it. Let us turn and wash it white in the spirit, if not the blood, of the
Revolution. Let us turn slavery from its claims of "moral right," back
upon its existing legal rights and its arguments of "necessity." Let us
return it to the position our fathers gave it, and there let it rest in
peace. Let us readopt the Declaration of Independence, and with it the
practices and policy which harmonize with it. Let North and South, let all
Americans--let all lovers of liberty everywhere join in the great and good
work. If we do this, we shall not only have saved the Union, but we shall
have so saved it as to make and to keep it forever worthy of the saving.
We shall have so saved it that the succeeding millions of free happy
people the world over shall rise up and call us blessed to the latest
generations.
At Springfield, twelve days ago, where I had spoken substantially as I
have here, Judge Douglas replied to me; and as he is to reply to me here,
I shall attempt to anticipate him by noticing some of the points he made
there. He commenced by stating I had assumed all the way through that the
principle of the Nebraska Bill would have the effect of extending slavery.
He denied that this was intended or that this effect would follow.
I will not reopen the argument upon this point. That such was the
intention the world believed at the start, and will continue to believe.
This was the countenance of the thing, and both friends and enemies
instantly recognized it as such. That countenance cannot now be changed by
argument. You can as easily argue the color out of the negro's skin. Like
the "bloody hand," you may wash it and wash it, the red witness of guilt
still sticks and stares horribly at you.
Next he says that Congressional intervention never prevented slavery
anywhere; that it did not prevent it in the Northwestern Territory, nor
in Illinois; that, in fact, Illinois came into the Union as a slave State;
that the principle of the Nebraska Bill expelled it from Illinois, from
several old States, from everywhere.
Now this is mere quibbling all the way through. If the Ordinance of '87
did not keep slavery out of the Northwest Territory, how happens it that
the northwest shore of the Ohio River is entirely free from it, while the
southeast shore, less than a mile distant, along nearly the whole length
of the river, is entirely covered with it?
If that ordinance did not keep it out of Illinois, what was it that made
the difference between Illinois and Missouri? They lie side by side, the
Mississippi River only dividing them, while their early settlements were
within the same latitude. Between 1810 and 1820 the number of slaves in
Missouri increased 7211, while in Illinois in the same ten years they
decreased 51. This appears by the census returns. During nearly all of
that ten years both were Territories, not States. During this time the
ordinance forbade slavery to go into Illinois, and nothing forbade it to
go into Missouri. It did go into Missouri, and did not go into Illinois.
That is the fact. Can any one doubt as to the reason of it? But he says
Illinois came into the Union as a slave State. Silence, perhaps, would
be the best answer to this flat contradiction of the known history of the
country. What are the facts upon which this bold assertion is based? When
we first acquired the country, as far back as 1787, there were some slaves
within it held by the French inhabitants of Kaskaskia. The territorial
legislation admitted a few negroes from the slave States as indentured
servants. One year after the adoption of the first State constitution,
the whole number of them was--what do you think? Just one hundred and
seventeen, while the aggregate free population was 55,094,--about four
hundred and seventy to one. Upon this state of facts the people framed
their constitution prohibiting the further introduction of slavery, with
a sort of guaranty to the owners of the few indentured servants, giving
freedom to their children to be born thereafter, and making no mention
whatever of any supposed slave for life. Out of this small matter the
Judge manufactures his argument that Illinois came into the Union as a
slave State. Let the facts be the answer to the argument.
The principles of the Nebraska Bill, he says, expelled slavery from
Illinois. The principle of that bill first planted it here--that is, it
first came because there was no law to prevent it, first came before we
owned the country; and finding it here, and having the Ordinance of '87 to
prevent its increasing, our people struggled along, and finally got rid of
it as best they could.
But the principle of the Nebraska Bill abolished slavery in several of the
old States. Well, it is true that several of the old States, in the last
quarter of the last century, did adopt systems of gradual emancipation by
which the institution has finally become extinct within their limits; but
it may or may not be true that the principle of the Nebraska Bill was
the cause that led to the adoption of these measures. It is now more
than fifty years since the last of these States adopted its system of
emancipation.
