CHAPTER VII. THE PROGRAMS OF _MIN SHÊNG_.

The Three Programs of _Min Shêng_.

The new ideology of Sun Yat-sen, as has been shown, demanded three

fulfilments of the doctrine of _min shêng_: a nationalistic economic

revolution, a deliberate industrial revolution, and a social revolution.

The last was to be accomplished negatively rather than positively. It was

to aim at the reconstruction of the Chinese economy in such a manner as to

avoid the necessity of class war. Since Chinese society was to be

revolutionized by the development of a nation and a state, with all that

that implied, and was to be changed by a transition from a handicraft

economy to an industrial one, Sun Yat-sen hoped that these changes would

permit the social revolution to develop at the same time as the others,

and did not plan for it separately and distinctly. The three revolutions,

all of them economic, were to develop simultaneously, and all together

were to form a third of the process of readjustment.

In considering the actual plans for carrying out the _min shêng_

principle, the student encounters difficulties. The general philosophical

position of the _min shêng_ ideology in relation to the ideologies of

nationalism and democracy, and in connection with such foreign

philosophies as capitalism and Marxism, has already been set forth. The

direct plans that Sun Yat-sen had for the industrial revolution in China

are also clear, since he outlined them, laboriously although tentatively,

in _The International Development of China_;(295) but whereas the ideology

and the actual physical blueprints can be understood clearly enough, the

general lines of practical governmental policy with regard to economic

matters have not been formulated in such a way as to make them

indisputable.

Sun Yat-sen was averse to tying the hands of his followers and successors

with respect to economic policy. He said: “While there are many

undertakings which can be conducted by the State with advantage, others

cannot be conducted effectively except under competition. I have no

hard-and-fast dogma. Much must be left to the lessons of experience.”(296)

It would be inexpedient to go into details about railway lines and other

modern industrial enterprises by means of which Sun sought to modernize

China. On the other hand, it would be a waste of time merely to repeat the

main economic theses of the new ideology. Accordingly, the examination of

the program of _min shêng_ will be restricted to the consideration of

those features that affected the state, either directly or indirectly, or

which had an important bearing upon the proposed future social

organization of the Chinese. Among the topics to be discussed are the

political nature of the national economic revolution, the political effect

of the industrial revolution upon the Chinese, and the expediency of Sun’s

plans for that revolution; the nature of the social revolution which was

to accompany these two first, especially with reference to the problem of

land, the problem of capital, and the problem of the class struggle; the

sphere of state action in the new economy; and the nature of that ideal

economy which would be realized when the Chinese should have carried to

completion the programs of _min shêng_. Railway maps and other designs of

Sun, which have proved such an inspiration in the modernization of China

and which represent a pioneer attempt in state planning, will have to be

left to the consideration of the economists and the geographers.(297)

The program of _min shêng_ was vitally important to the realization of the

Nationalist revolution as a whole, so important, indeed, that Sun Yat-sen

put it first in one of his plans:

The first step in reconstruction is to promote the economic

well-being of the people by providing for their four necessities

of life, namely, food, clothing, shelter, and transportation. For

this purpose, the Government will, with the people’s co-operation,

develop agriculture to give the people an adequate food supply,

promote textile industries to solve their clothing problem,

institute gigantic housing schemes to provide for them decent

living quarters, and build roads and canals so that they may have

convenient means of travel.

Next is the promotion of democracy....

The third step is the development of nationalism....(298)

The plans for realizing _min shêng_ were to be the most necessary and the

most difficult. In the change from a world-society to a race-nation, the

Chinese had their own social solidarity and the experience of the Western

nations to guide them. There was little in the development of a nation

that had not already been tried elsewhere. The only real obstacles were

the ignorance of the people, in relation to the new social environment in

which their whole society was involved, and the possibility of opposition

from the politically oppressing powers.

In the development of democracy the Chinese could rely in part upon the

experience of the West. The Kuomintang could observe the machinery of

democratic states in regular operation abroad. Although the new democracy

of the five powers and the four rights was differed from the democratic

methods of the West, still, as in mechanics, certain fundamental rules of

political organization in its technical details could be relied upon. The

Chinese people had a democratic background in the autonomy of the various

extra-political units.

In _min shêng_ neither the experience of the West nor the old Chinese

background would be of much value. More than the other two principles and

programs, _min shêng_ sought to alter the constitution and nature of

Chinese society. Yet in _min shêng_ the Chinese were to be guided only

negatively by Western experience. Into their society, passing through a

great economic upheaval, they must introduce, by a trial-and-error method,

the requirements for economic unity, efficiency, and justice.

The National Economic Revolution.

After the pitiable failure of the 1912 Republic, Sun Yat-sen began to

place an especially heavy emphasis on the necessity of a national economic

revolution which would carry on the achievements of the national political

revolution. He placed an even greater stress upon the necessity of _min

shêng_ in the revolutionary ideology, and became more and more clearly

conscious of the danger imperialism constituted to the Chinese

race-nation. He believed that, as the 1912 revolution had been created by

the sword, the new economic revolution might be furthered by the pen, and

with this in mind he wrote _The International Development of China_. At

the time that he wrote this work, he seems to have been convinced of the

fruitlessness of purely military effort, and the superior value of pacific

economic organization.(299)

This organization was to be effected through capital brought in from the

outside. As it developed that capital would not come in, that instead of

continuing the terrific pace of production which the World War had

demanded, the nations returned to comparative laissez faire, and let their

economies slump, Sun was persuaded that the whole revolution would have to

be carried on by the Chinese themselves, with the possible help of the

Communist Russians, and of Japan. He found the reorganized Kuomintang to

be the instrument of this last revolution, both politically and

democratically, and began to emphasize Chinese resistance to the outside,

rather than appeal for help from the barbarian nations.

It is this last attitude which one finds expressed in the acts of the last

years of his life. The national revolution was to be made a reality by

being intimately associated with the economic life and development of the

country. The plans made for economic development should be pushed as far

as possible without waiting for foreign help. The Chinese should use the

instrument of the boycott as a sanction with which to give weight to their

national policy.(300) They had to practise economic nationalism in order

to rid themselves of the incubus of imperialism which was sucking the

life-blood of their country. In this connection between nationalism and

_min shêng_, the economic aspect of the nationalist program was to be the

means, and the national aspect of the _min shêng_ program the consequence.

Unless Chinese, both as members of a state and as individuals stirred by

national sentiment, were moved to action against Western economic

aggression, they might consider themselves already doomed.

How did Sun propose to promote the national economic revolution,(301) as

distinguished from the industrial revolution and the social revolution? He

gave, in the first place, as earlier stated, the economic part of his

theories a greater weight than they had hitherto enjoyed, and placed them

first in his practical program. Secondly, he tended to associate the

national political revolution more and more with the real seat of economic

power: the working class. In this introduction of the working class into

the labors for the fulfilment of _min shêng_ as a national economic

revolution, he was doing two things. He was hoping to bring the standards

of Chinese labor up to those of the West, and he was making use of the

political power of labor in China as an added instrument of the national

economic revolution.

The Chinese nation could and should not continue, as a nation, on a scale

of living lower than that of the Western nations. He urged the Chinese

workers, as the class most affected, to fight for the economic advancement

of themselves and of their nation. “Comrades, the people meeting here are

all workers and represent a part of the nation. A great responsibility

rests on Chinese labor, and if you are equal to the task, China will

become a great nation and you a mighty working class.”(302) The Chinese

workers were performing not only a duty that they owed to themselves—they

were also acting patriotically.

In advancing the national economic revolution by advancing themselves,

they could not afford to lose sight of the political part of the

revolution. “Beyond the economic struggle for the shortening of the

working day and the increase of wages, there are before you other much

more important questions of a political character. For our political

objectives you must follow the three principles and support the

revolution.”(303) The two parts of the revolution could not be separated

from one another.

Besides the economic part of the national revolution, there was another

readjustment of which Sun did not often speak, because it was not an open

problem which could be served by immediate political action. This was the

problem of the transition of China from an autarchic to a trading economy.

The old Chinese world had been self-sustaining, so self-sustaining that

the Emperor Tao Kuang wrote to George III of England that he did not

desire anything that the barbarians might have, but, out of the mercy and

the bounty of his heart, would permit them to come to China in order to

purchase the excellent things that the Chinese possessed in such

abundance.(304) The impact of the West had had serious economic

consequences,(305) and the Chinese were in the unpleasant position of

having their old economic system disrupted without gaining the advantages

of a nationally organized economy in return. They had the actual privilege

of consuming a greater variety of goods than before, but this was offset

by the fact that the presence of these goods threw their domestic markets

and old native commercial system out of balance, without offering a

correspondingly large potentiality of foreign export. Furthermore, the

political position of the Western powers in China was such, as Sun Yat-sen

complained, that trade was conducted on a somewhat inequitable basis.

The consequences of a national economic revolution could not but be

far-reaching. The political changes in the economic situation demanded by

Sun Yat-sen in his program of economic nationalism—the return of tariff

autonomy, the retrocession of the occupied concessions, etc.—would have a

great positive and immediate effect; but there would be a long system of

development, not to be so easily predicted or foreseen, which would

inevitably appear as a result of Chinese nationhood. If China were to have

a state strong enough to perform the economic functions which Sun wished

to have imposed upon it, and were to take her place as one of the great

importing and exporting nations of the world, it is obvious that a real

economic revolution would have to be gone through.

Here again the liberal-national character of Sun’s ideology and programs

with respect to relations with the West appears. The Fascist states of the

present time exhibit a definite drift from free trade to autarchy. In

China the change from an autarchic world-society to a trading nation

constituted the reverse. Sun Yat-sen did not leave a large legacy of

programs in this connection, but he foresaw the development and was much

concerned about it.

The Industrial Revolution.

The program of industrial revolution was planned by Sun Yat-sen with great

care. The same belief which led him to urge the social revolution also

guided him in his plans for the industrial revolutionizing of the Chinese

economy, namely, his belief that China could profit by the example of the

West, that what the West had done wastefully and circuitously could be

done by the Chinese deliberately and straightforwardly. He proposed that

the change from the old economy to the new be according to a well thought

out plan. “However, China must develop her industries by all means. Shall

we follow the old path of western civilization? This old path resembles

the sea route of Columbus’ first trip to America. He set out from Europe

by a southwesterly direction through the Canary Islands to San Salvador,

in the Bahama group. But nowadays navigators take a different direction to

America and find that the destination can be reached by a distance many

times shorter. The path of Western civilization was an unknown one and

those who went before groped in the dark as Columbus did on his first

voyage to America. As a late comer, China can greatly profit in covering

the space by following the direction already charted by western

pioneers.”(306) By calling in the help of friends who were familiar with

engineering and by using his own very extensive knowledge of Chinese

economic potentialities, Sun Yat-sen drafted a broad long-range plan by

means of which China would be able to set forth on such a charted course

in her industrial revolution. This plan, offered tentatively, was called

_The International Development of China_ in the English and _The Outline

of Material Reconstruction_ in the Chinese version, both of which Sun

himself wrote.

This outline was originally prepared as a vast plan which could be

financed by the great powers, who would thereby find markets for their

glut of goods left over by the war. The loan was to be made on terms not

unprofitable to the financial powers, but nevertheless equitable to the

Chinese. Sun Yat-sen hoped that with these funds the Chinese state could

make a venture into state socialism. It was possible, in his opinion, to

launch a coöperative modern economy in China with the assistance of

international capitalism, if the capital employed were to be remunerated

with attractive rates of interest, and if the plan were so designed as to

allow for its being financially worthwhile. He stated:

Before entering into the details of this International development

scheme four principles have to be considered:

1. The most remunerative field must be selected in order to

attract foreign capital.

2. The most urgent needs of the nation must be met.

3. The lines of least resistance must be followed.

4. The most suitable positions must be chosen.(307)

He was not oblivious to the necessity of making each detail of his plan

one which would not involve the tying-up of unproductive capital, and did

not propose to use capital advanced for the purposes of the industrial

revolution for the sake of military or political advantage.

This may be shown in a concrete instance. He spoke of his Great

Northeastern railway system as a scheme which might not seem economically

attractive, and then pointed out that, as between a railway system running

between densely-populated areas, the latter would be infinitely the more

preferable. But, said he, “... a railway between a densely populated

country and a sparsely settled country will pay far better than one that

runs end to end in a densely populated land.”(308)

Even though he came to despair of having this scheme for the development

of China carried out by international financial action, the expediency of

his plans remained. He sought the fulfillment of this outline throughout

his life; it has remained as a part of his legacy, challenging the Chinese

people by the grandeur of its conception and the precision of its details.

It is a work which cannot easily be summarized in a discussion of

political doctrines. Fully comparable in grandeur to the Russian

_Piatiletka_, it provides for a complete communication system including

all types of transport, the development of great ports, colonization and

reclamation projects, and the growth of vast industrial areas comparable

to the Donbas or the Kuzbas. The plan, while sound as a whole and not

inexpedient in detail, is not marked by that irregularity of proportion

which marks planning under capitalism; although not as fully worked out as

the later Russian projects, Sun’s plan, in 1922, was considerably more

advanced than any Russian plan of that time. Sun shared with Lenin a

passionate conviction of the inevitable necessity of industrialization;

but while Lenin saw in industrialism the strengthening of that

revolutionary bulwark, the proletariat, Sun believed in industrialism as a

benefit to the whole nation.

This plan is the obvious fruit of Sun’s advocacy of the adoption of the

Western physical sciences. Here there is little trace of his ideological

consistency with the old premises of Chinese society. He does not

challenge them, but he does present a concrete plan which refers only

incidentally to the political or the ideological. It is heavy with the

details of industrial revolution. Sun Yat-sen’s enthusiasm shows clearly

through the pages of this work; he wrote it at a time when his health was

still comparatively good, and when he was not harassed by the almost

explosive dynamics of the situation such as that in which he delivered the

sixteen lectures on the _San Min Chu I_. Here the practical aspects of his

thinking show forth, his willingness to consider and debate, the profound

and quiet enthusiasm for concrete projects which animated him and which

was so infectious among his followers.

It were, of course, unfeasable to attempt any detailed description and

assessment of the plan.(309) The great amount of point by point

elaboration worked over by Sun Yat-sen in order to make his plan appealing

precludes the consideration of any one project in detail as a sample.

Failing this, the magnitude of the plan may be gauged by a recapitulation

of the chief points in each of his programs. It must be remembered,

however, that each one of these subheads might necessitate hundreds of

millions of dollars for execution, involving the building of several

industrial cities or the reconstruction of a whole industry throughout the

country. The printing industry, for example, not even mentioned in the

general outline given below, was discussed as follows:

This industry provides man with intellectual food. It is a

necessity of modern society, without which mankind cannot

progress. All human activities are recorded, and all human

knowledge is stored in printing. It is a great factor of

civilization. The progress and civilization of different nations

of the world are measured largely by the quantity of printed

matter they turned out annually. China, though the nation that

invented printing, is very backward in the development of its

printing industry. In our international Development Scheme, the

printing industry must also be given a place. If China is

developed industrially according to the lines which I suggested,

the demand for printed matter will be exceedingly great. In order

to meet this demand efficiently, a system of large printing houses

must be established in all large cities in the country, to

undertake printing of all kinds, from newspapers to encyclopedia

[sic!]. The best modern books on various subjects in different

countries should be translated into Chinese and published in cheap

edition form for the general public in China. All the publishing

houses should be organized under one common management, so as to

secure the best economic results.

In order to make printed matter cheap, other subsidiary industries

must be developed at the same time. The most important of these is

the paper industry. At present all the paper used by newspapers in

China is imported. And the demand for paper is increasing every

day. China has plenty of raw materials for making paper, such as

the vast virgin forests of the northwestern part of the country,

and the wild reeds of the Yangtze and its neighboring swamps which

would furnish the best pulps. So, large plants for manufacturing

paper should be put up in suitable locations. Besides the paper

factories, ink factories, type foundries, printing machine

factories, etc., should be established under a central management

to produce everything that is needed in the printing

industry.(310)

With this comment on printing as a small sample of the extent of each

minor project in the plans, let us observe Sun’s own summary:

I.

The Development of a Communications System.

(a)

100,000 miles of Railways.

(b)

1,000,000 miles of Macadam Roads.

(c)

Improvement of Existing Canals.

(1)

Hangchow-Tientsin Canals.

(2)

Sikiang-Yangtze Canals.

(d)

Construction of New Canals.

(1)

Liaoho-Sunghwakiang Canal.

(2)

Others to be projected.

(e)

River Conservancy.

(1)

To regulate the Embankments and Channel of the Yangtze

River from Hankow to the Sea thus facilitating

Ocean-going ships to reach that Port at all seasons.

(2)

To regulate the Hoangho Embankments and Channel to

prevent floods.

(3)

To regulate the Sikiang.

(4)

To regulate the Hwaiho.

(5)

To regulate various other rivers.

(f)

The Construction of more Telegraph Lines and Telephones and

Wireless Systems all over the Country.

II.

The Development of Commercial Harbors.

(a)

Three largest Ocean Ports with future capacity equalling New

York Harbor to be constructed in North, Central and South

China.

(b)

Various small Commercial and Fishing Harbors to be constructed

along the Coast.

(c)

Commercial Docks to be constructed along all navigable rivers.

III.

Modern Cities with public utilities to be constructed in all Railway

Centers, Termini, and alongside Harbors.

IV.

Water Power Development.

V.

Iron and Steel Works and Cement Works on the largest scale in order

to supply the above needs.

VI.

Mineral Development.

VII.

Agricultural Development.

VIII.

Irrigational Work on the largest scale in Mongolia and Sinkiang.

IX.

Reforestation in Central and North China.

X.

Colonization in Manchuria, Mongolia, Sinkiang, Kokonor, and

Thibet.(311)

The industrial revolution is to _min shêng_ what the present program of

socialist construction is to the Marxians of the Soviet Union, what

prosperity is to American democracy. Without industrialization _min shêng_

must remain an academic theory. Sun’s program gives a definite physical

gauge by means of which the success of his followers can be told, and the

extent of China’s progress estimated. It provides a material foundation to

the social and political changes in China.

The theory of Sun Yat-sen in connection with the continuation of the old

system is a significant one. His political doctrines, both ideological and

programmatic, are original and not without great meaning in the

development of an adequate and just state system in modern China. But this

work might have been done, although perhaps not as well, by other leaders.

The significance of Sun in his own lifetime lay in his deliberate

championing of the cause of industrial revolution as the _sine qua non_ of

development in China. In the epoch of the first Republic he relinquished

the Presidency in favor of Yüan Shih-k’ai in order to be able to devote

his whole time to the advancement of the railway program of the Republic.

In the years that he had to spend in exile, he constantly studied and

preached the necessity of modernizing China. Of his slogan, “Modernization

without Westernization!” modernization is the industrial revolution, and

non-Westernization the rest of his programs and ideology. The unity of Sun

Yat-sen’s doctrines is apparent; they are inseparable; but if one part

were to be plucked forth as his greatest contribution to the working

politics of his own time, it might conceivably be his activities and plans

for the industrial revolution.

He spoke feelingly and bitterly of the miserable lives which the vast

majority of his countrymen had to lead, of the expensiveness and

insecurity of their material existences, of the vast, tragic waste of

human effort in the form of man-power in a world where machine-power had

rendered muscular work unnecessary. “This miserable condition among the

Chinese proletariat [he apparently means the whole working class] is due

to the non-development of the country, the crude methods of production,

and the wastefulness of labor. The radical cure for all this is industrial

development by foreign capital and experts for the benefit of the whole

nation.... If foreign capital cannot be gotten, we will have to get at

least their experts and inventors to make for us our own

machinery....”(312) Howsoever the work was to be done, it had to be done.

In bringing China into the modern world, in modernizing her economy, in

assuring the justice of the new economy which was to emerge, Sun found the

key in the physical advancement of China, in the building of vast railway

systems, in creating ports “with future capacity equalling New York

harbor,” in re-making the whole face of Eastern Asia as a better home for

his beloved race-nation.

