of his daughter, for this very
purpose.[476]
[474] Herodot. iii, 136. προσίσχοντες δὲ αὐτῆς τὰ παραθαλάσσια
ἐθήσαντο καὶ ἀπεγράφοντο.
[475] Herodot. iii, 137, 138.
[476] Herodot. iii, 137. κατὰ δὴ τοῦτό μοι σπεῦσαι δοκέει τὸν
γάμον τοῦτον τελέσας χρήματα μεγάλα Δημοκήδης, ἵνα φανῇ πρὸς
Δαρείου ἐὼν καὶ ἐν τῇ ἑωϋτοῦ δόκιμος.
Thus finishes the history of Dêmokêdês, and of the “first Persians
(to use the phrase of Herodotus) who ever came over from Asia into
Greece.”[477] It is a history well deserving of attention, even
looking only to the liveliness of the incidents, introducing us as
they do into the full movement of the ancient world,—incidents which
I see no reason for doubting, with a reasonable allowance for the
dramatic amplification of the historian. Even at that early date,
Greek medical intelligence stands out in a surpassing manner, and
Dêmokêdês is the first of those many able Greek surgeons who were
seized, carried up to Susa,[478] and there detained for the Great
King, his court, and harem.
[477] Herodot. iii, 138.
[478] Xenophon, Memorab. iv, 2, 33. Ἄλλους δὲ πόσους οἴει (says
Sokratês) διὰ σοφίαν ἀναρπάστους πρὸς βασιλέα γεγονέναι, καὶ ἐκεῖ
δουλεύειν;
We shall run little risk in conjecturing that, among the
intelligent and able men thus carried off, surgeons and
physicians would be selected as the first and most essential.
Apollônidês of Kôs—whose calamitous end has been alluded to in
a previous note—was resident as surgeon, or physician, with
Artaxerxês Longimanus (Ktêsias, Persica, c. 30), and Polykritus
of Mendê, as well as Ktêsias himself, with Artaxerxês Mnêmon
(Plutarch, Artaxerxês, c. 31).
But his history suggests, in another point of view, far more serious
reflections. Like the Milesian Histiæus (of whom I shall speak
hereafter,) he cared not what amount of risk he brought upon his
country in order to procure his own escape from a splendid detention
at Susa. And the influence which he originated and brought to bear
was on the point of precipitating upon Greece the whole force of
the Persian empire, at a time when Greece was in no condition to
resist it. Had the first aggressive expedition of Darius, with his
own personal command and fresh appetite for conquest, been directed
against Greece instead of against Scythia (between 516-514 B. C.),
Grecian independence would have perished almost infallibly. For
Athens was then still governed by the Peisistratids; what she was,
under them, we have had occasion to notice in a former chapter.
She had then no courage for energetic self-defence, and probably
Hippias himself, far from offering resistance, would have found it
advantageous to accept Persian dominion as a means of strengthening
his own rule, like the Ionian despots: moreover, Grecian habit of
coöperation was then only just commencing. But fortunately, the
Persian invader did not touch the shore of Greece until more than
twenty years afterwards, in 490 B. C.; and during that precious
interval, the Athenian character had undergone the memorable
revolution which has been before described. Their energy and their
organization had been alike improved, and their force of resistance
had become decupled; moreover, their conduct had so provoked the
Persian that resistance was then a matter of necessity with them,
and submission on tolerable terms an impossibility. When we come
to the grand Persian invasion of Greece, we shall see that Athens
was the life and soul of all the opposition offered. We shall see
farther, that with all the efforts of Athens, the success of the
defence was more than once doubtful; and would have been converted
into a very different result, if Xerxês had listened to the best of
his own counsellors. But had Darius, at the head of the very same
force which he conducted into Scythia, or even an inferior force,
landed at Marathon in 514 B. C., instead of sending Datis in 490 B.
C.,—he would have found no men like the victors of Marathon to meet
him. As far as we can appreciate the probabilities, he would have met
with little resistance except from the Spartans singly, who would
have maintained their own very defensible territory against all his
efforts,—like the Mysians and Pisidians in Asia Minor, or like the
Mainots of Laconia in later days; but Hellas generally would have
become a Persian satrapy. Fortunately, Darius, while bent on invading
some country, had set his mind on the attack of Scythia, alike
perilous and unprofitable. His personal ardor was wasted on those
unconquerable regions, where he narrowly escaped the disastrous fate
of Cyrus,—nor did he ever pay a second visit to the coasts of the
Ægean. Yet the amorous influences of Atossa, set at work by Dêmokêdês
might well have been sufficiently powerful to induce Darius to assail
Greece instead of Scythia,—a choice in favor of which all other
recommendations concurred; and the history of free Greece would then
probably have stopped at this point, without unrolling any of the
glories which followed. So incalculably great has been the influence
of Grecian development, during the two centuries between 500-300 B.
C., on the destinies of mankind, that we cannot pass without notice a
contingency which threatened to arrest that development in the bud.
Indeed, it may be remarked that the history of any nation, considered
as a sequence of causes and effects, affording applicable knowledge,
requires us to study not merely real events, but also imminent
contingencies,—events which were on the point of occurring, but yet
did not occur. When we read the wailings of Atossa in the Persæ of
Æschylus, for the humiliation which her son Xerxês had just undergone
in his flight from Greece,[479] we do not easily persuade ourselves
to reverse the picture, and to conceive the same Atossa twenty years
earlier, numbering as her slaves at Susa the noblest Hêrakleid and
Alkmæônid maidens from Greece. Yet the picture would really have
been thus reversed,—the wish of Atossa would have been fulfilled,
and the wailings would have been heard from enslaved Greek maidens
in Persia,—if the mind of Darius had not happened to be preoccupied
with a project not less insane even than those of Kambysês against
Ethiopia and the Libyan desert. Such at least is the moral of the
story of Dêmokêdês.
[479] Æschyl. Pers. 435-845, etc.
