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KHARTOUM CAMPAIGN
1898
OR THE
RE-CONQUEST OF THE SOUDAN
BY
BENNET BURLEIGH.
AUTHOR OF "SIRDAR AND KHALIFA."
WITH MAPS, PLANS OF BATTLE, AND NUMEROUS
ILLUSTRATIONS
SECOND IMPRESSION.
LONDON: CHAPMAN & HALL, LIMITED
1899
PREFACE.
By the overthrow of Mahdism, the great region of Central Africa has
been opened to civilisation. From the date of the splendid victory of
Omdurman, 2nd September 1898, may be reckoned the creation of a vast
Soudan empire. At so early a stage, it is idle to speculate whether
the country will be held as a British possession, or as a province of
Egypt. "The land of the blacks," and their truculent Arab despoilers,
has the intrinsic qualities that secure distinction. Given peace, it
may be expected that the mixed negroid races of the Upper Nile will
prove themselves as orderly and industrious as they are conspicuously
brave. Whoever rules them wisely, will have the control of the best
native tribes of the Dark Continent, the raw material of a mighty
state. This, too, is foreshadowed; the dominant power in Central
Northern Africa, if no farther afield, will have its capital in
Khartoum, "Ethiopia will soon stretch out her hands unto God."
The recent events which have so altered the condition of affairs upon
the Upper Nile, deserve more than ephemeral record. A campaign so full
of inspiriting incident, a victory which has brought presage of a
great and prosperous Soudan, merits re-telling. Through half a score
of battles or more, from the beginning to the death of Mahdism, I have
followed British and Egyptian troops into action against the
dervishes. I knew General Hicks, and had the luck to miss accompanying
his ill-fated expedition. In the present volume, "Khartoum Campaign,"
the narrative of the reconquest is completed, the history being
carried to the occupation of Fashoda and Sobat, including the
withdrawal of Major Marchand's French mission. I have made use of my
telegrams and letters to the _Daily Telegraph_, London, and the full
notes I made from day to day during the campaign. Besides, I have
quoted in certain cases from official sources, and given extracts from
verbal and written communications made to me by distinguished officers
engaged in the operations.
For use of maps, sketches, and photographs, I am indebted to the
proprietors of the _Daily Telegraph_, to Mr Ross of _Black and White_,
Surgeon-General William Taylor, Colonel Frank Rhodes, Lieutenant E. D.
Loch, Grenadier Guards, Mr Francis Gregson, Mr Munro of Dingwall,
N.B., and others.
BENNET BURLEIGH.
LONDON, _December 1898_.
CONTENTS.
PAGE
CHAPTER I.
INTRODUCTORY--REVIEW OF THE FIELD, 1
CHAPTER II.
DAYS OF WAITING AND PREPARATION, 14
CHAPTER III.
MUSTERING FOR THE OVERTHROW OF MAHDISM, 35
CHAPTER IV.
BY THE WAY--FROM CAIRO TO DAKHALA, 45
CHAPTER V.
DAKHALA CAMP: GOSSIP AND DUTY, 63
CHAPTER VI.
MARCHING IN THE SOUDAN--FROM DAKHALA TO WAD HABESHI, 75
CHAPTER VII.
WITH THE ARMY IN THE FIELD--WAD HAMID TO EL HEJIR, 92
CHAPTER VIII.
EL HEJIR TO UM TERIF--INCIDENTS AND ACCIDENTS, 105
CHAPTER IX.
ADVANCE TO KERRERI--SKIRMISHING WITH THE ENEMY, 119
CHAPTER X.
THE BATTLE OF OMDURMAN--FIRST PHASE OF THE FIGHT, 135
CHAPTER XI.
BATTLE OF OMDURMAN--_continued._--THE CAVALRY
FIGHTS--MACDONALD'S SAVING ACTION, 167
CHAPTER XII.
STORIES OF THE BATTLE--OMDURMAN, 199
CHAPTER XIII.