The Social Revolution.

In considering the social revolution which was to form the third part of

the program of _min shêng_, four questions appear, each requiring

examination. It is in this field of Sun’s programs that the terms of the

Western ideology are most relevant, since the ideological distinctions to

be found in old China as contrasted with the West do not apply so

positively in problems that are to appear in a society which is to be

industrially modern. Even in this, however, some of the old Chinese ideas

may continue in use and give relevance to the terms with which Sun

discusses the social revolution. Private property, that mysterious

relation between an individual and certain goods and services, has been

almost a fetish in the West; the Chinese, already subject to the

collectivisms of the family, the village and the _hui_, does not have the

deep attachment to this notion that Westerners—especially those who do

have property—are apt to develop. Consequently, even though the discussion

of Sun’s programs with regard to distributive justice are remarkably like

the discussions of the same problem to be found in the West, the

possibility, at least, of certain minor though thoroughgoing differences

must be allowed for, and not overlooked altogether. The four aspects to

this problem which one may distinguish in Sun’s program for _min shêng_

are: what is to be the sphere of state action? what is to be the treatment

accorded private ownership of land? what is to be the position of private

capital? and, what of the class struggle?

Sun Yat-sen said: “In modern civilization, the material essentials of life

are five, namely: food, clothing, shelter, means of locomotion, and the

printed page.”(313) At other times he may have made slightly different

arrangements of these fundamental necessities, but the essential content

of the demands remained the same.

Behind his demand for a program to carry out _min shêng_ there was the

fundamental belief that a government which does not assure and promote the

material welfare of the masses of its citizens does not deserve to exist.

To him the problem of livelihood, the concrete aspect of _min shêng_, was

one which had to be faced by every government, and was a means of judging

the righteousness of a government. He could not tolerate a state which did

not assure the people a fair subsistence. There was no political or

ethical value higher than life itself. A government which did not see that

its subjects were fed, sheltered, clothed, transported, and lettered to

the degree which the economic level of its time permitted, was a

government deserving of destruction. Sun Yat-sen was not a doctrinaire on

the subject of classes; he would tolerate inequality, so long as it could

be shown not to militate against the welfare of the people. He was

completely intolerant of any government, Eastern or Western, which

permitted its subjects to starve or to be degraded into a nightmare

existence of semi-starvation. Whatever the means, this end of popular

livelihood, of a reasonable minimum on the scale of living for each and

every citizen, had to prevail above all others.(314)

Within the limits of this supreme criterion, Sun Yat-sen left the

government to its own choice in the matter of the sphere of state action.

If the system of private initiative could develop more efficiently than

could the government in certain fields, then leave those fields to private

effort. If and when private initiative failed to meet rigid requirements

to be established by the government it was not merely the privilege, it

was the obligation of the government to intervene. Sun Yat-sen seems to

have believed that government action would in the long run be desirable

anyhow, but to have been enough of a political realist at the same time to

be willing to allow the government a considerable length of time in

expanding its activities. In a developing country like China it seemed to

him probable that the ends of _ming shêng_ could best be served in many

fields by private enterprise. “All matters that can be and are better

carried out by private enterprise should be left to private hands which

should be encouraged and fully protected by liberal laws....”(315)

From the outset, Sun Yat-sen’s plan of empirical collectivism demanded a

fairly broad range of state action. “All matters that cannot be taken up

by private concerns and those that possess monopolistic character should

be taken up as national undertakings.”(316) This view of his may be

traced, among others, to three suppositions he entertained concerning

Bismarck, concerning "war socialism," and concerning the industrial

revolution in China. Sun shows a certain grudging admiration for Bismarck,

whom he believed to have offset the rising tide of democratic socialism in

Germany by introducing state socialism, in government control of

railroads, etc. “By this preventive method he imperceptibly did away with

the controversial issues, and since the people had no reason to fight, a

social revolution was naturally averted. This was the very great

anti-democratic move of Bismarck.”(317) Secondly, he believed that the

“... unification and nationalization of all the industries, which I might

call the Second Industrial Revolution ...” on account of the world war

would be even more significant than the first.(318) It intensified the

four elements of recent economic progress, which tended to prove the

falsity of the Marxian predictions of the future of capitalism, namely:

“a. Social and industrial improvements (i. e. labor and welfare

legislation); b. State ownership of the means of transportation and of

communication; c. Direct taxes; d. Socialized distribution (the

coöperative movement).”(319) Finally, Sun believed that the magnitude of

the Chinese industrial revolution was such that no private capital could

establish its foundations, and that the state had perforce to initiate the

great undertakings of industrialism.

Concerning Sun’s beliefs regarding the sphere of state action in economic

matters, one may say that his ideology of empirical collectivism required

a program calling for: 1) the protection of private enterprise and the

simultaneous launching of great state enterprises at the beginning; 2) the

intermediate pursuance of a policy by means of which the state would be

the guarantor of the livelihood of the people, and establish the sphere of

its own action according to whether or not private enterprise was

sufficient to meet the needs of the people; and 3) a long range trend

toward complete collectivism.

With respect to the question of land, Sun Yat-sen believed in his own

version of the “single tax,” which was not, in his programs, the single

tax, since he foresaw other sources of revenue for the state (tariffs,

revenue from state enterprises, etc.). According to the land-control

system of Sun Yat-sen the land-owner would himself assess the value of his

land. He would be prevented from over-assessing it by his own desire to

avoid paying too high a tax; and under-assessment would be avoided by a

provision that the state could at any time purchase the land at the price

set by the owner. If the land were to go up in value the owner would have

to pay the difference between the amount which he formerly assessed and

the amount which he believed it to be worth at the later time. The money

so paid would become “... a public fund as a reward, to all those who had

improved the community and who had advanced industry and commerce around

the land. The proposal that all future increment shall be given to the

community is the ‘equalization of land ownership’ advocated by the

Kuomintang; it is the _Min-sheng_ Principle. This form of the _Min-sheng_

Principle is communism, and since the members of the Kuomintang support

the _San Min_ Principles they should not oppose communism.” Continuing

directly, Sun makes clear the nature of the empirical collectivism of his

_min shêng_ program, which he calls communism. “The great aim of the

Principle of Livelihood in our Three Principles is communism—a share in

property by all. But the communism which we propose is a communism of the

future, not of the present. This communism of the future is a very just

proposal, and those who have had property in the past will not suffer at

all by it. It is a very different thing from what is called in the West

‘nationalization of property,’ confiscation for the government’s use of

private property which the people already possess.”(320) Sun Yat-sen

declared that the solution to the land problem would be half of the

solution of the problem of _min shêng_.(321)

Sun Yat-sen believed in the restriction of private capital in such a way

as to assure its not becoming a socially disruptive force. That is a part

of his ideology which we have already examined. In the matter of an actual

program, he believed in the use of “harnessed capital.”(322) He had no

real fear of capital; imperialist foreign capital was one thing—the small

native capital another. The former was a political enemy. The latter was

not formidable. In a speech on Red Labor Day, 1924, when his sympathies

were about as far Left as they ever were, in consideration for the

kindliness of the Communist assistance to Canton, he said: “Chinese

capitalists are not so strong that they could oppress the Chinese

workers,”(323) and added that, the struggle being one with imperialism,

the destruction of the Chinese capitalists would not solve the question.

The restriction of private capital to the point of keeping it harmless,

and thus avoiding the evils which would lead to the class war and a

violent social revolution, was only half the story of capitalism in China

which Sun Yat-sen wanted told in history. The other half was the

advancement of the industrial revolution by the state, which was the only

instrumentality capable of doing this great work. “China cannot be

compared to foreign countries. It is not sufficient (for her) to impose

restrictions upon capital. Foreign countries are rich, while China is

poor.... For that reason China must not only restrict private capital, but

she must also develop the capital of the State.”(324) The restrictions to

be placed upon private capital and upon private land speculation were

negative; the development of state-owned capital and of capital which the

state could trust politically were positive, as was the revenue which

should be gained from the governmental seizure of unearned increment. In

some cases the state would not even have to trouble itself to confiscate

the unearned increment; it could itself develop the land and profit by its

rise in value, applying the funds thus derived to the paying-off of

foreign loans or some socially constructive enterprise.(325)

Ideologically, Sun Yat-sen was opposed to the intra-national class war.

Class war could, nevertheless, be justified in the programs of Sun in two

ways: 1) if it were international class war, of the oppressed against the

oppressing nations; and 2) if it were the class war of the nationalist

Chinese workers against foreign imperialism. In these two cases Sun

Yat-sen thought class-war a good idea. He did not think class war

necessary in contemporary China, and hoped, by means of _min shêng_, to

develop an economy so healthy that the pathological phenomena of the class

struggle would never appear. On the other hand, in justice to Sun, and to

those Marxians who would apologize for him to their fellow-Marxians, there

can be little doubt that Sun Yat-sen would have approved of the class war,

even in China, if he had thought that Chinese capitalism had risen to such

power that it obstructed the way of the Chinese nation to freedom and

economic health. Even in this he might not have set any particular virtue

upon the proletariat as such; the capitalists would be the enemies of the

nation, and it would be the whole nation which would have to dispose of

them.

A finically Scrupulous and detailed examination of Sun Yat-sen’s programs

for _min shêng_ is intellectually unremunerative, since it has been

established that _min shêng_ may be called empirical collectivism;

collectivism which is empirical cannot be rigidly programmatic, or it

loses its empirical character. Sun, not accepting the dialectics of

historical materialism, and following the traditionally Chinese pragmatic

way of thinking, could not orient his revolution in a world of economic

predestinations. With the characteristic Chinese emphasis on men rather

than on rules and principles, Sun Yat-sen knew that if China were ruled by

the right sort of men, his programs would be carried through in accordance

with the expediency of the moment. He does not appear to have considered,

as do some of the left wing, that it was possible for the revolutionary

movement to be diverted to the control of unworthy persons. Even had he

foreseen such a possible state of affairs, he would not, in all

probability, have settled his programs any more rigidly; he knew, from the

most intimate and heart-breaking experience, how easy it is in China to

pay lip-service to principles which are rejected. The first Republic had

taught him that.

One must consequently regard the programs of national economic revolution,

of industrial revolution, and of social revolution as tentative and

general outlines of the course which Sun wished the Nationalist Kuomintang

and state to follow in carrying out _min shêng_. Of these programs, the

one least likely to be affected by political or personal changes was that

of the industrial revolution, and it is this which is most detailed.(326)

His great desire was that the Chinese race-nation continue, not merely to

subsist, but to thrive and multiply and become great, so that it could

restore the ancient morality and wisdom of China, as well as become

proficient in the Western sciences.

A last suggestion may be made concerning the programs of Sun Yat-sen,

before consideration of the Utopia which lay at the end of the road of

_min shêng_. His plans may continue to go on in _min shêng_ because they

are so empirical. His nationalism may be deflected or altered by the new

situation in world politics. His optimism concerning the rapidity of

democratic developments may not be justified by actual developments. The

programs of _min shêng_ are so general that they can be followed to some

degree by governments of almost any orientation along the Right-Left

scale. The really important criterion in the programs of _min shêng_ is

this: the people must live. It is a simple one to understand, and may be a

great force in the continued development of his programs, to the last

stage of _min shêng_.

The Utopia of _Min Shêng_.

Sun Yat-sen differs from the empirical collectivists of the West in that

he has an end to his program, which is to be achieved over a considerable

period of time. The means are such that he can be classified with those

Western thinkers; his goal is one which he took from the ideals in the old

ideology and which he identified with those of the communists, although

not necessarily with the Marxists. He said, at the end of his second

lecture on _min shêng_:

Our way is community of industrial and social profits. We cannot

say, then, that the doctrine of _min shêng_ is different from

communism. The _San Min Chu I_ means a government “of the people,

by the people, and for the people”—that is, the state is the

common property of all the people, its politics are participated

in by all, and its profits are shared by all. Then there will be

not only communism in property, but communism in everything else.

Such will be the ultimate end of _min shêng_, a state which

Confucius calls _ta t’ung_ or the age of “great similarity.”(327)

Perhaps no other passage from the works of Sun Yat-sen in relation to _min

shêng_ could illustrate his position so aptly. He describes his doctrine.

He labels it “communism,” although, as we have seen, it is quite another

thing than Marxism. He cites Lincoln. In the end he calls upon the

authority of Confucius.

To a Westerner, the ideal commonwealth of Sun Yat-sen bears a remarkable

resemblance to the world projected in the ideals of the ancient Chinese.

Here again there is “great similarity,” complete ideological harmony, and

the presumable disappearance of state and law. Property, the fount of war,

has been set aside, and men—animated by a profound and sincere

appreciation of _jên_—work together, all for the common good. The Chinese

will, in this Utopia, have struck down _might_ from the high places of the

world, and inaugurated an era of _the kingly way_ throughout the earth.

Their ancient doctrines of benevolence and peace shall have succeeded in

bringing about cosmospolitanism.

There are, however, differences from the old order of ideals. According to

the Marxists, nationality, after it has served its purpose as an

instrument in the long class struggle, may be set aside. Speculation of

this sort is rare among them, however, and it is difficult to envision

their final system. To Sun Yat-sen, however, there was the definite ideal

that the Chinese live on forever. This was an obligation imposed upon him

and his ideology by the teleological element in the old ideology which

required that humanity be immortal in the flesh and that it be immortal

through clearly traceable lines of descent. The individual was settled in

a genealogical web, reaching through time and space, which gave him a

sense of certainty that otherwise he might lack. This is inconsistent with

the Marxian ideal, where the family system, a relic of brutal days, shall

have vanished.

The physical immortality of the Chinese race was not the only sort of

immortality Sun Yat-sen wished China to have. His stress on the peculiar

virtues of the Chinese intellectual culture has been noted. The Chinese

literati had sought an immortality of integrity and intellect, a

continuity of civilization without which mere physical survival might seem

brutish. In the teleology of Sun’s ideal society, there would no doubt be

these two factors: filial piety, emphasizing the survival of the flesh;

and _jên_, emphasizing the continuity of wisdom and honor. Neither could

aptly continue unless China remained Chinese, unless the particular

virtues of the Chinese were brought once again to their full potency.(328)

The family system was to continue to the _min shêng_ Utopia. So too were

the three natural orders of men. Sun Yat-sen never advocated that the

false inequality of the present world be thrown down for the purpose of

putting in its place a false equality which made no distinction between

the geniuses, the apostles, and the unthinking. The Chinese world was to

be Chinese to the end of time. In this the narrowness of Sun Yat-sen’s

ideals is apparent; it is, perhaps, a narrowness which limits his

aspirations and gives them strength.

The Chinese Utopia which was to be at the end of _min shêng_ was to be

established in a world, moreover, which might not have made a complete

return to ideological control, in which the state might still survive. The

requirements of an industrial economy certainly presupposes an enormous

length of time before the ideology and the society shall have been

completely adjusted to the peculiarities of life in a world not only of

working men but of working machines. The state must continue until all men

are disciplined to labor: "When all these vagrants will be done away with

and when all will contribute to production, then clothing will be abundant

and food sufficient; families will enjoy prosperity, and individuals will

be satisfied.

“Then the question of the ‘people’s life’ will be solved.”(329)

Thus Sun Yat-sen concluded his last lecture on _min shêng_.

BIBLIOGRAPHY.

The bibliography of works in Western languages dealing with Sun Yat-sen is

short. The author has made no attempt to gather various fugitive pieces,

such as newspaper clippings. He believes, however, that the following

bibliography of Western works on Sun is the most nearly complete which has

yet appeared, and has listed, for the sake of completeness, two Russian

items as yet unavailable in the United States.

The first half of the bibliography presents these Western materials,

arranged according to their subject. Within each category, the individual

items are presented in chronological order; this has been done in order to

make clear the position of the works in point of time of publication—a

factor occasionally of some importance in the study of these materials.

The second half of the bibliography lists further works which have been

referred to or cited. The first group of these consists of a small

collection of some of the more important Chinese editions of, and Chinese

and Japanese treatises upon, Sun Yat-sen’s writings. The second group

represents various Western works on China or on political science which

have been of assistance to the author in this study.

Chinese names have been left in their natural order, with the patronymic

first. Where Chinese names have been Westernized and inverted, they have

been returned to their original Chinese order, but with a comma inserted

to indicate the change.

A. Major Sources on Sun Yat-sen Which are Available in Western Languages.

I. Biographies of Sun Yat-sen.

Ponce, Mariano, _Sun Yat-sen, El fundador de la Republica de

China_, Manila, 1912.

A popular biography. Valuable for the period just before 1912.

Cantlie, James and Sheridan-Jones, C., _Sun Yat-sen and the

Awakening of China_, New York, 1912.

Also a popular work. Valuable for the description of Sun Yat-sen’s

education.

Linebarger, Paul (and Sun Yat-sen), _Sun Yat-sen and The Chinese

Republic_, New York, 1925.

The only biography authorized by Sun Yat-sen, who wrote parts of it

himself. A propaganda work, it presents the most complete record of Sun’s

early life. Does not go beyond 1922.

Vilenskii (Sibiriakov), V., _Sun’ Iat-Sen—otets kitaiskoe

revoliutsii_, Moscow, 1925. The same, Moscow, 1926.

Not available.

Lee, Edward Bing-shuey, _Dr. Sun Yat-sen, His Life and

Achievements_ (English and French), Nanking, n. d.

A synopsis, by a spokesman for the Nationalist Party.

Wou, Saofong, _Sun Yat-sen, Sa Vie et Sa Doctrine_, Paris, 1929.

An excellent outline, largely from Chinese sources.

Restarick, Henry Bond, _Sun Yat-sen, Liberator of China_, New

Haven, 1931.

Useful for a description of Sun Yat-sen’s life in Honolulu, and of some of

his overseas connections.

—— (R.-Ch. Duval, translator), _Sun Yat-sen, Liberator de la

Chine_, Paris, 1932.

de Morant, George Soulie, _Soun Iat-sènn_, Paris, 1932.

A romantic work based upon Chinese sources, and the Chinese translation of

Linebarger’s work.

Linebarger, Paul; Linebarger, Paul M. A. (editor), _The Gospel of

Sun Chung-shan_, Paris, 1932.

Sharman, (Mrs.) Lyon, _Sun Yat-sen, His Life and Its Meaning, A

Criticall Biography_, New York, 1934.

The most complete biography of Sun Yat-sen. Well documented and prepared.

Mrs. Sharman’s work will remain authoritative for many years to come. Its

main fault is its somewhat hyper-sensitive criticism of Sun Yat-sen’s

personality, with which the author never comes in contact.

Linebarger, Paul, _The Life of Sun Chung-san_, Shanghai, 1932.

Fragmentary proofsheets. See note in Preface.

Reissig, Paul, _Sun Yat Sen und die Kuomintang_, Berlin, n. d. A

Lutheran missionary tract.

II. Translations of the Sixteen Lectures on the _San Min Chu I_.

Anonymous, _The Three Principles_, Shanghai 1927.

Of no value.

Tsan Wan, _Die Drei Nationalen Grundlehren, Die Grundlehren von

dem Volkstum_, Berlin, 1927.

A translation of the lectures on Nationalism; excellent as far as it goes.

d’Elia, Paschal M., S. J. (translator and editor); _Le Triple

Demisme de Suen Wen_, Shanghai, 1929.

The only annotated translation. The style is simple and direct, and the

notes accurate, for the most part, and informative. The uninitiated reader

must make allowances for Father d’Elia’s religious viewpoints. This is

probably the most useful translation.

Price, Frank W. (translator), Chen, L. T. (editor); _San Min Chu

I, The Three Principles of the People_, Shanghai, 1930.

The translation most widely known and quoted.

d’Elia, Paschal M., S. J., _The Triple Demism of Sun Yat-sen_,

Wuchang, 1931.

A translation of the French version.

Hsü, Leonard Shihlien; _Sun Yat-sen, His Political and Social

Ideals_, Los Angeles, 1933.

