REMARKS ON LORD ELLENBOROUGH’S DIRECTIONS.—PROOFS OF THIS FALLACY.—HIS
ASSUMPTION OF THINGS NOT IN EVIDENCE, AND UNWARRANTABLE
CONJECTURES, IN POSITIVE OPPOSITION TO EVIDENCE.—HIS DESIRE TO
CONVICT OBNOXIOUS PERSONS.—LEIGH HUNT, DR. WATSON, AND HONE.—LORD
ELLENBOROUGH A CABINET MINISTER AT THE TIME OF MY TRIAL.—MY
CONVICTION A MINISTERIAL NECESSITY.—VAIN ATTEMPTS TO GET MY CASE
REHEARD.—LETTER TO LORD EBRINGTON.—THE IMPROBABILITY OF MY
GUILT.—ABSURDITY OF SUCH IMPUTATION.—LETTER OF SIR ROBERT
WILSON.—LETTER OF THE LATE DUKE OF HAMILTON.—MR. HUME’S
LETTER.—CAUSES FOR MY PERSECUTION.—TREATMENT OF THE PRINCESS
CHARLOTTE, WHO FLED TO HER MOTHER’S PROTECTION.—SYMPATHY OF THE
PRINCESS FOR MY TREATMENT—MY POPULARITY INCREASED THEREBY.— MINE
REALLY A STATE PROSECUTION.—RESTORATION OF SIR ROBERT WILSON.—MY
RESTORATION INCOMPLETE TO THIS DAY.
If such evidence as has been exposed in the last chapter was unreliable,
the use made of it by the Bench was unjustifiable. Crane deposed to De
Berenger’s having with him “a portmanteau big enough to wrap a coat in.”
The person of whom the coat was bought deposed to his taking it away in
this portmanteau, yet the judge—despite the obvious consideration, that
De Berenger could not have gone to Dover in this splendid and ornamented
dress, but must have had some other dress for his journey—charged the
jury that “it did not appear that De Berenger _had the means of shifting
himself_!” He had the means of putting on the red coat at or near Dover,
and what doubt could there be that his portmanteau supplied the means of
again shifting it after his return? The evidence on the trial showed
that shortly before reaching London he _drew down_ the sun-blinds of the
chaise, when there can be no reasonable doubt that he changed it for the
green one in which he went to Dover, and which had been temporarily
placed in the portmanteau. Crane, as has been shown by his own words,
gave his evidence _under the expectation of reward_, and had no doubt
been instructed that a _red coat was the very thing wanted_.
On the evidence of this man Crane, the jury was further charged that De
Berenger not only entered my house in a red uniform, but that it was
also decorated _with a star and medal_! There was nothing in the
testimony of Crane or the waterman, which even related to a star and
medal. They never gave the slightest intimation of De Berenger’s wearing
any such ornaments; but as he appeared to have worn some ornaments of
the kind at Dover, this is _prima facie_ proof that he _had changed_ his
coat on his return, otherwise both Crane and the waterman must have seen
ornaments so conspicuous.
Still a star, like a red coat, was wanted to convict me, and a leading
question to the postboy—who admitted that, _previous_ to the trial, _he
had received 52l.!!!_ was, whether he had seen a star? His reply was
that he had seen something of the kind, but that “_he could not swear
what it was_.” He nevertheless said that he had “opened the
chaise-door,” and therefore must have been within a yard of the star, if
star there were, so that his refusal to swear to it is palpable proof
that De Berenger _wore no star on his return_, this being no doubt on
the red coat in the portmanteau. Yet, said Lord Ellenborough to the
jury, “HE PULLED OFF HIS SCARLET UNIFORM AT LORD COCHRANE’S HOUSE. HE
CAME TO LORD COCHRANE FULLY BLAZONED IN THE COSTUME OF HIS CRIME.”
(_Times’ report of the trial._)
The fact that De Berenger had with him, according to Crane’s evidence,
“a portmanteau big enough to wrap a coat in,” was not laid before the
jury, nor the obvious inference, that he must, beyond doubt, have
conveyed his scarlet coat to Dover in that portmanteau, because a man
whom the Solicitor-General said “_was no fool_,” would not have
committed such an act of folly as _prematurely_ to array himself in so
remarkable a dress, intended for so criminal a purpose.
