THE WAR AND THE PEOPLE
I
The war against Austria and Germany was not unpopular. Certainly there was
never an occasion when a declaration of war by their rulers roused so
little resentment among the Russian people. Wars are practically never
popular with the great mass of the people in any country, and this is
especially true of autocratically governed countries. The heavy burdens
which all great wars impose upon the laboring class, as well as upon the
petty bourgeoisie, cause even the most righteous wars to be regarded with
dread and sorrow. The memory of the war with Japan was too fresh and too
bitter to make it possible for the mass of the Russian people to welcome
the thought of another war. It cannot, therefore, in truth be said that the
war with the Central Empires was popular. But it can be said with sincerity
and the fullest sanction that the war was not unpopular; that it was
accepted by the greater part of the people as a just and, moreover, a
necessary war. Opposition to the war was not greater in Russia than in
England or France, or, later, in America. Of course, there were religious
pacifists and Socialists who opposed the war and denounced it, as they
would have denounced any other war, on general principles, no matter what
the issues involved might be, but their number and their influence were
small and quite unimportant.
The one great outstanding fact was the manner in which the sense of peril
to the fatherland rallied to its defense the different races, creeds,
classes, and parties, the great tidal wave of genuine and sincere
patriotism sweeping everything before it, even the mighty, passionate
revolutionary agitation. It can hardly be questioned or doubted that if the
war had been bitterly resented by the masses it would have precipitated
revolution instead of retarding it. From this point of view the war was a
deplorable disaster. That no serious attempt was made to bring about a
revolution at that time is the best possible evidence that the declaration
of war did not enrage the people. If not a popular and welcome event,
therefore, the declaration of war by the Czar was not an unpopular one.
Never before since his accession to the throne had Nicholas II had the
support of the nation to anything like the same extent.
Take the Jews, for example. Bitterly hated and persecuted as they had been,
despised and humiliated beyond description; victims of the knout and the
pogrom; tortured by Cossacks and Black Hundreds; robbed by official
extortions; their women shamed and ravaged and their babies doomed to rot
and die in the noisome Pale--the Jews owed no loyalty to the Czar or even
to the nation. Had they sought revenge in the hour of Russia's crisis, in
howsoever grim a manner, it would have been easy to understand their action
and hard indeed to regard it with condemnation. It is almost unthinkable
that the Czar could have thought of the Jews in his vast Empire in those
days without grave apprehension and fear.
Yet, as all the world knows, the Jews resolutely overcame whatever
suggestion of revenge came to them and, with marvelous solidarity,
responded to Russia's call without hesitation and without political
intrigue or bargaining. As a whole, they were as loyal as any of the
Czar's subjects. How shall we explain this phenomenon?
The explanation is that the leaders of the Jewish people, and practically
the whole body of Jewish Intellectuals, recognized from the first that the
war was more than a war of conflicting dynasties; that it was a war of
conflicting ideals. They recognized that the Entente, as a whole,
notwithstanding that it included the autocracy of Russia, represented the
generous, democratic ideals and principles vital to every Jew in that they
must be securely established before the emancipation of the Jew could be
realized. Their hatred of Czarism was not engulfed by any maudlin
sentiment; they knew that they had no "fatherland" to defend. They were not
swept on a tide of jingoism to forget their tragic history and proclaim
their loyalty to the infamous oppressor. No. Their loyalty was to the
Entente, not to the Czar. They were guided by enlightened self-interest, by
an intelligent understanding of the meaning to them of the great struggle
against Teutonic militarist-imperialism.
Every intelligent and educated Jew in Russia knew that the real source of
the brutal anti-Semitism which characterized the rule of the Romanovs was
Prussian and not Russian. He knew that it had long been one of the main
features of Germany's foreign policy to instigate and stimulate hatred and
fear of the Jews by Russian officialdom. There could not be a more tragic
mistake than to infer from the ruthless oppression of the Jews in Russia
that anti-Semitism is characteristically Russian. Surely, the fact that the
First Duma was practically unanimous in deciding to give equal rights to
the Jews with all the rest of the population proves that the Russian people
did not hate the Jews. The ill-treatment of the Jews was part of the policy
by which Germany, for her own ends, cunningly contrived to weaken Russia
and so prevent the development of her national solidarity. Racial animosity
and conflict was an ideal instrument for attaining that result. Internal
war and abortive revolutionary outbreaks which kept the country unsettled,
and the energies of the government taxed to the uttermost, served the same
end, and were, therefore, the object of Germany's intrigues in Russia,
equally with hostility to the Jews, as we shall have occasion to note.
German intrigue in Russia is an interesting study in economic determinism.
Unless we comprehend it we shall strive in vain to understand Russia's part
in the war and her rôle in the history of the past few decades. A brief
study of the map of Europe by any person who possesses even an elementary
knowledge of the salient principles of economics will reveal Germany's
interest in Russia and make quite plain why German statesmen have so
assiduously aimed to keep Russia in a backward economic condition. As a
great industrial nation it was to Germany's interest to have Russia remain
backward industrially, predominantly an agricultural country, quite as
surely as it was to her interest as a military power to have weakness and
inefficiency, instead of strength and efficiency, in Russia's military
organization. As a highly developed industrial nation Russia would of
necessity have been Germany's formidable rival--perhaps her most formidable
rival--and by her geographical situation would have possessed an enormous
advantage in the exploitation of the vast markets in the far East. As a
feudal agricultural country, on the other hand, Russia would be a great
market for German manufactured goods, and, at the same time, a most
convenient supply-depot for raw materials and granary upon which Germany
could rely for raw materials, wheat, rye, and other staple grains--a
supply-depot and granary, moreover, accessible by overland transportation
not subject to naval attack.
For the Russian Jew the defeat of Germany was a vital necessity. The
victory of Germany and her allies could only serve to strengthen Prussian
influence in Russia and add to the misery and suffering of the Jewish
population. That other factors entered into the determination of the
attitude of the Jews, such as, for example, faith in England as the
traditional friend of the Jew, and abhorrence at the cruel invasion of
Belgium, is quite true. But the great determinant was the well-understood
fact that Germany's rulers had long systematically manipulated Russian
politics and the Russian bureaucracy to the serious injury of the Jewish
race. Germany's militarist-imperialism was the soul and inspiration of the
oppression which cursed every Jew in Russia.