CLOSE OF CAMPAIGN--GORDON MEMORIAL SERVICE, KHARTOUM, 228
CHAPTER XIV.
KHARTOUM MEMORIAL COLLEGE--THE OFFICIAL DESPATCHES, 263
CHAPTER XV.
THE FASHODA AFFAIR--A RED BRITISH LINE THROUGH AFRICA, 295
POSTSCRIPT, 334
ILLUSTRATIONS.
PAGE
Brigadier-General H. A. Macdonald, C.B., D.S.O., _Frontispiece_
Bennet Burleigh, _To face page_ 1
Headquarters, Wady Halfa, 9
Darmali (British Brigade Summer Quarters), 23
Group of Staff Officers--Colonel Wingate in Centre, 34
Street in Dakhala, 53
Troops going to Wad Habeshi, 58
Wood Station (_en route_ to Omdurman), 69
Loading Up--Breaking Camp, 77
21st Lancers--Advance Guard, 81
Halt by the Way, 87
Slatin Pasha (on Foot), 89
Artillery going towards Omdurman, 125
Battle of Omdurman--Zereba Action, 151
Macdonald's Brigade advancing, 182
Sirdar directing Advance on Omdurman, 183
Khalifa's Captured Standard (Sirdar extreme left), 195
Chief Thoroughfare, Omdurman (Mulazim Wall, left; Osman
Digna's House, right), 196
Effect of Shell Fire upon Wall (Mulazim Enclosure), 197
Khalifa's House, 217
Mahdi's Tomb--Effect of Lyddite Shells, 219
Interior Mahdi's Tomb (Grille around Sarcophagus), 221
Khalifa's Gallows (cutting down his Last Victim), 223
Neufeld on Gunboat "Sheik"--Cutting off his Ankle-Irons, 225
Khalifa's Chief Eunuch (surrenders in British Camp), 229
Fresh Batch Wounded and Unwounded Dervish Prisoners,
Omdurman, 4th September 1898, 231
Neufeld, with Abyssinian Wife and Children; also Fellow
Prisoner, 241
Distant View, Khartoum (from Blue Nile), 255
Hoisting Flags, Khartoum, 259
Col. H. Macdonald at Omdurman, with Officer and
Non-Commissioned Officer of 1st Brigade, 291
MAPS AND PLANS.
General View Plan, "A," _page_ 173
Zereba Plan, "B," " 179
First Attack on Macdonald's Brigade, "C," Plate 1, " 187
Second Attack on Macdonald's Brigade, "D," Plate 2, " 191
KHARTOUM CAMPAIGN.
CHAPTER I.
INTRODUCTORY.--REVIEW OF FIELD.
It is an easier and kindlier duty to set forth facts than to proclaim
opinions and pronounce judgments. Before Tel-el-Kebir was fought in
September 1882 and the Egyptian army beaten and disbanded, the
insurrection headed by the Mahdi or False Prophet had begun. In the
disrupted condition of affairs which succeeded Arabi Pasha's defeat by
British arms the dervish movement made further rapid progress. To Sir
Evelyn Wood, V.C., at the close of 1882, was assigned the task, as
Sirdar or Commander-in-Chief of the Khedivial troops, of forming a
real native army. It was that distinguished soldier, aided by an
exceptionally able staff, who first took in hand the re-organisation
and proper training of the fellaheen recruits. By dint of drill,
discipline and stiffening with British commissioned and
non-commissioned officers he soon made passable soldiers of the
"Gippies." The new army was at first restricted to eight battalions
of Egyptian infantry, one regiment of cavalry, and four batteries of
artillery. Although there were Soudanese amongst Arabi's troops, they
were mostly gunners. It was not until May 1884 that the first "black"
regiment was raised. Yet it had been notorious that the Soudanese were
the only Khedivial soldiers who made anything of a stubborn stand
against us in the 1882 campaign. The blacks who came down with the
Salahieh garrison on the 9th of August 1882, and joined in the
surprise attack upon General Graham's brigade then in camp at
Kassassin, were not easily driven off. The large body of Egyptian
infantry and cavalry, although supported by several Krupp batteries
which, issuing from the Tel-el-Kebir lines, assailed us in front, were
readily checked and pushed back. It was our right rear that the
"blacks" and others forming the Salahieh column menaced, and it
required some tough fighting before Sir Baker-Russell with his cavalry
and horse artillery was able to drive them off. In truth, the "blacks"
held on long after the main body of Arabi's force had abandoned their
intention of driving the British into the Suez Canal or the sea.
