E-text prepared by Rick Niles, Josephine Paolucci, and the Project
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Transcriber's note: Minor typographical errors in the original text
have been corrected and footnotes moved to the
end of the book.
BOLSHEVISM
The Enemy of Political and Industrial Democracy
by
JOHN SPARGO
Author of
"Social Democracy Explained" "Socialism, a Summary and Interpretation of
Socialist Principles" "Applied Socialism" etc.
Harper & Brothers Publishers
New York and London
1919
* * * * * * *
BOOKS BY
JOHN SPARGO
BOLSHEVISM
AMERICANISM AND SOCIAL DEMOCRACY
SOCIAL DEMOCRACY EXPLAINED
HARPER & BROTHERS, NEW YORK
ESTABLISHED 1817
* * * * * * *
CONTENTS
PREFACE
I. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
II. FROM REVOLUTION TO REVOLUTION
III. THE WAR AND THE PEOPLE
IV. THE SECOND REVOLUTION
V. FROM BOURGEOISIE TO BOLSHEVIKI
VI. THE BOLSHEVIK WAR AGAINST DEMOCRACY
VII. BOLSHEVIST THEORY AND PRACTICE
POSTSCRIPTUM: A PERSONAL STATEMENT
APPENDICES:
I. AN APPEAL TO THE PROLETARIAT BY THE PETROGRAD WORKMEN'S AND
SOLDIERS' COUNCIL
II. HOW THE RUSSIAN PEASANTS FOUGHT FOR A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY
III. FORMER SOCIALIST PREMIER OF FINLAND ON BOLSHEVISM
PREFACE
In the following pages I have tried to make a plain and easily
understandable outline of the origin, history, and meaning of Bolshevism. I
have attempted to provide the average American reader with a fair and
reliable statement of the philosophy, program, and policies of the Russian
Bolsheviki. In order to avoid confusion, and to keep the matter as simple
and clear as possible, I have not tried to deal with the numerous
manifestations of Bolshevism in other lands, but have confined myself
strictly to the Russian example. With some detail--too much, some of my
readers may think!--I have sketched the historical background in order that
the Bolsheviki may be seen in proper perspective and fairly judged in
connection with the whole revolutionary movement in Russia.
Whoever turns to these pages in the expectation of finding a sensational
"exposure" of Bolshevism and the Bolsheviki will be disappointed. It has
been my aim to make a deliberate and scientific study, not an _ex-parte_
indictment. A great many lurid and sensational stories about the Bolsheviki
have been published, the net result of which is to make the leaders of this
phase of the great universal war of the classes appear as brutal and
depraved monsters of iniquity. There is not a crime known to mankind,
apparently, of which they have not been loudly declared to be guilty. My
long experience in the Socialist movement has furnished me with too much
understanding of the manner and extent to which working-class movements are
abused and slandered to permit me to accept these stories as gospel truth.
That experience has forced me to assume that most of the terrible stories
told about the Bolsheviki are either untrue and without any foundation in
fact or greatly exaggerated. The "rumor factories" in Geneva, Stockholm,
Copenhagen, The Hague, and other European capitals, which were so busy
during the war fabricating and exploiting for profit stories of massacres,
victories, assassinations, revolutions, peace treaties, and other momentous
events, which subsequent information proved never to have happened at all,
seem now to have turned their attention to the Bolsheviki.
However little of a cynic one may be, it is almost impossible to refrain
from wondering at the fact that so many writers and journals that in the
quite recent past maintained absolute silence when the czar and his minions
were committing their infamous outrages against the working-people and
their leaders, and that were never known to protest against the many crimes
committed by our own industrial czars against our working-people and their
leaders--that these writers and journals are now so violently denouncing
the Bolsheviki for alleged inhumanities. When the same journals that
defended or apologized for the brutal lynchings of I.W.W. agitators and the
savage assaults committed upon other peaceful citizens whose only crime was
exercising their lawful and moral right to organize and strike for better
wages, denounce the Bolsheviki for their "brutality" and their
"lawlessness" and cry for vengeance upon them, honest and sincere men
become bitter and scornful.
I am not a Bolshevik or a defender of the Bolsheviki. As a Social Democrat
and Internationalist of many years' standing--and therefore loyal to
America and American ideals--I am absolutely opposed to the principles and
practices of the Bolsheviki, which, from the very first, I have regarded
and denounced as an inverted form of Czarism. It is quite clear to my mind,
however, that there can be no good result from wild abuse or from
misrepresentation of facts and motives. I am convinced that the stupid
campaign of calumny which has been waged against the Bolsheviki has won for
them the sympathy of many intelligent Americans who love fairness and hate
injustice. In this way lying and abuse react against those who indulge in
them.
In this study I have completely ignored the flood of newspaper stories of
Bolshevist "outrages" and "crimes" which has poured forth during the past
year. I have ignored, too, the remarkable collection of documents edited
and annotated by Mr. Sisson and published by the United States Committee on
Public Information. I do not doubt that there is much that is true in that
collection of documents--indeed, there is some corroboration of some of
them--but the means of determining what is true and what false are not yet
available to the student. So much doubt and suspicion is reasonably and
properly attached to some of the documents that the value of the whole mass
is greatly impaired. To rely upon these documents to make a case against
the Bolsheviki, unless and until they have been more fully investigated and
authenticated than they appear to have been as yet, and corroborated, would
be like relying upon the testimony of an unreliable witness to convict a
man serious crime.
That the Bolsheviki have been guilty of many crimes is certain. Ample
evidence of that fact will be found in the following pages. They have
committed many crimes against men and women whose splendid service to the
Russian revolutionary movement serves only to accentuate the crimes in
question. But their worst crimes have been against political and social
democracy, which they have shamefully betrayed and opposed with as little
scruple, and as much brutal injustice, as was ever manifested by the
Romanovs. This is a terrible charge, I know, but I believe that the most
sympathetic toward the Bolsheviki among my readers will, if they are
candid, admit that it is amply sustained by the evidence.
Concerning that evidence it is perhaps necessary to say that I have
confined myself to the following: official documents issued by the
Bolshevist government; the writings and addresses of accredited Bolshevik
leaders and officials--in the form in which they have been published by the
Bolsheviki themselves; the declarations of Russian Socialist organizations
of long and honorable standing in the international Socialist movement; the
statements of equally well-known and trusted Russian Socialists, and of
responsible Russian Socialist journals.
While I have indicated the sources of most of the evidence against the
Bolsheviki, either in the text itself or in the foot-notes and references,
I have not thought it advisable to burden my pages with such foot-notes and
references concerning matters of general knowledge. To have given
references and authorities for all the facts summarized in the historical
outlines, for example, would have been simply a show of pedantry and served
only to frighten away the ordinary reader.
I have been deeply indebted to the works of other writers, among which I
may mention the following: Peter Kropotkin's _Memoirs of a Revolutionist_
and _Ideals and Realities of Russian Literature_; S. Stepniak's
_Underground Russia_; Leo Deutsch's _Sixteen Years in Siberia_; Alexander
Ular's _Russia from Within_; William English Walling's _Russia's Message_;
Zinovy N. Preev's _The Russian Riddle_; Maxim Litvinov's _The Bolshevik
Revolution: Its Rise and Meaning_; M.J. Olgin's _The Soul of the Russian
Revolution_; A.J. Sack's _The Birth of Russian Democracy_; E.A. Ross's
_Russia in Upheaval_; Isaac Don Levine's _The Russian Revolution_; Bessie
Beatty's _The Red Heart of Russia_; Louise Bryant's _Six Red Months in
Russia_; Leon Trotzky's _Our Revolution_ and _The Bolsheviki and World
Peace_; Gabriel Domergue's _La Russe Rouge_; Nikolai Lenine's _The Soviets
at Work_; Zinoviev and Lenine's _Sozialismus und Krieg_; Emile
Vandervelde's _Trois Aspects de la Révolution Russe_; P.G. Chesnais's _La
Révolution et la Paix_ and _Les Bolsheviks_. I have also freely availed
myself of the many admirable translations of official Bolshevist documents
published in _The Class Struggle_, of New York, a pro-Bolshevist magazine;
the collection of documents published by _The Nation_, of New York, a
journal exceedingly generous in its treatment of Bolshevism and the
Bolsheviki; and of the mass of material published in its excellent
"International Notes" by _Justice_, of London, the oldest Socialist
newspaper in the English language, I believe, and one of the most ably
edited.