The most complete selection of the documents of Sun Yat-senism available

in English. Dr. Hsü has assembled his materials remarkably well. His

chapter “The Basic Literature of Sunyatsenism” is the best of its kind in

English.

III. Other Translations of the Chinese Works of Sun Yat-sen.

Anonymous; _Zapiski kitaiskogo revoliutsionera_, Moscow, 1926.

Not available.

—— _Memoirs of a Chinese Revolutionary_, Philadelphia, n. d.

Not documented and apparently unreliable. English version of the above.

Wittfogel, Karl; _Sun Yat Sen, Aufzeichnungen eines chinesischen

Revolutionärs_, Vienna and Berlin, n. d. (ca. 1927).

The most complete Marxist critique, containing also an excellent short

biography.

Tsan Wan; _30 Jahre Chinesische Revolution_, Berlin, 1927.

An excellent translation of one of the short autobiographies of Sun

Yat-sen.

Wei Yung (translator); _The Cult of Dr. Sun, Sun Wên Hsüeh Shê_,

Shanghai, 1931.

Also referred to as _The Outline of Psychological Reconstruction_. It

comprises a series of popular essays discussing the problems involved in

modernization of the Chinese outlook, and presenting Sun Yat-sen’s theory

of knowledge versus action.

IV. Works in English by Sun Yat-sen.

Sun Yat-sen; _Kidnapped in London_, Bristol, 1897.

Sun Yat-sen’s first book in English. Expresses his Christian, modernist,

anti-Manchu attitude of the time.

—— _How China was Made a Republic_, Shanghai, 1919.

A short autobiography of Sun Yat-sen; see note in Preface.

—— _The International Development of China_, New York and London,

1929.

Sun Yat-sen’s bold project for the industrialization of China. First

proposed in 1919, the work calls for a coördinated effort of world

capitalism and Chinese nationalism for the modernization of China. Also

called the _Outline of Material Reconstruction_.

V. Commentaries on the Principles of Sun Yat-sen.

Li Ti tsun; _The Politico-Economic Theories of Sun Yat-sen_.

This work has not been published, but portions of it appeared in the

_Chinese Students’ Monthly_, XXIV, New York, 1928-1929, as follows: “The

Life of Sun Yat-sen,” no. 1, p. 14, November, 1928; “The Theoretical

System of Dr. Sun Yat-sen,” no. 2, p. 92, December 1928, and no. 3, p.

130, January 1929; and “The Sunyatsenian Principle of Livelihood,” no. 5,

p. 219, March 1929. It is most regrettable that the whole work could not

be published as a unit, for Li’s work is extensive in scope and uses the

major Chinese and foreign sources quite skilfully.

Tai Chi-tao (Richard Wilhelm, translator); _Die Geistigen

Grundlagen des Sunyatsenismus_, Berlin, 1931.

An informative commentary on the ethical system of Sun Yat-sen. Tai

Chi-tao is an eminent Party leader.

Antonov, K.: _Sun’iatsenizm i kitaiskaia revoliutsiia_, Moscow,

1931.

Not available to the author.

William, Maurice; _Sun Yat-sen Vs. Communism_, Baltimore, 1932.

A presentation, by the author of _The Social Interpretation of History_,

of the influence which that work had on Sun; useful only in this

connection.

Linebarger, Paul; Linebarger, Paul M. A. (editor); _Conversations

With Sun Yat-sen_, 1919-1922.

For comment on this and the following manuscript, see Preface.

Linebarger, Paul; _A Commentary on the San Min Chu I_. Four

volumes, unpublished, 1933.

Tsui, Shu-Chin, _The Influence of the Canton-Moscow Entente upon

Sun Yat-sen’s political Philosophy_, in _The Chinese Social and

Political Science Review_, XVIII, 1, 2, 3, Peiping, 1934.

A dissertation presented to Harvard University. Dr. Tsui covers the ground

very thoroughly; his conclusions challenge the general belief that the

Communists influenced Sun Yat-sen’s philosophy. Ranks with the works of

Tai Chi-tao, Hsü Shih-lien, and Father d’Elia as an aid to the

understanding of the Three Principles.

Jair Hung: _Les Idées Économiques de Sun Yat Sen_, Toulouse, 1934.

A doctoral thesis presented to the University of Toulouse, treating,

chiefly, the programmatic parts of the principle of _min shêng_.

Tsiang Kuen; _Les origines économiques et politiques du socialisme

de Sun Yat Sen_, Paris, 1933.

A doctoral thesis presented to the University of Paris, which deals with

the institutional and historical background of min sheng.

Li Chao-wei; _La souveraineté nationale d’après la doctrine

politique de Sun-Yet-Sin_, Dijon, 1934.

A doctoral thesis presented to the University of Dijon, concerning the

four popular powers of election, recall, initiative, and referendum.

B. Chinese Sources and Further Western Works Used as Auxiliary Sources.

I. Chinese and Japanese Works by or Concerning Sun Yat-sen.

Anonymous; _Tsung-li Fêng An Shih Lu (A True Record of the

Obsequies of the Leader)_, Nanking, n. d.

Bai-ko-nan (Mei Sung-nan); _San-min-shu-gi To Kai-kyu To-so (The

San Min Chu I and the Struggle between Capitalism and Labor)_,

Tokyo, 1929.

Chung Kung-jên; _San Min Chu I Li Lun Ti Lien Chiu (A Study of the

Theory of the San Min Chu I)_, Shanghai, 1931.

Huang Huan-wên; _Sun Wên Chu I Chen Ch’üan (The Real

Interpretation of the Principles of Sun Wên)_, Nanking, 1933.

Lin Pai-k’ê (Linebarger, Paul M. W.), Hsü Chih-jên (translator);

_Sun I-hsien Chüan Chi (The Life of Sun Yat-sen)_, 4th ed.,

Shanghai, 1927.

The Chinese translator has appended an excellent chronology of Sun’s life.

Sun Fu-hao; _San Min Chu I Piao Chieh (An Elementary Explanation

of the Sun Min Chu I)_, Shanghai, 1933.

Sun Yat-sen, Hu Han-min, ed.; _Tsung-li Ch’üan Chi (The Complete

Works of the Leader)_, 4 vol. in 1; 2nd ed., Shanghai, 1930.

The best collection, but by no means complete.

Sun Yat-sen; _Sun Chung-shan Yen Chiang Chi (A Collection of the

Lectures of Sun Chung-shan)_, 3rd ed., Shanghai, 1927.

Sun Yat-sen; _Tsung-li Yü Mo (The Posthumous Papers of the

Leader)_, Nanking, n. d.

Têng Hsi; _Chung Shan Jên Shêng Shih Hsia Tan Yüan, (An Inquiry

into the Origin of Chung Shan’s Philosophy of Life)_, Shanghai,

1933.

Tsao Kê-jen; _Sun Chung Shan Hsien-shêng Ching Chi Hsüeh Shê (The

Economic Theory of Mr. Sun Chung-shan)_, Nanking, 1935.

II. Works on China or the Revolution.

Amann, Gustav; _Sun Yatsens Vermächtnis_, Berlin, 1928.

Bland, J. O. and Backhouse, E.; _China Under the Empress Dowager_,

Philadelphia, 1910.

Beresford, Lord Charles; _The Break-up of China_, London, 1899.

Bonnard, Abel; _En Chine (1920-1921)_, Paris, 1924.

Burgess, J. S.; _The Guilds of Peking_, New York, 1928.

Buxton, L. H. Dudley; _China, The Land and the People_, Oxford,

1929.

Chen Tsung-hsi, Wang An-tsiang, and Wang I-ting; _General Chiang

Kai-shek: The Builder of New China_, Shanghai, 1929.

_Chinese Social and Political Science Review, The_, Peking

(Peiping), 1916-. The foremost journal of its kind in the Far

East.

_China Today_, New York, 1934-. Communist Monthly.

_China Weekly Review, The_, Shanghai, 1917-.

The leading English-language weekly in China, Liberal in outlook.

_China Year Book, The_, Shanghai, 1919-?

A necessary reference work for government personnel, trade statistics, and

chronology. Perhaps inferior to the corresponding volumes in other

countries.

Close, Upton, _pseud._ (Hall, Josef Washington); _Challenge:

Behind the Face of Japan_, New York, 1934.

——; _Eminent Asians_, New York, 1929.

Coker, Francis; _Recent Political Thought_, New York, 1934.

Creel, H. G.; Sinism, _A Study of the Evolution of the Chinese

World-view_, Chicago, 1929.

Cressey, George Babcock; _China’s Geographic Foundations_, New

York, 1934.

de Groot, J. J. M.; _Religion in China_, New York and London,

1912.

Djang, Chu (Chang Tso); _The Chinese Suzerainty_, Johns Hopkins

University doctoral dissertation, 1935.

Douglas, Sir Robert K.; _Europe and the Far East 1506-1912_, New

York, 1913.

Ellis, Henry; _Journal of the Proceedings of the Late Embassy to

China..._, Philadelphia, 1818.

_Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences_, New York, 1930-.

Articles on “Kuomintang” and “Sun Yat-sen.”

Erdberg, Oskar; _Tales of Modern China_, Moscow, 1932.

Erkes, Eduard; _Chinesische Literatur_, Breslau, 1922.

Foreign Office of Japan, The (?); _The Present Condition of

China_, Tokyo (?), 1932.

No author nor place of publication is given in this work, which presents a

description of those features of Chinese political and economic life that

might be construed as excusing Japanese intervention.

_Fundamental Laws of the Chinese Soviet Republic_, The, New York,

1934.

Goodnow, Frank Johnson; _China: An Analysis_, Baltimore, 1926.

Granet, Marcel; _Chinese Civilization_, New York, 1930.

Harvey, E. D.; _The Mind of China_, New Haven, 1933.

Holcombe, Arthur N.; _The Chinese Revolution_, Cambridge

(Massachusetts), 1930.

——; _The Spirit of the Chinese Revolution_, New York, 1930.

Hsia Ching-lin; Chow, James L. E.; and Chang, Yukon (translators);

_The Civil Code of The Republic of China_, Shanghai, 1930.

Hsieh, Pao Chao; _The Government of China (1644-1911)_, Baltimore,

1925.

Hsü, Leonard Shih-lien; _The Political Philosophy of

Confucianism_, New York, 1932.

Hsü, Pao-chien; _Ethical Realism in Neo-Confucian Thought_,

Dissertation, Columbia University, n. d.

Suggests the position of Sun Yat-sen in the history of Chinese philosophy.

Hu Shih; and Lin Yu-tang; _China’s Own Critics_, Peiping, 1931.

Isaacs, Harold (editor); _Five Years of Kuomintang Reaction_,

Shanghai, 1931.

Johnston, Reginald; _Twilight in the Forbidden City_, London,

1934.

Koo, V. K. Wellington; _Memoranda Presented to the Lytton

Commission_, New York, n. d.

Kotenev, Anatol M.; _New Lamps for Old_, Shanghai, 1931.

Kulp, D. H.; _Family Life in South China: The Sociology of

Familism_, New York, 1925.

Latourette, Kenneth; _The Chinese: Their History and Culture_, New

York, 1934.

Lea, Homer; _The Valor of Ignorance_, New York, 1909.

Liang Ch’i-ch’ao; _History of Chinese Political Thought_, New York

and London, 1930.

Li Chi; _The Formation of the Chinese People_, Cambridge

(Massachusetts), 1928.

Lin Yutang; _My Country and My People_, New York, 1936.

Linebarger, Paul Myron Wentworth; _Deutschlands Gegenwärtige

Gelegenheiten in China_, Brussels, 1936.

Lou Kan-jou; _Histoire Sociale de l’Epoque Tcheou_, Paris, 1935.

MacNair, Harley Farnsworth; _China in Revolution_, Chicago, 1931.

——; _Modern Chinese History—Selected Readings_, Shanghai, 1923.

Mänchen-Helfen, Otto; _China_, Dresden, 1931.

Maybon, Albert; _La Politique Chinoise_, Paris, 1908.

Sun Yat-sen presented a copy of this book to Judge Linebarger, and

enthusiastically recommended it.

Maybon, Albert; _La Republique Chinoise_, Paris, 1914.

Mayers, William Frederick; _The Chinese Government, A Manual of

Chinese Titles, Categorically Explained and Arranged, with an

Appendix_, Shanghai, 1897.

McGovern, William Montgomery; _Modern Japan, Its Political,

Military, and Industrial Organization_, London, 1920.

Myron, Paul, pseud. (Linebarger, Paul M. W.); _Our Chinese Chances

Through Europe’s War_, Chicago, 1915.

Meadows, Thomas Taylor; _The Chinese and Their Rebellions_,

London, 1856.

One of the permanently outstanding books on China; dealing primarily with

the T’ai P’ing rebellion, it presents an extraordinarily keen analysis of

the politics of the old Chinese social system.

Ogden, C. K. and Richards, I. A.; _The Meaning of Meaning_, New

York and London, 1927.

It is largely upon this work that the present author has sought to base

his technique of ideological analysis.

Peffer, Nathaniel; _The Collapse of a Civilization_, New York,

1930.

Price, Ernest Batson; _The Russo-Japanese Treaties of 1907-1916

Concerning Manchuria and Mongolia_, Baltimore, 1933.

Pages 1-13 present stimulating suggestions as to the nature of “China.”

Reichwein, Adolf; _China and Europe: Intellectual and Artistic

Contacts in the Eighteenth Century_, New York, 1925.

Roffe, Jean; _La Chine Nationaliste 1912-1930_, Paris, 1931.

Roy, Manabendra Nath; _Revolution und Konterrevolution in China_,

Berlin, 1930.

Ruffé, R. d’Auxion de; _Is China Mad?_ Shanghai, 1928.

The author, violently hostile to Sun Yat-sen, presents some details of

Sun’s life not published elsewhere.

Smith, Arthur; _Village Life in China_, New York, 1899.

Sheean, Vincent; _Personal History_, New York, 1935.

Shryock, John Knight; _The Origin and Development of the State

Cult of Confucius_, New York, 1932.

Starr, Frederick; _Confucianism_, New York, 1930.

Stoddard, Lothrop; _The Rising Tide of Color Against White World

Supremacy_, New York, 1930.

T’ang Leang-li; _The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution_, New

York, 1930.

——; _Wang ching-wei_, Peiping, 1931.

Tawney, Richard Henry; _Land and Labour in China_, London, 1932.

Thomas, Elbert Duncan; _Chinese Political Thought_, New York,

1927.

Treat, Payson J.; _The Far East_, New York and London, 1928.

Trotsky, Leon; _Problems of the Chinese Revolution_, New York,

1932.

Tyau Min-ch’ien T. Z.; _Two Years of Nationalist China_, Shanghai,

1930.

van Dorn, Harold Archer; _Twenty Years of The Chinese Republic_,

New York, 1932.

Vinacke, Harold Monk; _Modern Constitutional Development in

China_, Princeton, 1920.

Wang Ch’ing-wei et al.; _The Chinese National Revolution_,

Peiping, 1930.

Weale, E. L. Putnam, _pseud._ (Simpson, Bertram Lennox); _The

Vanished Empire_, London, 1926.

Weber, Max; _Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie_,

Tübingen, 1922.

Wieger, Leon, S. J.; _Chine Moderne_, 10 volumes, Hsien-hsien,

1921-32.

An enormous scrapbook of translations from the Chinese illustrating

political and religious trends. Catholic point of view.

——; _Textes Historiques: Histoire Politique de la Chine_,

Hsien-hsien, 1929.

—— and Davrout, L., S. J.; _Chinese Characters_, Hsien-hsien,

1927.

Wilhelm, Richard (Danton, G. H. and Danton, A. P., translators);

_Confucius and Confucianism_, New York, 1931.

——; _Geschichte der chinesischen Philosophie_, Breslau, 1929.

——; _Ostasien, Werden und Wandel des Chinesischen Kulturkreises_,

Potsdam and Zürich, 1928.

Perhaps the best of all works introductory to Chinese civilization.

Williams, S. Wells; _The Middle Kingdom_, New York, 1895.

——; _A Syllabic Dictionary of the Chinese Language_, Tungchou,

1909.

Wu Ch’ao-ch’u, _The Nationalist Program for China_, New Haven,

1930.

Wu Kuo-cheng; _Ancient Chinese Political Theories_, Shanghai,

1928.

Ziah, C. F.; _Philosophie Politique de la Chine Ancienne (700-221

AV. J.-C.)_, Paris, 1934.

CHINESE-ENGLISH GLOSSARY.

The author has not sought to prepare a lexicon of modern Chinese political

terms. He presents, however, a list of those Chinese words which have

frequently been left untranslated in the text, together with the

ideographs by which they are written in China, and brief definitions.

Variant meanings, however significant, have been omitted. Peculiar

definitions, to be found only in the present work, have been enclosed in

brackets. To locate the phrases, and discussions of them, consult the

index.

正 _chêng_; right; rectified

主 _chu_; used as a compound with _i_, below, to make _chu-i_:

principle, -ism

權 _ch’üan_; power

會 _hui_; society; guild

縣 _hsien_; district (a political subdivision)

義 _i_; propriety

仁 _jên_; humanity; fellow-feeling; benevolence, etc. [consciousness

of social orientation]

禮 _li_; rites; ceremonies [ideological conformity]

民 _min_; people; _Volk_

名 _ming_; name [terminology, or, a part of ideology]

能 _nêng_; capacity

霸 _pa_; violence; violent; tyrant; tyrannous

三 _san_; three

生 _shêng_; life; regeneration; livelihood

大 _ta_; great

道 _tao_; path; way; principle

德 _têh_; virtue

族 _tsu_; unity; kinship

同 _t’ung_; harmony; concord

王 _wang_; king; kingly

樂 _yüeh_; rhythm

INDEX.

PROPER NAMES AND SPECIAL TERMS

America (_see also_ United States), 62, 220

American Indians, 124

Anglo-Saxons, 62

Annam, 127

Austria, 62

Beresford, Lord Charles, 187

Bismarck, 254 ff.

Bolsheviks (_see_ Russians, Marxian philosophy)

Borodin, 5, 7, 161

Boxer Rebellion, 78

British Empire, 71, 199

Burgess, J. S., 41..

Cantlie, Sir James, 84

Canton, 7, 66, 126, 233

Catherine I of Russia, 243

Catholic Church, 54n., 122

Chang Tso (Djang Chu), 186n.

Ch’en Ch’iung-ming, 6

Chen, Eugene, 159n.

Chêng, state of, 27

_chêng ming_, 31ff., 83ff., 104, 114, 210

_ch’i_, 110

Chiang Chieh-shih (Chiang Kai-shek), 102n., 158n., 163n., 206

_Chien Kuo Fang Lo_ (see _The Program of National Reconstruction_)

_Chien Kuo Ta Kang_ (see _see The Outline of National Reconstruction_)

Ch’ien Lung, the Emperor, 168

Ch’in dynasty, 47

Ch’in Shih Huang Ti, the, 26n., 37

Chinese Eastern Railway, the, 201

Ch’ing dynasty (_see_ Manchu dynasty)

Chou dynasty, 25, 28

Christianity, 49, 67, 133n., 155n.

_ch’üan_, 107ff., 141, 218

_chun ch’üan_, 100n.

Chung Hua, The Republic of, 190

Cohen, Morris, 8n.

Coker, Francis W., 147ff.

Communists, 10, 64ff., 66, 106, 122, 160, 161, 163ff., 189, 205, 246ff.

Confucianism, 23ff., 60, 66ff., 82ff., 90ff., 106, 109, 113ff., 210

Confucius (K’ung Ch’iu), 25ff., 60, 76, 97, 105, 261

Creel, H. G., 23n.

Cressey, George B., 127n.

Davrout, L., 32n.

d’Elia, Paschal M., 4n.

Donbas region, 246

Douglas, Sir Robert K., 243n.

Dutch, the, 44n.