That insane expedition across the Danube into Scythia comes now
to be recounted. It was undertaken by Darius for the purpose of
avenging the inroad and devastation of the Scythians in Media and
Upper Asia, about a century before. The lust of conquest imparted
unusual force to this sentiment of wounded dignity, which in the
case of the Scythians could hardly be connected with any expectation
of plunder or profit. In spite of the dissuading admonition of his
brother Artabanus,[480] Darius summoned the whole force of his
empire, army and navy, to the Thracian Bosphorus,—a force not less
than seven hundred thousand horse and foot, and six hundred ships,
according to Herodotus. On these prodigious numbers we can lay no
stress. But it appears that the names of all the various nations
composing the host were inscribed on two pillars, erected by order
of Darius on the European side of the Bosphorus, and afterwards seen
by Herodotus himself in the city of Byzantium,—the inscriptions
were bilingual, in Assyrian characters as well as Greek. The Samian
architect Mandroklês had been directed to throw a bridge of boats
across the Bosphorus, about half-way between Byzantium and the mouth
of the Euxine. So peremptory were the Persian kings that their orders
for military service should be punctually obeyed, and so impatient
were they of the idea of exemptions, that when a Persian father named
Œobazus entreated that one of his three sons, all included in the
conscription, might be left at home, Darius replied that all three of
them should be left at home,—an answer which the unsuspecting father
heard with delight. They were indeed all left at home,—for they were
all put to death.[481] A proceeding similar to this is ascribed
afterwards to Xerxês;[482] whether true or not as matters of fact,
both tales illustrate the wrathful displeasure with which the Persian
kings were known to receive such petitions for exemption.
[480] Herodot. iv, 1, 83. There is nothing to mark the precise
year of the Scythian expedition; but as the accession of Darius
is fixed to 521 B. C., and as the expedition is connected with
the early part of his reign, we may conceive him to have entered
upon it as soon as his hands were free; that is, as soon as he
had put down the revolted satraps and provinces, Orœtês, the
Medes, Babylonians, etc. Five years seems a reasonable time to
allow for these necessities of the empire, which would bring
the Scythian expedition to 516-515 B. C. There is reason for
supposing it to have been before 514 B. C., for in that year
Hipparchus was slain at Athens, and Hippias the surviving
brother, looking out for securities and alliances abroad, gave
his daughter in marriage to Æantidês son of Hippoklus, despot
of Lampsakus, “perceiving that Hippoklus and his son had great
influence with Darius,” (Thucyd. vi, 59.) Now Hippoklus could
not well have acquired this influence _before_ the Scythian
expedition; for Darius came down then for the first time to the
western sea; Hippoklus served upon that expedition (Herodot. iv,
138), and it was probably then that his favor was acquired, and
farther confirmed during the time that Darius stayed at Sardis
after his return from Scythia.
Professor Schultz (Beiträge zu genaueren Zeitbestimmungen der
Hellen. Geschicht. von der 63n bis zur 72n Olympiade, p. 168, in
the Kieler Philolog. Studien) places the expedition in 513 B.
C.; but I think a year or two earlier is more probable. Larcher,
Wesseling, and Bähr (ad Herodot. iv, 145) place it in 508 B. C.,
which is later than the truth; indeed, Larcher himself places the
reduction of Lemnos and Imbros by Otanês in 511 B. C., though
that event decidedly came after the Scythian expedition (Herodot.
v, 27; Larcher, Table Chronologique, Trad. d’Hérodot. t. vii, pp.
633-635).
[481] Herodot. iv, 84.
[482] Herodot. vii, 39.
The naval force of Darius seems to have consisted entirely of subject
Greeks, Asiatic and insular; for the Phenician fleet was not brought
into the Ægean until the subsequent Ionic revolt. At this time all
or most of the Asiatic Greek cities were under despots, who leaned
on the Persian government for support, and who appeared with their
respective contingents to take part in the Scythian expedition.[483]
Of Ionic Greeks were seen,—Strattis, despot of Chios; Æakês son
of Sylosôn, despot of Samos; Laodamas, of Phôkæa; and Histiæus,
of Milêtus. From the Æolic towns, Aristagoras of Kymê; from the
Hellespontine Greeks, Daphnis of Abydus, Hippoklus of Lampsakus,
Hêrophantus of Parium, Metrodôrus of Prokonnêsus, Aristagoras of
Kyzikus, and Miltiadês of the Thracian Chersonese. All these are
mentioned, and there were probably more. This large fleet, assembled
at the Bosphorus, was sent forward into the Euxine to the mouth of
the Danube,—with orders to sail up the river two days’ journey,
above the point where its channel begins to divide, and to throw a
bridge of boats over it; while Darius, having liberally recompensed
the architect Mandroklês, crossed the bridge over the Bosphorus,
and began his march through Thrace, receiving the submission of
various Thracian tribes in his way, and subduing others,—especially
the Getæ north of Mount Hæmus, who were compelled to increase still
farther the numbers of his vast army.[484] On arriving at the Danube,
he found the bridge finished and prepared for his passage by the
Ionians: we may remark here, as on so many other occasions, that all
operations requiring intelligence are performed for the Persians
either by Greeks or by Phenicians,—more usually by the former. He
crossed this greatest of all earthly rivers,[485]—for so the Danube
was imagined to be in the fifth century B. C.,—and directed his march
into Scythia.
[483] Herodot. iv, 97, 137, 138.
[484] Herodot. iv, 89-93.
[485] Herod. iv, 48-50. Ἴστρος—μέγιστος ποταμῶν πάντων τῶν ἡμεῖς
ἴδμεν, etc.
As far as the point now attained, our narrative runs smoothly and
intelligibly: we know that Darius marched his army into Scythia,
and that he came back with ignominy and severe loss. But as to all
which happened between his crossing and recrossing the Danube,
we find nothing approaching to authentic statement,—nothing even
which we can set forth as the probable basis of truth on which
exaggerating fancy has been at work. All is inexplicable mystery.
Ktêsias indeed says that Darius marched for fifteen days into the
Scythian territory,—that he then exchanged bows with the king of
Scythia, and discovered the Scythian bow to be the largest,—and that,
being intimidated by such discovery, he fled back to the bridge by
which he had crossed the Danube, and recrossed the river with the
loss of one-tenth part of his army,[486] being compelled to break
down the bridge before all had passed. The length of march is here
the only thing distinctly stated; about the direction nothing is
said. But the narrative of Ktêsias, defective as it is, is much
less perplexing than that of Herodotus, who conducts the immense
host of Darius as it were through fairy-land,—heedless of distance,
large intervening rivers, want of all cultivation or supplies,
destruction of the country—in so far as it could be destroyed—by
the retreating Scythians, etc. He tells us that the Persian army
consisted chiefly of foot,—that there were no roads nor agriculture;
yet his narrative carries it over about twelve degrees of longitude
from the Danube to the country east of the Tanais, across the rivers
Tyras (Dniester), Hypanis (Bog), Borysthenês (Dnieper), Hypakyris.
