On July 16, 1918, Marie Spiridonova, in an address delivered in Petrograd,

protested vehemently against the manner in which the Bolshevik government

was departing from the policy it had agreed to maintain with regard to the

land, and going back to the old Social Democratic ideas. She declared that

she had been responsible for the decree of February, which provided for the

socialization of the land. That measure provided for the abolition of

private property in land, and placed all land in the hands of and under the

direction of the peasant communes. It was the old Socialist-Revolutionist

program. But the Bolshevik government had not carried out the law of

February. Instead, it had resorted to the Social Democratic method of

nationalization. In the western governments, she said, "great estates were

being taken over by government departments and were being managed by

officials, on the ground that state control would yield better results than

communal ownership. Under this system the peasants were being reduced to

the state of slaves paid wages by the state. Yet the law provided that

these estates should be divided among the peasant communes to be tilled by

the peasants on a co-operative system."[83] Spiridonova protested against

the attitude of the Bolsheviki toward the peasants, against dividing them

into classes and placing the greater part of them with the bourgeoisie. She

insisted that the peasants be regarded as a single class, co-operating with

the industrial proletariat, yet distinct from it and from the bourgeoisie.

For our present purpose, it does not matter whether the leaders of the

Bolsheviki were right or wrong in their decision that state operation was

better than operation by village co-operatives. Our sole concern here and

now is the fact that they did not keep faith with the section of the

peasants they had won over to their side, and the fact that, as this

incident shows, we cannot regard the formal decrees of the Soviet Republic

as descriptions of realities.

The Bolsheviki remain to-day, as at the beginning, a counter-revolutionary

power imposing its rule upon the great mass of the Russian people by armed

force. There can be little doubt that if a free election could be had

immediately upon the same basis as that on which the Constituent Assembly

was elected--namely, universal, secret, equal, direct suffrage, the

Bolsheviki would be overwhelmingly beaten. There can be little doubt that

the great mass of the peasantry would support, as before, the candidates of

the Socialist-Revolutionary party. It is quite true that some of the

leaders of that party have consented to work with the Bolshevik government.

Compromises have been effected; the Bolsheviki have conciliated the

peasants somewhat, and the latter have, in many cases, sought to make the

best of a bad situation. Many have adopted a passive attitude. But there

can be no greater mistake than to believe that the Bolsheviki have solved

the land question to the satisfaction of the peasants and so won their

allegiance.

VII

This survey of the theories and practices of the Bolsheviki would invite

criticism and distrust if the peace program which culminated in the

shameful surrender to Germany, the "indecent peace" as the Russians call

it, were passed over without mention. And yet there is no need to tell here

a story with which every one is familiar. By that humiliating peace Russia

lost 780,000 square kilometers of territory, occupied by 56,000,000

inhabitants. She lost one-third of her total mileage of railways, amounting

to more than 13,000 miles. She lost, also, 73 per cent. of her iron

production; 89 per cent. of her coal production, and many thousands of

factories of various kinds. These latter included 268 sugar-refineries, 918

textile-factories, 574 breweries, 133 tobacco-factories, 1,685

distilleries, 244 chemical-factories, 615 paper-mills, and 1,073

machine-factories.[84] Moreover, it was not an enduring peace and war

against Germany had to be resumed.

In judging the manner in which the Bolsheviki concluded peace with Germany,

it is necessary to be on guard against prejudice engendered by the war and

its passions. The tragi-comedy of Brest-Litovsk, and the pitiable rôle of

Trotzky, have naturally been linked together with the manner in which

Lenine and his companions reached Russia with the aid of the German

Government, the way in which all the well-known leaders of the Bolsheviki

had deliberately weakened the morale of the troops at the front, and their

persistent opposition to all the efforts of Kerensky to restore the

fighting spirit of the army--all these things combined have convinced many

thoughtful and close observers that the Bolsheviki were in league with the

Germans against the Allies. Perhaps the time is not yet ripe for passing

final judgment upon this matter. Certainly there were ugly-looking

incidents which appeared to indicate a close co-operation with the Germans.

There was, for example, the acknowledged fact that the Bolsheviki on

seizing the power of government immediately entered into negotiations with

the notorious "Parvus," whose rôle as an agent of the German Government is

now thoroughly established. "Parvus" is the pseudonym of one of the most

sinister figures in the history of the Socialist movement, Dr. Alexander

Helfandt. Born at Odessa, of German-Jewish descent, he studied in Germany

and in the early eighteen-nineties attained prominence as a prolific and

brilliant contributor to the German Socialist review, _Die Neue Zeit_. He

was early "exiled" from Russia, but it was suspected by a great many

Socialists that in reality his "exile" was simply a device to cover

employment in the Russian Secret Service as a spy and informer, for which

the prestige he had gained in Socialist circles was a valuable aid. When

the Revolution of 1905 broke out Helfandt returned to Russia under the

terms of the amnesty declared at that time. He at once joined the Leninist

section of the Social Democratic party, the Bolsheviki. A scandal occurred

some time later, when the connection of "Parvus" with the Russian

Government was freely charged against him. Among those who attacked him and

accused him of being an agent-provocateur were Tseretelli, the

Socialist-Revolutionist, and Miliukov, the leader of the Cadets.

Some years later, at the time of the uprisings in connection with the Young

Turk movement, "Parvus" turned up in Constantinople, where he was

presumably engaged in work for the German Government. This was commonly

believed in European political circles, though denied at the time by

"Parvus" himself. One thing is certain, namely, that although he was

notoriously poor when he went there--his financial condition was well known

to his Socialist associates--he returned at the beginning of 1915 a very

rich man. He explained his riches by saying that he had, while at

Constantinople, Bucharest, and Sofia, successfully speculated in war wheat.

He wrote this explanation in the German Socialist paper, _Die Glocke_, and

drew from Hugo Hasse the following observation: "I blame nobody for being

wealthy; I only ask if it is the rôle of a Social Democrat to become a

profiteer of the war."[85] Very soon we find this precious gentleman

settled in Copenhagen, where he established a "Society for Studying the

Social Consequences of the War," which was, of course, entirely pro-German.

This society is said to have exercised considerable influence among the

Russians in Copenhagen and to have greatly influenced many Danish

Socialists to take Germany's side. According to _Pravda_, the Bolshevik

organ, the German Government, through the intermediary of German Social

Democrats, established a working relation with Danish trade-unions and the

Danish Social Democratic party, whereby the Danish unions got the coal

needed in Copenhagen at a figure below the market price. Then the Danish

party sent its leader, Borgdjerg, to Petrograd as an emissary to place

before the Petrograd Soviet the terms of peace of the German Majority

Socialists, which were, of course, the terms of the German Government. We

find "Parvus" at the same time, as he is engaged in this sort of intrigue,

associated with one Furstenberg in shipping drugs into Russia and food from

Russia into Germany.[86] According to Grumbach,[87] he sought to induce

prominent Norwegian Socialists to act as intermediaries to inform certain

Norwegian syndicates that Germany would grant them a monopoly of coal

consignments if the Norwegian Social Democratic press would adopt a more

friendly attitude toward Germany and the Social Democratic members in the

Norwegian parliament would urge the stoppage or the limitation of fish

exports to England.

During this period "Parvus" was bitterly denounced by Plechanov, by

Alexinsky and other Russian Socialists as an agent of the Central Powers.

He was denounced also by Lenine and Trotzky and by _Pravda_. Lenine

described him as "the vilest of bandits and betrayers." It was therefore

somewhat astonishing for those familiar with these facts to read the

following communication, which appeared in the German Socialist press on

November 30, 1917, and, later, in the British Socialist organ, _Justice_:

STOCKHOLM, November 20.--The Foreign Relations Committee

of the Bolsheviki makes the following communication: "The German

comrade, 'Parvus,' has brought to the Bolshevik Committee at

Stockholm the congratulations of the _Parteivorstand_ of the

Majority Social Democrats, who declare their solidarity with the

struggles of the Russian proletariat and with its request to begin

pourparlers immediately on the basis of a democratic peace without

annexations and indemnities. The Foreign Relations Committee of

the Bolsheviki has transmitted these declarations to the Central

Committee at Petrograd, as well as to the Soviets."

When Hugo Hasse questioned Philipp Scheidemann about the negotiations which

were going on through "Parvus," Scheidemann replied that it was the

Bolsheviki themselves who had invited "Parvus" to come to Stockholm for the

purpose of opening up negotiations. This statement was denounced as a lie

by Karl Radek in _Pravda_. Some day, doubtless, the truth will be known;

for the present it is enough to note the fact that as early as November the

Bolsheviki were negotiating through such a discredited agent of the Central

Powers as Dr. Alexander Helfandt, otherwise "Parvus," the well-known

Marxist! Such facts as this, added to those previously noticed, tended

inevitably to strengthen the conviction that Lenine and Trotsky were the

pliant and conscious tools of Germany all the time, and that the protests

of Trotzky at Brest-Litovsk were simply stage-play.

