“The commerce of the enemy was carried on to an immense extent by a
system of licenses, which permitted the enemy to trade where they
pleased. These licenses, issued by us, _formed an article of common
sale_ in Hamburgh and other places, and by means of such licenses the
enemy’s ships were seen coasting along by hundreds in perfect
security, even filling the river Thames, contrary to the Navigation
Act! We were thus raising up sailors for Buonaparte, _to whose
commerce and navy our ministers were the best friends_.”
My representations were met by Sir William Scott, the Judge of the
Admiralty Court, with the inquiry as to “how that Court could possibly
be answerable for the accounts of the agents on which I had founded my
invectives? Lord Cochrane was a prompt accuser, but an unfortunate one,
and he pledged his credit these accusations would prove as unfortunate
as any that had preceded them.”
Unluckily for Sir William Scott’s allusion to my “unfortunate habit of
making unfounded accusations,” Mr. Rose, the treasurer of the Navy, got
up and officially confirmed my statements, by admitting the abuses
complained of!
“This evil,” said Mr. Rose, “had been so strongly represented to him,
that soon after he had become treasurer to the Navy he had bestowed
many days and nights in its investigation. The result was, that _he
had before him no less than 153 cases, nine out of which were now
before the judge of the Admiralty Court_ (Sir W. Scott himself!) _in
consequence of the enormous charges which their accounts contained_.
In one case the charges of an agent at Portsmouth, who had 62,000_l._
to distribute, _amounted to 9462l., of which 1200l. was stated to be
for postage_!”
Mr. Rose recommended me to alter my motion, and to move for papers
relative to a particular ship. I took this advice and moved for
documents relating to two vessels, which was carried. Sir William Scott,
however, never forgave me.
On the 9th of March, when these papers were laid before the House, I
moved for others in order to elucidate them. This gave rise to another
debate, in which some curious facts were brought to light by Colonel
Wardle:—
“In the Navy Pay Office it was usual to promote junior clerks over the
heads of men who were many years their seniors in the service. One
junior clerk, eleven years in the office, was promoted to a place of
300_l._ a year, over the heads of senior clerks from twenty-seven to
thirty years in the service. In another case a gentleman was obliged
to retire against his will on 170_l._ per annum, and a _boy of
fourteen_ was appointed to his situation _with a raised salary_, and
over the heads of many senior clerks. The Secretary of the Sick and
Hurt Office was pensioned off at his full salary of 500_l._, and an
assistant appointed in his stead _with a salary of 1000l._!!”
On the 12th of March, my respected colleague, Sir Francis Burdett, than
whom a purer patriot never breathed, moved that Mr. Gale Jones should be
discharged from Newgate, to which prison he had been committed by order
of the House, for placarding a handbill, the contents of which were
construed into a violation of the privileges of the House. Sir
Francis—conceiving that the people had privileges as well as those
claiming to be their representatives, or rather that the popular voice
constituted the power of their representatives—demanded the release of
Mr. Jones, on the ground that the House possessed no privilege to commit
a man for asserting his right to discuss its measures, and that neither
legally nor constitutionally could such privilege exist.
The debate which ensued, not coming within the scope of this work, may
be omitted. Suffice it to say that Sir Francis published in _Cobbett’s
Weekly Register_ a revised account of his speech, in which he declared
that the House of Commons sought to set aside Magna Charta and the laws
of England by an order founded on their own irresponsible power.
Accompanying this revised speech was a letter addressed by Sir Francis
to his constituents of Westminster; and these coupled together the House
chose to construe into a breach of their privileges also. The result, as
every one knows, was a motion for the committal of Sir Francis Burdett
to the Tower.
My worthy colleague, however, refused to surrender. As there was no
knowing to what lengths the despotism of the House might extend, a
rumour of breaking into the honourable Baronet’s house being prevalent,
a number of his friends, myself amongst them, assembled at his residence
in Piccadilly to see fair play; but one morning, during our absence, an
officer, armed with the Speaker’s warrant, forcibly entered, and Sir
Francis was carried off to the place of his imprisonment.
It is quite unnecessary to detail these circumstances, as they are well
known to every reader of English history. On the day after my excellent
colleague’s capture the electors of Westminster held a meeting in Palace
Yard, and adopted a petition which fell to my lot to present to the
House.