Gerrhos, and Tanais.[487] How these rivers could have been passed in
the face of enemies by so vast a host, we are left to conjecture,
since it was not winter time, to convert them into ice: nor does
the historian even allude to them as having been crossed either in
the advance or in the retreat. What is not less remarkable is, that
in respect to the Greek settlement of Olbia, or Borysthenês, and
the agricultural Scythians and Mix-hellenes between the Hypanis and
the Borysthenês, across whose country it would seem that this march
of Darius must have carried him,—Herodotus does not say anything;
though we should have expected that he would have had better means of
informing himself about this part of the march than about any other,
and though the Persians could hardly have failed to plunder or put in
requisition this, the only productive portion of Scythia.
[486] Ktêsias, Persica. c. 17. Justin (ii, 5—compare also
xxxviii, 7) seems to follow the narrative of Ktêsias.
Æschylus (Persæ. 864), who presents the deceased Darius as a
glorious contrast with the living Xerxês, talks of the splendid
conquests which he made by means of others,—“without crossing the
Halys himself, nor leaving his home.” We are led to suppose, by
the language which Æschylus puts into the mouth of the Eidôlon of
Darius (v, 720-745), that he had forgotten, or had never heard
of, the bridge thrown across the Bosphorus by order of Darius;
for the latter is made to condemn severely the impious insolence
of Xerxês in bridging over the Hellespont.
[487] Herodot. iv, 136. ἅτε δὲ τοῦ Περσικοῦ πολλοῦ ἐόντος πεζοῦ
στρατοῦ, καὶ τὰς ὁδοὺς οὐκ ἐπισταμένου, ὥστε οὐ τετμημένων
τῶν ὁδῶν, τοῦ δὲ Σκυθικοῦ, ἱππότεω, καὶ τὰ σύντομα τῆς ὁδοῦ
ἐπισταμένου, etc. Compare c. 128.
The number and size of the rivers are mentioned by Herodotus as
the principal wonder of Scythia, c. 82—Θωϋμάσια δὲ ἡ χώρη αὐτὴ
οὐκ ἔχει, χωρὶς ἢ ὅτι ποτάμους τε πολλῷ μεγίστους καὶ ἀριθμὸν
πλείστους, etc. He ranks the Borysthenês as the largest of all
rivers except the Nile and the Danube (c. 53). The Hypanis also
(Bog) is ποταμὸς ἐν ὀλίγοισι μέγας (c. 52).
But he appears to forget the existence of these rivers when he is
describing the Persian march.
The narrative of Herodotus in regard to the Persian march north of
the Ister seems indeed destitute of all the conditions of reality.
It is rather an imaginative description, illustrating the desperate
and impracticable character of Scythian warfare, and grouping in
the same picture, according to that large sweep of the imagination
which is admissible in epical treatment, the Scythians, with all
their barbarous neighbors from the Carpathian mountains to the river
Wolga. The Agathyrsi, the Neuri, the Androphagi, the Melanchlæni,
the Budini, the Gelôni, the Sarmatians, and the Tauri,—all of them
bordering on that vast quadrangular area of four thousand stadia
for each side, called Scythia, as Herodotus conceives it,[488]—are
brought into deliberation and action in consequence of the Persian
approach. And Herodotus takes that opportunity of communicating
valuable particulars respecting the habits and manners of each. The
kings of these nations discuss whether Darius is justified in his
invasion, and whether it be prudent in them to aid the Scythians.
The latter question is decided in the affirmative by the Sarmatians,
the Budini, and the Gelôni, all eastward of the Tanais,[489]—in the
negative by the rest. The Scythians, removing their wagons with
their wives and children out of the way northward, retreat and draw
Darius after them from the Danube all across Scythia and Sarmatia
to the north-eastern extremity of the territory of the Budini,[490]
several days’ journey eastward of the Tanais. Moreover, they destroy
the wells and ruin the herbage as much as they can, so that during
all this long march, says Herodotus, the Persians “found nothing to
damage, inasmuch as the country was barren;” it is therefore not easy
to see what they could find to live upon. It is in the territory
of the Budini, at this easternmost terminus on the borders of the
desert, that the Persians perform the only positive acts which are
ascribed to them throughout the whole expedition. They burn the
wooden wall before occupied, but now deserted, by the Gelôni, and
they build, or begin to build, eight large fortresses near the river
Oarus. For what purpose these fortresses could have been intended,
Herodotus gives no intimation; but he says that the unfinished work
was yet to be seen even in his day.[491]
[488] Herodot. iv, 101.
[489] Herodot. iv, 118, 119.
[490] Herodot. iv, 120-122.
[491] Herodot. iv, 123. Ὅσον μὲν δὴ χρόνον οἱ Πέρσαι ἤϊσαν διὰ
τῆς Σκυθικῆς καὶ τῆς Σαυρομάτιδος χώρης, οἳ δὲ εἶχον οὐδὲν
σίνεσθαι, ἅτε τῆς χώρης ἐούσης χέρσου· ἐπεὶ δὲ τε ἐς τὴν τῶν
Βουδίνων χώρην ἐσέβαλον, etc. See Rennell, Geograph. System of
Herodotus, p. 114, about the Oarus.
The erections, whatever they were, which were supposed to mark
the extreme point of the march of Darius, may be compared to
those evidences of the extreme advance of Dionysus, which the
Macedonian army saw on the north of the Jaxartês—“Liberi patris
terminos.” Quintus Curtius, vii, 9, 15, (vii, 37, 16, Zumpt.)