But for all that, unless and until official, documentary evidence is

forthcoming which proves them to have been in such relations with the

German Government and military authorities, they ought not to be condemned

upon the chain of suspicious circumstances, strong as that chain apparently

is. The fact is that they had to make peace, and make it quickly. Kerensky,

had he been permitted to hold on, would equally have had to make a separate

peace, and make it quickly. Only one thing could have delayed that for

long--namely, the arrival of an adequate force of Allied troops on the

Russian front to stiffen the morale and to take the burden of fighting off

from the Russians. Of that there was no sign and no promise or likelihood.

Kerensky knew that he would have had to make peace, at almost any cost and

on almost any terms, if he remained in power. If the Bolsheviki appear in

the light of traitors to the Allies, it should be remembered that pressure

of circumstances would have forced even such a loyal friend of the Allies

as Kerensky certainly proved himself to be to make a separate peace,

practically on Germany's terms, in a very little while. It was not a matter

of months, but of weeks at most, probably of days.

Russia had to have peace. The nation was war-weary and exhausted. The

Allies had not understood the situation--indeed, they never have understood

Russia, even to this day--and had bungled right along. What made it

possible for the Bolsheviki to assert their rule so easily was the fact

that they promised immediate peace, and the great mass of the Russian

workers wanted immediate peace above everything else. They were so eager

for peace that so long as they could get it they cared at the time for

nothing. Literally nothing else mattered. As we have seen, the Bolshevik

leaders had strenuously denied wanting to make a "separate peace." There is

little reason for doubting that they were sincere in this in the sense that

what they wanted was a _general_ peace, if that could be possibly obtained.

Peace they had to have, as quickly as possible. If they could not persuade

their Allies to join with them in making such a general peace, they were

willing to make a _separate_ peace. That is quite different from _wanting_

a separate peace from the first. There was, indeed, in the demand made at

the beginning of December upon the Allies to restate their war aims within

a period of seven days an arrogant and provocative tone which invited the

suspicion that the ultimatum--for such it was--had not been conceived in

good faith; that it was deliberately framed in such a manner as to prevent

compliance by the Allies. And it may well be the fact that Lenine and

Trotzky counted upon the inevitable refusal to convince the Russian people,

and especially the Russian army, that the Allied nations were fighting for

imperialistic ends, just as the Bolsheviki had always charged. The

Machiavellian cunning of such a policy is entirely characteristic of the

conspirator type.

On December 14th the armistice was signed at Brest-Litovsk, to last for a

period of twenty-eight days. On December 5th, the Bolsheviki had published

the terms upon which they desired to effect the armistice. These terms,

which the Germans scornfully rejected, provided that the German forces

which had been occupied on the Russian front should not be sent to other

fronts to fight against the Allies, and that the German troops should

retire from the Russian islands held by them. In the armistice as it was

finally signed at Brest-Litovsk there was a clause which, upon its face,

seemed to prove that Trotzky had kept faith with the Allies. The clause

provided that there should be no transfer of troops by either side, for the

purpose of military operations, during the armistice, from the front

between the Baltic and the Black Sea. This, however, was, from the German

point of view, merely a _pro forma_ arrangement, a "scrap of paper."

Grumbach wrote to _L'Humanité_ that on December 20th Berlin was full of

German soldiers from the Russian front en route to the western front. He

said that he had excellent authority for saying that this had been called

to the attention of Lenine and Trotzky by the Independent Social Democrats,

but that, "nevertheless, they diplomatically shut their eyes."[88] It is

more than probable that, in the circumstances, neither Lenine nor Trotzky

cared much if at all for such a breach of the terms of the armistice, but,

had their attitude been otherwise, what could they have done? They were as

helpless as ever men were in the world, as subsequent events proved.

As one reads the numerous declamatory utterances of Trotzky in those

critical days of early December, 1917, the justice of Lenine's scornful

description of his associate as a "man who blinds himself with

revolutionary phrases" becomes manifest. It is easy to understand the

strained relations that existed between the two men. His "neither war nor

peace" gesture--it was no more!--his dramatic refusal to sign the stiffened

peace terms, his desire to call all Russia to arms again to fight the

Germans, his determination to create a vast "Red Army" to renew the war

against Germany, and his professed willingness to "accept the services of

American officers in training that army," all indicated a mind given to

illusions and stone blind to realities. Lenine at least knew that the game

was up. He knew that the game into which he had so coolly entered when he

left Switzerland, and which he had played with all his skill and cunning,

was at an end and that the Germans had won. The Germans behaved with a

perfidy that is unmatched in modern history, disregarded the armistice they

had signed, and savagely hurled their forces against the defenseless,

partially demobilized and trusting Russians. There was nothing left for the

Bolsheviki to do. They had delivered Russia to the Germans. In March the

"indecent peace" was signed, with what result we know. Bolshevism had been

the ally of Prussian militarism. Consciously or unconsciously, willingly or

unwillingly, Lenine, Trotzky, and the other Bolshevik leaders had done all

that men could do to make the German military lords masters of the world.

Had there been a similar movement in France, England, the United States, or

even Italy, to-day the Hohenzollerns and Habsburgs would be upon their

thrones, realizing the fulfilment of the Pan-German vision.

VIII

In view of the fact that so many of our American pacifists have glorified

the Bolsheviki, it may be well to remind them, if they have forgotten, or

to inform them, if they do not know it, that their admiration is by no

means reciprocated. Both Lenine and Trotzky have spoken and written in

terms of utter disdain of pacifist movements in general and of the

pacifists of England and America in particular. They have insisted that,

_in present society_, disarmament is really a reactionary proposal. The

inclusion in the Constitution, which they have forced upon Russia by armed

might, of _permanent universal compulsory military service_ is not by

accident. They believe that only when all nations have become Socialist

nations will it be a proper policy for Socialists to favor disarmament. It

would be interesting to know how our American admirers and defenders of

Bolshevism, who are all anti-conscriptionists and ultra-pacifists, so far

as can be discovered, reconcile their position with that of the Bolsheviki

who base their state, not as a temporary expedient, _but as a matter of

principle_, upon universal, compulsory military service! What, one wonders,

do these American Bolsheviki worshipers think of the teaching of these

paragraphs from an article by Lenine?[89]

Disarmament is a Socialistic ideal. In Socialist society there

will be no more wars, which means that disarmament will have been

realized. But he is not a Socialist who expects the realization of

Socialism _without_ the social revolution and the dictatorship of

the proletariat. Dictatorship is a government power, depending

directly upon force, and, in the twentieth century, force means,

not fists and clubs, but armies. To insert "disarmament" into our

program is equivalent to saying, we are opposed to the use of

arms. But such a statement would contain not a grain of Marxism,

any more than would the equivalent statement, we are opposed to

the use of force.

* * * * *

_A suppressed class which has no desire to learn the use of arms,

and to bear arms, deserves nothing else than to be treated as

slaves_. We cannot, unless we wish to transform ourselves into

mere bourgeois pacifists, forget that we are living in a society

based on classes, and that there is no escape from such a society,

except by the class struggle and the overthrow of the power of the

ruling class.

In every class society, whether it be based on slavery, serfdom,

or, as at the present moment, on wage-labor, the class of the

oppressors is an armed class. Not only the standing army of the

present day, but also the present-day popular militia--even in the

most democratic bourgeois republics, as in Switzerland--means an

armament of the bourgeoisie against the proletariat....

How can you, in the face of this fact, ask the revolutionary

Social Democracy to set up the "demand" of "disarmament"? _To ask

this is to renounce completely the standpoint of the class

struggle, to give up the very thought of revolution_. Our

watchword must be: to arm the proletariat so that it may defeat,

expropriate, and disarm the bourgeoisie. This is the only possible

policy of the revolutionary class, a policy arising directly from

the _actual evolution_ of capitalistic militarism, in fact,

dictated by the evolution. Only after having disarmed the

bourgeoisie can the proletariat, without betraying its historic

mission, cast all weapons to the scrap-heap; and there is no doubt

that the proletariat will do this, but only then, and not by any

possibility before then.

How is it possible for our extreme pacifists, with their relentless

opposition to military force in all its forms to conscription, to universal

military service, to armaments of all kinds, even for defensive purposes,

and to voluntarily enlisted armies even, to embrace Bolshevism with

enthusiasm, resting as it does upon the basis of the philosophy so frankly

stated by Lenine, is a question for which no answer seems wholly adequate.

