CHAPTER XV.

THE FASHODA AFFAIR.--A RED BRITISH LINE THROUGH AFRICA.

France is following in the footsteps of Spain. A fatality dogs her

schemes of empire and colonisation. In truth she has no colonies--they

are but military possessions. She has set her face, alone and in

conjunction with others, in America, Asia, and Africa to hoop our

enterprises in with bands of iron. Failure attended her policy across

the Atlantic, in India, in Burmah, and but the other day at Fashoda.

Her object in that last instance was to connect her possessions in

West and East Africa, so that the red British lines which are steadily

extending from North and South Africa should never be joined. France

is the largest holder of territory upon the Dark Continent, and she

probably regarded that fact as the best justification for her subtle

move, through the Marchand and Abyssinian Missions, to add still more

to her dominions. She had been permitted to hoop us about at Bathurst

and Sierra Leone upon the West Coast and has all but completed the

same process round Ashantee and the Niger countries, not to speak of

elsewhere. Madagascar she had grabbed without a shadow of excuse, but

time and South African civilisation will make it a bigger Cuba.

Already her failures at government in that vast African island are

grievous. Less than five years ago, to use a phrase I have employed

elsewhere, property and life were ridiculously safe in that country.

But then the Hovas and Prime Minister Rainilaiarivony ruled the land.

Other changes predicted have come about there. The one native who

showed honesty and courage in successfully opposing them at Tamatave

the French subsequently executed. The Queen and Prime Minister were

banished. Speaking English, the chief foreign language spoken, has

been tabooed. Natives who are heard using it, or suspected of

employing our mother tongue, are thrust into prison and kept there,

_pour encourager les autres_, until they promise to discontinue

speaking it. Association of natives with English or Americans renders

them marked persons. The Protestant missions are regarded as centres

of treason and enmity to French authority. Quickly, as foretold, has

come about their reward(?) for non-interference politically in the

early days of French intrigue. Had they insisted, with the British

Government of a bygone day, in saving the island for the Malagasy,

they would have succeeded. Our commerce has also had to suffer, for

the French _instruct_ the natives that they must only buy articles of

French manufacture. The native who purchases British or American goods

soon discovers, from the severe handling he receives through the local

officials, that he has made a serious mistake. Robbery and

lawlessness are rife, and in many places neither life nor property is

safe beyond rifle-shot of the French garrisons. The facts are

notorious and are in possession of the Foreign Office in Downing

Street.

It had leaked out a day or two after the battle that the Sirdar

intended accompanying the expedition to Fashoda. The troops ordered to

proceed up the Nile with him were paraded outside Omdurman on the

morning of the 8th of September. These were 600 men of the 11th

Soudanese under Major Jackson, 600 men of the 13th Soudanese under

Major Smith Dorrian, 100 men of the Cameron Highlanders under Captain

the Hon. A. D. Murray, and Captain Peake's battery of 12 1/2-pounder

Maxim-Nordenfeldt guns. At the same time the force that was to be sent

across to reoccupy and assist in rebuilding the ruined Government

buildings in Khartoum also turned out for inspection. Nothing was left

to chance. Care was taken that only those fit and well should proceed

on the gunboats and barges to Fashoda. Provision was made that the

work of reconstruction should go on in his absence, and that Khartoum

and Omdurman should be left in a proper state of defence. A great air

of official mystification and secrecy prevailed respecting everything

that happened at that time. Particulars were difficult to glean of the

actual condition of affairs up the Blue and White Niles. Even the

plans for the removal of the military headquarters and the

re-establishment of the central authority in Khartoum were sealed

against us. As the telegraph service was in the Sirdar's hands, much

of the pains bestowed to keep news from us was surely unnecessary.

But the Sirdar has a way of bestowing confidences on no one--simply

issuing orders when the occasion arrives.

Since my return to England a reference to the correspondence disclosed

in the official despatches or Fashoda Blue-book proves the correctness

of the information that reached me even at that early stage. From the

summary of the documents which appeared in the _Daily Telegraph_ of

10th October, we learn that "before the battle of Omdurman Lord

Salisbury had given instructions to the Sirdar through Lord Cromer,"

as follows:--

"It is desirable that you should be placed in possession of the

views of Her Majesty's Government in respect to the line of action

to be followed in the event of Khartoum being occupied at an early

date by the forces now operating in the Soudan under the command

of Sir Herbert Kitchener.

"Her Majesty's Government do not contemplate that after the

occupation of Khartoum any further military operations on a large

scale, or involving any considerable expense, will be undertaken

for the occupation of the provinces to the south. But the Sirdar

is authorised to send two flotillas, one up the White and the

other up the Blue Nile.

"You are authorised to settle the composition of these two forces

in consultation with the Sirdar.

"Sir Herbert Kitchener should in person command the White Nile

flotilla as far as Fashoda, and may take with him a small body of

British troops, should you concur with him in thinking such a

course desirable.

"The officer in command of the Blue Nile flotilla is authorised to

go as far as the foot of the cataract, which is believed to

commence about Rosaires. He is not to land troops with a view to

marching beyond the point on the river navigable for steamers.

Should he, before reaching Rosaires, encounter any Abyssinian

outposts, he is to halt, report the circumstance, and wait for

further instructions.

"In dealing with any French or Abyssinian authorities who may be

encountered, nothing should be said or done which would in any way

imply a recognition on behalf of Her Majesty's Government of a

title to possession on behalf of France or Abyssinia to any

portion of the Nile Valley."

Although everybody engaged in the Fashoda expedition was repeatedly

warned not to disclose anything about it, and to forget all they had

seen or heard, I was enabled very shortly after the event to wire, day

by day, the whole story of the enterprise. It was General Grant, who,

during the Civil War in the United States of America, terribly vexed

at the newspaper correspondents, on one occasion vowed he would send

them all away and not have a press-man in his army. "Then, General,"

said the American journalist addressed, "may I ask what are you going

to do without soldiers, every man of them can speak and write?"

General Grant saw the absurdity of the position and smiled, and there

was an end of the matter. It was, perhaps, a choice of one of two

evils, either accepting and making the best of the situation to allow

the trained journalists to remain, or to prepare to meet a tremendous

inundation of wild letter-writing from all ranks that would find its

way into the public press and do incalculable harm. "Other times,

other manners," and those modern generals discredit themselves who

fail to recognise at the close of the nineteenth century that the

schoolmaster and the press must be reckoned with.

The information given me by the reis of the "Tewfikieh" proved

accurate in almost every detail. I confess that, at the time, knowing

the Arab indifference to exactness in dates, I did not credit his

assertion that Marchand had reached Fashoda six weeks before the

dervishes attacked him. Floating down stream in a small steam launch,

aluminum row-boats, and other craft, the Frenchmen arrived off Fashoda

on the 10th of July. In 1892-93 the French Government had begun

sending military or quasi-scientific missions from the west and east

African coasts to obtain treaties and pre-emption claims to territory

in the interior. That the French flag should wave from sea to sea was

their confessed desire. Their incentive was to forestall and annoy

Great Britain and render worthless the blood and treasure our country

might spend in smashing the dervishes. Major Marchand set out from the

west coast or French Congo in 1896, with a small body of Europeans and

about 500 Senegalese troops. With indomitable zeal and courage he

pushed east, reaching the vast basin lands of the Bahr el Ghazal after

sore hardships and the loss of many of his men, chiefly from sickness.

The spirit that animated the leader and his followers may be gathered

from the following lines which were written some time ago by a

non-commissioned officer of Senegalese Rifles to his relatives.

"We have no rest, not even for a single day, as a moment's delay

might render all our exertions useless. All that we shall have

done will be wasted if the English or others occupy our route when

we want to pass. When you read this letter we shall either be on

the Nile or our bones will be slowly whitening in the Egyptian

brushwood under a torrid sun. I verily believe that if we are

destroyed I shall retain regret for our failure in another world."

Fashoda is 444 miles by river south of Omdurman. It is situated upon

the west bank, on a low headland which at high Nile becomes an island.

Before the Mahdist rising, Fashoda was a fortified Egyptian station

with a garrison of 1000 men, and a native population of nearly 4000.

