“August 4, 1809.
“SIR,—Having learnt from my brother officers that a report has gone
abroad that I censured, in general terms, the conduct of the officers
employed in the Road of Aix, on the 12th of April, I wish to have an
opportunity to declare the truth on oath; considering reports of that
nature highly injurious to the service of our country. I am also
desirous to lay before the Court the orders given to the fireships for
their guidance, as these will tend to elucidate and clear some of
those who consider that blame has been imputed to them.
“I have the honour to be, sir,
“Your most obedient humble servant,
“COCHRANE.
“Admiral Sir Roger Curtis, President.”
Let the reader mark that expression of the president, “_it does not at
all bear upon the trial of Lord Gambier!_” Though the very first
sentence of Lord Gambier’s defence was an accusation of myself upon an
assumption for which there was no foundation whatever. Nothing but fear
of a parliamentary debate caused that letter to be attached to the
Minutes.
So clumsily was this accusation made against me, that Lord Gambier,
despite the unwarrantable assumption just quoted, subsequently admitted
my objection to the vote of thanks to have _been solely aimed at
himself_, and not, as he had just said, at the officers and men of the
fleet. Here are his lordship’s words:—
“Lord Cochrane _warned_ the noble lord at the head of the Admiralty
that if this measure (the vote of thanks) were attempted he should, if
standing alone, oppose it; thus, without specifically objecting to
thanks being given for the service performed, directing his hostility
_personally at me_.” (_Minutes_, p. 107.)
That is—I should not have objected to a vote of thanks to the officers
and men of the fleet, but only to himself _personally_. Yet in the same
breath he accused me of traducing the officers and men of the fleet;
with the intention, no doubt, of sheltering himself under the pretence
of my having traduced them also. Could anything be more puerile? I gave
no other “_warning_” to Lord Mulgrave than that which Lord Gambier
correctly stated, and that I certainly did give, but without a word
which could give rise to the slightest imputation on the officers and
men of the fleet.
The fact is, that I never accused Lord Gambier at all, _not even to Lord
Mulgrave_, to whom I only expressed an intention of opposing a
parliamentary vote of thanks. It was the Board of Admiralty who accused
him. Here are their accusations in full:—
“_By the Commissioners for executing the office of Lord High Admiral
of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, &c._
“Whereas Admiral the Right Hon. Lord Gambier has, by his letter to our
Secretary, of the 30th of May, 1809, requested that his conduct, as
Commander-in-chief of the Channel Fleet employed in Basque Roads,
between the 17th day of March and the 29th day of April, 1809, may be
inquired into by a court-martial:
“And whereas, by the log-books and minutes of signals of the
_Caledonia_, _Impérieuse_, and other ships employed on that service,
_it appears to us_ that the said Admiral Lord Gambier, on the 12th
day of the said month of April, the enemy’s ships being then on
shore, and the signal having been made that they could be destroyed,
did, for a considerable time, neglect or delay taking effectual
measures for destroying them: We, therefore, in compliance with his
lordship’s request, and _in consequence of what appears in the said
log-books and minutes of signals_, think fit that a court-martial
shall be assembled for the purpose of examining into his lordship’s
conduct, and trying him for the same: We send you herewith his
lordship’s said letter, and also his letter of the 10th of the said
month therein referred to, together with an attested copy of a
letter of our Secretary, dated the 29th of last month, and addressed
to Lord Cochrane, and his lordship’s reply thereto, with the
log-books and minutes of signals above-mentioned: and we do hereby
require and direct you to assemble a court-martial on Monday the
19th day of this month (if the witnesses shall be then ready, and if
not then ready, as soon after as they shall be so) to try the said
Admiral the Right Hon. Lord Gambier, for his conduct in the instance
hereinbefore mentioned; and also to inquire into his whole conduct
as Commander-in-chief of the Channel Fleet employed in Basque Roads,
between the 17th day of March and the 29th day of April, 1809, and
to try him for the same accordingly.—Given under our hands the 5th
day of June, 1809.
(Signed) “MULGRAVE.