Grateful acknowledgment is hereby made of friendly service rendered and
valuable information given by Mr. Alexander Kerensky, former Premier of
Russia; Mr. Henry L. Slobodin, of New York; Mr. A.J. Sack, Director of the
Russian Information Bureau in the United States; Dr. Boris Takavenko,
editor of _La Russia Nuova_, Rome, Italy; Mr. William English Walling, New
York; and my friend, Father Cahill, of Bennington.
Among the Appendices at the end of the volume will be found some important
documents containing some contemporary Russian Socialist judgments of
Bolshevism. These documents are, I venture to suggest, of the utmost
possible value and importance to the student and general reader.
JOHN SPARGO,
"NESTLEDOWN,"
OLD BENNNIGTON, VERMONT,
_End of January, 1919_.
BOLSHEVISM
CHAPTER I
THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
I
For almost a full century Russia has been the theater of a great
revolutionary movement. In the light of Russian history we read with
cynical amusement that in 1848, when all Europe was in a revolutionary
ferment, a German economist confidently predicted that revolutionary
agitation could not live in the peculiar soil of Russian civilization.
August Franz von Haxthausen was in many respects a competent and even a
profound student of Russian politics, but he was wrong in his belief that
the amount of rural communism existing in Russia, particularly the _mir_,
would make it impossible for storms of revolutionary agitation to arise and
stir the national life.
As a matter of historical fact, the ferment of revolution had appeared in
the land of the Czars long before the German economist made his remarkably
ill-judged forecast. At the end of the Napoleonic wars many young officers
of the Russian army returned to their native land full of revolutionary
ideas and ideals acquired in France, Italy, and Germany, and intent upon
action. At first their intention was simply to make an appeal to Alexander
I to grant self-government to Russia, which at one time he had seemed
disposed to do. Soon they found themselves engaged in a secret conspiratory
movement having for its object the overthrow of Czarism. The story of the
failure of these romanticists, the manner in which the abortive attempt at
revolution in December, 1825, was suppressed, and how the leaders were
punished by Nicholas I--these things are well known to most students of
Russian history. The Decembrists, as they came to be called, failed, as
they were bound to do, but it would be a mistake to suppose that their
efforts were altogether vain. On the contrary, their inspiration was felt
throughout the next thirty years and was reflected in the literature of the
period. During that period Russian literature was tinged with the faith in
social regeneration held by most of the cultured intellectual classes. The
Decembrists were the spiritual progenitors of the Russian revolutionary
movement of our time. In the writings of Pushkin--himself a
Decembrist--Lermontoff, Gogol, Turgeniev, Dostoyevsky, and many others less
well known, the influence of the Decembrist movement is clearly manifested.
If we are to select a single figure as the founder of the modern social
revolutionary movement in Russia, that title can be applied to Alexander
Herzen with greater fitness than to any other. His influence upon the
movement during many years was enormous. Herzen was half-German, his mother
being German. He was born at Moscow in 1812, shortly before the French
occupation of the city. His parents were very rich and he enjoyed the
advantages of a splendid education, as well as great luxury. At twenty-two
years of age he was banished to a small town in the Urals, where he spent
six years, returning to Moscow in 1840. It is noteworthy that the offense
for which he had been sent into exile was the singing of songs in praise of
the Decembrist martyrs. This occurred at a meeting of one of the "Students'
Circles" founded by Herzen for the dissemination of revolutionary Socialist
ideals among the students.
Upon his return to Moscow in 1840 Herzen, together with Bakunin and other
friends, again engaged in revolutionary propaganda and in 1842 he was again
exiled. In 1847, through the influence of powerful friends, he received
permission to leave Russia for travel abroad. He never again saw his native
land, all the remaining years of life being spent in exile. After a tour of
Italy, Herzen arrived in Paris on the eve of the Revolution of 1848,
joining there his friends, Bakunin and Turgeniev, and many other
revolutionary leaders. It was impossible for him to participate actively in
the 1848 uprising, owing to the activity of the Paris police, but he
watched the Revolution with the profoundest sympathy. And when it failed
and was followed by the terrible reaction his distress was almost
unbounded. For a brief period he was the victim of the most appalling
pessimism, but after a time his faith returned and he joined with Proudhon
in issuing a radical revolutionary paper, _L'Ami du Peuple_, of which,
Kropotkin tells us in his admirable study of Russian literature, "almost
every number was confiscated by the police of Napoleon the Third." The
paper had a very brief life, and Herzen himself was soon expelled from
France, going to Switzerland, of which country he became a citizen.
In 1857 Herzen settled in London, where he published for some years a
remarkable paper, called _Kolokol (The Bell)_, in which he exposed the
iniquities and shortcomings of Czarism and inspired the youth of Russia
with his revolutionary ideals. The paper had to be smuggled into Russia, of
course, and the manner in which the smuggling was done is one of the most
absorbing stories in all the tragic history of the vast land of the Czars.
Herzen was a charming writer and a keen thinker, and it is impossible to
exaggerate the extent of his influence. But when the freedom of the serfs,
for which he so vigorously contended, was promulgated by Alexander II, and
other extensive reforms were granted, his influence waned. He died in 1870
in Switzerland.
II
Alexander II was not alone in hoping that the Act of Liberation would usher
in a new era of prosperity and tranquillity for Russia. Many of the most
radical of the Intelligentsia, followers of Herzen, believed that Russia
was destined to outstrip the older nations of western Europe in its
democracy and its culture. It was not long before disillusionment came: the
serfs were set free, but the manner in which the land question had been
dealt with made their freedom almost a mockery. As a result there were
numerous uprisings of peasants--riots which the government suppressed in
the most sanguinary manner. From that time until the present the land
question has been the core of the Russian problem. Every revolutionary
movement has been essentially concerned with giving the land to the
peasants.
Within a few months after the liberation of the serfs the revolutionary
unrest was so wide-spread that the government became alarmed and instituted
a policy of vigorous repression. Progressive papers, which had sprung up as
a result of the liberal tendencies characterizing the reign of Alexander
II thus far, were suppressed and many of the leading writers were
imprisoned and exiled. Among those thus punished was that brilliant writer,
Tchernyshevsky, to whom the Russian movement owes so much. His
_Contemporary Review_ was, during the four critical years 1858-62 the
principal forum for the discussion of the problems most vital to the life
of Russia. In it the greatest leaders of Russian thought discussed the land
question, co-operation, communism, popular education, and similar subjects.
This served a twofold purpose: in the first place, it brought to the study
of the pressing problems of the time the ablest and best minds of the
country; secondly, it provided these Intellectuals with a bond of union and
stimulus to serve the poor and the oppressed. That Alexander II had been
influenced to sign the Emancipation Act by Tchernyshevsky and his friends
did not cause the authorities to spare Tchernyshevsky when, in 1863, he
engaged in active Socialist propaganda. He was arrested and imprisoned in a
fortress, where he wrote the novel which has so profoundly influenced two
generations of discontented and protesting Russians--_What is to Be Done?_
In form a novel of thrilling interest, this work was really an elaborate
treatise upon Russian social conditions. It dealt with the vexed problems
of marriage and divorce, the land question, co-operative production, and
other similar matters, and the solutions it suggested for these problems
became widely accepted as the program of revolutionary Russia. Few books in
any literature have ever produced such a profound impression, or exerted as
much influence upon the life of a nation. In the following year, 1864,
Tchernyshevsky was exiled to hard labor in Siberia, remaining there until
1883, when he returned to Russia. He lived only six years longer, dying in
1889.