The first Soudanese battalion was recruited and mustered-in at Suakim.
It got the next numeral in regimental order, and so became known as
the "Ninth." Many of the blacks who enlisted in the Ninth--Dinkas,
Shilluks, Gallas, and what not--were deserters from the Mahdi's
banner, or dervishes who had been taken prisoners at El Teb and Tamai.
It has never yet been deemed advisable to enrol any of the Arab
tribesmen in the Khedivial regular army. Hadendowa, Kababish, Jaalin,
Baggara, and many other clans, lack no physical qualifications for a
military career. Their desperate courage in support of a cause they
have at heart is an inspiration of self-immolation. But they are as
uncertain and difficult to regulate by ordinary methods of discipline
as the American Red Indian, and so are only fitted for irregular
service. In March 1885 General Sir Francis Grenfell succeeded to the
Sirdarship. With tact and energy he carried still further forward the
excellent work of his predecessor. Four additional Soudanese
battalions were created during his term, and the army was strengthened
and better equipped for its duties in many other respects. Sir Francis
had the satisfaction of leading his untried soldiers against the
dervishes, and winning brilliant victories and, in at least one
instance, over superior numbers. He it was, who, at Toski in August
1889, routed an invading army of dervishes, whereat was killed their
famous leader Wad en Nejumi. That battle put an end to the dream of
the Mahdists to overrun and conquer Egypt and the world. The Khalifa
thereafter found his safest policy, unless attacked, was to let the
regular Egyptian forces severely alone.
It was shown that, when well handled, the fellaheen and the blacks
could defeat the dervishes. Lord Kitchener of Khartoum became Sirdar
in the spring of 1892. His career in the land of the Nile may be
briefly summarised: first as a Lieutenant, then successively as
Captain, Major, Colonel and General, that Royal Engineer Officer from
1882 has been actively employed either in Egypt proper or the Soudan.
He has, during that interval, been entrusted with many perilous and
delicate missions and independent commands. Whatever was given him to
do was carried through with zeal and resolution. In his time also
little by little the Khedivial forces have been increased. A sixth
Soudanese battalion was raised in 1896, and in that and the following
year four additional fellaheen battalions were added to the army. When
the Khartoum campaign began, the total muster-roll of the regular
troops was eighteen battalions of infantry, ten squadrons of cavalry,
a camel corps of eight companies, five batteries of artillery,
together with the customary quota of engineers, medical staff,
transport, and other departmental troops. There was a railway
construction battalion numbering at least 2000 men, but they were
non-combatants. As the whole armed strength of Egypt was, for the
occasion, practically called into the field, the peace of the Delta
had to be secured by other means. A small armed body called the Coast
Guard and the ordinary police, apart from the meagre British garrison,
were responsible for public tranquillity. The re-organisation and
increase of the Coast Guard, which was decided on, into an army of
8000 men, was a brilliant idea, and one of the recent master-strokes
of Lord Cromer and the Sirdar. It is ostensibly a quasi-civil force,
and it was formed and equipped without the worry of international
queries and interference. The Coast Guard is mainly composed of picked
men, including old soldiers and reservists. Their duties carry them
into the interior as well as along the sea-coast, for, partly on
account of the salt tax, there are revenue defaulters along the
borders of the Nile as well as by the Mediterranean and Red Sea. They
are dressed like soldiers and are armed with Remingtons.