Of course, what Lenine advocates is class armament within the nation, for

civil war--the war of the classes. But he is not opposed to national

armaments, as such, nor willing to support disarmament as a national policy

_until the time comes when an entirely socialized humanity finds itself

freed from the necessity of arming against anybody_. There is probably not

a militarist in America to-day who, however bitterly opposed to disarmament

as a present policy, would not agree that if, in some future time, mankind

reaches the happy condition of universal Socialism, disarmament will then

become practicable and logical. It would not be difficult for General Wood

to subscribe to that doctrine, I think. It would not have been difficult

for Mr. Roosevelt to subscribe to it.

Not only is Lenine willing to support national armaments, and even to fight

for the defense of national rights, whenever an attack on these is also an

attack on proletarian rights--which he believes to be the case in the

continued war against Germany, he goes much farther than this _and provides

a theoretical justification for a Socialist policy of passive acceptance of

ever-increasing militarism_. He draws a strangely forced parallel between

the Socialist attitude toward the trusts and the attitude which ought to be

taken toward armaments. We know, he argues, that trusts bring great evils.

Against the evils we struggle, but how? Not by trying to do away with the

trusts, for we regard the trusts as steps in progress. We must go onward,

through the trust system to Socialism. In a similar way we should not

deplore "the militarization of the populations." If the bourgeoisie

militarizes all the men, and all the boys, nay, even all the women, why--so

much the better! "Never will the women of an oppressed class that is really

revolutionary be content" to demand disarmament. On the contrary, they will

encourage their sons to bear the arms and "learn well the business of war."

Of course, this knowledge they will use, "not in order that they may shoot

at their brothers, the workers of other countries, as they are doing in the

present war ... but in order that they may struggle against the bourgeoisie

in their own country, in order that they may put an end to exploitation,

poverty, and war, not by the path of good-natured wishes, but by the path

of victory over the bourgeoisie and of disarmament of the bourgeoisie."[90]

Universally the working class has taken a position the

very opposite of this. Universally we find the organized working class

favoring disarmament, peace agreements, and covenants in general opposing

extensions of what Lenine describes as "the militarization of populations."

For this universality of attitude and action there can only be one adequate

explanation--namely, the instinctive class consciousness of the workers.

But, according to Lenine, this instinctive class consciousness is all

wrong; somehow or other it expresses itself in a "bourgeois" policy. The

workers ought to welcome the efforts of the ruling class to militarize and

train in the arts of war not only the men of the nations, but the boys and

even the women as well. Some day, if this course be followed, there will be

two great armed classes in every nation and between these will occur the

decisive war which shall establish the supremacy of the most numerous and

powerful class. Socialism is thus to be won, not by the conquests of reason

and of conscience, but by brute force.

Obviously, there is no point of sympathy between this brutal and arrogant

gospel of force and the striving of modern democracy for the peaceful

organization of the world, for disarmament, a league of nations, and, in

general, the supplanting of force of arms by the force of reason and

morality. There is a Prussian quality in Lenine's philosophy. He is the

Treitschke of social revolt, brutal, relentless, and unscrupulous, glorying

in might, which is, for him, the only right. And that is what characterizes

the whole Bolshevik movement: it is the infusion into the class strife and

struggles of the world the same brutality and the same faith that might is

right which made Prussian militarism the menace it was to civilization.

And just as the world of civilized mankind recognized Prussian militarism

as its deadly enemy, to be overcome at all costs, so, too, Bolshevism must

be overcome. And that can best be done, not by attempting to drown it in

blood, but by courageously and consistently setting ourselves to the task

of removing the social oppression, the poverty, and the servitude which

produce the desperation of soul that drives men to Bolshevism. The remedy

for Bolshevism is a sane and far-reaching program of constructive social

democracy.

POSTSCRIPTUM: A PERSONAL STATEMENT

This book is the fulfilment of a promise to a friend. Soon after my return

from Europe, in November, I spent part of a day in New York discussing

Bolshevism with two friends. One of these is a Russian Socialist, who has

lived many years in America, a citizen of the United States, and a man

whose erudition and fidelity to the working-class movement during many

years have long commanded my admiration and reverence. The other friend is

a native American, also a Socialist. A sincere Christian, he has identified

his faith in the religion of Jesus and his faith in democratic Socialism.

The two are not conflicting forces, or even separate ones, but merely

different and complementary aspects of the same faith. He is a man who is

universally loved and honored for his nobility of character and his

generous idealism. While in Europe I had spent much time consulting with

Russian friends in Paris, Rome, and other cities, and had collected a

considerable amount of authentic material relating to Bolshevism and the

Bolsheviki. I had not the slightest intention of using this material to

make a book; in fact, my plans contemplated a very different employment of

my time. But, in the course of the discussion, my American Socialist friend

asked me to "jot down" for him some of the things I had said, and,

especially, to write, in a letter, what I believed to be the psychology of

Bolshevism. This, in an unguarded moment, I undertook to do.

When I set out, a few days later, to redeem my promise, I found that, in

order to make things intelligible, it was absolutely necessary to explain

the historical backgrounds of the Russian revolutionary movement, to

describe the point of view of various persons and groups with some detail,

and to quote quite extensively from the documentary material I had

gathered. Naturally, the limits of a letter were quickly outgrown and I

found that my response to my friend's innocent request approached the

length of a small volume. Even so, it was quite unsatisfactory. It left

many things unexplained and much of my own thought obscure. I decided then

to rewrite the whole thing and make a book of it, thus making available for

what I hope will be a large number of readers what I had at first intended

only for a dear friend.

I am very conscious of the imperfections of the book as it stands. It has

been written under conditions far from favorable, crowded into a very busy

life. My keenest critics will, I am sure, be less conscious of its defects

than I am. It is, however, an earnest contribution to a very important

discussion, and, I venture to hope, with all its demerits, a useful one. If

it aids a single person to a clearer comprehension of the inherent

wrongfulness of the Bolshevist philosophy and method, I shall be rewarded.

* * * * *

_So here, my dear Will, is the fulfilment of my promise._

APPENDICES

I. AN APPEAL TO THE PROLETARIAT BY THE PETROGRAD WORKMEN'S AND

SOLDIERS' COUNCIL

II. HOW THE RUSSIAN PEASANTS FOUGHT FOR A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY--A

REPORT TO THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST BUREAU

III. FORMER SOCIALIST PREMIER OF FINLAND ON BOLSHEVISM

APPENDIX I

AN APPEAL TO THE PROLETARIAT BY THE PETROGRAD WORKMEN'S AND SOLDIERS'

COUNCIL

COMRADES:

_Proletarians and Working-people of all Countries_:

We, Russian workers and soldiers, united in the Petrograd Workmen's and

Soldiers' Delegate Council, send you our warmest greetings and the news of

great events. The democracy of Russia has overthrown the century-old

despotism of the Czars and enters your ranks as a rightful member and as a

powerful force in the battle for our common liberation. Our victory is a

great victory for the freedom and democracy of the world. The principal

supporter of reaction in the world, the "gendarme of Europe," no longer

exists. May the earth over his grave become a heavy stone! Long live

liberty, long live the international solidarity of the proletariat and its

battle for the final victory!

Our cause is not yet entirely won. Not all the shadows of the old régime

have been scattered and not a few enemies are gathering their forces

together against the Russian Revolution. Nevertheless, our conquests are

great. The peoples of Russia will express their will in the Constitutional

convention which is to be called within a short time upon the basis of

universal, equal, direct, and secret suffrage. And now it may already be

said with certainty in advance that the democratic republic will triumph in

Russia. The Russian people is in possession of complete political liberty.

Now it can say an authoritative word about the internal self-government of

the country and about its foreign policy. And in addressing ourselves to

all the peoples who are being destroyed and ruined in this terrible war, we

declare that the time has come in which the decisive struggle against the

attempts at conquest by the governments of all the nations must be begun.

The time has come in which the peoples must take the matter of deciding the

questions of war and peace into their own hands.

Conscious of its own revolutionary strength, the democracy of Russia

declares that it will fight with all means against the policy of conquest

of its ruling classes, and it summons the peoples of Europe to united,

decisive action for peace. We appeal to our brothers, to the

German-Austrian coalition, and above all to the German proletariat. The

first day of the war you were made to believe that in raising your weapons

against absolutist Russia you were defending European civilization against

Asiatic despotism. In this many of you found the justification of the

support that was accorded to the war. Now also this justification has

vanished. Democratic Russia cannot menace freedom and civilization.

We shall firmly defend our own liberty against all reactionary threats,

whether they come from without or within. The Russian Revolution will not

retreat before the bayonets of conquerors, and it will not allow itself to

be trampled to pieces by outside military force. We call upon you to throw

off the yoke of your absolutist régime, as the Russian people has shaken

off the autocracy of the Czars. Refuse to serve as the tools of conquest

and power in the hands of the kings, Junkers, and bankers, and we shall,

with common efforts, put an end to the fearful butchery that dishonors

humanity and darkens the great days of the birth of Russian liberty.