The place was enclosed within a ditch and a sun-dried brick wall. From

its position it commanded the passage of the Nile, which was less than

half a mile in width. The dervishes allowed the place to fall into

ruins, only maintaining a very small garrison--less than 100 men--to

raid for grain to supply Omdurman with, and to collect revenue from

the native boats. Like the rest of the Soudan, the Shilluk country, in

which Fashoda is situated, had suffered terribly and been sadly

depopulated. The country of the Shilluk negroes used to extend for

several hundred miles northward down the left bank of the Nile from

the Bahr el Ghazal. It was but a strip, ten miles or so in width,

their nearest neighbours, with whom they were usually at war, being

the Baggara Arabs. Like so many other riverain tracts susceptible of

cultivation, it once teemed with people, the villages along the banks

appearing to be one continuous row of dwellings. Helped by the

Shilluks, Major Marchand had no difficulty in capturing Fashoda. The

old fortification was built upon the only accessible strip of dry

land, at high Nile, available for miles along the bank in that

vicinity. Seen from the river, the works consisted of a rectangular

mud-wall about 200 yards in length, protected by horse-shoe bastions

at the corners. The Khalifa being as usual in need of supplies sent

out a small foraging expedition many weeks before our arrival on the

scene. Starting in the steamers "Safieh" and "Tewfikieh," they

collected grain and cattle, shipping them down to Omdurman. Learning

that Europeans had been seen at Fashoda, part of the force proceeded

there, and engaged the French, attacking them by land and water. The

date was the 25th of August. Behaving with great steadiness, and

helped by Shilluks, after a stiff fight the dervishes were driven off,

after losing a number of men, by Marchand's little garrison. "If they

had had cannon," said the dervish skipper to me, "they fired so well

that they would have sunk our steamers." The dervish captains then ran

their boats down stream to collect their followers and return to

assault the position. About 100 miles north the "Safieh" stopped to

collect the raiders, who numbered about a thousand with four brass

guns.

At six o'clock on the morning of the 10th September, the Sirdar set

out from Omdurman with his expeditionary force. The troops were

embarked upon the gunboats "Sultan," "Sheik," "Fatah," and barges

towed by these vessels. Colonel Wingate, Major Lord Edward Cecil,

Captain J. K. Watson, A.D.C., and other officers, accompanied the

General on the stern-wheel steamer "Dal," which had for armament

several Maxims. A Union Jack, as well as an Egyptian flag, was hoisted

on the boat. Abundance of ammunition and two months' provisions for

the force were carried on the steamers and tows. The steamers went

along very leisurely, going only by daylight. In the afternoon, or

towards sunset, the flotilla made fast to some suitable bank. The

troops then formed a sort of camp, and parties went out with saws and

axes to cut timber for fuel for the boilers. The hard gummy mimosa and

sunt, when there is not too much sap in it, burns fiercely with a glow

almost equal to ordinary coal. South of Omdurman, the river still

being in full flood, the Nile had overspread the low banks for miles.

There were places where it resembled a lake, two to six miles wide,

dotted with islands. Landing was not always easily effected, for the

banks were frequently marshy. There was plenty of good sizable wood to

be had all along the river, the only difficulty being to reach and cut

it. More than once, in order to "fill up" the vessels for next day's

steaming, the Camerons and Soudanese soldiers laboured far into the

night, hewing and carrying timber for fuel by candle-light and the

electric beam. Nearing Fashoda the Nile in places ran through channels

but 400 yards in width. The water was deep and relatively clear, with

a current of but two miles or less an hour. Unfortunately, it rained

heavily nearly every night, and the troops quartered upon the barges

got drenched to the skin, the water pouring, in so many shower-baths,

through the cracked boarded coverings. It is a peculiarity of most

tropical climates, that Jupiter Pluvius does most of his work between

the hours of sunset and sunrise. The natives met with as a rule were

disposed to be friendly. Those with whom the men talked would not

quite credit the statement that the Khalifa had been defeated, his

army destroyed, and that he had run away. On Saturday the 17th

September, the gunboat "Abu Klea" caught up with and joined the

flotilla.

During the same night, dervish deserters, blacks, and Arabs came in.

They stated that a short way further up there was a camp of the enemy.

On Sunday morning, 18th September, when near Kaka, some 65 miles north

of Fashoda, the dervish steamer "Safieh" was sighted, lying at the

east bank close by the enemy's camp. The "Sultan" forged ahead and

began shelling the enemy with all her guns, using the Maxims as well.

With great alacrity the dervishes on shore replied, if indeed they did

not fire first. A few shots also came from the "Safieh." With their

rifled guns from behind screens of bushes the enemy bravely stood up,

making excellent practice at the gunboats. The "Sultan" had several

very narrow escapes, shells passing close over her bows and stern.

When the other gunboats got up, what with cannon, quick-firing guns,

and Maxims brought to bear upon the dervish camp, it was speedily

wrecked and torn. The enemy bolted into the bush, leaving over 200

dead and wounded behind, including several Baggara and the chief Emir.

A few shells from the "Sultan" had hulled and shattered the "Safieh,"

so the victory was complete. Detachments were landed from the gunboats

and the dervishes driven still further afield. Their camp was looted

and burned, and the "Safieh" and several nuggars temporarily repaired

and sent down to Omdurman. It was found that the patch put upon the

"Safieh's" boiler by chief-engineer Benbow in 1885 was intact. That

steamer went to rescue Sir Charles Wilson's party who were wrecked on

their return from Khartoum. Near Shabluka she was attacked by a

dervish fort and hulled. Lord Charles Beresford, who was in command,

stuck to the vessel after the boiler blew up, and during the night it

was repaired. On Sunday, 18th September, the Sirdar despatched a

Shilluk runner to go by land with a letter to Major Marchand telling

him of the approach of the Egyptian flotilla. Next morning a reply was

brought out to the "Dal" when it was within sight of Fashoda by an

officer in a row-boat flying the French flag, that the garrison would

receive him as a friendly visitor. Major Marchand furthermore declared

that by treaty the territory belonged to France and he had

communicated the fact to his Government, sending his despatches

through Abyssinia. Precise details of what had been done were

included.

It was 10 a.m. of the 19th September when the expedition reached

Fashoda and saw the French flag flying over the fort. A Senegalese

sentry was walking beneath the tricolor, and a row of these black

riflemen's heads peeped from the walls and trenches. All of them had

evidently been turned out under arms. Apparently there were about 300

people--not more--in the fortification. Steaming close in without

being hailed, the vessels hove to opposite the works. A row-boat

manned by Senegalese pushed from the shore and made for the "Dal."

From the stern staff drooped the French flag, and by the tiller sat

Major Marchand and an officer, M. Germain. The Major was dressed in a

suit of white ducks. Below the medium height, of spare habit, with

something like Dundreary side whiskers, he looked elderly and worn,

almost twice his years, for he is still a young man. As he stepped

aboard the steamer, he was received at the side. He and his companion

shook hands with the Sirdar and the other members of the headquarters

staff. A relatively brief conference ensued, at which the Sirdar

stated the object of his mission and his official instructions to

recover the lost provinces for Egypt. He intended, he said, to occupy

and hold them. Major Marchand intimated that he had established a

prior claim for his Government, and had entered into treaties with the

local rulers securing rights for France to the country along the Nile

south and through the Bahr el Ghazal. He had established posts at

Meshra er Rek and elsewhere in that region. Without express orders to

the contrary from his Government, he would not abandon the old

Egyptian fort, nor concede an inch of the territory he had acquired.

The Sirdar said he meant to land, and although he would avoid a

collision if possible with the Major and his party, yet he would not

be dissuaded from carrying out his orders because it might be

unpleasant. Would, he asked, the Major oppose him with force; his

means were inadequate to do so with any hope of success. Major

Marchand replied, "No," he was not in a position to justify any

attempt to contend with arms against the strong flotilla and land army

that could be brought against him by the Sirdar. Still, he would

neither yield nor withdraw without the order of his Government. The

Sirdar stated he was not adverse to letting the two Governments

settle the matter, meantime they as soldiers could remain on amicable

terms. In the course of an hour or so he would land his troops and

occupy a position as near the fort as possible. Major Marchand

protested, but said that he, under the circumstances, would have to

accept the situation.

Refreshments are always in order on board a ship where the Royal Navy

is in command. Over a friendly glass of champagne Marchand and the

Sirdar chatted on topics of general interest. The Major intimated that

he was rather short of ammunition and stores. He had sent his steam

launch south to try and bring up supplies and reinforcements from his

other stations. The doctor was anxious to obtain the assistance and

advice of some of the British medical staff as to the best treatment

of beri-beri or sleeplessness sickness, which had appeared among them.