“R. BICKERTON.
“WM. DOMETT.
“R. MOORSOM.
“To Sir Roger Curtis, Bart., Admiral
of the White, and Commander-in-chief
of his Majesty’s ships and vessels
at Spithead and in Portsmouth
Harbour.
“By Command of their Lordships,
“W.W. POLE.”
There is nothing here from which it can be inferred that—to use Lord
Gambier’s own words in his defence—I had driven him “to defend himself
against the _loose and indirect accusations_ of an officer so much his
inferior in rank.” I had made no accusation whatever against him, having
merely and only declared that the service rendered was not worth the
thanks of Parliament; the frequency of such thanks for trifling service
being at that period so notorious as to become subject for sarcasm, as
will appear in the next chapter. Had Lord Gambier construed my
parliamentary opposition rightly, he might have thanked me for saving
him from himself, and would have done so, had not his peculiar failing,
vanity, demanded an ovation for services which under evil advice he had
prevented from being fully consummated. So far from accusing Lord
Gambier, _I was ordered by the Admiralty to do so_, and refused, to my
own detriment[51]; telling the Board _to go to the logs of the fleet,
and frame their own accusations, if they had any_. Yet, even this
consideration did not prevent Lord Gambier from giving utterance to the
following bombast;—
-----
Footnote 51:
See vol. i. p. 407.
-----
“Whether Lord Cochrane supposed that he might with impunity endeavour
to lower me in the opinion of my country and of my sovereign, signal
marks of whose favour had at that instant been exclusively conferred
upon himself,—whether his Lordship thought to _raise his own
reputation at the expense of mine_,—and whether he expected that his
threat would intimidate me to silence, I know not.” (_Minutes_, p.
108.)
How could I “raise my own reputation” at the expense of Lord Gambier,
who had, in his first despatch, said that my conduct in the action of
Aix Roads “could not be exceeded by any feat of valour hitherto achieved
by the British navy;” though in his second despatch, substituted for the
first after his return to England, and that too by order of the Board of
Admiralty, he only remembered that I “lay with my ship about three miles
from the enemy!” His lordship was not once within gunshot of the enemy,
whilst my frigate was throughout engaged, and for some time
single-handed, against two line-of-battle ships, and a fifty gun ship,
the _Calcutta_, which I captured.
So far from “raising my reputation at the expense of Lord Gambier’s,” I
voluntarily stated on the court-martial, that “the feelings of Lord
Gambier for the honour and interest of his country were as strong as my
own.” (_Minutes_, p. 40.) For which mark of good nature, his lordship
said in his defence, that even “in the present proceedings, Lord
Cochrane stands in a situation only as an officer _under my command_!”
(_Minutes_, p. 107) the meaning of which evidently was that I ought not
to say anything but by order. The expression could not have had any
other meaning.
I will not enter further into Lord Gambier’s unfounded recriminations
upon myself, further than to remark, that even had they any foundation,
in no way did they bear upon the subject of the trial, much less were
they in any way connected with his defence to the inquiry as to _why it
was, that with a favourable wind, a rising tide, and plenty of water, he
had refrained from attacking eleven ships helplessly ashore, allowing
all but three to escape? This was the inquiry before the court, which,
departing from the subject of inquiry, connived at its being substituted
for recriminations on me for accusing Lord Gambier—though I had never
done so._
Upon the real point Lord Gambier in his defence wisely abstained from
trusting himself, except in such terms as the following. “_If_ he had
sent in any ships, and they should have been necessitated to remain a
whole tide in the Roads of Aix; _if_ they had been crippled in going in;
_if_ the wind, which was favourable for carrying them in, should not
have shifted so as to bring them out again; and that even, _if_ the wind
were fair and they should lose their foremasts, the crews would not have
been able to get the ships before the wind.” To this, I will add that
“_if_,” instead of conjuring up these absurd dangers to be apprehended
from an enemy of whom Lord Gambier had said to Captain Broughton, that
they were “_already destroyed_,” his Lordship had sent in ships to
finish the work, the court-martial would never have been heard of, and
he would have enjoyed a legitimate triumph. I was not his enemy. Those
who persuaded him not to second my efforts were so unquestionably.