The petition went even farther than had Sir Francis, by denouncing the
House as “prosecutor and juror, judge and executioner,” and denying its
right to exercise these combined offices. It taunted the House with
evading the offer of a member to prove at the bar that two of the
ministers had been distinctly charged with the sale of a seat on their
benches, and that such practices were “as notorious as the sun at
noonday.” They therefore prayed not only for the release of their
member, but for a reform of the House itself, “as the only means of
preserving the country from despotism.”
To have committed the whole of the electors of Westminster for adopting
such a petition would have been inconvenient. To have committed me for
presenting it would have been scarcely less dangerous, as depriving
Westminster of both its representatives. The predominant feeling in the
House appeared to be that of astonishment that a naval officer should
dare to meddle with such matters. One member opposed its reception at
all, another begged me to withdraw it, which I refused to do; and,
therefore, the House adopted the only possible alternative of “ordering
it to lie on the table.” The feeling towards myself may be conceived.
A similar petition from the freeholders of Middlesex was presented by
Mr. Byng, and denounced by Mr. Perceval as a “deliberate and
unparalleled insult to the House;” the petition denying the right of the
House to imprison Sir Francis, and accusing Mr. Perceval and Lord
Castlereagh by name as openly trafficking in seats; the petitioners
further declaring that the presence of Sir Francis Burdett in the House
was necessary to “enforce his plan of reform.” Angry debate followed,
but neither Sir Francis nor Mr. Jones were released till the following
month of June.
On the 11th of May Mr. Croker proposed a vote for the ordinances of the
Navy, when I embraced the opportunity of making what was at the time
termed “one of the most remarkable speeches ever delivered in that
House.” The speech indeed was remarkable—not for its eloquence, for it
had none, but for some very awkward statistics which _my enforced
leisure_ had enabled me to collect and arrange. And let me here remark,
that when my parliamentary speeches are adduced, the object is to give a
faithful picture of the condition as well of the House as of the Navy at
that period, not as specimens of an eloquence to which I had no
pretension. My parliamentary efforts, such as they are, are on record,
and the reproduction of a portion may save both myself and the reader
the trouble of further dilating thereon.
One besetting sin of the Administration was the bestowal of pensions,
which was carried on to a wonderful extent. Wives, daughters, distant
relatives, &c., of all sorts of people who had votes or influence
claimed a pension as a matter of right. Another besetting sin of the
Government was doling out pittances scarcely sufficient for the support
of life to those who had fought and bled for their country.
Bearing this in mind, the reader will readily comprehend the following
“remarkable” address—as it has been termed by historical writers—to the
House of Commons:—
“An admiral, worn out in the service, is superannuated at 410_l._ a
year, a captain at 210_l._, a _clerk of the ticket office retires on_
700_l._ _a year!_ The widow of Admiral Sir Andrew Mitchell has _one
third_ of the allowance given to the widow of a Commissioner of the
Navy!
“I will give the House another instance. Four daughters of the gallant
Captain Courtenay have 12_l._ 10_s._ each, the daughter of Admiral Sir
Andrew Mitchell has 25_l._, two daughters of Admiral Epworth have
25_l._ each, the daughter of Admiral Keppel 24_l._, the daughter of
Captain Mann, who was killed in action, 25_l._, four children of
Admiral Moriarty 25_l._ each. That is—thirteen daughters of admirals
and captains, several of whose fathers fell in the service of their
country, receive from the gratitude of the nation a sum _less than
Dame Mary Saxton, the widow of a commissioner_.
“The pension list is not formed on any comparative rank or merit,
length of service, or other rational principle, but appears to me to
be dependent on parliamentary influence alone. Lieutenant Ellison, who
lost his arm, is allowed 91_l._ 5_s._, Captain Johnstone, who lost his
arm, has only 45_l._ 12_s._ 6_d._, Lieutenant Arden, who lost his arm,
has 91_l._ 5_s._, Lieutenant Campbell, who lost his leg, 40_l._, and
poor Lieutenant Chambers, who lost both his legs, has only 80_l._,
_whilst Sir A.S. Hamond retires on_ 1500_l._ _per annum_. The brave
Sir Samuel Hood, who lost his arm, has only 500_l._, _whilst the late
Secretary of the Admiralty retires, in full health, on a pension of_
1500_l._ _per annum_!