Several of the mission had succumbed to that weird disease. It is not

unknown in the United Kingdom, a case having recently occurred at

Richmond Asylum, Dublin. After spending about half an hour on board,

Major Marchand and M. Germain, accompanied by Colonel Wingate and

Commander Keppel, went ashore together in the row-boat. Landing at the

fort, the party were received by the garrison with military honours.

The two British officers were shown every courtesy, and escorted over

the works, which had been considerably strengthened. A morass or small

lagoon cut the fortification off in rear from the mainland. It was a

position which could not easily have been carried by assault, but was

indefensible against cannon. The Senegalese Tirailleurs forming the

garrison were paraded for their inspection. There appeared to be about

120 of them, all stalwart, soldierly fellows, beside whom the

Frenchmen looked shrunken and diminutive. In addition to the

Senegalese, or rather natives of Timbuctoo, for such they were, about

150 Shilluks and nondescript natives made up the remainder of the

garrison. Including Major Marchand there were nine Europeans, or five

commissioned and four non-commissioned officers. Of four others who

had succumbed on the way, two died of beri-beri, one was killed by a

fall from a tree, and a third by a crocodile. The Nile in that

vicinity was found to be teeming with animal life. Not only crocodiles

but hippopotami were seen by those on board the flotilla.

Eventually the five steamers crept as close inshore towards the north

end of the fort as the shallow overflown land admitted. Colonel

Wingate and Commander Keppel having returned on board, all the troops

were ordered to disembark. The steamers were made fast to the banks,

and planks were placed ashore. They were of little use, for officers

and men had to flounder and wade through the shallows before they

reached firm ground 300 yards from the bank. Four of the guns of

Peake's battery were also landed. The force having been formed up was

marched a short distance to the south. It was halted behind and

exactly covering the French position from the land side, the flanks

overlapping and enclosing the old line of Egyptian works. A tall

flag-pole which was brought ashore was set up on a ruined bastion in

line with the French tricolor and about 300 yards behind it. Then the

Sirdar and staff came and stood around the pole. An instant later, the

order having been given, the Egyptian flag was hoisted to the top, and

the Soudanese bands played a few bars of the Khedivial anthem. Ere the

music ceased, the Sirdar, setting the example, called for three cheers

for His Highness the Khedive. The British flag, the Union Jack, was

meanwhile flying inshore from the "Dal." None of the French officers

attended the ceremony, but the Senegalese and the natives watched the

proceedings with great interest. In fact, as many of the soldiers of

the 11th and 13th Soudanese battalions were Shilluks, there had been

numerous greetings and interchanges of courtesy between them. The

worthy old Lieutenant Ali Gaffoon, a Shilluk, who had been in his

youth a sheikh and soldier, and who had fought in Mexico for

Maximilian, and since entered the Khedive's service, soon had crowds

of his countrymen and countrywomen flocking to see him. Immediately

after the flag was hoisted, Major Jackson was appointed commandant of

the Fashoda district, and left with a garrison of the 11th Soudanese

battalion and four guns of Captain Peake's battery. A large quantity

of stores of various kinds was landed for their use. Meanwhile E

Company of the Cameron Highlanders and the rest of the troops returned

on board ship. The bands and pipers again played as the troops marched

away, the Highlandmen stepping off to the tune of the "Cameron Men." E

Company of the Camerons numbered exactly 100 rank and file under five

officers: Captain Hon. A. Murray, Lieutenants Hoare, Cameron,

Alderson, and Surgeon-Captain Luther.

The fraternisation of the Soudanese soldiers and the Shilluks became

thorough. An informal reception of the natives, sheikhs, and headmen,

some of whom were attended by their wives, was held by the Sirdar

ashore and afterwards on board the "Dal." It was observed that,

although hundreds of natives were seen, they were only brought forward

in batches of less than a dozen to be presented. Besides, a

considerable interval always elapsed before the arrival of the

succeeding groups. Ali Gaffoon and his countrymen-comrades in the

ranks, with pardonable tribal pride, were adverse to bringing their

relatives and friends forward until the natives put on some clothes.

For that purpose they had borrowed or got together about a dozen Arab

dresses of kinds, wherewith to cover the bodies and limbs of the

unsophisticated Shilluks. The national costume for men is a state of

nudity, but they occasionally sprinkle their bodies with red or grey

ashes. The women usually wear scant leather or thong aprons. When the

Sirdar ascertained the true cause of the delay, time pressing, he

intimated he would waive for the nonce their putting on of ceremonial

attire. "Let them all come as they are," and they did. They evinced

the liveliest interest and pleasure in all they saw and heard in camp

and aboard ship. The chiefs declared they had signed no treaty with

the French nor conceded any of their country. All of them asserted

that they were subjects of the Khedive, to whom they renewed their

allegiance forthwith. The French mission had been short of food and

they had helped them only by giving supplies. Incidentally it may be

stated that the Shilluk country is exceedingly fertile. At one time it

was the most densely populated region of the Soudan for its acreage,

containing a population of over 2,000,000 souls, living under an

ancient dynasty of kings. From 1884 the Shilluks repeatedly warred

with the dervishes. In 1894 they rose again and fought for a long time

before their Queen was slain and they were put down. On that occasion

the Mahdists behaved with more than usual ferocity, putting thousands

to the sword. Strange to say, great numbers of Shilluks, like other

Soudan blacks, fought against us under the Khalifa's banners. The

moment, however, they were captured, with great readiness they

enlisted in the Khedivial army. Latterly so many deserters and

prisoners brought by their friends offered themselves as soldiers,

that only the smartest and strongest were chosen.

That afternoon the "Dal" and two of the gunboats left Fashoda and

steamed away up the Nile towards Sobat. Before leaving, the Sirdar

sent a formal written document to Major Marchand, protesting against

any usurpation by another Power of the rights of Great Britain and

Egypt to the Nile Valley. He stated that he would refuse to recognise

in any way French authority in the country. There was found to be

large quantities of grass weed and sudd in the Nile at no great

distance from Fashoda. In several places the clear channels were less

than 150 yards wide. As the steamers made southing, the river became

narrower and the obstacles to navigation more serious--floating

islands of weeds and banked sudd blocking the fairway, leaving it but

50 yards or less in width. It is about 62 miles from Fashoda to the

Sobat river, that Abyssinian tributary to the Nile. There was formerly

an Egyptian station and fort on the neck of land at the junction of

the two rivers. Other stations were also held by Khedivial troops

further up the river in the old days before the Mahdi's rebellion. It

was on the 20th September, the date as officially given, that the

flotilla reached Sobat. The place was overgrown with bush, as compared

with what had formerly been the case. Only a few natives were seen

upon the mainland and islands, and they were friendly disposed. The

Sobat, though but 150 yards or so wide, is 30 feet deep when in flood.

Its yellow stream runs at two knots an hour, the current driving far

into the wider and slacker waters of the Nile, which is about

three-quarters of a mile wide at that point. The banks were

accessible, and a landing of the troops was much more easily effected

than had been the case at Fashoda. As soon as the soldiers and the two

remaining guns of Captain Peake's battery were got ashore, the

Egyptian flag was formally hoisted and greeted. It was the Sirdar who

directed the whole proceedings. The ceremonial observance attending

the re-occupation was precisely similar to that which had taken place

at Fashoda. Major Smith Dorian was placed in command of the post and

district. Three companies of the 13th Soudanese were left as a

garrison together with the two Maxim-Nordenfeldt guns. A gunboat was

also detailed to proceed a little way up the Sobat and the Bahr el

Ghazal.

Next morning the vessels having been filled up with fuel, the Sirdar,

with the Camerons and the remainder of the troops not detached for

garrison duty, steamed away back towards Omdurman. No news had

penetrated to that remote region about the overthrow of the dervishes

and very little was known about the passing mission under Major

Marchand. The same day, 21st September, Fashoda was reached, and a

short stay was made. All was quiet and the two flags were flying just

as the Sirdar had left them. But the place had been transformed all

the same. A military camp had arisen that looked like a village.

Tukals and shelters covered the clearing behind the French lines.

Trenches also had been dug and Marchand's party were completely hemmed

in from the landward side as well as by water, the gunboats

controlling the river. The Shilluks had all gone over and put

themselves under Major Jackson and the Khedivial flag. A sort of

bazaar had been started and the country was already making for peace.

