CHAPTER V.

DAKHALA CAMP: GOSSIP AND DUTY.

Dirt is the essence of savagery, and there is a superfluity of both in

the Soudan. I have no desperate wish so to describe the vileness of

the surroundings of the correspondents' camp at Dakhala that even

casual thinkers will sniff at it. The place was bad enough in all

conscience, and, mayhap, therein I have said all that is necessary. As

for the worry of our lives, squatted as we were in the least agreeable

quarter of the big rectangular fort, long will the memory of those

days and nights burden our existence. What a time I had on those sand

and dust heaps, where every puff of wind and every footfall raised

clouds of pulverised cosmos. For two weeks, amid the wretched scene,

hideous by night as by day, I persisted in existing. It was a huge pen

with men, horses, camels, donkeys, dogs and poultry hobnobbing amid a

daily wreckage of old provision tins, garbage of soiled forage and

stable-sweepings and whatnot. All that, with a temperature of 116

degrees to 120 degrees Fahr. in the shade, wore the temper and added

amazingly to the consumption of wet things. At the Grenadier Guards'

mess one sultry evening they consumed twenty-eight dozen of sodas, and

it was not a record night. Without giving anybody's secret away, I may

say I know a gentleman who could polish off three dozen at a sitting,

and unblushingly call for more. These are details of more interest to

teetotalers than to the general public. Yet, not to let the subject

pass without a word of caution to afflicted future travellers in the

Soudan, the inordinate use of undiluted mineral waters of native

manufacture is most dangerous to health.

We correspondents had to wink both eyes in much of our telegraphic

news from the front, for military reasons. The press censor was

Colonel Wingate, chief of the Intelligence Department. In his absence,

Major-General Rundle, chief of staff, usually acted. Personally,

either gentleman was all that could be desired. Both were alike ready

and courteous in the discharge of their at all times rather onerous

duty, giving frequent audience to the numerous contingent of eager

newsmen, garrulous and prodigal with pencil and pen. Some of the

new-comers to the business felt sorely hit, because they were

precluded from writing at large upon all subjects connected with the

campaign. The excision of their copy grieved and hurt them as much as

if they had been subjected to a real surgical amputation. Yet those

two officers but obeyed orders, for after all, and under every

circumstance, the Sirdar, as I am well aware, was the real censor. It

is perhaps fairly open to argument whether the course adopted in

dealing with correspondents' copy was wise or necessary in a war

against an ignorant and savage foe. There was, at least, one official

blunder which gave occasion for much annoyance, and ought to have been

promptly remedied, or better still, never committed. It was expected

of Colonel Wingate, the censor, that amid multifarious important

responsibilities as chief of the Intelligence branch he should find

time daily to peruse and correct tens of thousands of words, often

crabbedly written, in press messages. With the approach of the day of

battle, his own department taxed more and more his entire attention,

and side by side the correspondents' telegrams grew in length and

importance. The task of proper censorship under such conditions was

impossible for any human being to discharge adequately. On that

account the public interest suffered, for press matters were often

neither promptly nor fully despatched. As a rule, the correspondents

were left in blissful ignorance of what had been cut out of their

copy, as well as of the exact nature of the residuum transmitted.

Besides these grievances there was one of favouritism alleged, but of

that there is always more or less in every phase of life and

association. All told, it may be thought that the correspondents'

complaints were of no very serious character. That depends on how they

are looked at. I have no taste for cavilling or grumbling over events

that are past. Surely, however, there is a middle way somewhere to be

found between the absolutism of a general in the field, who may gag

the correspondents or treat them as camp followers, and the clear

right of the British public under our free institutions to have news

dealing with the progress of their arms rapidly transmitted home. I

am well aware of the grave responsibilities that hedge a

commander-in-chief, and the cruel injury that an unrestrained

non-combatant may do him by recklessly writing on subjects calculated

to jeopardise the success of a campaign and hazard countless lives and

fortunes. The latter is an remote possibility. A commander-in-chief

has to consider that any enemy worth his salt is usually kept informed

by spies and deserters, and press-men who are known and cognisant of

their duty are no more likely to betray secrets to their country's

enemies than any officer or soldier in the Queen's service. And

nowadays the private correspondence from troops in the field cannot be

suppressed, and it is often published. Commanders of armies will

either have to accept the presence of recognised writers, over whom

they can exercise some control, or instead stand powerless before a

dangerous flood of random army letters poured into the public press.

The case can be met with judgment and care--plus penalties where

deserved. I am bringing no charges here, but discussing a vexed and

withal important question. I am glad to say that during the Omdurman

Campaign there was no attempt, within my knowledge, of muzzling the

press. This does not bear upon the Fashoda incident, but that came

later.