Empress Dowager, Tzŭ Hsi, the, 131

England, 62, 150n., 188

Erdberg, Oskar, 161n.

Fascism, 54, 146ff., 244

Ford, Henry, 132

_Four Books, The_, 75

France, 188

Gandhi, M. K., 156n., 180

Genro, the, 131

George III of England, 243

George, Henry, 72, 136ff., 144, 256

Germany, 62, 100, 196, 254ff.

Goodnow, Frank J., 97

Granet, Marcel, 23n.

Great Britain (_see_ British Empire, England)

_Great Learning, The_, 74

Greeks, the, 133

Hai Ching Kung, the, 44n.

Hamilton, Alexander, 77

Han Fei-tzŭ, 29, 93

Harvey, E. D., 154n.

Hawaii, 61n.

Hitler, Adolf, 56

Holcombe, Arthur N., 11n.

Hongkong, 51n.

Honolulu, 126

_hou chih hou chou_, the, 105

Hsieh, Pao-chao, 45n.

_hsien_, 45, 211ff., 230ff.

_hsien chih hsien chou_, the, 104, 106

Hsin dynasty, 58

Hsü, Leonard Shih-lien, 4n.

Hu Han-min, 4n., 186

_hui_, 38, 41, 95, 165

Hulutao port, 260

_hung fang_, 100n.

Hung Hsiu-ch’üan, 58

Hung Jair, 236n.

“ideology,” 18ff.

India, 90, 181

_International Development of China, The_, 4

Isaacs, Harold, 161n.

Japan, 28, 40, 47, 48, 51, 59, 63, 90, 170, 184, 188, 199ff., 240, 260

_jên_, 14, 30ff., 72ff., 141, 142, 144ff., 154, 263

Jên T’ai, 31n.

Jews, the, 168

Joffe, Adolf, 64

Johnston, Sir Reginald, 119

Kailan Mining Administration, The, 179

K’ang Hsi, the Emperor, 168

“Kang Têh” (_see_ P’u Yi)

Koo, V. K. Wellington, 122n.

Korea (Chosen), 48, 59, 70, 127, 200

Kulp, D. H., 38n.

Ku Hung-ming, 77

K’ung family, 90

Kung, H. H., 122n.

Kuo Hsing-hua, 44n.

Kuomintang, the, 104, 158ff., 205

Kwangtung Province (_see_ Canton)

Kuzbas region, 246

Lao Tzŭ, 25

Latins, the, 62

Latourette, Kenneth Scott, 91n.

Lea, Homer, 195

Lee, Frank C., 122n.

Legge translations, the, 23n., 75n.

Lenin, V. I., 132, 230n., 247

_li_, 31ff., 104, 115

Li Chao-wei, 219n.

Li Chi, 86n.

Li Ti-tsun, 137n.

Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, 30, 31n.

Lin Shen, President, 122n.

Lincoln, Abraham, 262

Linebarger, Paul Myron Wentworth, 8n., 84

Lotus society, the, 41

Lovejoy, Arthur O., 18n.

Lynn, Jermyn Chi-hung, 221n.

Macao, 49

Machiavelli, Niccolò, 26

“machine state,” 54

MacNair, Harley Farnsworth, 11n.

Malaysia, 186

Manchu (Ch’ing) dynasty, 22, 43, 44n., 47, 58ff., 96, 111, 119, 124, 131,

159ff., 167ff., 172ff., 182, 190, 227

“Manchukuo” (“Manchoukuo”), 71

Manchuria, 2, 51, 201, 205, 260

Mandarins, 104ff.

_Manifesto_ of the first Party congress, 4

Mannheim, Karl, 18n.

Marx, Karl, 72n., 163

Marxian philosophy, 14ff., 52, 55, 70, 72, 81n., 106, 125, 134n., 137ff.,

144, 192ff., 209ff., 236, 257ff.

Marxism-Leninism, 81, 136, 182, 189, 192ff.

Mayers, William Frederick, 45n.

Meiji Emperor, the, 82, 131

Mencius (Mêng Tzŭ), 76, 93, 97

Miao tribes, 168

Mill, John Stuart, 98n.

Millar, John, 98

_min_, 217

_min ch’üan_, 99, 100n., 209ff.

_Min Ch’üan Ts’u Pu_ (see _The Primer of Democracy_)

_min shêng_, 12, 101, 121, 122ff., 141, 180, 193, 236ff.

_min tsu_, 36, 99, 120

Ming dynasty, 96, 124

Ming T’ai Tsung, the Emperor, 124

Mo Ti, 93

Mohammedans, 190

Mongol (Yüan) dynasty, 47

Mongolia, 2, 87, 190

Montesquieu, Charles de S., Baron, 112, 221

Mussolini, Benito, 56

National Government of China, The, 3

_nêng_, 107ff., 141, 218

New Deal, the, 238n.

New Life Movement, the, 102n.

_Outline of National Reconstruction, The_, 4

_pa tao_, 71, 200

Pan-Asia, 197ff.

Pareto, Vilfredo, 15ff.

Peffer, Nathaniel, 10n.

Peru, 165

Philippines, 186, 187n., 200

_Philosophy of Sun Wên, The_ (see _Sun Wên Hsüeh Shê_)

Piatiletka (The Five-Year Plan), 132, 238n., 246

Plato, 79

Poland, 168

_Political Testament, The_, 2

Ponce, Mariano, 97

Portuguese, the, 49

Presidency of ancient states, the, 28

Price, Frank W., 4n.

_Primer of Democracy, The_, 4

_Program of National Reconstruction, The_, 4

_pu chih pu chou_, the, 105

P’u Yi, 119n.

Radcliffe-Brown, A. R., 91

Rea, George Bronson, 183

Reichwein, Adolf, 50n.

_Republic, The_, 79

Rome, 215

Roy, Manabendra Nath, 52n.

Russians (_see also_ Soviet Union), 49, 51, 100, 103n., 137, 194ff., 240

_San Min Chu I_, 4ff.

Sharman, Lyon, 1n.

Sheean, Vincent, 161n.

_shen ch’üan_, 100n.

_Shih Yeh Chi Hua_, 4

Shryock, John K., 36n.

Shun, the Emperor, 97, 168

Siam, 187

Smith, Adam, 237

Smith, Arthur, 40n.

South Manchuria Railway, The, 179

Soviets in China, 2, 212

Soviet Union (U. S. S. R.), 64, 147, 155n., 184ff., 189, 199, 201

Spring and Autumn Period, 27

Stalin, Joseph, 56, 158n.

Starr, Frederick, 23n.

Stoddard, Lothrop, 197

Sun-Joffe Manifesto, The, 64

_Sun Wên Hsüeh Shê_, 4

Sun Yat-sen, Mme. (née Soong Ching-ling), 122n., 158n., 159n., 253n.

Sung Chiao-jên, 138

Sung dynasty, 58

_ta chia_, 141

_ta t’ung_, 120, 210, 261

Tagore, Sir Rabindranath, 132, 156n.

Tai Chi-tao, 69

Tai-p’ing Rebellion, the, 50, 58, 172

Taiwan (Formosa), 44n., 51n.

T’ang Liang-li (T’ang Leang-li), 5n., 56n.

_tang pu_, 164

Taoism, 25

Tao Kuang, the Emperor, 243

Tawney, R. H., 45n.

_têh_ (_tê_), 31ff.

Thomas, Elbert Duncan, 25n.

Tibet, 2, 190

Triad Society, the, 41

_Triple Demism, The_ (see _San Min Chu I_)

_Ts’an Yi Yüan_, the, 228

Tsao Kun, 119n.

Tsiang Kuen, 236n.

Tsinanfu, 205

Tsui Shu-chin 10n.

_Tsung Li_, 162

Tung Meng Hui, 136ff.

Turkey, 199, 201

Tyau, Minch’ien T. Z., 5n.

United States of America, The, 79, 97, 112, 130, 187n., 188, 199, 205

Versailles Conference, the, 190

Vilenskii (Sibiriakov), V., 4n.

Vinacke, Harold Monk, 227n.

Vladislavich, 243

Wang An-shih, 58

Wang Ch’ing-wei, 5, 164, 206

Wang Mang, 58

_wang tao_, 71

Wang Yang-ming, 80n., 84

Warring States, the Age of, 27

Washington Conference, the, 188

Weale, Putnam (B. L. Simpson), 50, 225

Weber, Max, 15

Wei Yung, 4n.

Wên Wang, the, 168

Wieger, Leon, 32n.

Wilhelm, Richard, 23n., 68

William, Maurice, 10, 72, 142ff.

Williams, S. Wells, 44, 122n.

Wilson, Woodrow, 6, 190

Wittfogel, Karl, 4n.

Wou Saofong, 111n.

Wu Pei-fu, 222n.

Yangtze river (the _Ch’ang Chiang_), 100

Yao, the Emperor, 76, 97, 219, 233

Yellow river (the _Huang Ho_), 100

Yen Shing Kung, the, 44n.

_yi_ (_i_), 31ff.

Yoshemitsu, the Ashikaga Shogun, 183

Yuan, the Five, 224

Yüan dynasty (_see_ Mongol dynasty)

Yüan Shih-k’ai, 159, 166, 173, 183, 220, 251

_yüeh_, 91ff.

FOOTNOTES

_ 1 China Today_ (March, 1935), I, No. 6, p. 112. This is the leading

English-language journal of the Chinese Communists. Mme. Sun’s

letter to the paper is characteristic of the attitude toward Nanking

adopted throughout the magazine.

2 These manuscripts consist of the following chief items: Linebarger,

Paul Myron Wentworth, _Conversations with Sun Yat-sen 1919-1922_

(written in 1933-1935); the same, _A Commentary on the San Min Chu

I_ (four volumes, 1932-1933); and Sun Yat-sen, _How China Was Made a

Republic_ (Shanghai, 1919). These are all typescripts, with

autograph corrections by their respective authors. The manuscripts

of Judge Linebarger represent his attempts to replace, from memory,

books which were destroyed at the time of the bombardment of the

Commercial Press in Shanghai by the Japanese. He had prepared a

two-volume work on the life and principles of Sun Yat-sen and had

left his manuscripts and other papers in the vaults of the Press.

When the Press was bombed the manuscripts, documents, plates and

Chinese translations were all destroyed; the only things remaining

were a few pages of proof sheets for _The Life and Principles of Sun

Chung-san_, which remain in the possession of the present author.

Judge Linebarger attempted to replace these volumes. He had a few

notebooks in which he had kept the outlines of his own speeches; he

had not used these, because of the secondary value. When, however,

the major volumes were lost, he returned to these notebooks and

reconstructed his speeches. They were issued in Paris in 1932 under

the title of _The Gospel of Sun Chung-shan_. He also prepared the

_Commentary_ and the _Conversations_ from memory. These manuscripts

possess a certain somewhat questionable value. Judge Linebarger

himself suggested that they be allowed the same weight that

testimony, based upon memory but delivered under oath, upon a

subject ten years past would receive in a court of justice. The

seven volumes described are in the possession of the present author.

Other materials to which the author has had access are his father’s

diaries and various other private papers; but since he has not cited

them for references, he does not believe any description of them

necessary. Finally, there are the manuscripts of _Sun Yat-sen and

the Chinese Republic_, which contain a considerable amount of

material deleted from the published version of that work, which

appeared in New York in 1925. For comments on other source material

for Sun Yat-sen which is not generally used, see Bibliography.

3 Lyon Sharman, _Sun Yat-sen, His Life and Its Meaning_, New York,

1934, p. 405.

4 He did this in his _Political Testament_, which is given in almost

every work on Sun Yat-sen or on modern Chinese politics. It was

written in February and signed in March 1925, shortly before his

death.

5 The Chinese text of these is given in Hu Han-min, _ed._, _Tsung-li

Ch’üan Chi_ (_The Complete Works of the Leader_), 4 vol. in 1,

Shanghai, 1930. This collection comprises the most important works

of Sun which were published in his lifetime. Edited by one of the

two scholars closest to Sun, it is the standard edition of his

works. English versions of varying amounts of this material are

given in Paschal M. d’Elia, _The Triple Demism of Sun Yat-sen_,

Wuchang, 1931; Frank W. Price, _San Min Chu I, The Three Principles

of the People_, Shanghai, 1930; and Leonard Shih-lien Hsü, _Sun

Yat-sen, His Political and Social Ideals_, Los Angeles, 1933. Each

of these works will henceforth be cited by the name of its editor;

for brief descriptions and appraisals, see the bibliography.

6 The only English version of this work is one prepared by Wei Yung,

under the title of _The Cult of Dr. Sun_, Shanghai, 1931. Fragments

of this work are also to be found in Vilenskii (Sibiriakov), V.,

_Sun’ Iat-sen, Otets Kitaiskoi Revoliutsii_, (_Sun Yat-sen, Father

of the Chinese Revolution_), Moscow, 1925; _Zapiski Kitaiskogo

Revoliutsionera_, (_Notes of a Chinese Revolutionary_), Moscow,

1926; _Memoirs of a Chinese Revolutionary_, Philadelphia, n. d.; and

Karl Wittfogel, _Sun Yat Sen, Aufzeichnungen eines chinesischen

Revolutionärs_, Vienna & Berlin, n. d. (ca. 1927).

7 This work has not been translated into any Western language.

8 Sun Yat-sen, _The International Development of China_, New York and

London, 1929.

9 This is given in Hsü, cited above, and in Min-ch’ien T. Z. Tyau,

_Two Years of Nationalist China_, Shanghai, 1930, pp. 439-442. Dr.

Tyau substitutes the word “Fundamentals” for “Outline,” a rather

happy choice.

10 See bibliography for a complete list of the translations. d’Elia

translation, cited, pp. 36-49, dedicates a whole chapter to the

problem of an adequate translation of the Chinese phrase _San Min

Chu I_. He concludes that it can only be rendered by a nelogism

based upon Greek roots: _the triple demism_, “demism” including the

meaning of “principle concerning and for the people” and “popular

principle.”

11 T’ang Leang-li, _The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution_, New

York, 1930, p. 166.

12 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 58.

13 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 58.

14 See Lyon Sharman, _Sun Yat-sen, His Life and Its Meaning_, New York,

1934, p. 292, for a stimulating discussion of the parts that the

various documents played in the so-called "cult of Sun Yat-sen."

15 Sharman, cited, p. 270.

16 A typical instance of this sort of criticism is to be found in the

annotations to the anonymous translation of the _San Min Chu I_

which was published by a British newspaper in 1927 (_The Three

Principles_, Shanghai, 1927). The translator and annotator both

remained anonymous; the translation was wholly inadequate; and the

annotations a marvel of invective. Almost every page of the

translation was studded with notes pointing out and gloating over

the most trivial errors and inconsistencies. The inflamed opinion of

the time was not confined to the Chinese.

17 Paul M. W. Linebarger, _Deutschlands Gegenwärtige Gelegenheiten in

China_, Brussels, 1936, p. 53. Judge Linebarger repeats the story

told him by General Morris Cohen, the Canadian who was Sun’s

bodyguard throughout this period.

18 Nathaniel Peffer, _China: The Collapse of a Civilization_, New York,

1930, p. 155.

19 d’Elia, cited; Hsü, cited; and Wittfogel, cited.

20 Maurice William, _Sun Yat-sen Versus Communism_, Baltimore, 1932;

and Tsui Shu-chin, _The Influence of the Canton-Moscow Entente upon

Sun Yat-sen’s Political Philosophy_, in _The Social and Political

Science Review_, XVIII, 1, 2, 3, Peiping, 1934; and other works

listed in bibliography, pp. 268-269.

21 Two such are the chapters on Sun Yat-sen’s thought to be found in

Harley Farnsworth MacNair, _China in Revolution_, Chicago, 1931, pp.

78-91 (Chapter VI, “The Ideology and Plans of Sun Yat-sen”) and

Arthur N. Holcombe, _The Chinese Revolution_, Cambridge

(Massachusetts), 1930, pp. 120-155 (Chapter V, “The Revolutionary

Politics of Sun Yat-sen”). The former is the shorter of the two, and

is a summary of the various documents involved. The distinction

between the ideology and the plans is so convenient and illuminating

that the present writer has adopted it. Except for the comments on

the influence of William upon Sun Yat-sen, it is completely

reliable. The latter is a discussion, rather than an outline, and

admirably presents the gist of Sun’s thought.

22 Holcombe, cited, p. 136 ff.

23 The word “ideology” is one of the catchwords of the hour. The author

regrets having to use it, but dares not coin a neologism to replace

it. He does not desire that “ideology” be opposed to “truth,” but

uses the word in its broadest possible sense, referring to the whole

socio-psychological conditioning of a group of people. He does not,

therefore, speak of ideologies as a collection of Paretian

derivations, fictions which mask some “truth.” He considers his own

background—or Pareto’s, for that matter—as ideological, and—in the

sense of the word here employed—cannot conceive of any human belief

or utterance _not_ ideological. The task he has set himself is the

transposition of a pattern of Chinese ideas concerning government

from the Chinese ideology to the Western-traditionalist ideology of

the twentieth century. Whether one, the other, neither, or both, is

“right,” is quite beside the point, so far as the present enterprise

is concerned. In calling the whole non-physical background of a

society the ideology of that society, the author can excuse his

novel use of the term only if he admits that he establishes the new

meaning by definition, without any necessary reference to the

previous use of the term. He has no intention of following, in the

present work, any “theory of ideology” or definition of “ideology”

established by political philosophers, such as Marx, or sociologists

such as Weber, Mannheim, or Pareto. (Professor A. O. Lovejoy

suggested the following definition of the term, “ideology,” after

having seen the way it was employed in this work: “_Ideology_ means

a complex of ideas, in part ethical, in part political, in part

often religious, which is current in a society, or which the

proponents of it desire to make current, as an effective means of

controlling behavior.”)

24 Confucianism may be read in the Legge translations, a popular

abridged edition of which was issued in 1930 in Shanghai under the

title of _The Four Books_. Commentaries on Confucius which present

him in a well-rounded setting are Richard Wilhelm, _Confucius and

Confucianism_, New York, 1931; the same, _Ostasien, Werden und

Wandel des Chinesischen Kulturkreises_, Potsdam, 1928, for a very

concise account and the celebrated _Geschichte der chinesischen

Kultur_, Munich, 1928, for a longer account in a complete historical

setting; Frederick Starr, _Confucianism_, New York, 1930; H. G.

Creel, _Sinism_, Chicago, 1929; and Marcel Granet, _La Civilization

Chinoise_, Paris, 1929. Bibliographies are found in several of these

works. They deal with Confucius either in his historical setting or

as the main object of study, and are under no necessity of

distorting Confucius’ historical rôle for the purpose of showing his

connection with some other topic. The reader may gauge the amount of

distortion necessary when he imagines a work on Lenin, written for

the information and edification of Soviet Eskimos, which—for the

sake of clarity—was forced to summarize all Western thought, from

Plato and Jesus Christ down to Immanuel Kant and Karl Marx, in a few

pages providing a background to Lenin.

25 There is a work on Confucianism upon which the author has leaned

quite heavily: Leonard Shih-lien Hsü, _The Political Philosophy of

Confucianism_, New York, 1932. Dr. Hsü is interested in sociological

political theory. The novelty of his work has aroused a great amount

of criticism among Chinese scholars of the older disciplines,

whether the relatively conservative and established Western

disciplines or the ultra-conservative schools of the truly classical

literati. His work cannot be recommended for any purposes other than

those which Dr. Hsü himself had in mind; there are several other

works, the product of philosophers, historians, and literary

historians, which will present a portrait of Confucius and

Confucianism more conventionally exact. In its own narrow but

definite field Dr. Hsü’s work is an impressive accomplishment; he

transposes the Confucian terms into those of the most advanced

schools of social thought. A reader not forewarned might suffer by

this, and read into Confucius an unwarranted modernity of outlook;

if, however, the up-to-dateness is recognized as Dr. Hsü’s and not

Confucius’, the work is valuable. It puts Confucius on common ground

with modern social theory, ground on which he does not belong, but

where his ideas are still relevant and interesting. The present

author follows Dr. Hsü in this transposition of Confucius, but begs

the reader to remember that this is one made for purposes of

comparison only, and not intended as valid for all purposes. (He

must acknowledge the stimulating criticism of Mr. Jan Tai, of the

Library of Congress, who made it clear that this distortion of

Confucius was one which could be excused only if it were

admitted.)—An interesting presentation of Confucius as transposed

into the older political theory, untouched by sociology, is to be

found in Senator Elbert Duncan Thomas, _Chinese Political Thought_,

New York, 1927.