There was universal rejoicing at the downfall of the Khalifa. A

determination was expressed of promptly dealing with him or Osman

Digna, should either of them pass that way. The new twin-screw

gunboats "Sultan" and "Sheik" had nine days' rations for troops put

aboard. They were then detached, being ordered to remain behind for

patrol duty. Their instructions were to keep the river and banks clear

of all armed bands of dervishes, and, if necessary, afford assistance

to the posts at Sobat and Fashoda. They were also bidden to prevent

the transport of war material, or conveyance of reinforcements, except

by accredited Khedivial officers. The Sirdar in a note informed Major

Marchand that he had prohibited the transport of all war material upon

the Nile. Thereafter the Sirdar resumed the journey downstream. The

long and fertile island of Abba--it extends for 20 miles--was passed

without seeing anything of the fugitive Khalifa and his followers. It

was to Abba island the Mahdi went, and it was there the rebellion

first broke out. Subsequently it was ascertained that Abdullah and

Osman Digna with their retainers sought shelter in the heavy woods

opposite Abba island, and they were stated to be in hiding there at

the end of December 1898. The Sirdar and headquarters got back to

Omdurman on the 25th of September.

Popular feeling ran very high at home when it was ascertained that,

despite repeated notification, the French had tried to grasp the

fruits of the British victory over the dervishes. A Liberal statesman

had, years before, declared, that any attempt on the part of France to

occupy the Upper Nile valley lands would be regarded as an unfriendly

act by this country. Conservative statesmen had endorsed that official

pronouncement; yet, in face of these declarations, the thing had been

done with every evidence of a fine contempt for British feeling and

self-respect. The enemies of England in Egypt and elsewhere were

sniggering. Our diplomatic and military chiefs were making unusual

efforts to keep the Marchand affair a profound secret. At every stage

down the Nile from Omdurman to Cairo, the Camerons and all who had

been to Fashoda and Sobat were officially warned to keep the matter a

profound secret. The case I thought was too serious to be left hidden

in the breasts of a few where the issues involved were so tremendous.

So I openly set myself to learning what had happened, and wiring every

scrap of information for publication. Several officers were sent down

from Omdurman with special despatches. Long before they arrived even

in Cairo, cypher messages extending to many folios had been forwarded

day after day direct from Khartoum to Downing Street.

The Sirdar reached Cairo on the 6th of October and left for England on

the 21st of the same month. By that time much had happened. The

official despatches had been published in a Parliamentary paper and

there were ominous preparations for war in both France and Great

Britain. Fleets were being got ready for sea and feverish activity

prevailed in Gallic and British arsenals. The insistence of the

Parisian Ministers in seeking to have other questions discussed side

by side with the demand for the evacuation of Fashoda and their

dilatory tactics but increased the feeling of irritation in the United

Kingdom. Statesmen seemed to be undecided and diplomacy, as usual,

revolving in a circle. Happily, this country was never better prepared

for war, and that in the end, as has so often been the case, proved

the best advocate for peace. It would be uncharitable to emphasise the

fact of the French Government slipping away from one after another of

the positions they had taken up in reference to the whole question.

That being Frenchmen they felt acutely the false moves they had made

goes without saying. Whilst war was impending and the French

Government seemed bent upon driving our Government to that point, the

anti-British Pashas and the Gallic set in Egypt were jubilant. The

Turkish Pashas and Beys were openly chuckling and romancing about

unheard-of things. It is in Egypt, as it is in Armenia and was in the

Balkans: the Turk is the enemy of good government and freedom for the

people. A check to British policy and rule meant to them a possible

return of the old corrupt days when they did as they liked, treating

fellaheen and negroes as slaves. Had Great Britain in this instance

yielded a jot of her just rights to the intriguing and bellicose

spirit of French officialism Egypt would have been made an impossible

place for our countrymen to remain in. Being in Cairo and Alexandria

at the time I was privately assured by scores of my countrymen, men in

business and in public offices, that they would be obliged to quit

Egypt if France succeeded in her pretensions to the Nile Valley. Petty

annoyances, tyranny, all manner of injustice and even violence would

be resorted to, to force them to leave and to drive British interests

to the wall.

I avail myself again of the excellent synopsis of the official

despatches dealing with the Fashoda incident, which appeared in the

_Daily Telegraph_. The Parliamentary papers in question were issued on

the 9th of October last. The official papers opened with a despatch

from Sir Edmund Monson to the Foreign Secretary, bearing date December

10, 1897. Therein the British Ambassador says:--

"The despatches which I have recently addressed to your lordship

respecting the reports of the massacre of the Marchand Expedition,

and the comments made in connection with this rumoured disaster by

the French Press, will have already shown your lordship how

necessary it has become to remind the French Government of the

views held by that of Her Majesty as to their sphere of influence

in the Upper Nile Valley; and it has been with great satisfaction

that I have found myself so promptly authorised to make a

communication upon the subject to M. Hanotaux. Made in the way in

which it has been suggested by your lordship, I see no reason why

this communication should prejudice the chances of our coming to a

satisfactory arrangement upon the question with which we are

dealing in connection with the situation in West Africa."

Sir Edmund Monson enclosed in the despatch a copy of a note he had

addressed to M. Hanotaux, at that period French Minister of Foreign

Affairs, as follows:--

"The other point to which it is necessary to advert is the

proposed recognition of the French claim to the northern and

eastern shores of Lake Chad. If other questions are adjusted, Her

Majesty's Government will make no difficulty about this condition.

But in doing so they cannot forget that the possession of this

territory may in the future open up a road to the Nile; and they

must not be understood to admit that any other European Power than

Great Britain has any claim to occupy any part of the Valley of

the Nile. The views of the British Government upon this matter

were plainly stated in Parliament by Sir Edward Grey some years

ago during the Administration of the Earl of Rosebery, and were

formally communicated to the French Government at the time. Her

Majesty's present Government entirely adhere to the language that

was on this occasion employed by their predecessors."

To this M. Hanotaux replied:--

"In any case the French Government cannot, under present

circumstances, refrain from repeating the reservations which it

has never failed to express every time that questions relating to

the Valley of the Nile have been brought forward. Thus, in

particular, the declarations of Sir Edward Grey, to which the

British Government has referred, gave rise to an immediate protest

by our representative in London, the terms of which he repeated

and developed in the further conversations which he had at the

Foreign Office on the subject. I myself had occasion, in the

sitting of the Senate on April 5, 1895, to make, in the name of

the Government, declarations to which I consider that I am all the

more justified in referring from the fact that they have called

forth no reply from the British Government."

The speech to which M. Hanotaux refers is published at length in an

appendix, and, so far from being a reply to Sir Edward Grey, it gives

the French position completely away.

"I now come, gentlemen," he said, "to the question of the Upper

Nile. I will explain the situation to the Senate in a few words;

for I think it will be useful to complete the explanations which

M. de Lamarzelle has already given on this subject. Between the

country of the lakes and the point of Wady Halfa, on the Nile,

extends a vast region, measuring twenty degrees of latitude, or

2000 kilometres, that is, more than the breadth of Western Europe

from Gibraltar to Dunkirk. In this region there is at this moment,

perhaps, not a single European; in any case, there does not exist

any power derived, by any title, from a European authority. It is

the country of the Mahdi! Now, gentlemen, it is the future of this

country which fills with an uneasiness, which we may describe as

at least premature, the minds of a certain number of persons

interested in Africa. The Egyptians who occupied this vast domain

for a considerable time have moved to the north. Emin Pasha

himself was compelled to withdraw. The rights of the Sultan and

the Khedive alone continue to exist over the regions of the Soudan

and of Equatorial Africa."

That is to say, after the Mahdi, who was the _de facto_ ruler, the

authority over the whole basin of the Upper Nile reverted to the

Khedive and the Sultan as his suzerain, which is exactly the position

taken up by Lord Salisbury in his despatch of September 9, 1898.

Major Marchand has had various titles conferred upon him, and in the

penultimate despatch contained in the papers he is described by Lord

Salisbury as "a French explorer who is on the Upper Nile in a

difficult position." To M. Delcasse, however, is reserved the honour

of giving him an official designation. On September 7 the French

Foreign Minister, in an interview with Sir E. Monson, after handsomely

complimenting the British Government on the victory of Omdurman,

expressed his anxiety about a possible meeting of the Sirdar and M.

Marchand.

"Should he (M. Marchand) be met with, his Excellency said that he

had received instructions to be most careful to abstain from all

action which might cause local difficulties, and that he had been

enjoined to consider himself as an 'emissary of civilisation'

without any authority whatever to decide upon questions of right,

which must properly form the subject of discussion between Her

Majesty's Government and that of the French Republic.