“To speak less in detail, 32 flag officers, 22 captains, 50
lieutenants, 180 masters, 36 surgeons, 23 pursers, 91 boatswains, 97
gunners, 202 carpenters, and 41 cooks, in all 774 persons, cost the
country 4028_l._ _less than the nett proceeds of the sinecures of
Lords Arden_ (20,358_l._), _Camden_ (20,536_l._), _and Buckingham_
(20,693_l._).
“All the superannuated admirals, captains, and lieutenants put
together, have but 1012_l._ more than Earl Camden’s sinecure alone!
All that is paid to the wounded officers of the whole British navy,
and to the wives and children of those dead or killed in action, do
not amount by 214_l._ to as much as Lord Arden’s sinecure alone, viz.
20,358_l._ What is paid to the mutilated officers themselves is _but
half as much_!
“Is this justice? Is this the treatment which the officers of the Navy
deserve at the hands of those who call themselves His Majesty’s
Government? Does the country know of this injustice? Will this too be
defended? If I express myself with warmth I trust in the indulgence of
the House. I cannot suppress my feelings. Should 31 commissioners,
commissioners’ wives, and clerks have 3899_l._ more amongst them _than
all the wounded officers of the Navy of England_?
“I find upon examination that the Wellesleys receive from the public
34,729_l._, _a sum equal to 426 pairs of lieutenants’ legs, calculated
at the rate of allowance of Lieutenant Chambers’s legs. Calculating
for the pension of Captain Johnstone’s arm, viz. 45l., Lord Arden’s
sinecure is equal to the value of 1022 captains’ arms! The Marquis of
Buckingham’s sinecure alone will maintain the whole ordinary
establishment of the victualling department at Chatham, Dover,
Gibraltar, Sheerness, Downs, Heligoland, Cork, Malta, Mediterranean,
Cape of Good Hope, Rio de Janeiro, and leave 5460l. in the Treasury.
Two of these comfortable sinecures would victual the officers and men
serving in all the ships in ordinary in Great Britain, viz. 117 sail
of the line, 105 frigates, 27 sloops, and 50 hulks. Three of them
would maintain the dockyard establishments at Portsmouth and
Plymouth._ The addition of a few more would amount to as much as the
whole ordinary establishments of the royal dockyards at Chatham,
Woolwich, Deptford, and Sheerness; whilst the sinecures and offices
executed wholly by deputy would more than maintain the ordinary
establishment of all the royal dockyards in the kingdom!
“Even Mr. Ponsonby, who lately made so pathetic an appeal to the good
sense of the people of England against those whom he was pleased to
term demagogues, actually receives, for having been _thirteen months
in office_, a sum equal to nine admirals _who have spent their lives
in the service of their country_; three times as much as all the
pensions given to all the daughters and children of all the admirals,
captains, lieutenants, and other officers who have died in indigent
circumstances, or who have been killed in the service!”
This portion of the speech, true in every figure, was not incorrectly
termed “remarkable;” and it made an enemy of every sinecurist named, as
I had afterwards but too good reason to know. Nevertheless, the
Administration had made a mistake. I was not permitted to be employed
_afloat_, and was determined to effect all the good I could for the
naval service by advocating its interests _ashore_.
But the worst was yet to come. My very excellent grandmother, of whom I
have spoken in the first volume of this work in terms feebly expressive
of her worth, had a pension of 100_l._ for the services of her gallant
husband, Captain Gilchrist; and _though she had been dead eight years_,
some patriotic individual had been _drawing her pension, as though she
were still living_! Given, a hundred dead widows, with a pension of
100_l._ each, and some one was at the national expense the richer by
10,000_l._ per annum!
On this point, I thus proceeded, no doubt to the intense disgust of the
party enjoying the defunct pensions:—
“From the minute expenses noticed in the naval estimate, viz. for
oiling clocks, killing rats, and keeping cats, I suppose that great
care has been taken to have everything correct. It was, therefore,
with great surprise that I found the name of my worthy and respected
grandmother, the widow of the late Captain Gilchrist of the navy,
continuing on the list as receiving 100_l._ per annum, _though she
ceased to exist eight years ago_!”