Having thus been carried all across Scythia and the other territories
above mentioned in a north-easterly direction, Darius and his army
are next marched back a prodigious distance in a north-westerly
direction, through the territories of the Melanchlæni, the
Androphagi, and the Neuri, all of whom flee affrighted into the
northern desert, having been thus compelled against their will to
share in the consequences of the war. The Agathyrsi peremptorily
require the Scythians to abstain from drawing the Persians
into _their_ territory, on pain of being themselves treated as
enemies:[492] the Scythians in consequence respect the boundaries of
the Agathyrsi, and direct their retreat in such a manner as to draw
the Persians again southward into Scythia. During all this long march
backwards and forwards, there are partial skirmishes and combats of
horse, but the Scythians steadily refuse any general engagement.
And though Darius challenges them formally, by means of a herald,
with taunts of cowardice, the Scythian king Idanthyrsus not only
refuses battle, but explains and defends his policy, and defies the
Persian to come and destroy the tombs of their fathers,—it will then,
he adds, be seen whether the Scythians are cowards or not.[493]
The difficulties of Darius have by this time become serious, when
Idanthyrsus sends to him the menacing presents of a bird, a mouse, a
frog, and five arrows: the Persians are obliged to commence a rapid
retreat towards the Danube, leaving, in order to check and slacken
the Scythian pursuit, the least effective and the sick part of their
army encamped, together with the asses which had been brought with
them,—animals unknown to the Scythians, and causing great alarm by
their braying.[494] However, notwithstanding some delay thus caused,
as well as the anxious haste of Darius to reach the Danube, the
Scythians, far more rapid in their movements, arrive at the river
before him, and open a negotiation with the Ionians left in guard of
the bridge, urging them to break it down and leave the Persian king
to his fate,—inevitable destruction with his whole army.[495]
[492] Herodot. iv, 125. Hekatæus ranks the Melanchlæni as a
Scythian ἔθνος (Hekat. Fragment. 154, ed. Klausen): he also
mentions several other subdivisions of Scythians, who cannot be
farther authenticated (Fragm. 155-160).
[493] Herodot. iv, 126, 127.
[494] Herodot. iv, 128-132. The bird, the mouse, the frog, and
the arrows, are explained to mean: Unless you take to the air
like a bird, to the earth like a mouse, or to the water like a
frog, you will become the victim of the Scythian arrows.
[495] Herodot. iv, 133.
Here we reënter the world of reality, at the north bank of the
Danube, the place where we before quitted it. All that is reported
to have passed in the interval, if tried by the tests of historical
matter of fact, can be received as nothing better than a perplexing
dream. It only acquires value when we consider it as an illustrative
fiction, including, doubtless, some unknown matter of fact, but
framed chiefly to exhibit in action those unattackable Nomads, who
formed the north-eastern barbarous world of a Greek, and with whose
manners Herodotus was profoundly struck. “The Scythians[496] (says
he) in regard to one of the greatest of human matters, have struck
out a plan cleverer than any that I know. In other respects I do
not admire them; but they have contrived this great object, that no
invader of their country shall ever escape out of it, or shall ever
be able to find out and overtake them, unless they themselves choose.
For when men have neither walls nor established cities, but are all
house-carriers and horse-bowmen,—living, not from the plough, but
from cattle, and having their dwellings on wagons,—how can they be
otherwise than unattackable and impracticable to meddle with?” The
protracted and unavailing chase ascribed to Darius,—who can neither
overtake his game nor use his arms, and who hardly even escapes in
safety,—embodies in detail this formidable attribute of the Scythian
Nomads. That Darius actually marched into the country, there can be
no doubt. Nothing else is certain, except his ignominious retreat out
of it to the Danube; for of the many different guesses,[497] by which
critics have attempted to cut down the gigantic sketch of Herodotus
into a march with definite limits and direction, not one rests upon
any positive grounds, or carries the least conviction. We can trace
the pervading idea in the mind of the historian, but cannot find out
what were his substantive data.
[496] Herodot. iv. 46. Τῷ δὲ Σκυθικῷ γένεϊ ἓν μὲν τὸ μέγιστον τῶν
ἀνθρωπηΐων πρηγμάτων σοφώτατα πάντων ἐξεύρηται, τῶν ἡμεῖς ἴδμεν·
τὰ μέντοι ἄλλα οὐκ ἄγαμαι. Τὸ δὲ μέγιστον οὕτω σφι ἀνεύρηται,
ὥστε ἀποφυγέειν τε μηδένα ἐπελθόντα ἐπὶ σφέας, μὴ βουλομένους τε
ἐξευρεθῆναι, καταλαβεῖν μὴ οἷον τε εἶναι. Τοῖσι γὰρ μήτε ἄστεα
μήτε τείχεα ᾖ ἐκτισμένα, ἀλλὰ φερέοικοι ἐόντες πάντες, ἔωσι
ἱπποτοξόται, ζῶντες μὴ ἀπ᾽ ἀρότου, ἀλλ᾽ ἀπὸ κτηνέων, οἰκήματα δέ
σφι ᾖ ἐπὶ ζευγέων, κῶς οὐκ ἂν εἴησαν οὗτοι ἄμαχοί τε καὶ ἄποροι
προσμίσγειν;
Ἐξεύρηται δέ σφι ταῦτα, τῆς τε γῆς ἐούσης ἐπιτηδέης, καὶ τῶν
ποταμῶν ἐόντων σφι συμμάχων, etc.
Compare this with the oration of the Scythian envoys to Alexander
the Great, as it stands in Quintus Curtius, vii, 8, 22 (vii, 35,
22, Zumpt).
[497] The statement of Strabo (vii, p. 305), which restricts the
march of Darius to the country between the Danube and the Tyras
(Dniester) is justly pronounced by Niebuhr (Kleine Schriften,
p. 372) to be a mere supposition suggested by the probabilities
of the case, because it could not be understood how his large
army should cross even the Dniester: it is not to be treated as
an affirmation resting upon any authority. “As Herodotus tells
us what is impossible (adds Niebuhr), we know nothing at all
historically respecting the expedition.”
So again the conjecture of Palmerius (Exercitationes ad Auctores
Græcos, p. 21) carries on the march somewhat farther than the
Dniester,—to the Hypanis, or _perhaps_ to the Borysthenês.
Rennell, Klaproth, and Reichard, are not afraid to extend the
march on to the Wolga. Dr. Thirlwall stops within the Tanais,
admitting, however, that no correct historical account can be
given of it. Eichwald supposes a long march up the Dniester into
Volhynia and Lithuania.
