PLANS FOR ATTACKING THE FRENCH COAST SUBMITTED TO THE FIRST LORD, THE
RIGHT HONOURABLE CHARLES YORKE.—PEREMPTORILY ORDERED TO JOIN MY SHIP
IN AN INFERIOR CAPACITY.—MY REMONSTRANCE.—CONTEMPTUOUS REPLY TO MY
LETTER.—THREATENED TO BE SUPERSEDED.—MR. YORKE’S IGNORANCE OF NAVAL
AFFAIRS.—RESULT OF HIS ILL-TREATMENT OF ME.—MY REPLY PASSED
UNNOTICED, AND MYSELF SUPERSEDED.
It has already been stated that the _Impérieuse_ frigate under my
command had been placed by the Admiralty under the orders of the
Honourable Captain Duncan, son of the distinguished admiral of that
name, as acting-captain; but that permission to resume her command in
the Scheldt had been refused on my application to rejoin her; no doubt
with the intention of preventing me from effecting anything more which
might become obnoxious to another admiral.
Now that my presence in the House of Commons had become inconvenient,
the Admiralty affected to consider that _I was unjustifiably absenting
myself from my ship!_ and an intimation was given that I must join her
_within a week_!
So far from my absence being voluntary, _it had been forced_ upon me
from the necessity of attending the court-martial and an acting-captain
was to be put in my place. When I found that this step was determined
on, I asked that Captain Duncan might be appointed, knowing that he
would carry out my views in the management of a crew to which I was
attached, as from long and arduous service they were attached to me. But
notwithstanding this temporary appointment, I was anxiously urging on
the Board of Admiralty the necessity of further operations in which it
was my earnest wish to bear a part.
The correspondence which took place with the Admiralty will not only
show this, but the record may prove useful in case of future wars.
On the 7th of June, 1810, I transmitted the subjoined letter to the Hon.
Charles Yorke, who had succeeded Lord Mulgrave as First Lord of the
Admiralty:—
“London, 7th June, 1810.
“SIR,—When I had the honour to present myself to you the other day, I
used the freedom to submit to your judgment the mode by which the
commerce of the enemy might, in my humble opinion, be greatly injured,
if not completely ruined, and that such mode, whilst assisting the
present, would be providing for the future, exigencies of the State.
The subject has pressed itself so forcibly on my attention, that I am
induced to address you by letter, which is perhaps the best means to
avoid engaging too much of your time.
“Passing over the points I then noticed as a stimulus to the Navy,
which, unfortunately for this country, though for the benefit of our
inveterate foe, is checked and restrained in its operations, I shall
beg permission to call your attention to other parts of the subject I
had then the honour to introduce.
“I am the more impelled to the intrusion by the intelligence recently
received of the islands of Las Medas on the coast of Catalonia having
been taken by the French, who were doubtlessly influenced by the
motive _that ought to actuate us to possess ourselves of the islands
on the coast of France_, or such of them as tend to aid her best
interests.
“In the present state of our Navy, the French rest in the fullest
confidence of assured security, and are, therefore, entirely at our
mercy, as regards the objects in my contemplation.
“In the present state of French security, L’Ile Groa at the mouth of
the Loire, and L’Ile Dieu on the coast of Brittany, may be easily
seized by 800 men, in defiance of any opposition; and by a _coup de
main_ a fourth part of that number would be sufficient. These islands
would afford safe anchorage to our cruisers, with the wind on shore,
and when, in the winter season, it is dangerous to approach them.
“The islands at the entrance of the port of Marseilles could be taken
by 100 men, and their importance is demonstrable by their situation.
United with the possession of one of the Hières, they would enable us
to cut off the communication between that part of France which
consumes the commodities of Italy, and thus the trade of Leghorn and
Genoa—once of importance to us—would be lost to our enemy, who now
exclusively enjoys it.
“The port of Bayonne, whence the French supply their dockyards at
Rochefort and Brest with timber, may be rendered useless by sinking a
few old vessels laden with stones. In like manner the anchorage of Ile
d’ Aix might be destroyed—the passages in the entrance of the Garonne
rendered impracticable—and that of Mamusson filled up.