26 Granet, _Chinese Civilization_, cited, p. 84. Granet’s work, while

challenged by many sinologues as well as by anthropologists, is the

most brilliant portrayal of Chinese civilization to the time of Shih

Huang Ti. His interpretations make the language of the _Odes_

(collected by Confucius) intelligible, and clear up the somewhat

obscure transition from the oldest feudal society to the epoch of

the proto-nations and then to the inauguration of the world order.

27 Granet, cited, pp. 87-88.

28 Richard Wilhelm, _Geschichte der chinesischen Philosophie_, Breslau,

1929, p. 19.

29 One could therefore say that membership in a society is determined

by the outlook of the individual concerned.

30 In modern Western political thought, this doctrine is most clearly

demonstrated in the Marxian thesis of the withering-away of the

state. The Marxists hold that, as the relics of the class struggle

are eliminated from the new society, and classlessness and uniform

indoctrination come to prevail, the necessity for a state—which

they, however, consider an instrument of class domination—will

decline and the state will atrophy and disappear.

31 Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, _History of Chinese Political Thought during the

early Tsin Period_, translated by L. T. Chen, New York, 1930, p. 38.

32 Liang Ch’i-ch’ao (cited, p. 48 and following) discusses these

points.—The author is indebted to Mr. Jên Tai for the explanation of

the relation of these various factors in the Confucian ideology.

33 Leon Wieger and L. Davrout, _Chinese Characters_, Hsien-hsien, 1927,

p. 6.

34 Hsü, cited above, chapter three, contains an excellent discussion of

the doctrine of rectification.

35 A stimulating discussion of the pragmatism of early Chinese thought

is to be found in Creel, cited.

36 It must be pointed out in this connection that Confucius advocated

an ideology which would not only be socially useful but

scientifically and morally exact. He did not consider, as have some

Western thinkers of the past century, that the ideology might be a

quite amoral instrument of control, and might contain deliberate or

unconscious deception. Hsü writes, in his _Confucianism_, cited, p.

93, of the various translations of the word _li_ into English: “The

word _li_ has no English equivalent. It has been erroneously

translated as ‘rites’ or ‘propriety’. It has been suggested that the

term civilization is its nearest English equivalent; but

‘civilization’ is a broader term, without necessarily implying

ethical values, while _li_ is essentially a term implying such

values.” _Li_ is civilized behavior; that is, behavior which is

civilized in being in conformance with the ideology and the values

it contains.

37 Hsü, cited, p. 103.

38 Confucius the individual was quite nationalistically devoted to his

native state of Lu, and, more philosophically, hostile to the

barbarians. Hsü, cited, p. 118.

39 John K. Shryock, _The Origin and Development of The State Cult of

Confucius_, New York, 1932, traces this growth with great clarity

and superlative scholarship. The work is invaluable as a means to

the understanding of the political and educational structure

commonly called “Confucian civilization.”

40 This expansion took place in China in the reign of Ch’in Shih Huang

Ti, who used the state of Ch’in as an instrument by means of which

to destroy the multiple state-system and replace it with a powerful

unitary state for all China. He sought to wipe out the past, raising

the imperial office to a position of real power, and destroying the

whole feudal organization. He abolished tenantry and supplanted it

with a system of small freeholds. Although his immediate successors

did much to restore the forms and appearances of the past, his work

was not altogether undone. Himself hostile to Confucius, his actions

implemented the teachings to an enormous degree. See Granet, cited,

pp. 96-104.

41 D. H. Kulp, _Family Life in South China_, New York, 1925, p. xxiv.

42 H. G. Creel, cited, p. 10. Creole writes as follows of the

significance of the village: “The village life is very important,

for it appears to be the archetype from which the entire Chinese

conception of the world and even of the cosmos grew. The village

was, as has been said, small. It was based on agriculture. It was

apparently a community of a peaceful regularity and a social

solidarity beyond anything which we of the present can imagine.”

43 Arthur Smith, one of the few Westerners to live in a Chinese village

for any length of years, wrote: “It is a noteworthy fact that the

government of China, while in theory more or less despotic, places

no practical restrictions upon the right of free assemblage by the

people for the consideration of their own affairs. The people of any

village can, if they choose, meet every day of the year. There is no

government censor present, and no restriction upon the liberty of

debate. The people can say what they like, and the local Magistrate

neither knows nor cares what is said.... But should insurrection

break out, these popular rights might be extinguished in a moment, a

fact of which all the people are perfectly well aware.” _Village

Life in China_, New York, 1899, p. 228. This was written thirteen

years before the fall of the Ch’ing dynasty.

44 J. S. Burgess, _The Guilds of Peking_, New York, 1928. This is

perhaps the best work on the subject of the guilds which has yet

appeared. The information was gathered by the students of the

author, who as a teacher had excellent facilities for developing

contacts. The students, as Chinese, were able to gather data from

the conservative guild leaders in a manner and to a degree that no

Westerner could have done. The classification here given is a

modification of Burgess’.

45 S. Wells Williams, _The Middle Kingdom_, New York, 1895, p. 405. Dr.

Williams, whose work is perhaps the most celebrated single work on

China in the English language, wrote as follows concerning the

nobility under the Ch’ing:

“The titular nobility of the Empire, as a whole, is a body whose

members are without power, land, wealth, office, or influence, in

virtue of their honors; some of them are more or less hereditary,

but the whole system has been so devised, and the designations so

conferred, as to tickle the vanity of those who receive them,

without granting them any real power. The titles are not derived

from landed estates, but the rank is simply designated in addition

to the name....” He also pointed out that, under the Ch’ing, the

only hereditary titles of any significance were _Yen Shing Kung_

(for the descendant of Confucius) and _Hai Ching Kung_ (for the

descendant of Kuo Hsing-hua, the formidable sea adventurer who drove

the Dutch out of Taiwan and made himself master of that island).

46 William Frederick Mayers, _The Chinese Government, A Manual of

Chinese Titles ..._, Shanghai, 1897, devotes one hundred and

ninety-five pages to the enumeration of the Ch’ing titles. His work,

intended to be used as an office manual for foreigners having

relations with Chinese officials, remains extremely useful as a

presentation of the administrative outline of the Chinese government

in its last days before the appearance of Sun Yat-sen and the

Kuomintang. Pao Chao Hsieh, _The Government of China (1644-1911)_,

Baltimore, 1925, is a more descriptive work dealing with the whole

administration of the Ch’ing dynasty. No work has as yet appeared in

the West, to the knowledge of the present author, which describes

the historical development of government in China in any detail.

47 The figures given are those of the present day, which may be more or

less exact for the past century. For earlier times, the number will

have to be reduced in proportion with the remoteness in time. See

Richard Henry Tawney, _Land and Labour in China_, London, 1932.

48 Richard Wilhelm, _Confucius and Confucianism_, cited, pp. 130-132.

The connection between the naming of names and the operation of the

popular check of revolution is made evident by Wilhelm in a

brilliant passage. If a righteous ruler died a violent death at the

hands of one of his subjects, he was murdered; were he unrighteous,

he was only killed. Confucius himself used such terms in his annals.

His use of varying terms, terms carrying condemnation or

condonement, even of such a subject as regicide, electrified the

scholars of his day.

49 An exception must be made in the case of the first Russian colony in

Peking, which was lost in two centuries and became virtually

indistinguishable from the mass of the population. The Portuguese,

at Macao, displayed that tendency to compromise and miscegenate

which marked their whole progress along the coasts of Asia, but they

maintained their political supremacy in that city; today the

Macanese are largely of Chinese blood, but Portuguese-speaking, and

proud of their separateness.

50 Too many works have been written on the relations of the Chinese and

Westerners to permit any citations, with one exception. Putnam

Weale’s _The Vanished Empire_, New York, 1925, is an extraordinarily

vivid history of the collision of the civilizations. It is not

particularly commendable as a factual record, but as a brilliant and

moving piece of literature presenting the Chinese viewpoint, it is

unexcelled.

51 See Adolf Reichwein, _China and Europe: Intellectual and Artistic

Contacts in the Eighteenth Century_, New York, 1925, which makes

apparent the full extent to which modern Europe is indebted to China

for the luxuries of its culture.

52 In this connection, it might be pointed out that the attractive

strength of the two civilizations has not, as yet, been adequately

studied, although there is an enormous amount of loose

generalization on the subject: “The Chinese are becoming completely

Westernized,” or “The Chinese, in spite of their veneer, are always

Chinese; they will, in the end, absorb their conquerors.” But will

they? In the face of a modern educational and propaganda system,

there is at least room for doubt; it is not beyond all conjecture

that the Chinese of Manchuria might be Japanized as easily as the

fiercely chauvinistic Japanese might be sinicized. The only adequate

answer to the question would be through detailed studies of the

social conditioning and preferences of Chinese under foreign

influence (as in Hongkong, Taiwan, Manchuria), and of foreigners

under Chinese influence (the White Russians in China, the few other

Westerners in preëminently Chinese milieux).

53 An example of this is to be found in Manabendra Nath Roy,

_Revolution und Konterrevolution in China_, Berlin, 1930. Roy was

one of the emissaries of the Third International to the

Nationalists, and his ineptness in practical politics assisted

materially in the weakening of the Communist position. His work

quite seriously employs all the familiar clichés of Western class

dispute, and analyzes the Chinese situation in terms that ignore the

fact that China is Chinese.

54 This same line of attack seems, in the West, to be employed only by

the Catholic church which, while opposing any avowedly

collectivistic totalitarian state, seeks to maintain control on an

ideological and not a political basis, over almost all aspects of

the life of its members. No political party or governing group seems

to share this attitude.

55 Karl A. Wittfogel, in his _Sun Yat-sen_, cited, as well as Roy, in

the work cited, thinks very little of the justice of Confucianism.

The extreme mobility of Chinese society, which largely precluded the

development of any permanent class rule, is either unknown to them

or ignored. If the ideologue-officials of old China composed a

class, they were a class like no other known, for they provided for

the continuous purging of their own class, and its continuous

recruitment from all levels of society—excepting that of prostitutes

and soldiers.

56 T’ang Leang-li writes, in _The Inner History of the Chinese

Revolution_, New York, 1930, p. 168, as follows concerning Sun

Yat-sen’s early teaching of nationalism:

“Previous to the Republican Revolution of 1911, the principle of

nationality was known as the principle of racial struggle, and was

in effect little more than _a primitive tribalism rationalized to

serve as a weapon_ in the struggle against the Manchu oppressors. It

was the corner-stone of revolutionary theory, and by emphasizing the

racial distinction between the ruling and the oppressed classes,

succeeded in uniting the entire Chinese people against the Manchu

dynasty.” (Italics mine.) In speaking of _min ts’u_ as a primitive

tribalism which had been rationalized as a weapon, Dr. T’ang might

lead some of his readers to infer that Sun Yat-sen did not believe

what he taught, and that—as a master-stroke of practical politics—he

had devised an ideological weapon which, regardless of its

truthfulness, would serve him in his struggles. But, it may be

asked, what was Sun Yat-sen struggling for, if not the union and

preservation of the Chinese people?

57 See sections, below, on the programs of nationalism.

58 d’Elia translation, p. 131. Sun Yat-sen said: “Formerly China too

entertained the ambition of becoming mistress of the whole world and

of rising above all other countries; so she (too) advocated

cosmopolitanism.... When the Manchus entered the Great Wall, they

were very few; they numbered 100,000 men. How were those 100,000 men

able to subject hundreds of millions of others? Because the majority

of Chinese at that time favored cosmopolitanism and said nothing

about nationalism.”

59 d’Elia translation, pp. 126 ff.

60 It seems to the present writer that, whatever criteria are selected

for the determination of the nationhood of a given society,

_uniqueness_ certainly is _not_ one of the qualities attributed to a

“nation.” It is not appropriate for the author to venture upon any

extended search for a “true nation”; he might observe, however, that

in his own use—in contrast to Sun Yat-sen’s—he employs the term in a

consciously relative sense, contrasting it with the old Chinese

cosmopolitan society, which thought itself unique except for certain

imitations of itself on the part of half-civilized barbarians. A

“nation” must signify, among other things, for the purposes of this

work, a society calling itself such and recognizing the existence of

other societies of more or less the same nature. Sun Yat-sen, on the

other hand, regarded a nation as a group of persons as real as a

family group, and consistently spoke of the Chinese nation as having

existed throughout the ages—even in those times when the Chinese

themselves regarded their own society as the civilized world, and

did so with some show of exactness, if their own viewpoint is taken

into account.

61 d’Elia translation, cited, pp. 130-131. d’Elia’s italics, covering

the last two sentences in the quotation, have been omitted as

superfluous. As an illustration of the difference between the

translation of d’Elia and that of Hsü, the same paragraph might also

be cited from the latter translation. “The ethical value of

everything is relative and so nothing in the world is innately good

or innately bad. It is determined by circumstances. A thing that is

useful to us is a good thing; otherwise, a bad thing. Also, a thing

that is useful and advantageous to the world is a good thing;

otherwise, a bad thing.” Hsü translation, cited, pp. 210-211.

Excepting for occasional purposes of comparison, the translation of

Father d’Elia will be referred to in citing the sixteen lectures on

the _San Min Chu I_.

62 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 70. The curiously significant use of

the word “forever” is reminiscent of the teleology of the Chinese

family system, according to which the flesh-and-blood immortality of

man, and the preservation of identity through the survival of

descendants, is a true immortality.

_ 63 Wo-men Chung-kuo jen_ and _ni-men wai-kuo jen_.

64 Paul M. Linebarger, _The Life and Principles of Sun Chung-shan_, p.

102. There is here told the anecdote of Sun Yat-sen’s first

encounter with race-hatred. At Ewa, Hawaii, in 1880, Sun, then a

young lad just arrived from China, met a Westerner on the road. The

Westerner threatened him, and called him “Damn Chinaman!” and

various other epithets. When Sun Yat-sen discovered that the man was

neither deranged nor intoxicated, but simply venting his general

hatred of all Chinese, he was so much impressed with the incident

that he never forgot it.

65 Hsü translation, cited, p. 168; d’Elia translation, cited, p. 68.

66 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 70.

67 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 71.

68 Sun Yat-sen said: “A scrap of paper, a pen, and a mutual agreement

will be enough for the ruin of China ... in order to wipe her out by

common agreement, it suffices that the diplomats of the different

countries meet somewhere and affix their signatures.... One morning

will suffice to annihilate a nation.” d’Elia translation, cited, p.

170.

69 The danger of relying too much on foreign aid can be illustrated by

a reference to Sun-Joffe Manifesto issued in Shanghai, January 26,

1922. Sun Yat-sen, as the leader of the Chinese Nationalist

movement, and Adolf Joffe, as the Soviet Special Envoy, signed a

joint statement, the first paragraph of which reads as follows:

“Dr. Sun Yat-sen holds that the Communistic order or even the Soviet

System cannot actually be introduced into China, because there do

not exist here the conditions for the successful establishment of

either Communism or Sovietism. This view is entirely shared by Mr.

Joffe who is further of the opinion that China’s paramount and most

pressing problem is to achieve unification and attain full national

independence, and regarding this great task he has assured Dr. Sun

Yat-sen that China has the warmest sympathy of the Russian people

and can count on the support of Russia.”

See T’ang Leang-li, cited, p. 156.

In view of the subsequent Communist attempt, in 1927, to convert the

Nationalist movement into a mere stage in the proletarian conquest

of power in China, in violation of the terms of the understanding

upon which the Communists and the Chinese Nationalists had worked

together, the leaders of the Kuomintang are today as mistrustful of

what they term Communist politico-cultural imperialism as they are

of capitalist politico-economic imperialism. It is curious that the

APRA leaders in Peru have adopted practically the same attitude.

70 It is necessary to remember that in the four decades before 1925,

during which Sun Yat-sen advocated _nationalism_, the word had not

acquired the ugly connotations that recent events have given it. The

nationalism of Sun Yat-sen was conceived of by him as a pacific and

defensive instrument, for the perpetuation of an independent Chinese

race and civilization. See Paul M. W. Linebarger, _Conversations

with Sun Yat-sen, 1919-1922_, Book I, ch. 5, “Defensive

Nationalism,” and ch. 6, “Pacific Nationalism,” for a further

discussion of this phase of Sun Yat-sen’s thought.

_ 71 tien sha wei kung._

72 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 184. A reference to clan organization,

to be discussed later, has been deleted.

73 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 181 (summary of the sixth lecture on

nationalism).

74 Richard Wilhelm’s preface to _Die Geistigen Grundlagen des Sun Yat

Senismus_ of Tai Chi-tao (The Intellectual Foundations of

Sun-Yat-senism), Berlin, 1931 (henceforth cited as “Tai Chi-tao”),

pp. 8-9; “Die Grösse Sun Yat Sens beruht nun darauf, dass er eine

lebendige Synthese gefunden hat zwischen den Grundprinzipien des

Konfuzianismus and den Anforderungen der neuen Zeit, eine Synthese,

die über die Grenzen Chinas hinaus für die ganze Menschheit noch

einmal von Bedeutung werden kann. Sun Yat Sen vereinigt in sich die

eherne Konsequenz des Revolutionärs und die grosse Menschenliebe des

Erneuerers. Sun Yat Sen ist der gütigste von allen Revolutionären

der Menschheit gewesen. Und diese Güte hat er dem Erbe des Konfuzius

entnommen. So steht sein geistiges Werk da als eine verbindende

Brücke swischen der alten und der neuen Zeit. Und es wird das Heil

Chinas sein, wenn es entschlossen diese Brücke beschreitet.”

75 Tai Chi-tao, cited, p. 65.

76 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 186.

77 d’Elia translation, cited, pp. 187-8. Sun Yat-sen’s discussion of

the old morality forms the first part of his lecture on nationalism,

pp. 184-194 of the d’Elia translation.

78 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 66. The translation employs the words.

79 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 129. In connection with the doctrine

of _wang tao_, it may be mentioned that this doctrine has been made

the state philosophy of “Manchukuo.” See the coronation issue of the

_Manchuria Daily News_, Dairen, March 1, 1934, pp. 71-80, and the

_Japan-Manchoukuo Year Book_, Tokyo, 1934, pp. 634-635. The advocacy

of _wang tao_ in a state which is a consequence of one of the

perfect illustrations of _pa tao_ in the modern Far East, is

astonishing. Its use does possess significance, in demonstrating

that the shibboleths of ancient virtue are believed by the Japanese

and by “Emperor Kang Teh” to possess value in contemporary politics.

80 d’Elia translation, cited, pp. 528, 529.

81 See below, for discussion of the influence that Henry George, Karl

Marx, and Maurice William had upon the social interpretation of

history so far as economic matters were concerned.

82 See “The Theory of the Confucian World Society,” above.

83 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 341.

84 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 199.

85 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 194.

86 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 194. The original quotation, in

Chinese and in English, may be found in James Legge, translator,

_The Four Books_, Shanghai, 1930, p. 313.

87 d’Elia translation, cited, pp. 194-195.

88 Judge Paul Linebarger, in _Conversations with Sun Yat-sen_

(unpublished), states that Sun said to him: “China will go down in

history as the greatest literary civilization the world has ever

known, or ever will know, but what good does this deep literary

knowledge do us if we cannot combine it with the modernity of

Western science?” p. 64, Book Four.