Compare Ukert, Skythien, p. 26; Dahlmann, Historische
Forschungen, ii, pp. 159-164; Schaffarik, Slavische Alterthümer,
i, 10, 3, i, 13, 4-5; and Mr. Kenrick, Remarks on the Life and
Writings of Herodotus, prefixed to his Notes on the Second Book
of Herodotus, p. xxi. The latter is among those who cannot swim
the Dniester: he says: “Probably the Dniester (Tyras) was the
real limit of the expedition, and Bessarabia, Moldavia, and the
Bukovina, the scene of it.”
The adventures which took place at the passage of that river, both on
the out-march and the home-march, wherein the Ionians are concerned,
are far more within the limits of history. Here Herodotus possessed
better means of information, and had less of a dominant idea to
illustrate. That which passed between Darius and the Ionians on his
first crossing is very curious: I have reserved it until the present
moment, because it is particularly connected with the incidents which
happened on his return.
On reaching the Danube from Thrace, he found the bridge of boats
ready, and when the whole army had passed over, he ordered the
Ionians to break it down, as well as to follow him in his land-march
into Scythia;[498] the ships being left with nothing but the rowers
and seamen essential to navigate them homeward. His order was on the
point of being executed, when, fortunately for him, the Mitylenæan
general Kôês ventured to call in question the prudence of it, having
first asked whether it was the pleasure of the Persian king to listen
to advice. He urged that the march on which they were proceeding
might prove perilous, and retreat possibly unavoidable; because the
Scythians, though certain to be defeated if brought to action, might
perhaps not suffer themselves to be approached or even discovered.
As a precaution against all contingencies, it was prudent to leave
the bridge standing and watched by those who had constructed it.
Far from being offended at the advice, Darius felt grateful for it,
and desired that Kôês would ask him after his return for a suitable
reward,—which we shall hereafter find granted. He then altered his
resolution, took a cord, and tied sixty knots in it. “Take this cord
(said he to the Ionians), untie one of the knots in it each day after
my advance from the Danube into Scythia. Remain here and guard the
bridge until you shall have untied all the knots; but if by that time
I shall not have returned, then depart and sail home.”[499] After
such orders he began his march into the interior.
[498] Herodot. iv, 97. Δαρεῖος ἐκέλευσε τοὺς Ἴωνας τὴν σχεδίην
λύσαντας ἕπεσθαι κατ᾽ ἤπειρον ἑωϋτῷ, καὶ τὸν ἐκ τῶν νέων στρατόν.
[499] Herodot. iv, 98. ἢν δὲ ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ μὴ παρέω, ἀλλὰ
διέλθωσι ὑμῖν αἱ ἡμέραι τῶν ἁμμάτων, ἀποπλέετε ἐς τὴν ὑμετέρην
αὐτέων· μέχρι δὲ τούτου, ἐπεί τε οὕτω μετέδοξε, φυλάσσετε τὴν
σχεδίην.
This anecdote is interesting, not only as it discloses the simple
expedients for numeration and counting of time then practised, but
also as it illustrates the geographical ideas prevalent. Darius did
not intend to come back over the Danube, but to march round the
Mæotis, and to return into Persia on the eastern side of the Euxine.
No other explanation can be given of his orders. At first, confident
of success, he orders the bridge to be destroyed forthwith: he
will beat the Scythians, march through their country, and reënter
Media from the eastern side of the Euxine. When he is reminded that
possibly he may not be able to find the Scythians, and may be obliged
to retreat, he still continues persuaded that this must happen within
sixty days, if it happens at all; and that, should he remain absent
more than sixty days, such delay will be a convincing proof that he
will take the other road of return instead of repassing the Danube.
The reader who looks at a map of the Euxine and its surrounding
territories may be startled at so extravagant a conception. But he
should recollect that there was no map of the same or nearly the
same accuracy before Herodotus, much less before the contemporaries
of Darius. The idea of entering Media by the north from Scythia and
Sarmatia over the Caucasus, is familiar to Herodotus in his sketch
of the early marches of the Scythians and Cimmerians: moreover,
he tells us that after the expedition of Darius, there came some
Scythian envoys to Sparta, proposing an offensive alliance against
Persia, and offering on their part to march across the Phasis into
Media from the north,[500] while the Spartans were invited to land
on the shores of Asia Minor, and advance across the country to meet
them from the west. When we recollect that the Macedonians and their
leader, Alexander the Great, having arrived at the river Jaxartês, on
the north of Sogdiana, and on the east of the sea of Aral, supposed
that they had reached the Tanais, and called the river by that
name,[501]—we shall not be astonished at the erroneous estimation of
distance implied in the plan conceived by Darius.
[500] Herodot. vi, 84. Compare his account of the marches of
the Cimmerians and of the Scythians into Asia Minor and Media
respectively (Herodot. i, 103, 104, iv, 12).
[501] Arrian, Exp. Al. iii, 6, 15; Plutarch, Alexand. c. 45;
Quint. Curt. vii, 7, 4, vii, 8, 30 (vii, 29, 5, vii, 36, 7,
Zumpt).
The Ionians had already remained in guard of the bridge beyond the
sixty days commanded, without hearing anything of the Persian army,
when they were surprised by the appearance, not of that army, but
of a body of Scythians, who acquainted them that Darius was in full
retreat and in the greatest distress, and that his safety with the
whole army depended upon that bridge. They endeavored to prevail
upon the Ionians, since the sixty days included in their order to
remain had now elapsed, to break the bridge and retire; assuring
them that, if this were done, the destruction of the Persians was
inevitable,—of course, the Ionians themselves would then be free. At
first, the latter were favorably disposed towards the proposition,
which was warmly espoused by the Athenian Miltiadês, despot, or
governor, of the Thracian Chersonese.[502] Had he prevailed, the
victor of Marathon—for such we shall hereafter find him—would have
thus inflicted a much more vital blow on Persia than even that
celebrated action, and would have brought upon Darius the disastrous
fate of his predecessor Cyrus. But the Ionian princes, though
leaning at first towards his suggestion, were speedily converted
by the representations of Histiæus of Milêtus, who reminded them
that the maintenance of his own ascendency over the Milesians, and
that of each despot in his respective city, was assured by means of
Persian support alone,—the feeling of the population being everywhere
against them: consequently, the ruin of Darius would be their ruin
also. This argument proved conclusive. It was resolved to stay and
maintain the bridge, but to pretend compliance with the Scythians,
and prevail upon them to depart, by affecting to destroy it. The
northern portion of the bridge was accordingly destroyed, for the
length of a bow-shot, and the Scythians departed under the persuasion
that they had succeeded in depriving their enemies of the means of
crossing the river.[503] It appears that they missed the track of the
retreating host, which was thus enabled, after the severest privation
and suffering, to reach the Danube in safety. Arriving during the
darkness of the night, Darius was at first terrified to find the
bridge no longer joining the northern bank: an Egyptian herald, of
stentorian powers of voice, was ordered to call as loudly as possible
the name of Histiæus the Milesian. Answer being speedily made, the
bridge was reëstablished, and the Persian army passed over before the
Scythians returned to the spot.[504]
[502] Herodot. iv, 133, 136, 137.
