REFUSED PERMISSION TO REJOIN MY FRIGATE. I AM REGARDED AS A MARKED
MAN.—NO SECRET MADE OF THIS.—ADDITIONAL CAUSE OF OFFENCE TO THE
MINISTRY.—THE PART TAKEN BY ME ON THE REFORM QUESTION, THOUGH
MODERATE, RESENTED.—MOTION FOR PAPERS ON ADMIRALTY COURT
ABUSES.—EFFECT OF THE SYSTEM.—MODES OF EVADING IT.—ROBBERIES BY
PRIZE AGENTS.—CORROBORATED BY GEORGE ROSE.—ABOMINABLE SYSTEM OF
PROMOTION.—SIR FRANCIS BURDETT COMMITTED TO THE TOWER.—PETITIONS FOR
HIS LIBERATION INTRUSTED TO ME.—NAVAL ABUSES.—PITTANCES DOLED OUT TO
WOUNDED OFFICERS.—SINECURES COST MORE THAN ALL THE DOCKYARDS.—MY
GRANDMOTHER’S PENSION.—MR. WELLESLEY POLE’S EXPLANATION.—OVERTURE TO
QUIT MY PARTY.—DEPLORABLE WASTE OF PUBLIC MONEY.—BAD
SQUIBS.—COMPARISON WITH THE PRESENT DAY.—EXTRACT FROM “TIMES”
NEWSPAPER.
Just at the period of the court-martial on Lord Gambier, great national
expectations were excited by the combined military and naval expedition
to Walcheren, under the Earl of Chatham and Sir Richard Strachan. The
object of this armament, the most formidable England had ever sent
forth, was the capture or destruction of the French fleet in the
Scheldt, and of the arsenals and dockyards of Flushing, Terneuse, and
Antwerp, at the latter of which ports Buonaparte was carrying on naval
works with great vigour.
The force employed for this purpose comprised 40,000 troops, 35
sail-of-the-line, 2 fifty gun-ships, 3 forty-four gun-ships, 18
frigates, and nearly 200 smaller vessels, besides dockyard craft; the
first portion of the expedition quitting the Downs on the 28th of July,
1809, and anchoring the same evening near the coast of Walcheren.
To the reader acquainted with the views expressed in the first volume of
this work, it will not be surprising that I viewed the departure of this
force with regret; as had one half of the troops been placed, as
suggested in my letter to Lord Mulgrave, on the islands of the French
coast, and had half the frigates alone been employed, as had been the
_Impérieuse_ and other vessels in the Mediterranean, not a man could
have been detached from Western France to the Spanish peninsula, from
which the remaining portion of the British army might have driven the
French troops already there.
Full of these views, and knowing that short work might be made of the
Walcheren expedition, so as to liberate both the naval and military
force for service elsewhere, I laid before the Admiralty a plan for
destroying the French fleet and the Flemish dockyards, somewhat
analogous to that which would have proved completely effectual in Basque
Roads, had it been followed up by the Commander-in-chief. My new plan
had, moreover, received an important addition from the experience there
gained, and was now as formidable against fortifications as against
fleets.
The first measure of indignation against me for my late services to my
country was the summary rejection of my plan, and not only this, but a
refusal by Admiralty letter, given elsewhere, to proceed to the Scheldt
to join my frigate, which had been sent there under the temporary
command of the Hon. Captain Duncan, a most excellent and gallant
officer.
Of the disastrous failure of the Walcheren expedition—the destruction of
a large portion of the army by disease—and the retreat of the remainder,
I shall not speak; these matters being already well known to the student
of English history. I will, however, assert—and the assertion will be
borne out by the plan of attack submitted by me to the Admiralty—that
had my recommendation been adopted, even though not carried out under my
own supervision, nothing could have saved the French fleet in the
Scheldt from a similar fate to that which had befallen their armament in
Aix Roads. Even—as with the disaster in Aix Roads fresh in remembrance,
is probable—had the French fleet in the Scheldt taken refuge above
Antwerp, it could only have placed itself in a _cul-de-sac_; whilst
there was ample military and naval force to operate against the
dockyards and fortifications during the period that my appliances for
the destruction of the enemy’s fleet were in progress; for I in no way
wished to interfere with the operations of the general or admiral
commanding, but rather to conduct my own operations independently of
extraordinary aid from either.
The cost of this plan to the nation would have been ten rotten old
hulks, some fifty thousand barrels of powder, and a proportionate
quantity of shells. The cost of the expedition, which failed—in addition
to the thousands of lives sacrificed—was millions; and the millions
which followed by the prolongation of the war, by the refusal of the
Admiralty to put in operation any naval expedition calculated to effect
a beneficial object—who shall count? So much for war when conducted by
cabinets! But I was now a marked man, and the Government evidently
considered it preferable that the largest force which England had ever
despatched from her shores should incur the chance of failure in its
object, than that the simple and easily applied plans of a junior
post-captain should again jeopardise the reputation of his
Commander-in-chief.