Nasri Island as a base of concentration was, as I have intimated, a

blind. Although we correspondents were not permitted to go up the

river, or indeed move beyond the Atbara, until the Sirdar and

headquarters had started, yet we kept ourselves fully informed of all

that was happening at the front. There had been one or two little

skirmishes between bands of mounted dervishes and our wood-cutting

parties of Khedivial infantry. In these encounters our men had

generally the best of the fighting, and the Baggara horsemen

invariably retreated with a few empty saddles. In July Major-Generals

Hunter and Gatacre had, during a small reconnaissance, proceeded as

far up as Shabluka Cataract or Rapid on one of the gunboats. The

enemy, it was seen, were in no great strength there, and the seven

well-planned, thick-walled mud forts blocking the passage were weakly

held. Those two officers landed with a small body of troops and

surveyed a suitable camping site, at what they called Wad Hamid, but

which, in reality, was north of that place and close to Wad Habeshi.

The object was to find a spot easily accessible by river and land, and

with not too much bush about. At that season, the Nile having in many

places overflowed its lower borders, marshes extended for miles along

the ordinarily solid river banks. Wad Habeshi was merely a native

wood-cutting station at first, but little by little troops appeared on

the scene, and a large entrenched camp, with lines extending for

several miles, was duly formed. At the end of July two steamers, which

had made the perilous voyage up the Nile from the province of Dongola,

came in and made fast alongside the mud bars at Dakhala.

It was still early in August when all the four battalions of

Major-General Hon. N. G. Lyttelton's Second British Brigade reached

Dakhala. They were quartered in a cool and cleanly camp by the Atbara,

to the south-east of the fortified lines. The 21st Lancers also

arrived at Dakhala in due course. Major Williams' Field Battery, the

32nd R.A. of 15-pounders; Major Elmslie's 37th R.A., with the new

50-pounder Howitzers firing Lyddite shells; and Lieut. Weymouth's two

40-pounder Armstrong guns, besides other cannon and Maxims, were

likewise on time. Very smartly the batteries and Maxims were stowed

aboard native craft, which were taken in tow by gunboats to Wad Hamid.

Detachments of gunners accompanied the pieces and carriages, but the

majority of the artillerymen were ferried to the west bank, whence

they marched overland to the new camp. It was at Wad Habeshi that the

army was first actually marshalled as a concrete force, and forthwith

took the field. Not a moment was lost by day or night in moving men

and supplies onward. The little paddle steamer captured from the

dervishes during the 1896 Dongola Expedition, which had been repaired

and sent to Dakhala, was continually carrying troops and stores from

the east to the west bank. As the Nile was running at the rate of six

miles an hour in its wide bed, the "El Tahara," as the craft was

called, had to make a big circuit to effect a passage. The "El Tahara"

was one of the boats General Gordon built at Khartoum but never lived

to launch. As she was a new craft, the Mahdi changed her name, calling

her "The Maid," instead of "Khartoum," as it had been intended to dub

her. She was an excellent vessel, with fine engines much too powerful

for her frame.

[Illustration: WOOD STATION (EN ROUTE TO OMDURMAN).]

Both Surgeon-General Taylor, on behalf of the British division, and

Surgeon-Colonel Gallwey, for the Egyptian troops, completed their

arrangements for succouring the sick and wounded upon the march from

Shabluka to the attack upon Omdurman. Adequate provision was made for

field hospitals, floating hospitals and relief stations, for medical

officers, and attendants, with cradlets and stretchers, to follow each

military unit into action. For the British infantry it meant,

substantially, that behind each battalion a medical officer and two

non-commissioned officers should march, accompanied by six camels

bearing cacolets, and men with nine stretchers. A somewhat modified

scheme was got out for the cavalry and artillery, as well as for the

other Khedivial troops. In the anticipated action before Omdurman,

temporary operating stations were to be set up, out of ordinary

rifle-range, and native craft, which had been fitted up with cots,

were to be brought as near the scene as practicable to receive the

wounded.

An attempt made to lay a cable from Dakhala to the west bank was not

over successful. It was found that the great sag, caused by the

current, carried the cable down stream, so the whole length ran out

before the opposite bank was reached. The steamer "Melik" was the

telegraph ship, and paid the cable out from a wooden reel placed on

her stern quarter. A few days after the failure she was employed

picking up the wire, most of which was recovered by Captain Manifold,

R.E., who was the director of military telegraphs in the last as in

the three previous expeditions against the dervishes. The recovered

line was relaid across the Atbara, which is barely a third of the

width of the Nile. From the south bank of the Atbara two land lines

pass up the east shore of the Nile. Upon a lofty corresponding pair of

trestles an overhead wire was also hung across the smaller river. A

few miles south of Dakhala a cable had been laid to an island and

thence to the west bank. From the latter point an ordinary land wire

ran along the desert to Metemmeh. Later on it was laid to Omdurman.

The line was put down step by step as the troops advanced. Thus an

alternative system of telegraphic communication with Khartoum was

early provided for.