A circumstance strongly inferential, occurred which went far to prove
that De Berenger _had changed_ his dress before coming to my house. On
the first part of the journey he was proved to have worn a sword,
unquestionably as essential to his assumed character. But before he came
to my house, he had disengaged himself from the sword, for Crane swore
that on entering, he “took out of the chaise a portmanteau and a
_sword_, and went in.” So that, according to the evidence of Crane
himself, the chief witness for the prosecution, _he had made one
material alteration in his appearance_. Why should De Berenger have worn
his sword up to the last stage from Dover, during which he “pulled down
the sunblinds,” and then have taken it off, but for the plain reason
that he could not change his scarlet coat for his green uniform without
first taking off his sword, which he had not replaced, but laid it on
the chaise-seat during the operation. Not a word of this was allowed to
go to the jury, though if—as Lord Ellenborough argued—he had been
regardless of exhibiting himself to me in the false character of a
military officer, he _would hardly have taken off his sword_! These
facts were not only proofs that a partial change of dress had been made,
but that an entire change had been effected, to which the removal of the
sword was absolutely necessary. Had my servants been called upon the
trial, their testimony, as seen in their affidavits contained in the
previous chapter, must have been decisive.
It has been stated, that at the instance of Mr. Cochrane Johnstone, Sir
Alexander Cochrane applied to the Admiralty for permission to engage De
Berenger, and the records of the Admiralty would then, as no doubt they
will now, prove the fact. There was not a word passed on the subject at
the trial, nor any witness brought from the Admiralty to decide the
point. Yet Lord Ellenborough put it to the jury as beyond doubt, _that
it was I or Mr. Cochrane Johnstone, who was also a defendant in the same
prosecution, who applied to Sir Alexander for his engagement_!—thus
making this unfounded but important fact part of his direction to the
jury. Here are the judge’s words:—
“There is no doubt that Sir Alexander Cochrane had, on some
application from Mr. Cochrane Johnstone, _or Lord Cochrane_, applied
for him.” (_Report_, p. 483.)
It is difficult to account for the judge’s motive in making such a
statement, wholly unsupported by evidence. Neither was there even an
attempt to show that I had ever interfered or even interested myself in
any application on De Berenger’s behalf. The fact of Sir Alexander
Cochrane having made the application was most important for my defence,
because it added greatly to the probability of my statement in my
affidavit, and accounted for the conduct of De Berenger in presuming to
call on me to request a passage to America. This Lord Ellenborough
completely neutralised by telling the jury that _it was I_ who applied
to Sir Alexander for his employment; the impression made on the minds of
the jury being, that notwithstanding I disclaimed all knowledge of the
man, I had been on terms of intimacy with him before the application was
made!
The judge then declared as follows:—“But it does not rest there; for he
himself lends to this person the immediate means of concealment,—he lets
him have a hat _instead of his laced cap; and what had such a cap to do
with a sharpshooter’s uniform?_” (_Report_, p. 485.) I had never said a
word about a “laced cap,” nor had I ever seen De Berenger’s cap, for, as
one of my servants testified, it lay in the hall. After this direction
to the jury and my consequent conviction, I made it my business to
ascertain what kind of cap was worn by the adjutant of Lord Yarmouth’s
rifle-_corps_, and, to my great surprise and indignation, discovered
that the regimental head-dress of De Berenger was a black cap _with a
spacious gold band upon it, a long gold tassel pendant, and a death’s
head and marrow-bones in bronze!_—so that sharpshooters _had_ something
to do with laced caps.
Still more extraordinary was the judge’s observation to the jury:—“The
uniform of the rifle-corps is of a bottle-green colour, made to resemble
the colour of trees, that those who wear it may hide themselves in
woods, and escape discovery there.” (_Report_, p. 478.) This was in
direct opposition to the evidence, for Lord Yarmouth had actually
testified in Court that the uniform of the corps was “waistcoat-green,
with _a crimson cape_!”
MR. PARK.—“What is the uniform of your _corps_?”
LORD YARMOUTH.—“The uniform is the waistcoat-green, with a _crimson
cape_.”
MR. PARK.—“A bottle-green, is it not?”
LORD YARMOUTH.—“Some have got it a little darker than others, but it
should be a deep bottle-green, with a _crimson collar_.”
I have merely taken these instances at random, and without comment
further than necessary to enable the reader to comprehend them. As my
judge is no longer here to reply to me, I abstain from comment, however
much it might tend, now that the party spirit which ruined me has died
out, to establish my innocence. Still I cannot refrain from adducing a
few extracts from Lord Campbell’s work, relative to the trials of
politically obnoxious persons.
Lord Ellenborough’s efforts to convict Leigh Hunt of libel, and the
verdict of “Not Guilty” pronounced by an indignant jury, are matters
within the memory of many now living. “Such scandal,” says Lord
Campbell, “was excited by the mode in which Government prosecutions for
libel were now instituted and conducted, that Lord Holland brought the
subject before the House of Lords. The violence of Lord Ellenborough
when opposing Lord Holland’s motion, is foreign to the subject of the
present work. Sir James Mackintosh, who heard it, expressed himself
‘disgusted with its dogmatism.’” (_Lord Campbell_, vol. iii. p. 205.)