ADVANCE TO KERRERI--SKIRMISHING WITH THE ENEMY.
"Death and his brother sleep" can only be staved off; they overcome in
the end. The tired soldiers dropped into profound slumber, although
the night of the 29th August at Um Terif was boisterous and the cruel
enemy near. It was one of the real surprises of the campaign, that the
Mahdists never really harassed us, or ventured to rush our lines under
cover of night, or in the fog of a dust storm. It has often been too
hastily assumed that the dervishes never attacked by night. By the
Nile and in the Eastern Soudan they repeatedly pushed attacks under
cover of darkness, or worried their opponents by persistent
sniping,--as for instance at Tamai, before Suakin and Abu Klea. Then
again, their final and successful assault upon Khartoum was delivered
at dawn. Hicks Pasha's force was hammered early and late. It is all
the more strange, therefore, that they left the Sirdar's army severely
alone, never practising their familiar harassing tactics and seeking
to secure an advantage. Numerous, swift of foot, with spears and
swords, the odds would have been much more in their favour had they
come down like wolves in the night. It is difficult to say exactly
what would have happened, and it is not pleasant to contemplate what
might have befallen. In such a conflict the Sirdar's losses would have
been great. Could it have been that the Khalifa believed some of the
stories set about that our army intended paying him a surprise visit
by night, as we did Mahmoud, and so he kept his men in camp quietly
waiting for us. The utmost precautions were taken by the Sirdar and
his generals to protect the lines. A strong zereba surrounded the
camp; sentries were doubled, and active patrols were on the alert all
night. The gale continued until after sunset, when heavy rain clouds
gathered, obscuring the moonlight. By and by there came on a violent
and protracted thunderstorm, accompanied by an almost continuous
deluge. There was nothing to be done but to lie fast wrapped in great
coat or blanket and await the passing of the hours, wet, chilled,
ruminating on all sorts of queer subjects. I managed to undo a corner
of my packed tent and under it obtained relative warmth, and dryness
in spots.
The persistence of that storm bred despair. It was nearly 8 a.m. on
Tuesday the 30th August, when, having drenched us all to the marrow,
the rain ceased. The sun, although two hours high, was battling with a
fine mist. It was in a perfect downpour of rain at four o'clock in the
morning, that reveille had been sounded. And it was in sludge and
slush camels and mules were fed and loaded, and horses baited and
saddled. By 5.20 a.m. the army was at length on the march out of
camp, our faces set towards a village called Merreh, best indicated
upon the maps as Seg or Sheikh el Taib, the latter being the name of a
low hill. The distance the force was expected to trudge was about
eight miles, but the overflowed land put two miles more on. When
daylight came we could see Abdul Azim's friendlies upon the opposite
side of the Nile. Led by Major Stuart-Wortley, with whom were
Lieutenant R. Wood and Captain Buckle, the camels of their column kept
pace with ours. Closely skirting the east bank that day, Abdul Azim's
warriors had their right supported by one of the gunboats.
With the Sirdar and staff riding at the head of the infantry columns,
the army advanced in the formation in which it had been determined to
attack the enemy at Kerreri. Once more our mounted troops pushed far
ahead, covering a wide stretch of country, the 21st Lancers under
Colonel Martin on the left, the Egyptian cavalry under Colonel
Broadwood and eight companies of the Camel Corps under Major Tudway on
the extreme right. The infantry presented a front of three brigades
marching in echelon. A battery of artillery was attached to each
infantry brigade except Collinson's brigade. Three battalions were
detached from the whole force to guard the baggage and transport which
followed in the rear. In front on the left, or nearest the Nile, was
Wauchope's brigade. The four British battalions thereof marched side
by side in column, the Lincolns upon the right, the Warwicks on the
left, with the Seaforths and Camerons between them. To the right of
Wauchope's brigade was Maxwell's, and next it Lewis's Khedivial
brigades. Behind each of the three leading brigades above named
(reading from left to right) were Lyttelton's, Collinson's, and
Macdonald's commands. Seen upon the desert the army had the appearance
of a huge square with front a mile broad. The day being cloudy, and
cooler than usual for the season, General Gatacre and his brigadiers
voted at a council to extend the march. That course was adopted, the
army keeping on, but with very many brief halts for the brigades to
regain their formation. By the extra tramp the troops were enabled to