If the Nebraska Bill is the real author of the benevolent works, it
is rather deplorable that it has for so long a time ceased working
altogether. Is there not some reason to suspect that it was the principle
of the Revolution, and not the principle of the Nebraska Bill, that led
to emancipation in these old States? Leave it to the people of these old
emancipating States, and I am quite certain they will decide that neither
that nor any other good thing ever did or ever will come of the Nebraska
Bill.
In the course of my main argument, Judge Douglas interrupted me to say
that the principle of the Nebraska Bill was very old; that it originated
when God made man, and placed good and evil before him, allowing him to
choose for himself, being responsible for the choice he should make. At
the time I thought this was merely playful, and I answered it accordingly.
But in his reply to me he renewed it as a serious argument. In
seriousness, then, the facts of this proposition are not true as stated.
God did not place good and evil before man, telling him to make his
choice. On the contrary, he did tell him there was one tree of the fruit
of which he should not eat, upon pain of certain death. I should scarcely
wish so strong a prohibition against slavery in Nebraska.
But this argument strikes me as not a little remarkable in another
particular--in its strong resemblance to the old argument for the "divine
right of kings." By the latter, the king is to do just as he pleases with
his white subjects, being responsible to God alone. By the former,
the white man is to do just as he pleases with his black slaves, being
responsible to God alone. The two things are precisely alike, and it is
but natural that they should find similar arguments to sustain them.
I had argued that the application of the principle of self-government, as
contended for, would require the revival of the African slave trade; that
no argument could be made in favor of a man's right to take slaves to
Nebraska which could not be equally well made in favor of his right
to bring them from the coast of Africa. The Judge replied that the
Constitution requires the suppression of the foreign slave trade, but
does not require the prohibition of slavery in the Territories. That is a
mistake in point of fact. The Constitution does not require the action of
Congress in either case, and it does authorize it in both. And so there is
still no difference between the cases.
In regard to what I have said of the advantage the slave States have over
the free in the matter of representation, the Judge replied that we in
the free States count five free negroes as five white people, while in
the slave States they count five slaves as three whites only; and that the
advantage, at last, was on the side of the free States.
Now, in the slave States they count free negroes just as we do; and it so
happens that, besides their slaves, they have as many free negroes as we
have, and thirty thousand over. Thus, their free negroes more than balance
ours; and their advantage over us, in consequence of their slaves, still
remains as I stated it.
In reply to my argument that the compromise measures of 1850 were a system
of equivalents, and that the provisions of no one of them could fairly
be carried to other subjects without its corresponding equivalent being
carried with it, the Judge denied outright that these measures had any
connection with or dependence upon each other. This is mere desperation.
If they had no connection, why are they always spoken of in connection?
Why has he so spoken of them a thousand times? Why has he constantly
called them a series of measures? Why does everybody call them a
compromise? Why was California kept out of the Union six or seven months,
if it was not because of its connection with the other measures? Webster's
leading definition of the verb "to compromise" is "to adjust and settle
a difference, by mutual agreement, with concessions of claims by the
parties." This conveys precisely the popular understanding of the word
"compromise."
We knew, before the Judge told us, that these measures passed separately,
and in distinct bills, and that no two of them were passed by the votes of
precisely the same members. But we also know, and so does he know, that
no one of them could have passed both branches of Congress but for the
understanding that the others were to pass also. Upon this understanding,
each got votes which it could have got in no other way. It is this fact
which gives to the measures their true character; and it is the universal
knowledge of this fact that has given them the name of "compromises," so
expressive of that true character.
I had asked: "If, in carrying the Utah and New Mexico laws to Nebraska,
you could clear away other objection, how could you leave Nebraska
'perfectly free' to introduce slavery before she forms a constitution,
during her territorial government, while the Utah and New Mexico laws
only authorize it when they form constitutions and are admitted into the
Union?" To this Judge Douglas answered that the Utah and New Mexico laws
also authorized it before; and to prove this he read from one of their
laws, as follows: "That the legislative power of said Territory shall
extend to all rightful subjects of legislation, consistent with the
Constitution of the United States and the provisions of this act."