II
The democratic elements in Russia were led to support the government by
very similar reasoning. The same economic and dynastic motives which had
led Germany to promote racial animosities and struggles in Russia led her
to take every other possible means to uphold autocracy and prevent the
establishment of democracy. This had been long recognized by all liberal
Russians, no matter to what political school or party they might belong. It
was as much part of the common knowledge as the fact that St. Petersburg
was the national capital. It was part of the intellectual creed of
practically every liberal Russian that there was a natural affinity between
the great autocracies of Germany and Russia, and that a revolution in
Russia which seriously endangered the existence of monarchical absolutism
would be suppressed by Prussian guns and bayonets reinforcing those of
loyal Russian troops. It was generally believed by Russian Socialists that
in 1905 the Kaiser had promised to send troops into Russia to crush the
Revolution if called upon for that aid. Many German Socialists, it may be
added, shared that belief. Autocracies have a natural tendency to combine
forces against revolutionary movements. It would have been no more strange
for Wilhelm II to aid Nicholas II in quelling a revolution that menaced his
throne than it was for Alexander I to aid in putting down revolution in
Germany; or than it was for Nicholas I to crush the Hungarian Revolution in
1849, in the interest of Francis Joseph; or than it was for Bismarck to
rush to the aid of Alexander II in putting down the Polish insurrection in
1863.
The democrats of Russia knew, moreover, that, in addition to the natural
affinity which served to bind the two autocracies, the Romanov and
Hohenzollern dynasties had been closely knit together in a strong union by
years and years of carefully planned and strongly wrought blood ties. As
Isaac Don Lenine reminds us in his admirable study of the Russian
Revolution, Nicholas II was more than seven-eighths German, less than
one-eighth of his blood heritage being Romanov. Catherine the Great, wife
of Peter III, was a Prussian by birth and heritage and thoroughly
Prussianized her court. After her--from 1796 to 1917--six Czars reigned in
Russia, five of whom married German wives. As was inevitable in such
circumstances, the Russian court had long been notoriously subject to
German influences and strongly pro-German in its sympathies--by no means a
small matter in an autocratic country. Fully aware of their advantage, the
Kaiser and his Ministers increased the German influence and power at the
Russian court by encouraging German nobles to marry into Russian court
circles. The closing decade of the reign of Nicholas II was marked by an
extraordinary increase of Prussian influence in his court, an achievement
in which the Kaiser was greatly assisted by the Czarina, who was, it will
be remembered, a German princess.
Naturally, the German composition and character of the Czar's court was
reflected in the diplomatic service and in the most important departments
of the Russian government, including the army. The Russian Secret Service
was very largely in the hands of Germans and Russians who had married
German wives. The same thing may be said of the Police Department. Many of
the generals and other high officers in the Russian army were either of
German parentage or connected with Germany by marriage ties. In brief, the
whole Russian bureaucracy was honeycombed by German influence.
Outside official circles, much the same condition existed among the great
landowners. Those of the Baltic provinces were largely of Teutonic descent,
of course. Many had married German wives. The result was that the nobility
of these provinces, long peculiarly influential in the political life of
Russia, was, to a very large degree, pro-German. In addition to these,
there were numerous large landowners of German birth, while many, probably
a big majority, of the superintendents of the large industrial
establishments and landed estates were German citizens. It is notorious
that the principal factories upon which Russia had to rely for guns and
munitions were in charge of Germans, who had been introduced because of
their high technical efficiency.
In view of these facts, and a mass of similar facts which might be cited,
it was natural for the democrats of Russia to identify Germany and German
intrigue and influence with the hated bureaucracy. It was as natural as it
was for the German influence to be used against the democratic movement in
Russia, as it invariably was. Practically the entire mass of democratic
opinion in Russia, including, of course, all the Socialist factions,
regarded these royal, aristocratic, and bureaucratic German influences as a
menace to Russia, a cancer that must be cut out. With the exception of a
section of the Socialists, whose position we shall presently examine, the
mass of liberal-thinking, progressive, democratic Russians saw in the war a
welcome breaking of the German yoke. Believing that the victory of Germany
would restore the yoke, and that her defeat by Russia would eliminate the
power which had sustained Czarism, they welcomed the war and rallied with
enthusiasm at the call to arms. They were loyal, but to Russia, not to the
Czar. They felt that in warring against Prussian militarist-imperialism
they were undermining Russian Absolutism.
That the capitalists of Russia should want to see the power of Germany to
hold Russia in chains completely destroyed is easy to understand. To all
intents and purposes, from the purely economic point of view, Russia was
virtually a German colony to be exploited for the benefit of Germany. The
commercial treaties of 1905, which gave Germany such immense trade
advantages, had become exceedingly unpopular. On the other hand, the
immense French loan of 1905, the greater part of which had been used to
develop the industrial life of Russia, had the effect of bringing Russian
capitalists into closer relations with French capitalists. For further
capital Russia could only look to France and England with any confident
hope. Above all, the capitalists of Russia wanted freedom for economic
development; they wanted stability and national unity, the very things
Germany was preventing. They wanted efficient government and the
elimination of the terrible corruption which infested the bureaucracy. The
law of economic evolution was inexorable and inescapable; the capitalist
system could not grow within the narrow confines of Absolutism.
For the Russian capitalist class, therefore, it was of the most vital
importance that Germany's power should not be increased, as it would of
necessity be if the Entente submitted to her threats and permitted Serbia
to be crushed by Austria, and the furtherance of the Pan-German
_Mitteleuropa_ designs. It was vitally necessary to Russian capitalism that
Germany's strangle-hold upon the inner life of Russia should be broken. The
issue was not the competition of capitalism, as that is commonly
understood; it was not the rivalry for markets like that which animates the
capitalist classes of all lands. The Russian capitalist class was animated
by no fear of German competition in the sense in which the nations of the
world have understood that term. They had their own vast home market to
develop. The industrialization of the country must transform a very large
part of the peasantry into factory artisans living in cities, having new
needs and relatively high wages, and, consequently, more money to spend.
For many years to come their chief reliance must be the home market,
constantly expanding as the relative importance of manufacturing increased
and forced improved methods of agriculture upon the nation in the process,
as it was bound to do.