[503] Herodot. iv, 137-139.
[504] Herodot. iv, 140, 141.
There can be no doubt that the Ionians here lost an opportunity
eminently favorable, such as never again returned, for emancipating
themselves from the Persian dominion. Their despots, by whom the
determination was made, especially the Milesian Histiæus, were
not induced to preserve the bridge by any honorable reluctance to
betray the trust reposed in them, but simply by selfish regard to
the maintenance of their own unpopular dominion. And we may remark
that the real character of this impelling motive, as well as the
deliberation accompanying it, may be assumed as resting upon very
good evidence, since we are now arrived within the personal knowledge
of the Milesian historian Hekatæus, who took an active part in the
Ionic revolt a few years afterwards, and who may, perhaps, have been
personally engaged in this expedition. He will be found reviewing
with prudence and sobriety the chances of that unfortunate revolt,
and distrusting its success from the beginning; while Histiæus of
Milêtus will appear on the same occasion as the fomenter of it,
in order to procure his release from an honorable detention at
Susa, near the person of Darius. The selfishness of this despot
having deprived his countrymen of that real and favorable chance of
emancipation which the destruction of the bridge would have opened to
them, threw them into perilous revolt a few years afterwards against
the entire and unembarrassed force of the Persian king and empire.
Extricated from the perils of Scythian warfare, Darius marched
southward from the Danube through Thrace to the Hellespont, where he
crossed from Sestus into Asia. He left, however, a considerable army
in Europe, under the command of Megabazus, to accomplish the conquest
of Thrace. Perinthus on the Propontis made a brave resistance,[505]
but was at length subdued, and it appears that all the Thracian
tribes, and all the Grecian colonies between the Hellespont and
the Strymon, were forced to submit, giving earth and water, and
becoming subject to tribute.[506] Near the lower Strymon, was the
Edonian town of Myrkinus, which Darius ordered to be made over to
Histiæus of Milêtus; for both this Milesian, and Kôês of Mitylênê,
had been desired by the Persian king to name their own reward for
their fidelity to him on the passage over the Danube.[507] Kôês
requested that he might be constituted despot of Mitylênê, which was
accomplished by Persian authority; but Histiæus solicited that the
territory near Myrkinus might be given to him for the foundation of
a colony. As soon as the Persian conquests extended thus far, the
site in question was presented to Histiæus, who entered actively upon
his new scheme. We shall find the territory near Myrkinus eminent
hereafter as the site of Amphipolis. It offered great temptation to
settlers, as fertile, well wooded, convenient for maritime commerce,
and near to auriferous and argentiferous mountains.[508] It seems,
however, that the Persian dominion in Thrace was disturbed by an
invasion of the Scythians, who, in revenge for the aggression of
Darius, overran the country as far as the Thracian Chersonese, and
are even said to have sent envoys to Sparta proposing a simultaneous
invasion of Persia from different sides, by Spartans and Scythians.
The Athenian Miltiadês, who was despot, or governor, of the
Chersonese, was forced to quit it for some time, and Herodotus
ascribes his retirement to the incursion of these Nomads. But we
may be permitted to suspect that the historian has misconceived the
real cause of such retirement. Miltiadês could not remain in the
Chersonese after he had incurred the deadly enmity of Darius by
exhorting the Ionians to destroy the bridge over the Danube.[509]
[505] Herodot. iv, 143, 144, v, 1, 2.
[506] Herodot. v, 2.
[507] Herodot. v, 11.
[508] Herodot. v, 23.
[509] Herodot. vi, 40-84. That Miltiadês could have remained
in the Chersonese undisturbed, during the interval between the
Scythian expedition of Darius and the Ionic revolt,—when the
Persians were complete masters of those regions, and when Otanês
was punishing other towns in the neighborhood for evasion of
service under Darius, after he had declared so pointedly against
the Persians on a matter of life and death to the king and
army,—appears to me, as it does to Dr. Thirlwall (History of
Gr. vol. ii, App. ii, p. 486, ch. xiv, pp. 226-249), eminently
improbable. So forcibly does Dr. Thirlwall feel the difficulty,
that he suspects the reported conduct and exhortations of
Miltiadês at the bridge over the Danube to have been a falsehood,
fabricated by Miltiadês himself, twenty years afterwards, for
the purpose of acquiring popularity at Athens during the time
immediately preceding the battle of Marathon.
I cannot think this hypothesis admissible. It directly
contradicts Herodotus on a matter of fact very conspicuous, and
upon which good means of information seem to have been within his
reach. I have already observed that the historian Hekatæus must
have possessed personal knowledge of all the relations between
the Ionians and Darius, and that he very probably may have been
even present at the bridge: all the information given by Hekatæus
upon these points would be open to the inquiries of Herodotus.
The unbounded gratitude of Darius towards Histiæus shows that
some one or more of the Ionic despots present at the bridge must
have powerfully enforced the expediency of breaking it down.
That the name of the despot who stood forward as prime mover of
this resolution should have been forgotten and not mentioned
at the time, is highly improbable; yet such must have been the
case if a fabrication by Miltiadês twenty years afterwards
could successfully fill up the blank with his own name. The two
most prominent matters talked of, after the retreat of Darius,
in reference to the bridge, would probably be the name of the
leader who urged its destruction, and the name of Histiæus, who
preserved it. Indeed, the mere fact of the mischievous influence
exercised by the latter afterwards would be pretty sure to keep
these points of the case in full view.