“Proceeding on a more extensive scale, Belle Isle offers itself to
particular notice, and would be a most valuable acquisition, as it
gives shelter at all times to shipping. At Cette—commanding the
entrance of the canal through which the whole produce of Italy and the
shores of the Mediterranean are transported to the north of the French
empire—the locks might be seized on with facility, and held or blown
up, in defiance of the whole power of Buonaparte now in France. The
island of Elba might be reduced with as little difficulty, and as it
contains two excellent harbours, and protects the anchorage in the
Piombia passage, it is well calculated to interrupt all intercourse
between the Roman, Italian, and Tuscan States. Were it in our hands at
this moment, it would be an invaluable depôt for our manufactures,
which, on cutting off the trade with France, would be in the greatest
demand throughout the whole of Italy. It was given up at the
termination of the last war in ignorance—as may be presumed—of the
great advantage which it affords in this respect.
“I need not suggest to you, Sir, that if the measures on which I have
thus slightly touched were carried into effect, it would—even should
the enemy be disposed to disturb us—require a large portion of the
force _intended for the subjugation of Spain_, to be diverted from its
purpose. If these measures were to be followed up by a flying naval
expedition of trifling extent, and with comparatively only a handful
of troops, the enemy might be held in check, or at any rate their
plans elsewhere would be frustrated in part, and the remainder must
become insignificant from perplexity and embarrassment.
“I submit to you, Sir, that were it not for our naval superiority, and
a few thousand troops were at Buonaparte’s disposal, our coasts would
not be safe—the vessels in our ports would be swept away—and very
possibly the ports themselves laid in ashes. As we have at least
physical powers, and more honourable incitements than Buonaparte to
aid our energies and direct our objects, we ought bravely to pursue
all that he would dare to attempt.
“If, Sir, these points should appear to interest you, and you should
think it necessary to require of me further detail or information, I
shall be happy to wait on you for that purpose at any time you may be
pleased to name. I had intended to bring this subject before the
House, but a variety of obvious reasons showed me the propriety of
addressing you in the first instance.
“I have the honour, &c.,
“COCHRANE.
“The Right Hon. Charles Yorke.”
In reply to this letter, I was told by Mr. Yorke that the acting-captain
had been appointed to the _Impérieuse_ for _“my accommodation”!!_
instead of Captain Duncan having been appointed from the necessity
before mentioned! Mr. Yorke concluded his letter with a peremptory order
for me to proceed to sea within a week:—
“Admiralty, June 8th, 1810.
“MY LORD,—I had the honour this morning of receiving your Lordship’s
letter of yesterday, communicating your Lordship’s opinions on various
points of service connected with operations on the French coast in the
Bay as well as in the Mediterranean, which appear to be nearly of the
same effect with those which I had the honour of hearing from your
Lordship personally some days ago.
“I beg to return you my thanks for this communication of your
sentiments, and have now to inform you that as your Lordship’s ship,
the _Impérieuse_, is now nearly ready for sea, and destined for the
Mediterranean, and as _the period of the session of Parliament during
which your Lordship has been accommodated with an acting-captain to
command the frigate in your absence (!) has now nearly reached its
close_, I presume that it is your intention to join her without loss
of time, and to proceed in her to join Sir Charles Cotton, who will no
doubt employ your Lordship in the annoyance of the enemy and in the
protection of our Allies in the manner best suited to the exigencies
of the service.
“I request that your Lordship will have the goodness to inform me as
early as you can _on what day next week it is your intention to join
your ship_, as His Majesty’s service will not admit of her sailing
being much longer postponed.
“I have the honour, &c.,
“C. YORKE.
“Capt. Lord Cochrane.”
The assertion that an acting-captain had been appointed to the
_Impérieuse_ for my accommodation as a member of Parliament was
monstrous, for after the court-martial was ended I begged to be allowed
to join her; first, soon after the Walcheren expedition sailed, and
again when it failed to satisfy the national expectations; even then
offering to destroy the enemy’s fleet as had been done in Aix Roads. I
afterwards asked permission to view the siege of Flushing as a spectator
only, and _was refused_, the refusal being fortunately still in my
possession:—
“Admiralty, Oct. 11th, 1809.
“MY DEAR LORD,—I have mentioned your request to the Naval Lords at the
Board, and find it cannot be complied with.
“I am, my dear Lord,
“Your very faithful servant,
“MULGRAVE.
“The Lord Cochrane.”
Notwithstanding Mr. Yorke’s version of the reason of my absence from the
_Impérieuse_, I determined to make one more effort for permission to
carry out my plans for harassing the enemy’s coast, and thereby
preventing them from forwarding troops to Spain. My object was to get
two or three frigates and a few troops under my command. Had I been able
to accomplish this, what had been effected with the _Impérieuse_ alone
on the coast of Catalonia will be my excuse for saying, that such a
force would have been the most valuable aid to the British army in the
Peninsula.