It was Germany as a persistent meddler in Russian government and politics
that the capitalists of Russia resented. It was the unfair advantage that
this underhand political manipulation gave her in their own home field that
stirred up the leaders of the capitalist class of Russia. That, and the
knowledge that German intrigue by promoting divisions in Russia was the
mainstay of the autocracy, solidified the capitalist class of Russia in
support of the war. There was a small section of this class that went much
farther than this and entertained more ambitious hopes. They realized fully
that Turkey had already fallen under the domination of Germany to such a
degree that in the event of a German victory in the war, or, what really
amounted to the same thing, the submission of the Entente to her will,
Germany would become the ruler of the Dardanelles and European Turkey be in
reality, and perhaps in form, part of the German Empire.
Such a development could not fail, they believed, to have the most
disastrous consequences for Russia. Inevitably, it would add to German
prestige and power in the Russian Empire, and weld together the
Hohenzollern, Habsburg, and Romanov autocracies in a solid, reactionary
mass, which, under the efficient leadership of Germany, might easily
dominate the entire world. Moreover, like many of the ablest Russians,
including the foremost Marxian Socialist scholars, they believed that the
normal economic development of Russia required a free outlet to the warm
waters of the Mediterranean, which alone could give her free access to the
great ocean highways. Therefore they hoped that one result of a victorious
war by the Entente against the Central Empires, in which Russia would play
an important part, would be the acquisition of Constantinople by Russia.
Thus the old vision of the Czars had become the vision of an influential
and rising class with a solid basis of economic interest.
III
As in every other country involved, the Socialist movement was sharply
divided by the war. Paradoxical as it seems, in spite of the great revival
of revolutionary hope and sentiment in the first half of the year, the
Socialist parties and groups were not strong when the war broke out. They
were, indeed, at a very low state. They had not yet recovered from the
reaction. The manipulation of the electoral laws following the dissolution
of the Second Duma, and the systematic oppression and repression of all
radical organizations by the administration, had greatly reduced the
Socialist parties in membership and influence. The masses were, for a long
time, weary of struggle, despondent, and passive. The Socialist factions
meanwhile were engaged in an apparently interminable controversy upon
theoretical and tactical questions in which the masses of the
working-people, when they began to stir at last, took no interest, and
which they could hardly be supposed to understand. The Socialist parties
and groups were subject to a very great disability in that their leaders
were practically all in exile. Had a revolution broken out, as it would
have done but for the war, Socialist leadership would have asserted itself.
As in all other countries, the divisions of opinion created by the war
among the Socialists cut across all previous existing lines of separation
and made it impossible to say that this or that faction adopted a
particular view. Just as in Germany, France, and England, some of the most
revolutionary Socialists joined with the more moderate Socialists in
upholding the war, while extremely moderate Socialists joined with
Socialists of the opposite extreme in opposing it. It is possible, however,
to set forth the principal features of the division with tolerable
accuracy:
A majority of the Socialist-Revolutionary party executive issued an
anti-war Manifesto. There is no means of telling how far the views
expressed represented the attitude of the peasant Socialists as a whole,
owing to the disorganized state of the party and the difficulties of
assembling the members. The Manifesto read:
There is no doubt that Austrian imperialism is responsible for the
war with Serbia. But is it not equally criminal on the part of
Serbs to refuse autonomy to Macedonia and to oppress smaller and
weaker nations?
It is the protection of this state that our government considers
its "sacred duty." What hypocrisy! Imagine the intervention of the
Czar on behalf of poor Serbia, whilst he martyrizes Poland,
Finland and the Jews, and behaves like a brigand toward Persia.
Whatever may be the course of events, the Russian workers and
peasants will continue their heroic fight to obtain for Russia a
place among civilized nations.
This Manifesto was issued, as reported in the Socialist press, prior to the
actual declaration of war. It was a threat of revolution made with a view
to preventing the war, if possible, and belongs to the same category as the
similar threats of revolution made by the German Socialists before the war
to the same end. The mildness of manner which characterizes the Manifesto
may be attributed to two causes--weakness of the movement and a resulting
lack of assurance, together with a lack of conviction arising from the fact
that many of the leaders, while they hated the Czar and all his works, and
could not reconcile themselves to the idea of making any kind of truce with
their great enemy, nevertheless were pro-Ally and anxious for the defeat of
German imperialism. In other words, these leaders shared the national
feeling against Germany, and, had they been free citizens of a
democratically governed country, would have loyally supported the war.
When the Duma met, on August 8th, for the purpose of voting the war
credits, the Social Democrats of both factions, Bolsheviki and Mensheviki,
fourteen in number,[2] united upon a policy of abstention from voting.
Valentin Khaustov, on behalf of the two factions, read this statement:
A terrible and unprecedented calamity has broken upon the people
of the entire world. Millions of workers have been torn away from
their labor, ruined, and swept away by a bloody torrent. Millions
of families have been delivered over to famine.
War has already begun. While the governments of Europe were
preparing for it, the proletariat of the entire world, with the
German workers at the head, unanimously protested.
The hearts of the Russian workers are with the European
proletariat. This war is provoked by the policy of expansion for
which the ruling classes of all countries are responsible.
The proletariat will defend the civilization of the world against
this attack.
The conscious proletariat of the belligerent countries has not
been sufficiently powerful to prevent this war and the resulting
return of barbarism.
But we are convinced that the working class will find in the
international solidarity of the workers the means to force the
conclusion of peace at an early date. The terms of that peace will
be dictated by the people themselves, and not by the diplomats.
We are convinced that this war will finally open the eyes of the
great masses of Europe, and show them the real causes of all the
violence and oppression that they endure, and that therefore this
new explosion of barbarism will be the last.
As soon as this declaration was read the fourteen members of the Social
Democratic group left the chamber in silence. They were immediately
followed by the Laborites and Socialist-Revolutionists representing the
peasant Socialists, so that none of the Socialists in the Duma voted for
the war credits. As we shall see later on, the Laborites and most of the
Socialist-Revolutionists afterward supported the war. The declaration of
the Social Democrats in the Duma was as weak and as lacking in definiteness
of policy as the Manifesto of the Socialist-Revolutionists already quoted.