There are means of escaping from the difficulty of the case,
I think, without contradicting Herodotus on any matter of
fact important and conspicuous, or indeed on any matter of
fact whatever. We see by vi, 40, that Miltiadês _did quit the
Chersonese_ between the close of the Scythian expedition of
Darius and the Ionic revolt; Herodotus, indeed, tells us that he
quitted it in consequence of an incursion of the Scythians: but
without denying the fact of such an incursion, we may reasonably
suppose the historian to have been mistaken in assigning it as
the cause of the flight of Miltiadês. The latter was prevented
from living in the Chersonese continuously, during the interval
between the Persian invasion of Scythia and the Ionic revolt, by
fear of Persian enmity. It is not necessary for us to believe
that he was never there at all, but his residence there must have
been interrupted and insecure. The chronological data in Herodot.
vi, 40, are exceedingly obscure and perplexing; but it seems to
me that the supposition which I suggest introduces a plausible
coherence into the series of historical facts, with the slightest
possible contradiction to our capital witness.
The only achievement of Miltiadês, between the affair on the
Danube and his return to Athens shortly before the battle of
Marathon, is the conquest of Lemnos; and _that_ must have taken
place evidently while the Persians were occupied by the Ionic
revolt, (between 502-494 B. C.) There is nothing in his recorded
deeds inconsistent with the belief, therefore, that between
515-502 B. C. he may not have resided in the Chersonese at all,
or at least not for very long together: and the statement of
Cornelius Nepos, that he quitted it immediately after the return
from Scythia, from fear of the Persians, may be substantially
true. Dr. Thirlwall observes (p. 487)—“As little would it appear
that when the Scythians invaded the Chersonese, Miltiadês was
conscious of having endeavored to render them an important
service. He flies before them, though he had been so secure while
the Persian arms were in his neighborhood.” He has here put
his finger on what I believe to be the error of Herodotus,—the
supposition that Miltiadês fled from the Chersonese to avoid the
Scythians, whereas he really left it to avoid the Persians.
The story of Strabo (xiii, p. 591), that Darius caused the Greek
cities on the Asiatic side of the Hellespont to be burnt down,
in order to hinder them from affording means of transport to the
Scythians into Asia, seems to me highly improbable. These towns
appear in their ordinary condition, Abydus among them, at the
time of the Ionic revolt a few years afterwards (Herodot. v,
117).
Nor did the conquests of Megabazus stop at the western bank of the
Strymon. He carried his arms across that river, conquering the
Pæonians, and reducing the Macedonians under Amyntas to tribute. A
considerable number of the Pæonians were transported across into
Asia, by express order of Darius; whose fancy had been struck by
seeing at Sardis a beautiful Pæonian woman carrying a vessel on her
head, leading a horse to water, and spinning flax, all at the same
time. This woman had been brought over, we are told, by her two
brothers, Pigrês and Mantyês, for the express purpose of arresting
the attention of the Great King. They hoped by this means to be
constituted despots of their countrymen, and we may presume that
their scheme succeeded, for such part of the Pæonians as Megabazus
could subdue were conveyed across to Asia and planted in some
villages in Phrygia. Such violent transportations of inhabitants were
in the genius of the Persian government.[510]
[510] Herodot. v, 13-16. Nikolaus Damaskênus (Fragm. p. 36, ed.
Orell.) tells a similar story about the means by which a Mysian
woman attracted the notice of the Lydian king Alyattês. Such
repetition of a striking story, in reference to different people
and times, has many parallels in ancient history.
From the Pæonian lake Prasias, seven eminent Persians were sent as
envoys into Macedonia, to whom Amyntas readily gave the required
token of submission, inviting them to a splendid banquet. When
exhilarated with wine, they demanded to see the women of the regal
family, who, being accordingly introduced, were rudely dealt with by
the strangers. At length, the son of Amyntas, Alexander, resented the
insult, and exacted for it a signal vengeance. Dismissing the women,
under pretence that they should return after a bath, he brought back
in their place youths in female attire, armed with daggers: the
Persians, proceeding to repeat their caresses, were all put to death.
Their retinue and splendid carriages and equipment which they had
brought with them disappeared at the same time, without any tidings
reaching the Persian army. And when Bubarês, another eminent Persian,
was sent into Macedonia to institute researches, Alexander contrived
to hush up the proceeding by large bribes, and by giving him his
sister Gygæa in marriage.[511]
[511] Herodot. v, 20, 21.
Meanwhile Megabazus crossed over into Asia, carrying with him the
Pæonians from the river Strymon. Having been in those regions, he
had become alarmed at the progress of Histiæus with his new city
of Myrkinus, and communicated his apprehensions to Darius; who was
prevailed upon to send for Histiæus, retaining him about his person,
and carrying him to Susa as counsellor and friend, with every mark
of honor, but with the secret intention of never letting him revisit
Asia Minor. The fears of the Persian general were probably not
unreasonable; but this detention of Histiæus at Susa, became in the
sequel an important event.[512]
[512] Herodot. v, 23, 24.
On departing for his capital, Darius nominated his brother
Artaphernês satrap of Sardis, and Otanês, general of the forces on
the coast, in place of Megabazus. The new general dealt very severely
with various towns near the Propontis, on the ground that they had
evaded their duty in the late Scythian expedition, and had even
harassed the army of Darius in its retreat. He took Byzantium and
Chalkêdon, as well as Antandrus in the Troad, and Lampônium; and
with the aid of a fleet from Lesbos, he achieved a new conquest,—the
islands of Lemnos and Imbros, at that time occupied by a Pelasgic
population, seemingly without any Greek inhabitants at all.
These Pelasgi were of cruel and piratical character, if we may judge
by the tenor of the legends respecting them; Lemnian misdeeds being
cited as a proverbial expression for atrocities.[513] They were
distinguished also for ancient worship of Hêphæstus, together with
mystic rites in honor of the Kabeiri, and even human sacrifices to
their Great Goddess. In their two cities,—Hephæstias on the east of
the island, and Myrina on the west,—they held out bravely against
Otanês, nor did they submit until they had undergone long and severe
hardship. Lykarêtus, brother of that Mæandrius whom we have already
noticed as despot of Samos, was named governor of Lemnos; but he
soon after died.[514] It is probable that the Pelasgic population
of the islands was greatly enfeebled during this struggle, and we
even hear that their king Hermon voluntarily emigrated, from fear of
Darius.[515]
[513] Herodot. vi, 138. Æschyl. Choêphor. 632; Stephan. Byz. v.