Preferring, therefore, the service which I was desirous to render to my
country to my own wounded feelings, I addressed another letter to Mr.
Yorke:—
“London, June 11th, 1810.
“SIR,—In acknowledging the receipt of your letter of the 8th I confess
much embarrassment. The measures submitted to your judgment were, in
my humble opinion, of great national importance. They had in view to
weaken the hands of our enemy and strengthen our own. I therefore
indulged in the hope that they would have received your countenance
and support.
“It must have been apparent to you, Sir, that I did not offer them on
light grounds, nor without calculated certainty of success in the
event of their prosecution. I flattered myself with the hope of being
employed in the execution of a service on which my previous
observations would have enabled me to act with confidence.
“But although, Sir, you are pleased to thank me for my communication,
you pass over in silence the objects it embraced; and do away with
even the expressions of courtesy bestowed on it by asking ‘on what day
_in this week_ it was my intention to join my ship, as His Majesty’s
service would not admit of her sailing being much longer postponed;’
thus leaving me to conclude that in taking the liberty of approaching
you I had trespassed too far, and that to prevent my importunities in
future you had deemed it advisable to order me to join my ship, and
further, to join Sir Charles Cotton, who, you signify, ‘would no doubt
employ me in the annoyance of the enemy, and in the protection of our
Allies, in the manner best suited to the exigencies of the service.’
“I have throughout life been accustomed to do my duty to the utmost of
my power, and my anxiety to render the performance of it acceptable to
my country, whilst it stimulated me to inform myself on the best means
for that purpose, may have led me to intrude on those with whom alone
rests the power of encouraging my expectations. Yet I might have
imagined that my motives would sufficiently plead my excuse. On the
present occasion I had an additional inducement in addressing myself
in the first instance to you, Sir, instead of the House of Commons. I
felt that I was paying the respect due to the First Lord of the
Admiralty.
“It appears, however, that I have inadvertently offended, and am sorry
for it, as the public interest may be injured by the step I have
taken. I should have been gratified had you done me the honour to call
for details of the sketch which I laid before you, when I should have
been happy to supply a properly digested plan by which I propose to
secure the objects there shadowed forth.
“Had this plan, been brought under your consideration, I may venture
to say that you would have directed it to be carried into execution;
and I should have envied any person whom you might have honoured with
the charge of it, however much I might have regretted the refusal to
permit me to share in it, I should nevertheless have cheerfully
rendered every information required of me, or that I might have
conceived necessary.
“I have now no alternative than to submit to the wisdom of the House
the propositions you have thought proper to reject, or rather suffer
them to die away without further notice. I do not pride myself on the
accuracy of my judgment, but may be allowed to understand those
matters that come under my own immediate observation better than those
who have had no experience in such kind of warfare.
“The capture of Los Medas by the French has confirmed me in the
opinions I gave to Lord Mulgrave on my last _reconnaissance_ of Ile
d’Aix, and which I had the honour to state to you in my last. I again
submit that a similar course pursued by His Majesty’s Government
towards France would distract the purposes of Buonaparte, and injure
him infinitely more than any other step likely to be taken. The
capture of even one of the islands enumerated in my former letter
would be felt by him much as we should feel if a French force were to
capture the Isle of Wight.
“In another part of your letter you say that I have been
‘_accommodated with an acting-captain to command the frigate during my
absence_.’ I have to assure you that it was an accommodation I never
solicited, and one which, far from conveying a favour, was extremely
painful to my feelings, as it prevented my going on a service which I
was extremely desirous of witnessing. I even made an application to
Lord Mulgrave for permission to be a spectator only of the scene of
Flushing, so as to avail myself of the opportunity to acquire
information about the Scheldt and its environs, but was refused,
although others not connected with the service obtained leave to
proceed there.
“In conclusion, I beg permission to say that I have yet some objects
of moment to bring forward in Parliament, and that as there is no
enterprise given to the _Impérieuse_, I have no wish that she should
be detained for me one moment.
“I have the honour, &c.,
“COCHRANE.
“The Right Hon. Chas. Yorke.
“P.S. Your letter, Sir, is marked ‘private,’ which I consider as
applying solely to the destination of the _Impérieuse_, and, of
course, shall be silent on that subject.”