We know now that it was a compromise. It was possible to get agreement upon
a statement of general principles which were commonplaces of Socialist
propaganda, and to vaguely expressed hopes that "the working class will
find in the international solidarity of the workers the means to force the
conclusion of peace at an early date." It was easy enough to do this, but
it would have been impossible to unite upon a definite policy of resistance
and opposition to the war. It was easy to agree not to vote for the war
credits, since there was no danger that this would have any practical
effect, the voting of the credits--largely a mere form--being quite
certain. It would have been impossible to get all to agree to vote
_against_ the credits.
Under the strong leadership of Alexander Kerensky the Labor party soon took
a decided stand in support of the war. In the name of the entire group of
the party's representatives in the Duma, Kerensky read at an early session
a statement which pledged the party to defend the fatherland. "We firmly
believe," said Kerensky, "that the great flower of Russian democracy,
together with all the other forces, will throw back the aggressive enemy
and _will defend their native land_." The party had decided, he said, to
support the war "in defense of the land of our birth and of our
civilization created by the blood of our race.... We believe that through
the agony of the battle-field the brotherhood of the Russian people will be
strengthened and a common desire created to free the land from its terrible
internal troubles." Kerensky declared that the workers would take no
responsibility for the suicidal war into which the governments of Europe
had plunged their peoples. He strongly criticized the government, but
ended, nevertheless, in calling upon the peasants and industrial workers to
support the war:
"The Socialists of England, Belgium, France, and Germany have tried to
protest against rushing into war. We Russian Socialists were not able at
the last to raise our voices freely against the war. But, deeply convinced
of the brotherhood of the workers of all lands, we send our brotherly
greetings to all who protested against the preparations for this
fratricidal conflict of peoples. Remember that Russian citizens have no
enemies among the working classes of the belligerents! _Protect your
country to the end against aggression by the states whose governments are
hostile to us, but remember that there would not have been this terrible
war had the great ideals of democracy, freedom, equality, and brotherhood
been directing the activities of those who control the destinies of Russia
and other lands!_ As it is, our authorities, even in this terrible moment,
show no desire to forget internal strife, grant no amnesty to those who
have fought for freedom and the country's happiness, show no desire for
reconciliation with the non-Russian peoples of the Empire.
"And, instead of relieving the condition of the laboring classes of the
people, the government puts on them especially the heaviest load of the war
expenses, by tightening the yoke of indirect taxes.
"Peasants and workers, all who want the happiness and well-being of Russia
in these great trials, harden your spirit! Gather all your strength and,
having defended your land, free it; and to you, our brothers, who are
shedding blood for the fatherland, a profound obeisance and fraternal
greetings."
Kerensky's statement was of tremendous significance. Made on behalf of the
entire group of which he was leader, it reflected the sober second thought
of the representatives of the peasant Socialists and socialistically
inclined radicals. Their solemnly measured protest against the reactionary
policy of the government was as significant as the announcement that they
would support the war. It was a fact that at the very time when national
unity was of the most vital importance the government was already goading
the people into despairing revolt.
That a section of the Bolsheviki began a secret agitation against the war,
aiming at a revolt among the soldiers, regardless of the fact that it would
mean Russia's defeat and Germany's triumph, is a certainty. The government
soon learned of this movement and promptly took steps to crush it. Many
Russian Socialists have charged that the policy of the Bolsheviki was
inspired by provocateurs in the employ of the police, and by them betrayed.
Others believe that the policy was instigated by German provocateurs, for
very obvious purposes. It was not uncommon for German secret agents to worm
their way into the Russian Socialist ranks, nor for the agents of the
Russian police to keep the German secret service informed of what was going
on in Russian Socialist circles. Whatever truth there may be in the
suspicion that the anti-war Bolshevik faction of the Social Democrats were
the victims of the Russian police espionage system, and were betrayed by
one whom they had trusted, as the Socialist-Revolutionists had been
betrayed by Azev, the fact remains that the government ordered the arrest
of five of the Bolshevist Social Democratic members of the Duma, on
November 17th. Never before had the government disregarded the principle of
parliamentary immunity. When members of the First Duma, belonging to
various parties, and members of the Second Duma, belonging to the Social
Democratic party, were arrested it was only after the Duma had been
formally dissolved. The arrest of the five Social Democrats while the Duma
was still sitting evoked a strong protest, even from the conservatives.
The government based its action upon the following allegations, which
appear to have been substantially correct: in October arrangements were
made to convoke a secret conference of delegates of the Social Democratic
organization to plan for a revolutionary uprising. The police learned of
the plan, and when at last, on November 17th, the conference was held at
Viborg, eight miles from Petrograd--as the national capital was now
called--a detachment of police found eleven persons assembled, including
five members of the Imperial Duma, Messrs. Petrovsky, Badavev, Mouranov,
Samoelov, and Chagov. The police arrested six persons, but did not arrest
the Duma members, on account of their parliamentary position. An examining
magistrate, however, indicted the whole eleven who attended the conference,
under Article No. 102 of the Penal Code, and issued warrants for their
arrest. Among those arrested was Kamanev, one of Lenine's closest friends,
who behaved so badly at his trial, manifesting so much cowardice, that he
was censured by his party.
At this conference, according to the government, arrangements were made to
circulate among the masses a Manifesto which declared that "from the
viewpoint of the working class and of the laboring masses of all the
nations of Russia, the defeat of the monarchy of the Czar and of its armies
would be of extremely little consequence." The Manifesto urged the
imperative necessity of _carrying on on all sides the propaganda of the
social revolution among the army and at the theater of the war, and that
weapons should be directed not against their brothers, the hired slaves of
other countries, but against the reactionary bourgeois governments_. The
Manifesto went on, according to the government, to favor the organization
of a similar propaganda in all languages, among all the armies, with the
aim of creating republics in Russia, Poland, Germany, Austria, and all
other European countries, these to be federated into a republican United
Stares of Europe.