Quitting these “_ifs_,” and calculations of possible risk and
conjectural disasters, one or two points professionally connected with
the defence remained to be noticed.
Lord Gambier knew, that during the ebb and rising tide, the enemy’s
ships ashore were preparing to warp off with the flood, and he also knew
that the only two enemy’s ships at anchor, the _Foudroyant_ and
_Cassard_, which at the court-martial were converted into bugbears to
the whole British fleet, would be prepared in case of the attack which
they naturally expected, to cut or slip, and so run for the mouth of the
Charente as they did, the moment the ships aground had warped off and
escaped.
When the British fleet weighed from Basque Roads, the enemy was, as
Captain Broughton testified “_panic struck_.” When, in place of
proceeding straight on to the attack, the British ships _came to an
anchor_ in Little Basque Roads, the enemy, as their own writers declare,
considered “_la mollesse de Lord Gambier_” an unexpected stroke of good
luck, and set energetically to work to warp off their ships from the
bank on which they were stranded. As Captain Broughton rightly says, had
the frigates and smaller vessels been _then_ sent in, and a
demonstration only made of others ready to follow, the destruction of
the whole must have been complete. This is neither a matter of naval
tactics nor science, but a commonplace consequence. It was this which
caused Captain Malcolm to say, “Had it appeared to me that there was no
other chance of destroying them, but by such an attack, _I certainly
think it ought to have been made_.” (_Minutes_, p. 211.) And again, “Had
they been attacked by the British ships, they could not, in my opinion,
_have been warped off from the shore_, as to do so, it was necessary to
lay out anchors to heave them off.” (_Ibid._) There are no “_ifs_” or
contingent disasters in Captain Malcolm’s opinion, which, as Captain
Hutchinson pertinently remarks, was that of every officer in the fleet.
But even after the enemy’s ships had escaped, and the two at anchor, the
_Foudroyant_ and _Cassard_ _had_ run for the Charente, the
Commander-in-chief allowed an hour and a half to escape before a single
ship was sent into the inner roads, nor would any have been sent at all
had not I taken the _Impérieuse_ in alone, and then hoisted the signal
“in want of assistance.” Had not this been done, not a single ship of
the enemy’s fleet would have been destroyed, unless from the
impossibility of getting her again afloat, and I am not aware that any
such instance occurred.
To excuse this neglect, the hypothesis of banks and shoals, in the
charts of Messrs. Stokes and Fairfax was resorted to, for they neither
existed in the French charts, nor in reality. Coupled with this was the
alleged danger of point blank shot from the dilapidated batteries!
“Scarcely,” says Lord Gambier, “had the _Cæsar_ reached Aix Roads,
before she grounded, and _lay in a perilous situation exposed to the
point blank shot of the batteries_.” (_Minutes_, p. 128.) Unfortunately
for this hypothesis, a careful search in the _Cæsar’s_ log shows that
_she was never once touched by shot or shell!!_ and that in place of
grounding in Aix Roads, she grounded on the Boyart Sand—on her way to
Aix Roads—and that she lay there beyond the reach of shot; thus proving
what other officers testified, viz. that there was plenty of room in the
channel to avoid shot. The _Cæsar_ only went a few feet too far, and
came off next morning without damage of any kind.