Mohammed Achmed, who called himself the Mahdi, or the last of the
prophets, whose mission was to convert the world to Islamism, was a
native of Dongola. He was born near El Ordeh, or New Dongola, in 1848,
and was the son of a carpenter. In person, he was above the medium
height, robust, and with a rather handsome Arab cast of features.
During 1884 I saw his brother and two of his nephews in a village
south of El Ordeh. All of them were tall stalwart men, light of
complexion for Dongolese, courteous and hospitable to strangers.
Mohammed Achmed, from his youth, evinced a taste for religious studies
coupled with the ascetic extravagances of a too emotional nature. From
Khartoum to Fashoda he acquired a great reputation for sanctity.
Religious devotees gathered around him and followed him to his retreat
upon the island of Abba. There he, in May 1881, first announced his
claims as the true Mahdi. His barefaced assertions of special divine
command and guidance found credulous believers. With the wisdom of the
serpent he had added to his influence and security as a prophet by
marrying daughters of Baggara sheiks, _i.e._ chiefs. Mohammed Achmed
was a vigorous and captivating preacher, learned in all the literature
of the Koran, ever ready with apt and telling quotations. His early
teaching was decidedly socialistic, including a command for the
overthrow of the then existing civil state. His principles have been
summed up officially as "an insistence upon universal law and
religion--his own--with community of goods, and death to all who
refused adherence to his tenets." Unfortunately, "opportunity" played
into his hands. The misrule of the Pashas, the burden of over-taxation
coupled with the legal suppression of the slave trade, and the
demoralisation of the Egyptian forces enabled Mohammed Achmed to rebel
successfully. Troops sent against him were defeated and annihilated.
Towns capitulated to his arms and within a period of two years the
inhabitants of the Soudan were hailing him as the true Mahdi, their
invincible deliverer. With the capture of Khartoum, on the morning of
the 26th of January 1885, and the abandonment of the Soudan and its
population--the Egyptian frontier being fixed by British Government
order at Wady Halfa--the over-lordship of that immense region from the
Second Cataract to the Equatorial Lakes was yielded to the so-called
Mahdi Mohammed Achmed did not long enjoy his conquests. Success killed
him as it has done many a lesser man. For a season he gave himself up
to a life of indolence and the grossest lust. On the 22nd of June
1885, less than six months after Gordon's head had been struck off and
brought to him, the Mahdi suddenly died. It is said by some that his
death was due to smallpox, by others that one of his women captives
poisoned him in revenge for the murder of her relatives. His demise
was kept secret for a time by his successor Abdullah, the chief
Khalifa, and the other dervish leaders. It was given out that the
Mahdi's spirit had been called to Heaven for a space but would soon
return to lead his hosts to fresh triumphs and further fat spoils. A
tomb was erected over the place where his body lay, and the legend of
his mission was taken over by Abdullah, who also in due season had
visions and communicated reputed divine ordinances to the dervishes.
Abdullah, who was ignorant, illiterate and cruel, far beyond his dead
master--"the cruellest man on earth," Slatin Pasha dubbed him,--by his
exactions and treacheries soon overreached himself. Events were
hastening to the overthrow of Mahdism. Sheiks and tribes fell away
from the Khalifa and returned to the fold of orthodox Mohammedanism.
By 1889, as an aggressive force seeking to enlarge its boundaries,
Mahdism was spent. Thereafter, stage by stage, its power dwindled,
although Omdurman, the dervish capital, remained the headquarters of
the strongest native military power that North Africa has ever known.