The attempt made by a young student to assassinate Alexander II, on April
4, 1866, was seized upon by the Czar and his advisers as an excuse for
instituting a policy of terrible reaction. The most repressive measures
were taken against the Intelligentsia and all the liberal reforms which had
been introduced were practically destroyed. It was impossible to restore
serfdom, of course, but the condition of the peasants without land was even
worse than if they had remained serfs. Excessive taxation, heavy redemption
charges, famine, crop failures, and other ills drove the people to
desperation. Large numbers of students espoused the cause of the peasants
and a new popular literature appeared in which the sufferings of the people
were portrayed with fervor and passion. In 1868-69 there were numerous
demonstrations and riots by way of protest against the reactionary policy
of the government.
It was at this time that Michael Bakunin, from his exile in Switzerland,
conspired with Nechaiev to bring about a great uprising of the peasants,
through the Society for the Liberation of the People. Bakunin advised the
students to leave the universities and to go among the people to teach them
and, at the same time, arouse them to revolt. It was at this time, too,
that Nicholas Tchaykovsky and his friends, the famous Circle of
Tchaykovsky, began to distribute among students in all parts of the Empire
books dealing with the condition of the peasants and proposing remedies
therefor. This work greatly influenced the young Intelligentsia, but the
immediate results among the peasants were not very encouraging. Even the
return from Switzerland, by order of the government, of hundreds of
students who were disciples of Bakunin and Peter Lavrov did not produce any
great success.
Very soon a new organization appeared. The remnant of the Circle
Tchaykovsky, together with some followers of Bakunin, formed a society
called the Land and Freedom Society. This society, which was destined to
exert a marked influence upon revolutionary Russia, was the most ambitious
revolutionary effort Russia had known. The society had a constitution and a
carefully worked out program. It had one special group to carry on
propaganda among students; another to agitate among the peasants; and a
third to employ armed force against the government and against those guilty
of treachery toward the society. The basis of the society was the
conviction that Russia needed an economic revolution; that only an economic
revolution, starting with the producers, could overthrow Czarism and
establish the ideal state of society.
The members of this Land and Freedom Society divided their work into four
main divisions: (1) Agitation--passive and active. Passive agitation
included strikes, petitions for reforms, refusal to pay taxes, and so on.
Active agitation meant riots and uprisings. (2) Organization--the formation
of a fighting force prepared to bring about a general uprising. (3)
Education--the spreading of revolutionary knowledge and ideas, a
continuation of the work of the Tchaykovsky Circle. (4) Secularization--the
carrying on of systematic work against the Orthodox Church through special
channels. One of the early leaders of this society was George Plechanov,
who later founded the Russian Social Democracy and gave to the Russian
revolutionary movement its Marxian character, inspiring such men as Nikolai
Lenine and Leon Trotzky, among many others. The society did not attain any
very great amount of success in its efforts to reach the peasants, and it
was that fact more than any other which determined Plechanov's future
course.
III
When the failure of the Land and Freedom methods became evident, and the
government became more and more oppressive, desperate individuals and
groups resorted to acts of terrorism. It was thus that Vera Zasulich
attempted the assassination of the infamous Chief of Police Trepov. The
movement to temper Czarism by assassination systematically pursued was
beginning. In 1879 the Land and Freedom Society held a conference for the
purpose of discussing its program. A majority favored resorting to
terroristic tactics; Plechanov and a few other well-known revolutionists
were opposed--favoring the old methods. The society split, the majority
becoming known as the Will of the People and adopting a terroristic
program. This organization sentenced Czar Alexander II to death and several
unsuccessful attempts were made to carry out the sentence. The leaders
believed that the assassination of the Czar would give rise to a general
revolution throughout the whole of Russia. In February, 1880, occurred the
famous attempt to blow up the Winter Palace. For a time it seemed that the
Czar had learned the lesson the Will of the People sought to teach him, and
that he would institute far-reaching reforms. Pursuing a policy of
vacillation and fear, however, Alexander II soon fell back into the old
attitude. On March 1, 1881, a group of revolutionists, among them Sophia
Perovskaya, made another attempt upon his life, succeeding, at first, only
in damaging the bottom of the Czar's carriage and wounding a number of
Cossack soldiers. "Thank God, I am untouched," said the Czar, in response
to the inquiry of an officer of his guard. "It's too soon to thank God!"
cried N.I. Grinevitsky, hurling a bomb at the Czar. Within a short time
Alexander II and his assailant were both dead.
The assassination of Alexander II was a tragic event for Russia. On the
very morning of his death the ill-fated monarch had approved a plan for
extensive reforms presented by the liberal Minister, Loris-Melikoff. It had
been decided to call a conference three days later and to invite a number
of well-known public men to co-operate in introducing the reforms. These
reforms would not have been far-reaching enough to satisfy the
revolutionists, but they would certainly have improved the situation and
given Russia a new hope. That hope died with Alexander II. His son,
Alexander III, had always been a pronounced reactionary and had advised his
father against making any concessions to the agitators. It was not
surprising, therefore, that he permitted himself to be advised against the
liberals by the most reactionary bureaucrats in the Empire, and to adopt
the most oppressive policies.
The new Czar was greatly influenced by his former tutor, the reactionary
bureaucrat Pobiedonostzev. At first it was believed that out of respect for
his father's memory Alexander III would carry out the program of reforms
formulated by Loris-Melikoff, as his father had promised to do. In a
Manifesto issued on the 29th of April, 1881, Alexander III promised to do
this, but in the same document there were passages which could only be
interpreted as meaning that all demands for constitutional reform would be
resisted and Absolutism upheld at all cost. Doubtless it was due to the
influence of Pobiedonostzev, Procurator of the Holy Synod, that Alexander
III soon abandoned all intention of carrying out his father's wishes in the
matter of reform and instituted such reactionary policies that the peasants
feared that serfdom was to be restored. A terrible persecution of the Jews
was begun, lasting for several years. The Poles, too, felt the oppressive
hand of Pobiedonostzev. The latter was mastered by the Slavophil philosophy
that the revolutionary unrest in Russia was traceable to the diversity of
races, languages, and religions. He believed that Nihilism, Anarchism, and
Socialism flourished because the people were cosmopolitan rather than
nationalistic in experience and feeling, and that peace and stability could
come only from the persistent and vigorous development of the three
principles of Nationality, Orthodoxy, and Autocracy as the basis of the
state.
In this doctrine we have the whole explanation of the reactionary policy of
Alexander III. In the Manifesto of April 29th was announced the Czar's
determination to strengthen and uphold autocracy. That was the foundation
stone. To uphold orthodoxy was the next logical necessity, for autocracy
and orthodoxy were, in Russia, closely related. Hence the non-orthodox
sects--such as the Finnish Protestants, German Lutherans, Polish Roman
Catholics, the Jews, and the Mohammedans--were increasingly restricted in
the observance of their religion. They might not build new places of
worship; their children could not be educated in the faith of their
parents. In many cases children were taken away from their parents in order
to be sent to schools where they would be inculcated with the orthodox
faith. In a similar way, every attempt was made to suppress the use of
languages other than Russian.
Along with this attempt to force the whole population into a single mold
went a determined resistance to liberalism in all its forms. All this was
accompanied by a degree of efficiency in the police service quite unusual
in Russia, with the result that the terroristic tactics of the Will of the
People party were unavailing, except in the cases of a few minor officials.
Plots to assassinate the Czar were laid, but they were generally betrayed
to the police. The most serious of these plots, in March, 1887, led to the
arrest of all the conspirators.