Λῆμνος.
The mystic rites in honor of the Kabeiri at Lemnos and Imbros
are particularly noticed by Pherekydês (ap. Strabo, x, p. 472):
compare Photius, v. Κάβειροι, and the remarkable description of
the periodical Lemnian solemnity in Philostratus (Heroi. p. 740).
The volcanic mountain Mosychlus, in the north-eastern portion
of the island, was still burning in the fourth century B. C.
(Antimach. Fragment. xviii, p. 103, Düntzer Epicc. Græc. Fragm.)
Welcker’s Dissertation (Die Æschylische Trilogie, p. 248,
_seqq._) enlarges much upon the Lemnian and Samothracian worship.
[514] Herodot. v, 26, 27. The twenty-seventh chapter is extremely
perplexing. As the text reads at present, we ought to make
Lykarêtus the subject of certain predications which yet seem
properly referable to Otanês. We must consider the words from
Οἱ μὲν δὴ Λήμνιοι—down to τελευτᾷ—as parenthetical, which is
awkward; but it seems the least difficulty in the case, and the
commentators are driven to adopt it.
[515] Zenob. Proverb. iii, 85.
Lemnos and Imbros thus became Persian possessions, held by a
subordinate prince as tributary. A few years afterwards their lot was
again changed,—they passed into the hands of Athens, the Pelasgic
inhabitants were expelled, and fresh Athenian settlers introduced.
They were conquered by Miltiadês from the Thracian Chersonese; from
Elæus at the south of that peninsula to Lemnos being within less
than one day’s sail with a north wind. The Hephæstieans abandoned
their city and evacuated the island with little resistance; but the
inhabitants of Myrina stood a siege,[516] and were not expelled
without difficulty: both of them found abodes in Thrace, on and near
the peninsula of Mount Athos. Both these islands, together with that
of Skyros (which was not taken until after the invasion of Xerxês),
remained connected with Athens in a manner peculiarly intimate. At
the peace of Antalkidas (387 B. C.),—which guaranteed universal
autonomy to every Grecian city, great and small,—they were specially
reserved, and considered as united with Athens.[517] The property
in their soil was held by men who, without losing their Athenian
citizenship, became Lemnian kleruchs, and as such were classified
apart among the military force of the state; while absence in Lemnos
or Imbros seems to have been accepted as an excuse for delay before
the courts of justice, so as to escape the penalties of contumacy, or
departure from the country.[518] It is probable that a considerable
number of poor Athenian citizens were provided with lots of land in
these islands, though we have no direct information of the fact, and
are even obliged to guess the precise time at which Miltiadês made
the conquest. Herodotus, according to his usual manner, connects the
conquest with an ancient oracle, and represents it as the retribution
for ancient legendary crime committed by certain Pelasgi, who, many
centuries before, had been expelled by the Athenians from Attica,
and had retired to Lemnos. Full of this legend, he tells us nothing
about the proximate causes or circumstances of the conquest, which
must probably have been accomplished by the efforts of Athens,
jointly with Miltiadês from the Chersonese, daring the period that
the Persians were occupied in quelling the Ionic revolt, between
502-494 B. C.,—since it is hardly to be supposed that Miltiadês would
have ventured thus to attack a Persian possession during the time
that the satraps had their hands free. The acquisition was probably
facilitated by the fact, that the Pelasgic population of the islands
had been weakened, as well by their former resistance to the Persian
Otanês, as by some years passed under the deputy of a Persian satrap.
[516] Herodot. vi, 140. Charax ap. Stephan. Byz. v. Ἡφαιστíα.
[517] Xenophon, Hellen. v, 1, 31. Compare Plato, Menexenus, c.
17, p. 245, where the words ἡμετέραι ἀποίκιαι doubtless mean
Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros.
[518] Thucyd. iv, 23, v, 8, vii, 57; Phylarchus ap. Athenæum,
vi, p. 255; Dêmosthen. Philippic. 1, c. 12, p. 17, R.: compare
the Inscription, No. 1686, in the collection of Boeckh, with his
remarks, p. 297.
About the stratagems resorted to before the Athenian dikastery,
to procure delay by pretended absence in Lemnos or Skyros, see
Isæus, Or. vi, p. 58 (p. 80, Bek.); Pollux, viii, 7, 81; Hesych.
v. Ἴμβριος; Suidas, v. Λημνία δίκη: compare also Carl Rhode, Res
Lemnicæ, p. 50 (Wratislaw 1829).
It seems as if εἰς Λῆμνον πλεῖν had come to be a proverbial
expression at Athens for getting out of the way,—evading the
performance of duty: this seems to be the sense of Dêmosthenês,
Philipp. i, c. 9, p. 14. ἀλλ᾽ εἰς μὲν Λῆμνον τὸν παρ᾽ ὑμῶν
ἵππαρχον δεῖ πλεῖν, τῶν δ᾽ ὑπὲρ τῶν τῆς πόλεως κτημάτων
ἀγωνιζομένων Μενέλαον ἱππαρχεῖν.
From the passage of Isæus above alluded to, which Rhode seems to
me to construe incorrectly, it appears that there was a legal
_connubium_ between Athenian citizens and Lemnian women.
In mentioning the conquest of Lemnos by the Athenians and Miltiadês,
I have anticipated a little on the course of events, because that
conquest,—though coinciding in point of time with the Ionic revolt
(which will be recounted in the following chapter), and indirectly
caused by it, in so far as it occupied the attention of the
Persians,—lies entirely apart from the operations of the revolted
Ionians. When Miltiadês was driven out of the Chersonese by the
Persians, on the suppression of the Ionic revolt, his fame, derived
from having subdued Lemnos,[519] contributed both to neutralize the
enmity which he had incurred as governor of the Chersonese, and to
procure his election as one of the ten generals for the year of the
Marathonian combat.
[519] Herodot. vi, 136.