"M. Delcasse therefore begged me to inform your lordship of this

fact, and expressed the hope that the commander of Her Majesty's

naval forces on the river might be instructed to take no steps

which might lead to a local conflict with regard to such questions

of right."

It may be remarked, in passing, that this view of the position of the

emissary of civilisation does not tally with that which M. Marchand

subsequently gave to the Sirdar, to whom he stated "that he had

received precise orders for the occupation of the country and the

hoisting of the French flag over the Government buildings at Fashoda,

and added that, without the orders of his Government, which, however,

he expected, would not be delayed, it was impossible for him to retire

from the place."

The instructions given by Lord Salisbury, through Lord Cromer, to the

Sirdar, have been given elsewhere in this chapter.

On September 11 our Ambassador informed M. Delcasse of the advance of

the Sirdar up the Nile, and on the 18th the French Foreign Minister

stated further:--

"As a matter of fact, there is no Marchand Mission. In 1892 and

1893 M. Liotard was sent to the Upper Ubanghi as Commissioner,

with instructions to secure French interests in the north-east. M.

Marchand had been appointed one of his subordinates, and received

all his orders from M. Liotard. There could be no doubt that for a

long time past the whole region of the Bahr-el-Ghazal had been out

of the influence of Egypt."

Sir E. Monson left M. Delcasse in no doubt as to the view Her

Majesty's Government took of the situation. Of the interview referred

to, he reports to Lord Salisbury as follows, under date September

22:--

"Although his Excellency made two or three allusions to the

reasons for which, in his opinion, the French might consider that

the region in question was open to their advance, he himself

volunteered the suggestion that discussion between us would be

inopportune.

"In this I, of course, concurred, reminding him of the terms of

your lordship's telegram of the 9th inst.; but I told him, as

emphatically as I could, that I looked upon the situation at

Fashoda, if M. Marchand had occupied that town, as very serious,

inasmuch as Her Majesty's Government would certainly not acquiesce

in his remaining there, nor would they consent to relinquishing

the claims of Egypt to the restoration of all the country latterly

subject to the Khalifa, which had heretofore been a portion of

her territory. I felt it to be my duty, I said, to speak with

extreme frankness, and to assure him that on this point no

compromise would be possible.

"M. Delcasse listened to me with grave attention, but his reply

was chiefly to the effect that if the two Governments discussed

the matter with calmness and a sincere desire to avoid a conflict,

there could be no doubt of our arriving at a peaceable and

satisfactory solution. France does not desire a quarrel. In saying

this he could speak with absolute certainty. All his colleagues in

the Government are, like himself, anxious for good relations with

England. If this anxiety is reciprocated on the other side of the

Channel (and the tone of the English Press inspires him with

doubts of this) there can be no danger.

"I replied that Her Majesty's Government have no desire to pick a

quarrel with France, but that nothing could be gained by my

concealing from him the gravity of the situation as I regarded it,

or the fixed determination of Her Majesty's Government to

vindicate claims of the absolute justice of which they hold that

there can be no question. I, of course, avoided the use of any

expression which might sound like a menace, but short of this I

did my best to make my declaration of the impossibility of the

French being allowed to remain at Fashoda as clear and distinct as

could be expressed in words."

On 25th September, the day the expedition returned from Fashoda to

Omdurman, Mr Rennell Rodd, who during the absence of Lord Cromer in

Europe was in charge of affairs in Egypt, telegraphed to Lord

Salisbury the following despatch, which had been received from the

Sirdar:--

"I found at Fashoda, whence I have just returned, M. Marchand with

8 officers and 120 men. The French flag had been hoisted over the

old Government buildings in which they were located. I sent a

letter announcing my approach on the day before my arrival at

Fashoda. On the following morning, September 19, a reply was

brought to me from M. Marchand by a small rowing-boat carrying the

French flag. It stated that he had arrived at Fashoda on July 10,

having been instructed by his Government to occupy the

Bahr-el-Ghazal up to the confluence of the Bahr-el-Jebel, and also

the Shilluk country on the left bank of the White Nile as far as

Fashoda. It went on to say that he had concluded a treaty with the

Shilluk chiefs by which they placed the country under the

protection of France, and that he had sent this treaty to his

Government for ratification by way of Abyssinia, as well as by the

Bahr-el-Ghazal. He described his fight with the dervishes on

August 25, and stated that, in anticipation of a second and more

serious attack, he had sent his steamer south for reinforcements,

but that our arrival had prevented a further attack.

"When we arrived at Fashoda, M. Marchand and M. Germain came on

board our steamer, and I at once informed them that the presence

of a French party at Fashoda and in the Nile valley must be

considered as a direct infringement of the rights of Egypt and of

the British Government, and I protested in the strongest terms

against the occupation of Fashoda by M. Marchand and his party,

and the hoisting of the French flag in the dominions of his

Highness the Khedive. M. Marchand stated, in reply, that he had

received precise orders for the occupation of the country and the

hoisting of the French flag over the Government buildings at

Fashoda, and added that, without the orders of his Government,

which, however, he expected would not be delayed, it was

impossible for him to retire from the place. I then inquired of

him whether, in view of the fact that I was accompanied by a

superior force, he was prepared to resist the hoisting of the

Egyptian flag at Fashoda. He hesitated, and replied that he could

not resist. The Egyptian flag was then hoisted, about 500 yards

south of the French flag, on a ruined bastion of the old Egyptian

fortifications, commanding the only road which leads into the

interior from the French position. The latter is entirely

surrounded to the north by impassable marshes.

"Before leaving for the south I handed to M. Marchand a formal

written protest on the part of the Governments of Great Britain

and Egypt against any occupation of any part of the Nile valley

by France, as being an infringement of the rights of those

Governments. I added that I could not recognise the occupation by

France of any part of the Nile valley.

"I left at Fashoda a garrison of one Soudanese battalion, four

guns, and a gunboat under Major Jackson, whom I appointed

Commandant of the Fashoda district, and I proceeded to Sobat,

where the flag was hoisted and a post established on September 20.

We did not see or hear anything of the Abyssinians on the Sobat,

but were informed that their nearest post was about 350 miles up

that river. The Bahr-el-Jebel being entirely blocked by floating

weed, I gave orders for a gunboat to patrol up the Bahr-el-Ghazal

in the direction of Meshra-er-Rek. As we passed Fashoda on the

return journey north, I sent M. Marchand a letter stating that all

transport of war material on the Nile was absolutely prohibited,

as the country was under military law. The chief of the Shilluk

tribe, accompanied by a large number of followers, has come into

Major Jackson's camp. He entirely denies having made any treaty

with the French, and the entire tribe express the greatest delight

at returning to allegiance to us.

"M. Marchand is in want of ammunition and supplies, and any that

may be sent to him must take months to arrive at their

destination. He is cut off from the interior, and is quite

inadequately provided with water transport. Moreover, he has no

following in the country, and nothing could have saved his

expedition from being annihilated by the dervishes if we had been

a fortnight later in crushing the Khalifa."

The gist of this despatch was communicated to the French Government,

accompanied by a notification that the Sirdar's "language and

proceedings" had the complete approval of Lord Salisbury. M. Delcasse

was evidently at his wits' end to escape from an _impasse_ which was

chiefly of his own creation.

In an interview with Sir E. Monson on September 27 he wished to put

off a final decision till he had received the despatches which M.

Marchand had forwarded in duplicate by way of the French Congo and

Abyssinia respectively.

"To gain time, M. Delcasse," writes our Ambassador, "wished that I

should request your lordship to consent to a telegram being sent

by the French agent at Cairo to Khartoum, to be forwarded from

thence up the Nile to Fashoda. The telegram would contain

instructions to M. Marchand to send at once one of the French

officers serving on his mission to Cairo with a copy of his

above-mentioned report, so that the French Government might learn

its contents as soon as possible. They were, of course, ready to

bear all the expense.

"Stress was laid by M. Delcasse upon the great desire entertained

at Paris to prevent any serious difficulty from arising; at the

same time, he felt convinced, especially in view of the conduct of

the Sirdar at Fashoda, acting as he undoubtedly was under

instructions, that Her Majesty's Government were as anxious as the

French Government to avoid a conflict.

"I told M. Delcasse in reply that I must conclude from the

language which he had held that the French Government had decided

that they would not recall M. Marchand before receiving his

report, and I asked if I was right in this conclusion. I pointed

out to his Excellency that M. Marchand himself is stated to be

desirous of retiring from his position, which appeared to be a

disagreeable one. Such being the case, I must urgently press him

to tell me whether he refused at once to recall M. Marchand.