In the mean time there had appeared the first definite Marxian Social
Democratic group in Russia. Plechanov, Vera Zasulich, Leo Deutsch, and
other Russian revolutionists in Switzerland formed the organization known
as the Group for the Emancipation of Labor. This organization was based
upon the principles and tactics of Marxian Socialism and sought to create a
purely proletarian movement. As we have seen, when revolutionary terrorism
was at its height Plechanov and his disciples had proclaimed its futility
and pinned their faith to the nascent class of industrial wage-workers. In
the early 'eighties this class was so small in Russia that it seemed to
many of the best and clearest minds of the revolutionary movement quite
hopeless to rely upon it. Plechanov was derided as a mere theorist and
closet philosopher, but he never wavered in his conviction that Socialism
must come in Russia as the natural outcome of capitalist development. By
means of a number of scholarly polemics against the principles and tactics
of the Will of the People party, Plechanov gathered to his side of the
controversy a group of very brilliant and able disciples, and so laid the
basis for the Social Democratic Labor party. With the relatively rapid
expansion of capitalism, beginning with the year 1888, and the inevitable
increase of the city proletariat, the Marxian movement made great progress.
A strong labor-union movement and a strong political Socialist movement
were thus developed side by side.
At the same time there was a revival of terrorism, the one available reply
of the oppressed to brutal autocracy. While the Marxian movement made
headway among the industrial workers, the older terroristic movement made
headway among the peasants. Various groups appeared in different parts of
the country. When Alexander III died, at the end of 1894, both movements
had developed considerable strength. Working in secret and subject to
terrible measures of repression, their leaders being constantly imprisoned
and exiled, these two wings of the Russian revolutionary movement were
gathering strength in preparation for an uprising more extensive and
serious than anything that had hitherto been attempted.
Whenever a new Czar ascended the throne in Russia it was the fashion to
hope for some measure of reform and for a degree of liberality. Frequently,
as in the case of Alexander III, all such hopes were speedily killed, but
repeated experiences of the kind did not prevent the birth of new hopes
with the death of successive Czars. When, therefore, Alexander III was
succeeded by his son, Nicholas II, liberal Russia expectantly awaited the
promulgation of constitutional reforms. In this they were doomed to
disappointment, just as they had been on the occasion of the accession of
the new Czar's immediate predecessor. Nicholas II was evidently going to be
quite as reactionary as his father was. This was made manifest in a number
of ways. When a deputation from one of the zemstvos, which congratulated
him upon his ascension to the throne, expressed the hope that he would
listen to "the voice of the people and the expression of its desires," the
reply of the new Czar was a grim warning of what was to come. Nicholas II
told the zemstvos that he intended to follow the example of his father and
uphold the principles of Absolutism, and that any thought of participation
by the zemstvos or other organizations of the people in state affairs was a
senseless dream. More significant still, perhaps, was the fact that the
hated Pobiedonostzev was retained in power.
The revolutionists were roused as they had not been for a decade or more.
Some of the leaders believed that the new reign of reaction would prove to
be the occasion and the opportunity for bringing about a union of all the
revolutionary forces, Anarchists and Socialists alike, peasants and
industrial workers. This hope was destined to fail, but there was an
unmistakable revolutionary awakening. In the latter part of January, 1895,
an open letter to Nicholas II was smuggled into the country from
Switzerland and widely distributed. It informed the Czar that the
Socialists would fight to the bitter end the hateful order of things which
he was responsible for creating, and menacingly said, "It will not be long
before you find yourself entangled by it."
IV
In one respect Nicholas II differed from Alexander III--he was by nature
more humane and sentimental. Like his father, he was thoroughly dominated
by Pobiedonostzev's theory that Russia, in order to be secure and stable,
must be based upon Nationality, Orthodoxy, and Autocracy. He wanted to see
Holy Russia homogeneous and free from revolutionary disturbances. But his
sensitive nature shrank from the systematic persecution of the non-orthodox
sects and the Jews, and he quietly intimated to the officials that he would
not approve its continuance. At the same time, he was not willing to face
the issue squarely and openly announce a change of policy or restore
religious freedom. That would have meant the overthrow of Pobiedonostzev
and the Czar's emancipation from his sinister influence, and for that
Nicholas II lacked the necessary courage and stamina. Cowardice and
weakness of the will characterized his reign from the very beginning.
When the officials, in obedience to their ruler's wishes, relaxed the
severity which had marked the treatment of the Jews and the non-orthodox
Christian sects, the change was soon noted by the victims and once more
there was a revival of hope. But the efforts of the Finns to secure a
modification of the Russification policy were quite fruitless. When a
deputation was sent from Finland to represent to the Czar that the rights
and privileges solemnly reserved to them at the time of the annexation were
being denied to the people of Finland, Nicholas II refused to grant the
deputation an audience. Instead of getting relief, the people of Finland
soon found that the oppression steadily increased. It was evident that
Finnish nationality was to be crushed out, if possible, in the interest of
Russian homogeneity.
It soon became apparent, moreover, that Pobiedonostzev was to enjoy even
more power than he had under Alexander III. In proportion as the character
of Nicholas II was weaker than that of his father, the power of the
Procurator of the Holy Synod was greater. And there was a superstitious
element in the mentality of the new Czar which Pobiedonostzev played upon
with infinite cunning. He ruled the weak-willed Czar and filled the
ministries with men who shared his views and upon whom he could rely.
Notwithstanding the Czar's expressed wishes, he soon found ways and means
to add to the persecutions of the Jews and the various non-orthodox
Christian sects. In his determination to hammer the varied racial groups
into a homogeneous nation, he adopted terrible measures and so roused the
hatred of the Finns, Armenians, Georgians, and other subject peoples,
stirring among them passionate resentment and desire for revolutionary
action. It is impossible to conceive of a policy more dangerous to the
dynasty than was conceived and followed by this fanatical Russophil. The
Poles were persecuted and forced, in sheer despair, and by self-interest,
into the revolutionary movement. Armenians were persecuted and their church
lands and church funds confiscated; so they, too, were forced into the
revolutionary current.
Worse than all else was the cruel persecution of the Jews. Not only were
they compelled to live within the Pale of Settlement, but this was so
reduced that abominable congestion and poverty resulted. Intolerable
restrictions were placed upon the facilities for education in the secondary
schools, the gymnasia, and in the universities. It was hoped in this way to
destroy the intellectual leadership of the Jews. Pogroms were instigated,
stirring the civilized world to protest at the horrible outrages. The
Minister of the Interior, Von Plehve, proclaimed his intention to "drown
the Revolution in Jewish blood," while Pobiedonostzev's ambition was "to
force one-third of the Jews to conversion, another third to emigrate"--to
escape persecution. The other third he expected to die of hunger and
misery. When Leo Tolstoy challenged these infamies, and called upon the
civilized world on behalf of the victims, the Holy Synod denounced Tolstoy
and his followers as a sect "especially dangerous for the Orthodox Church
and the state." Later, in 1900, the Holy Synod excommunicated Tolstoy from
the Orthodox Church.
The fatal logic of fanatical fury led to attacks upon the zemstvos. These
local organizations had been instituted in 1864, by Alexander II, in the
liberal years of his reign. Elected mainly by the landlords and the
peasants, they were a vital part of the life of the nation. Possessing no
political powers or functions, having nothing to do with legislation, they
were important agencies of local government. The representatives of each
county constituted a county-zemstvo and the representatives elected by all
the county-zemstvos in a province constituted a province-zemstvo. Both
types concerned themselves with much the same range of activities. They
built roads and telegraph stations; they maintained model farms and
agricultural experiment stations similar to those maintained by our state
governments. They maintained schools, bookstores, and libraries:
co-operative stores; hospitals and banks. They provided the peasants with
cheap credit, good seeds, fertilizers, agricultural implements, and so
forth. In many cases they provided for free medical aid to the peasants. In
some instances they published newspapers and magazines.