Working-men of all countries! In fraternally stretching out our hands to

you across the mountains of our brothers' bodies, across the sea of

innocent blood and tears, across the smoking ruins of cities and villages,

across the destroyed gifts of civilization, we summon you to the work of

renewing and solidifying international unity. In that lies the guaranty of

our future triumph and of the complete liberation of humanity.

Working-men of all countries, unite!

TCHCHEIDZE, _the President_.

PETROGRAD, _April, 1917_.

APPENDIX II

HOW THE RUSSIAN PEASANTS FOUGHT FOR A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY[91]

A report to the International Socialist Bureau by Inna Rakitnikov,

Vice-President of the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Delegates,

placing themselves upon the grounds of the defense of the Constituent

Assembly.

With a letter-preface by the citizen, E. Roubanovitch, member of the

International Socialist Bureau.

_To the Executive Committee of the International Socialist

Bureau_:

DEAR COMRADES,--The citizen Inna Rakitnikov has lately

come from Petrograd to Paris for personal reasons that are

peculiarly tragic. At the time of her departure the Executive

Committee of the Second Soviet of Peasant Delegates of All-Russia,

of which she is one of the vice-presidents, requested her to make

to the International Socialist Bureau a detailed report of the

fights that this organization had to make against the Bolsheviki

in order to realize the convocation of the Constituent Assembly.

This is the report under the title of a document that I present

here, without commentary, asking you to communicate it without

delay to all the sections of the International. Two words of

explanation, only: First, I wish to draw your attention to the

fact that this is the second time that the Executive Committee of

the Soviet of the Peasants of All-Russia addresses itself publicly

to the International.

At the time of my journey to Stockholm in the month of September,

1917, I made, at a session of the Holland, Scandinavian committee,

presided over by Branting, a communication in the name of the

Executive Committee of the Soviet of Peasants. I handed over on

this occasion to our secretary, Camille Huysmans, an appeal to the

democrats of the entire world, in which the Executive Committee

indicated clearly its position in the questions of the world war

and of agrarian reform, and vindicated its place in the Workers'

and Socialist International family.

I must also present to you the author of this report. The citizen

Rakitnikov, a member of the Russian Revolutionary Socialist party,

has worked for a long time in the ranks of this party as a

publicist and organizer and propagandist, especially among the

peasants. She has known long years of prison, of Siberia, of

exile. Before and during the war until the beginning of the

Revolution she lived as a political fugitive in Paris. While being

a partizan convinced of the necessity of national defense of

invaded countries against the imperialistic aggression of German

militarism--in which she is in perfect accord with the members of

our party such as Stepan Sletof, Iakovlef, and many other

voluntary Russian republicans, all dead facing the enemy in the

ranks of the French army--the citizen Rakitnikov belonged to the

international group. I affirm that her sincere and matured

testimony cannot be suspected of partizanship or of dogmatic

partiality against the Bolsheviki, who, as you know, tried to

cover their follies and their abominable crimes against the plan

of the Russian people, and against all the other Socialist

parties, under the lying pretext of internationalist ideas, ideas

which they have, in reality, trampled under foot and betrayed.

Yours fraternally,

E. ROUBANOVITCH,

_June 28, 1918._

_Member of the B.S.I._

"The Bolsheviki who promised liberty, equality, peace, etc., have not been

ashamed to follow in the footsteps of Czarism. It is not liberty; it is

tyranny." (Extract from a letter of a young Russian Socialist, an

enthusiast of liberty who died all too soon.)

I

_Organization of the Peasants after the Revolution in Soviets of Peasant

Delegates_

A short time after the Revolution of February the Russian peasants grouped

themselves in a National Soviet of Peasant Delegates at the First Congress

of the Peasants of All-Russia, which took place at Petrograd. The Executive

Committee of this Soviet was elected. It was composed of well-known leaders

of the Revolutionary Socialist party and of peasant delegates sent from the

country. Without adhering officially to the Revolutionary Socialist party,

the Soviet of Peasant Delegates adopted the line of conduct of this party.

While co-ordinating its tactics with the party's, it nevertheless remained

an organization completely independent. The Bolsheviki, who at this

Congress attempted to subject the peasants to their influence, had not at

the time any success. The speeches of Lenine and the other members of this

party did not meet with any sympathy, but on the contrary provoked lively

protest. The Executive Committee had as its organ the paper _Izvestya of

the National Soviet of Peasant Delegates_. Thousands of copies of this were

scattered throughout the country. Besides the central national Soviet there

existed local organizations, the Soviets, the government districts who were

in constant communication with the Executive Committee staying at

Petrograd.

From its foundation the Executive Committee exercised great energy in the

work of the union and the organization of the peasant masses, and in the

development of the Socialist conscience in their breasts. Its members

spread thousands and hundreds of thousands of copies of pamphlets of the

Revolutionary Socialist party, exposing in simple form the essence of

Socialism and the history of the International explaining the sense and the

importance of the Revolution in Russia, the history of the fight that

preceded it, showing the significance of the liberties acquired. They

insisted, above all, on the importance of the socialization of the soil and

the convocation of the Constituent Assembly. A close and living tie was

created between the members of the Executive Committee staying at Petrograd

and the members in the provinces. The Executive Committee was truly the

expression of the will of the mass of the Russian peasants.

The Minister of Agriculture and the principal agrarian committee were at

this time occupied in preparing the groundwork of the realization of

socialization of the soil; the Revolutionary Socialist party did not cease

to press the government to act in this sense. Agrarian committees were

formed at once to fight against the disorganized recovery of lands by the

peasants, and to take under their control large properties where

exploitation based on the co-operative principle was in progress of

organization; agricultural improvements highly perfected would thus be

preserved against destruction and pillage. At the same time agrarian

committees attended to a just distribution among the peasants of the lands

of which they had been despoiled.

The peasants, taken in a body, and in spite of the agrarian troubles which

occurred here and there, awaited the reform with patience, understanding

all the difficulties which its realization required and all the

impossibilities of perfecting the thing hastily. The Executive Committee of

the Soviet of Peasants' Delegates played in this respect an important rôle.

It did all it could to explain to the peasants the complexity of the

problem in order to prevent them from attempting anything anarchistic, or

to attempt a disorganized recovery of lands which could end only with the

further enrichment of peasants who were already rich.

Such was, in its general aspect, the action of the National Soviet of

Peasants' Delegates, which, in the month of August, 1917, addressed,

through the intermediary of the International Socialist Bureau, an appeal

to the democracies of the world. In order to better understand the events

which followed, we must consider for a moment the general conditions which

at that time existed in Russia, and in the midst of which the action of

this organization was taking place.

II

_The Difficulties of the Beginning of the Revolution_

The honeymoon of the Revolution had passed rapidly. Joy gave place to cares

and alarms. Autocracy had bequeathed to the country an unwieldy heritage:

the army and the whole mechanism of the state were disorganized. Taking

advantage of the listlessness of the army, the Bolshevist propaganda

developed and at the same time increased the desire of the soldiers to

fight no more. The disorganization was felt more and more at the front; at

the same time anarchy increased in the interior of the country; production

diminished; the productiveness of labor was lowered, and an eight-hour day

became in fact a five or six-hour day. The strained relations between the

workers and the administration were such that certain factories preferred

to close. The central power suffered frequent crises; the Cadets, fearing

the responsibilities, preferred to remain out of power.

All this created a state of unrest and hastened the preparations for the

election of the Constituent Assembly, toward which the eyes of the whole

country were turned. Nevertheless, the country was far from chaos and from

the anarchy into which further events plunged it. Young Russia, not

accustomed to liberty, without experience in political life and autonomous

action, was far from that hopeless state to which the Bolsheviki reduced it

some months later. The people had confidence in the Socialists, in the

Revolutionary Socialist party, which then held sway everywhere, in the

municipalities, the zemstvos, and in the Soviets; they had confidence in

the Constituent Assembly which would restore order and work out the laws.

All that was necessary was to combat certain characteristics and certain

peculiarities of the existence of the Russian people, which impelled them

toward anarchy, instead of encouraging them, as did the Bolsheviki, who, in

this respect, followed the line of least resistance.

The Bolshevist propaganda did all within its power to weaken the

Provisional Government, to discredit it in the eyes of the people, to

increase the licentiousness at the front and disorganization in the

interior of the country. They proclaimed that the "Imperialists" sent the

soldiers to be massacred, but what they did not say is that under actual

conditions it was necessary for a revolutionary people to have a

revolutionary army to defend its liberty. They spoke loudly for a

counter-revolution and for counter-revolutionaries who await but the

propitious moment to take hold of the government, while in reality the

complete failure of the insurrection of Kornilov showed that the

counter-revolution could rest on nothing, that there was no place for it

then in the life of Russia.