The declaration that the defeat of the Russian armies would be "of
extremely little consequence" to the workers became the key-note of the
anti-war agitation of the Bolsheviki. Lenine and Zinoviev, still in exile,
adopted the view that the defeat of Russia was _actually desirable_ from
the point of view of the Russian working class. "We are Russians, and for
that very reason we want Czarism to be defeated," was the cry.[3] In his
paper, the _Social Democrat_, published in Switzerland, Lenine advocated
Russian defeat, to be brought about through treachery and revolt in the
army, as the best means of furthering revolutionary progress. The majority
of the Bolshevik faction made common cause with the extreme left-wing
Socialists of the Socialist-Revolutionary party, who shared their views and
became known as "Porazhentsi"--that is, advocates of defeat. Naturally, the
charge was made that they were pro-German, and it was even charged that
they were in the pay of Germany. Possibly some of them were, but it by no
means follows that because they desired Russia's defeat they were therefore
consciously pro-German. They were not pro-German, but anti-Czarists. They
believed quite honestly, most of them, that Russia's defeat was the surest
and quickest way of bringing about the Revolution in Russia which would
overthrow Czarism. In many respects their position was quite like that of
those Irish rebels who desired to see England defeated, even though it
meant Germany's triumph, not because of any love for Germany, but because
they hated England and believed that her defeat would be Ireland's
opportunity. However short-sighted and stupid such a policy may be judged
to be, it is quite comprehensible and should not be misrepresented. It is a
remarkable fact that the Bolsheviki, while claiming to be the most radical
and extreme internationalists, were in practice the most narrow
nationalists. They were exactly as narrow in their nationalism as the
Sinn-Feiners of Ireland. They were not blind to the terrible wrongs
inflicted upon Belgium, or to the fact that Germany's victory over Russia
would make it possible for her to crush the western democracies, France and
England. But neither to save Belgium nor to prevent German militarism
crushing French and English workers under its iron heel would they have the
Russian workers make any sacrifice. They saw, and cared only for, what they
believed to be _Russian_ interests.
IV
But during the first months of the war the Porazhentsi--including the
Bolsheviki--were a very small minority. The great majority of the
Socialist-Revolutionists rallied to the support of the Allied cause. Soon
after the war began a Socialist Manifesto to the laboring masses of Russia
was issued. It bore the signature of many of the best-known Russian
Socialists, representing all the Socialist factions and groups except the
Bolsheviki. Among the names were those of George Plechanov, Leo Deutsch,
Gregory Alexinsky, N. Avksentiev, B. Vorovonov, I. Bunakov, and A.
Bach--representing the best thought of the movement in practically all its
phases. This document is of the greatest historical importance, not merely
because it expressed the sentiments of Socialists of so many shades, but
even more because of its carefully reasoned arguments why Socialists should
support the war and why the defeat of Germany was essential to Russian and
international social democracy. Despite its great length, the Manifesto is
here given in its entirety:
We, the undersigned, belong to the different shades of Russian
Socialistic thought. We differ on many things, but we firmly agree
in that the defeat of Russia in her struggle with Germany would
mean her defeat in her struggle for freedom, and we think that,
guided by this conviction, our adherents in Russia must come
together for a common service to their people, in the hour of the
grave danger the country is now facing.
We address ourselves to the politically conscious working-men,
peasants, artisans, clerks--to all of those who earn their bread
in the sweat of their brow, and who, suffering from the lack of
means and want of political rights, are struggling for a better
future for themselves, for their children, and for their brethren.
We send them our hearty greeting, and persistently say to them:
Listen to us in this fatal time, when the enemy has conquered the
Western strongholds of Russia, has occupied an important part of
our territory and is menacing Kiev, Petrograd, and Moscow, these
most important centers of our social life.
Misinformed people may tell you that in defending yourselves from
German invasion you support our old political régime. These people
want to see Russia defeated because of their hatred of the Czar's
government. Like one of the heroes of our genius of satire,
Shchedrin, they mix fatherland with its temporary bosses. But
Russia belongs not to the Czar, but to the Russian working-people.
In defending Russia, the working-people defend themselves, defend
the road to their freedom. As we said before, the inevitable
consequences of German victory would be the strengthening of our
old régime.
The Russian reactionaries understand this very thoroughly. _In a
faint, half-hearted manner they are defending Russia from
Germany_. The Ministers who resigned recently, Maklakov and
Shcheglovitov, presented a secret report to the Czar, in November,
1914, in which they explained how advantageous it would be for the
Czar to make a separate peace with Germany. _They understand that
the defeat of Germany would be a defeat of the principles of
monarchism, so dear to all our European reactionaries_.
Our people will never forget _the failure of the Czar's government
to defend Russia_. But if the progressive, the politically
conscious people will not take part in the struggle against
Germany, the Czar's government will have an excuse for saying: "It
is not our fault that Germany defeats us; it is the fault of the
revolutionists who have betrayed their country," and this will
vindicate the government in the eyes of the people.
The political situation in Russia is such that only across the
bridge of national defense can we reach freedom. Remember, _we do
not tell you, first victory against the external enemy and then
revolution against the internal, the Czar's government_.
In the course of events the defeat of the Czar's government may
serve as a necessary preliminary condition for, and even as a
guaranty of, the elimination of the German danger. The French
revolutionists of the end of the eighteenth century would never
have been able to have overcome the enemy, attacking France on all
sides, had they not adopted such tactics only when the popular
movement against the old régime became mature enough to render
their efforts effective.
Furthermore, you must not be embarrassed by the arguments of those
who believe that every one who defends his country refuses thereby
to take part in the struggle of the classes. These persons do not
know what they are talking about. In the first place, in order
that the struggle of the classes in Russia should be successful,
certain social and political conditions must exist there. _These
conditions will not exist if Germany wins_.
In the second place, if the working-man of Russia cannot but
defend himself against the exploitation of the Russian landed
aristocrat and capitalist it seems incomprehensible that he should
remain inactive when the lasso of exploitation is being drawn
around his neck by the German landed aristocracy (the _Junker_)
and the German capitalist who are, unfortunately, at the present
time _supported by a considerable part of the German proletariat
that has turned traitor to its duty of solidarity with the
proletariat of other countries_.
By striving to the utmost to cut this lasso of German
imperialistic exploitation, the proletariat of Russia will
continue the struggle of the classes in that form which at the
present moment is most appropriate, fruitful, and effective.
It has been our country's fate once before to suffer from the
bloody horrors of a hostile invasion. But never before did it have
to defend itself against an enemy so well armed, so skilfully
organized, so carefully prepared for his plundering enterprise as
he is now.