Lord Cromer has been blamed for many things he did, and much that he
left undone, during the earlier days of Mahdism. A fuller knowledge of
the whole circumstances justifies my saying that, as custodian of
_British interests_, he acted throughout with singular prudence and
great forbearance. It was not with his wish or approval that several
of the untoward expeditions against the dervishes were undertaken. It
is permissible to regret that, from a variety of causes, the British
Government engaged in more than one ill-considered and irresolute
campaign for the destruction of Mahdism. Much treasure and countless
thousands of lives were foolishly squandered and all without the
least compensating advantage. The barren results of the Soudan
campaigns directed from the War Office in Pall Mall form too painful a
subject for discussion. It is only fair to say, that the military
officials' hands may have been much hampered from Downing Street.
[Illustration: HEADQUARTERS, WADY HALFA.]
As I have stated elsewhere, it was not until 1896 that the serious
reconquest of the Soudan was begun. Before then there had been, as Mr
Gladstone after all appropriately termed them, "military operations,"
but not a state of war. He might have called them "blood-spilling
enterprises," for they were only that and no more. The re-occupation
of the province of Dongola in 1896, freed the Nile up to Merawi, and
gave the disaffected Kababish, Jaalin and riverain tribesmen a chance
of reverting to their allegiance to the Khedive. It also enabled the
Sirdar to pass his gunboats farther up the river. Another gain issuing
from the forward movement was that his right was secured from serious
attack. Then followed the building of the wonderful Wady Halfa direct
desert railway towards Abu Hamid, Berber, and Dakhala at the mouth of
the Atbara. It was the 1897 campaign which put all these places into
the Sirdar's hands. During that year's high Nile, he passed his
gunboats over the long stretch of cataracts betwixt Merawi and Abu
Hamid, and ran them up the river where they co-operated with the land
forces, regulars and friendlies. Nay more, the steamers were set to do
a double duty: convey stores to the advanced posts and assail and
harass the dervishes, pushing as far south as Shendy and Shabluka,
the Sixth Cataract. By prodigies of labour and enterprise the railroad
was speedily constructed to Abu Hamid, then on to Berber, and thence
to Dakhala. The whole situation became greatly simplified the moment
the line reached Abu Hamid. From the first, the question of dealing a
death-blow to Mahdism with British-led troops had turned upon the
solution of the transport problem. The through rail and river
connection once established from Cairo _via_ Wady Halfa to Abu Hamid
put an end forever to all serious difficulty of providing adequate
supplies for the troops. From Abu Hamid the Nile is navigable far
south for many months during the year. Then again, the occupation of
Abu Hamid unlocked the Korosko desert caravan route and drew more wary
and recanting dervishes away from the Khalifa. Following the capture
of Abu Hamid, Berber was promptly taken for Egypt by the friendlies,
and the Suakim-Berber trade route, which had been closed for many
years, was re-opened.
The end was slowly drawing near, for the Sirdar was closing the lines
and mustering his forces for a final blow. Railroad construction went
forward apace. At the rate of from one to two miles a day track was
laid so as to get the line up to Dakhala. Meanwhile, workshops were
being erected at suitable points, and three additional screw gunboats,
built in England, were re-fitted for launching. The flotilla was
becoming formidable; it comprised 13 vessels, stern-wheelers and
screw-steamers, all armed with cannon and machine guns and protected
by bullet-proof shields.
Believing there was a chance to wreck the railroad and capture
outposts and stores, Mahmoud, a nephew and favourite general of the
Khalifa's, led a powerful dervish army from Shendy north to raid the
country to and beyond Berber. In spite of the gunboats, after
disposing of the recalcitrant Jaalins, Mahmoud crossed the Nile at
Metemmeh to the opposite bank. Accompanied by the veteran rebel, Osman
Digna, he quitted Aliab, marching to the north-east with 10,000
infantry, riflemen and spearmen, ten small rifled brass guns and 4000
cavalry. It was his intention to cross the Atbara about 30 miles up
from the Nile, and fall upon the flank and rear of the Sirdar's
detached and outlying troops, killing them in detail. He reckoned too
confidently and without full knowledge. Using the steamers and the
railways the Sirdar quickly concentrated his whole force, bringing men
rapidly up from Wady Halfa and the province of Dongola. The entrenched
Egyptian camp at the junction of the Atbara with the Nile was
strengthened, and General Gatacre's brigade of British troops was
moved on to Kunur, where Macdonald's and Maxwell's brigades also
repaired. Mahmoud had ultimately to be attacked in his own chosen
fortified camp. His army was destroyed and he himself was taken
prisoner. So closed the unexpected Atbara campaign in March last.