It must be remembered that the zemstvos were the only representative public
bodies elected by any large part of the people. While the suffrage was
quite undemocratic, being so arranged that the landlords were assured a
majority over the peasants at all times, nevertheless they did perform a
great democratic service. But for them, life would have been well-nigh
impossible for the peasant. In addition to the services already enumerated,
these civic bodies were the relief agencies of the Empire, and when crop
failures brought famine to the peasants it was always the zemstvos which
undertook the work of relief. Hampered at every point, denied the right to
control the schools they created and maintained, inhibited by law from
discussing political questions, the zemstvos, nevertheless, became the
natural channels for the spreading of discontent and opposition to the
régime through private communication and discussion.
To bureaucrats of the type of Pobiedonostzev and Von Plehve, with their
fanatical belief in autocracy, these organizations of the people were so
many plague spots. Not daring to suppress them altogether, they determined
to restrict them at every opportunity. Some of the zemstvos were suspended
and disbanded for certain periods of time. Individual members were exiled
for utterances which Von Plehve regarded as dangerous. The power of the
zemstvos themselves was lessened by taking from them such important
functions as the provisioning of famine-stricken districts and by limiting
in the most arbitrary manner the amount of the budget permitted to each
zemstvo. Since every decision of the zemstvos was subject to veto by the
governors of the respective provinces, the government had at all times a
formidable weapon at hand to use in its fight against the zemstvos. This
weapon Von Plehve used with great effect; the most reasonable actions of
the zemstvos were vetoed for no other reason than hatred of any sort of
representative government.
V
The result of all this was to drive the zemstvos toward the revolutionary
movements of the peasants and the city workers. That the zemstvos were not
naturally inclined to radicalism and revolution needs no demonstration.
Economic interest, tradition, and environment all conspired to keep these
popular bodies conservative. Landowners were always in the majority and in
general the zemstvos reflected the ideas and ideals of the enlightened
wealthy and cultivated classes. The peasant representatives in the zemstvos
were generally peasants of the most successful and prosperous type, hating
the revolutionists and all their works. By means of a policy incredibly
insane these conservatively inclined elements of the population were goaded
to revolt. The newspapers and magazines of the zemstvos became more and
more critical of the government, more and more outspoken in denunciation of
existing conditions. Presently, the leaders of the zemstvos followed the
example of the revolutionists and held a secret convention at which a
program for common action was agreed upon. Thus they were resorting to
illegal methods, exactly as the Socialists had done. Finally, many of the
liberal zemstvo leaders formed themselves into a political party--the Union
of Liberation--with a special organ of its own, called _Emancipation_. This
organ, edited by the brilliant and courageous Peter Struve, was published
in Stuttgart, Germany, and, since its circulation in Russia was forbidden,
it had to be smuggled into the country and secretly circulated, just as the
revolutionary Socialist journals were. Thus another bond was established
between two very different movements.
As was inevitable, revolutionary terrorism enormously increased. In the
cities the working-men were drawn mainly into the Social Democratic
Working-men's party, founded by Plechanov and others in 1898, but the
peasants, in so far as they were aroused at all, rallied around the
standard of the Socialist-Revolutionists, successors to the Will of the
People party. This party was peculiarly a party of the peasants, just as
the party of Plechanov was peculiarly a party of industrial workers. It
emphasized the land question above all else. It naturally scorned the view,
largely held by the Marxists in the other party, that Russia must wait
until her industrial development was perfected before attempting to realize
Socialism. It scorned the slow, legalistic methods and resolutely answered
the terrorism of Czarism by a terrorism of the people. It maintained a
special department for carrying on this grim work. Its Central Committee
passed sentences of death upon certain officials, and its decrees were
carried out by the members of its Fighting Organization. To this
organization within the party belonged many of the ablest and most
consecrated men and women in Russia.
A few illustrations will suffice to make clear the nature of this
terroristic retaliation: In March, 1902, Sypiagin, the Minister of the
Interior, was shot down as he entered his office by a member of the
Fighting Organization, Stephen Balmashev, who was disguised as an officer.
Sypiagin had been duly sentenced to death by the Central Committee. He had
been responsible for upward of sixty thousand political arrests and for the
suffering of many exiles. Balmashev went to his death with heroic
fortitude. In May, 1903, Gregory Gershuni and two associates executed the
reactionary Governor of Ufa. Early in June, 1904, Borikov, Governor-General
of Finland, was assassinated by a revolutionist. A month later, July 15th,
the infamous Von Plehve, who had been judged by the Central Committee and
held responsible for the Kishinev pogrom, was killed by a bomb thrown under
the wheels of his carriage by Sazanov, a member of the Fighting Force. The
death of this cruel tyrant thrilled the world. In February, 1905, Ivan
Kaliaiev executed the death sentence which had been passed upon the
ruthless Governor-General of Moscow, the Grand-Duke Serghei Alexandrovich.
There was war in Russia--war between two systems of organized terrorism.
Sometimes the Czar and his Ministers weakened and promised concessions, but
always there was speedy reaction and, usually, an increased vigor of
oppression. The assassination of Von Plehve, however, for the first time
really weakened the government. Czarism was, in fact, already toppling. The
new Minister of the Interior, Von Plehve's successor, Prince
Svyatpolk-Mirski, sought to meet the situation by a policy of compromise.
While he maintained Von Plehve's methods of suppressing the radical
organizations and their press, and using provocative agents to entrap
revolutionary leaders, he granted a certain degree of freedom to the
moderate press and adopted a relatively liberal attitude toward the
zemstvos. By this means he hoped to avert the impending revolution.
Taking advantage of the new conditions, the leaders of the zemstvos
organized a national convention. This the government forbade, but it had
lost much of its power and the leaders of the movement ignored the order
and proceeded to hold the convention. At this convention, held at St.
Petersburg, November 6, 1904, attended by many of the ablest lawyers,
doctors, professors, scientists, and publicists in Russia, a resolution was
adopted demanding that the government at once call representatives of the
people together for the purpose of setting up a constitutional government
in Russia. It was a revolutionary act, a challenge to the autocracy, which
the latter dared not accept. On the contrary, in December the Czar issued
an ambiguous ukase in which a number of concessions and reforms were
promised, but carefully avoiding the fundamental issues at stake.
VI
Meanwhile the war with Japan, unpopular from the first, had proved to be an
unbroken series of military defeats and disasters for Russia. From the
opening of the war in February to the end of the year the press had been
permitted to publish very little real news concerning it, but it was not
possible to hide for long the bitter truth. Taxes mounted higher and
higher, prices rose, and there was intense suffering, while the loss of
life was enormous. News of the utter failure and incompetence of the army
and the navy seeped through. Here was Russia with a population three times
as large as that of Japan, and with an annual budget of two billions as
against Japan's paltry sixty millions, defeated at every turn. What did
this failure signify? In the first place, it signified the weakness and
utter incompetence of the régime. It meant that imperialist expansion, with
a corresponding strengthening of the old régime, was out of the question.
Most intelligent Russians, with no lack of real patriotism, rejoiced at the
succession of defeats because it proved to the masses the unfitness of the
bureaucracy.
It signified something else, also. There were many who remembered the
scandals of the Turkish War, in 1877, when Bessarabia was recovered. At
that time there was a perfect riot of graft, corruption, and treachery,
much of which came under the observation of the zemstvos of the border.
High military officials trafficked in munitions and food-supplies. Food
intended for the army was stolen and sold--sometimes, it was said, to the
enemy. Materials were paid for, but never delivered to the army at all. The
army was demoralized and the Turks repulsed the Russians again and again.
Now similar stories began to be circulated. Returning victims told stories
of brutal treatment of the troops by officers; of wounded and dying men
neglected; of lack of hospital care and medical attention. They told worse
stories, too, of open treachery by military officials and others; of army
supplies stolen; of shells ordered which would fit no guns the Russian army
ever had, and so on. It was suggested, and widely believed, that Germany
had connived at the systematic corruption of the Russian bureaucracy and
the Russian army, to serve its own imperialistic and economic ends.