The position of the country is dangerous to the highest degree;
therefore upon all of you, upon all the politically conscious
children of the working-people of Russia, lies an enormous
responsibility.
If you say to yourselves that it is immaterial to you and to your
less developed brothers as to who wins in this great international
collision going on now, and if you act accordingly, Russia will be
crushed by Germany. And when Russia will be crushed by Germany, it
will fare badly with the Allies. This does not need any
demonstration.
But if, on the contrary, you become convinced that the defeat of
Russia will reflect badly upon the interests of the working
population, and if you will help the self-defense of our country
with all your forces, our country and her allies will escape the
terrible danger menacing them.
Therefore, go deeply into the situation. You make a great mistake
if you imagine that it is not to the interests of the
working-people to defend our country. In reality, nobody's
interests suffer more terribly from the invasion of an enemy than
the interests of the working-population.
Take, for instance, the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71. When the
Germans besieged Paris and the cost of all the necessaries of life
rose enormously, it was clear that the poor suffered much more
than the rich. In the same way, when Germany exacted five billions
of contribution from vanquished France, this same, in the final
count, was paid by the poor; for paying that contribution indirect
taxation was greatly raised, the burden of which nearly entirely
falls on the lower classes.
More than that. The most dangerous consequence to France, due to
her defeat in 1870-71, was the retardation of her economic
development. In other words, the defeat of France badly reflected
upon the contemporary interests of her people, and, even more,
upon her entire subsequent development.
The defeat of Russia by Germany will much more injure our people
than the defeat of France injured the French people. The war now
exacts incredibly large expenditures. It is more difficult for
Russia, a country economically backward, to bear that expenditure
than for the wealthy states of western Europe. Russia's back, even
before the war, was burdened with a heavy state loan. Now this
debt is growing by the hour, and vast regions of Russia are
subject to wholesale devastation.
If the Germans will win the final victory, they will demand from
us an enormous contribution, in comparison with which the streams
of gold that poured into victorious Germany from vanquished
France, after the war of 1871, will seem a mere trifle.
But that will not be all. The most consequent and outspoken
heralds of German imperialism are even now saying that it is
necessary to exact from Russia the cession of important territory,
which should be cleared from the present population for the
greater convenience of German settlers. Never before have
plunderers, dreaming of despoiling a conquered people, displayed
such cynical heartlessness!
But for our vanquishers it will not be enough to exact an
unheard-of enormous contribution and to tear up our western
borderlands. Already, in 1904, Russia, being in a difficult
situation, was obliged to conclude a commercial treaty with
Germany, very disadvantageous to herself. The treaty hindered, at
the same time, the development of our agriculture and the progress
of our industries. It affected, with equal disadvantage, the
interests of the farmers as well as of those engaged in industry.
It is easy to imagine what kind of a treaty victorious German
imperialism would impose upon us. In economic matters, Russia
would become a German colony. Russia's further economic
development would be greatly hindered if not altogether stopped.
Degeneration and deprivation would be the result of German victory
for an important part of the Russian working-people.
What will German victory bring to western Europe? After all we
have already said, it is needless to expatiate on how many of the
unmerited economic calamities it will bring to the people of the
western countries allied to Russia. We wish to draw your attention
to the following: England, France, even Belgium and Italy, are, in
a political sense, far ahead of the German Empire, which has not
as yet grown up to a parliamentary régime. German victory over
these countries would be the victory of the old over the new, and
if the democratic ideal is dear to you, you must wish success to
our Western Allies.
Indifference to the result of this war would be, for us, equal to
political suicide. The most important, the most vital interests of
the proletariat and of the laboring peasantry demand of you an
active participation in the defense of the country. Your watchword
must be victory over the foreign enemy. In an active movement
toward such victory, the live forces of the people will become
free and strong.
Obedient to this watchword, you must be as wise as serpents.
Although in your hearts may burn the flame of noble indignation,
in your heads must reign, invariably, cold political reckoning.
You must know that zeal without reason is sometimes worse than
complete indifference. Every act of agitation in the rear of the
army, fighting against the enemy, would be equivalent to high
treason, as it would be a service to the foreign enemy.
The thunders of the war certainly cannot make the Russian
manufacturers and merchants more idealistic than they were in time
of peace. In the filling of the numerous orders, inevitable during
the mobilization of industry for war needs, the capitalists will,
as they are accustomed to, take great care of the interests of
capital, and will not take care of the interests of hired labor.
You will be entirely right if you wax indignant at their conduct.
But in all cases, whenever you desire to answer by a strike, you
must first think whether such action would not be detrimental to
the cause of the defense of Russia.
The private must be subject to the general. The workmen of every
factory must remember that they would commit, without any doubt,
the gravest mistake if, considering only their own interests, they
forget how severely the interests of the entire Russian
proletariat and peasantry would suffer from German victory.
The tactics which can be defined by the motto, "All or nothing,"
are the tactics of anarchy, fully unworthy of the conscious
representatives of the proletariat and peasantry. The General
Staff of the German Army would greet with pleasure the news that
we had adopted such tactics. _Believe us that this Staff is ready
to help all those who would like to preach it in our country_.
They want trouble in Russia, they want strikes in England, they
want everything that would facilitate the achievement of their
conquering schemes.
But you will not make them rejoice. You will not forget the words
of our great fabulist: "What the enemy advises is surely bad." You
must insist that all your representatives take the most active
part in all organizations created now, under the pressure of
public opinion, for the struggle with the foe. Your
representatives must, if possible, take part not only in the work
of the special technical organizations, such as the War-Industrial
Committees which have been created for the needs of the army, but
also in all other organizations of social and political character.
The situation is such that we cannot come to freedom in any other
way than by the war of national defense.