"After considering his reply for some few minutes, his Excellency

said that he himself was ready to discuss the question in the most

conciliatory spirit, but I must not ask him for the impossible.

"I pointed out that your lordship's telegram of the 9th inst.,

which I had communicated to him at the time, had made him aware

that Her Majesty's Government considered that there could be no

discussion upon such questions as the right of Egypt to Fashoda."

To this Lord Salisbury replied next day:

"Her Majesty's Government cannot decline to assist in forwarding a

message from the French Agent in Egypt to a French explorer who

is on the Upper Nile in a difficult position, and your Excellency

is authorised to inform M. Delcasse that Her Majesty's Acting

Agent at Cairo will be instructed to transmit to Omdurman

immediately any such message, and at the same time to request Sir

H. Kitchener to forward it thence to its destination by any

opportunity which may be available.

"Her Majesty's Government do not desire to be made acquainted with

the purport of the message. But you must explain that they are

unable to accept any responsibility for the results to the safety

or health of the explorer which the delay in quitting his present

situation may bring about."

The official papers closed with the following laconic despatch from

Lord Salisbury to Sir E. Monson, bearing date 3rd October.

"I request your Excellency to inform the French Minister for

Foreign Affairs that, in accordance with his wish, his message for

M. Marchand has been transmitted to Khartoum, and will be

forwarded thence to its destination. In order to avoid any

misunderstanding, you should state to M. Delcasse that the fact of

Her Majesty's Government having complied with his Excellency's

request in regard to the transmission of the message does not

imply the slightest modification of the views previously expressed

by them. You should add that, whether in times of Egyptian or

Dervish dominion, the region in which M. Marchand was found has

never been without an owner, and that, in the view of Her

Majesty's Government, his expedition into it with an escort of 100

Senegalese troops has no political effect, nor can any political

significance be attached to it."

In the appendix were given past speeches and despatches by M. Decrais,

M. Hanotaux, Lord Kimberley, Sir E. Grey, etc.

The rest can be quickly told. Military and naval preparations for war

in both countries were redoubled and the public tone was bellicose.

Consols were affected and war appeared almost inevitable. It was

an occasion for union among all who rightly set patriotism above

party. Lord Rosebery, Late Premier, with splendid grace and

disinterestedness, in a speech, 13th October, voiced the sentiment of

the masses and classes. His lordship said:--

"Behind the policy of the British Government in this matter there

is the untiring and united strength of the nation itself.

(Cheers.) It is the policy of the last Government deliberately

adopted and sustained by the present Government. (Cheers.) That is

only a matter of form, but it is the policy of the nation itself,

and no Government that attempted to recede from or palter with

that policy would last a week. (Loud cheers.) I am perfectly

certain that no idea or intention of any weakening on this point

or this question has entered the head of Her Majesty's present

advisers."

Messages were transmitted up the Nile to Major Marchand at Fashoda. In

response thereto he sent Captain Baratier down with despatches. That

officer arrived with Slatin Pasha in Cairo on the 20th October. His

despatches were wired to Paris, for which Baratier himself started

next day. It happened that the Sirdar, who also left for England on

that date, was a fellow-traveller with him. Another hitch occurred,

the French Government stating that Marchand's report made no allusion

to the meeting with the Sirdar at Fashoda. That they would have to

wait for before giving an answer. Marchand, it was alleged, had not

had time to bring his report down to date, when Baratier left him.

They had not long to wait, for suddenly the announcement was sprung

that Major Marchand, acting on his own volition, had left Fashoda and

was coming down by Khedivial transport, to Cairo. He arrived in that

city on the evening of 3rd November, and got a deservedly hearty

reception from the English as well as the French community. Prominent

officials, civil and military, were there to greet the brave and hardy

explorer. His companion, Captain Baratier, who had been to Paris and

had hastened back intending to return to Fashoda, met the Major next

day in Cairo. But on the very day that Major Marchand reached Cairo,

the French Government had issued an official note stating it had been

decided to evacuate Fashoda, as the position had been reported

untenable. So saying "No, no, they would ne'er consent," they

consented.

At the Mansion House banquet given to the Sirdar, on 4th November,

Lord Salisbury said:--

"I received from the French Ambassador this afternoon the

information that the French Government had come to the conclusion

that the (Fashoda) occupation was of no sort of value to the

French Republic, and they thought that under those circumstances,

to persist in an occupation which only cost them money and did

harm, merely because some of their advisers thought they would be

an unwelcome neighbour, would not show the wisdom with which the

French Republic has uniformly been guided. They have done what I

believe every Government would have done in the same

position--they have resolved that the occupation must cease. A

formal intimation to that effect was made to me this afternoon,

and it has been conveyed to the French authorities at Cairo. I do

not wish to be misunderstood as saying that all causes of

controversy are by this removed between the French Government and

ourselves. It is probably not so, and it may be that we shall have

many discussions in the future, but a cause of controversy of a

singularly acute and somewhat dangerous character has been

removed, and we cannot but congratulate ourselves upon it."

In the same connection it is of interest to learn what Major Marchand

had to say. The full text of his speech made at a banquet given to him

and Captain Baratier by the French Club at Cairo on the 7th October

appeared in the Press. In the presence of the Acting French Diplomatic

Agent and others, Major Marchand said:--

"Monsieur le Ministre de France, Monsieur le President,

Messieurs--There are two reasons why you will not expect a speech

from me. In the first place I am only a soldier and no orator; and

then one cannot be talkative on a day of reflection, a day which

brings to me personally a great sorrow, the official abandonment

of Fashoda. Fashoda! it was only a point--it is true that it

synthetised everything. But if we lose the point we abandon

nothing of our thesis. To reflect is not to despair--on the

contrary. The experiences of this world teach us that the sum of

our sorrows is not greater than that of our joys. The more the

black period may be prolonged the more quickly will approach the

dawn of proud aspirations at length realised. And the granite

Sphinx which near at hand dreams on the desert sands, the Sphinx

which saw the passage of Bonaparte, which saw Lesseps and his

work, has not yet uttered its last word, has not murmured the

supreme sentence. The more fiercely evil fortune may pursue us the

more should we call to our aid the great hopes which swell the

heart and fortify the will. The French colony in Cairo, moreover,

has shown more than ten times over already that it knows no

discouragement. I should like, my dear and valiant compatriots, to

give you some small recompense. Listen! When, nearly three years

ago, the Congo-Nile mission left France, it was not in order to

make a more or less famous journey of exploration. No, its aim was

far higher. You have already guessed it. Why, then, proclaim it

here? We desired (here the speaker paused a moment) to carry

across French Africa to the French in Egypt a hand-grip from the

French of France. The road was long, sometimes hard; we have

reached our destination, however, since I have the honour to greet

you here to-day. Do you not see a symbol in this? Fortune, which

detests broad and easy paths, is perhaps at this moment on her

way, bringing you the succour so patiently looked for. We must

never despair, and who can say that the Sphinx may not be about to

smile? It is for this that I have come to tell you that if we are

few to-day we shall be many to-morrow--who forget nothing, who

abandon nothing. It is with this thought that I drink to your

health, gentlemen, the health of the French colony in Egypt. To

the Greater France!"

It is easy to feel great sympathy with so gallant and hardy a soldier,

who, having successfully accomplished the perilous mission entrusted

to him by his Government, found support denied him and his work

fruitless. Major Marchand and Captain Baratier again availed

themselves of the Egyptian military transport to return to their

comrades. At half-past 8 a.m., 11th December, the French hauled down

their flag at Fashoda, and left for the Sobat river. They were

intending to make their way up that stream to the nearest Abyssinian

post, and thereafter, striking through Menelik's country, hoped to

arrive on the East African coast at Djibutil. Their sick comrades they

entrusted to the Egyptian military authorities to send home by the

Nile through Lower Egypt. The invalided Frenchmen and Senegalese in

question reached Cairo at the end of the year.

Perhaps it was only to be expected that the French press and

politicians would display increased virulence against this country

over the Fashoda settlement. But their persistence in that course, and

the fact of their present extraordinary naval expenditure, can only

mean getting ready for war against Great Britain. This may lead our

people to consider whether it would not be cheapest and wisest to

settle the quarrel off-hand. True, delay makes for peace, but a peace

that is to be a struggle to overtop one another in armaments may be

more costly in every sense than sharp and decisive warfare. The chief

cause of the soreness in France against us is our presence in Egypt.

Yet the French have no such vital interest there as this country has.