Such was the state of Russia at the end of the year 1904. Then came the
tragic events of January, 1905, which marked the opening of the Revolution.
In order to counteract the agitation of the Social Democrats among the city
workers, and the formation by them of trades-unions, the government had
caused to be formed "legal" unions--that is, organizations of workmen
approved by the government. In order to give these organizations some
semblance to real labor-unions, and thereby the better to deceive the
workers, strikes were actually inspired by agents of the government from
time to time. On more than one occasion strikes thus instigated by the
government spread beyond control and caused great alarm. The Czar and his
agents were playing with fire.
Among such unions was the Gathering of Industrial Working-men of St.
Petersburg, which had for its program such innocent and non-revolutionary
objects as "sober and reasonable pastimes, aimed at physical, intellectual,
and moral improvement; strengthening of Russian national ideas; development
of sensible views concerning the rights and duties of working-men and
improvement of labor conditions and mutual assistance." It was founded by
Father Gapon, who was opposed to the revolutionary movement, and was
regarded by the Socialists as a Czarist tool.
On January 3d--Russian calendar--several thousand men belonging to the
Gathering of Industrial Workin-gmen of St. Petersburg went out on strike.
By the 6th the strike had assumed the dimensions of a general strike. It
was estimated that on the latter date fully one hundred and forty thousand
men were out on strike, practically paralyzing the industrial life of the
city. At meetings of the strikers speeches were made which had as much to
do with the political demands for constitutional government as with the
original grievances of the strikers. The strike was fast becoming a
revolution. On the 9th Father Gapon led the hosts to the Winter Palace, to
present a petition to the Czar asking for reforms. The text of the petition
was widely circulated beforehand. It begged the Czar to order immediately
"that representatives of all the Russian land, of all classes and groups,
convene." It outlined a moderate program which had the support of almost
the entire nation with the exception of the bureaucracy:
Let every one be equal and free in the right of election; order to
this end that election for the Constituent Assembly be based on
general, equal, direct, and secret suffrage. This is our main
request; in it and upon it everything is founded; this is the only
ointment for our painful wounds; and in the absence of this our
blood will continue to flow constantly, carrying us swiftly toward
death.
But this measure alone cannot remedy all our wounds. Many others
are necessary, and we tell them to you, Sire, directly and openly,
as to our Father. We need:
_I. Measures to counteract the ignorance and legal oppression of
the Russian people_:
(1) Personal freedom and inviolability, freedom of speech and the
press, freedom of assemblage, freedom in religious affairs;
(2) General and compulsory public education at the expense of the
state;
(3) Responsibility of the Ministers to the people, and guaranties
of lawfulness in administration;
(4) Equality before the law for all without exemption;
(5) Immediate rehabilitation of those punished for their
convictions.
(6) Separation of the Church from the state.
_II. Measures against the poverty of the people_:
(1) Abolition of indirect taxes and introduction of direct income
taxes on a progressive scale;
(2) Abolition of the redemption payments, cheap credit, and
gradual transferring of the land to the people;
(3) The orders for the naval and military Ministers should be
filled in Russia and not abroad;
(4) The cessation of the war by the will of the people.
_III. Measures against oppression of labor by capital_:
(1) Protection of labor by legislation;
(2) Freedom of consumers' and producers' leagues and
trades-unions;
(3) An eight-hour workday and a regulation of overtime;
(4) Freedom of struggle against capital (freedom of labor
strikes);
(5) Participation of labor representatives in the framing of a
bill concerning state insurance of working-men;
(6) Normal wages.
Those are, Sire, the principal wants with which we have come to
you. Let your decree be known, swear that you will satisfy them,
and you will make Russia happy and glorious, and your name will be
branded in our hearts and in the hearts of our posterity for ever
and ever. If, however, you will not reply to our prayer, we shall
die here, on the place before your palace. We have no other refuge
and no other means. We have two roads before us, one to freedom
and happiness, the other to the grave. Tell us, Sire, which, and
we will follow obediently, and if it be the road of death, let our
lives be a sacrifice for suffering-wearied Russia. We do not
regret the sacrifice; we bring it willingly.
Led on by the strange, hypnotic power of the mystical Father Gapon, who was
clad in the robes of his office, tens of thousands of working-people
marched that day to the Winter Palace, confident that the Czar would see
them, receive their petitions, and harken to their prayers. It was not a
revolutionary demonstration in the accepted sense of that term; the
marchers did not carry red flags nor sing Socialist songs of revolt.
Instead, they bore pictures of the Czar and other members of the royal
family and sang "God Save the Czar" and other well-known religious hymns.
No attempt was made to prevent the procession from reaching the square in
front of the Winter Palace. Suddenly, without a word of warning, troops
appeared from the courtyards, where they were hidden, and fired into the
crowded mass of human beings, killing more than five hundred and wounding
nearly three thousand. All who were able to do so turned and fled, among
them Father Gapon.
Bloody Sunday, as the day is known in Russian annals, is generally regarded
as the beginning of the First Revolution. Immediately people began to talk
of armed resistance. On the evening of the day of the tragedy there was a
meeting of more than seven hundred Intellectuals at which the means for
carrying on revolution was the topic discussed. This was the first of many
similar gatherings which took place all over Russia. Soon the Intellectuals
began to organize unions, ostensibly for the protection of their
professional interests, but in reality for political purposes. There were
unions of doctors, writers, lawyers, engineers, professors, editors, and so
on. Quietly, and almost without design, there was being effected another
and more important union, namely, the union of all classes against
autocracy and despotism.
The Czar gave from his private purse fifty thousand rubles for the relief
of the families of the victims of Bloody Sunday. On the 19th of January he
received a deputation of carefully selected "loyal" working-men and
delivered to them a characteristic homily, which infuriated the masses by
its stupid perversion of the facts connected with the wanton massacre of
Bloody Sunday. Then, at the end of the month, he proclaimed the appointment
of a commission to "investigate the causes of labor unrest in St.
Petersburg and its suburbs and to find means of avoiding them in the
future." This commission was to consist of representatives of capital and
labor. The working-men thereupon made the following demands:
(1) That labor be given an equal number of members in the commission with
capital;
(2) That the working-men be permitted to freely elect their own
representatives;
(3) That the sessions of the commission be open to the public;
(4) That there be complete freedom of speech for the representatives of
labor in the commission;
(5) That all the working-people arrested on January 9th be released.
These demands of the working-men's organizations were rejected by the
government, whereupon the workers agreed to boycott the commission and
refuse to have anything to do with it. At last it became evident to the
government that, in the circumstances, the commission could not accomplish
any good, and it was therefore abandoned. The Czar and his advisers were
desperate and vacillating. One day they would adopt a conciliatory attitude
toward the workers, and the next day follow it up with fresh measures of
repression and punishment.
Little heeding the stupid charge by the Holy Synod that the revolutionary
leaders were in the pay of the Japanese, the workers went on organizing and
striking. All over Russia there were strikes, the movement had spread far
beyond the bounds of St. Petersburg. General strikes took place in many of
the large cities, such as Riga, Vilna, Libau, Warsaw, Lodz, Batum, Minsk,
Tiflis, and many others. Conflicts between strikers and soldiers and police
were common. Russia was aflame with revolution. The movement spread to the
peasants in a most surprising manner. Numerous extensive and serious
revolts of peasants occurred in different parts of Russia, the peasants
looting the mansions of the landowners, and indulging in savage outbreaks
of rioting.