That the foregoing Manifesto expressed the position of the vast majority of
Russian Socialists there can be no doubt whatever. Between this position
and that of the Porazhentsi with their doctrine that Russia's defeat by
Germany was desirable, there was a middle ground, which was taken by a not
inconsiderable number of Socialists, including such able leaders as Paul
Axelrod. Those who took up this intermediate position were both
anti-Czarists and anti-German-imperialists. They were pro-Ally in the large
sense, and desired to see the Allies win over the Central Empires, if not a
"crushing" victory, a very definite and conclusive one. But they regarded
the alliance of Czarism with the Allies as an unnatural marriage. They
believed that autocratic Russia's natural alliance was with autocratic
Germany and Austria. Their hatred of Czarism led them to wish for its
defeat, even by Germany, provided the victory were not so great as to
permit Germany to extend her domain over Russia or any large part of it.
Their position became embodied in the phrase, "Victory by the Allies on the
west and Russia's defeat on the east." This was, of course, utterly
unpractical theorizing and bore no relation to reality.
V
Thanks in part to the vigorous propaganda of such leaders as Plechanov,
Deutsch, Bourtzev, Tseretelli, Kerensky, and many others, and in part to
the instinctive good sense of the masses, support of the war by Socialists
of all shades and factions--except the extreme Bolsheviki and
the so-called "Internationalist" sections of Mensheviki and
Socialist-Revolutionists--became general. The anti-war minority was
exceedingly small and had no hold upon the masses. Had the government been
both wise and honestly desirous of presenting a united front to the foe,
and to that end made intelligent and generous concessions to the democratic
movement, it is most unlikely that Russia would have collapsed. As it was,
the government adopted a policy which could not fail to weaken the military
force of the nation--a policy admirably suited to German needs.
Extremes meet. On the one hand there were the Porazhentsi Socialists,
contending that the interests of progress would be best served by a German
victory over Russia, and plotting to weaken and corrupt the morale of the
Russian army and to stir up internal strife to that end. On the other hand,
within the royal court, and throughout the bureaucracy, reactionary
pro-German officials were animated by the belief that the victory of
Germany was essential to the permanence of Absolutism and autocratic
government. They, too, like the Socialist "defeatists," aimed to weaken
and corrupt the morale of the army and to divide the nation.
These Germanophiles in places of power realized that they had unconscious
but exceedingly useful allies in the Socialist intransigents. Actuated by
motives however high, the latter played into the hands of the most corrupt
and reactionary force that ever infested the old régime. This force, the
reactionary Germanophiles, had from the very first hoped and believed that
Germany would win the war. They had exerted every ounce of pressure they
could command to keep the Czar from maintaining the treaty with France and
entering into the war on her side against Germany and Austria. When they
failed in this, they bided their time, full of confidence that the superior
efficiency of the German military machine would soon triumph. But when they
witnessed the great victorious onward rush of the Russian army, which for a
time manifested such a degree of efficiency as they had never believed to
be possible, they began to bestir themselves. From this quarter came the
suggestion, very early in the war, as Plechanov and his associates charged
in their Manifesto, that the Czar ought to make an early peace with
Germany.
They went much farther than this. Through every conceivable channel they
contrived to obstruct Russia's military effort. They conspired to
disorganize the transportation system, the hospital service, the
food-supply, the manufacture of munitions. They, too, in a most effective
manner, were plotting to weaken and corrupt the morale of the army. There
was universal uneasiness. In the Allied chancelleries there was fear of a
treacherous separate peace between Russia and Germany. It was partly to
avert that catastrophe by means of a heavy bribe that England undertook the
forcing of the Dardanelles. All over Russia there was an awakening of the
memories of the graft that ate like a canker-worm at the heart of the
nation. Men told once more the story of the Russian general in Manchuria,
in 1904, who, when asked why fifty thousand men were marching barefoot,
answered that the boots were in the pocket of Grand-Duke Vladimir! They
told again the story of the cases of "shells" for the Manchurian army which
were intercepted in the nation's capital, _en route_ to Moscow, and found
to contain--paving-stones! How General Kuropatkin managed to amass a
fortune of over six million rubles during the war with Japan was
remembered. Fear that the same kind of treason was being perpetrated grew
almost to the panic point.
So bad were conditions in the army, so completely had the Germanophile
reactionaries sabotaged the organization, that the people themselves took
the matter in hand. Municipalities all over the country formed a Union of
Cities to furnish food, clothes, and other necessaries to the army. The
National Union of Zemstvos did the same thing. More than three thousand
institutions were established on the different Russian fronts by the
National Union of Zemstvos. These institutions included hospitals,
ambulance stations, feeding stations for troops on the march, dental
stations, veterinary stations, factories for manufacturing supplies, motor
transportation services, and so on through a long catalogue of things which
the administration absolutely failed to provide. The same great
organization furnished millions of tents and millions of pairs of boots and
socks. Civil Russia was engaged in a great popular struggle to overcome
incompetence, corruption, and sabotage in the bureaucracy. For this work
the civilian agencies were not thanked by the government. Instead, they
were oppressed and hindered. Against them was directed the hate of the
dark forces of the "occult government" and at the same time the fierce
opposition and scorn of men who called themselves Socialists and champions
of proletarian freedom!
There was treachery in the General Staff and throughout the War Department,
at the very head of which was a corrupt traitor, Sukhomlinov. It was
treachery in the General Staff which led to the tragic disasters in East
Prussia. The great drive of the Austrian and German armies in 1915, which
led to the loss of Poland, Lithuania, and large parts of Volhynia and
Courland, and almost entirely eliminated Russia from the war, was
unquestionably brought about by co-operation with the German General Staff
on the part of the sinister "occult government," as the Germanophile
reactionary conspiracy in the highest circles came to be known.
No wonder that Plechanov and his friends in their Manifesto to the Russian
workers declared that the reactionaries were defending Russia from
subjugation by Germany in "a half-hearted way," and that "our people will
never forget the failure of the Czar's government to defend Russia." They
were only saying, in very moderate language, what millions were thinking;
what, a few months later, many of the liberal spokesmen of the country were
ready to say in harsher language. As early as January, 1915, the Duma met
and cautiously expressed its alarm. In July it met again, many of the
members coming directly from the front, in uniform. Only the fear that a
revolution would make the continuance of the war impossible prevented a
revolution at that time. The Duma was in a revolutionary mood. Miliukov,
for example, thundered:
" ... In January we came here with ... the feeling of patriotic alarm. We
then kept this feeling to ourselves. Yet in closed sessions of committees
we told the government all that filled the soul of the people. The answer
we received did not calm us; it amounted to saying that the government
could get along without us, without our co-operation. To-day we have
convened in a grave moment of trial for our fatherland. The patriotic alarm
of the people has proved to be well founded, to the misfortune of our
country. Secret things have become open, and the assertions of half a year
ago have turned out to be mere words. Yet the country cannot be satisfied
with words. _The people wish to take affairs into their own hands and to
correct what has been neglected. The people look upon us as legal executors
of their will_."