89 Tai Chi-tao, cited, p. 62. The passage reads in full: “Sun Yat-sen

umfasst vollkommen die wahren Gedanken Chinas, wie sie bei Yau und

Schun und auch bei Kung Dsï und Mong Dsï wiederfinden. Dadurch wird

uns klar, dass Sun Yat Sen der Erneuerer der seit 2000 Jahre

ununterbrochenen chinesischen sittlichen Kultur ist. Im vergangenen

Jahr hat ein russischer Revolutionär an Sun Yat Sen die folgende

Frage gerichtet: ‘Welche Grundlage haben Ihre Revolutionsgedanken?’

Sun Yat Sen hat darauf geantwortet: ‘In China hat es ein sittlichen

Gedanken gegeben, der von Yau, Schun, Yü, Tang, Wen Wang, Wu Wang,

Dschou Gung his zu Kung Dsï getragen worden ist; seither ist er

ununterbrochen, ich habe wieder an ihn angeknüpft und versacht, ihn

weiter zu entwickeln.’ Der Fragende hat dies nicht verstehen können

und sich weiter erkundigt; Sun Yat Sen hat noch mehrmals versucht,

ihm seine Antwort zu erklären. Aus dieser Unterredung können wir

ersehen, dass Sun Yat Sen von seine Gedanken überzeugt war,

gleichzeitig können wir ersehen, dass seine Nationalrevolution auf

dem Widererwachen der chinesischen Kultur beruht. Er hat die

schöpferische Kraft Chinas wieder ins Leben rufen und den Wert der

chinesischen Kultur fur die ganze Welt nutzbar machen wollen, um

somit den Universalismus verwirklichen zu können.” Allowance will

have to be made, as it should always in the case of Tai Chi-tao, for

the author’s deep appreciation of and consequent devotion to the

virtues of Chinese culture. Other disciples of Sun Yat-sen wrote in

a quite different vein. The present author inclines to the opinion,

however, that Tai Chi-tao’s summary is a just rendition of Sun

Yat-sen’s attitude. Sun Yat-sen loved and fought for the struggling

masses of China, whose misery was always before his pitying eyes; he

also fought for the accomplishments of Chinese civilization. In

modern China, many leaders have fought for the culture, and

forgotten the masses (men such as Ku Hung-ming were typical); others

loved the populace and forgot the culture. It was one of the

elements of Sun Yat-sen’s greatness that he was able to remember

both.

90 d’Elia translation, cited, pp. 199-202.

91 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 259.

92 This idea, of wealth as national capacity to produce, is of course

not a new one. It is found in the writings of Alexander Hamilton,

among others.

93 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 337.

94 Wei Yung, translator, _The Cult of Dr. Sun, Sun Wên Hsüeh Shê_,

cited. See the discussion on dietetics, pp. 3-9.

95 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 337.

96 Wei Yung’s translation, cited, is an English version of _The Outline

of Psychological Reconstruction_ of Sun Yat-sen. This work is

devoted to a refutation of the thesis, first propounded by Wang

Yang-ming (ca. 1472-1528), that knowledge is easy and action

difficult. In a society where the ideology had been stabilized for

almost two millenia, this was undoubtedly quite true. In modern

China, however, faced with the terrific problem of again settling

the problem of an adequate ideology, the reverse was true: knowledge

was difficult, and action easy. This was one of the favorite

aphorisms of Sun Yat-sen, and he devoted much time, effort, and

thought to making it plain to his countrymen. The comparative points

of view of Wang Yang-ming and Sun Yat-sen afford a quite clear-cut

example of the contrast between an established and unsettled

ideology.

97 d’Elia translation, cited, pp. 336-345. This discussion occurs in

the fifth lecture on democracy, incidental to Sun Yat-sen’s

explaining the failure of the parliamentary Republic in Peking, and

the general inapplicability of Western ideas of democracy to China.

98 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 344.

99 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 344.

100 It might again be pointed out that Sun Yat-sen differed with Marxism

which, while it, of course, does not hold that all knowledge is

already found, certainly keeps its own first premises beyond all

dispute, and its own interpretations sacrosanct. The dialectics of

Marx and Hegel would certainly appear peculiar in the Chinese

environment. Without going out of his way to point out the

difference between Sun’s Nationalism and Marxism-Leninism, the

author cannot refrain—in view of the quite popular misconception

that Sun Yat-sen was at one time almost a Marxist convert—from

pointing out the extreme difference between the premises, the

methods, and the conclusions of the two philosophies.

101 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 344.

102 Hsü, _Confucianism_, cited, contains two chapters relevant to the

consideration of this problem. Ch. III, “The Doctrine of

Rectification” (pp. 43-61), and Ch. XI, “Social Evolution” (pp.

219-232), discuss rectification and ideological development within

the Confucian ideology.

103 As an illustration of Dr. Sun’s continued activity as a medical man,

the author begs the reader’s tolerance of a short anecdote. In 1920

or 1921, when both Judge Linebarger and Sun Yat-sen were in

Shanghai, and were working together on the book that was to appear

as _Sun Yat-sen and the Chinese Republic_, the younger son of Judge

Linebarger—the brother of the present author—fell ill with a rather

obscure stomach disorder. The Western physicians having made little

or no progress in the case, Sun Yat-sen intervened with an old

Chinese herbal prescription, which he, a Western-trained physician,

was willing to endorse. The remedy was relatively efficacious—more

so than the suggestions of the European doctors. Even though Sun

Yat-sen very early abandoned his career of professional medical man

for that of revolutionist, he appears to have practised medicine

intermittently throughout his life.

104 Sun Yat-sen wrote, in Wei Yung translation, cited, p. 115: “In our

age of scientific progress the undertaker [sic!], seeks to know

first before undertaking. This is due to the desire to forestall

blunders and accidents so as to ensure efficiency and economy of

labor. He who is able to develop ideas from knowledge, plans from

ideas, and action from plans can be crowned with success in any

undertaking irrespective of its profoundness or the magnitude of

labor involved.”

105 Tai, cited, p. 66: “Wir sind Chinesen, und was wir zunächst zu

ändern haben liegt in China. Aber wenn alle Dinge in China wertlos

gewerden sind, wenn die chinesische Kultur in der Kulturgeschichte

der Welt keine Bedeutung mehr hat, und wenn das chinesische Volk die

Kraft, seine Kultur hochzuhalten, verloren hat, dann können wir

gleich mit gebundenen Händen den Tod abwarten; zu welchem Zweck

brauchen wir dann noch Revolution zu treiben!”

106 An interesting discussion of this attitude is to be found in Li Chi,

_The Formation of the Chinese People_, Cambridge (Massachusetts),

1928.

107 See Tsui Shu-chin, cited, pp. 96-146. The work of Tsui is good for

the field covered; his discussion of the contrasting policy of the

Communists and of Sun Yat-sen with respect to nationalities may be

regarded as reliable.

108 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 67 and following.

109 See above, “The Nation and State in Chinese Antiquity.”

110 The present state of Western knowledge of the sociology of China is

not sufficient to warrant reference to any authorities for the

description of egalitarianism and mobility. These matters are still

on that level of unspecialized knowledge where every visitor to

China may observe for himself. The bibliography on the social life

of the Chinese on pp. 240-242 of Kenneth Scott Latourette, _The

Chinese: Their History and Culture_, New York, 1934, contains some

of the leading titles that touch on the subject. Prof. A. R.

Radcliffe-Brown of the University of Chicago informed the present

author that he contemplates the planning of an extensive program of

socio-anthropological field work in Chinese villages which will

assist considerably in the understanding of the sociology of old

China.

111 Hsü, _Confucianism_, cited, p. 49, states the function of the

Confucian leaders quite succinctly: “... the Confucian school

advocates political and social reorganization by changing the social

mind through political action.”

112 Hsü, cited, p. 104.

113 Hsü, cited, pp. 195-196.

114 Mariano Ponce, _Sun Yat Sen, El fundador de la Republica de China_,

Manila, 1912, p. 23.

“Y tampoco era posible sustituirla por otra dinastía nacional. Sólo

existen al presente dos familias en China, de donde podían salir los

soberanos: uno es la descendencia de la dinastía Ming, de que

usurparon los mandchüs el trone, hace más de dos siglos y medio, y

la otra es la del filósofo Confucio, cuyo descendiente lineal

reconocido es el actual duque Kung. Ni en una, ni en otra existen

vástagos acondicionados para regir un Estado conforme á los

requerimientos de los tiempos actuales. Hubo de descartarse, pues,

de la plataforma de la ‘Joven China’ el pensamiento de instalar en

el trono á una dinastía nacional. Y sin dinastía holgaba el trono.

“No sabemos si aún habiendo en las dos familias mencionados miembros

con condiciones suficientes para ser el Jefe supremo de un Estado

moderno, hubiese prosperado el programa monarquico.

“Lo que sí pueda decir es que desde los primeros momentos

evolucionayon las ideas de Sun Yat Sen hacia el republicanismo....”

Ponce then goes on to point out Sun Yat-sen’s having said that the

decentralized system of old government and the comparative autonomy

of the vice-regencies presented a background of “a sort of

aristocratic republic” (“une especie de república aristocrática”).

115 Ponce, cited, p. 24. “... la única garantía posible, el único medio

por excelencia para obtener los mejores gobernantes....”

116 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 234.

117 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 235.

118 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 255.

119 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 266, note 1. Father d’Elia discusses

the reasons which made it seem more probable that Sun was

transliterating the name Millar into Chinese rather than (John

Stuart) Mill.

120 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 256 and following.

121 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 271.

122 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 273.

123 d’Elia translation, cited, pp. 242-243.

124 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 223 and following. Dr. Hsü (cited, p.

263 and following) translates these four epochs as following: _hung

fang_, “the stage of the great wilderness”; _shen ch’üan_, “the

state of theocracy”; _chun ch’üan_, “the stage of monarchy”; and

_min ch’üan_, “the stage of democracy.”

125 d’Elia translation, cited, pp. 241-242.

126 Linebarger, _Conversations_, cited, Book II, ch. 2.

127 It is of interest to note that the “New Life Movement” inaugurated

by Chiang Chieh-shih is concerned with many such petty matters such

as those enumerated above. Each of these small problems is in itself

of little consequence; in the aggregate they loom large.

128 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 331.

129 Hsü translation, cited, p. 352. It is interesting to note that the

translation by Father d’Elia gives a more literal translation of the

names that Sun Yat-sen applied to these categories. He translates

the Chinese terms as _pre-seeing_, _post-seeing_, and _non-seeing_.

130 Hsü translation, cited, p. 352.

131 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 348.

132 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 352. Sun Yat-sen defined democracy

thus: “... under a republican government, the people is sovereign.”

133 Tai Chi-tao, cited, p. 25, refers to this distinction as being

between force (_Gewalt_) and power (_Macht_). To the people

belonged, and rightfully, the force which could sanction or refuse

to sanction the existence of the government and the confirmation of

its policies. The government had the power (_Macht_), which the

people did not have, of formulating intelligent policies and

carrying them out in an organized manner.

134 Liang Chi-ch’ao, cited, pp. 50-52.

135 d’Elia translation, cited, pp. 279 and following.

136 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 368.

137 d’Elia translation, cited, pp. 368-9. Dr. Wou Saofong, in his _Sun

Yat-sen_ (Paris, 1929), summarizes his thesis of Sun Yat-sen in

somewhat different terms: “... Sun Yat-sen compare, le gouvernement

à un appareil mécanique, dont le moteur est constitué _par les lois_

ou les ministres, tandis que l’ingénieur que dirige la machine était

autrefois le roi et aujourd’hui le peuple,” p. 124. (Italics mine.)

This suggestion that the state-machine, in the theory of Sun

Yat-sen, is composed of laws as well as men is quite interesting;

Sun Yat-sen himself does not seem to have used this figure of speech

and it may be Dr. Wou’s applying the juristic interpretation on his

own initiative. Sun Yat-sen, in his sixth lecture on democracy,

says, “Statesmen and lawyers of Europe and America say that

government is a machine of which law is a tool.” (d’Elia

translation, cited, p. 368.)

138 It must always remain one of those conjectures upon which scholars

may expend their fantasy what Sun Yat-sen would have thought of the

necessity of the juristic state, which involved a quite radical

change throughout the Chinese social organism, had he lived to see

the ebb of juristic polity and, for all that, of voting democracy.

It is not unlikely that his early impressions of the United States

and his reading of Montesquieu would have led him to retain his

belief in a juristic-democratic state in spite of the fact that such

a state would no longer represent the acme of ultra-modernism.

139 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 378 and following.

140 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 369.

141 Reginald Johnston, _Twilight in the Forbidden City_, cited above,

presents an apparently true account of the conspiracies of the

various Northern generals which centered around the person of P’u

Yi. According to Johnston Tsao Kun was defeated in his attempt to

restore the Manchu Emperor only by the jealousies of his

fellow-militarists.

142 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 406.

143 Father d’Elia devotes the whole second chapter of his introduction

to the consideration of a suitable rendition of _San Min Chu I_,

which he calls the Triple Demism. (Work cited, pp. 36-49.) Again on

p. 402, he explains that, while he had translated _min shêng_ as

_socialism_ in the first French edition of his work, he now renders

it as _the economic Demism_ or _sociology_. The most current

translation, that of Frank Price, cited, gives _the principle of

livelihood_. Paul Linebarger gave it as _socialism_ as far back as

1917 (_The Chinese Nationalist Monthly_, December, 1917, Chicago) in

Chicago, at the time when Lin Shen, Frank C. Lee and he were all

working for Sun in that city. Dr. H. H. Kung, a high government

official related by marriage to Mme. Sun Yat-sen, speaks of the

three principles of _liberty_, _democracy_, and _economic

well-being_ (preface to Hsü, _Sun_, cited, p. xvi). Dr. V. K.

Wellington Koo, one of China’s most eminent diplomats, speaks of

_social organization_ (_Memoranda Presented to the Lytton

Commission_, New York City, n. d.). Citations could be presented

almost indefinitely. _Min_ means “people,” and _shêng_ means “life;

vitality, the living, birth, means of living” according to the

dictionary (S. Wells Williams, _A Syllabic Dictionary of the Chinese

Language_, Tungchou, 1909). The mere terms are of very little help

in solving the riddle of _min shêng_. Laborious examination is

needed, and even this will not, perhaps, lead us to anything more

than probability. Sun Yat-sen, in his lectures, called it by several

different names, which seem at first sight to contradict each other.

144 d’Elia translation, cited, pp. 91-92.

145 Linebarger, _Conversations_, cited, Bk. IV, p. 62: “I must confess

that the idea of using the sacred cult of ancestor worship as a

political machine is very abhorrent to me. In fact, I think that

even the rashest fool would never attempt to use this intimate cult

with its exclusively domestic privacy as a revolutionary

instrument.”

146 Linebarger, _Sun Yat-sen and the Chinese Republic_, New York, 1925,

pp. 68-9.

147 The same, pp. 135-139.

148 The same, pp. 104-105.

149 The same, pp. 122-123.

150 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 472.

151 Karl A. Wittfogel, _Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Chinas_, Leipzig,

1931. The author, the German Marxian who wrote the best Marxist

critique of Sun Yat-sen, is the only scholar to seek a really

complete picture of the old Chinese economy by the technique of

modern Western economic analysis. Described by the author as an

“attempt,” the first volume of this work runs to 737 pages. It is

valuable for the large amount of statistical material which it

contains, and for its systematic method; its Marxian bias narrows

its interest considerably.

152 Both works of Wittfogel, cited above, are useful for the

understanding of the transition from the old economy to the new. For

a general view of the economic situation and potentialities of

China, see George B. Cressey, _China’s Geographic Foundations_, New

York, 1934. The bibliography on Chinese economy to be found in

Latourette, cited above, vol. II, pp. 116-119, is useful.

153 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 97.

154 See below, section on the national economic revolution.

155 Hsü translation, cited, pp. 186-187. The d’Elia translation gives a

more exact rendering of Sun Yat-sen’s words (p. 97), but, by

following Sun Yat-sen in calling China a hypo-colony, is less

immediately plain to the Western reader than is the translation of

Dr. Hsü, who in this instance uses “sub” and “hypo” interchangeably.

156 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 443.

157 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 452.

158 His _International Development of China_, New York, 1922

(republished 1929), is a colossal plan which could only be compared

with the _Piatiletka_ or with the New Deal in the United States,

since Sun Yat-sen suggested that—in order to avoid the consequences

of a post-war depression—the nations of the world might cooperate in

the equal exploitation of Chinese national resources with the

Chinese. He proposed the modernization of China by a vast

international loan which could permit the Western nations to

maintain their war-time peak production, supplying China (1929 ed.,

p. 8). He concludes the work: “In a nutshell, it is my idea to make

capitalism create socialism in China so that these two economic

forces of human civilization will work side by side in future

civilization” (p. 237). The work is, however, generally regarded as

a transportation plan, since Sun Yat-sen sketched out a railway map

of China which would require decades to realize, and which

overshadowed, by its very magnitude, the other aspects of his

proposals.

159 At the risk of digression, one might comment on an interesting

element of the Euramerican ideology which is in sharp contrast to

the Chinese. The West has, apparently, always been devoted to

dichotomies of morality. The Greeks had reason and unenlightenment,

and whole series of ideals that could be fought for and against, but

the real division of good and bad in the West came, of course, with

Christianity, which accustomed Westerners to think for centuries in

terms of holiness versus evil—they being, geographically, holy, and

the outsiders (heathen), evil. Now that the supernatural foundations

of Christianity have been shaken by the progress of scientific and

intellectual uncertainty, many Westerners find an emotional and an

intellectual satisfaction in dividing the world into pure and

unclean along lines of sometimes rather abstruse economic questions.

This new morality seems to be based on distributive economics rather

than on deity. It is employed, of course, by the Marxians, but their

adversaries, in opposing them with equal passion, fall into the same

habit. It is shocking and unbelievable to such persons to discover

that there is a society whose ideology does not center around the

all-meaningful point of the ownership of the means of production.

Their only reaction is a negation of the possibility of such

thought, or, at least, of its realism. The intellectual position of

Sun Yat-sen in the modern world would be more clearly appreciated if

the intellectuals of the West were not adjusting their ideological

and emotional habits from religion to economics, and meanwhile

judging all men and events in economic terms. The present discussion

of Sun Yat-sen’s economic ideology is a quite subordinate one in

comparison to the examination of his ideology as a whole, but some

persons will regard it as the only really important point that could

be raised concerning him.

160 Tsui, cited, p. 345, quotes Nathaniel Peffer: “... Peffer said that

Dr. Sun never ‘attained intellectual maturity, and he was completely

devoid of the faculty of reason. He functioned mentally in sporadic

hunches. It was typical of him that he met Joffe, read the Communist

Manifesto, and turned Communist, and then read one book by an

American of whom he knew nothing, and rejected communism all in a

few months.’ ” Sun Yat-sen knew Marxism, years before the Russian

Revolution. The Communist Manifesto was not new to him. He was

extraordinarily well read in Western political and economic thought.

Sun Yat-sen never turned Communist, nor did he subsequently reject

communism any more than he had done for years.

161 The author hopes, at some future time, to be able to fill in the

intellectual background of Sun Yat-sen much more thoroughly than he

is able to at the present, for lack of materials. One interesting

method would involve the listing of every Western book with which

Sun Yat-sen can be shown to have been acquainted. It might be a

fairly accurate gauge of the breadth of his information.

162 d’Elia translation, cited, pp. 461-468. Father d’Elia’s note on the

relative positions of Henry George and Sun (p. 466) is interesting.

For a discussion of the actual program proposed by Sun, see below,

“The Program of _Min Shêng_” section on land policy.

163 Lyon Sharman, _Sun Yat-sen_, cited, p. 58.

164 The same, pp. 98-99. There is an inconsistency of wording here,

which may or may not be the fault of the translator. The oath refers

to the “equitable redistribution of the land” (p. 98); the platform

speaks of “the nationalization of land” (p. 98); and one of the

slogans is “Equalize land-ownership!”