While this was going on the army was being completely demoralized. The
terrible defeat of the Russian forces by the Japanese--the foe that had
been so lightly regarded--at Mukden was a crushing blow which greatly
impaired the morale of the troops, both those at home and those at the
front. Disaster followed upon disaster. May saw the destruction of the
great Russian fleet. In June rebellion broke out in the navy, and the crew
of the battle-ship _Potyamkin_, which was on the Black Sea, mutinied and
hoisted the red flag. After making prisoners of their officers, the sailors
hastened to lend armed assistance to striking working-men at Odessa who
were in conflict with soldiers and police.
VII
It was a time of turbulent unrest and apparent utter confusion. It was not
easy to discern the underlying significance and purpose of some of the most
important events. On every hand there were strikes and uprisings, many of
them without any sort of leadership or plan. Strikes which began over
questions of wages and hours became political demonstrations in favor of a
Constituent Assembly. On the other hand, political demonstrations became
transformed, without any conscious effort on the part of anybody, into
strikes for immediate economic betterment. There was an intense class
conflict going on in Russia, as the large number of strikes for increased
wages and shorter hours proved, yet the larger political struggle dwarfed
and obscured the class struggle. For the awakened proletariat of the
cities the struggle in which they were engaged was economic as well as
political. They wisely regarded the political struggle as part of the class
struggle, as Plechanov and his friends declared it to be. Yet the fact
remained that the capitalist class against which the proletariat was
fighting on the economic field was, for the most part, fighting against
autocracy, for the overthrow of Czarism and the establishment of political
democracy, as earnestly, if less violently, than the proletariat was. The
reason for this was the recognition by the leading capitalists of Russia of
the fact that industrial progress was retarded by the old régime, and that
capitalist development requires popular education, a relatively high
standard of living, political freedom, and stability and order in
government. It was perfectly natural, therefore, for the great associations
of manufacturers and merchants to unite in urging the government to grant
extensive political reforms so long as the class conflict was merely
incidental.
What had begun mainly as a class war had become the war of all classes
against autocracy. Of course, in such a merging of classes there
necessarily appeared many shadings and degrees of interest. Not all the
social groups and classes were as radical in their demands as the organized
peasants and city workers, who were the soul of the revolutionary movement.
There were, broadly speaking, two great divisions of social life with which
the Revolution was concerned--the political and the economic. With regard
to the first there was practical unanimity; he would be a blind slave to
theoretical formulæ who sought to maintain the thesis that class interests
divided masses and classes here. All classes, with the exception of the
bureaucracy, wanted the abolition of Czarism and Absolutism and the
establishment of a constitutional government, elected by the people on a
basis of universal suffrage, and directly responsible to the electorate.
Upon the economic issue there was less agreement, though all parties and
classes recognized the need of extensive change. It was universally
recognized that some solution of the land question must be found. There can
never be social peace or political stability in Russia until that problem
is settled. Now, it was easy for the Socialist groups, on the one hand, and
the moderate groups, upon the other, to unite in demanding that the large
estates be divided among the peasants. But while the Socialist
groups--those of the peasants as well as those of city workers--demanded
that the land be taken without compensation, the bourgeois elements,
especially the leaders of the zemstvos, insisted that the state should pay
compensation for the land taken. Judgment upon this vital question has long
been embittered by the experience of the peasants with the "redemption
payments" which were established when serfdom was abolished. During the
period of greatest intensity, the summer of 1905, a federation of the
various revolutionary peasants' organizations was formed and based its
policy upon the middle ground of favoring the payment of compensation _in
some cases_.
All through this trying period the Czar and his advisers were temporizing
and attempting to obtain peace by means of petty concessions. A greater
degree of religious liberty was granted, and a new representative body, the
Imperial Duma, was provided for. This body was not to be a parliament in
any real sense, but a debating society. It could _discuss_ proposed
legislation, but it had no powers to _enact_ legislation of any kind.
Absolutism was dying hard, clinging to its powers with remarkable tenacity.
Of course, the concessions did not satisfy the revolutionists, not even
the most moderate sections, and the net result was to intensify rather than
to diminish the flame.
On the 2d of August--10th, according to the old Russian calendar--the war
with Japan came to an end with the signing of the Treaty of Portsmouth.
Russia had experienced humiliating and disastrous defeat at the hands of a
nation far inferior in population and wealth, but infinitely superior in
military capacity and morale. The news of the conditions of peace
intensified the ardor and determination of the revolting Russian people
and, on the other hand, added to the already great weakness of the
government. September witnessed a great revival of revolutionary agitation,
and by the end of the month a fresh epidemic of strikes had broken out in
various parts of the country. By the middle of October the whole life of
Russia, civil, industrial, and commercial, was a chaos. In some of the
cities the greater part of the population had placed themselves in a state
of siege, under revolutionary leadership.
On the 17th of October--Russian style--the Czar issued the famous Manifesto
which acknowledged the victory of the people and the death of Absolutism.
After the usual amount of pietistic verbiage by way of introduction the
Manifesto said:
We make it the duty of the government to execute our firm will:
(1) To grant the people the unshakable foundations of civic
freedom on the basis of real personal inviolability, freedom of
conscience, of speech, of assemblage of unions.
(2) To admit now to participation in the Imperial Duma, without
stopping the pending elections and in so far as it is feasible in
the short time remaining before the convening of the Duma, all the
classes of the population, _leaving the farther development of the
principle of universal suffrage to the new legislative order._
(3) _To establish as an unshakable rule that no law can become
binding without the consent of the Imperial Duma, and that the
representatives of the people must be guaranteed a real
participation in the control over the lawfulness of the
authorities appointed by us_.
We call upon all faithful sons of Russia to remember their duty to
their fatherland, to aid in putting an end to the unprecedented
disturbances, and to exert with us all their power to restore
quiet and peace in our native land.
VIII
The Czar's Manifesto rang through the civilized world. In all lands it was
hailed as the end of despotism and the triumph of democracy and freedom.
The joy of the Russian people was unbounded. At last, after fourscore years
of heroic struggle and sacrifice by countless heroes, named and nameless,
the goal of freedom was attained. Men, women, and children sang in the
streets to express their joy. Red flags were displayed everywhere and
solemnly saluted by the officers and men of the Czar's army. But the
rejoicing was premature, as the events of a few hours clearly proved. With
that fatal vacillation which characterized his whole life, Nicholas II had
no sooner issued his Manifesto than he surrendered once more to the evil
forces by which he was surrounded and harked back to the old ways. The day
following the issuance of the Manifesto, while the people were still
rejoicing, there began a series of terrible pogroms. The cry went forth,
"Kill the Intellectuals and the Jews!"
There had been organized in support of the government, and by its agents,
bodies of so-called "patriots." These were, in the main, recruited from the
underworld, a very large number of them being criminals who were released
from the prison for the purpose. Officially known as the Association of
the Russian People and the Association to Combat the Revolution, these
organizations were popularly nicknamed the Black Hundreds. Most of the
members were paid directly by the government for their services, while
others were rewarded with petty official positions. The Czar himself
accepted membership in these infamous organizations of hired assassins.
Within three weeks after the issuance of the Manifesto more than a hundred
organized pogroms took place, the number of killed amounting to nearly four
thousand; the wounded to more than ten thousand, according to the most
competent authorities. In Odessa alone more than one thousand persons were
killed and many thousands wounded in a four-days' massacre. In all the
bloody pages of the history of the Romanovs there is nothing comparable to
the frightful terror of this period.
Naturally, this brutal vengeance and the deception which Nicholas II and
his advisers had practised upon the people had the immediate effect of
increasing the relative strength and prestige of the Socialists in the
revolutionary movement as against the less radical elements. To meet such
brutality and force only the most extreme measures were deemed adequate.