pass beyond the broad margin of thick bush out upon the comparatively
open, pebbly, and rocky ground, which sloped to a narrow strip of
soft, wet loam fringing the river. About 1 p.m., when still fully one
mile north of the hill of Sheikh el Taib, the army halted and a camp
was made. Access to the Nile was very difficult, for overflowed, boggy
land interposed. Roads, however, were made with cut bush, and the
animals were led over them to be watered. During the army's march the
Lancers scoured the country far in front. They managed to get into
touch with some dervish patrols whilst scouting. The opposing troopers
looked at each other from relatively open ground, and standing
separated by only a few hundred yards. One Baggara horseman came
within 150 yards of our men. The Lancers, keen to engage with steel,
did not attempt to fire upon their intrusive foemen, but innocently
tried instead to bag them. Several times our troopers advanced to the
charge, but the enemy, when the Lancers sought to put hands upon them,
were gone. That day the Baggara horsemen were met with in far greater
numbers than previously. By instructions, the Lancers rushed one of
the many small villages, or groups of native mud-dwellings and beehive
straw huts that dotted the sparse bush-land a mile or more inland from
the river beyond Sheikh el Taib. Several of the enemy hastened away,
and in one of the huts a man in dervish dress was found awaiting the
troops. He turned out to be a secret agent of Colonel Wingate's
Intelligence Department. The spy in question was a Shaggieh, named
Eshanni, and but thirty hours out from Omdurman. I was led to
understand that he gave much valuable information as to the position
and strength of the Khalifa's force and the state of affairs in
Omdurman. We were told that the Khalifa meant to attack us at or near
Kerreri. There was an old-time prophecy of the Persian Sheikh
Morghani, whose tomb is near Kassala, that the English soldiers would
one day fight at Kerreri. Mahomed Achmed and Abdullah had further
added to the prediction that there they were to be attacked and
defeated by the dervishes under the Khalifa. Kerreri plain, therefore,
had become a sort of holy place of pilgrimage to the Mahdists. It was
called the "death place of all the infidels," and thither at least
once a year repaired the Khalifa and his following to look over the
coming battle-ground and render thanks in anticipation for the
wholesale slaughter of the unbelievers and the triumph of the true
Moslems.
All except those on duty were abed by last post on 30th August at
Sheikh el Taib camp. Lights were ordered out, and the camp for a time
relapsed into darkness and silence. Headquarters and all other tents
had been struck and packed. During the night there was shooting, the
crack of the musketry sounding relatively near, but occasioning little
annoyance. The bullets were badly aimed if directed against the
British quarters. Whether the firing was really meant for "sniping" by
the dervishes, or was only a note of warning to their friends of our
presence, was not easy to decide with any degree of certainty. There
was no big roll of wounded to test the enemy's intent by, and a later
incipient alarm caused in another part of the camp in the small hours
was possibly all a mistake. One thing the dervishes did do. After the
manner of hill-men, they lit beacon fires on the rocky ridges around
us to warn the Khalifa of our whereabouts.
[Illustration: ARTILLERY GOING TOWARDS OMDURMAN.]
That night the camp lines had been drawn still closer than ever, only
260 yards' front being given to each battalion. On the morning of 31st
the troops were early astir. By 5.30 a.m. the main body, following the
mounted troops, had faced to the right, and were marching to the
westward so as to clear the bush and get out upon the open desert
tracks leading to Omdurman. The ground the army passed over was
broken, and there was scrub with several small khors to cross, so the
force proceeded slowly and cautiously. Four of the gunboats steamed up
the river, keeping abreast of our widely spread out cavalry. About six
o'clock the Lancers had again ascended to the top of El Taib, a hill
from which at that hour I was enabled to get a view of the dervish
camp. It appeared to be about ten miles due south. The Mahdists were
disposed in three long dense lines, at almost right angle to the
river. They were partly hidden among the low scrub west of Kerreri
town or village, their right being quite 2000 yards from the Nile,
which showed they had a wholesome respect for the gunboats. Flags and
helios were speedily busy in the hands of our signalmen sending back
information to the Sirdar. Seeing groups of dervishes within range, as
well as bands of Baggara horsemen, the gunboats opened fire from their
15-pounders and Maxims shortly after 7 a.m., driving the enemy's
nearest patrols into hiding or out of range.