To many of our colonies and dependencies the shortest way lies through

Egypt. Again, the French form quite a minority in numbers and wealth

among the foreign communities in Egypt. Since 1882, the year of

occupation, Great Britain has been careful to avoid interference with

the privileges and rights of all foreigners. In what community

controlled by France through sixteen years would it have been allowed

that an alien language should be maintained in use in public places.

No official step has been taken to diminish the use of French in

street nomenclature, or public conveyances, or public departments in

Egypt until last year. Arabic is the language of the people, and

English is the language of commerce in the country. A sensible change

in the direction indicated is at last evident, even in Cairo and

Alexandria. Shops and warehouses are displaying Anglo-Saxon signs, and

the natives are discarding French and are speaking English as the one

foreign language necessary to acquire.

There has been talk among our neighbours of emulating the Sirdar's

enterprise and founding French colleges at Khartoum and Fashoda. But

urged by less disinterested motives they may find it necessary instead

to devote their funds to the cultivation of the Gallic tongue in Lower

and Upper Egypt, rather than in the Soudan. In the year 1897, in

Tantah, the third largest town in the Delta, there were 130 scholars

learning French and but 40 studying English. In 1898 there were 98 at

the English classes and but a moiety at the French. The scholastic

year 1899, according to the officials of the Public Instruction

Department, will see a farther and even more serious decline in the

study of the French language. The French officials themselves are

painfully aware that the Gallic speech, for colloquial intercourse

between educated natives and Europeans, is doomed if matters continue

as at present. In Assouan, where during 1897 much the same state of

things prevailed as at Tantah; in 1898 there were 118 scholars

learning English and but three at the French classes.

Until quite recently, it was wont to be the case in Lower Egypt that

there were always two pupils learning French to one devoting attention

to acquiring English. In Upper Egypt of late years the difference had

not been so marked, the proportion of French and English students

being about equal. These figures refer to primary classes in Upper

Egypt, and to secondary, as well as primary, classes in Cairo and

Alexandria. As a matter of fact, the results of the examinations did

not follow in quite the same proportion in the Delta. About three

pupils have passed in French to two in English. Shortly after the

battle of Omdurman, applications had to be made for entrance into the

school classes for English and French tuition. In a great number of

schools, in both Upper and Lower Egypt, especially in the stronghold

of the French tongue--the Delta--not a single application was made by

candidates for entrance to the second primaries, in which French

teaching begins. That means to say that there will a dearth and

practically a cessation of French teaching in 1899 in the primary

schools, and subsequently, or in 1900, the year of the Exposition

Universelle at Paris, a total discontinuance of it in the secondary

schools. Taking the secondary schools examinations throughout the

whole of Lower Egypt by themselves, I learn that in 1898, although

there were a larger proportion of candidates for French certificates

of proficiency, yet the numbers that actually passed in each language

were about the same. The Examining Commissioners are Egyptian,

English, and French.

It is in Egypt as in certain other countries. The great ambition of

every lad is to get into the Government service, and failing that to

become a lawyer. Law schools are therefore well attended. Heretofore

budding lawyers have been taught in French classes only. An

English-speaking law section was started in 1898. The natives are

quick to appreciate any change which is to their advantage. Pupils in

the secondary schools have now opened to them careers which have

heretofore been closed. There is in truth a silent, but certain to be

effective, educational and social revolution begun in Egypt. No more

will every whim and caprice of those who seek to obstruct the advance

of the Egyptians be tolerated. In 1899 for the first time examining

educational centres will be established at Assouan and Suakin. All

those south of Assiut will be for English students only, for French

will be quite dropped. Not only will there be a college at Khartoum

but one at Kassala, where English as well as Arabic will be taught. In

a new and thorough manner has the regeneration of Egypt and the Soudan

been undertaken. The dream of a red English through-traffic line from

Cairo to Cape Town will have a speedy realisation. Possibly within

eighteen months the railway will be carried to the Sobat. Certainly

before 1899 is ended there will be through communication with

Khartoum. Mr Cecil Rhodes is busy with his South African lines, which

by that time should be up to the Zambesi, and within three years after

there will possibly be open rail and water communication from the

Mediterranean to Cape Town. But before then the telegraph wire will

bind North and South Africa together, and to the United Kingdom.

POSTSCRIPT.

This volume was written and in the printer's hands when an article by

a Mr E. N. Bennett appeared in the columns of _The Contemporary

Review_, entitled "After Omdurman." That gentleman made a series of

grave charges reflecting upon the Anglo-Egyptian arms, not only during

the Khartoum Expedition, but also on their conduct in Egypt and the

Soudan since 1882. In the _Daily Telegraph_ and elsewhere I have

deservedly stigmatised Mr Bennett's allegations as untrue, stupid, and

wantonly mischievous.

In the pages of _The Khartoum Campaign, 1898_, can be read the

detailed version of events which happened in the field "before" as

well as "after" Omdurman. I venture to think that abundant refutation

will be found in the Work of most of Mr Bennett's scandalous

assertions. Although it may seem to lend further temporary importance

to what that gentleman has written, as his accusations were made

public under the cover of a respectable magazine, perhaps a few words

more may not be out of place.

Mr Bennett's article was seemingly framed on the specious pretext of,

under a discussion of the principles of international law, questions

of belligerency, Geneva Convention rules, and so forth, to base

thereon a claim for the treatment of dervishes as combatants entitled

to all the amenities of civilised warfare. Several pages of his

composition are given up to treating upon that matter. For instance,

he says--"Moreover, it is worth remembering that the dervishes were

not 'savages' in the sense in which the word is applied to the

followers of a Lobengula or a Samory. On the contrary, they satisfied

all the requirements for recognition as an armed force." Now, that is

an aspersion upon Lobengula and Samory in particular. For unredeemed

devilishness, the dervishes have had no equals. The fact is, that the

Mahdists made it a constant practice to ruthlessly slaughter all

prisoners in battle, wounded or unwounded; to enslave, torture, or

murder their enemies, active or passive; to loot and to burn; to slay

children and debauch women. To set up a pretext that such monsters are

entitled to the grace and consideration of the most humane laws, is to

beggar commonsense and yap intolerable humbug. Yet British

self-respect was such, Mr Bennett to the contrary notwithstanding,

that the dervishes were treated as men, and not as wild beasts.

Started upon his false pursuit, Mr Bennett proceeds from error to

error, abounding in reckless misstatements, atrocious imputations, and

scattering charges void of truth. As briefly as possible, I will deal

with his accusations. One of his first deliverances is as

follows:--"It is, of course, an open secret that in all our Soudan

battles the enemy's wounded have been killed. The practice has, ever

since the days of Tel-el-Kebir, become traditional in Soudanese

warfare. After the battle of Atbara, it was announced that 3000

dervishes had been killed. There was practically no mention of the

wounded.... How, then, was it that no wounded were accounted for at

the Atbara?" Again he writes:--"But I cannot help thinking that if the

killing of the wounded had been sternly repressed at Tel-el-Kebir and

during the earlier Soudan campaigns, our dervish enemies would have

learned to expect civilised treatment," etc. Gaining courage, probably

from his own audacity, Mr Bennett had the hardihood to virtually

declare that the cruelties permitted by British officers made the

dervishes what they were.

Now, I went through the 1882 war in Egypt as well as most of the

campaigns in the Soudan. I am therefore in a better position than he

to declare, that his allegations are a perversion of the truth. It was

neither the practice at Tel-el-Kebir nor subsequent thereto for

British led troops to kill wounded men. The insinuation that they did

so, or connived at such slaughter, is a stupid or a malicious

falsehood. In every battle within the period referred to, large

numbers of wounded and unwounded prisoners were taken, and invariably

great lenience was shown. Surgical treatment also was, whenever

possible, always promptly rendered. Indeed, they were in countless

cases treated as tenderly as our own wounded. This further: in action

there are no soldiers less prone to needless blood-spilling, or men

readier to forgive and forget, than "Tommy Atkins." Official returns

exist setting at rest the fiction about Tel-el-Kebir and the Soudan

battles. At Tel-el-Kebir many thousand prisoners were made, and in

other engagements our hands were always full of dervish wounded. At

El Teb, Tamai, Abu Klea, Abu Kru, Gemaizeh, Atbara, and elsewhere,

wounded dervishes fell into our hands, and received every attention

from the medical staff. And in some of these actions our troops were

themselves in sore straits. Several hundred dervishes were picked up

within and without the Atbara dem, including the leader Mahmoud and

his two cousins. Be it remembered, our troops only remained there a

few hours, marching back to the Nile.