In fine, the situation of the country was difficult, but not critical. The

united efforts of the people and all the thousands of forces of the country

would have permitted it to come to the end of its difficulties and to find

a solution of the situation.

III

_The Insurrection of Kornilov_

But now the insurrection of Kornilov broke out. It was entirely unexpected

by all the Socialist parties, by their central committees, and, of course,

by the Socialist Ministers. Petrograd was in no way prepared for an attack

of this kind. In the course of the evening of the fatal day when Kornilov

approached Petrograd, the central committee of the Revolutionary Socialist

party received by telephone, from the Palace of Hiver, the news of the

approach of Kornilovien troops. This news revolutionized everybody. A

meeting of all the organizations took place at Smolny; the members of the

party alarmed by the news, and other persons wishing to know the truth

about the events, or to receive indications as to what should be done, came

there to a reunion. It was a strange picture that Smolny presented that

night. The human torrent rushed along its corridors, committees and

commissions sat in its side apartments. They asked one another what was

happening, what was to be done. News succeeded news. One thing was certain.

Petrograd was not prepared for the fight. It was not protected by anything,

and the Cossacks who followed Kornilov could easily take it.

The National Soviet of Peasants' Delegates in the session that it held that

same night at No. 6 Fontaka Street adopted a resolution calling all the

peasants to armed resistance against Kornilov. The Central Executive

Committee with the Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates established

a special organization which was to defend Petrograd and to fight against

the insurrection. Detachments of volunteers and of soldiers were directed

toward the locality where Kornilov was, to get information and to organize

a propaganda among the troops that followed the General, and in case of

failure to fight hand to hand. As they quit in the morning they did not

know how things would turn; they were rather pessimistic with regard to the

issue of the insurrection for the Socialists.

The end of this conspiracy is known. The troops that followed Kornilov left

him as soon as they found out the truth. In this respect, everything ended

well, but this event had profound and regrettable circumstances.

The acute deplorable crisis of the central power became chronic. The

Cadets, compromised by their participation in the Kornilov conspiracy,

preferred to remain apart. The Socialist-Revolutionists did not see clearly

what there was at the bottom of the whole affair. _It was as much as any

one knew at the moment_. Kerensky, in presence of the menace of the

counter-revolution on the right and of the growing anarchy on the extreme

left, would have called to Petrograd a part of the troops from the front to

stem the tide. Such was the rôle of different persons in this story. It is

only later, when all the documents will be shown, that the story can be

verified, but at all events it is beyond doubt that the Revolutionary

Socialist party was in no wise mixed in this conspiracy. The conspiracy of

Kornilov completely freed the hands of the Bolsheviki. In the Pravda, and

in other Bolshevist newspapers, complaints were read of the danger of a new

counter-revolution which was developing with the complicity of Kerensky

acting in accord or in agreement with the traitor Cadets. The public was

excited against the Socialist-Revolutionists, who were accused of having

secretly helped this counter-revolution. The Bolsheviki alone, said its

organs, had saved the Revolution; to them alone was due the failure of the

Kornilov insurrection.

The Bolsheviki agitation assumed large proportions. Copies of the _Pravda_,

spread lavishly here and there, were poisoned with calumny, campaigns

against the other parties, boasting gross flatteries addressed to the

soldiers and appeals to trouble. Bolsheviki meetings permeated with the

same spirit were organized at Petrograd, Moscow, and other cities.

Bolshevist agitators set out for the front at the same time with copies of

the _Pravda_ and other papers, and the Bolsheviki enjoyed, during this

time--as Lenine himself admits--complete liberty. Their chiefs, compromised

in the insurrection of June 3d, had been given their freedom.

Their principal watchword was "Down with the war!" "Kerensky and the other

conciliators," they cried, "want war and do not want peace. Kerensky will

give you neither peace, nor land, nor bread, nor Constituent Assembly. Down

with the traitor and the counter-revolutionists! They want to smother the

Revolution. We demand peace. We will give you peace, land to the peasants,

factories and work to the workmen!" Under this simple form the agitation

was followed up among the masses and found a propitious ground, first among

the soldiers who were tired of war and athirst for peace. In the Soviet of

the Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates of Petrograd the Bolshevist party

soon found itself strengthened and fortified. Its influence was also

considerable among the sailors of the Baltic fleet. Cronstadt was entirely

in their hands. New elections of the Central Executive Committee of the

Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates soon became necessary; they

gave a big majority to the Bolsheviki. The old bureau, Tchcheidze at its

head, had to leave; the Bolsheviki triumphed clamorously.

To fight against the Bolsheviki the Executive Committee of the National

Soviet of Peasants' Delegates decided at the beginning of December to call

a Second General Peasants' Congress. This was to decide if the peasants

would defend the Constituent Assembly or if they would follow the

Bolsheviki. This Congress had, in effect, a decisive importance. It showed

what was the portion of the peasant class that upheld the Bolsheviki. It

was principally the peasants in soldiers' dress, the "déclassé soldiers,"

men taken from the country life by the war, from their natural

surroundings, and desiring but one thing, the end of the war. The peasants

who had come from the country had, on the contrary, received the mandate to

uphold the Constituent Assembly. They firmly maintained their point of view

and resisted all the attempts of the Bolsheviki and the

"Socialist-Revolutionists of the Left" (who followed them blindly) to make

their influence prevail. The speech of Lenine was received with hostility;

as for Trotzky, who, some time before, had publicly threatened with the

guillotine all the "enemies of the Revolution," they prevented him from

speaking, crying out: "Down with the tyrant! Guillotineur! Assassin!" To

give his speech Trotzky, accompanied by his faithful "capotes," was obliged

to repair to another hall.

The Second Peasants' Congress was thus distinctly split into two parties.

The Bolsheviki tried by every means to elude a straight answer to the

question, "Does the Congress wish to uphold the Constituent Assembly?" They

prolonged the discussion, driving the peasants to extremities by every kind

of paltry discussion on foolish questions, hoping to tire them out and thus

cause a certain number of them to return home. The tiresome discussions

carried on for ten days, with the effect that a part of the peasants,

seeing nothing come from it, returned home. But the peasants had, in spite

of all, the upper hand; by a roll-call vote 359 against 314 pronounced

themselves for the defense without reserve of the Constituent Assembly.

Any work in common for the future was impossible. The fraction of the

peasants that pronounced itself for the Constituent Assembly continued to

sit apart, named its Executive Committee, and decided to continue the fight

resolutely. The Bolsheviki, on their part, took their partizans to the

Smolny, declared to be usurpers of the Soviet of Peasants' Delegates who

pronounced themselves for the defense of the Constituante, and, with the

aid of soldiers, ejected the former Executive Committee from their premises

and took possession of their goods, the library, etc.

The new Executive Committee, which did not have at its disposition Red

Guards, was obliged to look for another place, to collect the money

necessary for this purpose, etc. Its members were able, with much

difficulty, to place everything upon its feet and to assure the

publication of an organ (the _Izvestya_ of the National Soviet of Peasants'

Delegates determined to defend the Constituent Assembly), to send delegates

into different regions, and to establish relations with the provinces, etc.

Together with the peasants, workmen and Socialist parties and numerous

democratic organizations prepared themselves for the defense of the

Constituent Assembly: The Union of Postal Employees, a part of the Union of

Railway Workers, the Bank Employees, the City Employees, the food

distributors' organizations, the teachers' associations, the zemstvos, the

co-operatives. These organizations believed that the _coup d'état_ of

October 25th was neither legal nor just; they demanded a convocation with

brief delay of the Constituent Assembly and the restoration of the

liberties that were trampled under foot by the Bolsheviki.

These treated them as _saboteurs_, "enemies of the people," deprived them

of their salaries, and expelled them from their lodgings. They ordered

those who opposed them to be deprived of their food-cards. They published

lists of strikers, thus running the risk of having them lynched by the

crowds. At Saratov, for example, the strike of postal workers and

telegraphers lasted a month and a half. The institutions whose strike would

have entailed for the population not only disorganization, but an arrest of

all life (such as the railroads, the organizations of food distributers),

abstained from striking, only asking the Bolsheviki not to meddle with

their work. Sometimes, however, the gross interference of the Bolsheviki in

work of which they understood nothing obliged those opposed to them, in

spite of everything, to strike. It is to be noted also that the professors

of secondary schools were obliged to join the strike movements (the

superior schools had already ceased to function at this time) as well as

the theatrical artistes: a talented artist, Silotti, was arrested; he

declared that even in the time of Czarism nobody was ever uneasy on

account of his political opinions.

IV

_The Bolsheviki and the Constituent Assembly_

At the time of the accomplishment of their _coup d'état_, the Bolsheviki

cried aloud that the ministry of Kerensky put off a long time the

convocation of the Constituante (which was a patent lie), that they would

never call the Assembly, and that they alone, the Bolsheviki, would do it.