The reply of the First Lord was that it was “_neither his duty nor his
inclination to enter into controversy with me!_” A proof how the
interests of a nation may suffer from the political pique of a single
man in power. Not an individual of the Ministry considered me incapable
of carrying into execution, even with an insignificant force, the plans
foreshadowed; yet they were treated with contemptuous silence, and a
command to proceed immediately on a subordinate service.
“Admiralty, June 12th, 1810.
“MY LORD,—I have had the honour this morning of receiving your
Lordship’s letter of yesterday. _As I do not conceive it either my
public duty so it is by no means my private inclination to be drawn
into any official controversy with your Lordship, either in your
capacity of captain of a frigate in His Majesty’s service or of a
member of Parliament_.
“For this reason I must beg to decline replying to several parts of
your Lordship’s letter, in which you appear to have much misconceived
my meaning, as expressed in my former letter, or to observe upon the
turn and direction which your Lordship is pleased to endeavour to give
to our correspondence.
“I have thought it proper to lay the two letters which I have received
from your Lordship, being on points of service, before the Board of
Admiralty for their consideration; and have only now to request to be
distinctly informed whether or not it is your Lordship’s intention to
join your ship, the _Impérieuse_, now under orders for foreign
service, and nearly ready for sea, as soon as Parliament shall be
prorogued.
“I shall be much pleased to receive an answer in the affirmative,
because I should then entertain hopes that your activity and gallantry
might be made available for the public service. I shall be much
concerned to receive an answer in the negative, because in that case I
shall feel it to be my duty to consider it as your Lordship’s wish to
be superseded in the command of the _Impérieuse_.
“I am, my Lord,
“Your most obedient servant,
“C YORKE.
“Capt. Lord Cochrane.”
A more unjust order from a lay Lord of the Admiralty than this, to join
the _Impérieuse_ and proceed on foreign service, was never issued from
the Admiralty.
As a lay Lord, he was wholly ignorant of naval affairs, but nevertheless
refused _even to listen_ to the advice of an experienced sea-officer,
who had at least seen some service, and was therefore capable of
offering an opinion. In place of this he ordered me to sea, without the
semblance of promotion in any shape, or even the offer of a larger ship.
I had nevertheless received the warm thanks of Lord Collingwood for—as
his Lordship expressed it—having with a single frigate stopped a French
army from penetrating into Eastern Spain. With the same inadequate means
I had kept the whole coast of Languedoc in alarm, so as to prevent any
combination of troops on the Spanish frontier, this voluntary service
being executed in such a way as to induce Lord Collingwood to write to
the Admiralty, that “_my resources seemed to have no end_.” Weighed down
with fatigue and anxiety I had returned home, in the hope of relaxation,
when the Admiralty, even before there had been time to pay off my ship,
ordered me to prepare plans for destroying the French fleet in Aix
Roads, Lord Gambier having plainly told them that, if he made the
attempt, “it must be at _their peril and not his_.” I prepared those
plans, with the addition of a novel element in naval warfare, and drove
ashore the French fleet, which afterwards became a wreck, in spite of
the want of proper co-operation on the part of the Admiral who had
hesitated to attack them.
On my return to England I had been offered by Lord Mulgrave the thanks
of Parliament in conjunction with the Commander-in-chief, but refused to
couple my name with his. After all these services, for which I never
received reward nor thanks—except the red ribbon of the Bath from the
hands of my sovereign—another First Lord ordered me to proceed to sea
_in a week_, and that in a capacity as subordinate as the one occupied
before any of these services had been performed! nay, more, in spite of
my pointing out to him, how, with a trifling force, I could do far more
than I had done—a proposition which he treated with contemptuous
silence. There is nothing worse in the records of the Admiralty even at
that period.
Nevertheless, this ill-treatment determined me not to shrink from my
duty, though I was resolved that Mr. Yorke should neither get an
affirmative nor a negative from me as to joining the frigate. If the
command of the _Impérieuse_, under the orders of Sir Charles Cotton,
were forced upon me I would take it, but of this the Admiralty should be
the judges—not I. Had Lord Collingwood lived to reach England the
Admiralty would not have ventured to thrust such a command upon me after
my services of the previous three years and my plans for future
operations, which, as I have once or twice said, would have saved
millions spent on prolonged strife in the Peninsula.