A still less worthy part of the defence was, in laying the fault on
myself and Captain, now Admiral Seymour, of the _Pallas_ that nothing
more was done. “Lord Cochrane,” says the Commander-in-chief, “_remained_
in the Road of Aix, during the 13th and 14th, accompanied by the
_Pallas_, sloops and gun-brigs, but nothing was attempted by those two
frigates.” (_Minutes_, p. 129.) The fact was, that in the fight with the
line-of-battle ships destroyed on the evening of the 12th, before any
assistance came, the _Impérieuse_ was severely damaged, so much so, as
to occupy the whole of the 13th in repairs. This was why Admiral Seymour
so gallantly stood by us, and the 14th was occupied in vain attempts
even then to get a force sent in. Had Admiral Seymour run the _Pallas_
alone amongst the line-of-battle ships which remained, at the mouth of
the Charente, he would not have earned the high reputation he now
enjoys. But when Lord Gambier threw out this questionable insinuation,
he forgot to mention that Admiral Stopford lay at a short distance with
two line-of-battle ships and half a dozen frigates, besides having our
two frigates and all the smaller vessels under his command. Had Admiral
Stopford been asked why, with such a force under his orders, he remained
inactive, the reply would have not been to the Commander-in-chief’s
credit. Admiral Stopford would not have been a spectator only, could he
have helped himself.
I now quit this miserable subject for ever. The real fact is, that from
over-persuasion of those who were jealous of a junior officer
originating and being appointed to carry out plans deemed impossible by
others, Lord Gambier declined to second my efforts, as Admiral Austen
has plainly said in his letter previously quoted, the fact being as
completely confirmed by Captain Hutchinson. This decision of his
lordship was no doubt arrived at, when a council of officers were
summoned on board the flag-ship, on the morning of the 12th, at which
time the enemy’s fleet was lying helplessly ashore.
That, after such council, his Lordship never intended to make _any
attack at all_ on the French ships, is proved _beyond question_, by the
subjoined testimony of Captain Broughton.
“A ship or two might have been placed, in my opinion against the
batteries on the southern part of Ile d’Aix, so as to take off their
fire AND SILENCE THEM. I mentioned to Sir H. Neale, when the signal
was made for all captains in the morning, that I thought _they were
attackable_—speaking of the confused state in which the French ships
appeared to be at the time.”
“_I heard my Lord Gambier the same morning say_ (at this council) _it
had been his intention to have gone against the batteries I now speak
of, but as the enemy were on shore he did not think it necessary to
run any unnecessary risk of the fleet when the object of their
destruction seemed to be already obtained_.” (_Minutes_, pp. 221,
222.)
That is, he admits my exertions to have destroyed the French fleet,
(which was not destroyed—all except three ships having escaped) and
plainly tells Captain Broughton that _he will do nothing more_! This
should for ever decide the point.
If, however, proof be still wanted of the utter worthlessness of any
opposition in the power of the enemy to offer, whether by fortifications
or ships, it is to be found in the following statement at the close of
Lord Gambier’s defence:—
“I conclude by observing that the service actually performed has been
of great importance, as well in its immediate effects as in its
ultimate consequences; for the Brest fleet is so reduced as to be no
longer effective. It was upon this fleet the enemy relied for the
succour and protection of their West India colonies, and _the
destruction of their ships was effected in their own harbour, in sight
of thousands of the French. I congratulate myself and my country that
this important service has been effected, under Providence, with the
loss only of ten men killed, thirty-five wounded, and one missing._
NOT EVEN ONE OF THE SMALLEST OF OUR VESSELS EMPLOYED HAS BEEN DISABLED
FROM PROCEEDING ON ANY SERVICE THAT MIGHT HAVE BECOME NECESSARY.”
(_Minutes_, p. 138.)
By this voluntary admission of Lord Gambier I am willing to be
judged—feeling certain that posterity will be as fully convinced of the
inability of the enemy to inflict material damage on our ships, as was
Lord Gambier himself, according to his own testimony, as quoted in the
above passage. As Lord Gambier truly says, no damage worth mentioning
_was_ done to any of our ships, to which I shall add, that at no period
after the enemy’s ships were driven ashore were they in a condition to
inflict damage. This his lordship not only admits, but _proves_, in the
concluding paragraph of his defence, and yet the whole point of the
trial is made to rest on the surmise that had Lord Gambier done
_anything_ against the enemy’s ships aground, _the destruction of the
British force must have been the consequence_. That is, _by doing
nothing the enemy’s ships were destroyed; though by doing anything our
own would have been in danger_!!!
The subjoined chart B will show, at a glance, the whole affair.