But according as the results of the elections became known their opinions

changed.

In the beginning they boasted of their electoral victories at Petrograd and

Moscow. Then they kept silent, as if the elections had no existence

whatever. But the _Pravda_ and the _Izvestya_ of the Soviet of Workmen's

and Soldiers' Delegates continued to treat as caluminators those who

exposed the danger that was threatening the Constituent Assembly at the

hands of the Bolsheviki. They did not yet dare to assert themselves openly.

They had to gain time to strengthen their power. They hastily followed up

peace pourparlers, to place Russia and the Constituent Assembly, if this

met, before an accomplished fact.

They hastened to attract the peasants to themselves. That was the reason

which motived the "decree" of Lenine on the socialization of the soil,

which decree appeared immediately after the _coup d'état_. This decree was

simply a reproduction of a Revolutionary Socialists' resolution adopted at

a Peasants' Congress. What could the socialization of the soil be to Lenine

and all the Bolsheviki in general? They had been, but a short time before,

profoundly indifferent with regard to this Socialist-Revolutionist

"Utopia." It had been for them an object of raillery. But they knew that

without this "Utopia" they would have no peasants. And they threw them

this mouthful, this "decree," which astonished the peasants. "Is it a law?

Is it not a law? Nobody knows," they said.

It is the same desire to have, cost what it may, the sympathy of the

peasants that explains the union of the Bolsheviki with those who are

called the "Socialist-Revolutionists of the Left" (for the name

Socialist-Revolutionist spoke to the heart of the peasant), who played the

stupid and shameful rôle of followers of the Bolsheviki, with a blind

weapon between their hands.

A part of the "peasants in uniform" followed the Bolsheviki to Smolny. The

Germans honored the Bolsheviki by continuing with them the pourparlers for

peace. The Bolshevist government had at its disposal the Red Guards, well

paid, created suddenly in the presence of the crumbling of the army for

fear of remaining without the help of bayonets. These Red Guards, who later

fled in shameful fashion before the German patrols, advanced into the

interior of the country and gained victories over the unarmed populace. The

Bolsheviki felt the ground firm under their feet and threw off the mask. A

campaign against the Constituent Assembly commenced. At first in _Pravda_

and in _Izvestya_ were only questions. What will this Constituent Assembly

be? Of whom will it be composed? It is possible that it will have a

majority of servants of the bourgeoisie--Cadets Socialist-Revolutionists.

_Can we confide to such a Constituent Assembly the destinies of the Russian

Revolution? Will it recognize the power of the Soviets?_ Then came certain

hypocritical "ifs." "If," yes, "if" the personnel of the Constituent

Assembly is favorable to us; "if" it will recognize the power of the

Soviets, it can count on their support. _If not--it condemns itself to

death_.

The Socialist-Revolutionists of the Left in their organ, _The Flag of

Labor_, repeated in the wake of the Bolsheviki, "We will uphold the

Constituent Assembly in _the measure we_--"

Afterward we see no longer questions or prudent "ifs," but distinct

answers. "The majority of the Constituent Assembly is formed," said the

Bolsheviki, "of Socialist-Revolutionists and Cadets--that is to say,

enemies of the people. This composition assures it of a

counter-revolutionary spirit. Its destiny is therefore clear. Historic

examples come to its aid. _The victorious people has no need of a

Constituent Assembly. It is above the Constituante_. It has gone beyond

it." The Russian people, half illiterate, were made to believe that in a

few weeks they had outgrown the end for which millions of Russians had

fought for almost a century; that they no longer had need of the most

perfect form of popular representation, such as did not exist even in the

most cultivated countries of western Europe. To the Constituent Assembly,

legislative organ due to equal, direct, and secret universal suffrage, they

opposed the Soviets, with their recruiting done by hazard and their

elections to two or three degrees,[92] the Soviets which were the

revolutionary organs and not the legislative organs, and whose rôle besides

none of those who fought for the Constituent Assembly sought to diminish.

V

_The Fight Concentrates Around the Constituent Assembly_

This was a maneuver whose object appeared clearly. The defenders of the

Constituent Assembly had evidence of what was being prepared. The peasants

who waited with impatience the opening of the Constituent Assembly sent

delegates to Petrograd to find out the cause of the delay of the

convocation. These delegates betook themselves to the Executive Committee

of the Soviet of Peasants' Delegates (11 Kirillovskaia Street), and to the

Socialist-Revolutionist fraction of the members of the Constituante (2

Bolotnai Street). This last fraction worked actively at its proper

organization. A bureau of organization was elected, commissions charged to

elaborate projects of law for the Constituante. The fraction issued

bulletins explaining to the population the program which the

Socialist-Revolutionists were going to defend at the Constituante. Active

relations were undertaken with the provinces. At the same time the members

of the fraction, among whom were many peasants and workmen, followed up an

active agitation in the workshops and factories of Petrograd, and among the

soldiers of the Preobrajenski Regiment and some others. The members of the

Executive Committee of the Soviet of Peasants' Delegates worked in concert

with them. It was precisely the opinion of the peasants and of the workmen

which had most importance in the fight against the Bolsheviki. They, the

true representatives of the people, were listened to everywhere; people

were obliged to reckon with them.

It was under these conditions that the Democratic Conference met. Called by

the Provisional Government, it comprised representatives of the Soviets, of

parties, of organizations of the army, peasant organizations,

co-operatives, zemstvos, agricultural committees, etc. Its object was to

solve the question of power until the meeting of the Constituent Assembly.

At this conference the Bolsheviki formed only a small minority; but they

acted as masters of the situation, calling, in a provocative manner,

all those who were not in accord with them, "Kornilovist,

counter-revolutionaries, traitors!" Because of this attitude the

conference, which ought to have had the character of an assembly deciding

affairs of state, took on the character of a boisterous meeting, which

lasted several days of unending twaddle. What the Bolsheviki wanted was a

verbal victory--to have shouted more loudly than their opponents. The same

speeches were repeated every day. Some upheld a power exclusively

Socialist, others--the majority composed of delegates from different

corners of the country--sanctioned an agreement with all the democratic

elements.

The provincial delegates, having come with a view to serious work, returned

to their homes, carrying with them a painful impression of lost

opportunities, of useless debates.

There remained but a few weeks before the convocation of the Constituent

Assembly. Those who voted against a government exclusively Socialist did

not think that, under the troublesome conditions of the time, they could

expose the country to the risk of a dispersion of strength; they feared the

possible isolation of the government in face of certain elements whose help

could not be relied on. But they did not take into account a fact which had

resulted from the Kornilovist insurrection: the natural distrust of the

working masses in presence of all the non-Socialists, of those who--not

being in immediate contact with them--placed themselves, were it ever so

little, more on the right.

The Democratic conference resulted in the formation of a Pre-Parliament.

There the relations, between the forces in presence of each other, were

about the same. Besides the Bolsheviki soon abandoned the Pre-Parliament,

for they were already preparing their insurrection which curtailed the

dissolution of that institution.

"We are on the eve of a Bolshevik insurrection"--such was, at this time,

the opinion of all those who took part in political life. "We are rushing

to it with dizzy rapidity. The catastrophe is inevitable." But what is very

characteristic is this, that, while preparing their insurrection, the

Bolsheviki, in their press, did not hesitate to treat as liars and

calumniators all those who spoke of the danger of this insurrection, and

that on the eve of a conquest of power (with arms ready) premeditated and

well prepared in advance.

* * * * *

During the whole period that preceded the Bolshevik insurrection a great

creative work was being carried on in the country in spite of the

undesirable phenomena of which we have spoken above.

1. With great difficulty there were established organs of a local,

autonomous administration, volost and district zemstvos, which were to

furnish a basis of organization to the government zemstvos. The zemstvo of

former times was made up of only class representatives; _the elections to

the new zemstvos were effected by universal suffrage, equal, direct, and

secret_. These elections were a kind of schooling for the population,

showing it the practical significance of universal suffrage, and preparing

it for the elections to the Constituent Assembly. At the same time they

laid the foundation of a local autonomous administration.

2. Preparations for the election to the Constituent Assembly were made; an

agitation, an intense propaganda followed; preparations of a technical

order were made. This was a difficult task because of the great number of

electors, the dispersion of the population, the great number of illiterate,

etc. Everywhere special courts had been established, in view of the

elections, to train agitators and instructors, who afterward were sent in

great numbers into the country.