It was very curious that whilst this animosity was being directed
against me in my professional capacity, I had shortly before received
from His Majesty George the Third the highest decoration of the order of
the Bath for my professional services!
So little secret did the Government make of their determination not to
employ me again, that the public press regarded this determination as a
settled matter. It was nothing that I had been instrumental in
destroying the fleet so much dreaded by our West India merchants and the
nation generally, or that I had offered to serve the French fleet in the
Scheldt in the same way. I was now an obnoxious man, and the national
expenditure of millions for defeat, was by the ministry of that day
deemed preferable to cheap victory if achieved by a junior officer, to
whom the Chancellor of the Exchequer—whilst denying him thanks for the
service—had attributed the destruction of a fleet quite as formidable as
the one in the Scheldt.
It may be scarcely credible to the present age that the Government
should have openly announced such a determination. On the principle
adopted throughout this work, of adducing nothing without proof, it will
be necessary to place the preceding facts beyond dispute. From one of
the most talented periodicals of the time I extract the following
passage: “The worst injury which the radical reformers have done the
country, has been _by depriving it of Lord Cochrane’s services, and
withdrawing him from that career_ which he had so gloriously begun.”[72]
The pretence was, that I had _withdrawn myself!_ at the time I was
entreating the Admiralty to permit me to return to my frigate! This
matter will shortly be made very clear.
Footnote 72:
Ed. An. Reg. vol. iv. p. 107.
One grave cause of offence to the Ministry, in addition to my
determination to oppose the vote of thanks to Lord Gambier, had been the
part I took at the famous meeting; held at the Crown and Anchor in the
Strand. For a junior naval officer in that day to associate with such
persons as Sir Francis Burdett and Major Cartwright was bad enough, but
that he should _act_ with them was a thing unheard of in the naval
service.
At this meeting many irritating things were said, though not by me. The
late trial of the Duke of York was freely handled, and Colonel Wardle,
the principal promoter of it, held up to public admiration. The
“borough-mongering faction,” as it was forcibly termed by Sir Francis
Burdett, was painted as involving the country in perpetual misfortune,
and consigning to hopeless imprisonment all who ventured to expose their
practices; whilst, it was said, even His Majesty could not carry on his
fair share of government, being compelled to choose his ministers from a
faction which not only oppressed the people, but controlled the King
himself.
The resolutions moved by good old Major Cartwright at this celebrated
meeting were at that time regarded as treason, though at the present day
sound doctrine, viz. that “so long as the people were not fairly
represented corruption must increase—our debts and taxes accumulate—our
resources be dissipated—the native energy of the people be depressed,
and the country be deprived of its best defences. The remedy was only to
be found in the principles handed down to us by the wisdom and virtue of
our forefathers, in a full and fair representation of the people in
Parliament.”
This was perfectly true, and singularly enough, after the lapse of
fifty-one years, the very same question forms the principal feature of
the present session of Parliament, the debates on the subject in our day
differing very little from their predecessors of half a century ago, if
we may credit the following picture from a _Times_ leader of April 23rd
last. “Call Reform what you will, it is almost anything you please,
except legislation. _The belligerent parties will fight and cheat one
another, and both together will cheat the people!_”
If after a battle of fifty years the people have not achieved the
victory which early Reformers began, I have some right to call on the
public to estimate the amount of obloquy which befell myself for my
volun- *tary enrolment amongst the combatants on their side; and in the
belief that the public of the present day will do my memory that justice
which through life has been denied me, I shall not shrink from laying
these matters before them. If such a picture of our present legislators
be truly drawn, what must have been that of the faction against which I
had to contend?
The speech made by me at the Crown and Anchor was very moderate, and
indeed was spoken of by the ministerial organs as expressing less of the
spirit of faction than any which had been delivered on that day. The
worst part of it, so far as I can recollect, was that generally
recorded, that “I hoped the time would come when ministers would not be
employed all day in thinking what they were to cavil about all night,
and all night in useless debate—whereby the real business of the country
was neglected; so much so indeed, that when the newspapers had reached
me abroad, I felt ashamed at the manner in which the government of my
country was conducted.”
I had even gone further in moderation, though the Ministry did not know
it, viz. by observing to Sir Francis Burdett that I thought he was going
_too far_. His reply was characteristic. “My dear Lord Cochrane you
don’t know ministers. If you wish to get anything from them, you must go
for a great deal more than you want. Even then you will get little
enough.” “Oh!” replied I, “if those are your tactics, go on, I’ll
follow.”