In the vain hope that the national welfare would, on calm deliberation,
rise superior to petty official spite, I again addressed Mr Yorke as
follows:—
“Portman Square, June 14th, 1810.
“SIR,—When I had the honour to present to you in writing those ideas
that I had previously communicated verbally, it was far from my views
and contrary to my intention to draw you into any unofficial
correspondence. My solicitude to see the interests of my country
promoted and the power of the enemy reduced were my only objects. I
presumed that amidst the pressure of business any hints thrown out in
desultory conversation might escape your memory, but that committed to
paper they would meet your consideration. This was my chief reason for
addressing you by letter.
“As a member of Parliament I never harboured a wish to intrude myself
on your notice. I know that as a captain of a frigate I do not possess
any consequence, and am conscious that I never assumed any. But, Sir,
I submit that if information promising essential benefit to the State
is procured, the source from which it flows, however insignificant, is
not of the least moment.
“With an impression which I must lament, Sir, that you decline
entering on those parts of my letter which alone prevailed with me to
trouble you, I regret having done so. I am not in the habit of
entreaty, but when the public service is to be advanced entreaty
becomes a duty. I trust, therefore, that you will pardon me if I
repeat the hope that you will be pleased to regard the subject in a
more favourable light, and examine the grounds and principles on which
my opinions are founded. I feel convinced that any other officer
possessed of the knowledge necessary to form his judgment will tell
you that the measures I have proposed may _to a certainty and with
great ease be carried into execution_; and that the enemy would, in
consequence, be entirely crippled in his best resources.
“Had I been fortunate enough to receive the least encouragement from
you I should have brought forward other objects than those noticed.
Amongst these is one that has reference to the coast of Catalonia,
where the maritime towns are occupied by troops of the enemy just
sufficient to keep the peasantry in awe and exact from them
provisions. These, by possessing the open batteries, the French convey
coastways in fishing boats and small craft to their armies, which,
from the scarcity of cattle, fodder, and the state of the roads, they
could not obtain by any other means.
“The few troops stationed along the coast for these purposes might be
seized and brought off with a trifling force employed in the way I
have indicated. As a proof of this, the aid-de-camp of General Lechu,
and a whole company were brought off by the marines and crew of the
_Impérieuse_ alone, to whom they surrendered, well knowing that had
they left the battery they would have been put to death in detail by
the oppressed and irritated Spaniards.
“I am thankful, Sir, for your kindness in laying my letters before the
Lords Commissioners. The flattering terms in which you speak of my
humble abilities also demand my acknowledgment; and, whilst again
tendering them to the service of my country, I beg permission to say
that it is the first wish of my heart and the highest aim of my
ambition to be actively employed in my profession, and that from
former associations I prefer the _Impérieuse_ to every other frigate
in the Navy. But as she is to proceed immediately on foreign service,
I fear it is impossible for me to be in readiness to join her within
the time specified.
“I have the honour, &c.,
“COCHRANE.
“The Right Hon. Chas. Yorke.”
To this letter no reply was vouchsafed, and the Honourable Captain
Duncan was confirmed in the command of the _Impérieuse_, which in the
_following month_ sailed to join Sir Charles Cotton off Toulon.
Parliament being prorogued within a few days after the date of the last
letter, I had no opportunity of bringing the subject before the House.
On the publication of the first volume, it was said by some gentlemen of
the press, when kindly reviewing its contents, that something more might
have been said of that excellent and gallant admiral, Lord Collingwood.
This, I admit, would have been an easy task as regards the gossip of
others relative to his Lordship, but that is not the principle upon
which this work is conducted, every incident therein having befallen
myself personally.
The fact was, that though I had the good fortune to serve under Lord
Collingwood, it had never been my lot to serve with him. His Lordship’s
first act on joining him was, as is narrated in the first volume, to
appoint me as the successor of the officer in command of the squadron in
the Ionian Islands. Shortly after my arrival at Corfu, I fell in—as has
also been said in the first volume—during a cruise with a number of
enemy’s vessels _bearing the commandant’s license to trade_! and in
spite of the license captured and sent them to Malta for condemnation.
The commandant, as shown in the first volume, hereupon denounced me to
Lord Collingwood _as an unfit person to command a squadron_. I was
immediately afterwards recalled, and, as the reader knows, was
subsequently employed in harassing the French and Spanish coasts,
without further personal intercourse with his Lordship, except when
paying a flying visit to the fleet blockading Toulon.