The Council of Workmen's Deputies, which had been organized by the
proletariat of St. Petersburg a few days before the Czar issued his
Manifesto, now became a great power, the central guiding power of the
Revolution. Similar bodies were organized in other great cities. The
example set by the city workers was followed by the peasants in many places
and Councils of Peasants' Deputies were organized. In a few cases large
numbers of soldiers, making common cause with these bodies representing the
working class, formed Councils of Soldiers' Deputies. Here, then, was a new
phenomenon; betrayed by the state, weary of the struggle to democratize
and liberalize the political state, the workers had established a sort of
revolutionary self-government of a new kind, entirely independent of the
state. We shall never comprehend the later developments in Russia,
especially the phenomenon of Bolshevism, unless we have a sympathetic
understanding of these Soviets--autonomous, non-political units of
working-class self-government, composed of delegates elected directly by
the workers.
As the revolutionary resistance to the Black Hundreds increased, and the
rapidly growing Soviets of workmen's, peasants' and soldiers' delegates
asserted a constantly increasing indifference to the existing political
state, the government again tried to stem the tide by making concessions.
On November 3d--new style--in a vain attempt to appease the incessant
demand for the release of the thousands of political prisoners, and to put
an end to the forcible release of such prisoners by infuriated mobs, a
partial amnesty was declared. On the 16th a sop was thrown to the peasants
in the shape of a decree abolishing all the remaining land-redemption
payments. Had this reform come sooner it might have had the effect of
stemming the tide of revolt among the peasants, but in the circumstances it
was of no avail. Early in December the press censorship was abolished by
decree, but that was of very little importance, for the radical press had
thrown off all its restraints, simply ignoring the censorship. The
government of Nicholas II was quite as helpless as it was tyrannical,
corrupt, and inefficient. The army and navy, demoralized by the defeat
suffered at the hands of Japan, and especially by knowledge of the
corruption in high places which made that defeat inevitable, were no longer
dependable. Tens of thousands of soldiers and marines had joined with the
workmen in the cities in open rebellion. Many more indulged themselves in
purposeless rioting.
The organization of the various councils of delegates representing
factory-workers and peasants, inevitable as it seemed to be, had one
disastrous effect, the seriousness of which cannot be overstated. As we
have seen, the cruel, blundering policy of the government had united all
classes against it in a revolutionary movement of unexampled magnitude.
Given the conditions prevailing in Russia, and especially the lack of
industrial development and the corresponding numerical weakness of the
industrial proletariat, it was evident that the only chance of success in
the Revolution lay in the united effort of all classes against the old
régime. Nothing could have better served the autocracy, and therefore
injured the revolutionary cause, than the creation of a division in the
ranks of the revolutionists.
This was exactly what the separate organizations of the working class
accomplished. All the provocative agents of the Czar could not have
contrived anything so serviceable to the reaction. _Divide et impera_ has
been the guiding principle of cunning despots in all ages, and the astutest
advisers of Nicholas II must have grinned with Satanic glee when they
realized how seriously the forces they were contending against were
dividing. Stupid oppression had driven into one united force the
wage-earning and wage-paying classes. Working-men and manufacturers made
common cause against that stupid oppression. Now, however, as the
inevitable result of the organization of the Soviets, and the predominance
of these in the Revolution, purely economic issues came to the front. In
proportion as the class struggle between employers and employed was
accentuated the common struggle against autocracy was minimized and
obscured. Numerous strikes for increased wages occurred, forcing the
employers to organize resistance. Workers in one city--St. Petersburg, for
example--demanded the immediate introduction of an eight-hour workday, and
proclaimed it to be in force, quite regardless of the fact that longer
hours prevailed elsewhere and that, given the competitive system, their
employers were bound to resist a demand that would be a handicap favoring
their competitors.
As might have been foreseen, the employers were forced to rely upon the
government, the very government they had denounced and conspired to
overthrow. The president of the Council of Workmen's Deputies of St.
Petersburg, Chrustalev-Nosar, in his _History of the Council of Workmen's
Deputies_, quotes the order adopted by acclamation on November 11th--new
style--introducing, from November 13th, an eight-hour workday in all shops
and factories "in a revolutionary way." By way of commentary, he quotes a
further order, adopted November 25, repealing the former order and
declaring:
The government, headed by Count Witte, _in its endeavor to break
the vigor of the revolutionary proletariat, came to the support of
capital_, thus turning the question of an eight-hour workday in
St. Petersburg into a national problem. The consequence has been
that the working-men of St. Petersburg are unable now, apart from
the working-men of the entire country, to realize the decree of
the Council. The Council of Workmen's Deputies, therefore, deems
it necessary to _stop temporarily the immediate and general
establishment of an eight-hour workday by force_.
The Councils inaugurated general strike after general strike. At first
these strikes were successful from a revolutionary point of view. Soon,
however, it became apparent that the general strike is a weapon which can
only be used effectively on rare occasions. It is impossible to rekindle
frequently and at will the sacrificial passion necessary to make a
successful general strike. This the leaders of the proletariat of Russia
overlooked. They overlooked, also, the fact that the masses of the workers
were exhausted by the long series of strikes in which they had engaged and
were on the verge of starvation. The consequence was that most of the later
strikes failed to accomplish anything like the ends sought.
Naturally, the government was recovering its confidence and its courage in
proportion to the class divisions and antagonisms of the opposition. It
once more suppressed the revolutionary press and prohibited meetings. Once
more it proclaimed martial law in many cities. With all its old-time
assurance it caused the arrest of the leaders of the unions of workmen and
peasants, broke up the organizations and imprisoned their officers. It
issued a decree which made it a crime to participate in strikes. With the
full sanction of the government, as was shown by the publication of
documentary evidence of unquestioned authenticity, the Black Hundreds
renewed their brutality. The strong Council of Workmen's Deputies of St.
Petersburg, with which Witte had dealt as though it were part of the
government itself, was broken up and suppressed. Witte wanted
constitutional government on the basis of the October Manifesto, but he
wanted the orderly development of Russian capitalism. In this attitude he
was supported, of course, by the capitalist organizations. The very men who
in the summer of 1905 had demanded that the government grant the demands of
the workers and so end the strikes, and who worked in unison with the
workers to secure the much-desired political freedom, six months later were
demanding that the government suppress the strikes and exert its force to
end disorder.
Recognition of these facts need not imply any lack of sympathy with the
proletariat in their demands. The class struggle in modern industrial
society is a fact, and there is abundant justification--the justification
of necessity and of achievement--for aggressive class consciousness and
class warfare. But it is quite obvious that there are times when class
interests and class warfare must be set aside in favor of larger social
interests. It is obviously dangerous and reactionary--and therefore
wrong--to insist upon strikes or other forms of class warfare in moments of
great calamity, as, for example, during disasters like the Johnstown flood
and the Messina earthquake, or amid the ravages of a pestilential plague.
Marx, to whom we owe the formulation of the theory of class struggle which
has guided the Socialist movement, would never have questioned this
important truth; he would never have supported class separatism under
conditions such as those prevailing in Russia at the end of 1905. Only
doctrinaires, slaves to formulæ, but blind to reality, could have
sanctioned such separatism. But doctrinaires always abound in times of
revolution.
By December the government was stronger than it had been at any time since
the Revolution began. The zemstvos were no longer an active part of the
revolutionary movement. Indeed, there had come over these bodies a great
change, and most of them were now dominated by relatively reactionary
landowners who, hitherto apathetic and indifferent, had been stirred to
defensive action by the aggressive class warfare of the workers.
Practically all the bourgeois moderates had been driven to the more or less
open support of the government. December witnessed a new outburst in St.
Petersburg, Moscow, and other cities. Barricades were raised in the streets
in many places. In Moscow, where the most bitter and sanguinary struggles
took place, more than a thousand persons were killed. The government was
better prepared than the workers; the army had recovered no little of its
lost morale and did not refuse to shoot down the workers as it had done on
previous occasions. The strikes and insurrections were put down in bloody
vengeance and there followed a reign of brutal repression indescribably
horrible and savage. By way of protest and retaliation, there were
individual acts of terrorism, such as the execution of the Governor of
Tambov by Marie Spiridonova, but these were of little or no avail. The
First Revolution was drowned in blood and tears.