Now it is perceived from the reading of this that there is nothing express
upon the subject, but that the authority is sought to be implied merely
for the general provision of "all rightful subjects of legislation." In
reply to this I insist, as a legal rule of construction, as well as the
plain, popular view of the matter, that the express provision for Utah and
New Mexico coming in with slavery, if they choose, when they shall form
constitutions, is an exclusion of all implied authority on the same
subject; that Congress having the subject distinctly in their minds
when they made the express provision, they therein expressed their whole
meaning on that subject.
The Judge rather insinuated that I had found it convenient to forget the
Washington territorial law passed in 1853. This was a division of Oregon,
organizing the northern part as the Territory of Washington. He asserted
that by this act the Ordinance of '87, theretofore existing in Oregon, was
repealed; that nearly all the members of Congress voted for it, beginning
in the House of Representatives with Charles Allen of Massachusetts, and
ending with Richard Yates of Illinois; and that he could not understand
how those who now opposed the Nebraska Bill so voted there, unless it was
because it was then too soon after both the great political parties had
ratified the compromises of 1850, and the ratification therefore was too
fresh to be then repudiated.
Now I had seen the Washington act before, and I have carefully examined it
since; and I aver that there is no repeal of the Ordinance of '87, or of
any prohibition of slavery, in it. In express terms, there is absolutely
nothing in the whole law upon the subject--in fact, nothing to lead a
reader to think of the subject. To my judgment it is equally free from
everything from which repeal can be legally implied; but, however this
may be, are men now to be entrapped by a legal implication, extracted from
covert language, introduced perhaps for the very purpose of entrapping
them? I sincerely wish every man could read this law quite through,
carefully watching every sentence and every line for a repeal of the
Ordinance of '87, or anything equivalent to it.
Another point on the Washington act: If it was intended to be modeled
after the Utah and New Mexico acts, as Judge Douglas insists, why was it
not inserted in it, as in them, that Washington was to come in with or
without slavery as she may choose at the adoption of her constitution?
It has no such provision in it; and I defy the ingenuity of man to give a
reason for the omission, other than that it was not intended to follow the
Utah and New Mexico laws in regard to the question of slavery.
The Washington act not only differs vitally from the Utah and New Mexico
acts, but the Nebraska act differs vitally from both. By the latter
act the people are left "perfectly free" to regulate their own domestic
concerns, etc.; but in all the former, all their laws are to be submitted
to Congress, and if disapproved are to be null. The Washington act goes
even further; it absolutely prohibits the territorial Legislature, by very
strong and guarded language, from establishing banks or borrowing money on
the faith of the Territory. Is this the sacred right of self-government
we hear vaunted so much? No, sir; the Nebraska Bill finds no model in the
acts of '50 or the Washington act. It finds no model in any law from Adam
till to-day. As Phillips says of Napoleon, the Nebraska act is grand,
gloomy and peculiar, wrapped in the solitude of its own originality,
without a model and without a shadow upon the earth.
In the course of his reply Senator Douglas remarked in substance that he
had always considered this government was made for the white people and
not for the negroes. Why, in point of mere fact, I think so too. But in
this remark of the Judge there is a significance which I think is the key
to the great mistake (if there is any such mistake) which he has made
in this Nebraska measure. It shows that the Judge has no very vivid
impression that the negro is human, and consequently has no idea that
there can be any moral question in legislating about him. In his view the
question of whether a new country shall be slave or free is a matter of as
utter indifference as it is whether his neighbor shall plant his farm with
tobacco or stock it with horned cattle. Now, whether this view is right
or wrong, it is very certain that the great mass of mankind take a totally
different view. They consider slavery a great moral wrong, and their
feeling against it is not evanescent, but eternal. It lies at the very
foundation of their sense of justice, and it cannot be trifled with. It
is a great and durable element of popular action, and I think no statesman
can safely disregard it.
Our Senator also objects that those who oppose him in this matter do not
entirely agree with one another. He reminds me that in my firm adherence
to the constitutional rights of the slave States I differ widely from
others who are cooperating with me in opposing the Nebraska Bill, and he
says it is not quite fair to oppose him in this variety of ways. He should
remember that he took us by surprise--astounded us by this measure. We
were thunderstruck and stunned, and we reeled and fell in utter confusion.