In one of the numberless villages passed, there were several mutilated
and charred human bodies, victims of dervish suspicion, greed and
cruelty. Pushing well ahead on our right the Khedivial mounted force
got a chance to send a few volleys into groups of Abd el Baki's
scouts. That Emir commanded the dervish outlying forces. It was still
quite early when after an easy journey of eight miles the infantry
turned aside towards the river. The army was halted at a place called
Sururab, a few miles north of Kerreri. Why it was called Sururab I
know not, nor have I found the name on any map; but that was the
official designation given to the place where the force subsequently
bivouacked. The only reasonable fault to be found with Sururab was
that the river banks were exceedingly difficult of access. Our camps
were getting from bad to worse. That day flocks of huge vultures were
to be seen circling overhead as the army advanced. It may have been
our approach that disturbed them from their carrion feasts in the
devastated villages and the abandoned dervish camps. Omdurman itself
must also have long been a choice feeding place for them.
Once more the Sirdar's army had to spend an uncomfortable night. The
few tents that had been carried so far afield belonged to
headquarters, generals, commanding officers, and correspondents. They
were more of a burden than a comfort, for all canvas had to be struck
by last post, and thereafter neither lights nor loud talking were
permitted. The native troops' low shelter tents made out of their
spare rough blankets were allowed to pass unchallenged. It was another
night to be remembered which the army passed at Sururab. Early in the
evening the clouds gathered, and a series of violent thunderstorms,
accompanied by heavy rain, continued almost without cessation through
the weary, lagging hours. Rolled in their blankets, the soldiers,
wetted through, lay upon the sodden ground. Such of us as could
crawled under sheets of canvas or waterproofs, but these afforded
little protection from the driving sheets of falling water. From
Sirdar to private none escaped a thorough wetting. The enemy, had he
chosen, might have advanced from Kerreri or Omdurman, and been upon us
ere an alarm could have been given. Shortly after sunset everybody had
to be within the zereba. All openings in the hedge were thereafter
stopped up, and no one was allowed outside before reveille. Officers
and men of Gatacre's division had as usual to sleep in their places
lying down in the ranks fully dressed, with their arms beside them,
ready to spring to attention. Sentinels and patrols, watchful and
observant, moved noiselessly about throughout the whole night. True,
there were outside a few of Slatin's most trusted native friends,
chiefly Jaalin, set to listen and raise an outcry if the Khalifa's
dervishes came down upon us under cover of the inky night. But I had
grave doubts whether these native allies would have been of any
service, as the likelihood was that they were huddled under some rock
or tree, shivering in their wraps and sheepskins. Had the Khalifa been
astute or a tactician he would have attacked our camp at Sururab that
night or early next morning. He must have succeeded, at any rate, in
getting close enough to us without our hearing a note of warning to
have placed his army upon a practical equality with ours in point of
value of rifle fire. The Remington at 300 yards is as good as the
Lee-Metford for killing or wounding. His superiority in numbers and
mobility would have been all in his favour. Luckily, it was not to be.
We were again allowed to sleep in such peace as the elements would
permit. The fact remains that the dervishes lost another of the
several excellent chances they had to do us signal hurt.
Reveille went at 3.45 a.m. on 1st September. Little need of it there
was, for the men were astir, trying to keep warm by stamping about. In
the driving rain and slush the army got ready to march forward. The
boats, as usual, were sent on with the surplus stores, whilst the men
carried one day's emergency rations in their haversacks, and two days'
ordinary food was taken upon the camels of each battalion. Once more
the brigades marched in echelon. Gatacre's division was leading as
before on the left, with Wauchope's brigade in front, and Lyttelton's
behind. Steadily, deliberately, the armed tide of men flowed over the
undulating plain, down into shallow khors, swelling through the scrub,
their serried ranks always plainly to be seen. I went forward again
with the cavalry, accompanying the 21st Lancers, who were upon the
left front. The Egyptian troopers and the camelry went to their usual
place upon the right. In a short time we found that the dervish
advanced camp west of Kerreri had been abandoned, the enemy having
fallen back and joined their main force under the Khalifa nearer
Omdurman. Word was sent back to the Sirdar that the track was clear of
the enemy, and so the skirmish before getting into camp, which all the
infantry expected with some degree of confidence and elation, did not
happen. By 10 a.m. the army had wheeled into the lines assigned it in
the southward portion of the scattered village of Kerreri. Once more
both wings rested upon the Nile, Gatacre's division in front (south),
Macdonald's brigade at the north, with Collinson's brigade within and
in reserve. The army encamped in an irregular triangular enclosure, on
one side being the river, our flanks and face being protected by the
gunboats. Our zereba outline was something like a broken-backed
pyramid.