It stirred the blood of everybody in our dull camp to see detachment

after detachment of the second British brigade detrain. Most of us

turned out and like schoolboys followed the drums and fifes as they

played the troops to their camping-ground. A half-battalion of the

Grenadier Guards, led by Colonel Villiers-Hatton, arrived at Dakhala

on the 6th of August. Hale and strong the big fellows looked in their

campaigning khaki. "First-class fighting material," as Arabs and

negroes, who are by no means poor judges, were openly heard to confess

in their interchange of confidences. There is always much camp chaff

and yarning amongst "Tommies"--and their officers, too, for that

matter--at the expense of England's picked battalions. "Have you seen

the 'Queen's Company,' my man," asked a subaltern of the Grenadiers

one day of a private in the Northumberland Fusiliers. Now the "Queen's

Company" are all over six feet in stature, and there was a friendly

rivalry in grenadiership between them and certain Fusilier regiments.

The question was asked when the troops were marching over undulating

but rather bare ground where the tufted grass was little over knee

high. It happened the officer had been detached on other duty, and was

anxious to rejoin his command. "I think, sir," said the Northumbrian,

saluting respectfully, "that they have got lost in the long grass."

The subaltern looked unutterable things, but the "Tommy" held a

stoical face and said not a word more till the officer went off to

hunt anew for his men. For all the chaff, every one was glad to see

the Guards, and to speak of them as the Queen's soldiers. Of the

second brigade General Gatacre said that a better body of troops could

not be wished for by any general.

I rode out to several of the brigade field-days, or rather, mornings,

for there was plenty of drilling and field exercises for Lyttelton's

men. The brigade was repeatedly practised in attack formation against

imaginary bodies of dervishes, as well as at assaulting supposed

works. On more than one of these occasions the gallant Colonel of the

Guards, not having his charger up at that date, led his Grenadiers

afoot, and once, at any rate, was mounted on donkey-back.

Particularism gets lost in the desert. In the manoeuvres the troops

were usually led in line, the flanks being supported by two or three

companies in quarter column, and the centre having in rear a few

sections of companies ready to fill gaps. Save for a little noise in

passing orders, the result of a fast-becoming obsolete school of

training, even captious criticism could find no actual fault with

their work. Advancing across wadies and scaling knolls upon the

desert, the troops were instructed to open fire with ball cartridge.

The range given was 500 yards, and the ammunition used was the

tip-filed Lee-Metford bullets. As at the Atbara, without halting, the

line moved slowly on, the front rank firing as at a battue, each man

independently. There were a few section volleys tried, the soldiers

pausing for an instant to deliver their fire. Once or twice also, the

rear rank was closed up, and joined in the fusilade. One effect was to

paralyse the deer and birds within range. I noticed that the tip-filed

bullets did not usually spread, and that their man-stopping quality

was something of a myth. Even the dum-dum does not invariably "set up"

on striking an object. For the Omdurman Campaign a new hollow-nosed

bullet was issued for the Lee-Metfords. So far as I was able to

judge, it generally spread on hitting, and made a deadly wound,

tearing away bone and flesh at the point of exit.

On the 12th of August the 21st Lancers, together with camel and mule

transport animals, were crossed to the west bank in readiness for

marching to Wad Hamid. Saturday, the 13th August, was a very busy day

at Dakhala. On that date the Sirdar went by steamer to the front,

direct to Wad Habeshi. It was given out he was merely going on a

flying visit for inspection. There was renewed active drilling of

troops. Eight steamers that came down were reloaded and sent back with

troops and stores in the course of twenty-four hours. General Gatacre

went to Darmali, and there assisted in the embarkation of his old

brigade, Major-General A. Wauchope's. The task was effected within the

course of twelve hours, the Camerons, Seaforths, Lincolns and

Warwicks, with their kits and supplies, being densely packed upon the

steamers "Zafir," "Nazir," "Fatah," and the barges and giassas, which

these craft towed. Had the Thames Conservancy writs run on the Nile

there would have been terrible fines exacted for unlawful

overcrowding. On the 14th August these stern-wheelers, heavily laden

with Wauchope's men, steamed at a fast rate past the Atbara camp, on

their way south. These craft, the first of which took part in the 1896

Dongola Expedition, turned out to be really the most useful and

dependable of the whole Nile flotilla. They steamed remarkably well,

towed splendidly, and were, besides, good fighting craft. The three

Admiralty-designed twin-screw steamers, "Sheikh" "Sultan" and "Melik,"

were not as fast as had been expected; they could not tow any

reasonably big load, and, though they were stuffed with many

novelties, few of the innovations were of the least practical value.

They needed all their engine power to steam and when under weigh had

none to spare for driving the circular saws to cut firewood for fuel,

or to start the dynamos to work the search lights with which they were

fitted. Major Collinson, commanding the 4th Khedivial Brigade, left

Atbara camp for the front with the 17th and 18th Battalions, or half

his force, the 1st and 5th Battalions having preceded him some time

previously.

Khartoum Campaign, 1898; or the Re-Conquest of the Soudan · 第 5 / 15 章