3. _At the same time the ground was hurriedly prepared for the law

concerning the socialization of the soil._ The abandonment of his post by

Tchernov, Minister of Agriculture, did not stop this work. The principal

agricultural committee and the Minister of Agriculture, directed by

Rakitnikov and Vikhiliaev, hastened to finish this work before the

convocation of the Constituent Assembly. The Revolutionary Socialist party

decided to keep for itself the post of Minister of Agriculture; for the

position they named S. Maslov, who had to exact from the government an

immediate vote on the law concerning the socialization of the soil. _The

study of this law in the Council of Ministers was finished. Nothing more

remained to be done but to adopt and promulgate it. Because of the

excitement of the people in the country, it was decided to do this at once,

without waiting for the Constituent Assembly_. Finally, to better realize

the conditions of the time, it must be added that the whole country awaited

anxiously the elections to the Constituent Assembly. All believed that this

was going to settle the life of Russia.

VI

_The Bolshevist Insurrection_

It was under these conditions that the Bolshevist _coup d'état_ happened.

In the capitals as well as in the provinces, it was accomplished by armed

force; at Petrograd, with the help of the sailors of the Baltic fleet, of

the soldiers of the Preobrajenski, Semenovski, and other regiments, in

other towns with the aid of the local garrisons. Here, for example, is how

the Bolshevist _coup d'état_ took place at Saratov. I was a witness to

these facts myself. Saratov is a big university and intellectual center,

possessing a great number of schools, libraries, and divers associations

designed to elevate the intellectual standard of the population. The

zemstvo of Saratov was one of the best in Russia. The peasant population of

this province, among whom the Revolutionary Socialist propaganda was

carried on for several years by the Revolutionary Socialist Party, is wide

awake and well organized. The municipality and the agricultural committees

were composed of Socialists. The population was actively preparing for the

elections to the Constituent Assembly; the people discussed the list of

candidates, studied the candidates' biographies, as well as the programs of

the different parties.

On the night of October 28th, by reason of an order that had come from

Petrograd, the Bolshevik _coup d'état_ broke out at Saratov. The following

forces were its instruments: the garrison which was a stranger to the

masses of the population, a weak party of workers, and, in the capacity of

leaders, some Intellectuals who, up to that time, had played no rôle in the

public life of the town.

It was indeed a military _coup d'état_. The city hall, where sat the

Socialists, who were elected by equal, direct, and secret universal

suffrage, was surrounded by the soldiers; machine-guns were placed in front

and the bombardment began. This lasted a whole night; some were wounded,

some killed. The municipal judges were arrested. Soon after a Manifesto

solemnly announced to the population that the "enemies of the people," the

"counter-revolutionaries," were overthrown; that the power at Saratov was

going to pass into the hands of the Soviet (Bolshevist) of the Workmen's

and Soldiers' Delegates.

The population was perplexed; the people thought that they had sent to the

Town Hall Socialists, men of their choice. Now these men were declared

"enemies of the people," were shot down or arrested by other Socialists.

What did all this mean? And the inhabitant of Saratov felt a fear stealing

into his soul at the sight of this violence; he began to doubt the value of

the Socialist idea in general. The faith of former times gave place to

doubt, disappointment, and discouragement. The _coup d'état_ was followed

by divers other manifestations of Bolshevist activity--arrests, searches,

confiscation of newspapers, ban on meetings. Bands of soldiers looted the

country houses in the suburbs of the city; a school for the children of the

people and the buildings of the children's holiday settlement were also

pillaged. Bands of soldiers were forthwith sent into the country to cause

trouble there.

_The sensible part of the population of Saratov severely condemned these

acts_ in a series of Manifestos signed by the Printers' Union, the mill

workers, the City Employees' Union, Postal and Telegraph Employees,

students' organizations, and many other democratic associations and

organizations.

The peasants received the _coup d'état_ with distinct hostility. Meetings

and reunions were soon organized in the villages. Resolutions were voted

censuring the _coup d'état_ of violence, deciding to organize to resist the

Bolsheviki, and demanding the removal of the Bolshevist soldier members

from the rural communes. The bands of soldiers, who were sent into the

country, used not only persuasion, but also violence, trying to force the

peasants to give their votes for the Bolshevik candidates at the time of

the elections to the Constituent Assembly; they tore up the bulletins of

the Socialist-Revolutionists, overturned the ballot-boxes, etc.

But the Bolshevik soldiers were not able to disturb the confidence of the

peasants in the Constituent Assembly, and in the Revolutionary Socialist

party, whose program they had long since adopted, and whose leaders and

ways of acting they knew, the inhabitants of the country proved themselves

in all that concerned the elections wide awake to the highest degree. There

were hardly any abstentions, _90 per cent. of the population took part in

the voting_. The day of the voting was kept as a solemn feast; the priest

said mass; the peasants dressed in their Sunday clothes; they believed that

the Constituent Assembly would give them order, laws, the land. In the

government of Saratov, out of fourteen deputies elected, there were twelve

Socialist-Revolutionists; there were others (such as the government of

Pensa, for example) that elected _only_ Socialist-Revolutionists. The

Bolsheviki had the majority only in Petrograd and Moscow and in certain

units of the army. The elections to the Constituent Assembly were a

decisive victory for the Revolutionary Socialist party.

Such was the response of Russia to the Bolshevik _coup d'état_. To violence

and conquest of power by force of arms, the population answered by the

elections to the Constituent Assembly; the people sent to this

assembly, not the Bolsheviki, but, by an overwhelming majority,

Socialist-Revolutionists.

VII

_The Fight Against the Bolsheviki_

But the final result of the elections was not established forthwith. In

many places the elections had to be postponed. The Bolshevik _coup d'état_

had disorganized life, had upset postal and telegraphic communications, and

had even destroyed, in certain localities, the electoral mechanism itself

by the arrest of the active workers. The elections which began in the

middle of November were not concluded till toward the month of January.

In the mean time, in the country a fierce battle was raging against the

Bolsheviki. It was not, on the part of their adversaries, a fight for

power. If the Socialist-Revolutionists had wished they could have seized

the power; to do that they had only to follow the example of those who were

called "the Revolutionary Socialists of the Left." Not only did they not

follow their example, but they also excluded them from their midst. A short

time after the Bolshevik insurrection, when the part taken in this

insurrection by certain Revolutionary Socialists of the Left was found out,

the Central Committee of the Revolutionary Socialist party voted to exclude

them from the party for having violated the party discipline and having

adopted tactics contrary to its principles. This exclusion was confirmed

afterward by the Fourth Congress of the party, which took place in

December, 1917.

Soon after the _coup d'état_ of October the question was among all parties

and all organizations: "What is to be done? How will the situation be

remedied?" The remedy included three points. First, creation of a power

composed of the representatives of all Socialist organizations, with the

"Populist-Socialists" on the extreme right, and with the express condition

that the principal actors in the Bolshevik _coup d'état_ would not have

part in the Ministry. Second, immediate establishment of the democratic

liberties, which were trampled under foot by the Bolsheviki, without which

any form of Socialism is inconceivable. Third, convocation without delay of

the Constituent Assembly.

Such were the conditions proposed to the Bolsheviki in the name of several

Socialist parties (the Revolutionary Socialist party, the Mensheviki, the

Populist-Socialists, etc.), and of several democratic organizations

(Railroad Workers' Union, Postal and Telegraphic Employees' Union, etc.).

The Bolsheviki, at this time, were not sure of being able to hold their

position; certain Commissaries of the People, soon after they were

installed in power, handed in their resignation, being terrified by the

torrents of blood that were shed at Moscow and by the cruelties which

accompanied the _coup d'état_. The Bolsheviki pretended to accept the

pourparlers, but kept them dragging along so as to gain time. In the mean

time they tried to strengthen themselves in the provinces, where they

gained victories such as that of Saratov; they actively rushed the

pourparlers for peace; they had to do it at all cost, even if, in doing it,

they had to accept the assistance of the traitor and spy, by name Schneur,

for they had promised peace to the soldiers.

For this it sufficed them to have gained some victories in the provinces,

and that the Germans accepted the proposition of pourparlers of peace ("the

German generals came to meet us in gala attire, wearing their ribbons and

decorations," with triumph announced in their appeal to the Russian people

the representatives of this "Socialist" government Schneur & Co.), for this

the Bolsheviki henceforth refused every compromise and all conference with

the other parties. For the other parties--those who did not recognize the

Bolshevik _coup d'état_ and did not approve of the violence that was

perpetrated--there was only one alternative, the fight.

It was the Revolutionary Socialist party and the National Soviet of

Peasants' Delegates that had to bear the brunt of this fight, which was

carried on under extremely difficult conditions. All the non-Bolshevik

newspapers were confiscated or prosecuted and deprived of every means of

reaching the provinces; their editors' offices and printing establishments

were looted. After the creation of the "Revolutionary Tribunal," the

authors of articles that were not pleasing to the Bolsheviki, as well as

the directors of the newspapers, were brought to judgment and condemned to

make amends or go to prison, etc.