Notwithstanding the unanswerable argument of my grandmother’s pension,
and the equally unanswerable comparison of sinecures and naval
rewards—the Secretary of the Admiralty, Mr. Wellesley Pole, considered
that he satisfactorily replied to both, by pronouncing my statements
“inaccurate, and my complaints inconsistent! As to the pensions to the
children of admirals, Lord Cochrane must know very well that _the widow
or children of an admiral were not entitled, strictly speaking, to any
pension_!”
In his defence to the sinecures of his own family, Mr. Wellesley Pole
was even more infelicitous:—
“Lord Cochrane has thought proper to make an attack on the Wellesley
family, of which I am a member. He asserts that the Wellesleys receive
from the public no less than 34,000_l._ a year in sinecure places, and
then makes a calculation of _the number of arms and legs which that
sum would compensate_. In answer to this, I must observe that no
member of the Wellesley family, _except the noble lord at the head of
it_, possesses any sinecure. That noble lord certainly did, many years
ago, receive the _reversion_ of a sinecure which had since fallen in,
when he was about to go to a distant part of the world, in a most
arduous and important public situation. He was at that time in a
delicate state of health, and had a large family!”
That is, Mr. Wellesley Pole confirmed my calculation of the arms and
legs. Though one sinecure had “fallen in,” he neither said when, nor
what other sinecures had since accrued to the head of the family. His
general reply to the matter is curious even at the present day. Mr.
Wellesley Pole proceeded:—
“There is a considerable degree of eccentricity in the noble lord’s
manner, but at the same time he has so much good British stuff about
him, and so much knowledge of his profession, that he will always be
listened to with great respect. It is, therefore, the more to be
lamented that he does not follow the dictates of his own good
understanding, instead of being guided _by the erroneous advice, and
adopting the wild theories of others_. Let me advise him that
_adherence to the pursuits of his profession_, of which he is so great
an ornament, will tend more to his own honour and to the advantage of
his country, than a perseverance in _the conduct which he has of late
adopted, conduct which can only lead him into error_, and make him the
dupe of those who use the authority of his name to advance their own
mischievous purposes.”
This overture was unmistakable. If I would quit Sir Francis Burdett,
sell my constituents, and come over to the ministerial side, the
Government would—despite the affair of Lord Gambier—put me in the way of
advancement. If I did not forsake my party, the high professional
character drawn by Mr. Wellesley Pole would avail me nothing—not even to
get employed again! I need scarcely say that the overture,—politely
insinuating, as it did, that I was to be bought—was rejected on my part.
The remainder of my speech consisted of a contrast between this reckless
extravagance in pensions and sinecures, and the petty saving which
rendered the Navy useless:—
“Such are some of the pretended savings by which, when any are made,
the country is duped. Were there a prospect of success, I could point
out some savings better worthy attention. By adopting canvass of a
better quality, a saving equal to the additional income-tax imposed by
the Whigs may be made, equal, in fact, to one fourth of the Navy. The
remaining three fourths of the ships will be more effectual than the
whole, as their velocity would be increased by upwards of half a mile
in seven, and they would thus be enabled to capture those vessels
which at present escape from them all. The enemy distinguish our ships
of war from foreign ships by the colour of the wretched canvass, and
run away the moment they perceive our black sails rising above the
horizon, a circumstance to which they owe their safety, even more than
to its open texture. I have observed the meridian altitude of the sun
through the foretopsail, and by bringing it to the horizon through the
foresail, have ascertained the latitude as correctly as I could have
done otherwise. The paltry increase of cost will be more than
compensated by the superior strength of the canvass, on which depend
the safety of the ship and the preservation of all the lives on board.
“I shall, no doubt, hear it urged that a remedy is about to be
applied, and so it has ever since I can remember, but remedies at
public boards are sought in vain.”
To comprehend the preceding statements, it may be necessary to observe
that we had at that time more than 1000 ships of war of all classes
afloat, and that from the general bad character of their sailing and
equipment, the enemy, who had little more than a tenth of the number,
fairly laughed at us. Under any circumstances, the waste of money was
deplorable, but under the corrupt system by which worthless ships were
then introduced into the Navy, to which subject allusion is made in the
first volume, it was utter paralysation of every natural effort.