But we rose, each fighting, grasping whatever he could first reach--a
scythe, a pitchfork, a chopping-ax, or a butcher's cleaver. We struck in
the direction of the sound, and we were rapidly closing in upon him. He
must not think to divert us from our purpose by showing us that our drill,
our dress, and our weapons are not entirely perfect and uniform. When the
storm shall be past he shall find us still Americans, no less devoted to
the continued union and prosperity of the country than heretofore.
Finally, the Judge invokes against me the memory of Clay and Webster, They
were great men, and men of great deeds. But where have I assailed them?
For what is it that their lifelong enemy shall now make profit by assuming
to defend them against me, their lifelong friend? I go against the repeal
of the Missouri Compromise; did they ever go for it? They went for the
Compromise of 1850; did I ever go against them? They were greatly devoted
to the Union; to the small measure of my ability was I ever less so? Clay
and Webster were dead before this question arose; by what authority shall
our Senator say they would espouse his side of it if alive? Mr. Clay was
the leading spirit in making the Missouri Compromise; is it very credible
that if now alive he would take the lead in the breaking of it? The truth
is that some support from Whigs is now a necessity with the Judge, and for
this it is that the names of Clay and Webster are invoked. His old friends
have deserted him in such numbers as to leave too few to live by. He
came to his own, and his own received him not; and lo! he turns unto the
Gentiles.
A word now as to the Judge's desperate assumption that the compromises of
1850 had no connection with one another; that Illinois came into the Union
as a slave State, and some other similar ones. This is no other than a
bold denial of the history of the country. If we do not know that the
compromises of 1850 were dependent on each other; if we do not know that
Illinois came into the Union as a free State,--we do not know anything.
If we do not know these things, we do not know that we ever had a
Revolutionary War or such a chief as Washington. To deny these things is
to deny our national axioms,--or dogmas, at least,--and it puts an end to
all argument. If a man will stand up and assert, and repeat and reassert,
that two and two do not make four, I know nothing in the power of argument
that can stop him. I think I can answer the Judge so long as he sticks to
the premises; but when he flies from them, I cannot work any argument into
the consistency of a mental gag and actually close his mouth with it. In
such a case I can only commend him to the seventy thousand answers just in
from Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Indiana.
REQUEST FOR SENATE SUPPORT
TO CHARLES HOYT
CLINTON, De WITT Co., Nov. 10, 1854
DEAR SIR:--You used to express a good deal of partiality for me, and if
you are still so, now is the time. Some friends here are really for me for
the U.S. Senate, and I should be very grateful if you could make a mark
for me among your members. Please write me at all events, giving me the
names, post-offices, and "political position" of members round about you.
Direct to Springfield.
Let this be confidential.
Yours truly,
A. LINCOLN.
TO T. J. HENDERSON.
SPRINGFIELD,
November 27, 1854 T. J. HENDERSON, ESQ.
MY DEAR SIR:--It has come round that a whig may, by possibility, be
elected to the United States Senate, and I want the chance of being the
man. You are a member of the Legislature, and have a vote to give. Think
it over, and see whether you can do better than to go for me.
Write me, at all events; and let this be confidential.
Yours truly,
A. LINCOLN.
TO J. GILLESPIE.
SPRINGFIELD, Dec. 1, 1854.
DEAR SIR:--I have really got it into my head to try to be United States
Senator, and, if I could have your support, my chances would be reasonably
good. But I know, and acknowledge, that you have as just claims to the
place as I have; and therefore I cannot ask you to yield to me, if you are
thinking of becoming a candidate, yourself. If, however, you are not, then
I should like to be remembered affectionately by you; and also to have you
make a mark for me with the Anti-Nebraska members down your way.
If you know, and have no objection to tell, let me know whether Trumbull
intends to make a push. If he does, I suppose the two men in St. Clair,
and one, or both, in Madison, will be for him. We have the Legislature,
clearly enough, on joint ballot, but the Senate is very close, and Cullom
told me to-day that the Nebraska men will stave off the election, if they
can. Even if we get into joint vote, we shall have difficulty to unite our
forces. Please write me, and let this be confidential.