The premises of numerous organizations were being constantly pillaged; the

Red Guard came there to search, destroying different documents; frequently

objects which were found on the premises disappeared. Thus were looted the

premises of the Central Committee of the Revolutionary Socialist party (27

Galernaia Street), and, several times, the offices of the paper _Dielo

Narvda_ (22 Litcinaia Street), as well as the office of the "League for the

Defense of the Constituent Assembly," the premises of the committees of

divers sections of the Revolutionary Socialist party, the office of the

paper _Volia Naroda_, etc.

Leaders of the different parties were arrested. The arrest of the whole

Central Committee of the Revolutionary Socialist party was to be carried

out as well as the arrest of all the Socialist-Revolutionists, and of all

the Mensheviki in sight. The Bolshevist press became infuriated, exclaiming

against the "counter-revolution," against their "complicity" with Kornilov

and Kalodine.

All those who did not adhere to the Bolsheviki were indignant at the sight

of the crimes committed, and wished to defend the Constituent Assembly.

Knowingly, and in a premeditated manner, the Bolshevist press excited the

soldiers and the workmen against all other parties. And then when the

unthinking masses, drunk with flattery and hatred, committed acts of

lynching, the Bolshevist leaders expressed sham regrets! Thus it was after

the death of Doukhonine, who was cut to pieces by the sailors; and thus it

was after the dastardly assassination of the Cadets, Shingariev and

Kokochkine, after the shootings _en masse_ and the drowning of the

officers.

It was under these conditions that the fight was carried on; and the brunt

of it, as I have already stated, was sustained by the Revolutionary

Socialist party and the National Soviet of Peasants' Delegates, and it was

against these two that the Bolsheviki were particularly infuriated. "Now it

is not the Cadets who are dangerous to us," said they, "but the

Socialist-Revolutionists--these traitors, these enemies of the people." The

most sacred names of the Revolution were publicly trampled under foot by

them. Their cynicism went so far as to accuse Breshkovskaya, "the

Grandmother of the Russian Revolution," of having sold out to the

Americans. Personally I had the opportunity to hear a Bolshevist orator, a

member of the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers'

Delegates, express this infamous calumny at a meeting organized by the

Preobrajenski Regiment. The Bolsheviki tried, by every means, to crush the

party, to reduce it to a clandestine existence. But the Central Committee

declared that it would continue to fight against violence--and that in an

open manner; it continued to issue a daily paper, only changing its title,

as in the time of Czarism, and thus continued its propaganda in the

factories, and helped to form public opinion, etc.

At the Fourth Congress of the party, which took place in December, the

delegates from the provinces, where the despotism of the Bolsheviki was

particularly violent, raised the question of introducing terrorist methods

in the fight against the Bolsheviki. "From the time that the party is

placed in a fight under conditions which differ nothing from those of

Czarism, ancient methods are to be resumed; violence must be opposed to

violence," they said. But the Congress spurned this means; the

Revolutionary Socialist party did not adopt the methods of terrorism; it

could not do it, because the Bolsheviki were, after all, followed by the

masses--unthinking, it is true, but the masses, nevertheless. It is by

educating them, and not by the use of violence, that they are to be fought

against. Terrorist acts could bring nothing but a bloody suppression.

VIII

_The Second Peasant Congress_

In the space of a month a great amount of work was accomplished. A breach

was made in the general misunderstanding. Moral help was assured to the

Constituent Assembly on the part of the workmen and part of the soldiers of

Petrograd. There was no longer any confidence placed in the Bolsheviki.

Besides, the agitation was not the only cause of this change. The workers

soon came to understand that the Bolshevik tactics could only irritate and

disgust the great mass of the population, that the Bolsheviki were not the

representatives of the workers, that their promises of land, of peace, and

other earthly goods were only a snare. The industrial production diminished

more and more; numerous factories and shops closed their doors and

thousands of workmen found themselves on the streets. The population of

Petrograd, which, at first, received a quarter of a pound of bread per day

(a black bread made with straw), had now but one-eighth of a pound, while

in the time of Kerensky the ration was half a pound. The other products

(oatmeal, butter, eggs, milk) were entirely lacking or cost extremely high

prices. One ruble fifty copecks for a pound of potatoes, six rubles a

pound of meat, etc. The transportation of products to Petrograd had almost

ceased. The city was on the eve of famine.

The workers were irritated by the violence and the arbitrary manner of the

Bolsheviki, and by the exploits of the Red Guard, well paid, enjoying all

the privileges, well nourished, well clothed, and well shod in the midst of

a Petrograd starving and in rags.

Discontent manifested itself also among the soldiers of the Preobrajenski

and Litovsky regiments, and others. In this manner in the day of the

meeting of the Constituent Assembly they were no longer very numerous. What

loud cries, nevertheless, they had sent forth lately when Kerensky wished

to send the Preobrajenski and Seminovski regiments from Petrograd! "What?

Send the revolutionary regiments from Petrograd? To make easier the

surrender of the capital to the counter-revolution?" The soldiers of the

Preobrajenski Regiment organized in their barracks frequent meetings, where

the acts of the Bolsheviki were sharply criticized; they started a paper,

_The Soldiers' Cloak_, which was confiscated.

On the other hand, here is one of the resolutions voted by the workers of

the Putilov factory:

The Constituent Assembly is the only organ expressing the will of

the entire people. It alone is able to reconstitute the unity of

the country.

The majority of the deputies to the Constituent Assembly who had for some

time been elected had arrived in Petrograd, and the Bolsheviki always

retarded the opening. The Socialist-Revolutionist fraction started

conferences with the other fractions on the necessity for fixing a day for

the opening of the Constituante, without waiting the good pleasure of the

Commissaries of the People. They chose the date, December 27th, but the

opening could not take place on that day, the Ukrainian fraction having

suddenly abandoned the majority to join themselves to the Bolsheviki and

the Revolutionary Socialists of the Left. Finally, the government fixed the

opening of the Constituent Assembly for the 5th (18th) of January.

Here is a document which relates this fight for the date of the opening of

the Constituante:

_Bulletin of Members of the Constituent Assembly Belonging to the

Socialist-Revolutionist Fraction. No. 5, Dec. 31, 1917._

_To All the Citizens_:

The Socialist-Revolutionist fraction of the Constituent Assembly

addresses the whole people the present exposé of the reasons for

which the Constituent Assembly has not been opened until this day:

it warns them, at the same time, of the danger which threatens the

sovereign rights of the people.

Let it be thus placed in clear daylight, the true character of

those who, under pretext of following the well-being of the

workers, forge new chains for liberated Russia, those who attempt

to assassinate the Constituent Assembly, which alone is able to

save Russia from the foreign yoke and from the despotism which has

been born within.

Let all the citizens know that the hour is near when they must be

ready to rise like one man for the defense of their liberty and

their Constituent Assembly.

For, citizens, your salvation is solely in your own hands.

Citizens! you know that on the day assigned for the opening of the

Constituent Assembly, November 28th, all the

Socialist-Revolutionist deputies who were elected had come to

Petrograd. You know that neither violence of a usurping power nor

arrests of our comrades, by force of arms which were opposed to us

at the Taurida Palace, could prevent us from assembling and

fulfilling our duty.

But the civil war which has spread throughout the country retarded

the election to the Constituent Assembly and the number of

deputies elected was insufficient.

It was necessary to postpone the opening of the Constituent

Assembly.

Our fraction utilized this forced delay by an intensive

preparatory work. We elaborated, in several commissions, projects

of law concerning all the fundamental questions that the

Constituante would have to solve. We adopted the project of our

fundamental law on the question of the land; we elaborated the

measures which the Constituante would have to take from the very

first day in order to arrive at a truly democratic peace, so

necessary to our country; we discussed the principles which should

direct the friendly dwelling together of all the nationalities

which people Russia and assure each people a national point of

view, the free disposition of itself, thus putting an end to the

fratricidal war.

Our fraction would have been all ready for the day of the opening

of the Constituante, in order to commence, from the first, a

creative work and give to the impoverished country peace, bread,

land, and liberty.

At the same time, we did our utmost to accelerate the arrival of

the deputies and the opening of the Assembly.

During this time events became more and more menacing every day,

the Bolshevik power was more rapidly leading our country to its

fall. From before the time when the Germans had presented their

conditions of peace the Bolsheviki had destroyed the army,

suppressed its provisioning, and stripped the front, while at the

same time by civil war and the looting of the savings of the

people they achieved the economic ruin of the country. Actually,

they recognized themselves that the German conditions were

unacceptable and invited the reconstruction of the army. In spite

of this, these criminals do not retire; they will achieve their

criminal work.

Russia suffers in the midst of famine, of civil war, and enemy

invasion which threatens to reach even the heart of the country.

No delay is permissible.