Kerensky spoke to the same general effect, adding, "_I appeal to the people
themselves to take into their hands the salvation of the country and fight
for a full right to govern the state_." The key-note of revolution was
being sounded now. For the spirit of revolution breathed in the words, "The
people wish to take affairs into their own hands," and in Kerensky's
challenge, "I appeal to the people themselves to take into their hands the
salvation of the country." The Duma was the logical center around which the
democratic forces of the country could rally. Its moderate character
determined this. Only its example was necessary to the development of a
great national movement to overthrow the old régime with its manifold
treachery, corruption, and incompetence. When, on August 22d, the
Progressive Bloc was formed by a coalition of Constitutional Democrats,
Progressives, Nationalists, and Octobrists--the last-named group having
hitherto generally supported the government--there was a general chorus of
approval throughout the country, If the program of the Bloc was not radical
enough to satisfy the various Socialist groups, even the Laborites, led by
Kerensky, it was, nevertheless, a program which they could support in the
main, as far as it went.
All over the country there was approval of the demand for a responsible
government. The municipal councils of the large cities passed resolutions
in support of it. The great associations of manufacturers supported it. All
over the nation the demand for a responsible government was echoed. It was
generally believed that the Czar and his advisers would accept the
situation and accede to the popular demand. But once more the influence of
the reactionaries triumphed, and on September 3d came the defiant answer of
the government to the people. It was an order suspending the Duma
indefinitely. The gods make mad those whom they would destroy.
Things went from bad to worse. More and more oppressive grew the
government; more and more stupidly brutal and reactionary in its dealings
with the wide-spread popular unrest. Heavier and heavier grew the burden of
unscientific and unjustly distributed taxation. Worse and worse became the
condition of the soldiers at the front; ever more scandalous the neglect of
the sick and wounded. Incompetence, corruption, and treason combined to
hurry the nation onward to a disastrous collapse. The Germanophiles were
still industriously at work in the most important and vital places,
practising sabotage upon a scale never dreamed of before in the history of
any nation. They played upon the fears of the miserable weakling who was
the nominal ruler of the vast Russian Empire, and frightened him into
sanctioning the most suicidal policy of devising new measures of oppression
instead of making generous concessions.
Russia possessed food in abundance, being far better off in this respect
than any other belligerent on either side, yet Russia was in the grip of
famine. There was a vast surplus of food grains and cereals over and above
the requirements of the army and the civilian population, yet there was
wide-spread hunger. Prices rose to impossible levels. The most astonishing
anarchy and disorganization characterized the administration of the
food-supply. It was possible to get fresh butter within an hour's journey
from Moscow for twenty-five cents a pound, but in Moscow the price was two
and a half dollars a pound. Here, as throughout the nation, incompetence
was reinforced by corruption and pro-German treachery. Many writers have
called attention to the fact that even in normal times the enormous
exportation of food grains in Russia went on side by side with per capita
underconsumption by the peasants whose labor produced the great harvests,
amounting to not less than 30 per cent. Now, of course, conditions were far
worse.
When the government was urged to call a convention of national leaders to
deal with the food situation it stubbornly refused. More than that, it made
war upon the only organizations which were staving off famine and making it
possible for the nation to endure. Every conceivable obstacle was placed in
the way of the National Union of Zemstvos and the Union of Cities; the
co-operative associations, which were rendering valuable service in meeting
the distress of working-men's families, were obstructed and restricted in
every possible way, their national offices being closed by the police. The
officials of the labor-unions who were co-operating with employers in
substituting arbitration in place of strikes, establishing soup-kitchens
and relief funds, and doing other similar work to keep the nation alive,
were singled out for arrest and imprisonment. The Black Hundreds were
perniciously active in all this oppression and in the treacherous advocacy
of a separate peace with Germany.
In October, 1916, a conference of chairmen of province zemstvos adopted and
published a resolution which declared:
The tormenting and horrifying suspicion, the sinister rumors of
perfidy and treason, of dark forces working in favor of Germany to
destroy the unity of the nation, to sow discord and thus prepare
conditions for an ignominious peace, have now reached the clear
certainty that the hand of the enemy secretly influences the
affairs of our state.
VI
An adequate comprehension of the things set forth in this terrible summary
is of the highest importance to every one who would attempt the task of
reaching an intelligent understanding of the mighty upheaval in Russia and
its far-reaching consequences. The Russian Revolution of 1917 was not
responsible for the disastrous separate peace with Germany. The foundations
for that were laid by the reactionaries of the old régime. It was the
logical outcome of their long-continued efforts. Lenine, Trotzky, and their
Bolshevist associates were mere puppets, simple tools whose visions,
ambitions, and schemes became the channels through which the conspiracy of
the worst reactionaries in Russia realized one part of an iniquitous
program.
The Revolution itself was a genuine and sincere effort on the part of the
Russian people to avert the disaster and shame of a separate peace; to
serve the Allied cause with all the fidelity of which they were capable.
There would have been a separate peace if the old régime had remained in
power a few weeks longer and the Revolution been averted. It is most likely
that it would have been a more shameful peace than was concluded at
Brest-Litovsk, and that it would have resulted in an actual and active
alliance of the Romanov dynasty with the dynasties of the Hohenzollerns and
the Habsburgs. The Russian Revolution of 1917 had this great merit: it so
delayed the separate peace between Russia and Germany that the Allies were
able to prepare for it. It had the merit, also, that it forced the
attainment of the separate peace to come in such a manner as to reduce
Germany's military gain on the western front to a minimum.
The manner in which the Bolsheviki in their wild, groping, and frenzied
efforts to apply theoretical abstractions to the living world, torn as it
was by the wolves of war, famine, treason, oppression, and despair, served
the foes of freedom and progress must not be lost sight of. The Bolshevist,
wherever he may present himself, is the foe of progress and the ally of
reaction.