165 See also the discussion in Tsui, _Canton-Moscow Entente_, cited, pp.

371-376; and in Li Ti-tsun, “The Sunyatsenian principle of

Livelihood,” _The Chinese Students’ Monthly_, XXIV (March 1929), pp.

230. Li declares that Sun envisioned immediate redistribution but

ultimate socialization, but does not cite his source for this. Li’s

discussion of sources is good otherwise.

166 Sharman, p. 58; the same authority for the statement as to the 1905

manifesto.

167 Sharman, p. 94.

168 Wittfogel, _Sun Yat-sen_, cited, p. 61.

169 Wittfogel, _Sun Yat-sen_, cited, p. 66: “Dieses sehr unpräzise

Programm, das die Frage der Klasseninteressen und des Klassenkampfes

als des Mittels zur Brechung privilegierter Klasseninteressen nicht

aufwirft, war objektiv gar nicht Sozialismus, sondern etwas durchaus

anderes: Lenin hat die Formel ‘_Subjektiver Sozialismus_’ dafür

geprägt.”

170 Wittfogel, _Sun Yat-sen_, cited, p. 67: “So bedeutete denn Suns

‘Sozialismus’ im Munde der Chinesischen Bourgeoisie nichts als ein

Art Bekenntness zu einer ‘sozialen,’ d.h. massenfreundlichen

Wirtschaftspolitik.”

171 T’ang, cited, p. 46.

172 T’ang, cited, p. 172.

173 T’ang, cited, p. 172.

174 T’ang, cited, pp. 171-172.

175 Wittfogel, cited, pp. 117-118.

176 Wittfogel, cited, p. 140: “... Seine Drei Prinzipien verkörpern in

ihrer _Entwicklung_ den objektiven Wandel der ökonomisch-sozialen

Situation Chinas, in ihren _Widersprüchen_ die realen Widersprüche

der chinesischen Revolution, in ihren _jüngsten Tendenzen_ die

Verlagerung des sozialen Schwerpunktes der Revolution, die Klassen

in Aktion setzt, deren Ziel nicht mehr ein

bürgerlich-kapitalistisches, sondern ein

proletarisch-sozialistisches und ein bauerlich-agrar-revolutionäres

ist.

“Sun Yat-sen ist demnach nicht nur der bisher mächtigste

Repräsentant der bürgerlich-nationalen, antiimperialistischen

Revolutionen des erwach-enden Asiens überhaupt, er weist zugleich

über die bürgerliche Klassen-schranke dieser ersten Etappe der

asiatischen Befreiungsbewegung hinaus. Dies zu verkennen, wäre

verhängnisvoll, gerade auch für die proletarisch-kommunistische

Bewegung Ostasiens selbst.”

177 Statement of Judge Linebarger to the author. See also Linebarger,

_Conversations_, references to Communism which occur throughout the

whole book.

178 Tsui, cited, p. 144. It would involve a duplication of effort for

the present author to repeat the material of Dr. Tsui’s excellent

monograph on Sun Yat-sen and the Bolsheviks. Since the purpose of

the present work is to undertake an exposition of the Nationalist

political ideology and programs against the background of the old

Chinese ideology, such an emphasis upon one comparatively small

point in Sun Yat-sen’s doctrines would be entirely disproportionate

as well as superfluous. The reader is referred to the work of Dr.

Tsui for any details of these relations that he may wish to examine.

179 See Tsui, cited, and section below, on the class struggle of the

nations.

180 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 450. See also Tsui, cited, pp.

353-354; and Li, cited, pp. 229 and following.

181 Sun, _Development of China_, cited, p. 237.

182 Maurice William, _Sun Yat-sen Versus Communism_, Baltimore, 1932, p.

4.

183 William, in his _Sun Yat-sen Versus Communism_, cited, proves beyond

doubt that Sun Yat-sen was strongly indebted to him for many

anti-Marxian arguments.

184 See above, Chapter One, second, third, and fourth sections.

185 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 423.

186 Tsui, cited, pp. 121-123, n. 72.

187 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 472.

188 Hsü translation, cited, p. 422. The Hsü version will be cited from

time to time, whenever Father d’Elia’s interesting neologisms might

make the citation too disharmonious, in wording, with the comment.

189 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 294.

190 Francis W. Coker, _Recent Political Thought_, New York—London, 1934,

pp. 545-562, Ch. XX, “Empirical Collectivism.”

191 Coker, cited, pp. 546-547.

192 Coker, cited, pp. 548-549. Throughout the discussion of empirical

collectivism the present author will cite, by and large, the

categories given by Coker. Any special exceptions will be noted, but

otherwise the discussion will be based on Coker’s chapter on

“Empirical Collectivism,” cited above.

193 Linebarger, _Conversations_, cited, Book III, p. 31.

194 Linebarger, _Conversations_, cited, Book III, p. 30.

195 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 475.

196 See, however, the d’Elia translation, cited, pp. 298-301, for a

reference to labor unions and a statement for their need of

competent and honest leadership.

197 See Wittfogel, _Sun Yat-sen_, cited, “Die Arbeiter,” pp. 97-99.

T’ang, Hsü, and the various biographies of Sun almost all contain

references from time to time to Sun’s friendliness toward and

approval of organized labor.

198 Wittfogel, _Sun Yat-sen_, cited, pp. 325-329. The next speech of Sun

Yat-sen given in Wittfogel’s work is Sun’s indignant attack on “the

so-called Labor Government” of England, which permitted the old

methods of British Far Eastern imperialism to continue.

199 Linebarger, _Conversations_, cited, Book III, p. 18. This work,

while it cannot be given the weight of direct quotations from Sun’s

own writings or speeches, does contain a good deal about the

policies of _min shêng_ which does not appear elsewhere. The author

has sought to avoid citation of it where direct sources are

available, since the nature of the material makes it by no means so

authoritative as others might be.

200 Coker, cited, p. 551.

201 E. D. Harvey, _The Mind of China_, New Haven, 1933, deals

extensively with these supernatural elements. The reader who turns

to it should keep in mind the fact that the supernatural plays a

rôle in China distinctly less important than that which it did, say,

in medieval Europe, and that a strong agnostic, rather than a

skeptical, spirit among the Chinese has preserved them from the

grossest errors of superstition.

202 Latourette, cited, p. 129. Dr. Latourette’s sketch of Chinese

religious thought is especially good, as indeed it might be, since

he is one of the most celebrated American scholars in the field of

Western religion in China.

203 H. G. Creel, work cited, p. 127.

204 The author cannot give a documentary citation for this observation.

It was communicated to him many times by his father, Judge Paul

Linebarger, who stated that Sun Yat-sen was most apt to talk in

terms of morality and morale by preference. The fact that Sun

Yat-sen came from a Chinese Confucian background into a Western

Christian one cannot be ignored. He did not permit his Christianity

to sway him from what he considered his necessary lines of behavior

in politics; it did not, for example, prevent him from being

extremely cordial to the Soviet Union at the time that that state

was still more or less outcaste. And yet, speaking of the Christian

God, he is reputably reported to have said: “God sent me to China to

free her from bondage and oppression, and I have not been

disobedient to the Heavenly mission”; and, again, to have said on

the day before his death: “I am a Christian; God sent me to fight

evil for my people. Jesus was a revolutionist; so am I.” (Both

quotations from appendix to the d’Elia translation, p. 718.)

205 Sun Yat-sen authorized the biography, cited, which Judge Linebarger

wrote of him. It was a propaganda work, and neither he nor the

author had any particular expectation that it would ever be regarded

as a source, or as an academically prepared document. The last

chapter of this authorized biography bears the title, “Conclusion:

Sun the Moral Force.” This, perhaps, is significant as to Sun’s own

attitude.

206 Note the contrast between the thought of Sun in this respect and

that of Tagore or Gandhi. This has been pointed out by many Western

writers on China.

207 Linebarger, _Conversations_, cited, Book III, p. 20.

208 Sharman, cited, p. 282.

209 The reader must bear in mind the fact that what is presented here is

Sun Yat-sen’s political program for China. In many instances the

course of affairs has deviated quite definitely from that program,

and it can be only a matter of conjecture as to what Sun Yat-sen

would do were he to return and observe the Nationalist movement as

it now is. It is manifestly impossible to trace all the changes in

this program. The actual developments have conformed only in part

with Sun Yat-sen’s plans, although the leaders seek to have it

appear as though they are following as close to Sun Yat-sen’s

democratic politics as they can. Many persons who were close to Sun

Yat-sen, such as Mme. Sun Yat-sen, believe that the National

Government has betrayed the theory of Sun Yat-sen, and that

Generalissimo Chiang Chieh-shih has made himself the autocrat of the

National Government. It is, of course, impossible within the scope

of this thesis to enter into this dispute. Who rules the

Soviet—Stalin, or the Communist Party? Who rules China—Chiang

Chieh-shih, or the Kuomintang? In each case there is the question of

whether the leader could get along without the party, and whether

the party could get along without the leader, as well as the

question of the leader’s sincerity. These issues, however burning

they might be in real life, could not be adequately treated in a

work such as this. The author has sought to present Sun Yat-sen’s

theory of applied politics. Where events which Sun Yat-sen foresaw

have come to pass, the author has referred to them. He does not wish

to be understood as presenting a description of the whole course of

events in China.

210 Here, again, one must remember that Mme. Sun Yat-sen, Eugene Chen,

and others charge that the Party no longer rules, that it has been

prostituted by Chiang Chieh-shih, and now serves only to cloak a

military despotism. It may be noted, so far as the other side of the

question is concerned, that a greater number of the persons who were

eminent in the Party before Sun Yat-sen died have remained in it

than have left it.

211 See T’ang, work cited for an excellent description of the mutations

of the revolutionary party. T’ang criticizes the present personnel

of the Kuomintang severely, but the reader must keep in mind the

fact that he has since become reconciled with the present

leadership, and make allowances for the somewhat emphatic

indignation voiced at the time of writing the book. The brilliance

of the author guarantees that the story is well told, but it is not

told for the last time. See also, Min-ch’ien T. Z. Tyau, _Two Years

of Nationalist China_, Shanghai, 1930, for a summary that is as

excellent as it is short. Various changes have occurred in party

function, organization, and personnel since that time, but they have

not—to the knowledge of the author—been completely and adequately

covered by any one work.

212 For a history of this period, see T’ang, Sharman, or Tsui Shu-chin,

all cited above. The Communist side of the story is told by Harold

Isaacs (editor), _Five Years of Kuomintang Reaction_, Shanghai,

1932, and in the various works of the Stalinist and Trotskyist

groups concerning the intervention of the Third Internationale in

China. Two graphic personal accounts cast in semi-fictional form,

are Oscar Erdberg, _Tales of Modern China_, Moscow, 1932, and

Vincent Sheean, _Personal History_, New York, 1935; these present

the Communist and the left-liberal viewpoints, respectively. The

dramatic story of the Entente, the separation, and the ensuing

conflict are not yet remote enough to have cooled into material

ready for the historian.

213 The Kuomintang, in accepting the Communist administrative structure,

was not violating traditional Chinese patterns altogether. It has

been pointed out that the revised structure of the Kuomintang

resembled older Chinese guild patterns as well as the new Russian

style (Sharman, work cited, p. 262).

214 Here, again, one might refer to the disputes as to the orthodoxy and

integrity of the present leadership. The preëminence of

Generalissimo Chiang Chieh-shih, which cannot be doubted, is seen by

persons friendly to him as a strong and beneficent influence upon

the C. E. C. Persons hostile to him charge that he has packed the C.

E. C. with his adherents, and controls it as he chooses.

215 An interesting piece of research could deal with the method of

recruitment and registration in the Kuomintang before the coming of

the Communist advisers. There was rarely any doubt as to who was, or

was not, a member, but there was constant trouble as to the good

standing of members. Recruitment seems to have been on a basis of

oath-taking, initiation, etc.; what Party discipline there was seems

to have been applied only in the most extreme cases, and then

crudely.

216 It is interesting to note that the Kuomintang is to a certain degree

democratic in representing the various occupational groups in China.

Tyau, cited above, p. 25 and following, lists the percentages in the

membership in the Kuomintang according to occupation, as they stood

in 1930: Party work, 5.84%; government service, 6.61%; army and

navy, 3.26%; police, 4.09%; labor (in general), 7.32%; agriculture,

10.43%; navigation, 1.20%; railway, 1.14%; commerce, 10.47%;

students, 10.47%; teaching, 21.31%; independent professions, 1.66%;

social work, 1.68%; unemployed, O.54%; unclassified, 3.13%;

incomplete returns, 15.09%.

217 See above, pp. 59 and following.

218 Sun Yat-sen, _Kidnapped in London_, cited, _passim_.

219 d’Elia translation, cited, pp. 122-123.

220 The present instances are all taken from the third lecture on

nationalism, d’Elia translation, cited pp. 127-128. The Hsü

translation, in spite of its many merits, is not strong on

geography. Thus, in the translation referring to Poland which has

just been cited, the Hsü reading runs: “Although Persia was

partitioned by foreigners over a century ago, Persian nationalism

was not lost; consequently the Persians have been able to restore

their country to independence; and now Persia has the status of a

second or third class power in Europe” (p. 208), this in spite of

the fact that Persia is translated correctly further on (p. 327).

Another misreading is: “After the war, two new Slavic states were

born, namely Czechoslovakia and Jugoslovakia” (p. 217). These minor

errors are, however, among the very few which can be discovered in

the whole book, and do not mar the text to any appreciable extent.

221 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 132.

222 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 63.

223 T’ang, cited, pp. 168 and following, gives the various documents of

the First National Congress of the Kuomintang, which place the

application of nationalism first in their programs. “The Manifesto

On Going to Peking,” issued by Sun November 10, 1924, refers to

various points to be achieved; the first is, “National freedom from

external restriction will enable China to develop her national

economy and to increase her productivity.” (Hsü translation, p.

148.) This might imply that the execution of _min shêng_ was to be

coincidental with or anterior to the fulfillment of nationalism; it

probably does not.

224 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 187.

225 Discussions of this are to be found in Sir Reginald Johnston’s

_Twilight in the Forbidden City_, cited.

226 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 244.

227 d’Elia translation, cited, pp. 245-247.

228 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 187. Numerals have been written out by

the present author.

229 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 365. Italics are omitted.

230 This is not due to any mystical veneration of numbers, or religious

influence. In spreading doctrines which would have to be followed by

the unlettered as well as by the scholars, Sun Yat-sen found it

necessary to develop the general outline of his principles in such a

way as to give them a considerable mnemonic appeal. Thus, the three

principles—and the three French (liberty, equality, fraternity) and

American (of, by, for the people) principles—and the triple foreign

aggression, the four popular powers, the five governmental rights.

The use of the number three permitted Sun Yat-sen to weave together

the various strands of his teaching, and to attain a considerable

degree of cross-reference. It cannot be shown to have induced any

actual distortion of his theories.

231 Hsü translation, cited, p. 213. See also d’Elia translation, p. 134.

232 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 114.

233 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 101.

234 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 113. The whole present discussion of

economic oppression is drawn from the latter part of the second

lecture. Except in the case of direct quotation, no further

reference will be given to this section, which occurs at pp. 97-115

of the d’Elia translation.

235 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 106.

236 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 113.

237 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 113.

238 In referring to a sub-principle, the author is following Sun

Yat-sen’s arrangement of his ideas, even though the exact term,

“sub-principle,” is not to be found in Sun’s works. Each of the

three principles can be considered with respect to national unity,

national autonomy, and national survival. The correlation of the

three principles, each with itself and then the two others,

logically leads to the appearance of nine sub-principles. The writer

has not followed any artificial compulsion of numbers, merely for

the sake of producing a pretty outline, but has followed Sun Yat-sen

in seeking to make clear the specific relations of each of the three

principles to the three cardinal points which they embody.

239 d’Elia translation, cited, pp. 179-180.

240 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 180.

241 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 180.

242 Tsui, cited, pp. 113-114.

243 Linebarger, _Conversations_, cited, pp. 21 and following, Book I.

244 Among the persons whom he entrusted with the task of seeking foreign

capital for the just and honorable national development of China

through international means were George Bronson Rea and Paul

Linebarger. Mr. Rea was given a power of attorney by Sun to secure

loans for railway purposes to an unlimited amount. Mr. Rea never

used the document, but kept it among his papers. (Statement of Mr.

Rea to the author in Washington, spring of 1934, at the time that

the former was “Special Counsellor to the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs of Manchoukuo,” despite his former Chinese connections.)

Judge Linebarger was also unsuccessful. Sun Yat-sen was more

interested in having Judge Linebarger stop any assistance offered by

the Consortium to the Northern “Republic of China” than in having

him procure any actual funds.

245 It is obvious that a strong China would be a horrid nightmare to

Japan. Not only would the Chinese thwart the use of their man-power

and natural resources, as stepping stones to Asiatic or world

hegemony; they might even equal the Japanese in audacity, and think

of restoring the Japanese to the position of Chinese vassals which

they had enjoyed in the time of Yoshemitsu, the third Ashikaga

Shogun.

246 Tsui, cited, pp. 115-116.

247 Hu Han-min, cited in Tsui, work cited, p. 118, n. 63.

248 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 152. For a full discussion of this

curious relationship between China and her vassal states, see Djang

Chu (Chang Tso), _The Chinese Suzerainty_, Johns Hopkins University

doctoral dissertation, 1935. The submission to China was, among

other things, a means by which the rulers of the peripheral states

could get themselves recognized by an authority higher than

themselves, thus legitimizing their position.

249 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 153. Sun Yat-sen seems to have had a

high opinion of the American administration of the Philippines,

saying: The United States “... even allows the Filipinos to send

delegations to Congress in Washington. Not only does the United

States require no annual tribute in money from them, but, on the

contrary, she gives the Filipinos considerable subsidies to build

and maintain their roads and to promote education. It seems as

though so humanitarian a treatment would be regarded as the utmost

benevolence. Still, until the present day, the Filipinos do not

boast of being ‘Americanized’; they are daily clamoring for

independence” (d’Elia translation, p. 153). This statement is

interesting in two connections. In the first place, although Sun

Yat-sen had once thought of sending men, money, or munitions to help

the Filipino nationalists in their struggles against the Americans,

he seems to have conceived a warm admiration for the American

administration in those islands. Secondly, the reader may consider

that Sun Yat-sen, at the time that he made this comment, was in the

course of attacking imperialism. If Sun Yat-sen could offer so

enthusiastic an apology for the Americans in the Philippines, it

shows that he must have let the abstract principle ride, and judged

only on the basis of his own observation. To the orthodox Communist

the American rule of the Philippines is peculiarly wicked because of

the American denial of imperialist practises.

250 Some of the older books on China give interesting maps of that

country divided up into spheres of influence between the various

powers. It was quite fashionable among journalists to sketch the

various Chinese possessions of the great powers; the powers never

got around to the partition. The American declaration of the “Open

Door” may have had something to do with this, and the British

enunciation of the same doctrine probably carried weight. For a

time, however, the Europeans seemed quite convinced of the almost

immediate break-up of China into three or four big colonies. Lord

Charles Beresford, a prominent English peer, wrote a work which was

extremely popular; its title was _The Break-Up of China_ (London,

1899).

251 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 93.

252 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 165.

253 d’Elia translation, cited, pp. 165-170.

254 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 170.

255 The Communists envision three types of conflict to be produced by

the contradictions of imperialism: intra-national class war,

international class war, and inter-imperialist war. The first is the

struggle of the proletariat of the whole world against the various

national bourgeois governments; the second, the struggle of the

oppressed peoples, under revolutionary bourgeois or proletarian

leadership, against the oppressions of Western imperialism; and the

last, the conflict of the various imperialist powers with one

another. Sun Yat-sen’s theory agreed definitely with the second

point, the international class war; he seems to have admitted the

probability of class war within the nations of the West, and of

inter-imperialist war, but he did not draw the three types of

conflict together and because of them predicate an Armageddon and a

millenium. His flexible, pragmatic thought never ran to extremes;

although he agreed, more or less distinctly, with the Bolshevik

premises of the three conflicts of the imperialist epoch, he did not

follow them to their conclusion.