Your friend, as ever,
A. LINCOLN.
POLITICAL REFERENCES
TO JUSTICE MCLEAN.
SPRINGFIELD, ILL., December 6, 1854.
SIR:--I understand it is in contemplation to displace the present clerk
and appoint a new one for the Circuit and District Courts of Illinois. I
am very friendly to the present incumbent, and, both for his own sake and
that of his family, I wish him to be retained so long as it is possible
for the court to do so.
In the contingency of his removal, however, I have recommended William
Butler as his successor, and I do not wish what I write now to be taken as
any abatement of that recommendation.
William J. Black is also an applicant for the appointment, and I write
this at the solicitation of his friends to say that he is every way worthy
of the office, and that I doubt not the conferring it upon him will give
great satisfaction.
Your ob't servant,
A. LINCOLN.
TO T. J. HENDERSON.
SPRINGFIELD, December 15. 1854
HON. T. J. HENDERSON.
DEAR SIR:--Yours of the 11th was received last night, and for which I
thank you. Of course I prefer myself to all others; yet it is neither in
my heart nor my conscience to say I am any better man than Mr. Williams.
We shall have a terrible struggle with our adversaries. They are desperate
and bent on desperate deeds. I accidentally learned of one of the leaders
here writing to a member south of here, in about the following language:
We are beaten. They have a clean majority of at least nine, on joint
ballot. They outnumber us, but we must outmanage them. Douglas must be
sustained. We must elect the Speaker; and we must elect a Nebraska United
States Senator, or "elect none at all." Similar letters, no doubt, are
written to every Nebraska member. Be considering how we can best meet, and
foil, and beat them. I send you, by mail, a copy of my Peoria speech. You
may have seen it before, or you may not think it worth seeing now.
Do not speak of the Nebraska letter mentioned above; I do not wish it to
become public, that I received such information.
Yours truly,
A. LINCOLN.
1855
LOSS OF PRIMARY FOR SENATOR
TO E. B. WASHBURNE.
SPRINGFIELD, February 9, 1855 MY DEAR SIR:
I began with 44 votes, Shields 41, and Trumbull 5,--yet Trumbull was
elected. In fact 47 different members voted for me,--getting three new
ones on the second ballot, and losing four old ones. How came my 47
to yield to Trumbull's 5? It was Governor Matteson's work. He has been
secretly a candidate ever since (before, even) the fall election.
All the members round about the canal were Anti-Nebraska, but were
nevertheless nearly all Democrats and old personal friends of his. His
plan was to privately impress them with the belief that he was as good
Anti-Nebraska as any one else--at least could be secured to be so by
instructions, which could be easily passed.
The Nebraska men, of course, were not for Matteson; but when they found
they could elect no avowed Nebraska man, they tardily determined to let
him get whomever of our men he could, by whatever means he could, and ask
him no questions.
The Nebraska men were very confident of the election of Matteson, though
denying that he was a candidate, and we very much believing also that they
would elect him. But they wanted first to make a show of good faith to
Shields by voting for him a few times, and our secret Matteson men also
wanted to make a show of good faith by voting with us a few times. So
we led off. On the seventh ballot, I think, the signal was given to the
Nebraska men to turn to Matteson, which they acted on to a man, with one
exception. . . Next ballot the remaining Nebraska man and one pretended
Anti went over to him, giving him 46. The next still another, giving him
47, wanting only three of an election. In the meantime our friends, with
a view of detaining our expected bolters, had been turning from me to
Trumbull till he had risen to 35 and I had been reduced to 15. These would
never desert me except by my direction; but I became satisfied that if we
could prevent Matteson's election one or two ballots more, we could not
possibly do so a single ballot after my friends should begin to return
to me from Trumbull. So I determined to strike at once, and accordingly
advised my remaining friends to go for him, which they did and elected him
on the tenth ballot.
Such is the way the thing was done. I think you would have done the same
under the circumstances.