The last three were destroyed _on the falling tide_, but no others!
These being the only enemy’s ships which, after the escape of the
other four, remained assailable.
E. The position taken up by the _Impérieuse_, she being at the time of
the arrival of the assisting force engaged with the _Calcutta_, and
with the other two ships.
F. Position of the British ships sent in after the _Ocean_ and group
had warped off, viz. within pistol shot of the sand on which the
escaped ships lay till 1 p.m. aground.
The best comment, perhaps, on the whole affair of Aix Roads is what had
previously been effected with a less force than that under Lord Gambier,
and when the fortifications were perfect. The subjoined historical facts
should for ever put an end to all controversy on the subject, and at the
same time to the untenable defence set up at this memorable
court-martial.
“A well-planned and vigorous attack on the coast of France being in
1757 much desired, with a view to give a decisive blow to the marine
of that kingdom (_the very purpose for which Lord Gambier was sent,
and which Lord Mulgrave especially impressed on me_), a fleet was
ordered to be got in readiness, under the command of Sir E. Hawke,
Rear-Admiral Knowles being appointed second in command. On the 20th of
September the fleet made the Island of Oleron, and Sir E. Hawke
ordered the Vice-Admiral to proceed to Basque Road, to stand in _as
near_ to Ile d’Aix as the pilot would carry him, with such ships of
his division as he thought necessary, and _to batter the fort, until
the garrison should either abandon it or surrender_.”
“On the 22nd of September the fleet entered the bay called the Road of
Basque, between the islands of Rhé and Oleron. _About eight the next
morning_ Admiral Knowles in the _Neptune_, with the _Magnanime_,
_Barfleur_, _America_, _Alcide_, _Burford_, and _Royal William_, _made
sail towards Aix_. Captain Howe (_afterwards Earl Howe_) in the
_Magnanime_ led the van. At _half-past twelve_ the fort upon the
island began to fire, but he continued to advance without exchanging a
single shot, continually urging his pilot to lay his ship as close to
the fort as possible. _He dropped his anchor under the very walls._ It
was, however, near an hour before the fort struck its colours.”
(_Biographical Memoir of Earl Howe in the Naval Chronicle_, vol. i.
1799; see also _Campbell’s Lives of the Admirals_.)
This was the very fort, only now _in ruins_,—or to use Lord Gambier’s
words, “_no obstacle, from the dilapidated condition of the
fortifications_”—that his lordship adduced as a reason for not
endangering the British fleet by exposing the ships to its fire. Admiral
Harvey had perhaps Lord Howe’s exploit in his mind’s eye when he told
Lord Gambier to his face that “had Nelson been there, he would not have
waited for fire-ships, but would have dashed at once at the enemy;” an
assertion of which there can be no doubt, though poor Harvey was
dismissed the service for this and similar opinions.
Another extract, from Lord Clarendon’s remarks on Admiral Blake, shall
close the subject.
“He despised those rules which had been long in practice, to _keep his
ship and men out of danger, which had been held in former times a
point of great ability and circumspection; as if the principal art
requisite in the captain of a ship had been to be sure to come home
safe again_! He was the first man who brought ships to contemn
_castles on shore_, which had been thought ever very formidable, and
were discovered by him to _make a noise only, and to fright those who
could be rarely hurt by them_.” (CLARENDON’S _History of the
Rebellion_.)