The amount of obloquy these efforts to raise the condition of the naval
service brought on me, amongst persons who held that afloat or ashore
the duty of a naval officer was implicit obedience to the ministry of
the day, will be readily understood. Reply to my statements being
impossible, the ministerial organs made me the subject of numerous bad
squibs, one of which is subjoined:—
“You fight so well and speak so ill, Your case is somewhat odd,
Fighting abroad you’re quite _at home_, Speaking at home—_abroad_;
Therefore your friends, than hear yourself, Would rather of you hear;
And that your name in the _Gazette_, Than _Journals_, should appear.”
The wit is somewhat obtuse, but the feeling here expressed was no doubt
sincere. The Ministers indeed began to suspect that they had committed
an error in preventing me from joining my ship, and shortly afterwards
attempted to repair it by ordering me immediately to sea! With what
effect will appear in the next chapter.
To the credit of the present age, wilful corruption has passed away, but
false economy still prevails. It is only six years ago that we commenced
a war without a single gun-boat, the only description of vessel that
could operate with effect in the enemy’s waters. The consequence was
that nothing was effected. At the close of the war we built gun-boats by
the score, but now that they may be required for the defence of our own
coasts, only to find them so rotten, as to be in danger of crumbling
under the concussion arising from their own fire.
In the absence of a more assignable reason, it may be assumed that they
have been cheaply built, for it cannot for a moment be supposed that the
disaster arose from want of proper supervision. The subjoined extract
from a leading article of the _Times_ of April 25th, 1860, will tell the
story better than I can, and by that the public will see that the vice
of what may be termed extravagant saving is not yet extinct:—
“Five years ago we were compelled to denounce the management of our
military and naval establishments. The public and the Government have
long since done us justice in this matter, the former by demanding
that ‘the system’ which paralysed the efforts of Englishmen should be
at once reformed, the latter by setting about those reforms with more
or less activity. We have now, most unwillingly, to return to the
charge, and to lay before our readers a sad history of mismanagement
and waste.
“At this time, we are told, there are forty-seven gunboats, besides
mortar vessels, hauled up at Haslar yard. All the world remembers the
pæan which was sung over this miniature fleet. Christened with
coquettish little names, the gunboats, built according to the newest
model and commanded by gallant young officers, were the pets and the
pride of the country. It was told how after the war they were all
drawn up ready for use on the shortest notice, how they could be
brought down to the water in less than an hour, and the enemy
confronted in less than a week with an extempore fleet as formidable
as any that could issue from Cherbourg. Twenty-two, we are told, have
been repaired at a great cost, and, with the exception of coppering,
are fit for launching. Nine vessels are under repair, fourteen are
waiting examination. These repairs began more than three years ago,
and have been continued at intervals to the present time. It will
appear singular that vessels built only in 1854 and 1855 should so
soon require such extensive reconstruction. Very quietly do these
repairs seem to have been carried on. The decay has been attributed to
the fact that the gunboats had been stripped of their copper, and
placed high and dry in a current of air. But now it is announced that
the decay must be attributed to another cause. Some gunboats which had
been kept afloat have been hauled up, and have been found to be ‘far
more defective than those stored beneath the sheds, and the only
conclusion which can be arrived at is that the whole of our gunboats
afloat are unfit for service.’ They have been constructed with the
most reckless disregard to the quality of the material. If those which
have been examined are a sample of the whole, we are at this moment
without an efficient gunboat. Scarcely a sound piece of wood can be
seen about them, every part bearing marks of ‘sap,’ and some of the
ribs are completely enveloped with it; the pressure of the hand on
their frame crumbles it to dust. Much more to this effect is given in
our Naval Intelligence. The copper bolts, also, which should have gone
through and been clinched on each side, ‘were found to have been
changed into short ends of about two inches, driven in on each side;’
a fact which, if correct, convicts either the builders or their
workmen of a deliberate and most disgraceful fraud.
“It may be that _the Government price was too low, and it is said that
the only two sound vessels were built by a firm which lost money by
their construction_. But that cannot be an excuse for the others. The
public will demand a searching and unsparing inquiry into these
delinquencies, and if it should appear that men holding a foremost
position in the community have been guilty of such malpractices, they
should be duly exposed and punished.”