Thereafter, as the Khalifa showed no intention of inviting fresh
disaster by sending down another army to attack, the Sirdar despatched
his troops into summer rest-camps. Dry and shady spots were selected
by the banks of the Nile between Berber and Dakhala. One or another of
the numberless deserted mud villages was usually chosen for
headquarters and offices. With these for a nucleus, the battalion or
brigade encampment was pitched in front and the quarters were fenced
about with cut mimosa thorn-bush, forming a zereba. All along the
Upper Nile, wherever there is a strip of cultivable land, or where
water can be easily lifted from the river or wells for irrigation,
there the natives had villages of mud and straw huts. In many places,
for miles following miles, these hamlets fringe the river's banks,
sheltered amidst groves of mimosa and palms. The fiendish cruelty and
wanton destructiveness of the dervishes, who, not satiated with
slaughtering the villagers--men, women and children--further glutted
their fury by firing the homesteads and cutting down the date palms,
resulted in depopulating the country. Ignorant and fanatical in their
religious frenzy to convert mankind to their new-found creed, the
Mahdists held that the surest way to rid the world forthwith of all
unbelievers lay in making earth too intolerable to be lived in.
These native dwellings, when cleaned, were not uncomfortable abodes.
As the flat roofs were thickly covered with mats and grass whilst,
except the doorway, the openings in the mud-walls were small, they
were even in the glare of noontide heat, pleasantly cool and shady.
The troops found that straw huts or tukals afforded far better
protection than the tents from the sun and from dust-storms. So it
came about that, copying the example set by the fellaheen and black
soldiers, "Tommy Atkins" also built himself shelters, and "lean-to's"
of reeds, palm leaves and straw. Drills and field exercises were
relaxed, and the troops had time to rig up alfresco stages and
theatres and to enjoy variety entertainments provided by comrades with
talent for minstrelsy and the histrionic arts. Meanwhile the
preparations for the final campaign against Mahdism were not
slackened. Vast quantities of supplies and material of war were stored
at Dakhala. Outposts were pushed forward and Shendy was occupied,
whilst Metemmeh was held by friendly Jaalin tribesmen, who had
suffered much at the Khalifa's hands. The Bayuda desert route also had
been cleared of dervishes by these and by neighbouring tribesmen. On
the direct track from Korti to Omdurman, outlying wells and oases were
in possession of the Kababish and their allies who had broken away
from Abdullah's tyranny. The whirligig of time had transformed the
equality preachings, and "unity in the faith" of Mahdism into the
unbridled supremacy of the Baggara and especially the Taaisha branch
of that sept over all the people of the Soudan. They alone were
licensed to rob, ravish and murder with impunity. It was the natural
sequence of lawless society. Once the foe they leagued to plunder and
kill had been disposed of, they turned and rent each other. Abdullah
being a Taaisha, he, as a prop to his own pretensions, set them in
authority over all the races of the Soudan. One by one, however, Arab
clansmen and blacks repented and deserted Mahdism.
The time was ripe for ending the mad mutiny against government and
civilisation. July is the period of high Nile in the upper reaches,
and the Sirdar planned that his army should be ready to move forward
by then. At that date all was in readiness. The Egyptian army which
was to take the field consisted of one division of four brigades, each
of four battalions with artillery, cavalry and camelry. Besides these
there were two brigades of British infantry--Gatacre's division--a
regiment of British cavalry, the 21st Lancers, and two and a half
English batteries, with many Maxims. It was known that Abdullah had
called into Omdurman all his best men and meant giving battle.