Still further abominable charges Mr Bennett lays at the door of his

countrymen who command British and Khedivial troops. The Sirdar

himself is included in his rigmarole of accusations. But whether

dealing with particulars or the general course of events, Mr Bennett

discloses that he has scarcely a nodding acquaintanceship with truth.

He has said:--"This wholesale slaughter was not confined to Arab

servants," _i.e._, killing wounded dervishes. "The Soudanese seemed to

revel in the work, and continually drove their bayonets through men

who were absolutely unconscious.... This unsoldierly work was not even

left to the exclusive control of the black troops; our British

soldiers took part in it."

On whatever ground Mr Bennett may seek to support these assertions,

they are unwarranted and untruthful libels. There was no wholesale

slaughter of wounded dervishes, nor was there anything done in the

least justifying or providing a decent pretext for that ferocious

accusation. Very many thousands of dervish wounded fell into our hands

that day and later. Officers have written to the press, denying these

charges and the rest of Mr Bennett's tale of monstrosity. The Sirdar

himself has confirmed by a personal cablegram my refutation of them.

Here is another of Mr Bennett's suggestions of evil-doing, by innuendo

and assertion:--"It was stated that orders had been given to kill the

wounded." And, "If the Sirdar really believes that the destruction of

the wounded was a military necessity," etc. Can colossal crassness go

further? There is not and never was a scintilla of truth for the

charge of wholesale slaughtering of wounded dervishes, nor that the

Sirdar ever issued such an order, or that any reputable person ever

received it, or ever had it hinted to him. The accusation is an

unmitigated untruth, and absolutely at variance with all that was said

and done by the Sirdar before and during the course of the battle and

the pursuit. I certainly never heard of the matter until Mr Bennett

made the accusation, and I cannot trace its authorship beyond himself.

From the Sirdar down, contradictions of the charge have deservedly

been slapped in Mr Bennett's face.

But it is almost sheer waste of words to follow and refute line by

line the article "After Omdurman." Other of Mr Bennett's accusations

were: that the 21st Lancers, on the way to the front, robbed

hen-roosts and stricken villagers; that once in Omdurman the Soudanese

troops abandoned discipline, looted, ravished, and murdered the whole

night long; that on land and water our cannon and Maxims were

deliberately turned upon unarmed flying inhabitants, massacring,

without pity, men, women, and children. An these charges had been

true, I should have hastened to denounce the culprits, whoever they

were, in the interests of humanity and country. Happily, Mr Bennett's

tale is utterly without foundation, whatever reflection that casts

upon his condition. The Lancers passed through nothing but deserted

villages, where there were neither natives nor roosts to rob, even had

they been so disposed. As for the Soudanese troops, their discipline

throughout was perfect; there was no looting, no ravishing nor murder

done by them or any other divisions of the soldiery. Nor did our

gunners on shore or afloat ever fire upon unarmed people. Let it be

recalled that those whom Mr Bennett so flippantly accuses are

honourable gentlemen and fellow-countrymen. Three things in this

connection are worthy of special note. When the first dervish attack

upon our zereba was repulsed and Wad Melik's dead, dying and shamming

warriors carpeted the north slopes of Jebel Surgham and the plain in

front. "Cease fire" was sounded. Thereafter the dervishes arose from

the ground in hundreds and thousands and walked off, without awakening

a renewal of our fire from cannon, Maxims, or rifles. At the entry

into Omdurman the artillery and gunboats were ordered to be careful

how they fired, and grave risks were incurred by the Sirdar and staff

in personally counselling to friend and foe a cessation of fighting.

Inaccuracy and sensationalism Mr Bennett is welcome to, and to the

sort of notoriety it has brought him. Cheap maudlin sentiment may

profess a pity for those "dervish homes ruined" by the successes of

British arms. The dervishes in their day had no homes. Nay, they made

honest profession that their mission was to destroy other people's,

and do without carking domesticity, as that detracted from the merit

of preparation for paradise. As I have elsewhere said, one of the

"fads" of the day is to hold that liberalism of mind is always

characterised by being a friend to every country and race but your

own. Exact truth is as illusive to discovery by that as other

pernicious methods. That there may have been one or two instances of

cruelty practised on the battle-field is possible. Something of the

kind always takes place in warfare as in everyday life. But only the

amateur would magnify a few instances into a catalogue of charges.

Alas! you cannot eliminate from armies, any more than from ordinary

communities, the foolish, insane, and criminal.

THE AUTHOR.

LONDON, _February 1899_.

THE END.

NEILL AND COMPANY, LTD., PRINTERS, EDINBURGH.

_FOURTH IMPRESSION NOW READY._

SIRDAR AND KHALIFA;

OR THE

RE-CONQUEST OF THE SOUDAN.

BY

BENNET BURLEIGH.

WITH PORTRAITS, NUMEROUS ILLUSTRATIONS, MAPS, AND PLAN OF BATTLE.

DEMY 8vo, 12s.

THE DAILY NEWS says:--"Picturesque, spirited, and trustworthy

narrative.... The book comprises a summary of the military situation,

and a glance at the probable course of the renewed operations which

are now on the point of commencing."

THE PALL MALL GAZETTE says:--"Nothing could be more timely. It is

unnecessary at this time of day to speak of Mr Burleigh's familiar

style ... always to the point, clear, and vigorous; or of his

matter--the matter of an experienced, shrewd, and fearless war

correspondent. The book is just the book for the occasion, and will

make the tale that is coming directly more real to many of us. Mr

Burleigh gives a few useful introductory chapters dealing with

previous events, and a very interesting account of a trip to Kassala,

'our new possession'; but in the main it is the story of the Atbara

Campaign. The book makes good reading, entirely apart from its timely

instructiveness."

THE ST JAMES'S GAZETTE says:--"Its real value to the judicious reader

lies in the fact that it is a faithful record by a highly skilled

observer of the day-by-day life of an Anglo-Egyptian Army engaged in

desert warfare. The country itself--river and wilderness--the rival

leaders, the soldiery, their appearance, arms, and uniform, their

eating and drinking, their lying down and their rising up, their

marching and the final rush of battle--these are all here before us in

a living picture, making the book in reality an invaluable 'vade

mecum' for those who wish to realise just what it is that our men are

doing to-day between the Atbara and Omdurman."

THE WESTMINSTER GAZETTE says:--"The book is profoundly interesting.

Readers familiar with the author's letters in _The Daily Telegraph_ do

not need to be told that he is a master of vivid and picturesque

narrative. Mr Burleigh has been an eye-witness during the course of

all the campaigns in the Soudan in which British troops have been

employed, and therefore writes out of full knowledge and experience."

THE MORNING POST says:--"Many chapters are devoted to the Atbara

Campaign and the incidents connected with it, the storming of

Mahmoud's entrenched Camp on the 7th of April last, and interviews

with that Emir after he was taken prisoner. Mr Burleigh's book, it

will be sufficient to say, should prove very useful to all who follow

the progress of the Force now advancing on Omdurman. In a

supplementary chapter will be found official despatches, and the work

is provided with a map of the Soudan, and plans of the Battle of the

Atbara and of the Island of Meroe, showing positions before the

battle. The illustrations are numerous. Among them is a frontispiece

portrait of the Sirdar."

THE DAILY CHRONICLE says:--"We are given a connected and very

comprehensible account of all the operations up to the destruction of

Mahmoud's host and the Sirdar's triumphant return to Berber.... The

description of the main battle itself is very vivid and complete."

THE SCOTSMAN says:--"Mr Bennet Burleigh's new volume, 'Sirdar and

Khalifa,' comes just in the nick of time. Its object is to recount the

story of the reconquest of the Soudan up to the Battle of Atbara.... A

very readable book."

THE DAILY TELEGRAPH says:--"Readers of _The Daily Telegraph_ will not

be chary of accepting our estimate of the value of this book when we

remind them that its author is Mr Bennet Burleigh, who has acted

throughout the numerous campaigns which have been waged in the Soudan

as the War Correspondent of this journal, and gained himself a

well-merited reputation for his pluck in the face of the enemy, his

endurance of hardship and fatigue, his excellence of judgment, and his

graphic descriptions of the shock of battle.... It only remains to say

that this book is well illustrated, handsomely printed, and is in

every way a worthy record of a brief but memorable campaign."

End of Project Gutenberg's Khartoum Campaign, 1898, by Bennet Burleigh