256 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 75.

257 d’Elia translation, cited, pp. 148-149.

258 Such works as Lea’s _The Valor of Ignorance_, New York, 1909, and

Stoddard’s _The Rising Tide of Color Against White World Supremacy_,

New York, 1920, make precisely the same sort of statements,

although, of course, they regard the “Saxon” or “Teutonic” race as

the logical master-race of the world. Since Lea was associated for

some time with Sun Yat-sen, accompanying him from Europe to Nanking

in 1911, and undoubtedly had plenty of time to talk with him, it may

be that some of the particular terms used by Sun in this discussion

are those which he may have developed in his probable conversations

with Lea. Nothing more definite than this can be stated.

259 Quoted by Sun in d’Elia translation, cited, p. 138. The remark does

not sound like Lenin. A Communist would not invoke nature, nor would

he count the whole membership of an imperialist nation as

imperialist. The world, to him, is misguided by a tiny handful of

capitalists and traditional ideologues and their hangers-on, not by

the masses of any nation.

260 Note, however, the reference in d’Elia translation, cited, p. 76, or

the Price translation, p. 18. Sun Yat-sen speaks of _international

wars, within_ races, on the lines of social _classes_. He may have

meant international wars within the races and across race lines on

the basis of the oppressed nations of the world fighting the

oppressing nations. He may, however, have meant intra-national class

wars. Since he recognized the presence of the class conflict in the

developed capitalistic states of the West, this would not

necessarily imply his expectation of an intra-national class war in

China.

261 Wittfogel, _Sun Yat-sen_, pp. 331-337, gives the whole text of the

speech. Sharman, _Sun Yat-sen_, p. 304, refers to it.

262 Wittfogel, _Sun Yat-sen_, p. 335. “Es ist gegen Gerechtigkeit und

Menschlichkeit, dass eine Minderheit von vierhundert Millionen eine

Mehrheit von neunhundert Millionen unterdrückt....”

263 Wittfogel, _Sun Yat-sen_, p. 333. “Die Europäer halten uns Asiaten

durch die Macht ihrer materiellen Errungenschaften zu Boden.”

264 Wittfogel, _Sun Yat-sen_, cited, p. 333. “Wenn wir

zweitausendfünf-hundert Jahre zurückdenken, so war China damals das

mächtigste Volk der Welt. Es nahm damals eine Stellung ein wie heute

Grossbritannien und Amerika. Doch während Grossbritannien und die

Vereinigten Staaten heute zur zwei unter einer Reihe von Weltmächten

sind, war China damals die einzige grosse Macht.”

265 Ponce, work cited, p. xiv: “_Conozcámonos y nos amaremos más_—decía

el gran Sun Yat-sen á sus amigos orientales.” This work is, by the

way, the most extensive for its account of Sun’s associations with

Koreans, Filipinos, and Japanese. It has been completely overlooked

by the various biographers of and commentators on Sun, with the

exception of Judge Linebarger, to whom Sun Yat-sen presented a copy

of the work.

266 Wittfogel, _Sun Yat-sen_, p. 337: “In England und Amerika gibt es

immerhin eine kleine Zahl von Menschen, die diese unsere Ideale im

Einklang mit einer allgemeinen Weltbewegung verteidigen. Was die

anderen Barbarennationen anbelangt, so dürfte es auch in ihren

Reihen Menschen geben, die von der gleichen Überzeugung beseelt

sind.”

267 Wittfogel, _Sun Yat-sen_, p. 335: “Wenn wir Asiaten nach der

Herstellung einer panasiatischen Einheitsfront streben, müssen wir

selbst in unserer Zeit daran denken, auf welcher grundlegenden

Auffassung wir diese Einheitsfront errichten wollen. Wir sollen

dasjenige zugrunde legen, was die besondere Eigentümlichkeit unserer

östlichen Kultur gewesen ist, wir sollten unseren Nachdruck legen

auf die moralischen Werte, auf Güte und Gerechtigkeit. Sie sollen

das Fundament der Einheit ganz Asiens werden.”

268 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 207. Italics omitted.

269 The article by Tsui, cited, p. 177 and following, goes into a quite

detailed comparison of the Chinese Nationalist and the Marxian

Communist theories of the three stages of revolution. He draws

attention to the fact that, while the Communists do not speak of

"three stages" and prefer to emphasize the transitional stage of the

dictatorship of the proletariat, the two theories are similar almost

to the point of being identical.

270 Tsui, cited, p. 181.

271 Tyau, cited, p. 439 and following. It is also available in Hsü, _Sun

Yat-sen_, cited above, p. 85 and following. The Tyau translation was

preferred since it was written by an official of the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs, and may be regarded as the work of a Government

spokesman. It is interesting, by way of contrast, to quote a passage

from the Constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic, so-called:

“The Chinese Soviet Government is building up a state of the

democratic dictatorship [sic!] of the workers and peasants. All

power shall be vested in the Soviets of Workers, Peasants, and Red

Army men.” _Fundamental Laws of the Chinese Soviet Republic_, New

York, 1934, p. 18. The absence of an acknowledged period of

tutelage, in view of the unfamiliarity of the Chinese people with

democratic forms, is significant. The constitutional jurisprudence

of the Chinese Communists is, however, primarily a matter of

academic interest, since the Soviets, where they have existed, have

existed in a state of perpetual emergency, shielded by the Red

Terror and other devices of revolutionary control. The contrast

between a pronouncement of Sun Yat-sen and a constitution is a fair

one, since the writings of Sun Yat-sen form the final authority in

the Nationalist movement and government; in a dispute as to the

higher validity of a governmental provision or a flat contrary

statement of Sun Yat-sen, there can be little question as to which

would—or, in the eyes of the Nationalists, should—prevail.

272 It is interesting to note that the institution which most Western

writers would incline to regard as the very key-stone of democracy,

parliament, has a quite inferior place in the Sun Yat-sen system. In

the National Government of China, the Legislative Yuan is more like

a department than like a chamber. This question, however, will be

discussed under the heading of the Five Rights.

273 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 341.

274 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 342.

275 A discussion of the four powers and the five rights is to be found

in Li Chao-wei, _La Souveraineté Nationale d’après la Doctrine

Politique de Sun-Yet-Sin_, Dijon, 1934. This work, a doctoral thesis

submitted to the University of Dijon, treats the Western theory of

democracy and Sun’s theory comparatively. It is excellent in

portraying the legal outline of the Chinese governmental structure,

and points out many significant analogies between the two theories.

276 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 391.

277 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 395.

278 The unfavorable view of the Five Powers is taken by Dr. Jermyn

Chi-hung Lynn in his excellent little book, _Political Parties in

China_, Peiping, 1930. Since Dr. Lynn speaks kindly and hopefully of

the plans of Wu Pei-fu, one of the war-lords hostile to Sun Yat-sen

and the whole Nationalist movement, his criticism of Sun Yat-sen

need not be taken as completely impartial. It represents a point

that has been made time and time again by persons antagonistic to

the _San Min Chu I_.

“The Wu Chuan Hsien Fa is also no discovery of Dr. Sun’s. As is

known, the three power constitution, consisting of the legislative,

judiciary [sic!] and executive functions, was originally developed,

more or less unconsciously, by the English, whose constitution was

critically examined by Montesquieu, and its working elaborately

described by him for the benefit of his fellow-countrymen. And the

unwritten constitution of Old China contained the civil service

examination and an independent Board of Censors. Now the

much-advertised Wu Chuan Hsien Fa or Five-Power constitution only

added the systems of state examination and public censure to the

traditional form of constitution first advocated by the French

jurist.” P. 66, work cited.

279 Hsü translation, cited, p. 104.

280 For an intensively vivid description of this government, which Sun

Yat-sen’s planned democracy was to relegate to limbo, see B. L.

Putnam Weale, _The Vanished Empire_, London, 1926. Putnam Weale was

the pseudonym of Bertram Lennox Simpson, an Englishman born and

reared in China, who understood and participated in Chinese life and

policies as have few since the days of Marco Polo; he was an advisor

to the insurrectionary Peking “Nationalist” Government of 1931 when

he was shot to death in his home at Tientsin. Few other Westerners

have left such a wealth of accurate and sympathetic material about

modern China.

281 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 399.

282 Harold Monk Vinacke, _Modern Constitutional Development in China_,

Princeton, 1920, p. 100.

283 Vinacke, cited, p. 141 and following. While Dr. Vinacke’s book is

now out of date, it contains excellent material for the period

covered, roughly 1898 to 1919. He quotes Morse’s comment on the

provinces with approval: “The Provinces are satrapies to the extent

that so long as the tribute and matriculations are duly paid, and

the general policy of the central administration followed, they are

free to administer their own affairs in detail as may seem best to

their own provincial authorities.” (Hosea Ballou Morse, _The Trade

and Administration of China_, London, 1913, p. 46, quoted in

Vinacke, work cited, p. 5.)

284 Paul M. W. Linebarger, _Conversations with Sun Yat-sen_, mss., 1934;

Book two, Chapter Five, “Democratic Provincial Home Rule.”

285 Hsü, cited, p. 124.

286 Tyau, cited, p. 441. From “The Outline of National Reconstruction.”

287 Tyau, cited, p. 450.

288 V. I. Lenin, _State and Revolution_, New York, 1932. Lenin’s

discussion of Marx’s point, p. 39 and following, is stimulating

although inclining to the ingenious.

289 The number of the villages is taken from Tawney, Richard Henry,

_Land and Labor in China_, London, 1932; and the number of _hsien_

from Tyau, cited, p. 85.

290 Linebarger, _Conversations_, cited above; throughout this volume,

Judge Linebarger recalls references made by Sun Yat-sen to him

concerning the _hsien_.

291 It is but fair to state, at the beginning, that this point of the

family system as one of the institutions of the democratic nation

has been very largely neglected by the Kuomintang and the National

Government. To the knowledge of the author, no plan has ever been

drafted either by Party or by Government which would erect the

system that Sun Yat-sen proposed. It is not beyond all conjecture

that Sun’s suggestion may at a later date seem more practicable to

the leaders than now appears, and be put into operation in some

manner.

292 Hsü, cited, p. 164.

293 Hsü, cited, p. 243.

294 The material concerning the clans has been taken from the fifth

lecture on Nationalism (Hsü, cited, p. 240 and following; d’Elia,

cited, p. 174 and following). Judge Linebarger recorded Sun

Yat-sen’s mention of a convention of the clans in _Conversations_,

cited above, Book One, Chapter Eight, “The Clans in the Nation.”

295 There are three excellent discussions of the _min shêng_ programs.

Wou, cited, gives a clear precis of the doctrine. Hung Jair, _Les

idées économiques de Sun Yat Sen_, Toulouse, 1934, and Tsiang Kuen,

_Les origines économiques et politiques du socialisme de Sun Yat

Sen_, Paris, 1933, cover essentially the same ground, although they

are both doctoral dissertations submitted to French universities.

The former deals primarily with the theory of Sun’s economic ideas,

contrasting them with the economic thought of Adam Smith and of the

Marxians. The latter gives a rather extensive historical and

statistical background to Sun’s _min shêng_, and traces the Chinese

economic system, whence _min shêng_ was derived in part, quite

fully. These authors have covered the field so widely that the

present work need not enter into the discussion of the precise

immediate policies to be advocated under _min shêng_. Enough will be

given to describe the relations of _min shêng_ with the more

formally political principles of nationalism and democracy, and to

afford the reader an opportunity to assess its scope and

significance for himself. The works of Hung Jair, Tsiang Kuen, Wou

Saofong, and Li Ti-tsun all measure _min shêng_ in terms of

classical Western _laissez-faire_ economics and then in terms of

Marxism; they all proceed in considerable detail to recapitulate the

various concrete plans that Sun projected. The present author will

not enter into the minutiae of the problems of clothing, of

transport, of communications, etc., inasmuch as they have already

been dealt with and because they are not directly relevant to the

political or ideological features of Sun’s thought.

296 Tsui, cited, p. 378, n. 125.

_ 297 The International Development of China_ was welcomed as an

interesting fantasy in a world which had not yet heard of the Five

Year Plans and the programs of the New Deal. The fact that Sun

Yat-sen was a few years ahead of his contemporaries gave him the air

of a dreamer, which was scarcely deserved.

298 Hsü translation, “The Outline of National Reconstruction,” p. 85.

Two points of detail may be noted here. In the first place, _min

shêng_ has been emphasized by being placed first, although Sun

Yat-sen generally arranged his principles in their logical order:

nationalism, democracy, _min shêng_. Secondly, _min shêng_, although

emphasized, is dealt with in one single paragraph in this vitally

important document. The question of the _hsien_ is given eight

paragraphs to the one on _min shêng_. This is indicative of the

point stressed above, namely, that Sun Yat-sen, while he was sure of

the importance of _min shêng_, did not believe in hard and fast

rules concerning its development.

299 Work cited, p. 232.

300 See above, p. 180 ff.

301 The author uses the term “national economic revolution” to

distinguish those parts of the _ming shêng chu i_ which treat the

transformation of the Chinese economy in relation to the development

of a nation-state. Obviously, there is a great difference between

the economy of a society regarding itself as ecumenical, and one

faced with the problem of dealing with other equal societies. The

presence of a state implies a certain minimum of state interference

with economic matters; the national economic revolution of Sun

Yat-sen was to give the Chinese economy a national character,

coordinating the economic with the other programs of nationalism.

Hence, the significant stress in the phrase “national economic

revolution” should rest upon the word “national.”

302 Wittfogel, _Sun Yat-sen_, cited, p. 329. “Genossen, die hier

Versammelten sind alle Arbeiter und stellen eine Teil der Nation

dar. Auf den chinesischen Arbeitern lastet eine grosse Verantwortung

und wenn ihr dieser Aufgabe entsprechen werdet, so wird China eine

grosse Nation und ihr eine mächtige Arbeiterklasse.”

303 Wittfogel, _Sun Yat-sen_, p. 329. “Ausser dem wirtschaftlichen Kampf

für die Kürzung des Arbeitstages und die Erhöhung der Löhne stehen

vor Euch noch viel wichtigere Fragen von politischem Charakter. Für

die politischen Ziele müsst ihr meine Drei Prinzipien befolgen und

die Revolution unterstützen.”

304 Putnam Weale, _The Vanished Empire_, London, 1926, pp. 145-147. The

same observation had been made to the Russian ambassador,

Vladislavich, sent by Catherine I to Peking in 1727. The Chinese

said at that time, “ ... that foreign trade had no attraction for

the people, who were amply supplied with all the necessaries of life

from the products of their own country.” Sir Robert K. Douglas,

_Europe and the Far East 1506-1912_, New York, 1913, pp. 28-29.

305 See above, p. 47 ff.

_ 306 International Development_, cited, p. 237.

_ 307 International Development_, p. 12.

_ 308 International Development_, p. 21.

309 Wou Saofong, cited, gives an excellent summary of the plan, pp.

184-202. There is no particular reason, however, why the work by

Sun, which he wrote in fluent and simple English, should not be

consulted. The American edition is so well put together with maps

and outlines that a layman will find it comprehensible and

stimulating.

_ 310 International Development_, pp. 220-221.

_ 311 International Development_, pp. 6-8.

_ 312 International Development_, p. 198.

_ 313 International Development_, p. 199. Sun Yat-sen discussed only two

of these essentials (food, clothing) in his lectures on the _San Min

Chu I_. According to Tai Chi-tao, he was to have continued to speak

on the topics of “Housing,” “Health,” “Death,” “Conclusions on

Livelihood,” and “Conclusions on the San Min Doctrine,” but the only

person who may know what he intended to say on these subjects is

Mme. Sun Yat-sen. (See Hsü translation, “The Basic Literature of

Sunyatsenism,” pp. 39-40.)

314 This is based upon statements made by Judge Linebarger to the

author. According to him, Sun Yat-sen had few of the prejudices of

class, one way or the other, that affect the outlook of so many

Western leaders. He did not believe that the only possible solution

to the problem of livelihood was the Marxian one, and was confident

that the Chinese Nationalists would be able to solve the problem.

This question was to him paramount above all others; the life of the

masses of Chinese citizens was the life of China itself.

_ 315 International Development_, p. 11.

316 The same, p. 11.

317 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 326. The discussion of Bismarck runs

from p. 322 to 326; the length of the discussion shows what Sun

thinks of Bismarck’s acuteness, although he disapproved of

Bismarck’s anti-democratic stand.

_ 318 International Development_, p. 4.

319 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 426.

320 Price translation, pp. 434-435. In the d’Elia translation, pp.

465-466. The Price translation has been quoted in this instance

because Father d’Elia translates _min shêng_ as “the economic

Demism,” which—although interesting when used consistently—might not

be clear in its present context. Sun Yat-sen’s courteous use of the

word “communism,” in view of the Canton-Moscow entente then

existing, has caused a great deal of confusion. The reader may judge

for himself how much Sun’s policy constitutes communism.

321 One or two further points concerning the land policy may be

mentioned. In the first place, it is the land which is to be taxed.

A tax will be applied, according to this theory, on the land, and

the increment will also be confiscated. These are two separate forms

of revenue. Furthermore, lest all land-holders simply surrender

their land to the government, Sun makes clear that his taxation

program applies only to land. It would consequently be quite

advantageous for the owner to keep the land; the buildings on it

would not be affected by the increment-seizure program, and the land

would be worth keeping. “The value of the land as declared at

present by the landowner will still remain the property of each

individual landowner.” (d’Elia translation, p. 466; Father d’Elia’s

note on this page is informing.) The landowner might conceivably put

a mortgage on the land to pay the government the amount of the

unearned increment, and still make a handsome enough profit from the

use of the land to amortize the mortgage.

322 Linebarger, _Conversations_, Book III, p. 25.

323 Wittfogel, _Sun Yat-sen_, p. 328. “Die chinesischen Kapitalisten

sind nicht so stark, dass sie die chinesischen Arbeiter unterdrücken

könnten.”

324 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 469. Italics omitted. For the

discussion of the relation of the program of _min shêng_ to

capitalism, see d’Elia’s various footnotes and appendices dealing

with the subject. Father d’Elia, as a devout Catholic, does a

thorough piece of work in demonstrating that Sun Yat-sen was not a

Bolshevik and not hostile to the Roman Catholic Church, and had a

warm although infrequently expressed admiration for that

organization. Li Ti-tsun, in “The Sunyatsenian Principle of

Livelihood,” cited, tries to find the exact shade of left

orientation in _min shêng_, and digests the main policies. Wou and

Tsui, both cited, also discuss this point.

_ 325 International Development_, pp. 36-39.

326 By an irony of fate, the most conspicuous example of the realization

of any one of these plans was the beginning of the port of Hulutao,

which was to be “The Great Northern Port” of Sun’s vision. The

National Government had already started work on this port when the

Japanese, invading Manchuria, took it. There is so much pathos in

Sun’s own life that this frustation of his plans after his death

seems disappointing beyond words to his followers. In his own trust

in mankind, in the eagerness and the sincerity of his enthusiasms,

in the grandeur of his vision—here are to be found the most vital

clues to the tragedy of Sun Yat-sen. Like the other great founders

of the earth’s ideals, he charted worlds within the vision but,

perhaps, beyond the accomplishment of ordinary men.

327 Hsü translation, cited, p. 440; Price translation, p. 444; d’Elia

translation, cited, p. 476. The first has been preferred purely as a

matter of style. The Chinese words _min shêng_ and _San Min Chu I_

have been used instead of the English renderings which Hsü gives,

again as a pure matter of form and consistency with the text.

328 The author is indebted to Mr. Jên Tai for the clarification of this

ideal of dual continuity—of the family system, preserving the flesh,

and the intellectual tradition, preserving the cultural heritages.

329 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 538.