Whilst the infantry were settling down in camp at Kerreri the cavalry
were pushing in the enemy's outposts. The British division cut and
built around their front a good stout thorny zereba. Lyttelton's
brigade and three batteries were placed nearest the river. Upon their
right was Wauchope's brigade, next to it was Maxwell's and Lewis's
brigades, and then to the right, Macdonald's crack command.
Collinson's brigade was held in reserve within the zereba; Colonels
Maxwell, Lewis and Macdonald had their front protected by a double
line of ordinary shelter-trenches dug in the loose sand and gravel.
The British Tommies had no trench. Going forward a mile or so to
rejoin the cavalry I climbed the rugged granitic slopes of Surgham
Hill. Like most of the "jebels," or mounts, in this region, compared
with the spacious wilderness about them they are but toy hills. Few
of them are much over 150 feet high, large as they often loom in the
deceiving light of the Soudan. Many are but 50 feet in height, and
there are regular, peaky, and prettily-shaped little mountain ranges,
the summits of which overtop the plain but five to ten yards. Such
hills children might build in play by the sea-shore. Surgham was quite
a big one, and the signallers soon took possession of it, flagging and
"helioing" back to camp. From its top I was enabled to see Omdurman,
with Khartoum in the distance. The Mahdi's white, cone-shaped tomb,
its dome girt with rings, and ornamented with brazen finials, globe
and crescent, shone not six miles away in the midst of miles of mud
and straw huts. Four arabesque finials rose, one from each corner of
the supporting wall. Before the town was a wall of white tents, the
original camping ground of the Khalifa's levies and reinforcements
drawn from distant garrisons. Midway to Omdurman, or within three
miles of where I stood, was the whole dervish army. Clearly they had
moved out from the city, and were organised as a force prepared for
instant battle. Their tents, camels, and impedimenta had been left
behind. Only a few low shelter-tents marked the lines in which the
Khalifa's army lay in the sparse bush. There were flags and banners by
hundreds, indicating the position of the leaders, chiefs and lesser
emirs. The Khalifa's great black banner, with its Arabic lettering
sewn in the same material, was displayed from a lofty bamboo pole,
planted in the dense central part of the force. To the left of it,
our right, were green and blue flags of the Shereef, or second
Khalifa, and Osman or Sheikh Ed Din, the Khalifa's son and
generalissimo of his army. Osman, we heard, had been reinstated in
parental favour, for he had fallen from grace for advising his father
to make peace with the Sirdar. As in a daisy-pied field, there were
dervish battle flags everywhere among the thick, swart lines that in
rows barred our way to Omdurman. The banners were in all colours and
shades, shapes, and sizes, but only the Khalifa's was black. The force
was apparently drawn up in five bodies or divisions. Abdullah's, in
the centre, must have numbered fully 10,000 men. Counting as carefully
as I could, I estimated the enemy who were to be seen as at least
numbering 30,000, and, perhaps, 35,000 men. Horsemen and camelmen
could be seen moving about their lines, and here and there others
riding, native fashion, on donkey-back. It seemed to be a
well-organised, intelligently-handled enemy we had in front.
Thereafter I rode onward and joined the farthest Lancers' outposts.
Small parties of dervishes, mostly Jaalin and blacks, who were caught
by the troopers, but had perhaps purposely given the Khalifa the slip,
were rounded up and sent back under escort as prisoners. Meanwhile
both the British and Khedivial mounted troops kept pushing on, driving
in the enemy's scouts. By noon there had been a series of attempts on
our side to charge, but the foemen always gave way. The Egyptian
cavalry under Colonel Broadwood and the camelry under Major Tudway,
making a wide detour, got close to the dervish left, and engaged the
enemy occasionally with rifles and Maxims. But the enemy's horse came
out in strength, supported by footmen, and threatened them, so
Broadwood's men had to fall back.