The real grievance was, however, my support of the motions in Parliament
which arose from the meetings at the Crown and Anchor. Mr. Madocks
distinctly charged the Ministry with trafficking in seats, offering to
prove to the House that Lord Castlereagh had, through the agency of the
Honourable Mr. Wellesley, been instrumental in purchasing for Mr.
Quintin Dick the borough of Cashel; and that when in the matter of the
Duke of York Mr. Dick had determined to vote according to his
conscience, Lord Castlereagh intimated to that gentleman the necessity
of voting with the Government, or resigning his seat, which was
accordingly done. The Ministry declined to accept the challenge.[73]
Footnote 73:
The defence to these charges consisted of what was termed eloquence,
but which was nothing but empty declamation, without the slightest
attempt at argument. The subjoined effort of Mr. Canning on this very
occasion is a specimen:—
“Good God! was this the time to suppose that the character of the
House of Commons was lost, and that the most hazardous experiments
should be made to restore it! It was the character and influence of
that House which achieved all our blessings! and distinguished the
character and condition of this country from that of any other country
in the world! Was the source from which such blessings flowed to be
stigmatised as a sink of corruption?”
Even at the present day this is amusing.
The subsequent motion of Mr. Curwen went further. But I must not forget
that I am writing my autobiography, and not political history; I never
made pretensions to parliamentary eloquence, and shall not inflict on
the reader my humble efforts, excepting only those connected with the
naval service.
On the 19th of February I moved for certain papers relative to the
conduct of the Admiralty Court, and as my speech on that occasion was
sufficiently comprehensive, I will adduce it with some slight
explanations indicative of the practices which at that time were in full
operation:—
“If these papers are granted it will be in my power to expose a system
of abuses in the Admiralty Court unparalleled in this country, even
exceeding those prevalent in Spain under the infamous administration
of Godoy.
“The whole navy of England was, by the existing system, compelled to
employ one individual to carry on its business before the Admiralty
Court; a person perhaps in whose competence or honesty they might have
no confidence. But admitting his ability and integrity to be
unquestionable, still the thing was preposterous. Would any man like
to employ an attorney who at the same time did business for the other
side? Was such a regulation consistent with equity or common sense?
“Even the personal liberty of naval officers was answerable for some
seizures, the produce of which notwithstanding went to the Crown, and
the most abominable compromises sometimes took place. Whether the
profits of these compromises found their way into the pockets of any
particular individual I was not absolutely sure, but had evidence to
presume that this was the fact. What indeed could be the design of
confining the captors to one proctor, except that secrecy as to these
questionable transactions may be preserved.”
One case was my own. In the first volume of this work is narrated the
capture of the _King George_ privateer, or pirate, for which seizure by
any vessel of war a reward of 500_l._ had been issued. The _King George_
in part actually belonged to parties connected with the Maltese
Admiralty Court. As her condemnation was unavoidable, she was condemned
as a _droit_ to the Crown; and costs to the extent of 600_l._ were
decreed against myself, officers, and crew, for having taken her! A
subject which will hereafter have to be further alluded to.
The effect of this system was to indispose officers to look after
prizes, and thus many an enemy’s vessel was suffered to escape. One of
my reasons for harassing the French on the coasts of Languedoc and
Catalonia was, that it appeared more advantageous to effect something of
service to the country, than to take prizes for no better end than to
enrich the officers of the Maltese Admiralty Court, and at the same time
to be ourselves condemned in costs for our trouble.
Some curious stories might be told of the effect of the system. It was
my own practice, when any money was captured in a prize, to divide it
into two portions, first, the Admiral’s share, and next our own. We then
buried the money in a sand-bank, in order that it might not be in our
possession; and, as opportunity occurred, it was afterwards taken up,
the Admiral’s share being transmitted to him, our share was then
distributed at the capstan, in the usual proportions. As I never made
any secret of my own transactions, the Maltese officials regarded me
with perfect hatred; they, no doubt, honestly believing that by
appropriating our own captures to our own use, we were cheating them out
of what they had more right to than ourselves! By their practices they
appeared to entertain one idea only, viz. that officers were appointed
to ships of war for the sole purpose of enriching them!
In a case narrated in the first volume, where I had, in Caldagues Bay,
taken thirteen vessels laden with corn for the French army in Barcelona,
after having sunk two small ships of war protecting them—we sold the
corn vessels and their cargo to the Spaniards for a trifle, dividing the
dollars amongst us, after sending Lord Collingwood his share. We
afterwards took the vessels of war after raising them to Gibraltar,
where I purchased one as a yacht. Had I sent those corn vessels to
Malta, and had them condemned there—in place of obtaining anything for
the capture, a heavy bill of costs for the condemnation of such small
vessels would have greatly exceeded the sum realised by their sale.