Four of the Sirdar's gunboats, which had meanwhile steamed ahead, were
briskly battering the Mahdist riverside forts. These works, like those
abandoned to us at Shabluka Cataract and Kerreri, were strong,
well-built earthen bastions, with flanking curtains. The central
semicircular portion was pierced with three embrasures for ordnance,
but so badly made as to admit of but a limited area of fire. Each
curtain was loopholed for musketry. There was a deep, wide trench
before the works, the parapet of which was about ten feet high, whilst
the walls of earth were about three yards in thickness. Despite the
skill shown in the construction and placing of the forts, the
gunboats, by bringing their Maxims and quick-firing guns to bear,
passed them unscathed. There were Krupp guns mounted in most of these
works, but not a steamer was hit. Another event of even greater
importance was meanwhile happening. From the first it had been planned
that the Lyddite guns and the 40-pounder Armstrong cannon should be
employed to batter down or breach the Khalifa's walls. The howitzers
were sent on by one of the gunboats to be landed on Tuti Island, which
is opposite Khartoum, for that purpose. But it was found the maps were
wrong, and a better position was selected within suitable range on the
solid land of the east bank. As for the 40-pounders it was found too
inconvenient to tranship such heavy ordnance.
The battery firing the 50-lb. Lyddite shells having found the range,
about 3000 yards, opened fire upon Omdurman. In quick succession rapid
splashes of lurid flame burst in the town, followed by great clouds of
dust and whirling stones. I watched them training the howitzers on the
great wall and the whited sepulchre of the false prophet. With the
third shot they struck the base and anon the top of the Mahdi's tomb,
smashing the structure, and bringing down the uppermost cap of it. The
nature of the bombardment and its success was galling to the dervish
force, as could be seen by the commotion it excited in the city and
their camp. Our cavalry on the left got to skirmishing again with the
enemy's outposts, on which we had closed to within 800 yards. Bodies
of their horsemen came out and drove our advanced scouts in. Then,
three squadrons of the Lancers were led forward by Colonel Martin, and
the enemy once more retired. This, seemingly, was too much for the
Khalifa, so his whole army was set in motion against us. They came on
deliberately, but smartly, their infantry trying to surround and cut
our troopers off. Dismounting part of his men, Colonel Martin
materially delayed the enemy's advance, for the dervishes sent out
lines of black riflemen to deal with the Lancers. A rattling skirmish
at 500 to 800 yards ranges was in a few minutes in full progress. News
was sent back to the Sirdar that the enemy's army were coming on _en
masse_, and step by step Colonel Martin's troops were retired towards
Mount Surgham and the river. Our retreat was pressed, and the regiment
had to mount and trot off behind the shelter of Surgham to avoid the
vigorous advance of the dervishes. Among our mounted troops there were
relatively few losses, although the enemy must have suffered
considerably. I noticed many of them being knocked over by the
Lancers' fire. Before 3 p.m. the Sirdar had all his infantry and guns
in position, awaiting the expected attack within his lines at Kerreri.
A few mud-huts on the south face of the zereba materially added to the
strength of the position. Our cavalry had all to continue retiring,
and ultimately the Lancers went down to the river so as to clear the
front of the army. Surgham Hill was occupied by a few of the
dervishes. From there they must have had an excellent view of our
camp; indeed, they had as good a panoramic peep at us as we had at
them. For some reason the Khalifa thought better of attacking us that
day, and so halted with his main body quite out of range. Towards
sunset his men gradually retired, going back to their former position.
They had left their camp-fires burning, and their chunks of meat and
cakes of rough grain cooking under the supervision of slaves and
followers when they came out against the Lancers. So it happened on
the eve of the coming battle both armies rested quietly in their
respective camps, eating, sleeping, and the devout praying, within a
five miles' march of each other. For supper our men had stringy bully
beef and biscuit or bread. The dervishes had hunks of freshly roasted
mutton, goat and cattle, done on the embers, and bannocks of dhura
meal. Extra precautions were again observed to secure the Sirdar's
army from any night attack.